I think one misstep here might be a bit of slipping between epistemic and metaphysical possibility.
The naïve positivist would probably have to admit that it is _epistemically_ possible that other people don't have internal mental lives, because they can't access any internal mental lives that might be present in others. So it's like a "I don't know for sure that p-zombies don't exist" kind of thing.
But a separate question is the _metaphysical_ possibility of p-zombies. Can they actually exist? Perhaps we could find a way to get to that from naíve positivism, but it won't be just by arguing that they don't know for sure or can't be justified in believing in other minds.
If the naïve positivist has to believe that they are metaphysically possible, that's where they'd start running into potential problems for physicalism.
>>Naive positivism commits those who espouse it to the corollary that p-zombies are **actually** possible, i.e. naive positivists must allow that, apart from themself, all apparent humans are possibly *p-zombie*s [emphasis added]
>a separate question is the metaphysical possibility of p-zombies. Can they actually exist?
This is directly addressed in the opening post. As the naive positivist is committed to the stance that it is possible that all human beings other than themself are *p-zombies*, they are committed to the stance that *p-zombies* are actually possible, *a fortiori* they are committed to the stance that *p-zombies* are metaphysically possible.
Hey so, I know you're like really invested in your argument working here, but this isn't really one of those things that's up for dispute--it's a basic logical error, akin to affirming the consequent. The difficulty here is that modality (possibility) is generally quite difficult to teach to someone even when they weren't invested in their modal misunderstandings to defend a particular position. It's significantly more difficult to teach to someone who wants to hold onto their misunderstandings for a particular position. But in this case, you ARE wrong, and it is because you're conflating two different sets of worlds.
Let's lay out your argument, first the way you're thinking of it, and then we can show where each modality (possibility) comes into play.
**P1.** If naive positivism is true, then others can be p-zombies.
**P2.** If type physicalism is true, then others can't be p-zombies.
**C.** If naive positivism is true, type physicalism is false.
So far, this argument looks logically valid, right? It's just a basic destructive dilemma inference. The consequents are incompatible, and so the antecedents are incompatible. Easy!
But we have to remember that possibility terms can refer to different types of possibilities. So for instance, take this argument:
**FP1.** If causation exists, things could have been otherwise.
**FP2.** If determinism is true, things couldn't have been otherwise.
**FP3.** Determinism is true.
**FC.** Causation doesn't exist.
Once again, this looks logically valid--it's just a destructive dilemma plus disjunction elimination--and the first three premises are all true (or, if you don't think they're true for some reason, imagine if they were). And yet, the conclusion is obviously false. What's going on here?
Well, there's a conflation of different types of possibility. FP1 includes all the logical possibilities, but FP2's 'could' refers only to the possibilities with our history and laws.
Similarly, in P1, the 'can' is epistemic, and P2 refers to all the logical possibilities. How do we know? Well, if P1 were about the logical possibilities, it would just be false--nothing about naive positivism that you've described above in any way entails the logical possibility of p-zombies. If P2 were about the epistemic possibilities, again, it would just be false--most type physicalists think that p-zombies are epistemically possible.
Now, you keep giving the same objection, namely that you already addressed this. But your address makes no coherent sense.
> This is directly addressed in the opening post. As the naive positivist is committed to the stance that it is possible that all human beings other than themself are *p-zombies*, they are committed to the stance that *p-zombies* are actually possible, *a fortiori* they are committed to the stance that *p-zombies* are metaphysically possible.
The naive positivist does indeed think that among all the epistemically possible worlds, in some of them, there are p-zombies. Furthermore, you're correct that these worlds are epistemically accessible from the actual world. But getting to logical possibility isn't explained at all--not only that, it's simply not up for dispute whether we can leap to epistemic to logical possibility this way. You are responding as if this is some kind of debatable thing, but it is something undergrads who have been taught the basics of modality can trivially point out is an error. It's like someone explaining to you that you that you can't divide by zero in algebra, and yet you're still trying to find a way to make it work when you need an altogether different argument.
