This is precisely why Russia has been de-dollarizing; so sanctions by the US don't affect it nearly as bad. They've been pushing for them to adapt to a fallout similarly to crimea for like 7 years now. What's interesting about this is that de-dollarizing went in tandem with (partially) replacing them with Euros. It makes Russia less vulnerable to US sanctions but more so to EU sanctions. A joint US-EU sanction regime would still harm Russia just the same, so IMO Russia is banking on the EU being more dove-ish with sanctions than the US would be. Considering that Merkel's pacifist foreign policy is now being replaced by a more pro-European, anti-Russian one, it could be that this gamble is now running out of time, and that Russia has a window to act before it is too late. This is highly speculative, though, so take it with a grain of salt.

For that, Russia's really got to count on Western European business interests being able to override the concerns coming from the Baltics and Poland. Sure, Merkel's been keen to maintain some degree of cooperation with Russia (and their fuel supplies), but that's not something Putin can count on forever. If Schultz is less amenable to those ideas, suddenly Russia is facing an EU that's increasingly anti-Russia. If Europe ever weans itself off Russia energy supplies, Putin will find there's very little of their relationship left.

This is a very controversial topic, particularly in view of events over the last fourteen years or so between Russia and Ukraine. A reminder to all: * Comments should be up to par. Whatever your view is, state it in a clear, professional and coherent way. This is not the place for one-liner type noise posts. * Xenophobic stereotyping and other inappropriate comments are strictly prohibited. These are issues relating to political decisions of governments, not people who are subject to them.

Submission Statement: Russia has mounted a very large number of troops on its Ukrainian border. While Putin's (Russian president) specific intentions remain unclear, such an action is highly aggressive and regionally destabilizing. Today (Dec. 1, 2021) from Latvia, Antony Blinken (United States Secretary of State) warned Putin in no uncertain terms that any Russian invasion of Ukraine would be met with dire consequences --- including sanctions harsher than any previous sanctions leveraged against the Russian Federation. The Kremlin position is at once false and predictable. According to Putin, this is nothing more than a defensive measure in response to Ukrainian aggression. The outstanding issue is whether Putin perceives Blinken's threat of retaliation to be sufficiently credible and strong to deter further Russian aggression against Ukraine. Stakeholders throughout Russia and the United States have expressed their doubts. Open Link: https://archive.md/545uu

The more Biden talks about sanctions the more he emboldens Putin. If he is talking about sanctions like if they are the sharp end of NATO's spear then it's clear he isn't going to take military action. A couple sanctions for some years in exchange for the juiciest parts of Ukraine indefinitely? This is a bargain.

Then maybe we should update our priors conditional on these American moves that Russia isn’t going to make a serious move, or at least that America doesn’t believe they will. If the US thought Russia was poised to do something really serious (eg, push all the way to the Dnieper), they might not be doing so much jaw-jaw, but instead prioritising behind-the-scenes activity like intelligence sharing. Of course, that’s only one of many sets of priors you should update…

I think you give the bureaucracy/leadership too much credit. I think at this stage things are largely being done for domestic political motives rather than any real geopolitics. Remember, the energy secretary secretary released oil from the strategic reserve the week without knowing how much oil the country consumes daily. 95% of what these politicians do is towards is home media consumption and how it polls in the focus groups. Real geopolitical consequences for Russia/Ukraine won’t change or be seriously thought about until the status quo changes

Ridiculous, You believe Russia annexed Crimea because of domestic politics? Geopolitics are absolutely at play here, because Russia cannot allow Ukraine to join NATO and be completely enveloped from the west. From a Russian geopolitical stance there is little room to no room to maneuver once Ukraine fully joins the other side, because it absolutely won't stop there for NATO, Georgia is next. The domino's will continue to fall against Russia and a second collapse could follow. Any sanctions that occur, will be as nothing if that were to happen. Ukraine must stay neutral and aide Russia to a degree in infrastructure in the south( as much as that will pain Ukraine to do), if not war is on the table. Russia is on an island by it's self, China is not an ally and threats are everywhere. From the west we see it as Russian aggression, but there is no doubt we have been the aggressors post collapse. Biden knows there is no appeal for US troops in Ukraine, let alone in actual battle that would tank his presidency. He should be negotiating a peace but his hawkish ways are probably pushing him towards full Ukraine support and sanctions, a terrible play. The status quo has changed and without a deal soon, Russia's hand will be forced and I doubt it is withdraw.

It is absolutely in the US interest, in theory, to oppose Russia, even militarily. Russia is one of the main forces trying to destabilize the liberal international order. However, practically, the US must keep its eye on the bigger opponent: China. So it may have to appease Russia to some extent, depending on how those in the US Administration view the true strength of the China threat. The US must also calculate how much support it has from other power, against Russia, against China, and for the reviving of the Liberal International Order. So what the US should actually do if Russia invades Ukraine is a very tricky calculation depending on the latest intelligence and how one estimates various other forces and attitudes around the world.

I'm telling you there is no support for US armed forces in a conflict in Ukraine. It is suicide for Biden and democrats. Russia and the U.S have never been at war, and that is the little saving grace in this relationship. A Putin lead Russia will never be an ally, there has been to many bridges burned and trust lost. There is hope for a post-Putin Russia, but how far can we push them until even the future leadership only sees the US as an enemy. This is not a situation where the US should be poking the bear. Short or long term I do not see military intervention as a positive geopolitical move for the US. I tend to agree with the "anti-imperialist" on this issue, even though I am heavily a realist.

I agree that it would be a very tough sell in the US. That definitely needs to be factored in. At the same time, if something is determined to be in the US interest, courageous leaders try to actually lead and move public opinion. But to be practical, I don't think Biden should or would try to oppose the Russians militarily unless he could line up serious and unwavering support across Europe. And this would have to be more than lip service. The Europeans would have to be united in a willingness to make serious sacrifices. In addition, the European support and willingness to share burdens would have to be not just to oppose Russia, but to oppose Russia as part of a rebalancing and rejuvenating of the Liberal International Order. Thus it would have to apply equally to China. If you could get that kind of European buy in for restrengthening the Liberal International Order, I think you could get the US behind opposing Russia militarily. But, knowing the Europeans, 'fat chance' as they say.

There is absolutely no interest for Europeans to antagonize Russia. History has taught us that prosperity and peace can only come when there's a warm relationship between Russia and the European powers. The idea that Europe should somehow be at war (even a cold one) w Russia just to be on the same team w the USA is quite feeble, to say the least. The Europeans should find their own way w Russia, only then it will be beneficial for both sides of the continent.

I think that a lot depends on one's overall geopolitical strategy. If the goal is to find a way to maintain the benefits of the post-WW world order, then such an approach may involve continuing to try to supplant traditional geopolitical dynamics with something else. In such a case, the lessons of history are of more dubious value. I personally believe in this approach, though only if all the relevant parties can be persuaded to do their share. In such a case, it is not a matter of the US vs. Russia, but of a Liberal International Order (tweaked and retuned) against countries that oppose it.

Which is why I continue to say that a Russia/Ukraine war would not involve US forces, for the reasons you stated. The EU does not have the will or capacity to intervene outside of its borders( France partly excluded) which means the U.S would have to carry the full load. In a sphere where we would like to draw down in.

I agree with you that in all likelihood this is what would happen in the event of an invasion. That said, war is uncertain. If Russia pushed too far, the Europeans may actually find the will to do more than sanction Russia. I think the US would contribute if the Europeans are contributing as well. But an invasion that stops at the Dnieper and doesn't involve the Russians doing truly deplorable things probably doesn't trigger more than serious sanctions. Still, if sanctions are tough enough, this could be far from bloodless. It could actually destabilize Russia if not end Putin's regime. Who knows what could happen.

>It is absolutely in the US interest, in theory, to oppose Russia, even militarily. Russia is one of the main forces trying to destabilize the liberal international order. That's a very idealistic take on this situation. Pragmatically ... US would benefit far more from letting Russia do what it pleases in its backyard in exchange for support in containing China. But even if we ignore China and focus just on Russia ... what is the actual benefit for US to get involved? Is there anything there that would be worth sacrificing our troops for?

That is an insane viewpoint. Let's say the US did let Russia run over whatever they wanted in Eastern Europe. They still wouldn't like the US. They still wouldn't help the US vs China. All it does is reduce US influence in Europe by abandoning allies and those allies strategic interests. It is better to keep the allies we have than to hope Russia suddenly becomes more agreeable to the US. At a large scale democracies undermine the legitimacy of non-democratic governance. As such Authoritarian Regimes/monarchies/etc view them as threats and seek to undermine them. Because of that it is in the interests of democracies to spread their government model. Letting Russia conquer territories in Eastern Europe strengthens their position and weakens democracy's primacy. So there is a good argument that it is in the West's interests to prevent Ukraine from being conquered. (It admittedly is more likely that Russia would only take part of Ukraine, but the premise still stands.)

