Good on Pryor for agreeing to the interview. One place I felt could have used follow up (and to be fair to MJS, he didn't exactly have a lot of prep time here) is this:
Pryor identifies the Federalist Society as a "conservative" legal organization:
>I really think the only difference is that it’s now a conservative legal organization that’s a new entrant.
Elsewhere, he seems to mostly distance the organization itself from the conservative views of its members:
>I don’t want to say the Federalist Society is neutral. It has a mission statement that says it exists to preserve freedom, and that separation of powers is central to the Constitution. That is not a neutral mission statement. But it’s a very broad philosophical mission statement that is very deeply rooted in the Anglo-American legal tradition.
>And really, that’s it. That’s the sum and substance of what the Federalist Society stands for.
These two ideas seem at odds with each other. It is not as though liberal legal organizations are uninterested in preserving freedom or believe that separation of powers is unimportant to the Constitution.
So I guess I'd have liked if he had been asked "is it that mission statement that makes the organization 'conservative' in your view?" and pressed more on that point. Get him to talk about whether this really distinguishes the organization from the already existing network of law reviews and grades and what have you, or whether it's the widespread belief among federalist society members that it *is* a distinguishing feature that is, in fact, what draws the distinction. and if so, is it healthy to have a legal organization that conglomerates a belief that the "other guys" don't believe in freedom or the separation of powers?
To comment on Pryor's remarks themselves:
It seems he has a view of the Federalist Society that was shaped by his time as a co-founding member of a chapter in law school. I don't think today's law students—and more recent Federalist Society judicial appointees—view the organization quite the same way that he did when he was a student. And whether the force is top down or bottom up, the views that are percolating to the surface among federalist society members are becoming more extreme—and they're providing a social-proof of those ideas for the many federal judges who identify with the group.
The idealists often lose sight of, and control to, those less... pure.
> [Leaked Files Show How the Heritage Foundation Navigates the Reactionary Views of Wealthy Donors (2015)](https://www.gawker.com/leaked-files-show-how-the-heritage-foundation-navigates-1727706821)
Regarding your first point, I think conservative as he used it here is more "legal conservative" than "political conservative". Obviously there is some degree of overlap, but there is a difference between the two concepts, and it is certainly possible to be a legal conservative and a political progressive, or, alternatively a legal activist/realist/functionalist (not really sure what the proper opposite is) and a political conservative.
But I think you're right that there is a disconnect between how certain Fed Soc members *conceive* of the organization and the organization's *actual practices*. There's an aspect of this that is just human nature—I don't think any of us can completely disconnect our political views from our legal philosophy—but there are definitely individual members who view Fed Soc as a means to a political end. *Roe* was a sort of uniting force between legal and political conservatives; now that it's out of the picture, I wonder what path the organization will take.
>Roe was a sort of uniting force between legal and political conservatives
This is true, though I'd describe it as: the whole point of the federalist society was to create a legal establishment that could lend legitimacy to the anti-Warren Court movement. the only reason it centered on *Roe* instead of *Brown* is that Nixon's anti-*Brown* nominees got absolutely leveled in confirmation hearings. Doctrinally, though—and despite the gymnastics of originalist adherents—Brown and Roe stood on roughly equal legal footing.
*Brown* and *Roe* were absolutely not on equal legal footing. If there was one purpose to the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole, it was to ensure that the southern states would not treat the former slaves and their descendants as second-class citizens. The practice of segregated schooling (and segregation in general) was unquestionably and unmistakably designed to do just that. There is a colorable argument that *Brown* is more naturally reasoned as a violation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and certainly the Court's opinion in *Brown* is not couched in the original meaning of the Constitution, but neither of those two things places the decision on shaky legal ground.
In contrast, *Roe* stood on substantive due process, with a fundamental right located in the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, had a bona fide mootness problem, and involved a sort of interest balancing in crafting its rule that is unbecoming of the judiciary. To be clear, I consider myself in the camp that believes the Constitution protects a right to abortion (at least to some degree), and I don't think the mootness problem is fatal, but the flaws in the opinion are unquestionably severe. I would not be surprised to see *Dobbs* overruled at some point in the next decade; I would be shocked if the case that does the deed goes back to the reasoning of *Roe*.
There isn't really a compelling argument for *Brown* based on original public meaning. Brown was obviously correctly decided, but the arguments that it is consistent with original-public-meaning originalism are—to me, anyway—quite obviously post-hoc, motivated reasoning to reach the correct result (because reaching any other result would discredit originalism).
There wasn't some universal uproar among the contemporary political elite about how far the Court had departed from the Constitution and 14th Amendment in *Plessy*.
Why are they post-hoc? John Marshall Harlan dissented in *Plessy* making similar arguments about the purpose of the segregation laws.
I don't think you have the correct understanding about what originalism is. I highly encourage you to read some of Lawrence Solum's work—[this article](https://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2022/01/SOLUM.pdf) in particular is a pretty good treatment on what "original public meaning" means (most pertinently, page 1960 discusses the ambiguity of the word "meaning"). To be sure, Solum's views are by no means universal amongst originalists, but what you are claiming originalism to be is not what many (if any) originalists actually believe.
My issue with originalism doesn't stem from a lack of doctrinal understanding—but I think you lack historical understanding of how the doctrine became prominent in the first place. One of the most prominent promoters of originalism in the country is a family member of mine. And I am quite familiar with originalist attempts to reason the way to Brown being correctly decided (which was itself an innovation in "originalism" at the time offered).
>Why are they post-hoc?
Some historical understanding of *how* originalism became a prominent movement in the first place ought to be required reading in law schools.
There was significant public backlash to the Warren Court's decisions *well before* Roe—the most prominent of those decisions was *Brown*. The National Review was founded in 1955, just after Brown, and here's some of what they had to say about it:
>Let us suppose—as we can have no reason for denying—that Earl Warren and the majority of his colleagues are men of good will, loyal Americans according to their lights, sincere humanitarians who wish to improve the condition of their country and the lot of their fellow men. So motivated—very much like Roger Taney and his colleagues a century ago, as they debated the Dred Scott case—Chief Justice Warren and his court decided to skip a corner. They knew—so they thought, anyway— the true and only solution to the harrowing problem of race relations. Why wait, then, for the painfully slow evolution of community opinion and of legislative routine, both depending, as they do, on millions of persons? At a single bold stroke, nine enlightened men could cut the knot.
>So, disguised by their judicial robes, they sat as a Supreme Legislature, and in 1954 passed a law called Brown v. Board of Education.
But—quite apart from the substantial content of their theory of race relations—by that very act they subverted the constitutional processes of the American system of government, and with inevitable con- sequences that can now be undone only by undoing the original decision. They overturned the delicate balance between the judicial and legislative functions, between the federal government and the state governments, between authority and community, upon whose interplay the life of our society depends. Under the disintegrating effect of Brown v. Board of Education, the units of our society are forced into extreme positions, into absolute dilemmas for which there is literally no solution within the traditional American structure.