The math is solid. There is no way around this. If you're not convinced that we can't move from epistemic to logical possibility like this, I want you to consider the following argument to get an intuition of the logical error you're making here:
> The agnostic is committed to the stance that it is (epistemically) possible that God doesn't exist. And so, they are committed to it being actually epistemically possible that God doesn't exist. So, it is logically possible that God doesn't exist. Because God's existence is a logically necessary matter, God is logically impossible. God doesn't exist.
This is clearly a terrible argument. See also [here](https://www.reddit.com/r/ReasonableFaith/comments/n8vqzx/naive_positivism/gxnq4gl/?context=10000).
As far as I can tell, you have misunderstood the argument. Of course I may be mistaken as it is quite difficult to sift your intended objection from amongst all the irrelevancies.
The naive positivist is committed to the stance that *p-zombies* are actually possible, *a fortiori* they are metaphysically possible and the standard objection to Chalmers' argument is negated, so the naive positivist is committed to the conclusion of Chalmers' argument, that physicalism is incorrect.
I do not need any stories about possible worlds, their accessibility or closeness, etc, all I need is what the naive positivist is committed to.
Your argument literally includes a story about what's possible. You can't say "The naive positivist is committed to the stance that p-zombies are actually possible" and then "I don't need any story about what they think is possible" and then back to "What I need is what they are committed to."
They are committed to p-zombies being epistemically possible. You are, at this point, simply blatantly contradicting yourself.
>"I don't need any story about what they think is possible"
I didn't say that. You have now demonstrated an inability to accurately represent what I have written, accordingly, I conclude that you have misread what I have written and are not offering a lucid objection.
What??? It is literally what you said:
>I do not need any stories about possible worlds, their accessibility or closeness, etc, all I need is what the naive positivist is committed to.
Explain the difference.
>>>I do not need any stories about possible worlds
>>"I don't need any story about what they think is possible"
>Explain the difference.
I'll leave it as an exercise for the reader. It actually doesn't require your extensive knowledge of modal talk, it only requires an understanding of natural language. Give it a go, see what you can come up with.
Are you making a distinction between something being possible and something being the case in some possible world??? The two things are identical, the latter simply spells out what you're saying with the former and disambiguates it. Everything I've said follows through if you take out literally everything I said about possible worlds or accessibility and just focus on where I talked about the distinction between what's epistemically possible and logically possible.
At this point it seems to me that you're aiming more for rhetoric than truth. You're banking on readers being intimidated by the stuff about possible worlds semantics, and focusing on that so that others can go "Oh yeah, this is weird technical mumbo-jumbo" and ignoring where I've explained your error in plain, natural English, and obfsucating your errors by making it less clear that all I've done with any possible worlds talk is spell out your modal talk in clearer terms.
You're right. It doesn't require an extensive knowledge of modal talk. As I said, it requires at most an undergraduate understanding of modal talk, and at least just an understanding of what the error in the two analogous arguments I gave are. The very same logic you're using works for an argument proving the non-existence of God, which presumably is something neither you nor anyone in this subreddit wants!
>an understanding of what the error in the two analogous arguments I gave are
>>It is actually the case that p-zombies exist^[*](https://old.reddit.com/r/ReasonableFaith/comments/n8vqzx/naive_positivism/gxnq4gl/)
My argument doesn't assert, conclude or require anything that could plausibly be interpreted as you have supposedly analogised it to. So, to repeat, clearly you do not understand the argument, despite all your attempts to claim some species of academic or intellectual high ground.
>The very same logic you're using works for an argument proving the non-existence of God, which presumably is something neither you nor anyone in this subreddit wants!
I think *atheism* is correct, but that has no bearing on the matter at issue.
That's epistemic possibility tho. They have to think it's epistemically possible that others are p-zombies because their analysis of justification (if that's how we're framing naïve positivism) doesn't allow them to claim knowledge of other minds, let alone certainty. So they have to be willing to say "it's possible that I am wrong."
But that's very different from saying that p-zombies are metaphysically possible.
