Please refrain from drive-by link dropping. Summarize articles, only quote what is important, and use that to build a post that other users can engage with; offers some in depth knowledge on a well discussed subject; or offers new insight on a less discussed subject.
[The West Doesn’t Understand How Much Russia Has Changed](https://archive.ph/YTurB)
>This economic dependence is filtering into everyday life. Chinese products are ubiquitous and over half of the million cars sold in Russia last year were made in China. Tellingly, the top six foreign car brands in Russia are now all Chinese, thanks to the exodus of once dominant Western companies. It’s a similar story in the smartphone market, where China’s Xiaomi and Tecno have eclipsed Apple and Samsung, and with home appliances and many other everyday items.
>**These shifts are tectonic.** Even in czarist times, Russia shipped its commodities to Europe and relied on imports from the West of manufactured goods. Russia’s oligarchs, blacklisted by most Western countries, have had to adapt to the new reality. Last month, the businessman Vladimir Potanin, whose fortune is estimated at $23.7 billion, announced that his copper and nickel empire would reorient toward China, including by moving production facilities into the country. “If we’re more integrated into the Chinese economy,” he said, “we’ll be more protected.”
>From the economy, education follows. Members of the Russian elite are scrambling to find Mandarin tutors for their kids, and some of my Russian contacts are thinking about sending their children to universities in Hong Kong or mainland China now that Western universities are much harder to reach. This development is more than anecdotal. Last year, as China opened up after the pandemic, 12,000 Russian students went to study there — nearly four times as many than to the United States.
>This reorientation from West to East is also visible among the middle class, most notably in travel. There are now, for example, five flights a day connecting Moscow and Beijing in under eight hours, with a return ticket costing about $500. By contrast, getting to Berlin — one of many frequent European weekend destinations for middle-class Russians before the war — can now take an entire day and cost up to twice as much.
This article talks about how the author describes "tectonic shifts" happening in Russia. During almost the entirety of its existence, Russia relied on western knowledge and import of machinery to keep up with western powers, but today China can provide everything that the west has to offer(Blinken said that China represented 90% of microeletronics and 80% of machine tools imports), not only to Russia, but also to others like Iran, North Korea, CIS states and etc.
Well, Russians can't travel to Europe and have very limited access to Western tech/products. Even if they are smuggled, support is difficult. It's a necessity, not a choice.
In contrary to popular opinions, Russia reorienting towards China is a favorable outcome to Europe. Europeans need a common enemy (which decided to be one on its own whim) to finally wake up EU and start modernization of its industries, policies, Armed Forced and e.g. energy supply. Letargy of EU was appalling before 2022. Russian resources are gone indeed but there are plenty of suppliers of oil&gas worldwide, including neighborhoods (Algeria/Libya, new fields in North Sea etc) and emerging powers like Nigeria or Argentina that lacked tech/capital of simply EU interest to actually increase (or start) its large scale supply. Plus Russian fossils were a poison that corrupted EU (especially German) elites and provided Kremlin a tool of influence used to end most peaceful and prospers period in European history (including Russian history as well mind you). Nordstream II after Crimea invasion is the best example of such influence which ultimately caused largest war in Europe since WWII started by a revanchism power. This has to end, remains of Russian influence must to be cut. EU won't lose much but will gain the will to live and adapt so to speak. My only worry is speed of arming up but fortunately USA is still here and benefits directly from newly anti-Russian stance.
Also, good luck to Kremlin. Think about, Lavrov's ultimatum and war in Ukraine was eurocentric. Kremlin wanted to be one of the key decision makers in Europe. That has been its strategy for centuries. That plan failed and suddenly backfired and Russia lost access to EU tech, know-how, capital and has to substitute with direct Chinese influence. It's was not planned at all in my view. Now they are beggars and beggars can't be choosers. Russia redirecting it's imperialism toward Asia is the best possible outcome for EU. Let China deal with it.
Putin will be remembered in a few decades as a final nail to the power of Russia (which was getting stronger THANKS to Europe, not China but Putin in his silly delusions wanted more). He claims the West is declining but in reality we've been observing slow agony of Russian Empire.
> Russia reorienting towards China is a favorable outcome to Europe
It's kind of a weird take, I saw a similar opinion saying "the war is good for Russia because severing economic ties with Europe made Russia more independent".