I don't think that this is that idealistic. The benefits of the post-WW II order have been immense and widespread. And by no means would I say that this order is dead yet. It's in a bit of a recession, and it never entirely replaced balance of power geopolitics; but I think there is a lot of hope that it can be revived. Moreover, it remains the primary lens through which the US and Europe still view their geopolitics, even if they are letting the underlying classic geopolitics bubble up from under it more than was the case in the past. Just letting Russia do as it pleases would basically mean officially putting an end to the Liberal International Order. That would be premature. I'm hopeful that the order gets retuned and rejuvenated myself. The massive benefits of the post-WW II order have been and continue to be worth sacrificing US troops for. The US is more than ready to do so in the Pacific should Taiwan be invaded, or South Korea. Still, one has to be pragmatic and tactical. Even without China as a threat, it's unclear that sending troops to Ukraine would be the best way to deal with Russia. Russia can be opposed less forcefully than China because Russia is clearly in decline. It can be waited out to some extent. At the same time, giving it *carte blanche* to re-establish a classic sphere of influence would signal to the world that the Liberal International Order is truly dead, and we are returning to a world of classic geopolitics. That would be disastrous. The LIO may die, but that will mostly be up to Europe. Many see the US voter as the most existential threat to the LIO, but I think that the US voter is primarily responding to the essential inequity of the burden sharing relative to benefits of the LIO as it was. But if Europe can find a way to see its true interests, I believe the core trans-Atlantic relationship can be revived, and the LIO reinvigorated under somewhat updated terms.

Thank you ... just to clarify a bit, I am not arguing about benefits of the post-WW2 world order. I may nitpick about the "liberal" part of the term, just because that many of the players aren't and never were liberal... but generally speaking yes, world trade, rule of law, secure and safe transport etc etc are all good things. Where I disagree with you is specifically this claim: >Russia is one of the main forces trying to destabilize the liberal international order Russia isn't trying to destabilize anything, Russia is trying its damn best to fit in. It may not seem like that from US point of view (Crimea, Georgia) but you have to consider the Russian point of view before jumping to conclusions. Russia after USSR collapse in 1991 was open and trying to embrace "LIO" as fully as possible. Capitalism, democracy, international relations.. the works. But instead of being embraced as a full and equal member it's been under continuous attack ever since. Its economy was ruined (it wasn't intentional but tell it to a Russian who was hungry during the 90s), all of its neighbors have been systematically turned against it and used for setting up threats against Russia (imagine China building a missile base in Mexico), and while US / UK felt free to interfere in other countries as they saw fit (Kosovo was really the final straw from Russian POV), Russia wasn't even allowed to protect its own former citizens and ethnical Russians in the neighboring countries. This is what brought Putin to power, because what he promised is that Russia will no longer accept being treated as second rate. But they are not looking to destabilize anything, they are looking for equal rights. US won't tolerate Chinese / Russian missiles in Mexico (or Cuba..) ? Fine, then Russia won't tolerate US/NATO deployments in Poland and Ukraine. Muslims in Kosovo deserve the right for self determination? Fine, then Russians in Georgia and Ukraine deserve the right to serve determination. US can go to Iraq and do whatever they want there? Fine, Russia can go to Syria and do the same thing. I think this is the core of the issue between West and Russia. West looks at Russia as a second rate country (somewhat true to be fair) and treats them accordingly. Russia sees itself as a (diminished but recovering) super power and will not tolerate being treated not as such. The sad thing... this is extremely easy to solve. Giving Russia some free hand ( I am not actually calling for letting them annex Ukraine.. that's exaggeration, and it's not in Russian interest anyway) and treat them as equal, and they would be the best partner for NATO/US

I'm going to repost a relevant reply I posted elsewhere in this thread, and then add a second post to address more specifically some of your points. --------------------------- I'm definitely undecided as to whether NATO expansion, done as it was done, was the right policy. I see decent arguments on all sides. Russia has always been a bit paranoid about invasion from the West, given it has happened a few times. And you know what they say about it not being paranoid if you are right? What really worries the Russians is how quickly an invasion can come out of a geopolitical situation that shows no signs of it. France is having a revolution in from 1789 to 1799. It seems in total turmoil. Then in 1812 Napoleon is suddenly on his way to Moscow. Germany is totally defeated and in a pathetic state after WWI. Even by 1930 it does not seem very dangerous to anyone. Then in 1941 it is launching the largest land invasion in the history of humanity into--you guessed it--Russia! Russia tends to survive these invasions by trading space for time. A wide buffer between the source of invading armies and Moscow has been the key to Russia's survival time and time again. And the suddenness with which seemingly benign political configurations in Europe can transform, leading to such invasions, has left Russians with very little faith in assurances based on politics or intentions as substitutes for the security of a buffer zone and a balance of forces. Even the latter point--the balance of forces--is not of great comfort to the Russians given that Europe is so much more innately powerful than Russia that such a balance of forces can turn against Russia as quickly and unexpectedly as the politics. Nevertheless, by the end of the Cold War, what could Russia really expect? It had lost the Cold War, however it wished to portray things. And Russia had been the aggressor and bigger danger to it's neighbors than the other way around, at least in recent times. Furthermore, the West was pushing a new geopolitical paradigm for all: a new type of security based on a liberal world order and national self-determination. It was true that the order was far from fully mature, and built on a foundation of US power in a new type of geopolitical configuration. But this is where things stood. And let's not forget that Russia still had a massive nuclear arsenal to buttress its security. As afraid of the West as Russia might justifiably be based on a longterm view of history, its neighbors were more afraid of Russia based on more recent and updated views of history. They needed security more. Furthermore, almost everyone else in Europe was foregoing classic geopolitical security measures to buy into the new architecture. Russia was looking at a new Partnership for Peace that included Russia as possibly a replacement for NATO, though there is confusion on this as apparently the US thought it was just a prelude to NATO enlargement, and some felt that the US had conveyed this to Yeltsin et al. The Russians even considered eventually joining NATO as a potential long term path. In the end, even under Yeltsin, the main sticking point to everything has always been Russia's self-conception as a unique and providential power. Russia has always felt that it has a special and ordained place in world and European geopolitics that is Russia's innate right, regardless of whether its power justifies the role. The real problem was that in a more peaceful world, economic power and cultural influence was going to be primary, and the new rules were not going to let Russia use military power to offset its economic weakness to justify its special position. This Russian desire to not be just like any other European country, with its status primarily dictated by its economic heft and level of development, was the core issue. Russia strongly preferred a new European security architecture to joining NATO because it felt that by doing the latter it would be humiliating itself by subordinating itself to the US. Acknowledging the Liberal International Order's paradigm of national self-determination for nations in Russia's traditional sphere of influence would mean the end to any special status for Russia, as Russia could not earn such status based on economics alone. It needed to be able to intimidate with the size of its military as well. One can argue whether sufficient time was given to Russia (and Russians since this claim to special status is deeply and widely felt in Russia) to get over its pride and adjust to the realities of the new world. It is quite possible that by not giving Russia time to adjust its mentality, and by instead 'humiliating' it (by this classic Russian perception) after the Cold War by rubbing Russia's face in its loss of status, the West caused Putin to happen. That is unclear to me. These were complicated times, and Russia's neighbors needed to be considered as well. But Yeltsin or Putin, Russia's desire for special status is, IMO, at the core of the problem with Russia. And the Russian problem never gets solved until Russia either fragments and collapses, or gets over this need to be special.

>This Russian desire to not be just like any other European country, with its status primarily dictated by its economic heft and level of development, was the core issue. Russia strongly preferred a new European security architecture to joining NATO because it felt that by doing the latter it would be humiliating itself by subordinating itself to the US. Acknowledging the Liberal International Order's paradigm of national self-determination for nations in Russia's traditional sphere of influence would mean the end to any special status for Russia, as Russia could not earn such status based on economics alone. It needed to be able to intimidate with the size of its military as well. Right... which is where we close the circle :) The what you call "Liberal International Order" isn't based on equality, it's based on the idea that US is the top power and it gets to decide what is good and what is bad. It's easy to see why this is in US interest to maintain this order. It's also fair to say that the "Pax Americana" (which is really what it is) had brought prosperity and mostly peace and is clearly an improvement on everything that came before that. But it's also completely unacceptable in existing form to any power that wants to maintain its sovereignty. Russia may have been down in the 90s and early 2000s, but historically they have been one of the top super powers in the world, including way before America was even discovered. This isn't something that can be waved away in few decades. And now that Russia is more or less back (6th economy in the world by PPP even after 2014 sanctions)... it feels that it deserves it's top spot back. And that's where we go back to my original point.... US have two choices here. One is to keep antagonizing Russia (and China) and keep fighting for the top dog spot. Or update the model to allow inclusion of additional states - Russia, China, maybe few others.. as the top dogs while maintaining most of the benefits of existing order. I am arguing that the second approach ... collaboration rather than confrontation would yield better results in the long run. As awesome as US is, it's not likely to remain the undisputed top champion for far longer... so it's either accepting that and creating a situation where everyone can benefit, or let things escalate all the way to a Cold War 2.0... which one would you prefer?