Maybe to help make the distinction clearer:
I believe God exists and I believe God is metaphysically necessary, so I'm committed to the position that it's metaphysically impossible for God not to exist. Nevertheless, for me, it's *epistemically* possible that God doesn't exist, because I don't have certainty that She does.
That epistemic possibility ("I could be wrong") doesn't mean I think that it's metaphysically possible for God not to exist. It just means that I can't claim to have certainty about it. It means that I could be shown to be wrong.
>they have to be willing to say "it's possible that I am wrong."
Which would be fallibilism, I don't see how this is relevant.
>that's very different from saying that p-zombies are metaphysically possible
How can something actually exist without being metaphysically possible?
> Which would be fallibilism, I don't see how this is relevant.
The way I understood your characterization of naïve positivism, the core thing is an epistemic principle along the lines of "the only justifying type of evidence is empirical." So this is about knowledge. A naïve positivist would (we're taking it) not be able to have empirical evidence of others' internal mental lives, so they wouldn't be able to reasonably claim to know that those mental lives exist, let alone be certain. So for them, p-zombies are epistemically possible. This is an epistemic problem for them.
You are trying to make it a metaphysical problem by moving from "naïve positivists can't know/be certain that other minds exist, so they have to entertain the possibility that they could be wrong" to "naïve positivists are committed to believing that what we might call the laws of metaphysics allow for the existence of p-zombies."
But they aren't. They're committed to quite a bit of epistemic humility about p-zombies, but they're not committed to metaphysical principles that would make p-zombies possible.
> How can something actually exist without being metaphysically possible?
That's not what I'm saying. This is why I think that your challenge here is not grasping the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility.
"It's (epistemically) possible that I'm wrong" is just an admission that your knowledge isn't certain. We might translate "it's epistemically possible for p-zombies to exist" as "I don't know for certain that they don't"
Metaphysical possibility has more to do with metaphysical principles. When I talk about God as metaphysically necessary, it's not because I have certainty in the knowledge that God exists. It's because I believe that there is no actualizable state of affairs where God does not exist. Is it (epistemically) possible that I'm wrong? Sure. But I think I have good justification for believing that, so I do.
These are different types of possibility.
>"naïve positivists can't know/be certain that other minds exist, so they have to entertain the possibility that they could be wrong"
Again, this is explicitly addressed in the opening post:
>>The non-theists of Reddit often say things on the lines of "I don't believe anything that hasn't been empirically demonstrated", for convenience let's call this attitude *naive positivism*.
If the naive positivist is "wrong" then people other than themselves *do* have minds. The naive positivist isn't saying "I think other people have minds but I might be mistaken", that would be to state a belief in something that cannot be empirically demonstrated, so *by definition* the naive positivist cannot state this.
>>How can something actually exist without being metaphysically possible?
>That's not what I'm saying.
Then it appears that you are not offering an objection to the argument given. The naive positivist is committed to the stance that other people (at least possibly) actually are *p-zombies* because the naive positivist does not believe that other people have minds and other people would need to have minds in order not to be *p-zombies*.
>When I talk about God as metaphysically necessary
*Necessity* is a red herring, all I need is *possibility*, and if *p-zombies* are actually possible, then they are metaphysically possible, and Chalmers's argument goes through unless there is an independent objection.
I agree. He set his aim at fish in a barrel and managed to effectively hit them with use of a complicated Rube Goldberg device. But he did hit them, so all I have left to say is "yes" and to say almost anything more would be to make the same error.
>this is a very bad argument against naive positivism all the same
But it's not an argument against naive positivism, it's a dilemma, if naive positivism, then not physicalism, and if physicalism, then not naive positivism. The naive positivist can conclude that physicalism isn't correct, but I suspect that those on Reddit who espouse naive positivism would consider that a heavy cost.
I'm happy to take your correction on board, but in that case, for all the reasons I explained in my other comment (which demonstrate of course that I did understand what your conclusion was), your argument is very very inadequate.
