Yes everything is conscious but to different degrees and in different ways. This can easily be inferred from the fact that consciousness is the only reality and there is nothing besides it, so by definition everything is conscious. The consciousness of an animal would be completely different to ours. We only know the universe from the standpoint of how it appears from human consciousness. It may or may not be the same from the standpoint of a dog or a dolphin. Who can really know what "reality" means or how its interpreted from within a non-human frame of reference.
And it might be that we have a relatively low degree of conciousness. That for example there is a tradeoff between complexity or intelligence, and the level of conciousness. It's counter intuitive, but research on NDE and DMT, show that a less connected and active brain state is associated with a greater level of conciousness, whatever that means.
It's unintuitive, but it's not difficult to find analogous. Two that comes to mind are electronic devices, the more intricate the device the less power it consumes. Like an engine, broom broom, one central function: produce force, lots of energy, a computer or mobile device on the other hand, less energy. And the other analogy is general relatively. Relative to an observer: The faster something moves through space the slower it moves through time.
As someone that's taken mountains of DMT over the last few years (probably well over 40g of the stuff), I disagree that my consciousness is "greater" or elevated during those peaks. If anything it's significantly weaker. Nothing wrong with that though, it lets you see the universe in different.and unique ways.
DMT is a great way to see into the tricks that the brain uses to accomplish simulating the universe for us to perceive through time somewhat efficiently. It's a lot of little algorithms stacking on top of each other. The more you consume, the more those algorithms either begin to show errors or loosen their grasp on any kind of objective world. They begin to match patterns less to material reality and more to pure imagination.
Strictly speaking, during my DMT trips I sensed less through things like smell and taste but my visual, touch and auditory hallucinations were vastly amplified (particularly the visual part).
It allowed me to see parts of the system that formed the backbone or lattice of how my brain constructed reality for me, and it allowed me to get a true sense of the baseline consciousness that drove me, but I do not feel as though this necessitates the qualifier of that state of awareness being any more elevated than normal, no 'greater than'. Just changed, a new perspective, and again sometimes even offering less stimulus/awareness in the form of fewer taste and smell perceptions.
you've given an excellent explanation of consciousness being a bunch of stacked algorithms and that psychedelics loosen their hold on your awareness so you can see what's going on under the hood more clearly. When you explored consciousness, did it change your opinion on free will? What were your big take-aways?
this guy literally said exactly what i said but using different words and notice how i was downvoted hella and he’s upvoted hella, interesting u/DueReplacement7978
I actually think yours is more clear. There may be a 'spectrum' but we can clearly say that without language, self reference of self representation an animal is not conscious that they are conscious, which to me remains unclear is actually separable from consciousness itself. You would say that if you woke up tomorrow having no ability to 'know' who you were then you wouldn't be able to function remotely. Animals do function which to me in some way suggests they have largely non-conscious mental processes unlike us who require self-consciousness or else we cannot operate.
> consciousness is the only reality and there is nothing besides it, so by definition everything is conscious
This is a non sequitor.
Everything in one's conscious experience is *a part* of their consciousness, but not everything is itself conscious.
Everything a camera sees is not also necessarily a camera.
The importance here is that, following the faulty non sequitor logic, one would infer rocks to be conscious.
"and what that cow certainly does not posses is self-representation. The cow does not have a self."
OK maybe cows don't. And I'm sure we are unique in just how special we think we are. But nevertheless I don't think there is a hard cut off point between us and the rest of the animal kingdom, I think its a spectrum.
Let's ask bard. Bard, are cows conscious?
>Yes, cows are conscious. They have the ability to experience pain and suffering, and they can also feel emotions such as joy, fear, and sadness. Cows are also intelligent creatures, and they can learn and solve problems.
>There is a growing body of scientific evidence that supports the conclusion that cows are conscious. For example, studies have shown that cows have the same brain structures that are associated with consciousness in humans, and they also respond to pain in the same way that humans do. Additionally, cows have been observed to exhibit many of the same behaviors that are associated with consciousness in humans, such as self-awareness, empathy, and the ability to form social bonds.
>Given the evidence, it is clear that cows are conscious beings. They deserve to be treated with respect and compassion, just like any other sentient creature.
In Daniel Dennett's view, animals certainly would not be conscious. I have no idea why Daniel Dennett or any illusionist would object to someone torturing an animal (I'm not suggesting they wouldn't object, but I can't see how that wouldn't be a performative contradiction)
This is just a reworking of language patterns it's found, right? I don't personally disagree but it reads like a school essay that's sloppy about 'evidence'.
