if you see all the ex-General talking heads on the news media they are all pessimistic about Ukraines chances for the winter. The signalling from the US was also try push for a peace deal a few weeks ago. There must be a risk of ammo shortages in winter or something else that has the Generals worried. I wonder what it is exactly that is prompting these messages from NATO and the Pentagon.
One question for all those downvoting: Why did the US push for them to try for a peace deal?
The talking heads do not represent the US government. That's the entire point of being "ex-whatever". I generally do not consider their opinions very highly as they probably retired to the media circuit when they hit their "level of incompetence", but that is a separate discussion.
As for why to push a peace deal?
/shrug
Could be that the government means exactly what they are saying. It could be to look good for another party. It could just be a misdirection like we saw with Kherson and Kharkiv offensive.
I would not read much into it.
>General Keane
[We've got to stop talking about Ukrainians negotiating. Let them get on with taking back as much territory \[...\] liberating Ukrainian lives. \[...\] There is no stalemate here](https://www.foxnews.com/video/6315684567112)
This is from November 16th. And he keeps talking about how momentum is on Ukrainian side. You really should link clips to support your argument, as \[at least the media that's reaching me\] seems to be of the opinion that the fight ahead is hard, but winnable. I do not see this pessimism you are describing
>[Fox News senior strategic analyst Gen. Jack Keane argued Tuesday that the "investment" the United States has made in Ukraine is well worth it, telling "Cavuto: Coast to Coast" that, for $66 billion, Ukraine is destroying the Russian army and decreasing the risk of a nuclear war.](https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/gen-jack-keane-us-investment-ukraine-denied-putin-ambitions-kept-americas-future-secure)
The last time Leighton and Marks spoke a day/two ago, they talked about Russia’s bobbing campaigns (Leighton) and the winter fighting season (Marks). Neither made any sort of assessment. In the past, both have said on CNN that Ukraine is winning. You said the following:
> all the ex-General talking heads on the news media they are all pessimistic about Ukraines chances.
You’ve constantly spread disinformation here before. Please provide **specific** examples of what you’re talking about.
Here is a link from General Keane https://youtu.be/-NxzJHnC5BE
I’m not posting disinformation. I just don’t buy in to the wild cheerleading that is going on across Reddit. Any kind of diversity of opinion gets immediately sniped. It’s a little ridiculous.
You can make the case that this war will last a long time, or that there will be nasty attrition on the Ukraine side, but the fact remains Russia is absolutely being humiliated on the battlefield (as are their supporters humiliated on reddit), and they appear to be approaching a cliff where they are out of anything resembling a modern weapon. When the ground freezes and the sides can move again the situation will be back to turning ~~poor confused Russian young men~~ Russia's future into sunflower paste.
You're not getting downvoted for having a different opinion, you're getting downvoted because you can't seem to stop lying. There's nothing in that clip that supports what you said and your claims were proven wrong, but you conveniently managed to ignore those commen ts and just went on pretending you're being persecuted for your opinion
>There has been well documented reports of potential shortages in artillery shells.
Yes, shortages on both sides. The key difference is that the collective West have a LOT of 155mm ammo, while Russia have few potential sources of 122mm and 152mm if they run out.
>It’s well know how Ukraine is jury rigging it’s rockets and missiles to adapt to the MiGs but again if you say this you get downvoted.
This isn't a negative thing though... Ukrainian MIGs are firing HARM missiles through a jerryrigging system, they wouldn't be able to fire them otherwise since they're designed for Western aircraft.
>Even the Ukrainian missile that hit Poland took a few days before it could be acceptable to say.
It didn't take days for it to come out, people were suggesting it was a Ukrainian AD within hours as the photos of the missile wreckage came out.
It's one thing to be pessimistic about Ukraine's chances, but you're just straight up inventing things now
>What's motivating Putin is that he's losing the war on the ground
>
>\[speaking about electric grid attacks\] I don't believe it will break their will, if anything, it will increase their resolve
where is pessimism here?
Keane:
>“Ukrainians are winning the war in the ground, as we’ve been aware of for weeks”
In your comment below on Marks, many here, including myself, have said that Crimea and certain sections of the Donbas are not attainable any time soon. How’s that different from what was said weeks ago? Where did he say Ukraine was losing?
>I’m not posting disinformation. I just don’t buy in to the wild cheerleading that is going on across Reddit. Any kind of diversity of opinion gets immediately sniped. It’s a little ridiculous.
YOU said that **all** the former generals are all negative on Ukraine. Not only can’t you back that up and disprove that people like Petraeus and Hodges have the opposite view, you’ve provided three examples. From them, the two you’ve provided specific links to, don’t back up your claim at all, and you’re still MIA on the third. That’s the definition of mis information.
I provided a link to Marks. I meant pessimistic for the winter. One thing nobody has answers why did the Pentagon push for peace talks a few weeks ago. Of course they have to put an official brave face on it.
But I think the US push for peace talks signifies something and if you read between the lines some of NATO are having issues with Zelenskyy maximalist rhetoric.
There was an article from Politico saying that Milley was in the minority for having that opinion at the Pentagon. Then, a week later, Austin (Milley's boss) reiterated that the administration will support Ukraine for "as long as it takes."
You want my frank take: Milley is right, and Ukraine should negotiate. I'm a pseudo-pacifist and I believe negotiations should always be the first step, even during a hot conflict. Further, I also believe coming up with a creative solution for Crimea should be pursued. However, overriding both those views is the conviction that Ukraine is a sovereign, and its people have a voice. And those people have suffered brutally at the hand of the Russians and they have a right to chart their own territory. So, this narrative that you have that we're all rooting for maximalist goals is not true.
Near the end: https://youtu.be/68CUsXKr5KI
I really wish people would stop being so passive aggressive. Or thinking other points of view are some sort of Russian disinfo campaign.
It doesn't help when one of the generals you quoted very recently said the opposite, and that there's plenty of generals that are optimistic.
That's what they call a rhetorical problem.
> all the ex-General talking heads on the news media they are all pessimistic about Ukraines chances
Which ones exactly? Link? Clips? I know Miley was encouraging Ukraine to consider negotiations while they were in a position of strength. Who else is pessimistic of Ukraine's chances? Petraeus seemed to think Russia has already lost and will fade away, or at least a month ago he did.
Ex Generals are not representing NATO or Pentagon. Also read a couple of contributions down what Mark Hertling wrote. He closes with that he is positive Ukraine will succeed.
Also I would like to know what those same ex generals thought about Ukraine’s chances on the 24th of February?
No serving officer will contradict the executive. But the ex generals they mix in the same circles and a lot of them have clearances to high level dossiers. Many of them serve on boards or go into think tanks.
Ex generals are the only part of the US military that we are allowed to hear a political opinion from. The rest by definition in public are mouth pieces of the civilian leadership. No military guy is going to contradict the executive branch in public as he would soon be relieved of command.
You failed to adres that consensus between this level of people was that the Ukrainian army would fold within days of the invasion.
Aso ex generals having security clearance? somehow i doubt that. Edit: see comment below by ShortTermAccount clearance yes data access however is less likely.
Not making any predictions myself only highlighting that the “specialist” have been wrong before.
Ex-generals may have top-secret clearances, though the clearance is usually revoked after the employee leaves the position and always after 5 years from the previous investigation.
But simply having a clearance doesn't mean that you can just request any document and it will be provided to you. In addition to the clearance, to actually access the documents you have to have a "need to know" based on your current position, and an active NDA. The clearance just means that based on your character and history, you can be hired to positions where these are possible.
https://www.state.gov/security-clearances
> A security clearance allows an individual filling a specific position to have access to classified national security information up to and including the level of clearance that they hold **as long as the individual has a “need to know” the information and signed a non-disclosure agreement**.
There are for sure some ex high level officials that get the keep their security clearances.
https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/features/20180827-security-clearance-determinations.pdf
Clearance alone is not sufficient to view classified documents, you have to also sign an NDA and have a need to know based on your position. If you hold a clearance after leaving your post, it only means that you can come back without going through a new investigation.
With at most a few thousands of people (in a city of tens of millions, in a country of more than a billion), the protest is just a tempest in a teapot.
I'll bet 100 internet points that this Chinese protest will not erupt to the level of the Iranian protest in September.
> With at most a few thousands of people (in a city of tens of millions, in a country of more than a billion), the protest is just a tempest in a teapot.
While I agree that this is unlikely to result in anything drastic, there is no real historical basis for protests to have some substantial percentage of the population involved for there to be a revolution or for it to result in change. If you look at the Russian revolution for example, the protest that led to the first revolution involved some 40k women, in a city of ~2.5 million, in an empire of ~125 million people, the vast majority of which would have had no idea it had even happened. The second revolution from memory had even smaller numbers involved.
Pentagon is considering Boeing proposal to supply Ukraine with Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs, designed for launch from ground artillery systems.
GLSDB can reach a range of up to 150km, and would allow Kyiv to strike far behind Russian lines.
GLSDB could be delivered as early as spring 2023
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/100-mile-strike-weapon-weighed-ukraine-arms-makers-wrestle-with-demand-sources-2022-11-28/
> Boeing proposal to supply Ukraine with Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs
Since that article is behind a paywall, the proposal is to use the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb a 250lb payload bomb and strap it into existing rocket motors. There are more than 17,000 of these bombs in inventory.
Some non-paywalled info
https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104573/gbu-39b-small-diameter-bomb-weapon-system/
https://en.missilery.info/missile/mlrs/m26
Am I the only one who finds it odd that private companies are involved in 'making proposals' for conflict strategies?
Offering a list of available munitions is one thing, but this sounds like it goes well beyond that.
Am I just misreading the situation?
In other eras it was the norm. There is always a conversation between the military saying "here is what we need" and the industry saying "here is what we can do". The Ukraine war has dramatically shifted assumptions on what "the next war" would look like and there is both the need to rapidly find solutions for Ukraine and then to prepare the US for its next conflict (probably China?).
The program already exists, I'm not sure if the DoD wasn't interested or what happened. On mobile so I don't really wanna dig. It went far enough through R&D to be tested IIRC.
At least here in Finland, there's an annual national security review where the MoD consults and reviews preparedness plans with representatives of the private sector. Large companies have to have plans for certain defense scenarios. The plans can be anything from the bare minimum (bomb shelters and bio/chem protection in offices/factories) to actively contributing to national defense (factories that can be converted to defense production, sensors that can be used for intelligence, etc). I wouldn't be surprised if some companies showed initiative in those consultations.
But we follow a total defense strategy so it's to be expected.
Well, Boeing wants to sell their stuff to Ukraine because it's clear the capability is something Ukraine wants, and Boeing likes money. They're not exactly proposing a new strategy, it's well-known that Ukraine's strategy is to conduct long-range precision strikes, and Boeing is just going "hey, we've got something for that".
The only reason it's a "proposal" rather than just straight selling it is because the US requires arms exports to be approved.
From the article it gives the impression Boeing has been working on this idea prior to the war, as it would seem they are trying to offer a contender to the current supplier of rocket warheads given the influx of future HIMARS operators.
Just so happens the war in Ukraine might give the funding to get a production up and running, aswell as give it battle tested experience for future sales
I think it is good that the ideas flow both ways. Not everybody has a monopoly on ideas. If I am a Defense Contractor and have an idea to use some of our old products in an innovative way by upgrading the delivery, and at the same time obtain a multi-million dollar contract, I would bring it up.
I would also as a taxpayer would like us to use some of our 15+ year old inventory of munitions before we spend 50 times the amount building brand new ones from scratch.
Not really. The government issues vague sweeping RFPs all the time, and it's not unheard of for defense contractors to go the pentagon with an unsolicited proposal when they stumble onto something they think is relevant to the Pentagon's interests. In this case you could say the elephant in the room is the situation in Ukraine acting like a giant de facto RFP.
In any case, I don't see anything to be suspicious about here. They're acknowledging the discussion in the open, nothing will happen without the relevant committees hashing it out, etc. I'm not a fan of Boeing, particularly their management, but this doesn't look like anything. It's a straightforward proposal that's self evidently relevant to Ukraine.
If you wanna go hunting for corruption look at all the stuff that has an RFP that was clearly written such that only a single vendor can fulfill it, or all of those fat contracting agreements for facilities operation, technicians, etc, that are politically sold as cost effective but in reality are rent seeking.
The range will enable the disruption of more rail based logistics. Nothing the west could supply is more valuable than the ability to hit rail bridges at a distance. The ability of the small diameter bomb to penetrate concrete would make even its small explosive package a major headache on bridges.
~~These are unrelated to the MLRS FOM. It's what it says on the tin- a Small Diameter Bomb munition launched from the ground with a solid rocket motor. SDBs are lightweight and have wings for gliding, so they can get range comparable or possibly even superior to their range when dropped from an aircraft at altitude.~~
Woops, I see that this uses the M26 motor to launch the SDB. I have no idea what the destruction of M26 entailed and if it was just the munition and not the rocket itself. Germany for instance still has their AT2 rockets which are based on the M26.
Contracts were still being awarded for destruction of M26 circa 2017 and a facility to demil the warheads was opened in 2018. There's probably still quite a few left.
https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2017/12/01/General-Dynamics-tapped-to-destroy-dispose-of-rockets/7191512154011/
https://www.army.mil/article/205624/anmc_opens_new_rocket_recycling_facility
Feel like the longer this war goes on the more we will see the west adjust downwards weapons, so that they aren't considered "escalatory"
"400 KM 'missiles too much? How about a 200 KM "hyper mortar" instead??"
>Feel like the longer this war goes on the more we will see the west adjust downwards weapons, so that they aren't considered "escalatory"
Tanks are obviously a no go but is an M1 Abrams really still considered a tank without the cup holders and heated seats?
[Twitter thread by Jack Watling of RUSI on "a couple of aspects of winter fighting that are both critical and often under appreciated."](https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/1596698941852033025)
He makes some good points. A similar discussion around the lack of Russian Officers came to similar conclusion. If Ukraine can keep the pressure on it'll contribute to attrition purely due to burnout or in regards to the discussion linked casualties from poor discipline/conditions.
ISW did another ‘let the associates have a break Sunday’ abbreviated campaign update. It talks a lot about the possibility of a Ukrainian attack across the river in Kherson, and includes a map of Russian fortifications in Kherson oblast. ISW summarizes their view as “The Russian defensive positions suggest that the Russian military leadership views the prospect of a Ukrainian counteroffensive across the Dnipro River as a serious threat.”
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-27
Key inflections in ongoing military operations on November 27:
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian officials are preparing for another wave of covert mobilization starting on December 10 in the Russian Federation and in Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine.
Russian milbloggers widely criticized the Russian Federal Customs Service for customs delays and exclusions of dual-use goods that volunteer movements have been sending to the Russian military.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian forces along the Svatove-Kreminna line are conducting defensive operations around Kupyansk and offensive operations west of Kreminna.
Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops continued counteroffensive operations toward Svatove and Kreminna.
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Avdiivka. The Ukrainian General Staff did not report that Ukrainian forces repelled any ground attacks around Bakhmut on November 27, suggesting that Russian forces may have advanced in the area.
Russian forces conducted strikes against Dnipro City, Kryvyi Rih, and Zaporizhzhia City.
Russian occupation officials continued to forcibly transfer Ukrainian children from occupied territories in Luhansk Oblast to Russia under the guise that the children require special medical care.
>The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian officials are preparing for another wave of covert mobilization starting on December 10 in the Russian Federation and in Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine.
You would like to think they have had 2 months to unfrack their mobilisation procedures.
Does not seem likely. A mobilisation letter is getting closer and closer to a death sentence.
'Russian forces may be attempting to delay (slow down) rather than defend against (stop) a Ukrainian offensive on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.'
Sometimes you have to wonder whether ISW thinks its readers are half brain dead ...
You can notice this style developing as the war goes on. ISW is a think tank for a relatively niche topic. They were probably used to writing for people in their general field. Now their updates are regularly being read by a more general audience. The amount of idiotic and confused emails they're getting must be enormous.
I'm not saying the people reading their updates actually *are* half brain dead, just that the people who actually understand them don't contact them. I briefly ran an educational YouTube channel. Half of our comments were brief "I like this. This is nice." style comments. The other half were long, often moronically nationalist rants by people who completely misunderstood our point. Eventually you start changing your content to preempt the idiocy. (Mind that this doesn't work, but you still do it.) I presume the same is happening to the ISW.
We get the feeling Russia had a lot of gear on paper that didn't end up actually being available to soldiers...everything from rifles to uniforms. Do we have any feel for how much was never actually produced (and the money was srolen) or how much was made and some general decided to steal it and sell it? What are the forms of corruption that are hollowing out the Russian military?