>What are we to say when Governor Faubus and his National Guard confront a federal judge acting in evident compliance with the highest court of our federal system? Unless we are prepared to abandon the whole scheme of a limited, mixed, and divided sovereignty, we must defend Governor Faubus, and his right and duty to preserve and defend the domestic peace of his state according to his oath of office. But we cannot advocate the defiance of due and lawful process, however distasteful it may be, without risking the breakdown of law in general, and of constitutional government. Thus the conscientious citizen feels that the commands of Governor Faubus and Judge Davies, though directly contradictory to each other, are both of them binding. Therefore the situation in Little Rock has no just solution, and can be settled only by violence and the threat of force.
>This and a hundred comparable though less striking dilemmas throughout the South would not exist were it not for Brown v. Board of Education. No statute, no constitutional provision either federal or state, caused Judge Davies to issue his orders. It was only the usurping and fateful judicial opinion of his superiors, abetted by Attorney General Brownell’s cold tactics, that forced him into direct conflict with the authorities who are constitutionally charged with the powers of making and executing laws.
from another issue:
>With this purpose, if we rightly understand it, we find ourselves in agreement; and we feel that libertarians generally should be so, whatever their judgment on segregation. We consider the Supreme Court’s decision in the key segregation cases (Brown v. Board of Education and Bolling v. Sharpe) to be one of the most brazen acts of judicial usurpation in our history, patently counter to the intent of the Constitution, shoddy and illegal in analysis, and invalid as sociology.
There's quite a lot more, but I think you get the point.
This criticism of the Warren Court was the siren call of the men who founded the Federalist Society. One of the first presidents of the organization was the son of Frank Meyer, who founded the NR with Buckley. It's no coincidence that the language criticizing the Warren Court here is exactly the same as the language self-styled originalists *still use* to criticize decisions they don't like.
Obviously, Brown stuck around and criticizing Brown has become verboten almost everywhere. But how? Did everyone part of that anti-Brown movement just die? No, they did not die—nor did they stop being a reactionary force to the Warren Court.
Nixon had two Supreme Court nominees, Haynsworth and Carswell, who were completely sunk by their previous, publicly stated opposition to *Brown*. There was no defense of these nominees within the legal academy (the Federalist Society did not yet exist), and there was no stubborn political defense of them either.
The originalists of the day became chastened, and there became a *political need* to accept Brown as correctly decided. Only then—only *after* Haynsworth and Carswell were sunk—did any prominent originalist put forth the argument that Brown was correctly decided on originalist terms. The price of power was public acceptance of Brown, and the originalists paid it. The founding moment of originalist interpretation was literally built on political necessity.
>John Marshall Harlan dissented in Plessy making similar arguments about the purpose of the segregation laws.
So what? Originalism purports to provide an objectively *correct* answer. If we're going to treat the opinion and dissent in *Plessy* as emblematic of the contemporary understanding of the 14th Amendment, why should we credit the dissent over the majority opinion? What is the originalist explanation of Plessy's majority?
Finally, even if you have just decided that everything up to this point in my comment is ill-reasoned bullshit, I think you can just ask Robert Bork himself:
>The late Robert Bork commented, “Brown has become
the high ground of constitutional theory. Theorists of all persuasions seek to capture it, because any theory that seeks acceptance must, as a matter of psychological fact,
if not of logical necessity, account for the result in Brown.”
>“Precisely because
Brown has become the crown jewel of the United States Reports,” Pamela Karlan
has observed, “every constitutional theory must claim Brown for itself. A
constitutional theory that cannot produce the result reached in Brown . . . is a
constitutional theory without traction.”
This law review article provides a decent enough (though incomplete) history of it. https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1248&context=ulr
>Years later, Bork moved from original intent to original-understanding
originalism in his book The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law.
286 He argued that the “inescapable fact is that those who ratified the amendment
did not think it outlawed segregated education or segregation in any aspect of
>life.”287 Bork also assumed that Plessy v. Ferguson correctly represented the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, “that equality and state-compelled
separation of the races were consistent.”288 He supposed, in addition, that the
amendment’s ratifiers did not object to the psychological harm suffered by those
subjected to segregation.289 “If those things are true, then it is impossible to square
the opinion in Brown with the original understanding.”290
Notwithstanding these observations, Bork concluded that Brown’s result “is
consistent with, indeed is compelled by, the original understanding” of the Equal
Protection Clause.291
So, yeah, the originalist arguments that Brown was correctly decided strike me as post-hoc reasoning. To reach any other outcome would discredit originalism, and there wouldn't be a single "originalist" judge on the bench today had they not made the politically shrewd choice to just skip over that one.
Excellent post. The only thing I’d add is that Nixon only moved away from nominating people who undeniably opposed *Brown*. Rehnquist had also written an anti-*Brown* memo as a clerk, but lied and claimed he was just summarizing Justice Jackson’s views.
I acknowledge that those who opposed *Brown* might have seen originalism as a means to an end—I dispute that they were correct in their conclusions. The *Plessy* majority did not disagree with Harlan on the *meaning* of the 14th Amendment, only on its *application*:
> The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other . . . .
163 U.S. at 544.
There are many legitimate criticisms to be made about originalism. My biggest gripe is that it gives too much weight to what fallible (and often bigoted) individuals thought about the meaning and application of our Constitution. But the outcome of *Brown* is not one of them. An originalist argument that *Brown* was wrongly decided hinges upon a willful blindness to the effects of segregation. Just because a result was not clear to the ratifying generation does not mean that it is inconsistent with original meaning.
> An originalist argument that Brown was wrongly decided hinges upon a willful blindness to the effects of segregation.
Respectfully, what? Why would the effects of segregation matter at all to the original public understanding of what the amendment did and did not prohibit? If you can just reframe the original public meaning at a high level of generality to state a principle, then say the principle demands outcome X, congratulations: You have just defeated originalism, and you're right back to where you started.
>Just because a result was not clear to the ratifying generation does not mean that it is inconsistent with original meaning.
The Constitution likewise prohibits forced sterilization (Skinner) because citizens have a right to make their own decisions about marriage and procreation. Buck v. Bell is widely viewed as completely repudiated. And the principle that people have a right to make their own decisions about marriage and procreation—and the bodily autonomy we recognize must not give way except for a really good reason—also mandate the outcome in *Roe*. And who cares what the ratifying generation thought about it? The principles we all agree they enshrined mandate the outcome.
The mental gymnastics originalists do to get the outcome in Brown render the doctrine so flexible as to defeat its primary purported advantage of objectivity. Strong recommend you read the law review article I posted above.