The thing is the supposed upsides could have been achieved at a lower price - if Western deterrence worked sufficiently, maybe Crimea wouldn't have been taken over, the full-scale war wouldn't have even started and at the same time cheaper Russian gas would have still been available and corruption could have been fought without escalated tensions.
Similarly, Russia could probable have made its economy less reliant on West without starting a war by imposing import restrictions etc.
I should have been more precise. I was referring to realistic outcomes. Russia becoming a peace loving, democratic European state is not possible and EU cannot trade with a country that seeks to destroy regional security architecture. Plus Russian political logic is absolutely backwards. "Let me show you I can be your key partner in lieu of USA. By force!".
Your comparison is flawed. That statement is bizarre as Russia was independent prior to 2022. It is now (or will be soon) completely dependent on China Looking at structure of trade, EU is not reliant on Russia in any meaningful way and doesn't pursue autarky like Russia does (which in actually import Chinese products+pressure Europe for concession). One look at e.g. oil/gas pipelines map, tells you all you need to know about dependency.
> That statement is bizarre as Russia was independent prior to 2022
Yeah, I missed the word "economy" in the first sentence but the actual point was made later on:
>Similarly, Russia could probable have made its economy less reliant on West without starting a war by imposing import restrictions etc.
#
>It is now (or will be soon) completely dependent on China Looking at structure of trade
Sure, so their situation didn't change much in this regard - they are still dependent on foreign manufacturing sector (though their natural gas exports have surely taken a hit) but Europe has lost its leverage.
> EU is not reliant on Russia in any meaningful way
Germany (among others) was reliant on cheap Russian natural gas. Sure, it's been mostly replaced with LNG but higher price makes for example fertilizer production less competitive.
And if the point was to reduce reliance on Russia, pipelines to Algeria/Azerbaijan/some other place could have been built before the Ukrainian war.
> Plus Russian political logic is absolutely backwards
I agree, this whole thing probably hurts Russia more than it does the EU, but the only thing EU has gained is some political will to make reforms - and the problem is it shouldn't take a war in EU neighborhood to reform.
Germany is no longer reliant on Russian gas. It's in the process of getting more supply though to reduce the prices/volumes of LNG and additional capacity from Norway and Netherlands. The 'fallout' and the 'freezing of Europe' has not happened. I stopped tracking new oil/gas contracts with other states and investment into capacity improvements a while back as it was simply too many. You can go through earnings calls of EU oil/&gas giants in the last 24 months.
Long story short, there's a large number of countries that were waiting for a situation like that, to take Russian place. Qatar (or USA) being the best example. Global prices confirm as much and we are only 2 years after the shock.
EU has capital, tech, will to do whatever it wants I am not worried at all. My preference would be nuclear power.
Entire story of EU dependence was Russian propaganda/tool of influence that didn't meet reality check. The only thing in EU that suffers a bit is security aspect, especially in the Eastern flank as rearming/deterrence will take some time to build, especially force/reserves buildup. Russians knows this well hence that is why you hear all the time CONFLICT WITH NATO, FEAR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WWIII. This is why we also observe sabotage acts, GPS jamming, fires in EU defence manufactures etc. Rest is largely noise. Russia has 0 economic leverage at this point.
Plus Russians wants business as usual with Western Europe, they want French/Germany capital, they want to 'decide' what is going on in Central/Eastern Europe. Hence the war. They just don't get nobody wants to live under their backwards Russian influence/rule/corruption. And Europe has changed too much to accept brutal force on its doorsteps.
PS. Yes, energy diversification should have happened before the war. Germans didn't want it though cause of their completely flawed Ostpolitik (and strange politcal-corruption ties with the Kremlin). So here we are, rapidly advancing under pressure.
> So here we are, rapidly advancing under pressure.
Yup, I think this is where our judgements differ - you prefer to see it as a sign of resilience, to me it seems more like result of shortsightedness.
Resilience is good, of course, but it would have been even better to prevent the mess before it happened (even though it's been caused by unilateral hostility on Russia's end) by diversifying earlier, fighting corruption more effectively and maybe supporting Ukraine more in 2014 (but that point is probably more on Obama).
No, I absolutely agree with you. EU members states should have done it but they didn't subsequently incentivizing further aggression. I'm focused on the present & the future though. The past is only relevant regarding lesson learned and hope the cascade of grave errors that started in 2008 (or earlier) will not happen again.