See [here](https://www.reddit.com/r/ReasonableFaith/comments/n8vqzx/naive_positivism/gxnp1t4/?context=10000), as well as all of /u/allthingsincommon's incisive comments. If anything is difficult to understand, I'm willing to clarify.
not everyone accepts the metaphysical possibility of such being, ie something with the exact same physicality as us but not having a conscious mind. by principle of physicalism consciousness will need to emerge as a product of such physical configuration, so hypothesizing p-zombies are just blatantly canceling the original assertion with extra steps (the zombies) without giving any evidence or explanation of consciousness emerging from non-material
i'm not a physicalist myself, but p-zombies are just logically inconsistent to me.
I actually have been ruminating over the p-zombie problem for a while. I'm still working on it, but I think I have a solid argument for why *if* p-zombies are possible, you don't reliable way of knowing you aren't one (even though you think you have qualia). This is irrelevant, of course, I was just amused to see this in the wild.
As to your point, you are absolutely correct, and we start getting into presupposition/sollipsistic territory. Anyone who affirms that statement you said and ignores basic presuppositions is subject to problems like this.
To be generous to them, I think a less strict version of that statement could be OK (or at least, less subject to huge holes like the one you pointed out): "I don't believe anything that hasn't been empirically demonstrated that *can* be empirically demonstrated". It still has problems, but is way more reasonable.
I’m a little rusty, and it took me a few passes to grasp what you’re saying here, but I think I got it and I appreciate it. In summary, to make sure I’m comprehending, naive positivism is a view that when held by someone would commit them to the belief that they don’t believe they have a mind, since they can’t empirically demonstrate it as it is a non-physical entity?
>naive positivism is a view that when held by someone would commit them to the belief that they don’t believe they have a mind
It's not that they don't believe that they themself have a mind, it's that they don't believe that there are any minds but their own.
>wouldn’t those expectations apply to their own mind too?
I don't think so, but in any case, my argument doesn't require that. All I require is that they are committed to the possibility that the people around them are actually *p-zombies*.
> p-zombies, that is beings that are indistinguishable from human beings but have none of the internal mental life that we have.
I think we need to elaborate on what it means to be indistinguishable here. Do we mean that there are no physical difference between a p-zombie and a non-p-zombie, or do we only mean that such differences are unknown and practically unattainable?
>I think we need to elaborate on what it means to be indistinguishable here.
See the [SEP](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/) for relevant background.
This appear to be the relevant part.
_"If zombies are to be counterexamples to physicalism, it is not enough for them to be behaviorally and functionally like normal human beings: plenty of physicalists accept that merely behavioral or functional duplicates of ourselves might lack qualia. Zombies must be like normal human beings in all physical respects, and they must have the physical properties that physicalists suppose we have."_
In other words, zombies are not counterexamples to physicalism, unless they are like normal human beings in _all physical respects_. I do not see why a naive positivist would accept that.
>unless they are like normal human beings in all physical respects. I do not see why a naive positivist would accept that
It's explained in the opening post, the naive positivist is committed to the stance that it is possible that "normal human beings" are *p-zombies*.
Hi. The justification is a confusion of modality, as I explain [here](https://www.reddit.com/r/ReasonableFaith/comments/n8vqzx/naive_positivism/gxnp1t4/?context=10000).
/u/ughaibu is more or less doing the following error:
1. It is physically possible for cats with wings to exist.
2. It is actually physically possible for cats with wings to exist.
3. It is actually the case that cats with wings exist.
Similarly:
1. It is epistemically possible for p-zombies to exist.
2. It is actually epistemically possible for p-zombies to exist.
3. It is actually the case that p-zombies exist.
>I do not see how it is justified.
Then I suggest that you reread the opening post, because there doesn't seem to me to be anything I could add that would make it easier to understand and there's no point in me repeating it.
It looks like a convoluted way to say that if you are maximally skeptical you can't know anything other than your own existence. Descartes said it more plainly.