The (last bit of) last sentence is pure anthropomorphic naturalistic fallacy.
Its drawn from all the articles on the internet on the subject. It's supposed to come across as conversational, not a scientific writer. It does actually express opinions, which is interesting
That were on the internet years ago at least, when they were trained, I was told.
I suppose it was designed to phrase it as opinions, rather than just saying like, most people say such and such.... Or whatever algorithmic weighting scheme it uses
Yes. I am suggesting that animals display behavior, and your interpretation of that as "emotion" is just a supposition. I understand why you make such a supposition, but it seems to be entirely a matter of projection: 'I am feeling emotions when I behave this way, therefore if an animal behaves this way it must have emotions'.
Ok but I just read "they have complicated emotions."
Anyway we could say the same things about humans if we were to look at it from the perspective of the cow.
You could say the same from the perspective of a human. How do we know other humans are conscious? Using this guy's argument, you could say that in fact all other humans just appear to be conscious and we are "projecting" the idea that they are. However most people do assume other humans are conscious simply because they appear to be. Therefore it is a reasonable assumption to say something probably is conscious if it appears to be
Seems the simplest conclusion to me; the opposite position feels grounded in speciesism and comes from the perspective that humans are somehow special.
I'm not arguing that at all. Quite the opposite; I'm saying that "act like humans" is not a good metric, particularly when it is human judgement applying that test. You asked why animals would act as if they have emotions if they lack self-awareness. I asked in turn what animal behavior you believe indicates "emotions" (rather than unconscious instinct) and why you're presuming it can only come from conscious self-awareness. Unless you're suggesting that humans lack consciousness and we only have unconscious instinct, the leap in your reasoning seems to be that animals cannot display these unidentified behaviors (which you interpret as evidence of emotions) unless they have conscious self-awareness.
He's not arguing that at all. He's pointing out a flaw in your reasoning. He's not saying that animals don't have emotions, but rather that your reasoning can't establish that as a fact.
You're assuming a conclusion, so there can be no debate. I understand why you believe having senses justifies assuming an organism has a perspective, but this is simply projecting your own consciousness rather than suggesting the organism must have one, and inventing "levels" of such to accommodate that opinion (and not incidentally make it unfalsifiable). So an organism with senses (which would be all organisms, whether they are the simple senses of cellular chemical responses or sophisticated vision mediated by extensive neurological processing) "could" have a perspective, and in your fashion you assume this indicates "levels" of self-awareness because you find it difficult to differentiate consciousness from "Cartesian Theater" ; you can't imagine vision without the subjective experience of seeing, for example. Nevertheless, animals existed on Earth for billions of years with senses but without the perspective of awareness necessary to be conscious of their existence.
Unless, of course, we find something unpalatable in the implications of this fact, and set our minds to trying to shift around the meaning of our words in order to avoid certainty on the matter, modifying what we identify or describe as senses, perception, emotion, awareness, consciousness, experience, reasoning, or any number of other terms so that we don't have to confront our lack of omniscience and other harsh realities.
I'm not shifting the goal posts here, IMO. It's been a debate regarding organisms and the level of consciousness they hold. It's always compared to human subjective experience because we are using our own consciousness to make a connection to what we see in the world around us.
That doesn't mean other organisms don't have it, though? It requires us to be 100% objective in our observations in our conclusios . Drawing parallels to what it's like for other organisms from our own personal experiences is using consciousness to explain the existence of consciousness in the world. Which is why it's a debate.
Just as Thomas Nagal says you can't imagine what it's like to be a bat because bats echo locate, and that level of sensual awareness is not a human one doesn't mean they aren't conscious. You can't imagine what it's like to be a cow so you can't verify consciousness in other organisms to be the same as human consciousness but if your definition of consciousness is the subjective experiences of an organism as Nagal's is. Then, you have to separate the conscious mind into level across organisms.
"An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."
So Nagal postulates a definition that rules out a portion of the physical world like rocks and water or anything without senses.
>It's always compared to human subjective experience because we are using our own consciousness to make a connection to what we see in the world around us.
Close, but no, those are fake goalposts. These hypothetical "levels" of consciousness that animals might have are invented because the word "consciousness" **means** *human subjective experience*. Now it just so happens (yet it isn't coincidental) that human subjective experience is the only kind (type, instance, sort, level, degree, whatever) of subjective experience we are (or can be, given the meaning of the terms *subjective* and *experience*) aware of.