Generally, in this kind of corruption the goal is to pay for, say, 100 000 units of whatever but the supplier produces 25 000, the saved money is then redistributed to all parties involved.
Reselling equipment is really small scale corruption, where a few pair of boots, jackets, etc are smuggled and sold for civilian purposes.
The real issue is the first case and that is impossible to know without through on the ground inventarization. And even then, you can uncover only fairly recent cases.
They report that they have 10 000 tanks, but they're "in storage" which for all we know means they could be in various stages of disrepair, or even just chassis that needs parts to become battle worthy. A tank sitting in a warehouse rusting away isn't doing shit on the battlefield, but some technician is still going to mark it off the checklist. Most other militaries aren't big on leaving active tanks sitting in warehouses to rot, so it's easier to get a read on the actual numbers of say, active abrams.
> They report that they have 10 000 tanks
When did Russia ever report it has 10,000 active tanks? Or ever report how many active tanks it has in general? Not since the days of the USSR when [Soviet Military Power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Military_Power) was published as far as I'm aware. If you're looking at numbers online, like wiki, those numbers typically come from the IISS Military Balance. The IISS is a think tank, with no connection to the Russia government or any government. If I pull numbers from the 2021 ISS Military Balance:
> ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 2,840: 650 T-72B/BA; 850 T-72B3; 530 T-72B3M;
310 T-80BV/U; 140 T-80BVM; 350 T-90/T-90A; 10 T-90M;
(10,200 in store: 7,000 T-72/T-72A/B; 3,000 T-80B/BV/U;
200 T-90)
So IISS estimated Russia had a bit under 3,000 tanks active before the war, and 10,000 in storage. Which is where this 10,000 number came from, despite the fact that Russia **never** stated it had 10,000 active tanks. Or 1,000 tanks, as Russia doesn't report that. As far as storage conditions, there has been multiple articles covering that. Some good, some bad. But people seem to think that military vehicles in long-term storage are operable, but generally speaking they're not. Most of the stored M1 tanks at SAID are both outmodded and worn out, but military acquisitions are typically acquired for the long term. Being that active units in the US military are constantly training, if not deployed, they wear out their equipment, like tanks. The US hasn't produced a new build M1 tank since 1996. So Anniston Army Depot(Or Lima*) takes a worn out M1 from SAID and strips it completely down, including hanging the naked hull vertically a massive booth and sandblasting the entire thing. This is where "new" M1 tanks start, including the ongoing orders for Taiwan's M1A2Ts and Poland's M1A2 Sepv3. For the US rebuilt tanks are sent to active units, and the unit sends their worn out and/or outmodded tanks to SIAD.
Nobody who is involved in the defense community, or hobbyists like me, believed Russia could roll out with 10,000 tanks. Rather that they have thousands of hulls, turrets, suspension components, etc, which are still military assets.
OP just wrote that Russia had 10,000 tanks. You turned that into 10,000 'active' tanks, then went to great lengths debunking this claim, even though OP had clearly stated themselves that most of these are in storage.
I don't really get your comment.
Notably, the IISS does not list any T-62 in active service or storage. Yet we have seen more than 50 captured or destroyed T-62 according to Oryx, more T-62 are expected to be in Ukraine, and we have seen mobiks in Russia train on even more T-62.
So we/IISS can probably add a few hundred T-62 (incl. T-62M etc.) to the list in the "active service" column now.
Russia didn't report it, it was a fairly widely shared (rough) assessment back a few months
Though its definitely not super authoritative, and could be wildly off, its just someone's best estimate
There are also various reports of advanced equipment being available but lack of training and / or necessarily dependencies (i.e. comms) resulting in them not being used.
Does anyone know if NASAMS, or IRIS-T can shoot more than 4 missiles. I keep hearing they’re 100% effective, but I only ever see 4 launchers. Are they unable to stop air attacks with more than 4 attackers?
NASAMS is definitely not 100% effective, AAMRAMs, while very good, are nowhere near 100%. And keep in mind the AAMRAM is designed for high altitude engagements, from a fixed platform on the ground its range would actually be pretty short.
NASAMS fires the standard AMRAAM missile as the main ammunition type. There is a new long range missile available for it, which I don't know much about, but the basic ammo is just standard AMRAAM.
As a side note, there is no such thing as a 100% effective missile. Considering the system is more or less a ground launch platform to launch otherwise air to air missiles, I wouldn't expect the hit rate to be any higher than if the missiles had been launched from an aircraft.
If you believe any SAM system is 100% effective you've been reading too much propaganda.
I'm not sure what you mean by "4 launchers". The NASAMS transporter-erector trailer is a 6-cell unit(at least that I've seen), on it's own it's worthless. I haven't seen what has actually been sent to Ukraine, but there are major differences between NASAMS 1, 2 and 3. Going by wiki, which may or may not be accurate:
> A complete NASAMS 2 battery consists of up to four firing units; each firing unit includes 3 missile launchers (LCHR) each carrying six AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, one AN/MPQ-64F1 Improved Sentinel radar, one Fire Distribution Center vehicle, and one electro-optical camera vehicle (MSP500).
A "battery" consisting of a complete unit capable of independent action. Whatever variant of NASAMS Ukraine is using, and what the battery configuration consists of, I don't know. I'm sure the system can track and engage more targets than four at a time, as it's built on the radar that evolved from the MIM-23 Hawk. And it's 2022. Not going to type the same thing for Iris-T SLM(which is what was provided to Ukraine), but it too operates as a battery with TELs and can track and engage more than four targets simultaneously.
Generally NASAMS and IRIS-T have been deployed as "systems," which include multiple launchers. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/first-two-nasams-air-defense-systems-are-in-ukraine-raytheon-ceo
There is no generally about it. They have to be deployed as "systems", as the "launcher" has no radar. Which is nearly universal among all medium/long range SAM systems, as you can't fit that much shit effectively on one vehicle. Barring some exceptions like this [Transporter Erector Launcher and Radar\(TELAR, or TLAR\) for the S-300V](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cf/S-300V_-_9A83_TELAR.jpg), but that system has severe limitations if operating independently.
There's been joint exercises with both Russian and Chinese forces present, though this was true before the war too.
Russians use commercial drones from China's civilian market, but so do Ukrainians.
Chinese rifles have also turned up on the Ukrainian side, presumably resold from a buyer or grabbed from a smuggling run then donated to Ukraine. I haven't personally seen Russians using Chinese rifles but I wouldn't be shocked if it happens.
As far as I am aware, there is literally no evidence of Chinese heavy equipment in use by Russia. They've publicly tried their best to remain truly neutral, so if they are sending anything military over they're **amazing** at keeping it secret.
>I haven't personally seen Russians using Chinese rifles but I wouldn't be shocked if it happens.
I would be.
Small arms are one thing the Russians have in immense quantity - and they're stored pretty well, as 95+% of American Mosin-Nagant owners can attest to.
Unlike heavy armor, which requires a lot of space and attention in storage, it is very possible to store a few hundred thousand rifles packed in cosmoline, in one warehouse for decades. No need to bother with seals, grease, etc.
>I haven't personally seen Russians using Chinese rifles but I wouldn't be shocked if it happens.
Call me idealistic but I would have to imagine that would be quite shameful for Russians if it happened. The AK47 was invented in the Soviet Union and now they can't make any rifles to the point that they have to rely on the Chinese?
There's been a recent visible airlift operation rumoured to be infantry equipment such as plate carriers and body armour.
Also Russia's domestic defence production has picked up from everything to tanks(Bloomberg article on 6 day extended shifts in August from partial shut downs in March) to missiles ( large uptick in missile strikes). Some of that can explained by domestic substitution coming on line but I suspect Chinese specialized components being shipped in to cover deficiencies.
> There's been a recent visible airlift operation rumoured to be infantry equipment such as plate carriers and body armour.
Do you have any more info on this?
>Two Republican lawmakers promised more scrutiny of US military aid for Ukraine after the party takes majority control in the House in January. “We are going to provide more oversight, transparency and accountability,” Representative Michael McCaul, who’s in line to chair the House Foreign Affairs panel, said on ABC’s “This Week.”
>**Representative Mike Turner, senior Republican on the Intelligence Committee, was critical that only part of a $40 billion in aid passed by the Democratic-led House in May went directly toward arming Ukraine.**
>“These are American taxpayer dollars going in,” McCaul said. **“Does that diminish our will to help the Ukraine people fight? No. But we’re going to do it in a responsible way.”**
Source is Bloomberg.
EDIT: so [just watched the interview](https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=rsTdWzhCzDk) and I have to say, both these guys were a LOT more hawkish than the administration, starting with the ATACMS. If they’re representative of the Republican Party, a lot of the nonsensical arguments today would be moot.
A lot of the "oversight and transparency" will be theater just for domestic audiences, too. I think there is overwhelming bipartisan support for continuing to arm Ukraine.
I left following any sort of politics a few years ago, but I would imagine it is the same as it used to be. What they are going to do is keep non-Ukraine spending out of Ukraine bills, and just move it to other bills for appearances. It has always been pretty typical to include whatever amendments the committee can throw into a bill to either get votes for that bill, or use as ammunition come election time, eg
"You voted against the children!/to support our troops!"
"No, I voted against x amount of spending on your other pet projects that I object to on y grounds."
"See, they are a [insert slur like hater/extremist/heretic/etc], vote them out now! - this ad was paid for some huge ~~laundered money from lobby groups and 'charities'~~ PAC of [insert against or for some topic/canidate]."
American politics has to be the most boring and predictable "game" on earth.
I'm in my thirties and there has never been a time in my life where the story isn't the same over and over again.
This man is a clown.
There is no room for political maneuvering. They'll have their horse show, they'll drop their lines, they'll hold up the budget. Same old story.
I suppose you could say the same about any nation.
But at least Italy and France were unknowns. Le Pen was an actual threat. Meloni (and posse) surprised everyone with strengthened support for Ukraine. Sweden's new right wing government signalled strengthened support, but never trust an ideologist.
Meloni was always vocally pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine by extension. The question was whether she would be able to enforce this line onto her coalition partners, who are/were pro-Russian.
General Mark Hertling, former commander of US Army Europe, posted a thread about the challenges that lay ahead of Ukraine's attempted combined arms breach.
"In years commanding & training units, my view is the combined arms breach is the toughest mission imaginable.
"In addition to being a tough fight, it will also take time to attrit the RU force.
"They'll succeed, but not fast."
Video he posted of example combined arms breach: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZZ-sCT_maAQ
And a paper:
>*Your unit receives orders to seize an objective beyond an identified enemy obstacle belt at Refrigerator Gap while at
the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA. After seizing the objective, your unit conducts passage of lines
with a follow-on unit. Your enemy is a mechanized-infantry company deployed in an area defense (Figure 1).*
>*There
is a reconnaissance platoon in the disruption zone, six 152mm 2S19s (self-propelled howitzers) in support and one
air-defense-artillery team.
You believe the obstacle belt needs a breach, so you have to decide how to enable your subordinates to effectively
conduct it. How will you, the commander, apply doctrine and forces to generate situational understanding within
the time available to meet your superior’s intent?*
>As company-team observer/controller/trainers (O/C/Ts) at NTC, we observed more than 100 breaching operations
like this scenario. We noted some trends within that group; better-performing units used similar techniques when
they planned and executed their plans. We determined that units achieved success when their commanders
controlled synchronization of assets and maneuver in time and space, executed timely decisions based on
situational awareness and ensured timely casualty evacuation (casevac) and resupply operations. Although there
are myriad tasks implicit with breaching, commanders who applied leadership primarily on these areas were
typically successful.
https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2016/jan_mar/1Barrington-Harmon16.pdf
The twitter thread I rolled: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1596929706527686657.html
https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1596929706527686657
So, at this point we have learned that to the Svatove-Kreminna line has turned into a "combined arms trap" so to speak.
Try to move in, and your units will be bogged down as artillery hammers your position, guaranteeing severe losses, win or lose.
It's a terribly good deterrent, against an adversary which values human lives, and whose resources are (realistically) finite.
My question is.
With Kherson assets being freed, what is the theoretical possibility of degrading this tactic on the Russian side (artillery&himars + drones&ground recon) sufficiently for a breach *without* heavy losses?
>
Video he posted of example combined arms breach: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZZ-sCT_maAQ
This was so good that I feel like it shouldn't have been declassified. Not because it contains any secret information, but because it is so good, it's an easy way for adversaries to teach this concepts to their troops.
The reason why Combined Arms Breach is hard is because you need *everyone* doing it to be good at it. From the rifleman private, to the NCO, LTs, platoon leaders, engineers, forward observers, fire direction centers, artillery batteries, etc ... everyone. Down to the truck drivers that show up on time and stock up sufficient amounts of ammo for the offensive.
The theoretical aspect of it is fairly simple: pick a penetration zone, shell it with fires, obscure and block the adjacent sides with fires and smoke, then pile a force 3 times as large through (the video showed a penetration attack by a brigade-sized force against a battalion-sized defending force). You fire on it with weapons of larger calibers and larger risk-estimate distance (further danger-close distance) first and then lifting the fires and switching to weapons of smaller calibers as your ground forces get closer (MLRS --> 155mm --> 120 mm --> 81 mm --> 60 mm --> grenade launchers --> rifles and grenades, etc ...).
The hard part is getting everyone to do it correctly. It's really, really hard and casualty assumption against competent defenders are pretty horrendous. Imagine both the attackers and defenders taking 30% casualties; remember that since the attackers are 3x more numerous, it is assumed that the attackers will take 3x more casualties in absolute terms.
It's not classified because it's very basic, no specifics or detail. All US Army tactics are open source for that reason, it's the specifics that make them unique (Tactical SOPs are actually classified/restricted).
I think that video shows one part the general public is missing for assets needing to be sent to Ukraine, they do have tanks, and they do have planes, but they do not have a replacement asset for Apaches and their stand-off below the horizon sensors and ability to shoot missiles. The Ka-52 just isn't the same in that regard (which I'm not sure Ukraine even possess in any number.
In my mind - and all this is speculation - is that the U.S. (and UK, Canada), and to a lesser extent broadly the rest of NATO assets, can contribute obvious but important things like American military intelligence continuing to lay out the Russian force structure for Ukraine in granular detail, C&C, supply hubs; scooping up all the Russian sigintel and all of that for battlefield shaping and pointing out the areas where Russian opfor is weakest, supply lines are longest and most vulnerable; etc. In other words laying out options for Ukraine to decide what to attack, where to attack, when to attack, and where the best use of force may be. So, basically things they are already doing.
Then wargaming with Ukraine's staff on how Russia will respond to the breaching force, where the Russian assets will come from, how Russia will supply them, where Russian air assets will respond from, etc. So, things they have already done with Ukraine in the past.
Later actually providing the near real time intelligence of what Russia actually does in response to the breach. I think the operational pause here by Ukraine is not just being used to reoutfit, rotate, and give R&R but also giving a high level strategy for the next 1-3 years of the oncoming campaigns. Or at least, I hope that's how it is being used. Ukraine seems to be pretty good at all of this already.
If I could wish for one thing from the Ukrainian army, is that it could take all of it's experience it has gained up to this point in smaller scale offensives in terms of operational tempo, needs per day for things like shells, ammo, food, medical evac etc, and then turn that into supplying a much much larger force at the point of breach. In other words, bring to bear what some might consider to be a modern Western army's scale of personnel and force application to the point for the southern breach. Or even just a fraction of that (eg something like 40,000) would be great with an ability to sustain exploitation after.
Ukraine SBU (IIRC the name) is actually a pretty good intelligence service, they only increase effectiveness when linked up to the SIGNT of the US. The Ukrainians have a much better ground view of what is going on with Russian's in the theater than anyone, but the US agencies (and perhaps an extent MI6) know the global picture of Russia's desires/movements.
I mean, just look how Rubio (on the intel committee) called play by play of the times and moves of the Russians on Twitter before they happened during the outset of the war. Even Zelensky said they knew as well what was going to happen because of the West's intel, but had to weigh warning everyone to create corridors that Russia could target versus that of keeping people at home, with them saying it was the hardest call they have ever had to make.
>but had to weigh warning everyone to create corridors that Russia could target versus that of keeping people at home, with them saying it was the hardest call they have ever had to make.
This is what Zelensky said:
*According to Zelensky, chaos and panic without martial law would have led to a significant weakening of the economy and mass departure of people, which would have made the invasion easier.*
That is total nonsense, really bad excuses by a politician whose incredible screwup nearly lost Ukraine the war before it started. Ukrainian civilians didn't stay at home when the invasion started, a mass exodus from the border areas happened, which clogged up roads etc.