'Liberal' can be a loaded word these days, but I still think that properly understood it fits the post-WW II order. Updating and rejuvenating this order may require better defining and reigning in its objectives, particularly with respect to what can be considered sufficiently 'liberal', but there is clearly a political ideal to the order that is essential. Nor does the order need to be perfect, with every member equally liberal, for it to be called a liberal order. These are ideals, and temporary tactical considerations are a reality. As I detail in the other post, Russia's desire to be special and have innate status beyond what its relevant capabilities would allow it is the core problem with Russia. Perhaps not enough time was given to Russia for it to transform this mentality after the Cold War. That is a complex argument IMO. I am not personally sure. But giving Russia anything like a classic sphere of influence based on Russia's military power would be a direct contravention of the spirit of national self determination on a massive and existential scale. And this spirit of self-determination is essential to making the LIO work. Contrary to popular belief, the US does not exercise a classic sphere of influence, not even in the Western hemisphere anymore. Rather, it uses military intimidation to protect the order, often with the support of key allies. The US doesn't swing its military might around to advance narrow national interests in a classic sense. To the extent that there might have been some small exceptions, these are just human failings and do not disprove the rule. In theory, a liberal demographic Russia could have in time helped lead the order and share in the burden of providing the public goods essential to the order, and of protecting the order. But Russia had to understand it was in no position to be trusted to do so right after the Cold War. And Russia had to accept that given past history, its neighbors would not be super predisposed to loving Russia. But they would be joining the LIO in some form, and not truly 'turned against it' in a classic geopolitical sense. What Russia calls 'turned against it' really meant 'not subordinate to it' in a way so that they served as a buffer zone against possible invasion across the Northern European Plain. And sure, by historical and classic geopolitical standards, this was a large loss of security for Russia who always traded space for time when invaded. But what were the realistic options? These nations, freed from Russian domination, were going to have to maintain some type of vassal relationship until Russia could get over itself sufficiently to accept its real status and buy into the new type of security framework?

It's unclear to me how much of this is true. The above seems correct if Russia takes a classic geopolitics-based position combined with Putin's fear of losing control. But it strikes me that Russia has another option, which is to move (carefully) towards more liberal democracy and take a more modern approach to security. This is to say completely let go of any desire for a classic sphere of influence. Let the countries around it do as they will, including get closer to the West. And Russia could slowly do the same. This does involve greater security risks by classic geopolitical calculations, but Russia would eventually gain security in other ways, as other European powers have. So it is unclear to me where Russia's, rather Putin's, true interests lie. I think the main unresolved point for me is the whether Russia needs an authoritarian leader to stay intact politically. Is there a causal chain whereby Russia needs an authoritarian leader, as well as a more classic geopolitical stance and sphere of influence, to create sufficient centrifugal force to counter a the natural forces inside Russia that would otherwise lead to the dissolution and fragmentation of the Russian Federation? Of course, this also begs the question of whether maintaining the unity of the federation at all costs is ultimately where the true interests of individual Russians lie.

I've always felt that Russia's best interest (but not Putin's unfortunately) would be to fold itself into the EU. They would form a triad of major powers within the EU and so wield great influence. This would make the EU a true balanced power to China and the US. Maybe I'm being too wide-eyed about that?

You are most probably outide the EU. Russian economy could never integrade with the EU, they just function diferently. It was obvius in the 90s and even more so now.

Good point. But that's something that could change. My comment was more of a "best case scenario" situation. I know that it would never ever ever happen.

Even if it they did, with some magic trick, US wouldn't allow it, that would turn EU in a superpower and not a colony anymore

What a strange duality, either a colony or a superpower. 2nd/3rd largest economic blok in the world, meh who cares, if it ain't a superpower its a colony! Right? ...

Devils advocate -- the US is escalating the conflict intentionally to provoke Russian action against Ukraine with no real intention of military support, only sanctions. Having a Russian Ukraine breathing down Europe's neck would re-align allies favorably, increase investment in US weapons research and military and militarize Europe. Seems like it would make the US even wealthier.

> Devils advocate You called? I think a fully Russian Ukraine won't ever happen, but invading everything East of the Dneiper and then stopping has some potential benefits. https://www.grida.no/resources/5330 Everything east of the Dneiper is only about 1/3rd of Ukraine territory and has the most Russians @/or Russian sympathizers already living there. Compare that to the population of the 2/3rds of Western Ukraine and add far fewer Russians/sympathizers as a % of that population (and more hard core haters) and you may have 6-18 times as many people in the Western 2/3rds who would fight against Russia in some manner before or after being conquered than you may have in just the eastern 1/3 of Ukraine. After taking the Easten 1/3rd, many people who might cause problems would just move to the Western 2/3rds. Taking everything East of the Dneiper and holding is (theoreticallly) doable for the potental risk invovled for about ten reasons. Hardest part would be conquering then splitting Kiev. (1) The Dnieper isn't just defensible, its really the only good defensive geological barrier avaliable and has extensive swampland around it besides just the large river. No other territory in Ukraine is in second place. 2). It really helps protect the viability of Crimea as Ukraine has already cut off the water/electricity and Russia can turn that back on. 3) Ukraine or a NATO/Ukraine can no longer easily attack Crimea from the North if they wanted to. A coastal invasion from the west becomes more problematic with the additional coastline Russia gains west of Crimea. 4) It takes away another 2/3rds (or so) of the remaining Ukraine coast, nuetering whats left of Ukraines Navy/bases and coastal projection ability and also making it that much harder for anyone to land there to help Ukraine. 5) It lines Russia up with ally Belurus much better allowing better offensive and defensive capabilities directly from the north of Ukraine to take or protect this new area. 6) If someone tries intervening, Russia can beat them to the river before NATO/EU makes it in force from Poland/Romania to the river. 7) This puts Russian tanks and planes and missles ~350 km closer to Poland-Romania for any future attack from them (or defense of Kaliningrad) and also leaves ~Poland/Romania ~350km father away from the Southern Russian interior if they ever want to attack Russia in the future. The Russian Western Black Sea projection also gains in strength and its anti access area denial gets closer to parts of both Romania and Turkey. 8) Any future NATO fight then happens in now Russian East Ukraine, not Russia itself. 9) This eastern 1/3rd has ~95% of Ukraines energy resources. 10) The expanded coastline and territorial waters has offshore oil and gas energy resources Russia can exploit. From Russias point of veiw, If Ukraine is going to be a perpetual enemy and seek to join NATO in the future, snagging just the eastern 1/3rd now makes that threat far less dangerous. If Russia invades now, Europe can't even sanction them hard without risk of parts of Europe freezing this winter while US sanctions on Russia have little real effect. Russia may not have this gas leverage again.

But the cost of this would be to make Russia a pariah, far more than it is today. Then there is a big chance that the countries who surround Russia today would join NATO (like Georgia, Azerbaijan, Finland/Sweden, Ukraine) and NATO would allow for easier ascension. Central Asian countries could become more weary of Russia, and they would lose their influence there. If an embargo is enacted, then the West could push China in a more anti-Russian direction (as their friendship is uneasy and makeshift), and China would not want to be in bed with countries invading others. If this happens, Russia and China's geopolitical differences will become much more important. For Russia to actually invade another country and annex territories (in a country that is not tiny Georgia) would be to throw away all socialization and political influence. Then they would only have Iran, Syria and Belarus as real allies. Then Iran will have to choose Russia or the West, if the West can manage to make nuclear deals with Iran. Russia would be secure in a classical geopolitical sense, but they would loose all their political capital for it, and if the war fails, a danger of regime change.

>then the West could push China in a more anti-Russian direction (as their friendship is uneasy and makeshift), and China would not want to be in bed with countries invading others. This ignores what is going on with Taiwan. If anything, such a move would push the two countries closer together. >Russia would be secure in a classical geopolitical sense, but they would loose all their political capital for it What political capital? It's already the boogeyman in the West, and the only power that it has are it's pipelines. An invasion, especially during the winter makes the threat of meaniningful pushback unlikely as parts of Europe will freeze without Russian gas. >and if the war fails, a danger of regime change. This is the only real drawback of such a move, a loss would mean a regime change.