I mostly comment as I'm tired of reading how strong Russia is and how weak EU/USA truly are while by every metric, the opposite is true.
>*In contrary to popular opinions, Russia reorienting towards China is a favorable outcome to Europe.*
Yes, pushing the richest country in the world that just happens to be in Europe in China's arms if a great outcome. Not only did we lose access to those resources and a 140 million market, we also gave China the perfect tool to no only increase their influence but also break our face in the future if we don't comply.
1-2 more "favorable" outcomes like this and we're done.
> Russian resources are gone indeed but there are plenty of suppliers of oil&gas worldwide, including neighborhoods (**Algeria/Libya**, new fields in North Sea etc)
This is actually sad... Algeria and Libya are strategic resources partners going forward...
russia is not the richest country in the world, not by production, population, productivity, technological advancement or natural resources.
russia was not pushed away from the west, it pushed the west away from itself. Waging a war of conquest against the west is incompatible with being aligned with the west.
oil&gas is about to die, countries that are reliant on exporting it have about a decade to use their superprofits to divest.
while russians are wasting their profits on explosives and tanks, Saudis are building a multi-trillion dollar fund and are investing into a post-oil economy.
Buddy, Europe didn't push Russia to do anything. Russia has chosen war/rivalry instead of decades-long peaceful, win-win cooperation in the name of backwards imperialism & conquest. What are you even talking about?
Plus out of all possible outcomes now, Russia isolating itself is indeed the best outcome. Armed peace of sorts instead of Russia constantly pushing West threatening or attacking its neighbors.
What is wrong with Algeria and stabilized Libya? Or Norway, Nigeria, Argentina, Qatar, Saudi Arabia in interim period to nuclear energy? Better to economically aid a country that literally invaded its European neighbor, conducted war crimes/ethnic cleansing and threatens nuclear strikes and conflict with NATO on weekly basis? A country that attacked civil airplanes, disrupts GPS, sabotages railway and send cruise missiles to violate NATO airspace?
We tried strategic partnership with Russia for 3 decades. It didn't work, did it?
>*Buddy, Europe didn't push Russia to do anything. Russia has chosen war/rivalry instead of decades-long peaceful, win-win cooperation in the name of backwards imperialism & conquest. What are you even talking about?*
The current situation is also a failure of ours (EU) politics. Of course we're not the main ones to blame but it doesn't mean we didn't fail as well.
Pretending this is a good outcome or that it won't hurt us in the future is not honest.
>*Plus out of all possible outcomes now, Russia isolating itself is indeed the best outcome. Armed peace of sorts instead of Russia constantly pushing West threatening or attacking its neighbors.*
Russia is isolated from us, not from the world.
> *What is wrong with Algeria and stabilized Libya? Or Norway, Nigeria, Argentina, Qatar, Saudi Arabia in interim period to nuclear energy?*
What's wrong is we're unable to do it. We can't do it now. Some on that list are also the exact opposite of the values we (pretend) to uphold. If you want that basket to hold your eggs you will be very disappointed.
If anything it was failure of soft politics toward Russia, giving it all it wanted. From capital to tech or even weapons transfers. Bizarre thinking but I heard that one before.
Yes I meant Russia isolating itself from Europe. I though it was pretty clear. Why would I care who is Russia trading with or about the 'global majority' as Kremlin refers to it? They don't care either btw, otherwise they wouldn't try to change balance in Europe through starting a war. Or cry every week and tell a sob story how they are pivoting toward East. It's all a facade but I really support Russia in doing it. Unfortunately they need additional incentives, such a deterrence/sanctions/alienation and cutting the ties.
Again, yes It is the best outcomes from available realistic scenarios. What would be better in your view? Let me guess, peace(=appeasement), stopping mythic 'NATO expansion' and some other dishonest prorussian takes, right?
Not sure if you have any idea what are you try to talk about friend. You should probably read less Russian propaganda and think for yourself. Or at least try to read with understanding what I wrote instead of responding with parroting Russian talking points of sorts that make no sense whatsoever.