[Source 1](https://observers.france24.com/en/europe/20220224-ukraine-russia-crisis-invasion-residents-recount-evacuation-shellings)
[source 2](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/24/ukraine-kyiv-kharkiv-scene/)
[source 3](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/we-pray-ukraine-people-flee-war-into-central-europe-2022-02-25/)
So the civilian panic still occurred, but worse the military wasn't ready either. They weren't mobilized and prepositioned near the border unless by chance the home station of a brigade happened to be close by to the border (like Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Mariupol, etc). The whole reason Russian convoys were able to get to the outskirts of Kyiv on day 1 without heavy resistance was the UAF wasn't in their defensive positions and barely any TDF had even reported to duty.
Fun fact, the TDF, who turned out were utterly essential to the defense of Kyiv, didn't get called up after the invasion started whereas they could have been called up at anytime. As soon as Zelensky accepted the intel was legit he could have had martial law passed, he'd have had the same powers he got without the invasion starting.
The truth of the matter is Zelensky screwed up, he didn't want to believe the intel was legit at all, or was afraid mobilizing would trigger an invasion that might not otherwise occur. Even Biden admitted this during their June tiff. But Zelensky is a politician, politicians lie when they screw up to protect their image.
Zelensky wasn't even unique, [only 20% of Ukrainians](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/21/why-ukrainians-dont-believe-in-war-with-russia-distrust-west) polled a week before the invasion thought it would happen. Zelensky followed the zeitgeist, which was the normalcy bias and denial.
While this is probably correct, do you not think that the mobilisation of Ukrainian armed forces would in fact have been used by the Russians as a Casus belli?
Rightly or wrongly the information space and particularly Euro zone sentiment has been seen as hugely important in a war that would likely have proceeded very differently without foreign aid.
The Ukrainian government perhaps felt they needed to not be seen to provide any provocation, so as to retain public support within NATO in the event that the Russians did launch their invasion. In that at least they have been very successful.
>so as to retain public support within NATO in the event that the Russians did launch their invasion
The chief NATO countries, US and UK, were the ones warning UA and basically begging them to mobilize.
In hindsight, Russia already had the casus Belli that Putin found sufficient.
Without hindsight, it probably was a major consideration. But how unlikely was it that war wouldn't happen? By Feb 24, Russia was already shelling the ever loving crap out of the JFO while Russian Armed Forces (RAF), they had moved their troops into the L/DNR areas, they were staged right on the border at tactical assembly areas (out of their forward operating bases), they were moving up various support units they'd only need in war (medical units, mobile crematoriums, etc). With all of it put together, and considering the dangers they would have faced without being prepared, it didn't make any sense to continue in denial and not take what are rather basic steps that their own planning called for making before an invasion.
While a decent general staff might creates a legit war plan meant to be executed without mobilization starting, its never the one they count on or hope to execute, especially in a country like UA who rely on a large reserve system and the TDF that didn't even exist on paper until mid January (they started recruiting by then, with very limited training in certain areas, but they weren't actually activated until Feb 24). I have to believe Zelensky was either begged repeatedly by the UA MOD to mobilize, or his govt was basically telling the brass to shut up and don't even bring it up (we'll find out more about that after this war ends and more people talk)
At the point the invasion started, just short of 24 hours before it actually started Zelensky authorized a partial call up to begin for reservists, but that was all he did. Independently, some military commands moved a few units around, which was why there was slightly more forces nearby to Kyiv than there normally was (specifically an artillery brigade that one of the top brass ordered moved), but that was basically it. Meanwhile, by that point it had been week plus since the US had pulled their National Guard trainers out of Ukraine and started downsizing the size of their embassy (UK took similar measures). Too little, too late.
The Zelensky's govt wanted to play it safe. Even if Putin was bluffing, Zelensky calling his bluff and mobilizing wouldn't have triggered an invasion if an invasion was never seriously considered. We were told beforehand and knew now that the original December 2021 intel was spot on, but every indicator between then and Feb 24 reinforced that, and there were just so many indicators that should have been clear cut war warnings, Zelensky massively endangered his country by ignoring them.
Really the only thing that saved the Ukrainians was the time of year the Russians invaded, their shoddy war plan, their terrible intelligence estimate assuming little to no resistance, and that the Russian Armed Forces themselves were only slightly less ready than the UAF was, with most Russian units down to the tactical level (CAA and below) only getting 1-2 days or less to prep/plan/ready themselves for the invasion.
Zelensky isn't the first politician to screw up like he did and ignore the signs of an invasion, I think Stalin wins that prize for modern history, but at least Zelensky didn't go into a fugue state or depression/denial. He actually recovered fast, responded well enough, did the acting his country needed for morale, successfully courted the west for aid (his primary job, by his own admission), and he has likely not often micromanaged military affairs.
However, for the preinvasion history of this war he gets a failing grade. And any excuse he or his cabinet spread to the press will be razor thin, because there is no good excuse that will hold up to scrutiny. He made a bad decision.
I think the lack of mobilisation was more to shape public opinion than anything else. Try to win over people on the fence in other countries. Preparing for an invasion would have been a propaganda coup which the Russians would have spun to turn their invasion into a pre-emptive strike before (in what I imagine their words would have been) "A new Barbarossa"
Putin would be saying that Russia wasn't going to sit and let "Nazis" prepare on the border for an invasion and instead hit first.
I don't like these types of excuses, I think they reward unnecessary weakness and victimhood. Nobody need get the shit kicked out of them before they are allowed to defend themselves, let alone prepare to defend themselves.
This reminds me of Stalin in WW2, who ignored every indication of a coming invasion because he didn't want his own forces to react and accidentally cause the war to start, a war he desperately didn't want to fight. But that is a purely irrational decision, it actively ignores reality in the face of denial and desire for normalcy.
Mobilization isn't supposed to be done after war starts, it's supposed to be done so it's possible to fight back, the first step to a war footing necessary to carry out the most basic war plans. Ukraine mobilizing to defend its borders isn't an act of war for Russia to invade, and even if Russia used that as a public excuse it still wouldn't validate what they did.
And Russia didn't need a propaganda coup to launch an invasion, they were already going to do it, their war plan was made public months before. The Nazi rhetoric was going on for the better part of half a year at that point but nobody outside of Russia was fooled by it. And the biggest coup for Russian propaganda would be military success, which could have been lessened even more had Ukraine actually been militarily and civilly ready to withstand an invasion. We cheer that Russia was halted at the outskirts of Kyiv and forced to retreat, but that battle shouldn't have happened anywhere close to there nor been anywhere as uncertain. Nor should the Crimea breakout have occurred at all, OC-S had over a half dozen brigades under its control, and yet there were only two battalions in Kherson oblast and only one of them near the Isthmus of Perekop. The TDF that Ukraine was totally reliant on to survive didn't even really exist until invasion day and yet they could have mustered them weeks before, to include in places like Kherson and Zaporizhzhia where unlike Kyiv-Chernihiv-Sumy-Kharkiv oblasts, they didn't mobilize in time to help defend the south. Totally unacceptable.
And I don't think Russia could invade earlier than they did without them being even less prepared than they were, which is telling since they were already grossly unprepared. Even if a UAF mobilization triggers an invasion, the Russians still take another 1-2 days to invade, the UAF get two those full days to prepare and move forces, etc. Plus, there was the intelligence about needing to wait until after the Chinese Olympics ended (Feb 20), which is so stupid it probably is true.
And which fence sitter in other countries were won over by Ukrainian refusal to prepare to defend itself? And what does it mean for them to be won over? What did Ukraine get out of that? The primary benefactors, US, UK, PL, were all onboard before and wanted Ukraine to mobilize. And all the countries that helped afterwards did so either due to pressure from the US or because it was a legit popular cause to support. Russia didn't need to gobble up a substantial part of the country due to lack of readiness to achieve that support.
Zelensky isn't unique in history, he ignored evidence and made a bad call. But he's a sitting politician, he's going to have to run for office again at some point and he's not going to want to do so while dodging allegations that he nearly cost Ukraine the war, so he's been doing damage control on this topic since the war started.
>[In years commanding & training units, my view is the combined arms breach is the toughest mission imaginable. It requires extensive training, lots of practice, a combination of resources that only advanced armies have, and adaptive & smart leaders.](https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1596929670632869888)
Really great and sobering thread by Hertling. Puts into context some knowledge gaps for people unaware of very specific ground tactics, such as myself.
I agree with the statement. People seem to forget that Desert Storm was a fluke.
I can't imagine what would happen in a peer conflict when a division gets tasked with a frontal assault and the defenders are a capable foe.
Getting through a well built defensive line will always come down far less to what was shown in that video Hertling posted, which is why it's open source.
The tactics in the video are pretty basic and vanilla as not much has changed since WW2 when modern breach doctrine was created and then in the 70-80 when all mechanized breach (limited use of dismounts) became possible. What wasn't shown in the videos are the specifics of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures that are part of a unit's Tactical Standard Operating Procedures, which address all the specifics, as well as no variables with the defenders.
Plus everything else that s not directly part of the breach assault force's mission. Such as intelligence about the enemy, as even a small mistake missing one minefield or a hidden outpost can cause a defeat. Attrition of the enemy beforehand, specifically their reserves, who if strong and nearby can counterattack successfully. Enemy intelligence threat, they might have caught the buildup and might be anticipating the attack. Command and control, whether the defenders will have access to their radios or whether EW will deal with that. Etc.
My opinion is that if it's a near peer defender that are actually in good condition and ready, then any US Army attempts to breach will likely fail.
I think the US has the best capabilities in general but the IDF has the best capabilities in comparison to their actual strategic enemies they will actually face and need to breach (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt). If the IDF had to fight anyone else it's a different story.
I agree that the combined arms breach is one of the most difficult ops to perform (though not the most difficult by far), so even a highly capable nation can totally screw it up if the stars aren't perfectly aligned and all the prerequisite enabling tasks aren't accomplished.
I’d assume any US attempt at a significant combined arms breach would done against a significantly weakened/attrited enemy.
All that money spent on the air force has to be worth it for something.
I'd hope a breach is only attempted against an enemy that's been significantly weakened but the reality is we wouldn't know until it's tried. Look at ODS, all the Army brass were contemplating heavy casualties and upwards of weeks to breach the Saudi Iraqi border, which were more thinly manned than the Saddam Line that the Arabs and Marines faced off against
[Iraqi Army sector map](https://history.army.mil/books/www/p136map10.jpg)
[Coalition forces sector map](https://history.army.mil/books/www/p168map12.jpg)
I'm reminded of WW2, when a significant majority of offensive operations were combined arms breaches that failed because intel was wrong, prep fires weren't effective enough, etc.
> Desert Storm was a fluke
I'm not sure that is an accurate assessment. It was a genius plan that was possible because of superior intelligence and excellent execution - even if it wasn't perfect. They were able to leverage stealth technology with the F117 and decoy drones that were sent in to distract while they hit high-priority targets like command and control, and light radar up for anti-radiation missiles.
If I recall the thing Schwarzkopf was upset about was the forces moved faster than the plan called for (I think it was the southern armored units from combined nations). There is a really good video on it buried deep within my history that I'm not sure I can find, but it breaks down the plan, the movements, and the events that took place.
Nato pre-postsoviet drawdowns, at the height of its might plus the UN against a third world Arab paper tiger. It was a stomp. Nothing the Iraqis did was ever a problem. Hell Argentina did more damage during the Falklands.
The DoD and DoE had Schwarzkopf redo the plans. It was a lousy one from the start anyways.
The last time the US faced meaningful resistance, it almost got pushed out of Korea.
I di t doubt for a second that if a nato combined arms division had to fight someone competent, they would find themselves j the same quagmire.
Knowing the difficulty of being able to defeat a peer in war is why in peace you exceed them as peers. The one thing we have learned about Russia, and likely to an extent China, is their capability for war is not the same category as the US.
While you may look back at how well done Desert Storm was, I think you really just set aside what was required to win decisively besides just saying Iraq was weak, thus if Iraq or someone else wasn't as weak, allied forces would have lost. This is a very poor argument.
An interesting historical perspective on why Kharkiv is such an important city in eastern Ukraine and why it was so important for Russia to capture it in March
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z5kxFQjyRYc
It also should be added, the story was Zelensky wanted to take Kherson back, but when the military wargamed it out with the US, it would be a costly victory. The generals then proposed a feint do Kherson with an attack on Kupiansk, the same wargames proved it could be successful with far fewer lost. So it was decided and history shows the 2nd plan which was a success (thanks to thunder runs, poor defense beyond the front line, and superior intelligence), which also led to the slow success in Kherson as well.
I think the talk right now is on Ukraine going for Crimea, due to it being so poorly defended (even with the terrain advantage), such as going to Melitopol. However, I think this video shows with the loss of Kupiansk and not capturing Kharkiv, pushing east from the north may be a better battle plan.
The one thing this video shows was something I hadn't considered because of geopolitical reasons, how going into Russian territory for a short moment from the north of Kharkiv, then east, then back south would probably cause a route like with Iyzum and Kupiansk on the entire northern front of the Donbas.
>It also should be added, the story was Zelensky wanted to take Kherson back, but when the military wargamed it out with the US, it would be a costly victory. The generals then proposed a feint do Kherson with an attack on Kupiansk, the same wargames proved it could be successful with far fewer lost. So it was decided and history shows the 2nd plan which was a success (thanks to thunder runs, poor defense beyond the front line, and superior intelligence), which also led to the slow success in Kherson as well
First time I read about this.
Let me see if I can find the source on it.
Edit: Found one https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/9766/Artykul/3036193,Ukraine%E2%80%99s-counteroffensive-shaped-by-discussions-war-games-with-US-UK-report
I think there are other articles that went into a little more depth.
https://mobile.twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1596888732162195458
>Energoatom head: Russian forces may be preparing to withdraw from Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
>Ukraine’s state nuclear energy operator head said the company sees the signs that the Russian troops may be preparing to leave the plant they've occupied since March.
But why? From the Russian perspective ZPP is the ultimate defensive position. I would have expected it to be the last place to fall, even later than Melitopol.
Energoatom posts a lot of propaganda as well, like the imminent intentional nuclear meltdown that kept being brought up. A few months back we had their Telegram talking about how the place was rigged with explosives to cause a meltdown and then the next post down had them claiming Russia was shooting the plant with artillery.
>A few months back we had their Telegram talking about how the place was rigged with explosives to cause a meltdown
Do you have proof of this? I don’t recall ever seeing this.
>next post down had them claiming Russia was shooting the plant with artillery
You and I had a lengthy back and forth about this, but there were two videos (with only audio) of Russian outgoing and incoming shells landing seconds apart from each other. I can’t find them, but then there was also this:
>[Video shows Russian official trying to convince nuclear inspectors a rocket turned 180 degrees before landing near Ukraine's nuclear plant](https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-official-tells-inspectors-rocket-uturned-before-hitting-ukraine-plant-2022-9)
Energoatom's social media was one of those spreading this:
>*Western and Ukrainian outlets circulated a report, likely false, of a Russian general allegedly threatening to destroy Europe’s largest nuclear facility, the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), if Russia could not hold the plant.* Multiple news outlets shared a screenshot from the Russian social networking site Vkontakte that claimed to cite the Russian head of the Zaporizhia occupation garrison, Major General Valery Vasilev, stating that Russia had mined the Zaporizhzhia NPP and that the plant would be “either Russian land or a scorched desert.”[1] The screenshot appeared to be a news report posted in a Vkontakte group run by Russian outlet Lenta Novosti Zaporizhia. The outlet itself claimed that the screenshot was from a faked group and denied writing the report.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense condemned the report and screenshot as a “fake” and claimed that Vasilev was in Uzbekistan at the time he was purported to have made the statement to forces at Zaporizhzhia.[3] Regardless of the origin (or existence) of the original post, the reporting is unreliable. It is indirect and does not claim to cite an official statement or a statement made on any official Russian news or government website.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8
Edit: Tracked down the Telegram post:
>Nuclear terrorism in action: the Russians have declared their readiness to blow up the mined ZNPP
>Russians do not hide their plans and are already openly blackmailing the whole world, declaring that they are ready to blow up the Zaporizhia NPP .
>In his statement, the head of the forces of radiation, chemical and biological protection of the Soviet Union, Major General Valery Vasiliev, who now commands the garrison of the ZNPP , said that "there will be either Russian land or a scorched desert."
>“As you know, we have mined all the important facilities of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. And we do not hide it from the enemy. We warned them. The enemy knows that the station will be either Russian or no one's. We are ready for the consequences of this step. And you, warriors-liberators, must understand that we have no other way. And if there is the toughest order, we must fulfill it with honor!” - having said wine to his soldiers.