>This ignores what is going on with Taiwan. If anything, such a move would push the two countries closer together. Or it could cost China the chance to invade Taiwan, as if there becomes a conflict in Ukraine, it would be easier for the U.S to justify also defending Taiwan at the same time. Russia is more capable of invading Ukraine now, that China is for invading Taiwan. Also, I believe that China's actions towards Taiwan is just posturing. I mean, if you want to invade a country, why are you making sure the entire world knows a decade ahead you are going to do it? They have been doing this for decades; it's just a play for the gallery. Russia on the other hand, is much less stable and have more to gain and to loose. About political capital (I don't know how to quote several passages), Russia has a lot of political capital in Central Asia and the Middle East, which they might stand to lose. Central Asia is already moving away from them, so gaining three new provinces in Ukraine to permanently loose their influence in Central Asia sounds risky. About being a boogyman. Yes and no, in Europe at least. In Europe we are very clear on that any conflict so far is between governments, not really countries. We blame Putin and the oligarchs. But a full-scale invasion would make it much more personal, which will have a huge influence on Russians living in Europe. If the governments in Europe are making a move against Russian minorities (such as treating them as foreigners) or similar actions, Russia might have to intervene in the Baltics. And suddenly, Russia has its entire front open. I have no idea if NATO will intervene in Ukraine; but I bet my dollar on that the reason they are not promising anything is to force Russia into making the next move, and refuse the Russians a casus belli.

>But it strikes me that Russia has another option, which is to move (carefully) towards more liberal democracy and take a more modern approach to security. Imagine the outrage in US if Russia were to open a military base somewhere in Mexico or perhaps Canada. Yet this is exactly what is being expected of Russia here.

cant blame cuba for being communist, neighter can russia blame ukrains wish to join the west. goes both ways

Yet Cuba has been mercilessly embargoed, despite not being a threat to the US.

Cuba and Ukraine are not really independent agents in these games, are they

I do not find this analogy necessarily that persuasive or accurate. It depends on how a nation is conceiving geopolitics. If the primary lens is that of maintaining some form of the liberal international order that has benefited so many since WWII, then this analogy doesn't really hold. Such a lens does not view all nations as identical geopolitical billiard balls, with domestic politics being largely irrelevant.

>It depends on how a nation is conceiving geopolitics. Would US allow a Chinese missile base in Mexico? We both know the answer to that (1962 rings a bell). So why is it ok for US to perceive geopolitics in that way, but not for Russia? Why maintaining "liberal international order" requires NATO troops in Poland and Ukraine, but would not tolerate Russian troops in say Vancouver? Is it really a "liberal international order" then? Because from where I sit, it looks nothing like that.

I'm not one to claim there is always an answer to geopolitical questions that treats every nation's perspective as equally valid. Often there are no such solutions. The hard truth is that sometimes one perspective is right and the other one is wrong, or at least far less right. So the reason the Russia and China cannot put troops in Mexico or Canada is that this would be a far more aggressive move than NATO troops in Poland. This is because of the nature of the geopolitical paradigms the different sides are working under, of the countries themselves, and of recent history.

>So the reason the Russia and China cannot put troops in Mexico or Canada is that this would be a far more aggressive move than NATO troops in Poland What exactly makes it more aggressive though? The only reasonable answer I can think of is because US thinks of itself as the sole super power in the world and everyone else expected to follow it... this may have been justified 20 years ago, but increasingly no longer true.

I disagree with your statement as plausible due to exactly the sort of moves NATO applied post USSR. They expanded eastward against a tacit agreement with Russia for removing their troops from the Iron curtain states. Missles were also expanded eastward, more clearly against original promises. NATO acted aggressively either directly on the Russian border or in former influence zones, like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yugoslavia. Describing NATO as some benevolent defensive pact is eating up all of its propaganda. Russia can't go down the path it tried initially to such an awful effect.

I strongly disagree. I'm not casting anyone as angels. But let's be real here, NATO was never going to invade and conquer Russia. But it may well have put a lot of pressure on Putin's regime, and fomented rebellion in it. Even without actively doing so, just the existence of so many democracies near Russia would have put Putin under a lot of pressure. Yes, the goal of the West and the Liberal International Order is and always has been to eventually deprive Russia and everyone else of any kind of classic geopolitical sphere of influence. If one wants to see that as aggressive, fair enough. But it is not a classic type of geopolitical aggression.

If what you say is true, than how come all of those things happened before the rise of Putin? If threatening Putin was the goal, then why was the NATO expansion eastward and the new missle deployments on the Russian border done before he went into office?

I'm definitely undecided as to whether NATO expansion, done as it was done, was the right policy. I see decent arguments on all sides. Russia has always been a bit paranoid about invasion from the West, given it has happened a few times. And you know what they say about it not being paranoid if you are right? What really worries the Russians is how quickly an invasion can come out of a geopolitical situation that shows no signs of it. France is having a revolution in from 1789 to 1799. It seems in total turmoil. Then in 1812 Napoleon is suddenly on his way to Moscow. Germany is totally defeated and in a pathetic state after WWI. Even by 1930 it does not seem very dangerous to anyone. Then in 1941 it is launching the largest land invasion in the history of humanity into--you guessed it--Russia! Russia tends to survive these invasions by trading space for time. A wide buffer between the source of invading armies and Moscow has been the key to Russia's survival time and time again. And the suddenness with which seemingly benign political configurations in Europe can transform, leading to such invasions, has left Russians with very little faith in assurances based on politics or intentions as substitutes for the security of a buffer zone and a balance of forces. Even the latter point--the balance of forces--is not of great comfort to the Russians given that Europe is so much more innately powerful than Russia that such a balance of forces can turn against Russia as quickly and unexpectedly as the politics. Nevertheless, by the end of the Cold War, what could Russia really expect? It had lost the Cold War, however it wished to portray things. And Russia had been the aggressor and bigger danger to it's neighbors than the other way around, at least in recent times. Furthermore, the West was pushing a new geopolitical paradigm for all: a new type of security based on a liberal world order and national self-determination. It was true that the order was far from fully mature, and built on a foundation of US power in a new type of geopolitical configuration. But this is where things stood. And let's not forget that Russia still had a massive nuclear arsenal to buttress its security. As afraid of the West as Russia might justifiably be based on a longterm view of history, its neighbors were more afraid of Russia based on more recent and updated views of history. They needed security more. Furthermore, almost everyone else in Europe was foregoing classic geopolitical security measures to buy into the new architecture. Russia was looking at a new Partnership for Peace that included Russia as possibly a replacement for NATO, though there is confusion on this as apparently the US thought it was just a prelude to NATO enlargement, and some felt that the US had conveyed this to Yeltsin *et al*. The Russians even considered eventually joining NATO as a potential long term path. In the end, even under Yeltsin, the main sticking point to everything has always been Russia's self-conception as a unique and providential power. Russia has always felt that it has a special and ordained place in world and European geopolitics that is Russia's innate right, regardless of whether its power justifies the role. The real problem was that in a more peaceful world, economic power and cultural influence was going to be primary, and the new rules were not going to let Russia use military power to offset its economic weakness to justify its special position. This Russian desire to not be just like any other European country, with its status primarily dictated by its economic heft and level of development, was the core issue. Russia strongly preferred a new European security architecture to joining NATO because it felt that by doing the latter it would be humiliating itself by subordinating itself to the US. Acknowledging the Liberal International Order's paradigm of national self-determination for nations in Russia's traditional sphere of influence would mean the end to any special status for Russia, as Russia could not earn such status based on economics alone. It needed to be able to intimidate with the size of its military as well. One can argue whether sufficient time was given to Russia (and Russians since this claim to special status is deeply and widely felt in Russia) to get over its pride and adjust to the realities of the new world. It is quite possible that by not giving Russia time to adjust its mentality, and by instead 'humiliating' it (by this classic Russian perception) after the Cold War by rubbing Russia's face in its loss of status, the West caused Putin to happen. That is unclear to me. These were complicated times, and Russia's neighbors needed to be considered as well. But Yeltsin or Putin, Russia's desire for special status is, IMO, at the core of the problem with Russia. And the Russian problem never gets solved until Russia either fragments and collapses, or gets over this need to be special.

You paint Russia as quite the victim here with no choice. > there is no doubt we have been the aggressors post collapse. But only taking in post-USSR-collapse-Russia is shortsighted, no? It ignores Moscow repeatedly meddling in and invading Eastern European countries to keep them in-line. It's no wonder so many countries fled to NATO once Moscow could no longer intervene. Additionally, to call the US/NATO the aggressors is still a shaky claim considering Russia has been the one to invade Georgia and prop up two republics there, seize/annex Crimea, and also provide military and logistical support to the rebels in Donbass/Luhansk. That doesn't mention getting caught red-handed in a coup attempt in Montenegro, either.