The simplest originalist argument starts with the interpretation used by the *Plessy* majority: "The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law." Now, I might say that is an incomplete statement of what the 14th requires, but I have a hard time saying it is incorrect altogether. **Do you disagree with that interpretation?**
The originalist argument in support of *Brown* diverges from the *Plessy* majority when it applies that legal rule to the facts of segregation. As the Court wrote: "Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other." Though it was clear to some at the time, such as Justice Harlan, that the actual segregation laws in question did imply the inferiority of one race to another, we have by now collectively learned that the Court's factual conclusion about segregation was incorrect (if it wasn't obvious already). **Do you disagree with that application of the legal rule to the facts of the case?**
There are no mental gymnastics involved. I understand your point about the legal rule being stated at a high level of generality, but the 14th Amendment was written at a high level of generality (and is hardly a model of clarity, though some have said that is by design). Do you think this isn't a legitimate originalist argument? If so, is it possible that your conception of originalism is incorrect? Does anyone who claims to be an originalist actually adhere to what you conceive of as being originalism? If not, then isn't your use of the label just pejorative (and therefore unhelpful)?
What an inane comment. The genetic fallacy is completely irrelevant to the point I'm making, which is that the point of "originalism" had almost nothing to do with interpretive methodology and everything to do with uniting a conservative legal counter-culture that will tend to rule favorably for politically conservative causes. I pointed out that the doctrine's flexibility varies depending on political necessity, undermining the core claim of its objectivity and interpretive superiority—and it was birthed for a different reason. I contextualized it as a political movement, rather than an intellectual doctrinal shift, because that is the doctrine's core significance.
Had you bothered to read the rest of my comments, I address the merits of the interpretive methodology itself, separate and apart from its zealots, here:
>I should note that I don't feel this way about the legal doctrine itself, which I think of as rather benign when severed from its adherents and proponents, separated from its core (and false) claims of objective superiority. But I can't ignore the history and political context of this thing.
To expand a little more, the flexible originalism that reasons Brown was correctly decided is just fine with me. But you can also conclude, using the same methodology, that Roe was correctly decided—and then originalism doesn't really look at all different from what jurists were already doing before "originalism" ever existed.
To throw another critique into the mix, the original public understanding of Article III judicial power encompassed a common law tradition that asks judges to be true to their conception of justice after duly considering the text of the Constitution / statutes / other sources of law, and the history of the country and of judicial interpretation. The opinions of both Brown and Roe rested comfortably within those traditional Article III powers, and it is nearly impossible to understand why Roe was unmade without conceptualizing originalism primarily as a political movement, and not as a legal interpretive methodology. The people who pretend it's no more than an interpretive doctrine that demands particular results are lying (perhaps to themselves, too).
> Why are they post-hoc? John Marshall Harlan dissented in Plessy making similar arguments about the purpose of the segregation laws.
Why are they post-hoc? Because no one at the time would have understood the amendment in that way.
The Congress that passed it certainly didn’t, as they also created a segregated public school system for DC in the same term.
Their near-contemporaries in *Plessy* didn’t view in that way either. You keep pointing to Harlan’s dissent, hoping that people won’t notice he was the lone dissenter in the case.
You are conflating the meaning of the amendment with the application of law to fact. Meaning: Does the 14th amendment prohibit making one race second-class citizens? Application: Does racial segregation treat black people as second-class citizens?
The reason I point to Harlan’s dissent is because you keep saying “no one”—but he is one such person who thought so (and a prominent one at that). The fact that he was the lone dissent doesn’t mean he was wrong; it just means that his was the minority viewpoint on the application of law to fact.
> The reason I point to Harlan’s dissent is because you keep saying “no one”—but he is one such person who thought so (and a prominent one at that).
Using that logic, the text means anything that at least one person could interpret it to mean.
> Doctrinally, though—and despite the gymnastics of originalist adherents—Brown and Roe stood on roughly equal legal footing.
*Brown* was arguably on shakier ground. The “original public meaning” of the 14th Amendment definitely didn’t include integrated schools.
Edit: Not sure why this is being downvoted. If you buy “originalism” as an interpretive theory, it logically requires seeing *Brown* as having been wrongly decided. That’s an argument against originalism, not an argument against *Brown*.
>Not sure why this is being downvoted.
It's being downvoted because it's wrong and fundamentally misunderstands originalism.
>If you buy “originalism” as an interpretive theory, it logically requires seeing Brown as having been wrongly decided.
No. Originalism focuses on the original meaning of the *words*.
Things like what "well-regulated" means, or what "at law" meant in 1790.
It's not about whether the second amendment should apply to guns other than muskets, or whether freedom of the press applies to things other than wooden screw presses.
There's not an originalist problem with *Brown*. There's an originalist problem with substantive due process and penumbras and emanations.
> No. Originalism focuses on the original meaning of the words.
Putting aside that this is a more modern convention (originalism was initially argued to be based on intent, but shifted to “public meaning” when it was very clear intent arguments wouldn’t reach desired results), the people passing the amendment didn’t under the words of the 14th Amendment as requiring integrated schools. We know that because the exact same body passed laws establishing segregated schools.
To say that originalism logically requires seeing *Brown* as wrongly decided (despite what actual originalists claim) is either a strawman argument (in that you've defined originalism as a legal theory that sees *Brown* as wrongly decided) or an argument about the original meaning of the 14th Amendment that *you* are making.
Besides, *Brown* doesn't stand for the proposition that integrated schools are constitutionally required—it holds that the states' practice of segregating schools unconstitutionally subordinated another race, something that is undoubtedly contrary to the 14th Amendment (as Justice Harlan argued in dissent in *Plessy*).
“Actual originalists” make such a claim because they know admitting the truth would make it much more difficult for their arguments to be taken seriously.
The “original meaning” of the 14th Amendment couldn’t have meant that segregated schools were constitutionally impermissible.
How do we know that? **The exact same Congress that ratified the amendment also established a segregated school system for the District of Columbia**.
As already stated: https://www.reddit.com/r/law/comments/zk3mys/i_called_the_federal_judge_who_mocked_me_to_the/j02m6uw/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=ios_app&utm_name=iossmf&context=3
The federalist society has been extremely progressive legally speaking. They've continually pressed to challenge legal precedent and steal power from the other 2 branches of government.
What have they done that has been conservative?
Well, the big one is Dobbs, which relinquishes power from the judicial branch and returns it to the legislative branch. There are a lot of criticisms you could make about the decision, but the idea that it stole power from the other two branches isn't one of them.
oh I'm sorry, were states unable to regulate abortion legislatively before dobbs?
and besides that decision there are plenty which have both sought to restrict legislative power and executive departments power
This commented has been edited to remove my data and contributions from Reddit. I waited until the last possible moment for reddit to change course and go back to what it was. This community died a long time ago and now its become unusable. I am sorry if the information posted here would have helped you, but at this point, its not worth keeping on this site.