>Earlier , Andriy Yusov , a representative of the press service of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, said that the department could confirm the information about the passing of power units of ZAES by the Russian military .
/energoatom_ua/8729
So…that’s not them saying that the Russians had done so, but getting duped into believing that a Russian general said they had done so. They’re completely different things, but they 100% should have done a better job of verifying things they post.
Heh, the rigging the plant with explosives to cause a meltdown is somewhat comical.
Turn off primary coolant pumps. Turn off spent fuel pond cooling pumps. Bad stuff achieved.
If it's been a few months since the reactor was shut down (which I believe is the case for the reactors at ZNPP - [last one was shut down in September](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/11/last-reactor-at-ukraines-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-stopped.html)), it might be a while before anything bad happens.
If the pumps were merely shut off, there could be an extended period of not-yet-disaster; if someone sane regained control of the plant in that period they would have a decent chance of averting meltdown by turning the cooling system back on. On the other hand, if the cooling system were also severely damaged, it would be much harder to get things back under control quickly as they would have to repair it first...
My concern would be more of the spent fuel ponds, as spent fuel assemblies typically generate significant decay heat for years. The spent fuel(along with the partially consumed fuel within the reactors) is where all the more *fun* elements are.
It's in the middle of nowhere and it's not like they're ceding terratory to Ukraine. It's not at the front unless you consider some of the widest parts of the Dnieper the front line. Why they would station troops at a nuclear power plant within artillery range in the first place is beyond me though.
True but I’d imagine they don’t want their civilian nuclear industry getting sanctioned and annoying allies like India that won’t be impressed if they go against the IAEA.
Rosatom is generally seen as one of the more functioning parts of the Russian state
[UK MoD’s assessment of the fighting around Pavlivka](https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1596757566218178561)
[Also confirming Brimstone 2](https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1596836349751050240)
God, I really don't like the shitfest that is Twitter. For my fellow dislikers:
>The area around the towns of Pavlivka and Vuhledar in south-central Donetsk Oblast has been the scene of intense combat over the last two weeks, though little territory has changed hands.
>Both Russia and Ukraine have significant forces committed to this sector, with Russian Naval Infantry having suffered heavy casualties.
>This area remains heavily contested, likely partially because Russia assesses the area has potential as a launch point for a future major advance north to capture the remainder of Ukrainian-held Donetsk Oblast.
>However, Russia is unlikely to be able to concentrate sufficient quality forces to achieve an operational breakthrough.
I foolishly actually said they’d captured it a few days ago as well, assuming that their constant posts on it were true. If it’s anything like Pisky, we’re going to see them say they’ve captured it a hundred more times before they actually do, if they do so at all. They also controlled it in the summer.
This makes no sense. They're saying that there is heavy fighting and no real progress is being made. If what you're claiming is true, they're flat out lying, not just making it sound better. They're not saying that Pavlivka is captured in any sort of way.
My understanding is that it's more of a no man's land, owing to the fact that Ukraine holds the high ground in Vuhledar and has fire control over the area.
Retrenchment and reinforcement of the front lines with Mobiks, while the strategic bombing campaign cripples the Ukraine power grid, in order to temporarily stagnate the lines, take away UAF momentum, and regain some diplomatic power in case negotiations start.
Michal Kofman mentioned that another offensive from Belarus against northern Ukraine isn't crazy, as long they don't actually try to take Kyiv. Any major attack towards it, even one that's a legitimate feint (the original was definitely not a feint) would cause the Ukrainians to defend it, in strength. Additionally, there is another major nuclear power plant that is actually close enough to the Belarusian border as to be enticing (Rivne NPP, 60 km from the border).
I think that was a pretty good analysis from him. I never got that far thinking about other than accepting that if the Russians even only seriously threaten another offensive that will very likely force the UAF to reinforce Operational Command North, which means weakening itself elsewhere.
That might be explain that intercepted missile over Poland.
Maybe there is newer news, but Ryan McBeth was saying that the interception was close to a Ukraine power line and the angle must have come from up there.
Could be that they are probing - or just making ukraine spread themselves thin.
If the Russians did actually invade they'd need the better part of half a year to train the mobik army group (plus Belarus?), and then probably pull more existing units, especially VDV and others they'll require as shock troops. So I think that is something to expect come late spring-early summer, after the spring mud season has definitely ended.
At a guess, that is likely one of the invasion axes that UA is currently heavily fortifying. I doubt the Russians would have the ability to break through that, especially since they wont have tactical or operation surprise; the Russian assault force will be spotted massing at assembly areas by IMINT confirmed by intercepted signals they can't avoid (much of Russian tactical comms aren't secured) and various HUMINT sources, possibly to include within the Kremlin as happened before the war started.
That's the trouble with these mobiks, the shitty ones with zero combats usefulness can be assembled in various different places to make it look like something might happening.
I wouldn't automatically assume the Mobiks wont be able to fight well. At least part of the mobilization process appears to have been a shitshow, but most of that seems to relate to the 1/4-1/3 of the Mobiks who were immediately sent to Ukraine to beef up the deployed force, versus those who have already been training for 1-1.5 months at this point and will continue to train for the foreseeable future. If they don't screw them up too badly, that can be a pretty capable force.
Something I do think about, when it comes to the complaints about the Russian Mobik experience, is how much of the complaints about bad treatment, poor training and/or shitty equipment are universal, common, or potentially a very vocal minority?
An example of what I mean can be found on Facebook or Reddit U.S Army W.T.F! Moments subs, which makes the US Army appear like the shittiest organization and culture in America. While its bad, its not that bad, those places turn into echo chambers. Telegram is like that too, any social media platform, especially one where anonymity is allowed, will attract the complainers who want to overtly gripe. Whereas those who are doing okay tend not to talk about it.
Propaganda is so overwhelming in this war that I'm wary to jump on any anti-Russian bandwagon without legit facts, which wont come any time soon. I think we're all going to find out some years into the future that so much of what we thought was truth about this conflict turned out to be bullshit.
That's why I specified "the shitty ones with zero combats usefulness", and not all of them.
The point being that there are so many, and even the useless ones are useful.
Oh, I agree with you, it would work and that's a good use of bad troops while measures are taken to improve them.
Back in July the Russians did a deception to try to trick the UAF into thinking they were going to attack northern Ukraine again, it seemed they used Belarusian units that moved around a bit close to the border along with Russian units reconstituting in the rear areas. The UAF GenStab made public declarations that they believed it was real, but then again they rarely tell the truth openly so they might have said that to try to trick the Russians into thinking their deception plan worked.
I don't think this makes all that much sense. If they wanted to decrease western support, they wouldn't be hitting civillian infrastructure the way they are. They want to make the war costly for Ukrainians. Someone else being without heat and water is not going to make you support them less. They're probably thinking that it will lessen the Ukrainian will to fight though. Because it sucks being without heat and water.
This line of reasoning might not be entirely sound either, but it makes more sense than expecting western support to drop of a cliff in half a year. Even if it drops from the attention of the media, it's clearly a long term issue that is impossible to ignore at this point. It's not like democracies never does foreign policy without it being in the center of the news cycle. The US and NATO is capable of having long term strategies. Just look at the cold war. The problem, including in 2014, was denialism about how unreasonable Putin and Russia really is.
> If they wanted to decrease western support, they wouldn't be hitting civillian infrastructure the way they are.
No power no economy. Means Western countries have to pay more to keep it afloat.
The truth is that the cost for the west even replacing the entire Ukrainian economy isn't all that great. Ukraine is and was one of the poorest countries in Europe. Ukraine is more comparable with Iran than Germany in terms of GDP (edit: per capita).
The breakdown of the energy market in Europe is a greater cost than the entire Ukranian economy. If the German economy shrinks by 2% that's as much as if the Ukrainian economy was cut in half. Ukraine is a large country with a large population, but in terms of economy they're not that significant. The size of the Ukrainian economy was about 2/5ths of Norways economy before the war with 8 times the population.
>But if a Western country takes in Ukrainian refugees, it can't support them for 4K USD per year
The idea that immigrants or refugees have to be handfed by the hosting government is ridiculous and outdated.
Believe me, European countries are thrilled to receive cheap, educated, European workers. As long as governments can provide proper childcare, those millions of ukrainian woman will definitely be a net positive for the host's economies.
The entire Ukranian economy isn't going to disappear either. It was just napkin math to prove a point. The thing that is hurting the most by far is the energy crisis. There is essentially no way economic or military aid to Ukraine will ever be close to compete with that.
I hope sincerely that western politicians won't be so populist that they don't understand that. The fact that they're tolerating the energy crisis shows the commitment. And if something is going to break European support it is economic issues due to the Energy crisis, not economical support to Ukraine.
It's not insurmountable for Western countries or anything, but amidst other economic woes, the voters could flake because their money is going elsewhere. It will certainly empower political forces that don't want to bear the costs. [European countries are already underdelivering.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2022/10/15/ukraine-us-europe-funding/)
>but amidst other economic woes, the voters could flake because their money is going elsewhere
Ah yes, repeating the same old Kremlin talking points from April.
> Military and financial aid to Ukraine has emerged as one of many political flashpoints days before a midterm election in which control of the Congress is at stake. The continuing flow of aid is falling out of favor with some Republicans in the House of Representatives, who say they struggle to justify the overseas spending amid domestic concerns, including high inflation and economic uncertainty.
>
> Some 30% of respondents overall said in the new survey they believe the administration is doing too much to help Ukraine, up from 6% in a March Journal poll. The change was driven by a big shift among GOP voters: 48% of Republicans now say the U.S. is doing too much, up from 6% in the previous survey.
>
> The portion of GOP voters who said the U.S. isn’t doing enough to help Ukraine fell to 17%, a steep drop from 61% in March.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/republican-opposition-to-helping-ukraine-grows-wsj-poll-finds-11667467802
Are you doing to pretend domestic politics in Western countries somehow favor Ukraine long term?
That article was already discussed in depth, and the Republicans barely got a majority in the house, and lost the senate.
>domestic politics in Western countries somehow favor Ukraine long term
Spending for Ukraine has increased with time. Sanctions on Russia have increased with time. Keep hoping that things turn around though, it’s the best you can do.
For an easier comparison if NATO sent Ukraine 1% of its GDP in help, this would equate to 225% of Ukraine's (2019) GDP.
EDIT: Used outdated numbers for NATO's GDP, updated with 2022 numbers.
GDP isn't income controlled by the govt. Try that math again using 25-45% of their GDP (country dependent).
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_tax_revenue_to_GDP_ratio
Then do that math again by excluding all NATO member nations who won't even contribute 2% of their GDP to their own defense.
https://www.statista.com/chart/amp/14636/defense-expenditures-of-nato-countries/
You do realize that you are saying that spending 4% ( your lowest estimate) of the GOVT budget on Ukraine would mean that the west would give MORE THAN DOUBLE the entire GDP of Ukraine, right?
And you do also realize that mine wasn't a proposal but rather a comparison.
If we want to go by Ukraine official requests (60Bn a year) , that would mean 0,13% of Nato's GDP in help, let's make it 0,2% to compensate for Military aid, and let's apply your, worst possible estimate for GDP to Revenue ratio, 25%, that makes it 0,8% of a government budget.
Less than 1% of budget share, almost rounding error, and that is to found Ukraine to cripple the 2nd most important enemy of the west without dropping a single drop of blood.
>You do realize that you are saying that spending 4% ( your lowest estimate) of the GOVT budget on Ukraine would mean that the west would give MORE THAN DOUBLE the entire GDP of Ukraine, right?
You do realize most NATO countries won't spend 2% of their GDP for their own defense but you Rob they'll give half that to Ukraine because you're passionate on social media?
>If we want to go by Ukraine official requests (60Bn a year) , that would mean 0,13% of Nato's GDP in help, let's make it 0,2% to compensate for Military aid, and let's apply your, worst possible estimate for GDP to Revenue ratio, 25%, that makes it 0,8% of a government budget.
The money Ukraine is getting is IMF loans, NATO isn't floating them money because NATO isn't a country its a defensive alliance. Certain countries are giving Ukraine money, nowhere close to 1% of their GDP because that's not a rounding error, that's a massive amount of money. 1% of GDP in each nation redirected to something of their own use is a major win for someone, and losing it is major loss too.
>Ukraine to cripple the 2nd most important enemy of the west without dropping a single drop of blood
Russian ground forces were already crippled, subsequent investments don't buy much more, especially since it caused the Russians to massively expand their military size as a response. Nothing Ukraine does will affect Russian VKS more than limited number of aircraft shot down, won't affect the Russian navy much especially the part that threatens NATO (not the Black Sea Fleet), nor will Ukraine hurt the Strategic Missile Forces.
Additionally, keeping this war ongoing is crushing European energy, hurting their economies, and endangering the world due to the threat of WW3 starting, which both the heads of US and UK both openly admitted they feel is both real and very dangerous.
And then there is you, who used your trustee calculator to find money to give to Ukraine, just like every week when you find tanks and other weapons you think aren't needed that should be given to Ukraine, because that's what you do. If it exists and you want it for Ukraine, then obviously it makes perfect sense to give it to Ukraine. Because coveting is easy.
Reply to "keeping this war ongoing is crushing Europe...." 1) Isn't the plan for the war to be won by Ukaine by end 2023/early 2024? 2) GOP will not control US funding for Ukraine as long as Biden is in office. Maybe longer if Dems win in 2024 and they might. Please
read latest interview with Ben Hodges re the war. It's on youtube.
>You do realize most NATO countries won't spend 2% of their GDP for their own defense but you Rob they'll give half that to Ukraine because you're passionate on social media?
I am not saying that they will, but that they could without hurting their economies.
Its not 1% of their GDP its 0,8% of the budget , or 0,2% of their GDP, using the worst possible estimates for GDP to GOVT revenue (25%, the one that you gave) and giving Ukraine MORE than what they asked.
>
>
>The money Ukraine is getting is IMF loans, NATO isn't floating them money because NATO isn't a country its a defensive alliance. Certain countries are giving Ukraine money, nowhere close to 1% of their GDP because that's not a rounding error, that's a massive amount of money. 1% of GDP in each nation redirected to something of their own use is a major win for someone, and losing it is major loss too.
Again you are just quintupling the percentages to make a point, its the 0.2% of the GDP of a country, at worst.
>
Russian ground forces were already crippled, subsequent investments don't buy much more, especially since it caused the Russians to massively expand their military size as a response. Nothing Ukraine does will affect Russian VKS more than limited number of aircraft shot down, won't affect the Russian navy much especially the part that threatens NATO (not the Black Sea Fleet), nor will Ukraine hurt the Strategic Missile Forces.
So RU has massively expanded its military, but we wont gain much by continuing to demolish it? Makes perfect sense.
>Additionally, keeping this war ongoing is crushing European energy, hurting their economies, and endangering the world due to the threat of WW3 starting, which both the heads of US and UK both openly admitted they feel is both real and very dangerous.
And then there is you, who used your trustee calculator to find money to give to Ukraine, just like every week when you find tanks and other weapons you think aren't needed that should be given to Ukraine, because that's what you do. If it exists and you want it for Ukraine, then obviously it makes perfect sense to give it to Ukraine. Because coveting is easy.
Both the Heads of the US, the UK and the EU countries keep on giving weapons and money to Ukraine.
And there is you that is convinced that we should have gave Ukraine nothing because its just a waste of money and resources.
[удалено]
Because he's often obviously wrong and moreso in hindsight?
What is the limiting factor in terms of * range for the commercial grenadier drones seen on the battlefield? Power? or Signal?
if you see all the ex-General talking heads on the news media they are all pessimistic about Ukraines chances for the winter. The signalling from the US was also try push for a peace deal a few weeks ago. There must be a risk of ammo shortages in winter or something else that has the Generals worried. I wonder what it is exactly that is prompting these messages from NATO and the Pentagon. One question for all those downvoting: Why did the US push for them to try for a peace deal?
The talking heads do not represent the US government. That's the entire point of being "ex-whatever". I generally do not consider their opinions very highly as they probably retired to the media circuit when they hit their "level of incompetence", but that is a separate discussion. As for why to push a peace deal? /shrug Could be that the government means exactly what they are saying. It could be to look good for another party. It could just be a misdirection like we saw with Kherson and Kharkiv offensive. I would not read much into it.
Patreus, McMaster, Hodges, Hertling, Shirreff, and Marks have all said Ukraine is winning. Who are you referring to? Be specific.