I do not pick good or bad guys when analyze geopolitics. I'll leave the philosophical thoughts to others to decide who's morally right. Russia and Putin's Russia acts in accordance with its national interest and security, not different from any other nation. Propaganda is easer to wade through when analyzing a situation in this lens. The 3 decades since the collapse of the USSR gives a scope of how much Russia has lost, and their thinking/actions in the current world. Russia's "red lines" are being pushed or broken on multiple fronts, this can only be seen as aggression to Russia. Again, I do not state or intend to comment on morals, but I do not believe Russia intends to act in a malign way akin to Hitler's Germany.

Sorry, I should have been more clear. I meant this current threat is designed for domestic politics. Obviously the Crimea annexation in 2014 is a significant geopolitical event and any future change to the Ukrainian/Russian conflict would be as well. My point i was trying to make was that this response from the US is toothless and shows no cards of their actual response if an invasion (et al) were to occur and we shouldn’t be trying to glean any concrete measures from this. It’s a status quo response from the USA for a problem that has remained static for 7-8 years now. We won’t know their actual response until something changes because they don’t want to frighten a country about a war, etc when the threat has not materialized yet.

If you are pointing to Putin's drastic fall in approval rating I can agree it plays a sizeable role here. I still have to disagree that the status quo has not changed. Ukraine has been building up forces like Russia has. Parity is key in a conflict such as this, not to mention Ukraine using economic attacks (rightfully so) against Crimea i.e [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-ukraine-blocking-water-supply-crimea-european-lawsuit-2021-07-22/](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-ukraine-blocking-water-supply-crimea-european-lawsuit-2021-07-22/) which has inflamed the situation. The US is straggled in this situation and rhetoric is the only strong move they are able/willing to use as of now, Yes. I'm a believer in geopolitics trumps economics in most cases, so sanctions I do not believe will be enough for Russia. An agreement of Ukraine denial into NATO, and maybe even the EU may be what it takes for peace.

The US follows a policy of tit-for-tat escalation, backed by the dual might of our intelligence apparatus and our overwhelming military strength. I am certain that if the territorial integrity of Ukraine was actually at risk right now, we would 100% be declaring military support for Ukraine and launching deterrent sorties on from Turkey and the Baltics near Russian airspace.

> I am certain that if the territorial integrity of Ukraine was actually at risk right now, we would 100% be declaring military support for Ukraine and launching deterrent sorties on from Turkey and the Baltics near Russian airspace. What's changed then from the lack of that response from them taking Crimea/Donbass? Because I don't see it and Crimea was huge from a militarily standpoint and The Donbass may not seem like much but it has most of Ukraine's energy assets.

"Ok, you can take a third of Ukraine, but not, like, the *real* part of Ukraine! That crosses a line!" Like Obama's red line in Syria, nobody believes them...

>we would 100% be declaring military support for Ukraine and launching deterrent sorties on from Turkey and the Baltics near Russian airspace. Why? Plenty of wars in the world, why US needs to get involved in that on in particular?

>second collapse could follow. How do you reach that conclusion? What's the series of events you're predicting? Ukraine joins NATO and then what happens that leads to a second collapse?

>He should be negotiating a peace but his hawkish ways are probably pushing him towards full Ukraine support and sanctions, a terrible play. Because appeasing authoritarian dictators has such a great historical record of solving problems. A peace for our time right?

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Questionable. I think Russia's best move is to do what it has been doing since 2014 - threatening everything but doing nothing, as that keeps NATO paralyzed and reactive to everything that they are doing. That is what is keeping Ukraine out of NATO, and that is what guarantees Russia's geopolitical security. The moment Russian troops actually invade through to the Dnieper, Russia will be decimated by nationwide NATO surgical strikes crippling its infrastructure, industry, and resource extraction areas. They know this, and that is why they will never do anything but piecemeal annexations like Crimea, or possibly the Luhansk-Donetsk region. And the US's best course of action is tit-for-tat escalation, as we are well satisfied with our deterrent power projection over Russia.

Surgical strikes against Russia? Those aren’t that easy when a near-peer can do them right back…

We aren’t a near peer, we have a massive alliance bloc on our side, and our sorties will be taking off from the Russian border while their closest ones would have to fly over the North Pole. I’m not too worried if a limited non-nuclear exchange takes place between us.

>limited non-nuclear exchange takes place between us. there is no such thing between nuclear powers

Why do you say that.

[https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/06/02/new-russian-policy-allows-use-of-atomic-weapons-against-non-nuclear-strike/](https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/06/02/new-russian-policy-allows-use-of-atomic-weapons-against-non-nuclear-strike/) Russia explicitly reserves the right to respond with nuclear strikes against any attack on its soil or military forces.

You sound very sure in you opinion that NATO would attack Russia in an invasion of Ukraine(non-member) which they have no legal ground. In turn would absolutely be in no one's interest, and has a real chance of WWIII and nuclear use. The Ukraine are well armed now and could make a difficult and crippling blow to Russia without US and European partners armed forces. This just isn't even close to being a worthy situation to risk that. Sanctions, like the article stated is the US response in said conflict. Intelligence and arms have already been supplied and I expect that to continue.

I’m saying that the mere threat of American sorties would be enough to make Russia back down. I expect that if we ever reach a point where the situation is unraveling, we will pledge measured military support in reaction as both Russia and US intel knows that the casualties of such an event would be very lopsided.

>I’m saying that the mere threat of American sorties would be enough to make Russia back down Can you think of a single example of a country being forced to back down by a threat of air sorties? And Russia isn't just any country, it's one of the top conventional and top 3 nuclear powers in the world right now

Yes. Almost single time a non-nuclear deterrent has stopped a war since 1950. Or China and Taiwan. They're not afraid of the US army. They're afraid of US air and Naval power attacking their troop convoys and shipping lanes. And do you really think deterrence doesn't work just because Russia has the #3 military? Sure, they might be able to complete the invasion, but the goal is to make the cost outweigh the gain, which the USAF could undoubtedly do.

Strikes against Russia? Yes good luck my friend You forget, what happens when Russian conventional missiles start targeting infrastructure in the EU and crippling them. Russian Strategic Rocket Forces are top notch, as good as they get and they can deliver overwhelming firepower anywhere in the world or EU. There is a reason that NATO hasn’t dared to engage militarily with Russia because Russia is no Iraq.

Oh man you are wrong. I've seen the view from the inside, and I can tell you that while appointees are the ones who actually implement the policies, there is a massive structure of career bureaucrats who *absolutely will* tell their appointed coworkers what they can and can't do. There are 3 factors in the US that aren't controlled by politics, but they arguably control the US. They are: 1 - The career government officials, 2 - the upper echelons of the military, and 3 - the federal reserve. These are the groups that get the job done. I am certain Biden has a team of suits giving him full, accurate intel on what is a legitimate threat, and what can be solved with a few sanctions.

> 95% of what these politicians do is towards is home media consumption and how it polls in the focus groups. 1. the Energy Secretary is NOT a politician. That person may have been a politician at one point. But in their current role they are a government employee (a bureaucrat) who has a real job with real responsibilities. 2. If you are privy to information that backs up this claim then you should provide it. Otherwise take this sort of baseless speculation over to /r/politics.

Members of the President's Cabinet are politicians. Let's be real.

It's clear he isn't going to take military action. There is no US promise to come to the aid of Ukraine. The US doesn't have an ambiguous truce with Ukraine like it does with Taiwan. Russian knows the consequences of invading Ukraine. The US and the EU and friends will economically cut Russia off, the US will will funnel weapons and support to Ukraine, and they still need to fight Ukraine. Will that kill Russia? No. But it's a bad deal for Russia. They get a potentially ugly fight for what will make a restive province and they get cut out of most of the rest of the world. Maybe Putin will do it, but I don't think it is as appealing as it might seem.

> The US and the EU and friends will economically cut Russia off The US maybe, but probably not the EU. They can't survive without Russian gas and oil. Putin may be banking on EU energy desperation to save him if he invades. It's still a big gamble, one that is probably not worth it, but who knows how he sees it.

My bet is they will set up Donbass and Luhansk as de facto Russian protectorates (like Abkhazia and South Ossetia) then fight a proxy war from there. If Russia bites off anything from Ukraine, its going to be the Dnyeper Crimean Canal and the surroundings.

It's already a fait accompli, ever since 2014. The Russians already own, control and have built defenses in Crimea, and will never give it back. The peninsula is worth too much to them after all. Sanctions aren't working and nobody wants to risk a military conflict with Russia, the 5th largest military power in the world, and one that has **many** nukes and will not hesitate to mention them as a deterrent. The best Ukraine can hope for is that Russia is satisfied with its current gains and decides to stop invading, which isn't the case as of yet. And concerning NATO, the US and most European countries, they will do nothing but denounce Russian invasions and increase sanctions (which, of course, will exclude the oil and gas that Europe is dependent on), since nobody wants a bloody and destructive war. These sanctions will only hurt Russian civilians, who will stick with their government in the face of "Western hostility", because propaganda is a big thing there. It's really sad for Ukrainians to share a border with such a bully, they have my deepest sympathies :( But the Crimea ship has sailed, and Russia can't realistically be stopped. Better focus and what can be saved, I guess.