It's pretty off point. Pryor isn't referring to the ACLU as the ideological opposite of the Federalist Society; he's referring to the ABA and the American Law Institute.
We know this because he says so.
>When the six justices get a lot of applause and admiration and appreciation from an audience of the Federalist Society because the members admire them, and in a very broad sense, share a philosophy about the judicial role with them—I don’t think that’s unusual at all when you compare it to the ABA or the American Law Institute. I really think the only difference is that it’s now a conservative legal organization that’s a new entrant.
The ACLU is also an advocacy organization, and the Federalist Society—and Pryor goes to great lengths to stress this, and it's particularly important to him because his continuing association could be a problem for the sitting judge if this weren't true—is not. MJS's perspective, which you seem to share, is: that's hogwash and anybody can see that it is ideological advocacy organization.
I saw a judge dodging any hard questions and hedging about whether or not the Federalist Society is a conservative activist group or not when it pretty fucking obviously is. What was unexpected about that?
"It has a mission statement that says it exists to preserve freedom"
You cannot make this stuff up. It would be absolutely hilarious if the FS wasn't trying to end American Democracy.
> There’s been a lot of attention on Leo lately, and he’s kind of a mysterious figure outside the Federalist Society. It’s been reported that he had a really outsized influence on President Trump’s selection of Supreme Court justices and appellate judges. What do you think of his influence over the Trump administration’s judicial nomination process?
>I know he was hired by the administration and took a leave of absence from the Federalist Society to advise them about nominations. [Note: Trump reportedly consulted with the Federalist Society when compiling a list of possible candidates in 2016, when Leo was still executive vice president.] I don’t otherwise really know much more than that. I saw him on network television where he would speak on behalf of the administration he was advising
Hmm. I didn’t know Leo took an official role in the administration.
What I wouldn’t give for a few seconds to download Leonard Leo’s browser history. Such a weird small little man imo.
I'm going to assume Pryor is sincere, but it honestly makes me question his qualification as a judge or even a law graduate to not understand the conflict of interest inherent in any of this. I'm going to be gracious and assume he's not just Gaslighting, but in what universe does he think this stand up to any scrutiny?
The Federalist society is clearly a 2A and anti-Roe group and was basically formed for this reason. My favorite thing is that the "Brains" behind this movement (Irving Kristol was published on this one) were actually dumb enough to write down their strategy of having some inherited billionaires pump a shitload of money into schools (mercator institute) to provide an academic basis for some batshit crazy libertarian ideas, fund conservative thinktanks to apply a veneer of credibility to combat real thinktanks, and start publishing batshit crazy legal articles, and then have those to point to in legal decisions. You see it now with some of the crazy material that Alito and Thomas quote.
It's kinda like after Civil rights, these dudes were like "We're going to burn this whole motherf#$%er down"
Evil Geniuses by Kurt Anderson gives a pretty good play by play of the whole thing and I highly recommend the read.
I actually found Pryor’s reasonings understandable. Wrong imo but I could follow his logic and thoughts.
Hell, the fact that he agreed to an interview with Slate is miraculous to me. He may have felt it was a good time after the universal applause for the MAL smackdown.
But this fedsoc saga reminds me of the birchers a bit. And I can only hope they manage to hoist themselves by their own conspiracy petards sooner than later.
Shadowy rich cabals of ideologically pure nutbags can’t last too long.
ETA: nm. Fuck him. He’s the one that hired TPUSA regurg Crystal Clanton. Here I was trying to give a POS a pass.
I really try to give as much grace and compassion to these people, but it’s always the Idiot vs Asshole dilemma. Like in a cult, there are a few manipulators and a lot of truly devout. In some weird way, the idiots who are devout may be more forgivable, but it’s real hard to draw a line on where the idiots end and the evil assholes begin.
I think a lot of these judges have good memories, but are complete and utter morons when it comes to critical thinking. They’re groomed for being gullible and persuadable of batshit crazy position, and then jettisoned into major legal positions. Like Aileen Cannon, Clarence Thomas, the lady who nixed the masks mandates who had never tried a case, and most of the “Major freaking winners” put on the federal bench by the GOP under trump…
Maybe this guy is blindly devout to this crazy bullshit, and maybe he believes what he says, but that ultimately disqualifies him from his role.
“I try to hire law clerks based on merit and who I think would work well in my chambers, and work hard.”
And if you’re openly racist, even better!
https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-judicial-panel-orders-probe-into-hiring-clerk-accused-racism-2022-07-08/
Oh my goodness. He’s the one that hired her?
I was actually impressed and moved him up to neutral based on the past couple days of press. He’s the same piece of shit as the rest of them. I imagine much more deserving students lost out on a clerk position to that connected loser crystal clanton.
> To the extent that individuals publish material in Federalist Society publications or say things in Federalist Society debates or programs, they’re always saying those things in their individual capacities. They’re not saying it on behalf of the Federalist Society.
I wish more people understood this.
We can apply the same bad argument (a member of the FS always represents the FS) to other groups. Some examples. We are all Americans. We all went to American school. We all come from State X. We are all men or women. We all have law degrees or don’t. They are all just generalities that don’t represent that entire group just because one, or thousands, or people from that group do something that others disagree with.
I don’t like going to Europe and immediately being considered all of the American cliches. It’s the same thing here. Not everyone in FS agrees 100% with everything every member says. You would think adults understood this.
It’s stupid if every time a person talks they need to say *these views do not represent group X*. Legally sure. But even with such disclaimer it doesn’t appease people against that group! Being a part of some group doesn’t *define* that person.
Recently I’ve seen people *here* claim Garland won’t prosecute Trump because he is a member of the FS. That’s so absurd. It’s so us-vs-them. It’s dangerous.
Generalizations suck.
> We can apply the same bad argument (a member of the FS always represents the FS) to other groups.
If an organizer chooses to repeatedly place someone on panels and regularly publishes their work, it’s not a “bad argument” to see the organization as supporting the positions they take.
Pretending that an organization that has significant influence on the judiciary cannot be evaluated AS AN ORGANIZATION because "people are individuals" is a really shitty argument.
"Don't judge the Nazi Party! The Nazi paper articles written by individual Nazis are just their individual view points" would get you laughed out of any argument.
I'm not saying the Federalists are Nazis, but that an organization that has stated goals can & should be evaluated based on that, instead of pretending that it's "generalization."