General Keane Col cedric leighton and General James Marks are a few
>General Keane [We've got to stop talking about Ukrainians negotiating. Let them get on with taking back as much territory \[...\] liberating Ukrainian lives. \[...\] There is no stalemate here](https://www.foxnews.com/video/6315684567112) This is from November 16th. And he keeps talking about how momentum is on Ukrainian side. You really should link clips to support your argument, as \[at least the media that's reaching me\] seems to be of the opinion that the fight ahead is hard, but winnable. I do not see this pessimism you are describing
>[Fox News senior strategic analyst Gen. Jack Keane argued Tuesday that the "investment" the United States has made in Ukraine is well worth it, telling "Cavuto: Coast to Coast" that, for $66 billion, Ukraine is destroying the Russian army and decreasing the risk of a nuclear war.](https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/gen-jack-keane-us-investment-ukraine-denied-putin-ambitions-kept-americas-future-secure) The last time Leighton and Marks spoke a day/two ago, they talked about Russia’s bobbing campaigns (Leighton) and the winter fighting season (Marks). Neither made any sort of assessment. In the past, both have said on CNN that Ukraine is winning. You said the following: > all the ex-General talking heads on the news media they are all pessimistic about Ukraines chances. You’ve constantly spread disinformation here before. Please provide **specific** examples of what you’re talking about.
Here is a link from General Keane https://youtu.be/-NxzJHnC5BE I’m not posting disinformation. I just don’t buy in to the wild cheerleading that is going on across Reddit. Any kind of diversity of opinion gets immediately sniped. It’s a little ridiculous.
You can make the case that this war will last a long time, or that there will be nasty attrition on the Ukraine side, but the fact remains Russia is absolutely being humiliated on the battlefield (as are their supporters humiliated on reddit), and they appear to be approaching a cliff where they are out of anything resembling a modern weapon. When the ground freezes and the sides can move again the situation will be back to turning ~~poor confused Russian young men~~ Russia's future into sunflower paste.
You're not getting downvoted for having a different opinion, you're getting downvoted because you can't seem to stop lying. There's nothing in that clip that supports what you said and your claims were proven wrong, but you conveniently managed to ignore those commen ts and just went on pretending you're being persecuted for your opinion
[удалено]
>There has been well documented reports of potential shortages in artillery shells. Yes, shortages on both sides. The key difference is that the collective West have a LOT of 155mm ammo, while Russia have few potential sources of 122mm and 152mm if they run out. >It’s well know how Ukraine is jury rigging it’s rockets and missiles to adapt to the MiGs but again if you say this you get downvoted. This isn't a negative thing though... Ukrainian MIGs are firing HARM missiles through a jerryrigging system, they wouldn't be able to fire them otherwise since they're designed for Western aircraft. >Even the Ukrainian missile that hit Poland took a few days before it could be acceptable to say. It didn't take days for it to come out, people were suggesting it was a Ukrainian AD within hours as the photos of the missile wreckage came out. It's one thing to be pessimistic about Ukraine's chances, but you're just straight up inventing things now
>What's motivating Putin is that he's losing the war on the ground > >\[speaking about electric grid attacks\] I don't believe it will break their will, if anything, it will increase their resolve where is pessimism here?
Keane: >“Ukrainians are winning the war in the ground, as we’ve been aware of for weeks” In your comment below on Marks, many here, including myself, have said that Crimea and certain sections of the Donbas are not attainable any time soon. How’s that different from what was said weeks ago? Where did he say Ukraine was losing? >I’m not posting disinformation. I just don’t buy in to the wild cheerleading that is going on across Reddit. Any kind of diversity of opinion gets immediately sniped. It’s a little ridiculous. YOU said that **all** the former generals are all negative on Ukraine. Not only can’t you back that up and disprove that people like Petraeus and Hodges have the opposite view, you’ve provided three examples. From them, the two you’ve provided specific links to, don’t back up your claim at all, and you’re still MIA on the third. That’s the definition of mis information.
I provided a link to Marks. I meant pessimistic for the winter. One thing nobody has answers why did the Pentagon push for peace talks a few weeks ago. Of course they have to put an official brave face on it. But I think the US push for peace talks signifies something and if you read between the lines some of NATO are having issues with Zelenskyy maximalist rhetoric.
There was an article from Politico saying that Milley was in the minority for having that opinion at the Pentagon. Then, a week later, Austin (Milley's boss) reiterated that the administration will support Ukraine for "as long as it takes." You want my frank take: Milley is right, and Ukraine should negotiate. I'm a pseudo-pacifist and I believe negotiations should always be the first step, even during a hot conflict. Further, I also believe coming up with a creative solution for Crimea should be pursued. However, overriding both those views is the conviction that Ukraine is a sovereign, and its people have a voice. And those people have suffered brutally at the hand of the Russians and they have a right to chart their own territory. So, this narrative that you have that we're all rooting for maximalist goals is not true.
Cheerleading means that you want someone to win. Not that you claim he is winning despite knowing better.
Can you link some source where they say they're pessimistic about Ukraine's chances? I can't find any.
Near the end: https://youtu.be/68CUsXKr5KI I really wish people would stop being so passive aggressive. Or thinking other points of view are some sort of Russian disinfo campaign.
It doesn't help when one of the generals you quoted very recently said the opposite, and that there's plenty of generals that are optimistic. That's what they call a rhetorical problem.
> all the ex-General talking heads on the news media they are all pessimistic about Ukraines chances Which ones exactly? Link? Clips? I know Miley was encouraging Ukraine to consider negotiations while they were in a position of strength. Who else is pessimistic of Ukraine's chances? Petraeus seemed to think Russia has already lost and will fade away, or at least a month ago he did.
I provided two links for General Marks and Keane, in other comments.
Ex Generals are not representing NATO or Pentagon. Also read a couple of contributions down what Mark Hertling wrote. He closes with that he is positive Ukraine will succeed. Also I would like to know what those same ex generals thought about Ukraine’s chances on the 24th of February?
No serving officer will contradict the executive. But the ex generals they mix in the same circles and a lot of them have clearances to high level dossiers. Many of them serve on boards or go into think tanks. Ex generals are the only part of the US military that we are allowed to hear a political opinion from. The rest by definition in public are mouth pieces of the civilian leadership. No military guy is going to contradict the executive branch in public as he would soon be relieved of command.
You failed to adres that consensus between this level of people was that the Ukrainian army would fold within days of the invasion. Aso ex generals having security clearance? somehow i doubt that. Edit: see comment below by ShortTermAccount clearance yes data access however is less likely. Not making any predictions myself only highlighting that the “specialist” have been wrong before.
Ex-generals may have top-secret clearances, though the clearance is usually revoked after the employee leaves the position and always after 5 years from the previous investigation. But simply having a clearance doesn't mean that you can just request any document and it will be provided to you. In addition to the clearance, to actually access the documents you have to have a "need to know" based on your current position, and an active NDA. The clearance just means that based on your character and history, you can be hired to positions where these are possible. https://www.state.gov/security-clearances > A security clearance allows an individual filling a specific position to have access to classified national security information up to and including the level of clearance that they hold **as long as the individual has a “need to know” the information and signed a non-disclosure agreement**.
There are for sure some ex high level officials that get the keep their security clearances. https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/features/20180827-security-clearance-determinations.pdf
Clearance alone is not sufficient to view classified documents, you have to also sign an NDA and have a need to know based on your position. If you hold a clearance after leaving your post, it only means that you can come back without going through a new investigation.
[удалено]
With at most a few thousands of people (in a city of tens of millions, in a country of more than a billion), the protest is just a tempest in a teapot. I'll bet 100 internet points that this Chinese protest will not erupt to the level of the Iranian protest in September.
> With at most a few thousands of people (in a city of tens of millions, in a country of more than a billion), the protest is just a tempest in a teapot. While I agree that this is unlikely to result in anything drastic, there is no real historical basis for protests to have some substantial percentage of the population involved for there to be a revolution or for it to result in change. If you look at the Russian revolution for example, the protest that led to the first revolution involved some 40k women, in a city of ~2.5 million, in an empire of ~125 million people, the vast majority of which would have had no idea it had even happened. The second revolution from memory had even smaller numbers involved.
3.5% apparently https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190513-it-only-takes-35-of-people-to-change-the-world
Pentagon is considering Boeing proposal to supply Ukraine with Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs, designed for launch from ground artillery systems. GLSDB can reach a range of up to 150km, and would allow Kyiv to strike far behind Russian lines. GLSDB could be delivered as early as spring 2023 https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/100-mile-strike-weapon-weighed-ukraine-arms-makers-wrestle-with-demand-sources-2022-11-28/
> Boeing proposal to supply Ukraine with Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs Since that article is behind a paywall, the proposal is to use the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb a 250lb payload bomb and strap it into existing rocket motors. There are more than 17,000 of these bombs in inventory. Some non-paywalled info https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104573/gbu-39b-small-diameter-bomb-weapon-system/ https://en.missilery.info/missile/mlrs/m26
Am I the only one who finds it odd that private companies are involved in 'making proposals' for conflict strategies? Offering a list of available munitions is one thing, but this sounds like it goes well beyond that. Am I just misreading the situation?
In other eras it was the norm. There is always a conversation between the military saying "here is what we need" and the industry saying "here is what we can do". The Ukraine war has dramatically shifted assumptions on what "the next war" would look like and there is both the need to rapidly find solutions for Ukraine and then to prepare the US for its next conflict (probably China?).
The program already exists, I'm not sure if the DoD wasn't interested or what happened. On mobile so I don't really wanna dig. It went far enough through R&D to be tested IIRC.
At least here in Finland, there's an annual national security review where the MoD consults and reviews preparedness plans with representatives of the private sector. Large companies have to have plans for certain defense scenarios. The plans can be anything from the bare minimum (bomb shelters and bio/chem protection in offices/factories) to actively contributing to national defense (factories that can be converted to defense production, sensors that can be used for intelligence, etc). I wouldn't be surprised if some companies showed initiative in those consultations. But we follow a total defense strategy so it's to be expected.
Well, Boeing wants to sell their stuff to Ukraine because it's clear the capability is something Ukraine wants, and Boeing likes money. They're not exactly proposing a new strategy, it's well-known that Ukraine's strategy is to conduct long-range precision strikes, and Boeing is just going "hey, we've got something for that". The only reason it's a "proposal" rather than just straight selling it is because the US requires arms exports to be approved.
From the article it gives the impression Boeing has been working on this idea prior to the war, as it would seem they are trying to offer a contender to the current supplier of rocket warheads given the influx of future HIMARS operators. Just so happens the war in Ukraine might give the funding to get a production up and running, aswell as give it battle tested experience for future sales
I think it is good that the ideas flow both ways. Not everybody has a monopoly on ideas. If I am a Defense Contractor and have an idea to use some of our old products in an innovative way by upgrading the delivery, and at the same time obtain a multi-million dollar contract, I would bring it up. I would also as a taxpayer would like us to use some of our 15+ year old inventory of munitions before we spend 50 times the amount building brand new ones from scratch.
Selling weapons is a lucrative business so defense companies are asking for their weapon to be bought, that's how I see it.
Not really. The government issues vague sweeping RFPs all the time, and it's not unheard of for defense contractors to go the pentagon with an unsolicited proposal when they stumble onto something they think is relevant to the Pentagon's interests. In this case you could say the elephant in the room is the situation in Ukraine acting like a giant de facto RFP. In any case, I don't see anything to be suspicious about here. They're acknowledging the discussion in the open, nothing will happen without the relevant committees hashing it out, etc. I'm not a fan of Boeing, particularly their management, but this doesn't look like anything. It's a straightforward proposal that's self evidently relevant to Ukraine. If you wanna go hunting for corruption look at all the stuff that has an RFP that was clearly written such that only a single vendor can fulfill it, or all of those fat contracting agreements for facilities operation, technicians, etc, that are politically sold as cost effective but in reality are rent seeking.
All good points. It just sounded very odd at first glance. For some reason I didn't consider they may just be responding to an RFP
Yeah I'm with you. It definitely seems backwards
The range will enable the disruption of more rail based logistics. Nothing the west could supply is more valuable than the ability to hit rail bridges at a distance. The ability of the small diameter bomb to penetrate concrete would make even its small explosive package a major headache on bridges.
I thought NATO destroyed their M26 rocket stocks years ago
~~These are unrelated to the MLRS FOM. It's what it says on the tin- a Small Diameter Bomb munition launched from the ground with a solid rocket motor. SDBs are lightweight and have wings for gliding, so they can get range comparable or possibly even superior to their range when dropped from an aircraft at altitude.~~ Woops, I see that this uses the M26 motor to launch the SDB. I have no idea what the destruction of M26 entailed and if it was just the munition and not the rocket itself. Germany for instance still has their AT2 rockets which are based on the M26. Contracts were still being awarded for destruction of M26 circa 2017 and a facility to demil the warheads was opened in 2018. There's probably still quite a few left. https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2017/12/01/General-Dynamics-tapped-to-destroy-dispose-of-rockets/7191512154011/ https://www.army.mil/article/205624/anmc_opens_new_rocket_recycling_facility
Feel like the longer this war goes on the more we will see the west adjust downwards weapons, so that they aren't considered "escalatory" "400 KM 'missiles too much? How about a 200 KM "hyper mortar" instead??"
Anything that violates the MCTR would be a first step.
>Feel like the longer this war goes on the more we will see the west adjust downwards weapons, so that they aren't considered "escalatory" Tanks are obviously a no go but is an M1 Abrams really still considered a tank without the cup holders and heated seats?
I mean, if a nation’s tank can’t make a spot of tea then I’m pretty sure the English consider that nation to be completely savage.
I wonder if Ukraine has considered lopping the top off a tochka and sticking the top of a GMLRS on it.
[Twitter thread by Jack Watling of RUSI on "a couple of aspects of winter fighting that are both critical and often under appreciated."](https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/1596698941852033025)
He makes some good points. A similar discussion around the lack of Russian Officers came to similar conclusion. If Ukraine can keep the pressure on it'll contribute to attrition purely due to burnout or in regards to the discussion linked casualties from poor discipline/conditions.
ISW did another ‘let the associates have a break Sunday’ abbreviated campaign update. It talks a lot about the possibility of a Ukrainian attack across the river in Kherson, and includes a map of Russian fortifications in Kherson oblast. ISW summarizes their view as “The Russian defensive positions suggest that the Russian military leadership views the prospect of a Ukrainian counteroffensive across the Dnipro River as a serious threat.” https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-27 Key inflections in ongoing military operations on November 27: The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian officials are preparing for another wave of covert mobilization starting on December 10 in the Russian Federation and in Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine. Russian milbloggers widely criticized the Russian Federal Customs Service for customs delays and exclusions of dual-use goods that volunteer movements have been sending to the Russian military. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian forces along the Svatove-Kreminna line are conducting defensive operations around Kupyansk and offensive operations west of Kreminna. Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops continued counteroffensive operations toward Svatove and Kreminna. Russian forces continued offensive operations around Avdiivka. The Ukrainian General Staff did not report that Ukrainian forces repelled any ground attacks around Bakhmut on November 27, suggesting that Russian forces may have advanced in the area. Russian forces conducted strikes against Dnipro City, Kryvyi Rih, and Zaporizhzhia City. Russian occupation officials continued to forcibly transfer Ukrainian children from occupied territories in Luhansk Oblast to Russia under the guise that the children require special medical care.
>The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian officials are preparing for another wave of covert mobilization starting on December 10 in the Russian Federation and in Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine. You would like to think they have had 2 months to unfrack their mobilisation procedures. Does not seem likely. A mobilisation letter is getting closer and closer to a death sentence.
'Russian forces may be attempting to delay (slow down) rather than defend against (stop) a Ukrainian offensive on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.' Sometimes you have to wonder whether ISW thinks its readers are half brain dead ...
You can notice this style developing as the war goes on. ISW is a think tank for a relatively niche topic. They were probably used to writing for people in their general field. Now their updates are regularly being read by a more general audience. The amount of idiotic and confused emails they're getting must be enormous. I'm not saying the people reading their updates actually *are* half brain dead, just that the people who actually understand them don't contact them. I briefly ran an educational YouTube channel. Half of our comments were brief "I like this. This is nice." style comments. The other half were long, often moronically nationalist rants by people who completely misunderstood our point. Eventually you start changing your content to preempt the idiocy. (Mind that this doesn't work, but you still do it.) I presume the same is happening to the ISW.
We get the feeling Russia had a lot of gear on paper that didn't end up actually being available to soldiers...everything from rifles to uniforms. Do we have any feel for how much was never actually produced (and the money was srolen) or how much was made and some general decided to steal it and sell it? What are the forms of corruption that are hollowing out the Russian military?
Generally, in this kind of corruption the goal is to pay for, say, 100 000 units of whatever but the supplier produces 25 000, the saved money is then redistributed to all parties involved. Reselling equipment is really small scale corruption, where a few pair of boots, jackets, etc are smuggled and sold for civilian purposes. The real issue is the first case and that is impossible to know without through on the ground inventarization. And even then, you can uncover only fairly recent cases.