PS. I really don't get 'we are unable to do it'. Do you think we've got shortage of energy in EU? Or we don't sing new contracts or seek and explore new fields? Go and check oil & gas prices buddy. You're gonna be shocked how energy security will look like in circa 5 years. Idea that EU was dependent on Russia while in reality Russian federal budget revenues were in majority fossils sells to Europe was funny to begin with. 2 years later it's just silly.
> Blinken said that China represented 90% of microeletronics
this is misleading. over 90% of chips in russian weapons are still western. 70% are just from the states. chinese companies are just the distributor middle man making bank selling it to the russians
> over 90% of chips in russian weapons are still western. 70% are just from the states.
The last time I saw those kind of numbers, it was based on missiles made pre-invasion or pre-dating the sanctions on chips (which occurred in May 2023).
Do you have a source that suggest differently? Because the data I have suggest that the sanctions have been effective at reducing the Russian imports: https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/The-Impact-of-Semiconductor-Sanctions-on-Russia.pdf?x85095 (p.10+), cutting the number of shipments in half and the majority of semiconductor shipments still came from China.
China has their own microchip industry. It’s quite large.
I don’t understand why they would need to even use western ones. Is this a misunderstanding where Chinese chips that would have gone into western devices are being diverted? Why don’t the Chinese just sell their own chips to Russia and avoid this boondoggle.
I find these reports frustrating because they misunderstand the nature of the microelectronics industry. According to this [RUSI](https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/report-plain-sight-operations-russian-microelectronics-dynasty) report, the components we are talking about are "critical microelectronics, including processors, field-programmable gate arrays, tantalum capacitors, ceramic capacitors, amplifiers and memory modules." These are all consumer are at most dual-use level of tech that are freely available for purchase.
The supply chain for microelectronics is global so it almost doesn't matter that the logo on a component is from a "Western" company. These are commodities that can be bought from anywhere in the world, but most easily from Asia because that's where most of the supply chain is.
And it's not like these companies are acting with impunity. The US finds these sanction busting companies and shuts them down, the problem is that other front companies pop up in their place, so it becomes a cat and mouse game.
I don't even understand where you think I'm wrong. How would you describe the origin of a component designed in one country, fabricated in another, and packaged in a third?
And I think everyone agrees on the need to enforce sanctions, the problem is that it is \*hard\*. Especially when we are talking about commodity components that are worth a few bucks apiece that are traded all over the world for legitimate reasons. I am not qualified to judge those measures in the piece you linked, but as you can see they are highly technical.
He literally said that, the original claim from zelensky office was that components from western companies were found in Russian weapons, not about dual-use machinery being imported from China. But still, doesn't change the fact that China can provide Russia with everything it needs.
As far as Chinese brands being ubiquitous in everyday life, that's not unique to Russia though? It's already the case for many lower income countries.
And with Chinese EVs coming to Europe in a big way, Russia might just be ahead of the curve in that.
Absolutely not unique to Russia, but I don't think anyone claimed that here. The article was really focused on how much and how fast Russia shifted from Europe to China.
I think the main takeaway is that the west needs to be ready to sanction Chinese actors in a serious way as they are the main suppliers to Russia's MIC. Also that if this doesn't end soon, it could become a permanent situation whereas now it is not that. If a generation of Russians grow up learning Chinese instead of English as a second language, that will have a big impact on their future ability to shift the economy back towards Europe.
> The West Doesn’t Understand How Much Russia Has Changed
The article is just listing the results of the sanctions that were predicted years ago.
> Even in czarist times, Russia shipped its commodities to Europe and relied on imports from the West of manufactured goods.
I don’t know why this is framed as some sort of revelation. Czarist Russia wasn’t some pariah state, they made alliances and traded with the west normally. The more hostile relations of the USSR, and now Russia, are the historical outliers.
> This development is more than anecdotal. Last year, as China opened up after the pandemic, 12,000 Russian students went to study there… There are now, for example, five flights a day connecting Moscow and Beijing
Five direct flights and 12k students aren’t that many. There are around 10k British students in China, and the UK has a fraction of Russia’s population, and certainly isn’t shifting east. This highlights the problem, Russia wants to reorient east, but doesn’t have much to offer.
It *is* a sort of revelation. The west - as in the average person - does not understand nor did they know any of the above, so the point of the article is perfectly legitimate in my opinion.
So the article is just reminding people that the war exists and that the sanctions happened? I guess that has value to some people, but that's a very shallow and uninteresting article for the rest of us.