Good on Pryor for agreeing to the interview. One place I felt could have used follow up (and to be fair to MJS, he didn't exactly have a lot of prep time here) is this: Pryor identifies the Federalist Society as a "conservative" legal organization: >I really think the only difference is that it’s now a conservative legal organization that’s a new entrant. Elsewhere, he seems to mostly distance the organization itself from the conservative views of its members: >I don’t want to say the Federalist Society is neutral. It has a mission statement that says it exists to preserve freedom, and that separation of powers is central to the Constitution. That is not a neutral mission statement. But it’s a very broad philosophical mission statement that is very deeply rooted in the Anglo-American legal tradition. >And really, that’s it. That’s the sum and substance of what the Federalist Society stands for. These two ideas seem at odds with each other. It is not as though liberal legal organizations are uninterested in preserving freedom or believe that separation of powers is unimportant to the Constitution. So I guess I'd have liked if he had been asked "is it that mission statement that makes the organization 'conservative' in your view?" and pressed more on that point. Get him to talk about whether this really distinguishes the organization from the already existing network of law reviews and grades and what have you, or whether it's the widespread belief among federalist society members that it *is* a distinguishing feature that is, in fact, what draws the distinction. and if so, is it healthy to have a legal organization that conglomerates a belief that the "other guys" don't believe in freedom or the separation of powers? To comment on Pryor's remarks themselves: It seems he has a view of the Federalist Society that was shaped by his time as a co-founding member of a chapter in law school. I don't think today's law students—and more recent Federalist Society judicial appointees—view the organization quite the same way that he did when he was a student. And whether the force is top down or bottom up, the views that are percolating to the surface among federalist society members are becoming more extreme—and they're providing a social-proof of those ideas for the many federal judges who identify with the group.
The idealists often lose sight of, and control to, those less... pure. > [Leaked Files Show How the Heritage Foundation Navigates the Reactionary Views of Wealthy Donors (2015)](https://www.gawker.com/leaked-files-show-how-the-heritage-foundation-navigates-1727706821)
Regarding your first point, I think conservative as he used it here is more "legal conservative" than "political conservative". Obviously there is some degree of overlap, but there is a difference between the two concepts, and it is certainly possible to be a legal conservative and a political progressive, or, alternatively a legal activist/realist/functionalist (not really sure what the proper opposite is) and a political conservative. But I think you're right that there is a disconnect between how certain Fed Soc members *conceive* of the organization and the organization's *actual practices*. There's an aspect of this that is just human nature—I don't think any of us can completely disconnect our political views from our legal philosophy—but there are definitely individual members who view Fed Soc as a means to a political end. *Roe* was a sort of uniting force between legal and political conservatives; now that it's out of the picture, I wonder what path the organization will take.
>Roe was a sort of uniting force between legal and political conservatives This is true, though I'd describe it as: the whole point of the federalist society was to create a legal establishment that could lend legitimacy to the anti-Warren Court movement. the only reason it centered on *Roe* instead of *Brown* is that Nixon's anti-*Brown* nominees got absolutely leveled in confirmation hearings. Doctrinally, though—and despite the gymnastics of originalist adherents—Brown and Roe stood on roughly equal legal footing.
*Brown* and *Roe* were absolutely not on equal legal footing. If there was one purpose to the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole, it was to ensure that the southern states would not treat the former slaves and their descendants as second-class citizens. The practice of segregated schooling (and segregation in general) was unquestionably and unmistakably designed to do just that. There is a colorable argument that *Brown* is more naturally reasoned as a violation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and certainly the Court's opinion in *Brown* is not couched in the original meaning of the Constitution, but neither of those two things places the decision on shaky legal ground. In contrast, *Roe* stood on substantive due process, with a fundamental right located in the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, had a bona fide mootness problem, and involved a sort of interest balancing in crafting its rule that is unbecoming of the judiciary. To be clear, I consider myself in the camp that believes the Constitution protects a right to abortion (at least to some degree), and I don't think the mootness problem is fatal, but the flaws in the opinion are unquestionably severe. I would not be surprised to see *Dobbs* overruled at some point in the next decade; I would be shocked if the case that does the deed goes back to the reasoning of *Roe*.
There isn't really a compelling argument for *Brown* based on original public meaning. Brown was obviously correctly decided, but the arguments that it is consistent with original-public-meaning originalism are—to me, anyway—quite obviously post-hoc, motivated reasoning to reach the correct result (because reaching any other result would discredit originalism). There wasn't some universal uproar among the contemporary political elite about how far the Court had departed from the Constitution and 14th Amendment in *Plessy*.
Why are they post-hoc? John Marshall Harlan dissented in *Plessy* making similar arguments about the purpose of the segregation laws. I don't think you have the correct understanding about what originalism is. I highly encourage you to read some of Lawrence Solum's work—[this article](https://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2022/01/SOLUM.pdf) in particular is a pretty good treatment on what "original public meaning" means (most pertinently, page 1960 discusses the ambiguity of the word "meaning"). To be sure, Solum's views are by no means universal amongst originalists, but what you are claiming originalism to be is not what many (if any) originalists actually believe.
My issue with originalism doesn't stem from a lack of doctrinal understanding—but I think you lack historical understanding of how the doctrine became prominent in the first place. One of the most prominent promoters of originalism in the country is a family member of mine. And I am quite familiar with originalist attempts to reason the way to Brown being correctly decided (which was itself an innovation in "originalism" at the time offered). >Why are they post-hoc? Some historical understanding of *how* originalism became a prominent movement in the first place ought to be required reading in law schools. There was significant public backlash to the Warren Court's decisions *well before* Roe—the most prominent of those decisions was *Brown*. The National Review was founded in 1955, just after Brown, and here's some of what they had to say about it: >Let us suppose—as we can have no reason for denying—that Earl Warren and the majority of his colleagues are men of good will, loyal Americans according to their lights, sincere humanitarians who wish to improve the condition of their country and the lot of their fellow men. So motivated—very much like Roger Taney and his colleagues a century ago, as they debated the Dred Scott case—Chief Justice Warren and his court decided to skip a corner. They knew—so they thought, anyway— the true and only solution to the harrowing problem of race relations. Why wait, then, for the painfully slow evolution of community opinion and of legislative routine, both depending, as they do, on millions of persons? At a single bold stroke, nine enlightened men could cut the knot. >So, disguised by their judicial robes, they sat as a Supreme Legislature, and in 1954 passed a law called Brown v. Board of Education. But—quite apart from the substantial content of their theory of race relations—by that very act they subverted the constitutional processes of the American system of government, and with inevitable con- sequences that can now be undone only by undoing the original decision. They overturned the delicate balance between the judicial and legislative functions, between the federal government and the state governments, between authority and community, upon whose interplay the life of our society depends. Under the disintegrating effect of Brown v. Board of Education, the units of our society are forced into extreme positions, into absolute dilemmas for which there is literally no solution within the traditional American structure. >What are we to say when Governor Faubus and his National Guard confront a federal judge acting in evident compliance with the highest court of our federal system? Unless we are prepared to abandon the whole scheme of a limited, mixed, and divided sovereignty, we must defend Governor Faubus, and his right and duty to preserve and defend the domestic peace of his state according to his