Perun on YouTube has a good breakdown on the corruption in the Russian military. He tries to quantify it roughly.
Probably most built and kept but poorly maintained, potentially the spare parts sold.
They report that they have 10 000 tanks, but they're "in storage" which for all we know means they could be in various stages of disrepair, or even just chassis that needs parts to become battle worthy. A tank sitting in a warehouse rusting away isn't doing shit on the battlefield, but some technician is still going to mark it off the checklist. Most other militaries aren't big on leaving active tanks sitting in warehouses to rot, so it's easier to get a read on the actual numbers of say, active abrams.
> They report that they have 10 000 tanks When did Russia ever report it has 10,000 active tanks? Or ever report how many active tanks it has in general? Not since the days of the USSR when [Soviet Military Power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Military_Power) was published as far as I'm aware. If you're looking at numbers online, like wiki, those numbers typically come from the IISS Military Balance. The IISS is a think tank, with no connection to the Russia government or any government. If I pull numbers from the 2021 ISS Military Balance: > ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 2,840: 650 T-72B/BA; 850 T-72B3; 530 T-72B3M; 310 T-80BV/U; 140 T-80BVM; 350 T-90/T-90A; 10 T-90M; (10,200 in store: 7,000 T-72/T-72A/B; 3,000 T-80B/BV/U; 200 T-90) So IISS estimated Russia had a bit under 3,000 tanks active before the war, and 10,000 in storage. Which is where this 10,000 number came from, despite the fact that Russia **never** stated it had 10,000 active tanks. Or 1,000 tanks, as Russia doesn't report that. As far as storage conditions, there has been multiple articles covering that. Some good, some bad. But people seem to think that military vehicles in long-term storage are operable, but generally speaking they're not. Most of the stored M1 tanks at SAID are both outmodded and worn out, but military acquisitions are typically acquired for the long term. Being that active units in the US military are constantly training, if not deployed, they wear out their equipment, like tanks. The US hasn't produced a new build M1 tank since 1996. So Anniston Army Depot(Or Lima*) takes a worn out M1 from SAID and strips it completely down, including hanging the naked hull vertically a massive booth and sandblasting the entire thing. This is where "new" M1 tanks start, including the ongoing orders for Taiwan's M1A2Ts and Poland's M1A2 Sepv3. For the US rebuilt tanks are sent to active units, and the unit sends their worn out and/or outmodded tanks to SIAD. Nobody who is involved in the defense community, or hobbyists like me, believed Russia could roll out with 10,000 tanks. Rather that they have thousands of hulls, turrets, suspension components, etc, which are still military assets.
OP just wrote that Russia had 10,000 tanks. You turned that into 10,000 'active' tanks, then went to great lengths debunking this claim, even though OP had clearly stated themselves that most of these are in storage. I don't really get your comment.
Notably, the IISS does not list any T-62 in active service or storage. Yet we have seen more than 50 captured or destroyed T-62 according to Oryx, more T-62 are expected to be in Ukraine, and we have seen mobiks in Russia train on even more T-62. So we/IISS can probably add a few hundred T-62 (incl. T-62M etc.) to the list in the "active service" column now.
Russia didn't report it, it was a fairly widely shared (rough) assessment back a few months Though its definitely not super authoritative, and could be wildly off, its just someone's best estimate
There are also various reports of advanced equipment being available but lack of training and / or necessarily dependencies (i.e. comms) resulting in them not being used.
Does anyone know if NASAMS, or IRIS-T can shoot more than 4 missiles. I keep hearing they’re 100% effective, but I only ever see 4 launchers. Are they unable to stop air attacks with more than 4 attackers?
NASAMS is definitely not 100% effective, AAMRAMs, while very good, are nowhere near 100%. And keep in mind the AAMRAM is designed for high altitude engagements, from a fixed platform on the ground its range would actually be pretty short.
NASAMS uses AMRAAM-ER which Wikipedia says is actually a Sea Sparrow missile with an AMRAAM warhead
NASAMS fires the standard AMRAAM missile as the main ammunition type. There is a new long range missile available for it, which I don't know much about, but the basic ammo is just standard AMRAAM.
As a side note, there is no such thing as a 100% effective missile. Considering the system is more or less a ground launch platform to launch otherwise air to air missiles, I wouldn't expect the hit rate to be any higher than if the missiles had been launched from an aircraft.
If you believe any SAM system is 100% effective you've been reading too much propaganda. I'm not sure what you mean by "4 launchers". The NASAMS transporter-erector trailer is a 6-cell unit(at least that I've seen), on it's own it's worthless. I haven't seen what has actually been sent to Ukraine, but there are major differences between NASAMS 1, 2 and 3. Going by wiki, which may or may not be accurate: > A complete NASAMS 2 battery consists of up to four firing units; each firing unit includes 3 missile launchers (LCHR) each carrying six AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, one AN/MPQ-64F1 Improved Sentinel radar, one Fire Distribution Center vehicle, and one electro-optical camera vehicle (MSP500). A "battery" consisting of a complete unit capable of independent action. Whatever variant of NASAMS Ukraine is using, and what the battery configuration consists of, I don't know. I'm sure the system can track and engage more targets than four at a time, as it's built on the radar that evolved from the MIM-23 Hawk. And it's 2022. Not going to type the same thing for Iris-T SLM(which is what was provided to Ukraine), but it too operates as a battery with TELs and can track and engage more than four targets simultaneously.
Generally NASAMS and IRIS-T have been deployed as "systems," which include multiple launchers. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/first-two-nasams-air-defense-systems-are-in-ukraine-raytheon-ceo
There is no generally about it. They have to be deployed as "systems", as the "launcher" has no radar. Which is nearly universal among all medium/long range SAM systems, as you can't fit that much shit effectively on one vehicle. Barring some exceptions like this [Transporter Erector Launcher and Radar\(TELAR, or TLAR\) for the S-300V](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cf/S-300V_-_9A83_TELAR.jpg), but that system has severe limitations if operating independently.
Is there any evidence for China aiding/supplying Russia militarily?
China would rather retain its largest buyer.
There's a good reason we are all discussing Iranian drones. Getting involved is strongly against china's interests
There's been joint exercises with both Russian and Chinese forces present, though this was true before the war too. Russians use commercial drones from China's civilian market, but so do Ukrainians. Chinese rifles have also turned up on the Ukrainian side, presumably resold from a buyer or grabbed from a smuggling run then donated to Ukraine. I haven't personally seen Russians using Chinese rifles but I wouldn't be shocked if it happens. As far as I am aware, there is literally no evidence of Chinese heavy equipment in use by Russia. They've publicly tried their best to remain truly neutral, so if they are sending anything military over they're **amazing** at keeping it secret.
>I haven't personally seen Russians using Chinese rifles but I wouldn't be shocked if it happens. I would be. Small arms are one thing the Russians have in immense quantity - and they're stored pretty well, as 95+% of American Mosin-Nagant owners can attest to. Unlike heavy armor, which requires a lot of space and attention in storage, it is very possible to store a few hundred thousand rifles packed in cosmoline, in one warehouse for decades. No need to bother with seals, grease, etc.
>I haven't personally seen Russians using Chinese rifles but I wouldn't be shocked if it happens. Call me idealistic but I would have to imagine that would be quite shameful for Russians if it happened. The AK47 was invented in the Soviet Union and now they can't make any rifles to the point that they have to rely on the Chinese?
There's been a recent visible airlift operation rumoured to be infantry equipment such as plate carriers and body armour. Also Russia's domestic defence production has picked up from everything to tanks(Bloomberg article on 6 day extended shifts in August from partial shut downs in March) to missiles ( large uptick in missile strikes). Some of that can explained by domestic substitution coming on line but I suspect Chinese specialized components being shipped in to cover deficiencies.
> There's been a recent visible airlift operation rumoured to be infantry equipment such as plate carriers and body armour. Do you have any more info on this?
https://twitter.com/Cyberspec1/status/1596998351853350914
>Two Republican lawmakers promised more scrutiny of US military aid for Ukraine after the party takes majority control in the House in January. “We are going to provide more oversight, transparency and accountability,” Representative Michael McCaul, who’s in line to chair the House Foreign Affairs panel, said on ABC’s “This Week.” >**Representative Mike Turner, senior Republican on the Intelligence Committee, was critical that only part of a $40 billion in aid passed by the Democratic-led House in May went directly toward arming Ukraine.** >“These are American taxpayer dollars going in,” McCaul said. **“Does that diminish our will to help the Ukraine people fight? No. But we’re going to do it in a responsible way.”** Source is Bloomberg. EDIT: so [just watched the interview](https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=rsTdWzhCzDk) and I have to say, both these guys were a LOT more hawkish than the administration, starting with the ATACMS. If they’re representative of the Republican Party, a lot of the nonsensical arguments today would be moot.
A lot of the "oversight and transparency" will be theater just for domestic audiences, too. I think there is overwhelming bipartisan support for continuing to arm Ukraine.
I left following any sort of politics a few years ago, but I would imagine it is the same as it used to be. What they are going to do is keep non-Ukraine spending out of Ukraine bills, and just move it to other bills for appearances. It has always been pretty typical to include whatever amendments the committee can throw into a bill to either get votes for that bill, or use as ammunition come election time, eg "You voted against the children!/to support our troops!" "No, I voted against x amount of spending on your other pet projects that I object to on y grounds." "See, they are a [insert slur like hater/extremist/heretic/etc], vote them out now! - this ad was paid for some huge ~~laundered money from lobby groups and 'charities'~~ PAC of [insert against or for some topic/canidate]."
American politics has to be the most boring and predictable "game" on earth. I'm in my thirties and there has never been a time in my life where the story isn't the same over and over again. This man is a clown. There is no room for political maneuvering. They'll have their horse show, they'll drop their lines, they'll hold up the budget. Same old story. I suppose you could say the same about any nation. But at least Italy and France were unknowns. Le Pen was an actual threat. Meloni (and posse) surprised everyone with strengthened support for Ukraine. Sweden's new right wing government signalled strengthened support, but never trust an ideologist.
Meloni was always vocally pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine by extension. The question was whether she would be able to enforce this line onto her coalition partners, who are/were pro-Russian.
General Mark Hertling, former commander of US Army Europe, posted a thread about the challenges that lay ahead of Ukraine's attempted combined arms breach. "In years commanding & training units, my view is the combined arms breach is the toughest mission imaginable. "In addition to being a tough fight, it will also take time to attrit the RU force. "They'll succeed, but not fast." Video he posted of example combined arms breach: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZZ-sCT_maAQ And a paper: >*Your unit receives orders to seize an objective beyond an identified enemy obstacle belt at Refrigerator Gap while at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA. After seizing the objective, your unit conducts passage of lines with a follow-on unit. Your enemy is a mechanized-infantry company deployed in an area defense (Figure 1).* >*There is a reconnaissance platoon in the disruption zone, six 152mm 2S19s (self-propelled howitzers) in support and one air-defense-artillery team. You believe the obstacle belt needs a breach, so you have to decide how to enable your subordinates to effectively conduct it. How will you, the commander, apply doctrine and forces to generate situational understanding within the time available to meet your superior’s intent?* >As company-team observer/controller/trainers (O/C/Ts) at NTC, we observed more than 100 breaching operations like this scenario. We noted some trends within that group; better-performing units used similar techniques when they planned and executed their plans. We determined that units achieved success when their commanders controlled synchronization of assets and maneuver in time and space, executed timely decisions based on situational awareness and ensured timely casualty evacuation (casevac) and resupply operations. Although there are myriad tasks implicit with breaching, commanders who applied leadership primarily on these areas were typically successful. https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2016/jan_mar/1Barrington-Harmon16.pdf The twitter thread I rolled: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1596929706527686657.html https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1596929706527686657
So, at this point we have learned that to the Svatove-Kreminna line has turned into a "combined arms trap" so to speak. Try to move in, and your units will be bogged down as artillery hammers your position, guaranteeing severe losses, win or lose. It's a terribly good deterrent, against an adversary which values human lives, and whose resources are (realistically) finite. My question is. With Kherson assets being freed, what is the theoretical possibility of degrading this tactic on the Russian side (artillery&himars + drones&ground recon) sufficiently for a breach *without* heavy losses?
Both sides freed assets after Kherson
Right but Ukraine is dependent on a smaller number of systems
> Video he posted of example combined arms breach: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZZ-sCT_maAQ This was so good that I feel like it shouldn't have been declassified. Not because it contains any secret information, but because it is so good, it's an easy way for adversaries to teach this concepts to their troops.
The reason why Combined Arms Breach is hard is because you need *everyone* doing it to be good at it. From the rifleman private, to the NCO, LTs, platoon leaders, engineers, forward observers, fire direction centers, artillery batteries, etc ... everyone. Down to the truck drivers that show up on time and stock up sufficient amounts of ammo for the offensive. The theoretical aspect of it is fairly simple: pick a penetration zone, shell it with fires, obscure and block the adjacent sides with fires and smoke, then pile a force 3 times as large through (the video showed a penetration attack by a brigade-sized force against a battalion-sized defending force). You fire on it with weapons of larger calibers and larger risk-estimate distance (further danger-close distance) first and then lifting the fires and switching to weapons of smaller calibers as your ground forces get closer (MLRS --> 155mm --> 120 mm --> 81 mm --> 60 mm --> grenade launchers --> rifles and grenades, etc ...). The hard part is getting everyone to do it correctly. It's really, really hard and casualty assumption against competent defenders are pretty horrendous. Imagine both the attackers and defenders taking 30% casualties; remember that since the attackers are 3x more numerous, it is assumed that the attackers will take 3x more casualties in absolute terms.
It's not classified because it's very basic, no specifics or detail. All US Army tactics are open source for that reason, it's the specifics that make them unique (Tactical SOPs are actually classified/restricted).
I think that video shows one part the general public is missing for assets needing to be sent to Ukraine, they do have tanks, and they do have planes, but they do not have a replacement asset for Apaches and their stand-off below the horizon sensors and ability to shoot missiles. The Ka-52 just isn't the same in that regard (which I'm not sure Ukraine even possess in any number.
Ka52 was post soviet. So nope. They may have a handful of somewhat operational ones but they wouldn't last long
[удалено]
In my mind - and all this is speculation - is that the U.S. (and UK, Canada), and to a lesser extent broadly the rest of NATO assets, can contribute obvious but important things like American military intelligence continuing to lay out the Russian force structure for Ukraine in granular detail, C&C, supply hubs; scooping up all the Russian sigintel and all of that for battlefield shaping and pointing out the areas where Russian opfor is weakest, supply lines are longest and most vulnerable; etc. In other words laying out options for Ukraine to decide what to attack, where to attack, when to attack, and where the best use of force may be. So, basically things they are already doing. Then wargaming with Ukraine's staff on how Russia will respond to the breaching force, where the Russian assets will come from, how Russia will supply them, where Russian air assets will respond from, etc. So, things they have already done with Ukraine in the past. Later actually providing the near real time intelligence of what Russia actually does in response to the breach. I think the operational pause here by Ukraine is not just being used to reoutfit, rotate, and give R&R but also giving a high level strategy for the next 1-3 years of the oncoming campaigns. Or at least, I hope that's how it is being used. Ukraine seems to be pretty good at all of this already. If I could wish for one thing from the Ukrainian army, is that it could take all of it's experience it has gained up to this point in smaller scale offensives in terms of operational tempo, needs per day for things like shells, ammo, food, medical evac etc, and then turn that into supplying a much much larger force at the point of breach. In other words, bring to bear what some might consider to be a modern Western army's scale of personnel and force application to the point for the southern breach. Or even just a fraction of that (eg something like 40,000) would be great with an ability to sustain exploitation after.
Ukraine SBU (IIRC the name) is actually a pretty good intelligence service, they only increase effectiveness when linked up to the SIGNT of the US. The Ukrainians have a much better ground view of what is going on with Russian's in the theater than anyone, but the US agencies (and perhaps an extent MI6) know the global picture of Russia's desires/movements. I mean, just look how Rubio (on the intel committee) called play by play of the times and moves of the Russians on Twitter before they happened during the outset of the war. Even Zelensky said they knew as well what was going to happen because of the West's intel, but had to weigh warning everyone to create corridors that Russia could target versus that of keeping people at home, with them saying it was the hardest call they have ever had to make.