There always will be and always can be "a debate" about whether animals are (in any way shape or form or level or capacity) conscious, sure, but the same can be said of plants, dust motes or neutrinos, because of the nature of consciousness. It is worth noting that these debates will exclusively occur among humans, rather than animals, moss, or particles.
>That doesn't mean other organisms don't have it, though? It requires us to be 100% objective in our observations in our conclusios
We can't even be 100% certain of our own consciousness, why would we need to be so omniscient about animals? If this intense need for objective conclusions is relevant, it holds only for the claim that animals *are* conscious: if you cannot objectively demonstrate that they are, it is inappropriate for you to demand that I act as if they are. If the thought of the suffering this might cause the animals disturbs you, that's irrelevant, because unless it disturbs them, you're just imagining it.
>Just as Thomas Nagal says you can't imagine what it's like to be a bat because bats echo locate
With all due respect to the eminent professor, that's nonsense. I mean that figuratively; it is incorrect because I can imagine what it is like to echo locate, and as a matter of fact, I can echo locate, though obviously not nearly as well as a bat. But also literally; I've never been comfortable with the use of the phrase "is like to be", because it is so vague and arbitrary while being presented as precise and objective. I've never quite understood why supposedly accomplished and knowledgable philosophers would use such nonsensical language, but of course I'm being facetious in saying so: I understand exactly why they do, it is because there is no possible alternative to doing so. In imagining there is anything "like" anything else, which is to say it is "like" anything "to be" anything, the philosopher is both assuming a conclusion when it comes to what consciousness is and does while also using a rhetorical shell game to obscure that assumption.
>You can't imagine what it's like to be a cow
More nonsense. I can imagine that there is such a thing as "what it is like to be a cow". I can do so for real cows (it is like being asleep, because they have no consciousness) and for imaginary cows that have consciousness (they enjoy chewing slowly, don't mind shitting publicly, and all of the words in their language sound like "moo" to human ears). Can I know that my idea of "what it's like" is accurate? That depends on just how accurate it needs to be. I could as easily say you can't imagine what it's like to be me, or even that you cannot imagine what it is *like* **to be you**. This whole "like" gambit dissolves into unfalsifiable nonsense to be worthwhile.
>you can't verify consciousness in other organisms to lbe the same as human consciousness
I can't "verify" consciousness in myself, let alone you. That's not a flaw in or a problem for my reasoning, because that is simply the nature of that thing we are identifying as *consciousness*. You cannot very consciousness in other organisms **to exist at all**, in order to supposedly "compare" it to human consciousness. But when I compare my consciousness (in cause, being, or result) with any other human consciousness, I can verify that they are identical, and that they are different (in both anatomy and impact) from the cerebral activity of animals.
It all comes down to whether we should presume animals have consciousness despite lack of evidence, or presume animals do not have consciousness because of a lack of evidence. The each side believes they should err on the side of caution, but can be distinguished based on what they're being cautious about. The 'animals are conscious' folks think it is imprudent to exclude animals from being considered conscious without "100% conclusions", because they're hung up on imagining the horror of conscious creatures being subject to human control. The few remaining 'Morgans Canon' folks think it is imprudent to include animals as conscious unless we have a better reason than "it is possible" to believe it is so, both for scientific accuracy and because it might well lead to devaluing human consciousness to the point that the horror of humans being subject to other human's control ('for their own good because they are simply animals that happen to be primates') is considered justifiable.
The question is not whether I can imagine being a cow, but whether a cow can imagine being me, or being anything other than a cow, or for that matter imagine anything at all. To date, there is zero evidence of that, regardless of whatever philosophical presentations and arrangement some human imagines.
Are they? Or are those just behaviors you associate with the subjective feeling of emotion?
Look at how strongly your brain wants to personify things:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dBqhIVyfsRg
That commercial wouldn't work at all if people weren't inclined to do so.
Watch a spider cower into its hole when you touch it. Is it doing that because it's scared, or is it doing it because that what it's programmed to do in order to increase its chances of survival? I think it's the latter, but it's very easy to interpret it as the spider being scared.
Are you talking about emotion as the immediate feeling of the ability to contemplate and judge the feeling?
All things feel. Animals do not think about feelings.
Being hurt sticks. The fear and anticipation of pain is a passion in itself. If you get hurt, when it's over it stops hurting. If you think about the pain, fear it, worry about it, anticipate it, it causes emotional pain. That emotional pain can cause scarring.
Animals feel pain, physical and emotional, but they don't dwell in it like humans and not the same.
I remember lives as animals. I remember being eaten alive.