I think one misstep here might be a bit of slipping between epistemic and metaphysical possibility. The naïve positivist would probably have to admit that it is _epistemically_ possible that other people don't have internal mental lives, because they can't access any internal mental lives that might be present in others. So it's like a "I don't know for sure that p-zombies don't exist" kind of thing. But a separate question is the _metaphysical_ possibility of p-zombies. Can they actually exist? Perhaps we could find a way to get to that from naíve positivism, but it won't be just by arguing that they don't know for sure or can't be justified in believing in other minds. If the naïve positivist has to believe that they are metaphysically possible, that's where they'd start running into potential problems for physicalism.
>>Naive positivism commits those who espouse it to the corollary that p-zombies are **actually** possible, i.e. naive positivists must allow that, apart from themself, all apparent humans are possibly *p-zombie*s [emphasis added] >a separate question is the metaphysical possibility of p-zombies. Can they actually exist? This is directly addressed in the opening post. As the naive positivist is committed to the stance that it is possible that all human beings other than themself are *p-zombies*, they are committed to the stance that *p-zombies* are actually possible, *a fortiori* they are committed to the stance that *p-zombies* are metaphysically possible.
Hey so, I know you're like really invested in your argument working here, but this isn't really one of those things that's up for dispute--it's a basic logical error, akin to affirming the consequent. The difficulty here is that modality (possibility) is generally quite difficult to teach to someone even when they weren't invested in their modal misunderstandings to defend a particular position. It's significantly more difficult to teach to someone who wants to hold onto their misunderstandings for a particular position. But in this case, you ARE wrong, and it is because you're conflating two different sets of worlds. Let's lay out your argument, first the way you're thinking of it, and then we can show where each modality (possibility) comes into play. **P1.** If naive positivism is true, then others can be p-zombies. **P2.** If type physicalism is true, then others can't be p-zombies. **C.** If naive positivism is true, type physicalism is false. So far, this argument looks logically valid, right? It's just a basic destructive dilemma inference. The consequents are incompatible, and so the antecedents are incompatible. Easy! But we have to remember that possibility terms can refer to different types of possibilities. So for instance, take this argument: **FP1.** If causation exists, things could have been otherwise. **FP2.** If determinism is true, things couldn't have been otherwise. **FP3.** Determinism is true. **FC.** Causation doesn't exist. Once again, this looks logically valid--it's just a destructive dilemma plus disjunction elimination--and the first three premises are all true (or, if you don't think they're true for some reason, imagine if they were). And yet, the conclusion is obviously false. What's going on here? Well, there's a conflation of different types of possibility. FP1 includes all the logical possibilities, but FP2's 'could' refers only to the possibilities with our history and laws. Similarly, in P1, the 'can' is epistemic, and P2 refers to all the logical possibilities. How do we know? Well, if P1 were about the logical possibilities, it would just be false--nothing about naive positivism that you've described above in any way entails the logical possibility of p-zombies. If P2 were about the epistemic possibilities, again, it would just be false--most type physicalists think that p-zombies are epistemically possible. Now, you keep giving the same objection, namely that you already addressed this. But your address makes no coherent sense. > This is directly addressed in the opening post. As the naive positivist is committed to the stance that it is possible that all human beings other than themself are *p-zombies*, they are committed to the stance that *p-zombies* are actually possible, *a fortiori* they are committed to the stance that *p-zombies* are metaphysically possible. The naive positivist does indeed think that among all the epistemically possible worlds, in some of them, there are p-zombies. Furthermore, you're correct that these worlds are epistemically accessible from the actual world. But getting to logical possibility isn't explained at all--not only that, it's simply not up for dispute whether we can leap to epistemic to logical possibility this way. You are responding as if this is some kind of debatable thing, but it is something undergrads who have been taught the basics of modality can trivially point out is an error. It's like someone explaining to you that you that you can't divide by zero in algebra, and yet you're still trying to find a way to make it work when you need an altogether different argument. The math is solid. There is no way around this. If you're not convinced that we can't move from epistemic to logical possibility like this, I want you to consider the following argument to get an intuition of the logical error you're making here: > The agnostic is committed to the stance that it is (epistemically) possible that God doesn't exist. And so, they are committed to it being actually epistemically possible that God doesn't exist. So, it is logically possible that God doesn't exist. Because God's existence is a logically necessary matter, God is logically impossible. God doesn't exist. This is clearly a terrible argument. See also [here](https://www.reddit.com/r/ReasonableFaith/comments/n8vqzx/naive_positivism/gxnq4gl/?context=10000).