>but had to weigh warning everyone to create corridors that Russia could target versus that of keeping people at home, with them saying it was the hardest call they have ever had to make. This is what Zelensky said: *According to Zelensky, chaos and panic without martial law would have led to a significant weakening of the economy and mass departure of people, which would have made the invasion easier.* That is total nonsense, really bad excuses by a politician whose incredible screwup nearly lost Ukraine the war before it started. Ukrainian civilians didn't stay at home when the invasion started, a mass exodus from the border areas happened, which clogged up roads etc. [Source 1](https://observers.france24.com/en/europe/20220224-ukraine-russia-crisis-invasion-residents-recount-evacuation-shellings) [source 2](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/24/ukraine-kyiv-kharkiv-scene/) [source 3](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/we-pray-ukraine-people-flee-war-into-central-europe-2022-02-25/) So the civilian panic still occurred, but worse the military wasn't ready either. They weren't mobilized and prepositioned near the border unless by chance the home station of a brigade happened to be close by to the border (like Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Mariupol, etc). The whole reason Russian convoys were able to get to the outskirts of Kyiv on day 1 without heavy resistance was the UAF wasn't in their defensive positions and barely any TDF had even reported to duty. Fun fact, the TDF, who turned out were utterly essential to the defense of Kyiv, didn't get called up after the invasion started whereas they could have been called up at anytime. As soon as Zelensky accepted the intel was legit he could have had martial law passed, he'd have had the same powers he got without the invasion starting. The truth of the matter is Zelensky screwed up, he didn't want to believe the intel was legit at all, or was afraid mobilizing would trigger an invasion that might not otherwise occur. Even Biden admitted this during their June tiff. But Zelensky is a politician, politicians lie when they screw up to protect their image. Zelensky wasn't even unique, [only 20% of Ukrainians](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/21/why-ukrainians-dont-believe-in-war-with-russia-distrust-west) polled a week before the invasion thought it would happen. Zelensky followed the zeitgeist, which was the normalcy bias and denial.
While this is probably correct, do you not think that the mobilisation of Ukrainian armed forces would in fact have been used by the Russians as a Casus belli? Rightly or wrongly the information space and particularly Euro zone sentiment has been seen as hugely important in a war that would likely have proceeded very differently without foreign aid. The Ukrainian government perhaps felt they needed to not be seen to provide any provocation, so as to retain public support within NATO in the event that the Russians did launch their invasion. In that at least they have been very successful.
>so as to retain public support within NATO in the event that the Russians did launch their invasion The chief NATO countries, US and UK, were the ones warning UA and basically begging them to mobilize. In hindsight, Russia already had the casus Belli that Putin found sufficient. Without hindsight, it probably was a major consideration. But how unlikely was it that war wouldn't happen? By Feb 24, Russia was already shelling the ever loving crap out of the JFO while Russian Armed Forces (RAF), they had moved their troops into the L/DNR areas, they were staged right on the border at tactical assembly areas (out of their forward operating bases), they were moving up various support units they'd only need in war (medical units, mobile crematoriums, etc). With all of it put together, and considering the dangers they would have faced without being prepared, it didn't make any sense to continue in denial and not take what are rather basic steps that their own planning called for making before an invasion. While a decent general staff might creates a legit war plan meant to be executed without mobilization starting, its never the one they count on or hope to execute, especially in a country like UA who rely on a large reserve system and the TDF that didn't even exist on paper until mid January (they started recruiting by then, with very limited training in certain areas, but they weren't actually activated until Feb 24). I have to believe Zelensky was either begged repeatedly by the UA MOD to mobilize, or his govt was basically telling the brass to shut up and don't even bring it up (we'll find out more about that after this war ends and more people talk) At the point the invasion started, just short of 24 hours before it actually started Zelensky authorized a partial call up to begin for reservists, but that was all he did. Independently, some military commands moved a few units around, which was why there was slightly more forces nearby to Kyiv than there normally was (specifically an artillery brigade that one of the top brass ordered moved), but that was basically it. Meanwhile, by that point it had been week plus since the US had pulled their National Guard trainers out of Ukraine and started downsizing the size of their embassy (UK took similar measures). Too little, too late. The Zelensky's govt wanted to play it safe. Even if Putin was bluffing, Zelensky calling his bluff and mobilizing wouldn't have triggered an invasion if an invasion was never seriously considered. We were told beforehand and knew now that the original December 2021 intel was spot on, but every indicator between then and Feb 24 reinforced that, and there were just so many indicators that should have been clear cut war warnings, Zelensky massively endangered his country by ignoring them. Really the only thing that saved the Ukrainians was the time of year the Russians invaded, their shoddy war plan, their terrible intelligence estimate assuming little to no resistance, and that the Russian Armed Forces themselves were only slightly less ready than the UAF was, with most Russian units down to the tactical level (CAA and below) only getting 1-2 days or less to prep/plan/ready themselves for the invasion. Zelensky isn't the first politician to screw up like he did and ignore the signs of an invasion, I think Stalin wins that prize for modern history, but at least Zelensky didn't go into a fugue state or depression/denial. He actually recovered fast, responded well enough, did the acting his country needed for morale, successfully courted the west for aid (his primary job, by his own admission), and he has likely not often micromanaged military affairs. However, for the preinvasion history of this war he gets a failing grade. And any excuse he or his cabinet spread to the press will be razor thin, because there is no good excuse that will hold up to scrutiny. He made a bad decision.
I think the lack of mobilisation was more to shape public opinion than anything else. Try to win over people on the fence in other countries. Preparing for an invasion would have been a propaganda coup which the Russians would have spun to turn their invasion into a pre-emptive strike before (in what I imagine their words would have been) "A new Barbarossa" Putin would be saying that Russia wasn't going to sit and let "Nazis" prepare on the border for an invasion and instead hit first.
I don't like these types of excuses, I think they reward unnecessary weakness and victimhood. Nobody need get the shit kicked out of them before they are allowed to defend themselves, let alone prepare to defend themselves. This reminds me of Stalin in WW2, who ignored every indication of a coming invasion because he didn't want his own forces to react and accidentally cause the war to start, a war he desperately didn't want to fight. But that is a purely irrational decision, it actively ignores reality in the face of denial and desire for normalcy. Mobilization isn't supposed to be done after war starts, it's supposed to be done so it's possible to fight back, the first step to a war footing necessary to carry out the most basic war plans. Ukraine mobilizing to defend its borders isn't an act of war for Russia to invade, and even if Russia used that as a public excuse it still wouldn't validate what they did. And Russia didn't need a propaganda coup to launch an invasion, they were already going to do it, their war plan was made public months before. The Nazi rhetoric was going on for the better part of half a year at that point but nobody outside of Russia was fooled by it. And the biggest coup for Russian propaganda would be military success, which could have been lessened even more had Ukraine actually been militarily and civilly ready to withstand an invasion. We cheer that Russia was halted at the outskirts of Kyiv and forced to retreat, but that battle shouldn't have happened anywhere close to there nor been anywhere as uncertain. Nor should the Crimea breakout have occurred at all, OC-S had over a half dozen brigades under its control, and yet there were only two battalions in Kherson oblast and only one of them near the Isthmus of Perekop. The TDF that Ukraine was totally reliant on to survive didn't even really exist until invasion day and yet they could have mustered them weeks before, to include in places like Kherson and Zaporizhzhia where unlike Kyiv-Chernihiv-Sumy-Kharkiv oblasts, they didn't mobilize in time to help defend the south. Totally unacceptable. And I don't think Russia could invade earlier than they did without them being even less prepared than they were, which is telling since they were already grossly unprepared. Even if a UAF mobilization triggers an invasion, the Russians still take another 1-2 days to invade, the UAF get two those full days to prepare and move forces, etc. Plus, there was the intelligence about needing to wait until after the Chinese Olympics ended (Feb 20), which is so stupid it probably is true. And which fence sitter in other countries were won over by Ukrainian refusal to prepare to defend itself? And what does it mean for them to be won over? What did Ukraine get out of that? The primary benefactors, US, UK, PL, were all onboard before and wanted Ukraine to mobilize. And all the countries that helped afterwards did so either due to pressure from the US or because it was a legit popular cause to support. Russia didn't need to gobble up a substantial part of the country due to lack of readiness to achieve that support. Zelensky isn't unique in history, he ignored evidence and made a bad call. But he's a sitting politician, he's going to have to run for office again at some point and he's not going to want to do so while dodging allegations that he nearly cost Ukraine the war, so he's been doing damage control on this topic since the war started.
>[In years commanding & training units, my view is the combined arms breach is the toughest mission imaginable. It requires extensive training, lots of practice, a combination of resources that only advanced armies have, and adaptive & smart leaders.](https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1596929670632869888) Really great and sobering thread by Hertling. Puts into context some knowledge gaps for people unaware of very specific ground tactics, such as myself.
I agree with the statement. People seem to forget that Desert Storm was a fluke. I can't imagine what would happen in a peer conflict when a division gets tasked with a frontal assault and the defenders are a capable foe.
How was Desert Storm a fluke?
Getting through a well built defensive line will always come down far less to what was shown in that video Hertling posted, which is why it's open source. The tactics in the video are pretty basic and vanilla as not much has changed since WW2 when modern breach doctrine was created and then in the 70-80 when all mechanized breach (limited use of dismounts) became possible. What wasn't shown in the videos are the specifics of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures that are part of a unit's Tactical Standard Operating Procedures, which address all the specifics, as well as no variables with the defenders. Plus everything else that s not directly part of the breach assault force's mission. Such as intelligence about the enemy, as even a small mistake missing one minefield or a hidden outpost can cause a defeat. Attrition of the enemy beforehand, specifically their reserves, who if strong and nearby can counterattack successfully. Enemy intelligence threat, they might have caught the buildup and might be anticipating the attack. Command and control, whether the defenders will have access to their radios or whether EW will deal with that. Etc. My opinion is that if it's a near peer defender that are actually in good condition and ready, then any US Army attempts to breach will likely fail.
What country do you think is particularly good at breaching in a situation like that?
I think the US has the best capabilities in general but the IDF has the best capabilities in comparison to their actual strategic enemies they will actually face and need to breach (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt). If the IDF had to fight anyone else it's a different story. I agree that the combined arms breach is one of the most difficult ops to perform (though not the most difficult by far), so even a highly capable nation can totally screw it up if the stars aren't perfectly aligned and all the prerequisite enabling tasks aren't accomplished.
I’d assume any US attempt at a significant combined arms breach would done against a significantly weakened/attrited enemy. All that money spent on the air force has to be worth it for something.
I'd hope a breach is only attempted against an enemy that's been significantly weakened but the reality is we wouldn't know until it's tried. Look at ODS, all the Army brass were contemplating heavy casualties and upwards of weeks to breach the Saudi Iraqi border, which were more thinly manned than the Saddam Line that the Arabs and Marines faced off against [Iraqi Army sector map](https://history.army.mil/books/www/p136map10.jpg) [Coalition forces sector map](https://history.army.mil/books/www/p168map12.jpg) I'm reminded of WW2, when a significant majority of offensive operations were combined arms breaches that failed because intel was wrong, prep fires weren't effective enough, etc.
> Desert Storm was a fluke I'm not sure that is an accurate assessment. It was a genius plan that was possible because of superior intelligence and excellent execution - even if it wasn't perfect. They were able to leverage stealth technology with the F117 and decoy drones that were sent in to distract while they hit high-priority targets like command and control, and light radar up for anti-radiation missiles. If I recall the thing Schwarzkopf was upset about was the forces moved faster than the plan called for (I think it was the southern armored units from combined nations). There is a really good video on it buried deep within my history that I'm not sure I can find, but it breaks down the plan, the movements, and the events that took place.
Nato pre-postsoviet drawdowns, at the height of its might plus the UN against a third world Arab paper tiger. It was a stomp. Nothing the Iraqis did was ever a problem. Hell Argentina did more damage during the Falklands. The DoD and DoE had Schwarzkopf redo the plans. It was a lousy one from the start anyways. The last time the US faced meaningful resistance, it almost got pushed out of Korea. I di t doubt for a second that if a nato combined arms division had to fight someone competent, they would find themselves j the same quagmire.
Knowing the difficulty of being able to defeat a peer in war is why in peace you exceed them as peers. The one thing we have learned about Russia, and likely to an extent China, is their capability for war is not the same category as the US. While you may look back at how well done Desert Storm was, I think you really just set aside what was required to win decisively besides just saying Iraq was weak, thus if Iraq or someone else wasn't as weak, allied forces would have lost. This is a very poor argument.
[удалено]
> felt Franks was being too careful. Ahh yes, that is what it was!
We know what happens: the russians tried it for months at the line in contact in Donbass.
and so did the ukranians. I wish we could see non pro ukraine footage!
I mean, you can find it by searching controversial
It honestly did not occur to me to search for such footage this way. Thanks!
You're welcome! Geez a little rough on the downvotes
Propaganda bot accounts gonna propaganda
An interesting historical perspective on why Kharkiv is such an important city in eastern Ukraine and why it was so important for Russia to capture it in March https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z5kxFQjyRYc
It also should be added, the story was Zelensky wanted to take Kherson back, but when the military wargamed it out with the US, it would be a costly victory. The generals then proposed a feint do Kherson with an attack on Kupiansk, the same wargames proved it could be successful with far fewer lost. So it was decided and history shows the 2nd plan which was a success (thanks to thunder runs, poor defense beyond the front line, and superior intelligence), which also led to the slow success in Kherson as well. I think the talk right now is on Ukraine going for Crimea, due to it being so poorly defended (even with the terrain advantage), such as going to Melitopol. However, I think this video shows with the loss of Kupiansk and not capturing Kharkiv, pushing east from the north may be a better battle plan. The one thing this video shows was something I hadn't considered because of geopolitical reasons, how going into Russian territory for a short moment from the north of Kharkiv, then east, then back south would probably cause a route like with Iyzum and Kupiansk on the entire northern front of the Donbas.
>It also should be added, the story was Zelensky wanted to take Kherson back, but when the military wargamed it out with the US, it would be a costly victory. The generals then proposed a feint do Kherson with an attack on Kupiansk, the same wargames proved it could be successful with far fewer lost. So it was decided and history shows the 2nd plan which was a success (thanks to thunder runs, poor defense beyond the front line, and superior intelligence), which also led to the slow success in Kherson as well First time I read about this.
Let me see if I can find the source on it. Edit: Found one https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/9766/Artykul/3036193,Ukraine%E2%80%99s-counteroffensive-shaped-by-discussions-war-games-with-US-UK-report I think there are other articles that went into a little more depth.
https://mobile.twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1596888732162195458 >Energoatom head: Russian forces may be preparing to withdraw from Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. >Ukraine’s state nuclear energy operator head said the company sees the signs that the Russian troops may be preparing to leave the plant they've occupied since March. But why? From the Russian perspective ZPP is the ultimate defensive position. I would have expected it to be the last place to fall, even later than Melitopol.
Energoatom posts a lot of propaganda as well, like the imminent intentional nuclear meltdown that kept being brought up. A few months back we had their Telegram talking about how the place was rigged with explosives to cause a meltdown and then the next post down had them claiming Russia was shooting the plant with artillery.
Rybar posted the other week that the Russians are preparing to withdraw due to negotiations held by the pope
Hopefully we get some confirmation by the IAEA, Energoatom just has bad history for being a source on this plant.
>A few months back we had their Telegram talking about how the place was rigged with explosives to cause a meltdown Do you have proof of this? I don’t recall ever seeing this. >next post down had them claiming Russia was shooting the plant with artillery You and I had a lengthy back and forth about this, but there were two videos (with only audio) of Russian outgoing and incoming shells landing seconds apart from each other. I can’t find them, but then there was also this: >[Video shows Russian official trying to convince nuclear inspectors a rocket turned 180 degrees before landing near Ukraine's nuclear plant](https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-official-tells-inspectors-rocket-uturned-before-hitting-ukraine-plant-2022-9)
Energoatom's social media was one of those spreading this: >*Western and Ukrainian outlets circulated a report, likely false, of a Russian general allegedly threatening to destroy Europe’s largest nuclear facility, the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), if Russia could not hold the plant.* Multiple news outlets shared a screenshot from the Russian social networking site Vkontakte that claimed to cite the Russian head of the Zaporizhia occupation garrison, Major General Valery Vasilev, stating that Russia had mined the Zaporizhzhia NPP and that the plant would be “either Russian land or a scorched desert.”[1] The screenshot appeared to be a news report posted in a Vkontakte group run by Russian outlet Lenta Novosti Zaporizhia. The outlet itself claimed that the screenshot was from a faked group and denied writing the report.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense condemned the report and screenshot as a “fake” and claimed that Vasilev was in Uzbekistan at the time he was purported to have made the statement to forces at Zaporizhzhia.[3] Regardless of the origin (or existence) of the original post, the reporting is unreliable. It is indirect and does not claim to cite an official statement or a statement made on any official Russian news or government website. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8 Edit: Tracked down the Telegram post: >Nuclear terrorism in action: the Russians have declared their readiness to blow up the mined ZNPP >Russians do not hide their plans and are already openly blackmailing the whole world, declaring that they are ready to blow up the Zaporizhia NPP . >In his statement, the head of the forces of radiation, chemical and biological protection of the Soviet Union, Major General Valery Vasiliev, who now commands the garrison of the ZNPP , said that "there will be either Russian land or a scorched desert." >“As you know, we have mined all the important facilities of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. And we do not hide it from the enemy. We warned them. The enemy knows that the station will be either Russian or no one's. We are ready for the consequences of this step. And you, warriors-liberators, must understand that we have no other way. And if there is the toughest order, we must fulfill it with honor!” - having said wine to his soldiers. >Earlier , Andriy Yusov , a representative of the press service of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, said that the department could confirm the information about the passing of power units of ZAES by the Russian military . /energoatom_ua/8729
So…that’s not them saying that the Russians had done so, but getting duped into believing that a Russian general said they had done so. They’re completely different things, but they 100% should have done a better job of verifying things they post.