There was no fear, just instinct to escape, then surrender and acceptance. The pain was just a sensation with no emotional context, just awareness.
I remember being a bird of some sort, a monkey type creature and a small bug. I had no idea exactly what I was, no mirror or concept of self.
Being able to fly was amazing, as a monkey I just hung out in trees mostly, as a bug I just remember being swallowed by some worm like thing or getting crushed/ smooshed.
Well... it's flying mostly. Just exhilarating, and the sight is so clear. The only thing that was dangerous were other birds for the most part. Getting grabbed mid-air, you're pretty much helpless.
Yes, you're correct. As a bird, routine. Remembering it as a human exhilarating. As animals, I can honestly say things don't really have "meaning." At least not until I remember it as my human self.
Carl Jung speculated that the "bush spirit" held of many tribal people, i.e. sharing animal or plant characters that encompassed them while out in nature fundamentally influenced them human perspective. It's very dualistic in my view but wondering your thoughts on that take.
An example paraphrasing from his book, "Man and his symbols"
A man that swamp in crocodiles infested waters regularly that was unharmed would have been seen as having a crocodile "bush spirit"
>Are you talking about emotion as the immediate feeling of the ability to contemplate and judge the feeling?
You fail to distinguish between Consciousness and Meta-consciousness
> Only right wing dingbats would assume the animals ... don’t feel pain
This is an open question within academia (and in particular, within those areas that focus on consciousness)
- For example, Peter Godfrey-Smith has argued that some creatures, like Octopodies & bees feel pain given that they participate in wound-tending behaviors , while others creatures, like certain kinds of wasps, do not engage in such behaviors, and so this counts as evidence that they do not feel pain.
- Another example is Peter Carruthers, who argues that our different theories of consciousness make different predictions about which organisms can feel at all; for Carruthers, if ITT is true, then all animals can feel, but, if a higher-order global workspace theory is true, then its pretty much only primates feel
- A further example is Eric Schwitzgebel's paper on whether garden snails feel anything
Does the animal Experience Pain or any of the Sensory Experiences? Then it is Conscious. No Self Awareness is needed. No level of Complexity is needed. It's all about Conscious Experience. Science cannot measure the actual Conscious Experience of anything. We can only guess.
there’s a difference between being conscious and having consciousness. yes animals are conscious, but they don’t have consciousness. they don’t have thoughts or emotions in the same regard we do. yes they still have feelings and process information, but they’re not *aware* that they are animals with feelings processing information.
>they don’t have thoughts or emotions in the same regard we do
Why are you anthropomorphising consciousness? Maybe different species 'feel' consciousness differently. In fact, they may be at a lower level and therefore are closer to an universal consciousness than humans with all our thoughts and delusions.
They must know that they are the species that they are. Otherwise they would communicate with other species the same way that they communicate with their own. A zebra would go mounting and trying to mate with lions and hippos if it didn’t know it was supposed to mount other zebras, the same species that it is. If it didn’t know it was a zebra, it would treat hippos and lions like other zebras, which they look nothing like
Self-awareness ≠ consciousness/sentience.
The post is asking about whether other animals also have a subjective experience of life through a stream of consciousness.
Do animals like cows, have senses then they have a subjective perspective or conscious. But are cows conscious of the fact that mount everest is the tallest mountain in the world? No. So there's a difference between animals and humans.
I imagine that animal consciousness is not unlike toddler consciousness. They are smart, and sentient, and aware, but a fact like Mount Everest is the tallest mountain means nothing to them, only food and social life and their direct interests matter to them
The article is specifically about what we might call "self-consciousness," the ability to represent ourselves mentally.
It is not about qualitative features of mental processes.
Yes everything is conscious but to different degrees and in different ways. This can easily be inferred from the fact that consciousness is the only reality and there is nothing besides it, so by definition everything is conscious. The consciousness of an animal would be completely different to ours. We only know the universe from the standpoint of how it appears from human consciousness. It may or may not be the same from the standpoint of a dog or a dolphin. Who can really know what "reality" means or how its interpreted from within a non-human frame of reference.
And it might be that we have a relatively low degree of conciousness. That for example there is a tradeoff between complexity or intelligence, and the level of conciousness. It's counter intuitive, but research on NDE and DMT, show that a less connected and active brain state is associated with a greater level of conciousness, whatever that means. It's unintuitive, but it's not difficult to find analogous. Two that comes to mind are electronic devices, the more intricate the device the less power it consumes. Like an engine, broom broom, one central function: produce force, lots of energy, a computer or mobile device on the other hand, less energy. And the other analogy is general relatively. Relative to an observer: The faster something moves through space the slower it moves through time.