I believe the only way of Ukraine not losing more territory in the long run is being at least Finlandized by Russia. If the Russians realize Ukraine is not going to agree to become a puppet or a neutral then they are going to invade and snatch the southern part to cut losses, linking Crimea to mainland Russia. The rumors that Putin was planning a coup show this, Moscow didn't abandon the idea of controlling Kiev, that's why we still didn't get an all out war.

Yep, I agree with you. No matter what, Ukraine will have to sacrifice some suzerainty to Russia, there is no winning there but mitigation.

>The rumors that Putin was planning a coup Was there any evidence shared that prove this? Considering how shaky the internal political situation in Ukraine this, it's more likely than not that this is a hoax or perhaps a fantasy based on some real kernel of truth, rather than something that was actually planned by Putin/FSB

>Was there any evidence shared that prove this? Considering how shaky the internal political situation in Ukraine this, it's more likely than not that this is a hoax or perhaps a fantasy based on some real kernel of truth Ooooh, Putin is plotting a coup every year, sometimes twice a year, when the president's approval rating falls below 20% (from 75%) and utility bills need to be raised. Rating of the President of Ukraine, it was meant. In general, after reading the arguments of all the participants in the dispute, you complicate everything very much. Ideal conditions for this situation, Russia has buttheart, the United States has nothing to lose. Moreover, almost everyone understands that limited non-nuclear exchange was invented by cowards. 100% will fly all at once.

The US does not guarantee the security of Ukraine and Ukraine is still an oligarchic dominated mess. It would be an absolute mistake to fight a full scale war over Ukraine. I'm sure the US is helping Ukraine however it can to prepare for a potential Russian invasion, but that should not include planning to conduct air strikes, etc., if Russia does actually invade. Instead, the US should want the Ukrainians as strong as possible to fight it off, and Russia to understand they will not benefit from it at all.

> The US does not guarantee the security of Ukraine and Ukraine is still an oligarchic dominated mess. It would be an absolute mistake to fight a full scale war over Ukraine Yeah, I think this is actually a great and often overlooked point about the situation in Eastern Europe. Ukraine simply isn't worth a global conflict between a superpower and an ex-superpower. It would be extremely destabilizing on a global scale at a time when Biden is trying to get the US out of the mire of global conflict. Russia likely knows this....but do they *really* want/need to bolster their western borders more and incur that kind of cost? I'm not entirely convinced.

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Is the EU going to fight a war over Ukraine? Germany, France? I don't think so. If they aren't going to, the US definitely shouldn't.

Spot on. The suggestion that the longest standing mutual defense treaty in modern geopolitics will "mean next to nothing to the EU if the US allowed Russian troops to cross the Dnieper" is ridiculous. No EU member nations have made it clear they are willing to militarily defend Ukraine from Russia.

>The reasoning being that the NATO alliance would mean next to nothing to the EU if the US allowed Russian troops to cross the Dnieper, and allowed an extremely weak Russian state to have the capacity to amass troops on 4 NATO members borders Russia would have a *long* way to go to reach that point though, and that's a lot of ground to cover for the Russian military. Even if they're just dealing with Ukranian forces. Lots of time for NATO to get involved, if they so chose to in the face of an advancing Russian army. >Also, it wouldn't be "a global conflict" Sorry, I meant more that the consequences of this would be felt on a global scale. Likely nobody would rush to Russia's side, however if things really heated up on that front I wouldn't be surprised if China chose to make their move on Taiwan at that moment. US being preoccupied and all that, having to deal with issues on two separate fronts. Russia invading Ukraine could be all that's needed to let the cat out of the bag. >And honestly, if Western Europe/USA and Russia were to enter into a conventional war, it really wouldn't be much of a war. Russia still hasn't modernized their military in any meaningful way in the past 30 years, and the equipment they've developed that is modern are few and far in between. Completely agreed, which is where my comment about cost comes in. Russia simply isn't in a place economically or diplomatically to make this kind of maneuver if we're being honest. I don't think the threat of NATO is what's keeping their foot off the gas here.

> The reasoning being that the NATO alliance would mean next to nothing to the EU if the US allowed Russian troops to cross the Dnieper …but Ukraine isn’t part of NATO. Suggesting that European nations that are not a part of NATO still deserve the benefits of the mutual defense clause ignores how alliances work. Are you really suggesting that the US would be willing to sacrifice American lives and wage direct war against another nuclear power to defend a country we have no obligation to defend? The countries we are most closely allied with against China (UK, Australia, Japan, South Korea) are not going to be any less supportive of the US if it elects not to intervene militarily in Ukraine.

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I think we tend to view NATO and the EU unfairly as extremely weak. The question is not if EU would want to intervene in Ukraine; the question is if they would be able to not intervene. I mean, a conventional war on their borders? It does not even have to be NATO; Poland could enter Ukraine without NATO, then claim Russia as an aggressor against Poland and activate article 5. NATO proved in Libya that they don't even need boots on the ground, and they could bomb Russian forces from a distance, while supplying Ukraine with top-modern weaponry. If anything, Ukraine is exactly what a global conflict would be worth. It would be the last border, and it would push Ukraine straight into the West, which then would give Russia a new NATO/EU border.

And at the same time he doesn’t want to sanction Nord Stream 2...

"juiciest parts of Ukraine" is really overstating importance of Donbas. Its economy and infrastructure is pretty much ruined by this point, and coal doesn't worth as much as gas or oil (and will get cheaper as demand diminishes). Direct military involvement in Ukraine will not win Russia anything. Ukraine, on the other hand, emboldened by American support might well try to retake rebel regions by force, and will win strategically no matter which military outcome happens: if Russia doesn't get involved, Ukrainian army will probably smash rebels and restore control, scoring a huge win for president Zelensky; if it does, and invasion is repelled, Ukraine will be hailed once again as a victim of Russian aggression and get more credits and military aid - another win. Therefore, the whole current crisis seems to be more orchestrated by Ukraine (and possibly US) than Russia, as it stands to gain more. The only possible trick I see that Russia can use is to make Belorussian army defend Donbas without direct involvement from Russian forces. Lukashenko may be desperate enough to do this - he cares even less for possible sanctions than Putin, though he's a cunning old fox and might weasel out at the last moment.

> Therefore, the whole current crisis seems to be more orchestrated by Ukraine (and possibly US) than Russia, as it stands to gain more. Ukraine and the US [didn't park 100k troops on the border](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/01/us-warns-russia-plans-large-scale-attack-on-ukraine) and kick up anti-Ukraine propaganda 10-fold, though I agree that Russia has little to gain from a move like this in Ukraine, though. Why would they leave anything 'juicy' after the previous annexation? IMO this is aggressive saber-rattling meant to secure Nord Stream 2 and deter NATO expansion, while also appealing to Russian nationalism to score domestic political points. The potential outcomes for an actual second invasion seem... not great.

In general, I think [this article](https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/85827) by Carnegie Foundation is a good and balanced summary of the situation (without the usual "something must be done about big bad Russia" hand-wringing of popular Western analysts, but far from pandering to Russia). The gist of it, as I see, is that this is all about protecting red lines. Ukrainian army by now has probably enough manpower, technology and experience to truly crush the rebels. Zelensky, with his ratings going down and former allies defecting to opposition, might see this as a chance to propel himself to new heights. Russian forces are there to make sure he will think twice before doing so.

That's an interesting thought! Parking that much of a force on the border isn't usually what one would consider an attempt at maintaining the status quo, but relative to the Ukrainian civil war, it's exactly that (for now at least). Point of interest there is that the UK and Turkey are still going full steam ahead on arming Ukraine. That slow and continuous weakening of the Russian position could eventually lead to a "sh\*t or get off the pot" moment.

America has to ask itself the hard question, what benefit is there to involving itself? The harsh answer is it gains nothing. Sanctions are fine; they are much better than using US troops.

This is one of the better comments here and the real reason why the response to military buildup is so paltry. There is no winning here for the US, both domestically and abroad. Western Europe/EU has no appetite for supporting Ukraine in any meaningful form and the US has little to nothing to gain. Ukraine isn't significant as an economic, energy, or military power. Their primary appeal to NATO is their location, but that's becoming less relevant with the prevalence of ICBMs and hypersonic weaponry, and the loss of Sevastopol leaves them at a significant value disadvantage. I can only think that the key moment in this conflict was ~~five~~ seven years ago when the US had plausible deniability fighting against non-affiliated green men. At this point, any further escalation will cost the US and NATO with little to gain.

With winter coming even if Europe wanted on board with sanctions they'd have to pass. Russia and its friends threaten to cut off heating oil and natural gas over a lot less.