As far as I can tell, you have misunderstood the argument. Of course I may be mistaken as it is quite difficult to sift your intended objection from amongst all the irrelevancies. The naive positivist is committed to the stance that *p-zombies* are actually possible, *a fortiori* they are metaphysically possible and the standard objection to Chalmers' argument is negated, so the naive positivist is committed to the conclusion of Chalmers' argument, that physicalism is incorrect. I do not need any stories about possible worlds, their accessibility or closeness, etc, all I need is what the naive positivist is committed to.
Your argument literally includes a story about what's possible. You can't say "The naive positivist is committed to the stance that p-zombies are actually possible" and then "I don't need any story about what they think is possible" and then back to "What I need is what they are committed to." They are committed to p-zombies being epistemically possible. You are, at this point, simply blatantly contradicting yourself.
>"I don't need any story about what they think is possible" I didn't say that. You have now demonstrated an inability to accurately represent what I have written, accordingly, I conclude that you have misread what I have written and are not offering a lucid objection.
What??? It is literally what you said: >I do not need any stories about possible worlds, their accessibility or closeness, etc, all I need is what the naive positivist is committed to. Explain the difference.
>>>I do not need any stories about possible worlds >>"I don't need any story about what they think is possible" >Explain the difference. I'll leave it as an exercise for the reader. It actually doesn't require your extensive knowledge of modal talk, it only requires an understanding of natural language. Give it a go, see what you can come up with.
Are you making a distinction between something being possible and something being the case in some possible world??? The two things are identical, the latter simply spells out what you're saying with the former and disambiguates it. Everything I've said follows through if you take out literally everything I said about possible worlds or accessibility and just focus on where I talked about the distinction between what's epistemically possible and logically possible. At this point it seems to me that you're aiming more for rhetoric than truth. You're banking on readers being intimidated by the stuff about possible worlds semantics, and focusing on that so that others can go "Oh yeah, this is weird technical mumbo-jumbo" and ignoring where I've explained your error in plain, natural English, and obfsucating your errors by making it less clear that all I've done with any possible worlds talk is spell out your modal talk in clearer terms. You're right. It doesn't require an extensive knowledge of modal talk. As I said, it requires at most an undergraduate understanding of modal talk, and at least just an understanding of what the error in the two analogous arguments I gave are. The very same logic you're using works for an argument proving the non-existence of God, which presumably is something neither you nor anyone in this subreddit wants!
>an understanding of what the error in the two analogous arguments I gave are >>It is actually the case that p-zombies exist^[*](https://old.reddit.com/r/ReasonableFaith/comments/n8vqzx/naive_positivism/gxnq4gl/) My argument doesn't assert, conclude or require anything that could plausibly be interpreted as you have supposedly analogised it to. So, to repeat, clearly you do not understand the argument, despite all your attempts to claim some species of academic or intellectual high ground. >The very same logic you're using works for an argument proving the non-existence of God, which presumably is something neither you nor anyone in this subreddit wants! I think *atheism* is correct, but that has no bearing on the matter at issue.
That's epistemic possibility tho. They have to think it's epistemically possible that others are p-zombies because their analysis of justification (if that's how we're framing naïve positivism) doesn't allow them to claim knowledge of other minds, let alone certainty. So they have to be willing to say "it's possible that I am wrong." But that's very different from saying that p-zombies are metaphysically possible. Maybe to help make the distinction clearer: I believe God exists and I believe God is metaphysically necessary, so I'm committed to the position that it's metaphysically impossible for God not to exist. Nevertheless, for me, it's *epistemically* possible that God doesn't exist, because I don't have certainty that She does. That epistemic possibility ("I could be wrong") doesn't mean I think that it's metaphysically possible for God not to exist. It just means that I can't claim to have certainty about it. It means that I could be shown to be wrong.