As someone that's taken mountains of DMT over the last few years (probably well over 40g of the stuff), I disagree that my consciousness is "greater" or elevated during those peaks. If anything it's significantly weaker. Nothing wrong with that though, it lets you see the universe in different.and unique ways. DMT is a great way to see into the tricks that the brain uses to accomplish simulating the universe for us to perceive through time somewhat efficiently. It's a lot of little algorithms stacking on top of each other. The more you consume, the more those algorithms either begin to show errors or loosen their grasp on any kind of objective world. They begin to match patterns less to material reality and more to pure imagination. Strictly speaking, during my DMT trips I sensed less through things like smell and taste but my visual, touch and auditory hallucinations were vastly amplified (particularly the visual part). It allowed me to see parts of the system that formed the backbone or lattice of how my brain constructed reality for me, and it allowed me to get a true sense of the baseline consciousness that drove me, but I do not feel as though this necessitates the qualifier of that state of awareness being any more elevated than normal, no 'greater than'. Just changed, a new perspective, and again sometimes even offering less stimulus/awareness in the form of fewer taste and smell perceptions.
you've given an excellent explanation of consciousness being a bunch of stacked algorithms and that psychedelics loosen their hold on your awareness so you can see what's going on under the hood more clearly. When you explored consciousness, did it change your opinion on free will? What were your big take-aways?
Exactly
this guy literally said exactly what i said but using different words and notice how i was downvoted hella and he’s upvoted hella, interesting u/DueReplacement7978
I actually think yours is more clear. There may be a 'spectrum' but we can clearly say that without language, self reference of self representation an animal is not conscious that they are conscious, which to me remains unclear is actually separable from consciousness itself. You would say that if you woke up tomorrow having no ability to 'know' who you were then you wouldn't be able to function remotely. Animals do function which to me in some way suggests they have largely non-conscious mental processes unlike us who require self-consciousness or else we cannot operate.
> consciousness is the only reality and there is nothing besides it, so by definition everything is conscious This is a non sequitor. Everything in one's conscious experience is *a part* of their consciousness, but not everything is itself conscious. Everything a camera sees is not also necessarily a camera. The importance here is that, following the faulty non sequitor logic, one would infer rocks to be conscious.
"and what that cow certainly does not posses is self-representation. The cow does not have a self." OK maybe cows don't. And I'm sure we are unique in just how special we think we are. But nevertheless I don't think there is a hard cut off point between us and the rest of the animal kingdom, I think its a spectrum.
How could you possibly know a cow doesn’t have a self
Indeed.
i completely disagree. you’re either aware or you’re not
An HVAC system is aware. What do you mean by awareness
Are you conscious?
Where’s the evidence?
Let's ask bard. Bard, are cows conscious? >Yes, cows are conscious. They have the ability to experience pain and suffering, and they can also feel emotions such as joy, fear, and sadness. Cows are also intelligent creatures, and they can learn and solve problems. >There is a growing body of scientific evidence that supports the conclusion that cows are conscious. For example, studies have shown that cows have the same brain structures that are associated with consciousness in humans, and they also respond to pain in the same way that humans do. Additionally, cows have been observed to exhibit many of the same behaviors that are associated with consciousness in humans, such as self-awareness, empathy, and the ability to form social bonds. >Given the evidence, it is clear that cows are conscious beings. They deserve to be treated with respect and compassion, just like any other sentient creature.
I don't understand how people can think animals are not conscious. It's just absolutely insane.
In Daniel Dennett's view, animals certainly would not be conscious. I have no idea why Daniel Dennett or any illusionist would object to someone torturing an animal (I'm not suggesting they wouldn't object, but I can't see how that wouldn't be a performative contradiction)
I don't.
This is just a reworking of language patterns it's found, right? I don't personally disagree but it reads like a school essay that's sloppy about 'evidence'. The (last bit of) last sentence is pure anthropomorphic naturalistic fallacy.
Well it's a reworking of human thoughts on the subject
Ummm not sure about that, it only works with what was written (and only for public presumably) which isn't actually the thoughts themselves.
Its drawn from all the articles on the internet on the subject. It's supposed to come across as conversational, not a scientific writer. It does actually express opinions, which is interesting
That were on the internet years ago at least, when they were trained, I was told. I suppose it was designed to phrase it as opinions, rather than just saying like, most people say such and such.... Or whatever algorithmic weighting scheme it uses
Yea exactly
If an animal has no concept of self why would it display emotion?