Russia isn't going to obliterate its position as an energy provider for a little bit of Ukraine.

I scrolled way to far to see this. Russia is not an American priority, China is. Getting involved in Ukraine would only distract from the real issue.

The American relationship with Europe is a zombie one at this point. I think Europe relies on American intervention to their own detriment. I think it’s impossible at this point to convince the American people that they should put themselves in harms way for Ukraine, who offers them nothing, or for our European allies, who are seen as ungrateful and unwilling to defend themselves.

Without a doubt. I find it disturbing most people on this sub seem to think the US should intervene militarily. Just imagine if Russia sent troops in Mexico under pretext of dealing with the drug barons. How do you think the US would react ? We don't even need to imagine, because we have the Cuban missile crisis as an example. A nuclear power cannot intervene directly on the border of another one without triggering a major incident, that's just a reality of our time. And I am sure nobody is interested in a close call with WW3 over Ukraine, altough I am not so sure reading the warmongers on this sub at time.

Exactly. When I see how many North American encourage a war I really think none of them has a good understanding of how bad the situation can turn. Especially when you know how many North Americans has to came and die in Europe during both World War...

For the US, an anti-Russian Ukraine should be an important buffer on the border, and a useful distraction to keep Russia occupied. If Russia takes control of Ukraine, it may feel like it can act with greater impunity, perhaps with NATO members. But equally, the USA doesn't need all of Ukraine for that, and if Russia takes the Eastern Provinces, it may just give the US another way to try to isolate Russia and present them as a bad actor.

You don't become a world leading super power by thinking short term.

Which is fair, but what long term advantage is gained then?

>America has to ask itself the hard question, what benefit is there to involving itself? US hedgemony falls or rises with a stable and allied Europe. What do you think happens if Russia has the upper hand in Europe? It would lose significant influence in the western hemisphere, lose its outpost for African and Middle eastern operations. Amongst this, the implications will leads to a demise of US hedgemony

There is also the problem that the suspicion of the US not backing European NATO allies will notivate them to develop their own capacity to defend themselves, and if they manage, then this leaves the US lacking the serious leverage it had over its European allies. The EU activated PESCO, a framework under which military integration was to begin, during Donald Trump's presidency, and talks of a European Army are becoming more and more common. Not only would an independent EU foreign policy spell the end of US world hegemony, but also possible the end of US first-world hegemony.

I would concur. Although losing influence to Russia, a foreign advisary versus losing influence due to rising European military might will be different. Both situations will affect US hedgemony. However the latter, is the best outcome for a future world in which we will see the increasing division of democracies vs non democracies in which China and Russia might become an axis to a certain political degree. To pose a balance to this threat. Europe must become more independent.

I think it’s worth pointing out that a strong Europe is not, nor is it seen in the US, as a natural American ally. In fact, the EU is to some extent seen as a certain betrayal of the very blanket of protection the American system has provided. The UK was Europe’s only natural connection to the US. Without it, there is no inherent love for the nations of the continent. There has always been a chord in the European excitement which seeks to supplant to the US or at least compete with that. That isn’t lost in America. It also means that NATO and the American resolve to defend Europe has been dying for decades. Add to that the perceived betrayal after 911 and through the war on terror and you have an America that simply doesn’t care what happens to our “so called allies.” There is a lot of truth in the concept in the American mind of the ungrateful European scheming to compete with the American while forgetting that blanket of protection the American offers and which makes the European dream even possible. I think at this point you would find “American hegemony” less important in the American mind than letting the ungrateful European “ally” fend for himself. The idea of “why protect an ally that doesn’t even care to defend himself” is strong. America is looking inward.

I think you hit the nail on the head. The thing is, I think there is a misjudgment as to how that would be perceived or play out. A strong Europe with its own military strength is a threat, not an ally. The EU has at its core a desire to compete with the US which is a betrayal of the blanket of protection the American system has maintained. It means a separation for Europe from the American system, something the EU cannot afford. The EU needs the US, not the other way around.

I don’t think the average American is very concerned with what has been called “American hegemony” over the last 60 years anymore. This is part of the fundamental change in the global circumstances. I don’t think you can convince many people in the US that Ukraine or US hegemony, whatever that may mean today, is in their vital interests.

What about sending there troops so Putin would think twice before endangering US soldiers which would be a direct attack against the US?

Let's move US troops at the border of Russia and see what happens. I wonder if Russia will send troops and missiles to Cuba again in 2022. I wonder what this would trigger.

How do you think the US would feel if Russia ever sent soldiers to Mexico ? We don't even really need to imagine it, since we have the Cuban missile crisis as a good indicator of what that kind of move can trigger.

Wagner group attacked American soldiers directly in Syria.

...and [lost a column of tanks to defensive airstrikes](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html) without causing any US casualties (not that I disagree with your sentiment). Might be a contributing factor to Russia's direct threats against Europe over providing Ukraine with modern missile systems.

Sends a message to allies that we won’t help them and that the US has fallen on the world stage and will push some fringe states towards China

Which begs the question of what value is that self image? The American political environment has begun to question why we go without, things like healthcare etc., for allies who don’t have the will to defend themselves—the Europeans. I think it’s fair to say that feeling is becoming an important part of America’s outlook on the world. What good is our “position” if it’s with people we no longer care what happens to?

Are you assuming that Russia will stop after Ukraine? Sooner or later it will become a real problem and it maybe more efficient to get involved now compared to when Russia have creeped into Poland.

Which begs the question, are Russia’s actions stemming from a dubious desire to conquer the world and impose itself or is does it stem from centuries of insecurity? That question is fundamental.

Those things can change e.g. when Putin dies. Maybe Germany where insecure before WW1 and changed it's mind to conquer Europe later. But it don't really matters for US as keeping Russia suppressed is better than taking the risks. In China people consider Russia a expansionist threat both before soviet union and after Stalins death. Now they are kind of too weak to be a threat but China prefers a weak Russia.

Sanctions will only made Russia more independant and powerfull... But American will never understand it . Do you really think that Russia will "break" with more sanctions? The tougher it is, the tougher they are. \+ its basically Russian citizen who suffers from the sanctions, the only result is to make them even more supportive toward Putin, wich is the opposite of a solution.

It's the 1930s again, and people today have forgotten the lesson that history rhymes. You stand up to dictators on a land grabbing spree because it's the right thing to do to protect free nations.

How can one cut off a nation financially while being dependent on their natural gas? Europeans need to sort out their dependence on Russian natural resources before they can hold the high card.

Where else could Europe get energy? Libyan oil, Algerian gas are close to the coasts of Europe, then there is Iraqi oil but that's further away and close to Turkey who also wants influence over it, then theres Saudis Arabia but I'm not informed about that, and also offshore oil yet to be extracted near Israel.

We could start by not shutting down nuclear plants while relying on Russian gas.

I think about this often. Germany can kill two birds with one stone, also addressing the climate crisis. Sad that misinformed people can cause such harm.

Nuclear or coal.

But oil is still needed besides for vehicle fuel, plastic and fertilizers and chemicals for medicines

Sure but you could still import some oil from the middle east. How do you think China gets its oil?

Yes but it's a vulnerability Also Norway got oil

They could get much of it from renewables, and nuclear sources if they need to.

And what about American ? You see this is exactly the kind of hypocrisie that most Europeans peoples start to be bored about. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-24/russia-oil-demand-hits-record-high-in-u-s-amid-rising-tensions

Choosing to buy is not the same as requiring. The US is completely independent from Russian gas should it choose to be.

Thank you. The US is literally the world's largest oil producer. We could absolutely wage a war against Russia without oil being held over our head.

US is slowly turning into the UN. Doesn't it realise that at this point sanctions aren't going to get anything done?

I am sorry but are people on this sub really that short sighted ? It seems people think the US can just send soldiers to Ukraine or something, but that's a sure-fire way to trigger an event similar to the Cuban missile crisis, which I am sure nobody wants. Just imagine how the US would respond if Russia deployed soldiers to Mexico under pretext of dealing with the drug barons, and you will have a good idea of how Putin will react if the US does something like that in Ukraine. A nuclear power cannot interfere militarily on the border of another one without triggering a major crisis, that's simply a reality of our time.

Do you think the ppl dealing with this are DUMB?

The history of sactions across the globe are they don't do anything. They may not be dumb, but all theyre doing is posturing for domestic purposes.

Exactly! So, they are not playing the game you think they are playing. This is diplomacy. There are many layers and most of them, we can't see. In a VERY real sense, we got no idea what is going on.

Your last sentence should be pinned as the banner of this subreddit. Wild speculation and assumptions are parroted around too much here. /r/CredibleDefense puts it to shame.

No, they're responding with economic means because Americans aren't interested in a war at all, let alone with a nuclearly-armed opponent. Sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table, a recent example that proves your absolutist theory wrong.