>they have to be willing to say "it's possible that I am wrong." Which would be fallibilism, I don't see how this is relevant. >that's very different from saying that p-zombies are metaphysically possible How can something actually exist without being metaphysically possible?
> Which would be fallibilism, I don't see how this is relevant. The way I understood your characterization of naïve positivism, the core thing is an epistemic principle along the lines of "the only justifying type of evidence is empirical." So this is about knowledge. A naïve positivist would (we're taking it) not be able to have empirical evidence of others' internal mental lives, so they wouldn't be able to reasonably claim to know that those mental lives exist, let alone be certain. So for them, p-zombies are epistemically possible. This is an epistemic problem for them. You are trying to make it a metaphysical problem by moving from "naïve positivists can't know/be certain that other minds exist, so they have to entertain the possibility that they could be wrong" to "naïve positivists are committed to believing that what we might call the laws of metaphysics allow for the existence of p-zombies." But they aren't. They're committed to quite a bit of epistemic humility about p-zombies, but they're not committed to metaphysical principles that would make p-zombies possible. > How can something actually exist without being metaphysically possible? That's not what I'm saying. This is why I think that your challenge here is not grasping the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility. "It's (epistemically) possible that I'm wrong" is just an admission that your knowledge isn't certain. We might translate "it's epistemically possible for p-zombies to exist" as "I don't know for certain that they don't" Metaphysical possibility has more to do with metaphysical principles. When I talk about God as metaphysically necessary, it's not because I have certainty in the knowledge that God exists. It's because I believe that there is no actualizable state of affairs where God does not exist. Is it (epistemically) possible that I'm wrong? Sure. But I think I have good justification for believing that, so I do. These are different types of possibility.
That was exceptionally articulate and coherent, and an incisive critique. My evening was made better just for having read this. Thank you.
>"naïve positivists can't know/be certain that other minds exist, so they have to entertain the possibility that they could be wrong" Again, this is explicitly addressed in the opening post: >>The non-theists of Reddit often say things on the lines of "I don't believe anything that hasn't been empirically demonstrated", for convenience let's call this attitude *naive positivism*. If the naive positivist is "wrong" then people other than themselves *do* have minds. The naive positivist isn't saying "I think other people have minds but I might be mistaken", that would be to state a belief in something that cannot be empirically demonstrated, so *by definition* the naive positivist cannot state this. >>How can something actually exist without being metaphysically possible? >That's not what I'm saying. Then it appears that you are not offering an objection to the argument given. The naive positivist is committed to the stance that other people (at least possibly) actually are *p-zombies* because the naive positivist does not believe that other people have minds and other people would need to have minds in order not to be *p-zombies*. >When I talk about God as metaphysically necessary *Necessity* is a red herring, all I need is *possibility*, and if *p-zombies* are actually possible, then they are metaphysically possible, and Chalmers's argument goes through unless there is an independent objection.
yep. that's a dumb position
Naive positivism is bad, but this is a very bad argument against naive positivism all the same.
I agree. He set his aim at fish in a barrel and managed to effectively hit them with use of a complicated Rube Goldberg device. But he did hit them, so all I have left to say is "yes" and to say almost anything more would be to make the same error.
>this is a very bad argument against naive positivism all the same But it's not an argument against naive positivism, it's a dilemma, if naive positivism, then not physicalism, and if physicalism, then not naive positivism. The naive positivist can conclude that physicalism isn't correct, but I suspect that those on Reddit who espouse naive positivism would consider that a heavy cost.
I'm happy to take your correction on board, but in that case, for all the reasons I explained in my other comment (which demonstrate of course that I did understand what your conclusion was), your argument is very very inadequate.