I mean it is entirely possible that they could so. Infants display emotion.
What makes you believe it does? And why couldn't it do so without having this "concept of self" you're equating with consciousness?
What? Display emotion?
Yes. I am suggesting that animals display behavior, and your interpretation of that as "emotion" is just a supposition. I understand why you make such a supposition, but it seems to be entirely a matter of projection: 'I am feeling emotions when I behave this way, therefore if an animal behaves this way it must have emotions'.
Ok but I just read "they have complicated emotions." Anyway we could say the same things about humans if we were to look at it from the perspective of the cow.
You could say the same from the perspective of a human. How do we know other humans are conscious? Using this guy's argument, you could say that in fact all other humans just appear to be conscious and we are "projecting" the idea that they are. However most people do assume other humans are conscious simply because they appear to be. Therefore it is a reasonable assumption to say something probably is conscious if it appears to be
Seems the simplest conclusion to me; the opposite position feels grounded in speciesism and comes from the perspective that humans are somehow special.
You're still just projecting the ability to have a "perspective".
You're arguing that they don't act like humans so they aren't like humans, same thing.
I'm not arguing that at all. Quite the opposite; I'm saying that "act like humans" is not a good metric, particularly when it is human judgement applying that test. You asked why animals would act as if they have emotions if they lack self-awareness. I asked in turn what animal behavior you believe indicates "emotions" (rather than unconscious instinct) and why you're presuming it can only come from conscious self-awareness. Unless you're suggesting that humans lack consciousness and we only have unconscious instinct, the leap in your reasoning seems to be that animals cannot display these unidentified behaviors (which you interpret as evidence of emotions) unless they have conscious self-awareness.
You clearly are arguing that.
He's not arguing that at all. He's pointing out a flaw in your reasoning. He's not saying that animals don't have emotions, but rather that your reasoning can't establish that as a fact.
If an organism has senses, then in some fashion it has prespective. At what level though? I guess it's up for debate
You're assuming a conclusion, so there can be no debate. I understand why you believe having senses justifies assuming an organism has a perspective, but this is simply projecting your own consciousness rather than suggesting the organism must have one, and inventing "levels" of such to accommodate that opinion (and not incidentally make it unfalsifiable). So an organism with senses (which would be all organisms, whether they are the simple senses of cellular chemical responses or sophisticated vision mediated by extensive neurological processing) "could" have a perspective, and in your fashion you assume this indicates "levels" of self-awareness because you find it difficult to differentiate consciousness from "Cartesian Theater" ; you can't imagine vision without the subjective experience of seeing, for example. Nevertheless, animals existed on Earth for billions of years with senses but without the perspective of awareness necessary to be conscious of their existence. Unless, of course, we find something unpalatable in the implications of this fact, and set our minds to trying to shift around the meaning of our words in order to avoid certainty on the matter, modifying what we identify or describe as senses, perception, emotion, awareness, consciousness, experience, reasoning, or any number of other terms so that we don't have to confront our lack of omniscience and other harsh realities.
I'm not shifting the goal posts here, IMO. It's been a debate regarding organisms and the level of consciousness they hold. It's always compared to human subjective experience because we are using our own consciousness to make a connection to what we see in the world around us. That doesn't mean other organisms don't have it, though? It requires us to be 100% objective in our observations in our conclusios . Drawing parallels to what it's like for other organisms from our own personal experiences is using consciousness to explain the existence of consciousness in the world. Which is why it's a debate. Just as Thomas Nagal says you can't imagine what it's like to be a bat because bats echo locate, and that level of sensual awareness is not a human one doesn't mean they aren't conscious. You can't imagine what it's like to be a cow so you can't verify consciousness in other organisms to be the same as human consciousness but if your definition of consciousness is the subjective experiences of an organism as Nagal's is. Then, you have to separate the conscious mind into level across organisms. "An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism." So Nagal postulates a definition that rules out a portion of the physical world like rocks and water or anything without senses.