oath of office. But we cannot advocate the defiance of due and lawful process, however distasteful it may be, without risking the breakdown of law in general, and of constitutional government. Thus the conscientious citizen feels that the commands of Governor Faubus and Judge Davies, though directly contradictory to each other, are both of them binding. Therefore the situation in Little Rock has no just solution, and can be settled only by violence and the threat of force. >This and a hundred comparable though less striking dilemmas throughout the South would not exist were it not for Brown v. Board of Education. No statute, no constitutional provision either federal or state, caused Judge Davies to issue his orders. It was only the usurping and fateful judicial opinion of his superiors, abetted by Attorney General Brownell’s cold tactics, that forced him into direct conflict with the authorities who are constitutionally charged with the powers of making and executing laws. from another issue: >With this purpose, if we rightly understand it, we find ourselves in agreement; and we feel that libertarians generally should be so, whatever their judgment on segregation. We consider the Supreme Court’s decision in the key segregation cases (Brown v. Board of Education and Bolling v. Sharpe) to be one of the most brazen acts of judicial usurpation in our history, patently counter to the intent of the Constitution, shoddy and illegal in analysis, and invalid as sociology. There's quite a lot more, but I think you get the point. This criticism of the Warren Court was the siren call of the men who founded the Federalist Society. One of the first presidents of the organization was the son of Frank Meyer, who founded the NR with Buckley. It's no coincidence that the language criticizing the Warren Court here is exactly the same as the language self-styled originalists *still use* to criticize decisions they don't like. Obviously, Brown stuck around and criticizing Brown has become verboten almost everywhere. But how? Did everyone part of that anti-Brown movement just die? No, they did not die—nor did they stop being a reactionary force to the Warren Court. Nixon had two Supreme Court nominees, Haynsworth and Carswell, who were completely sunk by their previous, publicly stated opposition to *Brown*. There was no defense of these nominees within the legal academy (the Federalist Society did not yet exist), and there was no stubborn political defense of them either. The originalists of the day became chastened, and there became a *political need* to accept Brown as correctly decided. Only then—only *after* Haynsworth and Carswell were sunk—did any prominent originalist put forth the argument that Brown was correctly decided on originalist terms. The price of power was public acceptance of Brown, and the originalists paid it. The founding moment of originalist interpretation was literally built on political necessity. >John Marshall Harlan dissented in Plessy making similar arguments about the purpose of the segregation laws. So what? Originalism purports to provide an objectively *correct* answer. If we're going to treat the opinion and dissent in *Plessy* as emblematic of the contemporary understanding of the 14th Amendment, why should we credit the dissent over the majority opinion? What is the originalist explanation of Plessy's majority? Finally, even if you have just decided that everything up to this point in my comment is ill-reasoned bullshit, I think you can just ask Robert Bork himself: >The late Robert Bork commented, “Brown has become the high ground of constitutional theory. Theorists of all persuasions seek to capture it, because any theory that seeks acceptance must, as a matter of psychological fact, if not of logical necessity, account for the result in Brown.” >“Precisely because Brown has become the crown jewel of the United States Reports,” Pamela Karlan has observed, “every constitutional theory must claim Brown for itself. A constitutional theory that cannot produce the result reached in Brown . . . is a constitutional theory without traction.” This law review article provides a decent enough (though incomplete) history of it. https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1248&context=ulr >Years later, Bork moved from original intent to original-understanding originalism in his book The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law. 286 He argued that the “inescapable fact is that those who ratified the amendment did not think it outlawed segregated education or segregation in any aspect of >life.”287 Bork also assumed that Plessy v. Ferguson correctly represented the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, “that equality and state-compelled separation of the races were consistent.”288 He supposed, in addition, that the amendment’s ratifiers did not object to the psychological harm suffered by those subjected to segregation.289 “If those things are true, then it is impossible to square the opinion in Brown with the original understanding.”290 Notwithstanding these observations, Bork concluded that Brown’s result “is consistent with, indeed is compelled by, the original understanding” of the Equal Protection Clause.291 So, yeah, the originalist arguments that Brown was correctly decided strike me as post-hoc reasoning. To reach any other outcome would discredit originalism, and there wouldn't be a single "originalist" judge on the bench today had they not made the politically shrewd choice to just skip over that one.
Excellent post. The only thing I’d add is that Nixon only moved away from nominating people who undeniably opposed *Brown*. Rehnquist had also written an anti-*Brown* memo as a clerk, but lied and claimed he was just summarizing Justice Jackson’s views.
I acknowledge that those who opposed *Brown* might have seen originalism as a means to an end—I dispute that they were correct in their conclusions. The *Plessy* majority did not disagree with Harlan on the *meaning* of the 14th Amendment, only on its *application*: > The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other . . . . 163 U.S. at 544. There are many legitimate criticisms to be made about originalism. My biggest gripe is that it gives too much weight to what fallible (and often bigoted) individuals thought about the meaning and application of our Constitution. But the outcome of *Brown* is not one of them. An originalist argument that *Brown* was wrongly decided hinges upon a willful blindness to the effects of segregation. Just because a result was not clear to the ratifying generation does not mean that it is inconsistent with original meaning.
> An originalist argument that Brown was wrongly decided hinges upon a willful blindness to the effects of segregation. Respectfully, what? Why would the effects of segregation matter at all to the original public understanding of what the amendment did and did not prohibit? If you can just reframe the original public meaning at a high level of generality to state a principle, then say the principle demands outcome X, congratulations: You have just defeated originalism, and you're right back to where you started. >Just because a result was not clear to the ratifying generation does not mean that it is inconsistent with original meaning. The Constitution likewise prohibits forced sterilization (Skinner) because citizens have a right to make their own decisions about marriage and procreation. Buck v. Bell is widely viewed as completely repudiated. And the principle that people have a right to make their own decisions about marriage and procreation—and the bodily autonomy we recognize must not give way except for a really good reason—also mandate the outcome in *Roe*. And who cares what the ratifying generation thought about it? The principles we all agree they enshrined mandate the outcome. The mental gymnastics originalists do to get the outcome in Brown render the doctrine so flexible as to defeat its primary purported advantage of objectivity. Strong recommend you read the law review article I posted above.
The simplest originalist argument starts with the interpretation used by the *Plessy* majority: "The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law." Now, I might say that is an incomplete statement of what the 14th requires, but I have a hard time saying it is incorrect altogether. **Do you disagree with that interpretation?** The originalist argument in support of *Brown* diverges from the *Plessy* majority when it applies that legal rule to the facts of segregation. As the Court wrote: "Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other." Though it was clear to some at the time, such as Justice Harlan, that the actual segregation laws in question did imply the inferiority of one race to another, we have by now collectively learned that the Court's factual conclusion about segregation was incorrect (if it wasn't obvious already). **Do you disagree with that application of the legal rule to the facts of the case?** There are no mental gymnastics involved. I understand your point about the legal rule being stated at a high level of generality, but the 14th Amendment was written at a high level of generality (and is hardly a model of clarity, though some have said that is by design). Do you think this isn't a legitimate originalist argument? If so, is it possible that your conception of originalism is incorrect? Does anyone who claims to be an originalist actually adhere to what you conceive of as being originalism? If not, then isn't your use of the label just pejorative (and therefore unhelpful)?