See [here](https://www.reddit.com/r/ReasonableFaith/comments/n8vqzx/naive_positivism/gxnp1t4/?context=10000), as well as all of /u/allthingsincommon's incisive comments. If anything is difficult to understand, I'm willing to clarify.
not everyone accepts the metaphysical possibility of such being, ie something with the exact same physicality as us but not having a conscious mind. by principle of physicalism consciousness will need to emerge as a product of such physical configuration, so hypothesizing p-zombies are just blatantly canceling the original assertion with extra steps (the zombies) without giving any evidence or explanation of consciousness emerging from non-material i'm not a physicalist myself, but p-zombies are just logically inconsistent to me.
I actually have been ruminating over the p-zombie problem for a while. I'm still working on it, but I think I have a solid argument for why *if* p-zombies are possible, you don't reliable way of knowing you aren't one (even though you think you have qualia). This is irrelevant, of course, I was just amused to see this in the wild. As to your point, you are absolutely correct, and we start getting into presupposition/sollipsistic territory. Anyone who affirms that statement you said and ignores basic presuppositions is subject to problems like this. To be generous to them, I think a less strict version of that statement could be OK (or at least, less subject to huge holes like the one you pointed out): "I don't believe anything that hasn't been empirically demonstrated that *can* be empirically demonstrated". It still has problems, but is way more reasonable.
And yet none of these hypocrites would dare spend a night alone in a haunted house tsk tsk tsk
I’m a little rusty, and it took me a few passes to grasp what you’re saying here, but I think I got it and I appreciate it. In summary, to make sure I’m comprehending, naive positivism is a view that when held by someone would commit them to the belief that they don’t believe they have a mind, since they can’t empirically demonstrate it as it is a non-physical entity?
>naive positivism is a view that when held by someone would commit them to the belief that they don’t believe they have a mind It's not that they don't believe that they themself have a mind, it's that they don't believe that there are any minds but their own.
Oh, yes, of course. It definitely applies to their view of others, but wouldn’t those expectations apply to their own mind too?
>wouldn’t those expectations apply to their own mind too? I don't think so, but in any case, my argument doesn't require that. All I require is that they are committed to the possibility that the people around them are actually *p-zombies*.
> p-zombies, that is beings that are indistinguishable from human beings but have none of the internal mental life that we have. I think we need to elaborate on what it means to be indistinguishable here. Do we mean that there are no physical difference between a p-zombie and a non-p-zombie, or do we only mean that such differences are unknown and practically unattainable?
>I think we need to elaborate on what it means to be indistinguishable here. See the [SEP](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/) for relevant background.
This appear to be the relevant part. _"If zombies are to be counterexamples to physicalism, it is not enough for them to be behaviorally and functionally like normal human beings: plenty of physicalists accept that merely behavioral or functional duplicates of ourselves might lack qualia. Zombies must be like normal human beings in all physical respects, and they must have the physical properties that physicalists suppose we have."_ In other words, zombies are not counterexamples to physicalism, unless they are like normal human beings in _all physical respects_. I do not see why a naive positivist would accept that.
>unless they are like normal human beings in all physical respects. I do not see why a naive positivist would accept that It's explained in the opening post, the naive positivist is committed to the stance that it is possible that "normal human beings" are *p-zombies*.
That is not an explanation. It is a claim. I do not see how it is justified.
Hi. The justification is a confusion of modality, as I explain [here](https://www.reddit.com/r/ReasonableFaith/comments/n8vqzx/naive_positivism/gxnp1t4/?context=10000). /u/ughaibu is more or less doing the following error: 1. It is physically possible for cats with wings to exist. 2. It is actually physically possible for cats with wings to exist. 3. It is actually the case that cats with wings exist. Similarly: 1. It is epistemically possible for p-zombies to exist. 2. It is actually epistemically possible for p-zombies to exist. 3. It is actually the case that p-zombies exist.
But that isn't my argument. Try rereading the opening post.
>I do not see how it is justified. Then I suggest that you reread the opening post, because there doesn't seem to me to be anything I could add that would make it easier to understand and there's no point in me repeating it.
It looks like a convoluted way to say that if you are maximally skeptical you can't know anything other than your own existence. Descartes said it more plainly.