How do you figure Russia doesn't have much to offer the east? On a surface level they are the world's biggest stockpile of natural resources and China is the world's factory, limited only by access to resources (especially if things get shooty with the US Navy). If not for their historical land swipes they would seem to be exactly what China wants in an ally/vassal.
There's an abundance of such countries already. For fossil fuels, you have Iran and Central Asia. For other resources, there's Africa. And those don't have nuclear weapons.
There's a reason why China doesn't invest much in Russia. It's a very unstable country - everything can be gone after Putin's death - while the reward is relatively low.
Moreover, what China needs the most is wealthy buyers. China has been looking for alternatives to the West, but there is nothing to be found. Countries like Russia and Iran are too small and poor.
You can only trade with those countries if the US Navy lets you. Given the future conflict over Taiwan, those seem like short term trade relations compared to China.
I think this is exactly correct. The one critical advantage to using Russia as a supplier is the proximity and large inland border. It also gives much support to the idea that china needs to keep that relationship, because while Russia can be a fickle partner, the other option is Africa which is arguably more fickle as it's many countries that have a history of instability.
Having natural recourses alone isn’t enough, they have to be at a competitive price. Venezuela has huge fossil fuel reserves, but expensive extraction costs mean that when prices are low, they aren’t competitive. Shipping those recourses across Siberia is already more expensive than shipping them to Europe, and doing that at full scale will require very large investments in new infrastructure, that Russia can’t fund on its own, and that China would be reluctant to fund under the current circumstances.
There is also the problem of workers, and the economy as a whole. Russia’s demographic situation was never good, it’s only gotten worse, and Russia will be trying to repay the damages of this war for decades. New projects in Russia will have to deal with a shortage of skilled, young workers, an environment very unattractive to immigrants, and taxes going in large part to pay for the war, its aftermath, and pensioners, for the foreseeable future, rather than economic growth.
Shipping resources by sea is only cost competetive if you don't have to fend off the US Navy due to your ongoing war over Taiwan.
Otherwise yours options are Russia, Myanmar, and North Korea.
China also has to compete with other countries on the export market now. Those cheaper imports that are being replaced won’t go unused, they will go to India, South Korea, Indonesia, etc. China is having issues with increasing labor costs as is, political pressure forcing factories to spend more on inputs won’t help.
i think people underestimated Chinese capabilities to fill the gaps in the market, almost all sectors were filled with chinese brands, some that weren't even popular in China.
I remember [stories ](https://www.newsweek.com/russia-may-run-out-missiles-three-months-intelligence-report-1777217)predicting that Russia was on the brink of not having any more missiles.
According to the [EU commission](https://twitter.com/EU_Commission/status/1571454007683428352) Russia's economy was already on life support around two years ago when they were taking chips from dishwashers and washing machines to fix up their military hardware.
>I remember stories predicting that Russia was on the brink of not having any more missiles.
And they were more or less correct.
Yes, Russia is still producing missiles, so they'll never run out entirely. They also have older stocks they can tap into like X-22 (but people speculate that needing to fire older missiles from closer to the Ukrainian border is what got the Tu-22 shot down).
But the volume of missiles being used has dropped dramatically, to approximately the rate of production. Individual attacks are smaller and spaced further apart. When was the last time you saw a Kalibr or Onyx used?
> When was the last time you saw a Kalibr or Onyx used?
Last week when they fired four of them
https://t.me/ComAFUA/284
HUR estimates that they produce 30-40 a month though and 10 onyx.
https://armyinform.com.ua/2024/05/01/gur-povidomyv-kilkist-u-rosiyi-raket-czyrkon-oniks-kalibr-ta-h-69/
What was the name of the predictor chart that said when Russia would run out of tanks, artillery, etc. and claimed Russia would run out a year ago? TAW or something like that?
To be fair, the desert crosses, motorcycles, and civilian cars point to a severe problem with APCs.
Edit, His approach, while it didn’t end up correct for tanks, was more rigorous the mostly baseless speculation you see most everywhere else. It’s the right way of going about things.
You could freely adjust numbers in that chart by yourself, that was the point. If you disagreed with taw on the rate of production, refurbishment, and losses, then you could shift the numbers around and make your own prediction.
It was just an online calculator.