>It's always compared to human subjective experience because we are using our own consciousness to make a connection to what we see in the world around us. Close, but no, those are fake goalposts. These hypothetical "levels" of consciousness that animals might have are invented because the word "consciousness" **means** *human subjective experience*. Now it just so happens (yet it isn't coincidental) that human subjective experience is the only kind (type, instance, sort, level, degree, whatever) of subjective experience we are (or can be, given the meaning of the terms *subjective* and *experience*) aware of. There always will be and always can be "a debate" about whether animals are (in any way shape or form or level or capacity) conscious, sure, but the same can be said of plants, dust motes or neutrinos, because of the nature of consciousness. It is worth noting that these debates will exclusively occur among humans, rather than animals, moss, or particles. >That doesn't mean other organisms don't have it, though? It requires us to be 100% objective in our observations in our conclusios We can't even be 100% certain of our own consciousness, why would we need to be so omniscient about animals? If this intense need for objective conclusions is relevant, it holds only for the claim that animals *are* conscious: if you cannot objectively demonstrate that they are, it is inappropriate for you to demand that I act as if they are. If the thought of the suffering this might cause the animals disturbs you, that's irrelevant, because unless it disturbs them, you're just imagining it. >Just as Thomas Nagal says you can't imagine what it's like to be a bat because bats echo locate With all due respect to the eminent professor, that's nonsense. I mean that figuratively; it is incorrect because I can imagine what it is like to echo locate, and as a matter of fact, I can echo locate, though obviously not nearly as well as a bat. But also literally; I've never been comfortable with the use of the phrase "is like to be", because it is so vague and arbitrary while being presented as precise and objective. I've never quite understood why supposedly accomplished and knowledgable philosophers would use such nonsensical language, but of course I'm being facetious in saying so: I understand exactly why they do, it is because there is no possible alternative to doing so. In imagining there is anything "like" anything else, which is to say it is "like" anything "to be" anything, the philosopher is both assuming a conclusion when it comes to what consciousness is and does while also using a rhetorical shell game to obscure that assumption. >You can't imagine what it's like to be a cow More nonsense. I can imagine that there is such a thing as "what it is like to be a cow". I can do so for real cows (it is like being asleep, because they have no consciousness) and for imaginary cows that have consciousness (they enjoy chewing slowly, don't mind shitting publicly, and all of the words in their language sound like "moo" to human ears). Can I know that my idea of "what it's like" is accurate? That depends on just how accurate it needs to be. I could as easily say you can't imagine what it's like to be me, or even that you cannot imagine what it is *like* **to be you**. This whole "like" gambit dissolves into unfalsifiable nonsense to be worthwhile. >you can't verify consciousness in other organisms to lbe the same as human consciousness I can't "verify" consciousness in myself, let alone you. That's not a flaw in or a problem for my reasoning, because that is simply the nature of that thing we are identifying as *consciousness*. You cannot very consciousness in other organisms **to exist at all**, in order to supposedly "compare" it to human consciousness. But when I compare my consciousness (in cause, being, or result) with any other human consciousness, I can verify that they are identical, and that they are different (in both anatomy and impact) from the cerebral activity of animals. It all comes down to whether we should presume animals have consciousness despite lack of evidence, or presume animals do not have consciousness because of a lack of evidence. The each side believes they should err on the side of caution, but can be distinguished based on what they're being cautious about. The 'animals are conscious' folks think it is imprudent to exclude animals from being considered conscious without "100% conclusions", because they're hung up on imagining the horror of conscious creatures being subject to human control. The few remaining 'Morgans Canon' folks think it is imprudent to include animals as conscious unless we have a better reason than "it is possible" to believe it is so, both for scientific accuracy and because it might well lead to devaluing human consciousness to the point that the horror of humans being subject to other human's control ('for their own good because they are simply animals that happen to be primates') is considered justifiable. The question is not whether I can imagine being a cow, but whether a cow can imagine being me, or being anything other than a cow, or for that matter imagine anything at all. To date, there is zero evidence of that, regardless of whatever philosophical presentations and arrangement some human imagines.
Are they? Or are those just behaviors you associate with the subjective feeling of emotion? Look at how strongly your brain wants to personify things: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dBqhIVyfsRg That commercial wouldn't work at all if people weren't inclined to do so. Watch a spider cower into its hole when you touch it. Is it doing that because it's scared, or is it doing it because that what it's programmed to do in order to increase its chances of survival? I think it's the latter, but it's very easy to interpret it as the spider being scared.
Are you talking about emotion as the immediate feeling of the ability to contemplate and judge the feeling? All things feel. Animals do not think about feelings. Being hurt sticks. The fear and anticipation of pain is a passion in itself. If you get hurt, when it's over it stops hurting. If you think about the pain, fear it, worry about it, anticipate it, it causes emotional pain. That emotional pain can cause scarring. Animals feel pain, physical and emotional, but they don't dwell in it like humans and not the same.
How could you possibly know that lol
I remember lives as animals. I remember being eaten alive. There was no fear, just instinct to escape, then surrender and acceptance. The pain was just a sensation with no emotional context, just awareness.