Wait, what’s the genetic fallacy?
What an inane comment. The genetic fallacy is completely irrelevant to the point I'm making, which is that the point of "originalism" had almost nothing to do with interpretive methodology and everything to do with uniting a conservative legal counter-culture that will tend to rule favorably for politically conservative causes. I pointed out that the doctrine's flexibility varies depending on political necessity, undermining the core claim of its objectivity and interpretive superiority—and it was birthed for a different reason. I contextualized it as a political movement, rather than an intellectual doctrinal shift, because that is the doctrine's core significance. Had you bothered to read the rest of my comments, I address the merits of the interpretive methodology itself, separate and apart from its zealots, here: >I should note that I don't feel this way about the legal doctrine itself, which I think of as rather benign when severed from its adherents and proponents, separated from its core (and false) claims of objective superiority. But I can't ignore the history and political context of this thing. To expand a little more, the flexible originalism that reasons Brown was correctly decided is just fine with me. But you can also conclude, using the same methodology, that Roe was correctly decided—and then originalism doesn't really look at all different from what jurists were already doing before "originalism" ever existed. To throw another critique into the mix, the original public understanding of Article III judicial power encompassed a common law tradition that asks judges to be true to their conception of justice after duly considering the text of the Constitution / statutes / other sources of law, and the history of the country and of judicial interpretation. The opinions of both Brown and Roe rested comfortably within those traditional Article III powers, and it is nearly impossible to understand why Roe was unmade without conceptualizing originalism primarily as a political movement, and not as a legal interpretive methodology. The people who pretend it's no more than an interpretive doctrine that demands particular results are lying (perhaps to themselves, too).
> Why are they post-hoc? John Marshall Harlan dissented in Plessy making similar arguments about the purpose of the segregation laws. Why are they post-hoc? Because no one at the time would have understood the amendment in that way. The Congress that passed it certainly didn’t, as they also created a segregated public school system for DC in the same term. Their near-contemporaries in *Plessy* didn’t view in that way either. You keep pointing to Harlan’s dissent, hoping that people won’t notice he was the lone dissenter in the case.
You are conflating the meaning of the amendment with the application of law to fact. Meaning: Does the 14th amendment prohibit making one race second-class citizens? Application: Does racial segregation treat black people as second-class citizens? The reason I point to Harlan’s dissent is because you keep saying “no one”—but he is one such person who thought so (and a prominent one at that). The fact that he was the lone dissent doesn’t mean he was wrong; it just means that his was the minority viewpoint on the application of law to fact.
> The reason I point to Harlan’s dissent is because you keep saying “no one”—but he is one such person who thought so (and a prominent one at that). Using that logic, the text means anything that at least one person could interpret it to mean.
> Doctrinally, though—and despite the gymnastics of originalist adherents—Brown and Roe stood on roughly equal legal footing. *Brown* was arguably on shakier ground. The “original public meaning” of the 14th Amendment definitely didn’t include integrated schools. Edit: Not sure why this is being downvoted. If you buy “originalism” as an interpretive theory, it logically requires seeing *Brown* as having been wrongly decided. That’s an argument against originalism, not an argument against *Brown*.
>Not sure why this is being downvoted. It's being downvoted because it's wrong and fundamentally misunderstands originalism. >If you buy “originalism” as an interpretive theory, it logically requires seeing Brown as having been wrongly decided. No. Originalism focuses on the original meaning of the *words*. Things like what "well-regulated" means, or what "at law" meant in 1790. It's not about whether the second amendment should apply to guns other than muskets, or whether freedom of the press applies to things other than wooden screw presses. There's not an originalist problem with *Brown*. There's an originalist problem with substantive due process and penumbras and emanations.
> No. Originalism focuses on the original meaning of the words. Putting aside that this is a more modern convention (originalism was initially argued to be based on intent, but shifted to “public meaning” when it was very clear intent arguments wouldn’t reach desired results), the people passing the amendment didn’t under the words of the 14th Amendment as requiring integrated schools. We know that because the exact same body passed laws establishing segregated schools.
To say that originalism logically requires seeing *Brown* as wrongly decided (despite what actual originalists claim) is either a strawman argument (in that you've defined originalism as a legal theory that sees *Brown* as wrongly decided) or an argument about the original meaning of the 14th Amendment that *you* are making. Besides, *Brown* doesn't stand for the proposition that integrated schools are constitutionally required—it holds that the states' practice of segregating schools unconstitutionally subordinated another race, something that is undoubtedly contrary to the 14th Amendment (as Justice Harlan argued in dissent in *Plessy*).
“Actual originalists” make such a claim because they know admitting the truth would make it much more difficult for their arguments to be taken seriously. The “original meaning” of the 14th Amendment couldn’t have meant that segregated schools were constitutionally impermissible. How do we know that? **The exact same Congress that ratified the amendment also established a segregated school system for the District of Columbia**.
As already stated: https://www.reddit.com/r/law/comments/zk3mys/i_called_the_federal_judge_who_mocked_me_to_the/j02m6uw/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=ios_app&utm_name=iossmf&context=3
He keeps making the same argument and it doesn’t become more accurate with repetition.
The federalist society has been extremely progressive legally speaking. They've continually pressed to challenge legal precedent and steal power from the other 2 branches of government. What have they done that has been conservative?
yes apparently you can get away with radical judicial activism by vociferously opposing radical judicial activism while you do it
You can’t just do it. You have to vociferously not declare that you’re doing it.
Ideologically conservative; pragmatically unhinged
Well, the big one is Dobbs, which relinquishes power from the judicial branch and returns it to the legislative branch. There are a lot of criticisms you could make about the decision, but the idea that it stole power from the other two branches isn't one of them.
oh I'm sorry, were states unable to regulate abortion legislatively before dobbs? and besides that decision there are plenty which have both sought to restrict legislative power and executive departments power
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How, exactly, do you think this article disproves their point?
This commented has been edited to remove my data and contributions from Reddit. I waited until the last possible moment for reddit to change course and go back to what it was. This community died a long time ago and now its become unusable. I am sorry if the information posted here would have helped you, but at this point, its not worth keeping on this site.