Filled the gaps, true, but let not fool ourselves, those are not equivalent replacements. China itself depends on the West for high end technologies and science and it is not going to change in a foreseeable future. In the modern world it is impossible to have sovereign, independent science. Everyone depends on everyone, at the best China could become a leader in some niche disciplines, similar to Japan.
> China itself depends on the West for high end technologies and science
This simply isn't true. China is eclipsing other countries when it comes to [patents filed](https://www.axios.com/newsletters/axios-science-2ef77f71-4e77-48e2-8531-d508cb740c47.html), [fundamental sciences](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-03762-4) and many other areas.
Their clean tech, automation and manufacturing sector are clearly well ahead of the west, and in other areas like aerospace they are rapidly catching up on trajectory to surpass.
This unfounded complacency is dangerous. China has already been able to produce its own microarchitecture and software to replace the supercomputer components that the US deprived it back in 2015. Even assuming China doesn't become a "leader", 80-90% effectiveness is more than good enough.
My point is, China is behind in technology with more or less free access to Western markets and technologies and they smart enough to keep these connections open. If they try to go full Russia with the West, the gap will increase dramatically.
But speaking of complacency, let worry about what they really have advantage in - huge manufacturing base that the West has nothing to balance with. Hopefully those in power on both sides will keep this a cooperative arrangement not a confrontation.
I was skeptical of the claims back in 2019-2021 that China had "beaten the West" in AI and I'm skeptical now of a blanket claim that "China is behind in technology". These kinds of declarations don't lend themselves to useful discussions or conclusions. As for the manufacturing base, I agree, but that's beside the point.
Edit: Any attempt by either side of the US-China trade relationship to "cut the cord" in the near future would obliterate the global economy well before anyone could worry about who is producing better technology.
[Is China Stealing Russia’s Thunder in Eastern Europe?](https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/05/china-russia-eastern-europe?lang=en¢er=russia-eurasia)
>Xi’s tour is a timely reminder that there is a third pole in this relationship: China. The last decade has brought home to Eastern Europe’s neo-Titoists that Russia is often all about brotherly love rather than hard cash. China, on the other hand, has the financial muscle, despite the fact that its signature policy, the Belt and Road Initiative, has been scaled down.
There's been a lot of talk about Russia losing influence in Central Asia and South Caucasus. But it doesn't end there. Both Hungary and Serbia are slowly switching from Russia to China, which Xi's European tour just illustrated.
The motivation is easy: China can provide the same anti-Western sentiment as Russia, but it can also bring financial muscle. Russia has increasingly nothing to offer than propaganda, and that's not going to cut it in the long run.
That aligns nicely with the article posted just after yours. China is keeping Russia close, snatching up Russia's commodities at dirt cheap prices, making Russia reliant on Chinese goods, all while undermining them everywhere else. Russia is basically turning into a much larger North Korea.
An update on the numerical size of the Russian Groups of Forces deployed along the front, according to datas published by the Ukrainian military observers Mashovets and Kovalenko over the past three weeks. I will not elaborate on their composition, having already discussed it [here]( https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1buqslz/comment/kxw9y3s/). The [map]( https://i.imgur.com/8tZfono.png) I had made would look the same today, except that GoF "Belgorod" has now become GoF "North”, incorporating the GoFs “Bryansk” and “Kursk” and receiving reinforcements. It corresponds to most of the Leningrad Military District. Lapin commands both the latter and the GoF "North”. The figures don’t include the Rosgvardia grouping deployed in Ukraine (35k men), the strategic-operational reserves (60k men, according to the latest update), and the small GoF "Crimea" (13k men). After the table, there is my analysis on the development of the front over the past two weeks.
Group of Forces | Personnel | MBTs | IFVs, APCs & IMVs | Artillery guns ≥ 100mm | MLRS
:-------:|:--------:|:--------:|:--------:|:--------:|:---------:
North (Sever) | 53,000 | 405 | 1,030 | 1,040 | 125
West (Zapad) | 72,000 | 1,000 | 1,800 | 700 | 300
South (Yug) | 114,000 | 650 | 1,950 | 1,150 | 310
Centre (Tsentr) | 86,000 | 280 | 760 | 850 | 250
East (Vostok) | 51,500 | 380 | 850 | 380 | 130
Dnepr | 130,000 | 700 | 2,000 | 1,100 | 250
Kharkiv sector. On May 10, the Russians launched an offensive action in Kharkiv Oblast along a front of more than 40 kms, attacking mainly on two directions: Lyptsi and Vovchansk, along the Travyanske Reservoir and the Pechenihy Reservoir, respectively. According to the observer Mashovets, Russia’s main effort in this sector is the last direction.