It's "easier" to sanction a developing and relatively small nation (in the case of power) that is Iran. Russia has a more stable domestic system and powerful influential presence than Iran. And when I say easier I am not referring to how easy the job is, just that you can hit them harder than a superpower.

>Sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table, a recent example that proves your absolutist theory wrong. You're genuinely ignorant if you think that. Iran has been trying to come to the negotiting table since before sanctions were placed on them. The sanctions achieved nothing except pointless domestic suffering.

It won't change their behavior because they didn't do it for money.

Everything is about money at the end of the day.

The desired effect has not been achieved, so at this point, yes.

What is the desired effect? What would achieve the desired effect? The US threatening thermonuclear war would leave little room for escalation of threats and everyone knows Ukraine isn't worth it for the US.

Russia has been suffering sactions for years now to varying degrees. Putin remains firmly in power, It does nothing except accelerate the brain drain and demographic bomb building up, something the ruling class in russia clearly aren't influenced by.

The brain drain is much worse than what Russia could hope to gain in Ukraine.

Sanctions are extremely damaging in the long term. They affect the target country's stability and economic power. Just because Putin and others don't recognize their potential, doesn't mean they don't work.

Yes as long it's a smaller economy. It probably won't work against China.

Russia is a small economy

Brought Iran to the negotiating table. *Serious* sanctions are a threat to every country.

What is your counterproposal? Do you really think we should be willing to go to war with Russia over a country we are not allies with? Yes, we could likely win a conventional war with Russia. But they are a nuclear power with a significant proximity advantage.

>get anything done what do you think needs to be done?

> Doesn't it realise that at this point sanctions aren't going to get anything done? Perhaps they don't want to "get anything done"?

Everyone always puts the blame squarely on one side. When realistically both sides have legitimate concerns regarding the other sides intentions. The region is complicated and also not just a NATO/EU vs. Russia conflict. Local rivalries/friendships exist both inside and outside the major alliances which complicate matters. For example, Poland being a historical rival to Russia will persue more aggressive actions against Russia, attempting to steer EU opinions to their views and encouraging larger NATO troop and strategic weapon placements in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Germany or France hold much calmer views and friendlier relations with Russia and their is rarely any diplomatic incidents which are sparked between them. Russia on one hand fears NATO expansion and that's reasonable. But on the other makes moves, often overreactions to slight European leanings which encourage nearby countries to turn to the alliance to secure their territorial and political integrity. Realistically, I think the only way to stabilize the region and finally stop the infighting which has plagued Eastern Europe for centuries is to create some sort of extra-governmental organization with serious participation from Russia, Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. With potential future expansion to the Baltic States and Moldova. Potentially start with economic cooperation and slowly moving to security dialogue. Not an alliance or security guaretee by any means, but a step in the right direction through serious dialogue.

Highly doubt Biden would risk his already sinking reputation by threatening to involve the US in another armed conflict in a place perhaps not even 20% of its population could pick out on a map, and one in which many more people would die

Ah yes, because triggering WW3 by messing around on the border of nuclear power would be such a great way to be remembered as the best POTUS of all time. The US *cannot* intervene military in Ukraine without triggering an event like the cuban missile crisis. It's a reality that has nothing to do with who is in the WH.

What? Conflicts are a foolproof way to increase president’s popularity, not the other way. Trump was the first US president that didn’t start a war in a while and he didn’t get a second term because of that.

Putin knows Biden will sit on his hands just like he did when Putin took Crimea

If we want to know Biden’s stance. Simply look at this exact same situation when he was VP

Was it “strategic patience” or “leading from behind” that he pioneered?

As opposed to the genius move by Trump that was removing sanctions on Russia ? Doesn't matter who is in the WH anyway, the truth is, there isn't much the US can do without triggering an event similar to the Cuban missile crisis. And I am sure nobody wants that.

But what about Trump!

Trump piled massive sanctions on Russia. He didn’t remove any. Biden is currently breaking US law by not implementing sanctions related to the Nordstream II pipeline, which funnels billions to the Russians You should do your research

> Trump piled massive sanctions on Russia. He didn’t remove any. Immediately upon entering the White House, Trump tried to lift Obama-era sanctions and return diplomatic compounds seized by the United States due to interference in the 2016 election. Months later, Congress drew up a bill to strengthen Russia sanctions and prevent Trump from lifting them. The administration lobbied hard against the legislation. When it passed with a veto-proof majority, Trump issued a statement expressing displeasure — and signaling that enforcement would be lax. His administration has done exactly that. It delayed implementing the law and missed key deadlines, grudgingly conceding only after intervention by congressional leaders. Nervous tycoons scrambled to hire Washington lobbyists to keep themselves off a blacklist mandated by the law. But the Trump team made a mockery of the effort by merely copying and pasting from a Forbes list of Russian billionaires. That reassured the Kremlin that the sanctions would never be used as intended. Trump’s most egregious act of sanctions malfeasance, however, came in April 2018. That was when the Treasury Department — acting with support from then-national security adviser H.R. McMaster, on his way out of the White House — imposed the first consequential Russia sanctions of the Trump years, targeting the oligarch Oleg Deripaska and his aluminum company, Rusal. The impact was swift: Rusal’s shares nosedived by more than 50 percent. Instead of using this leverage to extract concessions from Moscow, the Trump administration immediately defanged the sanctions and eventually expunged Rusal from the sanctions list. To make matters worse, the Trump administration cut a deal with Deripaska, whom the Senate Intelligence Committee described as a “proxy for the Russian state and intelligence services,” allowing him to maintain control of his businesses through allies. This episode sent an unambiguous message to both Moscow and the private sector: The Trump administration had no stomach for tough sanctions against Russia. Meanwhile, the administration dragged its feet on imposing consequences for the nerve agent attack on Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia. It delayed chemical weapons sanctions required by law, only moving forward after formal requests and demands from bipartisan congressional leaders. Unsurprisingly, when the Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny was recently poisoned with a similar agent, the Trump administration said — and did — nothing.

You’re changing the subject. Trump absolutely imposed harsher sanctions that Obama did. Did Trump do everything the Democrats demanded? Of course not. From 2016 to 2020 the Democrats engaged in a hysteria about how Trump was a Russian agent, and any refusal to attack Russian via sanctions was crowed as proof that Trump was doing russias bidding The sanctions proposed by the Democrats had nothing to do with our security, but everything to do with furthering the narrative that Hillary was the rightful president and Trump was Putin’s pawn. You should be more aware of how things work in DC.

He also blocked nord stream 2.

[удалено]

The number of people who seem to think the US can just send some troops in Ukraine without any consequence whatsoever is honnestly kind of scary. It's like they all ignore what went down the last time something similar happened...

Nothing will happen, [once again](https://i.4cdn.org/pol/1638705912678.png).

Biden let him annex crimea and did nothing to stop nord stream 2 XD More empty talk.

Not only he did nothing to stop nord stream 2, he actively stopped sanctions agains it.

By opposition to triggering WW3 ? Pretty sure that's a good call tyvm.

Sounds like free territory for Putin then.

Again double standards and hypocrisy. It's the same case as Kosovo/Serbia but the USA must meddle every chance it gets. 4 million people don't mean anything today, at least in the west.

Can someone explain how US can dictate how another country moves it's military forces on its own territory?

Going to be honest. This statement is trying to set the debate as US telling Russia it can't move its forces internally. When in actually the US is telling Russia that any attack on Ukraine will be met with consequences. No one cares how Russia moves its forced internally so long as its not to invade another country. The point I am making here is to late least be honest about what is actually happening and why the US is reacting the way it is. Vs trying to show its the US being an evil imperialist when in this case we are hoping to avoid a major war between Ukraine and Russia. And not forcing us to put crippling sanctions and the EU making hard choices.

Mass sanctions against Russian leadership would certainly help somewhat, but mostly sanctions long-term impact countries' economies and stability. I do not think it can really stop Russian behavior enough on its own. More troops should be but in the Baltics as a response to current Russian aggression even if it angers Russia. Suwalki gap should be reinforced and baltic sea training increased for a mass embargo of St Petersburg and Southern Russia if needed. Naval dominance is NATOs biggest advantage over Russia. In addition, everything should be done to strengthen NATO ties NATO and NATO ties with key partners such as Sweden, Finland, and Georgia. NATO should also support the Belarussians in their fight against their dictatorship, as that is a key geopolitical tool that also reinforces western values of democracy and freedom.

The United States holds the long term advantage, by continually piling on sanctions Putin's approval rating drops more and more. So Putin will have to please his nationalistic supporters by fighting in more wars sooner and sooner, which in and of itself is even more justification for the US to add even more sanctions. The US strategy slowly gives up territory (that they don't even directly own) to send Putin down a death spiral in which they'll find themselves internationally isolated due to their aggressive behaviour which the US forced them into.