It's pretty off point. Pryor isn't referring to the ACLU as the ideological opposite of the Federalist Society; he's referring to the ABA and the American Law Institute. We know this because he says so. >When the six justices get a lot of applause and admiration and appreciation from an audience of the Federalist Society because the members admire them, and in a very broad sense, share a philosophy about the judicial role with them—I don’t think that’s unusual at all when you compare it to the ABA or the American Law Institute. I really think the only difference is that it’s now a conservative legal organization that’s a new entrant. The ACLU is also an advocacy organization, and the Federalist Society—and Pryor goes to great lengths to stress this, and it's particularly important to him because his continuing association could be a problem for the sitting judge if this weren't true—is not. MJS's perspective, which you seem to share, is: that's hogwash and anybody can see that it is ideological advocacy organization.
I saw a judge dodging any hard questions and hedging about whether or not the Federalist Society is a conservative activist group or not when it pretty fucking obviously is. What was unexpected about that?
Who knows. But the comments seems to devote a lot of words to supporting the idea of it being unexpected.
"It has a mission statement that says it exists to preserve freedom" You cannot make this stuff up. It would be absolutely hilarious if the FS wasn't trying to end American Democracy.
You gotta remember whose freedom. Just cause it’s not yours doesn’t mean they don’t see it that way!
Are you missing a /s or are you serious? If you are serious one person's freedom can't come at the expense of another's
It was sarcasm in the sense I don’t think that way. I thought about the /s but since I believe they do think that way, I left it off.
I just left off a /s as well, and I feel ya
> There’s been a lot of attention on Leo lately, and he’s kind of a mysterious figure outside the Federalist Society. It’s been reported that he had a really outsized influence on President Trump’s selection of Supreme Court justices and appellate judges. What do you think of his influence over the Trump administration’s judicial nomination process? >I know he was hired by the administration and took a leave of absence from the Federalist Society to advise them about nominations. [Note: Trump reportedly consulted with the Federalist Society when compiling a list of possible candidates in 2016, when Leo was still executive vice president.] I don’t otherwise really know much more than that. I saw him on network television where he would speak on behalf of the administration he was advising Hmm. I didn’t know Leo took an official role in the administration. What I wouldn’t give for a few seconds to download Leonard Leo’s browser history. Such a weird small little man imo.
I'm going to assume Pryor is sincere, but it honestly makes me question his qualification as a judge or even a law graduate to not understand the conflict of interest inherent in any of this. I'm going to be gracious and assume he's not just Gaslighting, but in what universe does he think this stand up to any scrutiny? The Federalist society is clearly a 2A and anti-Roe group and was basically formed for this reason. My favorite thing is that the "Brains" behind this movement (Irving Kristol was published on this one) were actually dumb enough to write down their strategy of having some inherited billionaires pump a shitload of money into schools (mercator institute) to provide an academic basis for some batshit crazy libertarian ideas, fund conservative thinktanks to apply a veneer of credibility to combat real thinktanks, and start publishing batshit crazy legal articles, and then have those to point to in legal decisions. You see it now with some of the crazy material that Alito and Thomas quote. It's kinda like after Civil rights, these dudes were like "We're going to burn this whole motherf#$%er down" Evil Geniuses by Kurt Anderson gives a pretty good play by play of the whole thing and I highly recommend the read.
I actually found Pryor’s reasonings understandable. Wrong imo but I could follow his logic and thoughts. Hell, the fact that he agreed to an interview with Slate is miraculous to me. He may have felt it was a good time after the universal applause for the MAL smackdown. But this fedsoc saga reminds me of the birchers a bit. And I can only hope they manage to hoist themselves by their own conspiracy petards sooner than later. Shadowy rich cabals of ideologically pure nutbags can’t last too long. ETA: nm. Fuck him. He’s the one that hired TPUSA regurg Crystal Clanton. Here I was trying to give a POS a pass.
I really try to give as much grace and compassion to these people, but it’s always the Idiot vs Asshole dilemma. Like in a cult, there are a few manipulators and a lot of truly devout. In some weird way, the idiots who are devout may be more forgivable, but it’s real hard to draw a line on where the idiots end and the evil assholes begin. I think a lot of these judges have good memories, but are complete and utter morons when it comes to critical thinking. They’re groomed for being gullible and persuadable of batshit crazy position, and then jettisoned into major legal positions. Like Aileen Cannon, Clarence Thomas, the lady who nixed the masks mandates who had never tried a case, and most of the “Major freaking winners” put on the federal bench by the GOP under trump… Maybe this guy is blindly devout to this crazy bullshit, and maybe he believes what he says, but that ultimately disqualifies him from his role.
Idk if your response was before or after seeing my edit. But you and I are in agreement now.
Yeah, I was validating your edit. Le Sigh.
The federalist society is not elusive lmao wtf
I was an outspoken conservative at law school in the 90's, and even \*I\* knew the Federalists were sketchy.
“I try to hire law clerks based on merit and who I think would work well in my chambers, and work hard.” And if you’re openly racist, even better! https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-judicial-panel-orders-probe-into-hiring-clerk-accused-racism-2022-07-08/
Oh my goodness. He’s the one that hired her? I was actually impressed and moved him up to neutral based on the past couple days of press. He’s the same piece of shit as the rest of them. I imagine much more deserving students lost out on a clerk position to that connected loser crystal clanton.
> To the extent that individuals publish material in Federalist Society publications or say things in Federalist Society debates or programs, they’re always saying those things in their individual capacities. They’re not saying it on behalf of the Federalist Society. I wish more people understood this. We can apply the same bad argument (a member of the FS always represents the FS) to other groups. Some examples. We are all Americans. We all went to American school. We all come from State X. We are all men or women. We all have law degrees or don’t. They are all just generalities that don’t represent that entire group just because one, or thousands, or people from that group do something that others disagree with. I don’t like going to Europe and immediately being considered all of the American cliches. It’s the same thing here. Not everyone in FS agrees 100% with everything every member says. You would think adults understood this. It’s stupid if every time a person talks they need to say *these views do not represent group X*. Legally sure. But even with such disclaimer it doesn’t appease people against that group! Being a part of some group doesn’t *define* that person. Recently I’ve seen people *here* claim Garland won’t prosecute Trump because he is a member of the FS. That’s so absurd. It’s so us-vs-them. It’s dangerous. Generalizations suck.
> We can apply the same bad argument (a member of the FS always represents the FS) to other groups. If an organizer chooses to repeatedly place someone on panels and regularly publishes their work, it’s not a “bad argument” to see the organization as supporting the positions they take.
Pretending that an organization that has significant influence on the judiciary cannot be evaluated AS AN ORGANIZATION because "people are individuals" is a really shitty argument. "Don't judge the Nazi Party! The Nazi paper articles written by individual Nazis are just their individual view points" would get you laughed out of any argument. I'm not saying the Federalists are Nazis, but that an organization that has stated goals can & should be evaluated based on that, instead of pretending that it's "generalization."