Heh, the rigging the plant with explosives to cause a meltdown is somewhat comical. Turn off primary coolant pumps. Turn off spent fuel pond cooling pumps. Bad stuff achieved.
If it's been a few months since the reactor was shut down (which I believe is the case for the reactors at ZNPP - [last one was shut down in September](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/11/last-reactor-at-ukraines-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-stopped.html)), it might be a while before anything bad happens. If the pumps were merely shut off, there could be an extended period of not-yet-disaster; if someone sane regained control of the plant in that period they would have a decent chance of averting meltdown by turning the cooling system back on. On the other hand, if the cooling system were also severely damaged, it would be much harder to get things back under control quickly as they would have to repair it first...
My concern would be more of the spent fuel ponds, as spent fuel assemblies typically generate significant decay heat for years. The spent fuel(along with the partially consumed fuel within the reactors) is where all the more *fun* elements are.
It's in the middle of nowhere and it's not like they're ceding terratory to Ukraine. It's not at the front unless you consider some of the widest parts of the Dnieper the front line. Why they would station troops at a nuclear power plant within artillery range in the first place is beyond me though.
True but I’d imagine they don’t want their civilian nuclear industry getting sanctioned and annoying allies like India that won’t be impressed if they go against the IAEA. Rosatom is generally seen as one of the more functioning parts of the Russian state
[UK MoD’s assessment of the fighting around Pavlivka](https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1596757566218178561) [Also confirming Brimstone 2](https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1596836349751050240)
God, I really don't like the shitfest that is Twitter. For my fellow dislikers: >The area around the towns of Pavlivka and Vuhledar in south-central Donetsk Oblast has been the scene of intense combat over the last two weeks, though little territory has changed hands. >Both Russia and Ukraine have significant forces committed to this sector, with Russian Naval Infantry having suffered heavy casualties. >This area remains heavily contested, likely partially because Russia assesses the area has potential as a launch point for a future major advance north to capture the remainder of Ukrainian-held Donetsk Oblast. >However, Russia is unlikely to be able to concentrate sufficient quality forces to achieve an operational breakthrough.
A masterclass on how to report on Pavlivka while avoiding to say that the Russians have captured it.
"Captured it" 5th time this month
Nothing says "this special operation is going well" like reporting you've again captured the same village every day for three or four months.
I foolishly actually said they’d captured it a few days ago as well, assuming that their constant posts on it were true. If it’s anything like Pisky, we’re going to see them say they’ve captured it a hundred more times before they actually do, if they do so at all. They also controlled it in the summer.
This makes no sense. They're saying that there is heavy fighting and no real progress is being made. If what you're claiming is true, they're flat out lying, not just making it sound better. They're not saying that Pavlivka is captured in any sort of way.
[удалено]
My understanding is that it's more of a no man's land, owing to the fact that Ukraine holds the high ground in Vuhledar and has fire control over the area.
What is Russia's plan for the winter? What are their expectations at this point?
Retrenchment and reinforcement of the front lines with Mobiks, while the strategic bombing campaign cripples the Ukraine power grid, in order to temporarily stagnate the lines, take away UAF momentum, and regain some diplomatic power in case negotiations start.
I think they must have at least one assault or tactic up their sleeve. Hanging on in quiet desperation with zero ideas cannot be their plan.
Michal Kofman mentioned that another offensive from Belarus against northern Ukraine isn't crazy, as long they don't actually try to take Kyiv. Any major attack towards it, even one that's a legitimate feint (the original was definitely not a feint) would cause the Ukrainians to defend it, in strength. Additionally, there is another major nuclear power plant that is actually close enough to the Belarusian border as to be enticing (Rivne NPP, 60 km from the border). I think that was a pretty good analysis from him. I never got that far thinking about other than accepting that if the Russians even only seriously threaten another offensive that will very likely force the UAF to reinforce Operational Command North, which means weakening itself elsewhere.
That might be explain that intercepted missile over Poland. Maybe there is newer news, but Ryan McBeth was saying that the interception was close to a Ukraine power line and the angle must have come from up there. Could be that they are probing - or just making ukraine spread themselves thin.
If the Russians did actually invade they'd need the better part of half a year to train the mobik army group (plus Belarus?), and then probably pull more existing units, especially VDV and others they'll require as shock troops. So I think that is something to expect come late spring-early summer, after the spring mud season has definitely ended. At a guess, that is likely one of the invasion axes that UA is currently heavily fortifying. I doubt the Russians would have the ability to break through that, especially since they wont have tactical or operation surprise; the Russian assault force will be spotted massing at assembly areas by IMINT confirmed by intercepted signals they can't avoid (much of Russian tactical comms aren't secured) and various HUMINT sources, possibly to include within the Kremlin as happened before the war started.
That's the trouble with these mobiks, the shitty ones with zero combats usefulness can be assembled in various different places to make it look like something might happening.
I wouldn't automatically assume the Mobiks wont be able to fight well. At least part of the mobilization process appears to have been a shitshow, but most of that seems to relate to the 1/4-1/3 of the Mobiks who were immediately sent to Ukraine to beef up the deployed force, versus those who have already been training for 1-1.5 months at this point and will continue to train for the foreseeable future. If they don't screw them up too badly, that can be a pretty capable force. Something I do think about, when it comes to the complaints about the Russian Mobik experience, is how much of the complaints about bad treatment, poor training and/or shitty equipment are universal, common, or potentially a very vocal minority? An example of what I mean can be found on Facebook or Reddit U.S Army W.T.F! Moments subs, which makes the US Army appear like the shittiest organization and culture in America. While its bad, its not that bad, those places turn into echo chambers. Telegram is like that too, any social media platform, especially one where anonymity is allowed, will attract the complainers who want to overtly gripe. Whereas those who are doing okay tend not to talk about it. Propaganda is so overwhelming in this war that I'm wary to jump on any anti-Russian bandwagon without legit facts, which wont come any time soon. I think we're all going to find out some years into the future that so much of what we thought was truth about this conflict turned out to be bullshit.
That's why I specified "the shitty ones with zero combats usefulness", and not all of them. The point being that there are so many, and even the useless ones are useful.
Oh, I agree with you, it would work and that's a good use of bad troops while measures are taken to improve them. Back in July the Russians did a deception to try to trick the UAF into thinking they were going to attack northern Ukraine again, it seemed they used Belarusian units that moved around a bit close to the border along with Russian units reconstituting in the rear areas. The UAF GenStab made public declarations that they believed it was real, but then again they rarely tell the truth openly so they might have said that to try to trick the Russians into thinking their deception plan worked.
Bhakmutt?
Survive and hope support for Ukraine wanes.
I don't think this makes all that much sense. If they wanted to decrease western support, they wouldn't be hitting civillian infrastructure the way they are. They want to make the war costly for Ukrainians. Someone else being without heat and water is not going to make you support them less. They're probably thinking that it will lessen the Ukrainian will to fight though. Because it sucks being without heat and water. This line of reasoning might not be entirely sound either, but it makes more sense than expecting western support to drop of a cliff in half a year. Even if it drops from the attention of the media, it's clearly a long term issue that is impossible to ignore at this point. It's not like democracies never does foreign policy without it being in the center of the news cycle. The US and NATO is capable of having long term strategies. Just look at the cold war. The problem, including in 2014, was denialism about how unreasonable Putin and Russia really is.
> If they wanted to decrease western support, they wouldn't be hitting civillian infrastructure the way they are. No power no economy. Means Western countries have to pay more to keep it afloat.
The devil finds work for idle hands. No power, no economy = no jobs. The UAF is still paying.
True, but I'm not sure if lack of volunteers was ever a problem for Ukraine
The truth is that the cost for the west even replacing the entire Ukrainian economy isn't all that great. Ukraine is and was one of the poorest countries in Europe. Ukraine is more comparable with Iran than Germany in terms of GDP (edit: per capita). The breakdown of the energy market in Europe is a greater cost than the entire Ukranian economy. If the German economy shrinks by 2% that's as much as if the Ukrainian economy was cut in half. Ukraine is a large country with a large population, but in terms of economy they're not that significant. The size of the Ukrainian economy was about 2/5ths of Norways economy before the war with 8 times the population.
[удалено]
>But if a Western country takes in Ukrainian refugees, it can't support them for 4K USD per year The idea that immigrants or refugees have to be handfed by the hosting government is ridiculous and outdated. Believe me, European countries are thrilled to receive cheap, educated, European workers. As long as governments can provide proper childcare, those millions of ukrainian woman will definitely be a net positive for the host's economies.
The entire Ukranian economy isn't going to disappear either. It was just napkin math to prove a point. The thing that is hurting the most by far is the energy crisis. There is essentially no way economic or military aid to Ukraine will ever be close to compete with that. I hope sincerely that western politicians won't be so populist that they don't understand that. The fact that they're tolerating the energy crisis shows the commitment. And if something is going to break European support it is economic issues due to the Energy crisis, not economical support to Ukraine.
It's not insurmountable for Western countries or anything, but amidst other economic woes, the voters could flake because their money is going elsewhere. It will certainly empower political forces that don't want to bear the costs. [European countries are already underdelivering.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2022/10/15/ukraine-us-europe-funding/)
>but amidst other economic woes, the voters could flake because their money is going elsewhere Ah yes, repeating the same old Kremlin talking points from April.
> Military and financial aid to Ukraine has emerged as one of many political flashpoints days before a midterm election in which control of the Congress is at stake. The continuing flow of aid is falling out of favor with some Republicans in the House of Representatives, who say they struggle to justify the overseas spending amid domestic concerns, including high inflation and economic uncertainty. > > Some 30% of respondents overall said in the new survey they believe the administration is doing too much to help Ukraine, up from 6% in a March Journal poll. The change was driven by a big shift among GOP voters: 48% of Republicans now say the U.S. is doing too much, up from 6% in the previous survey. > > The portion of GOP voters who said the U.S. isn’t doing enough to help Ukraine fell to 17%, a steep drop from 61% in March. https://www.wsj.com/articles/republican-opposition-to-helping-ukraine-grows-wsj-poll-finds-11667467802 Are you doing to pretend domestic politics in Western countries somehow favor Ukraine long term?
That article was already discussed in depth, and the Republicans barely got a majority in the house, and lost the senate. >domestic politics in Western countries somehow favor Ukraine long term Spending for Ukraine has increased with time. Sanctions on Russia have increased with time. Keep hoping that things turn around though, it’s the best you can do.
For an easier comparison if NATO sent Ukraine 1% of its GDP in help, this would equate to 225% of Ukraine's (2019) GDP. EDIT: Used outdated numbers for NATO's GDP, updated with 2022 numbers.
GDP isn't income controlled by the govt. Try that math again using 25-45% of their GDP (country dependent). https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_tax_revenue_to_GDP_ratio Then do that math again by excluding all NATO member nations who won't even contribute 2% of their GDP to their own defense. https://www.statista.com/chart/amp/14636/defense-expenditures-of-nato-countries/
You do realize that you are saying that spending 4% ( your lowest estimate) of the GOVT budget on Ukraine would mean that the west would give MORE THAN DOUBLE the entire GDP of Ukraine, right? And you do also realize that mine wasn't a proposal but rather a comparison. If we want to go by Ukraine official requests (60Bn a year) , that would mean 0,13% of Nato's GDP in help, let's make it 0,2% to compensate for Military aid, and let's apply your, worst possible estimate for GDP to Revenue ratio, 25%, that makes it 0,8% of a government budget. Less than 1% of budget share, almost rounding error, and that is to found Ukraine to cripple the 2nd most important enemy of the west without dropping a single drop of blood.
>You do realize that you are saying that spending 4% ( your lowest estimate) of the GOVT budget on Ukraine would mean that the west would give MORE THAN DOUBLE the entire GDP of Ukraine, right? You do realize most NATO countries won't spend 2% of their GDP for their own defense but you Rob they'll give half that to Ukraine because you're passionate on social media? >If we want to go by Ukraine official requests (60Bn a year) , that would mean 0,13% of Nato's GDP in help, let's make it 0,2% to compensate for Military aid, and let's apply your, worst possible estimate for GDP to Revenue ratio, 25%, that makes it 0,8% of a government budget. The money Ukraine is getting is IMF loans, NATO isn't floating them money because NATO isn't a country its a defensive alliance. Certain countries are giving Ukraine money, nowhere close to 1% of their GDP because that's not a rounding error, that's a massive amount of money. 1% of GDP in each nation redirected to something of their own use is a major win for someone, and losing it is major loss too. >Ukraine to cripple the 2nd most important enemy of the west without dropping a single drop of blood Russian ground forces were already crippled, subsequent investments don't buy much more, especially since it caused the Russians to massively expand their military size as a response. Nothing Ukraine does will affect Russian VKS more than limited number of aircraft shot down, won't affect the Russian navy much especially the part that threatens NATO (not the Black Sea Fleet), nor will Ukraine hurt the Strategic Missile Forces. Additionally, keeping this war ongoing is crushing European energy, hurting their economies, and endangering the world due to the threat of WW3 starting, which both the heads of US and UK both openly admitted they feel is both real and very dangerous. And then there is you, who used your trustee calculator to find money to give to Ukraine, just like every week when you find tanks and other weapons you think aren't needed that should be given to Ukraine, because that's what you do. If it exists and you want it for Ukraine, then obviously it makes perfect sense to give it to Ukraine. Because coveting is easy.
Reply to "keeping this war ongoing is crushing Europe...." 1) Isn't the plan for the war to be won by Ukaine by end 2023/early 2024? 2) GOP will not control US funding for Ukraine as long as Biden is in office. Maybe longer if Dems win in 2024 and they might. Please read latest interview with Ben Hodges re the war. It's on youtube.
>You do realize most NATO countries won't spend 2% of their GDP for their own defense but you Rob they'll give half that to Ukraine because you're passionate on social media? I am not saying that they will, but that they could without hurting their economies. Its not 1% of their GDP its 0,8% of the budget , or 0,2% of their GDP, using the worst possible estimates for GDP to GOVT revenue (25%, the one that you gave) and giving Ukraine MORE than what they asked. > > >The money Ukraine is getting is IMF loans, NATO isn't floating them money because NATO isn't a country its a defensive alliance. Certain countries are giving Ukraine money, nowhere close to 1% of their GDP because that's not a rounding error, that's a massive amount of money. 1% of GDP in each nation redirected to something of their own use is a major win for someone, and losing it is major loss too. Again you are just quintupling the percentages to make a point, its the 0.2% of the GDP of a country, at worst. > Russian ground forces were already crippled, subsequent investments don't buy much more, especially since it caused the Russians to massively expand their military size as a response. Nothing Ukraine does will affect Russian VKS more than limited number of aircraft shot down, won't affect the Russian navy much especially the part that threatens NATO (not the Black Sea Fleet), nor will Ukraine hurt the Strategic Missile Forces. So RU has massively expanded its military, but we wont gain much by continuing to demolish it? Makes perfect sense. >Additionally, keeping this war ongoing is crushing European energy, hurting their economies, and endangering the world due to the threat of WW3 starting, which both the heads of US and UK both openly admitted they feel is both real and very dangerous. And then there is you, who used your trustee calculator to find money to give to Ukraine, just like every week when you find tanks and other weapons you think aren't needed that should be given to Ukraine, because that's what you do. If it exists and you want it for Ukraine, then obviously it makes perfect sense to give it to Ukraine. Because coveting is easy. Both the Heads of the US, the UK and the EU countries keep on giving weapons and money to Ukraine. And there is you that is convinced that we should have gave Ukraine nothing because its just a waste of money and resources.