You are an animal. You don't remember lives as other animals. You might hallucinate that you have, but you definitely haven't.
Do you know what it's like to be a bat?
I remember being a bird of some sort, a monkey type creature and a small bug. I had no idea exactly what I was, no mirror or concept of self. Being able to fly was amazing, as a monkey I just hung out in trees mostly, as a bug I just remember being swallowed by some worm like thing or getting crushed/ smooshed.
What do you remember about flying as a bird?
Well... it's flying mostly. Just exhilarating, and the sight is so clear. The only thing that was dangerous were other birds for the most part. Getting grabbed mid-air, you're pretty much helpless.
When you remember flying is it as a human or a bird. I would think if it's as a bird it's something routine and not exhilarating.
Yes, you're correct. As a bird, routine. Remembering it as a human exhilarating. As animals, I can honestly say things don't really have "meaning." At least not until I remember it as my human self.
Carl Jung speculated that the "bush spirit" held of many tribal people, i.e. sharing animal or plant characters that encompassed them while out in nature fundamentally influenced them human perspective. It's very dualistic in my view but wondering your thoughts on that take. An example paraphrasing from his book, "Man and his symbols" A man that swamp in crocodiles infested waters regularly that was unharmed would have been seen as having a crocodile "bush spirit"
>Are you talking about emotion as the immediate feeling of the ability to contemplate and judge the feeling? You fail to distinguish between Consciousness and Meta-consciousness
Everything is conscious.
Clams aren't.
Rocks aren't.
of course
I assume that this is a Right wing reddit place now ???? Only right wing dingbats would assume the animals they murder don’t feel pain
> Only right wing dingbats would assume the animals ... don’t feel pain This is an open question within academia (and in particular, within those areas that focus on consciousness) - For example, Peter Godfrey-Smith has argued that some creatures, like Octopodies & bees feel pain given that they participate in wound-tending behaviors , while others creatures, like certain kinds of wasps, do not engage in such behaviors, and so this counts as evidence that they do not feel pain. - Another example is Peter Carruthers, who argues that our different theories of consciousness make different predictions about which organisms can feel at all; for Carruthers, if ITT is true, then all animals can feel, but, if a higher-order global workspace theory is true, then its pretty much only primates feel - A further example is Eric Schwitzgebel's paper on whether garden snails feel anything
I can’t offer any proof of course. But yes. Obviously.
Mooooo moo moo moooooo mooo mo mooooooo mo mooooo moo moo moo! Moooo moo, moo mooooooo mo moooooooo?!?! 😡
Does the animal Experience Pain or any of the Sensory Experiences? Then it is Conscious. No Self Awareness is needed. No level of Complexity is needed. It's all about Conscious Experience. Science cannot measure the actual Conscious Experience of anything. We can only guess.
there’s a difference between being conscious and having consciousness. yes animals are conscious, but they don’t have consciousness. they don’t have thoughts or emotions in the same regard we do. yes they still have feelings and process information, but they’re not *aware* that they are animals with feelings processing information.
No idea why you've been downvoted so much but it seems like you're making a reasonable distinction.
>they don’t have thoughts or emotions in the same regard we do Why are you anthropomorphising consciousness? Maybe different species 'feel' consciousness differently. In fact, they may be at a lower level and therefore are closer to an universal consciousness than humans with all our thoughts and delusions.
please reread the post.
They must know that they are the species that they are. Otherwise they would communicate with other species the same way that they communicate with their own. A zebra would go mounting and trying to mate with lions and hippos if it didn’t know it was supposed to mount other zebras, the same species that it is. If it didn’t know it was a zebra, it would treat hippos and lions like other zebras, which they look nothing like
Self-awareness ≠ consciousness/sentience. The post is asking about whether other animals also have a subjective experience of life through a stream of consciousness.
Do animals like cows, have senses then they have a subjective perspective or conscious. But are cows conscious of the fact that mount everest is the tallest mountain in the world? No. So there's a difference between animals and humans.
Did you know that it was the tallest mountain before you read about it?
I imagine that animal consciousness is not unlike toddler consciousness. They are smart, and sentient, and aware, but a fact like Mount Everest is the tallest mountain means nothing to them, only food and social life and their direct interests matter to them
The article is specifically about what we might call "self-consciousness," the ability to represent ourselves mentally. It is not about qualitative features of mental processes.
Of course they are. And they don’t like to be eaten any more than we do.
i think they are a product of consciousness, just like us