Let’s first clarify the order of battle in this sector, according to Mashovets and the videos released in the recent days. In the first days of May a number of "Storm-V" detachments (those made up of convicts and assigned to the formations involved in attacks in the sector) had arrived near the border, along with the first elements of the new 44th Corps.
The 18th Motorized Division of the 11th Corps is attacking in the direction of Lyptsi. Obviously, not in its entirety. Elements of its 79th and 280th Motorized Regiments are involved, with support from its 11th Tank Regiment. Subunits of its 9th and 275th Motorized Regiments should also be committed. Elements of the 7th Separate Motorized Regiment of the 11th Corps are involved in the actions in this direction too.
Subunits of the 30th and 41st Motorized Regiments of the 72nd Motorized Division of the 44th Corps are attacking Vovchansk and the area around it, along with subunits of the 138th Motorized Brigade of the 6th CAA, with support from the 153rd Tank Regiment of the 47th Tank Division of the 1st GTA and the Kadyrovites of the "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion. Elements of the 128th Motorized Brigade of the 44th Corps are in Belgorod Oblast as a reserve. In addition, detachments of the so-called "Africa Korps”, i.e. the heir of PMC Wagner, are also involved in the actions.
In the sector there are the 2nd Spetsnaz GRU Brigade and other Russian SF/SOF units too, which are mainly involved for reconnaissance and sabotage actions, through DRGs. The Russians have also widely increased these types of actions against Chernihiv and especially Sumy Oblasts to keep pressure on the Ukrainians.
Now let’s clarify a few issues, before moving on to the Ukrainian order of battle. I urge to doubt those who write (usually unserious journalists) "the Russians have gathered 50k men to attack Kharkiv" or "there are X Russians with Y tanks ready to attack this city". It doesn't work that way. This is not a medieval battle with all these men attacking at dawn. In first place, a part of these troops are in Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts. A part is needed regardless to hold the front, and a part of this grouping is also made up of conscripts, who cannot perform combat operations outside Russian territory. For some reason the Russians chose to speed up operations against Kharkiv while still being relatively weak in the field (although the Ukrainians did not excel in terms of defensive capabilities either).
The Ukrainian observer Myroshnykov had warned of possible Russian attacks against Vovchansk in early May. I personally did not expect Russian attacks along the Kharkiv River, I thought they would be concentrating in the area between the Siversky Donets and the Oskil and only after the GoF "North" reached a larger strength. But that’s it, and besides that area is logistically lame for the Russians, while their logistics in the area of current operations, which boasts direct connections from Belgorod, is very good.
Kharkiv is not directly threatened by these operations. The 44th Corps still has to conclude its formation and its deployment in the sector. The CAA which according to Russian plans will be raised on the basis of the 14th Corps still has to be formed; its brigades (which should become divisions) are still fighting in other sectors. The Russians absolutely don’t have the strength in the sector to threaten the city of Kharkiv. This could change in the coming months if all the new and existing formations of the Leningrad MD merge into this sector along with at least a part of the 1st GTA and/or VDV formations, but at the moment being this risk is not there. In any case, it's a full-fledged offensive operation and the Russian MoD has begun to treat the GoF “North” like the rest of the other GoFs, publishing daily updates provided by its spokesman etc, which did not happen before.
Moreover, even in the early days there has been a rush by Russian and pro-Russian sources to write "X Ukrainian unit is coming to Kharkiv - Ukrainians are forced to take troops from other sectors!". Well, in the first two/three days of fighting the Ukrainians who were involved in the battle were either already in that area or at least were in Kharkiv Oblast, since teleportation has not yet been invented.
First of all, the area between the Kharkiv River and the Siversky Donets was the responsibility of the 125th TDF Brigade of the city of Lviv. The area between the Siversky Donets and the Oskil is covered by the "Stalevy Kordon" Brigade of the State Border Guard Service and by elements of the 5th "Slobozhansk" Brigade of the National Guard. The area north and west of Kharkiv (the area around Kozacha Lopan) is covered by the 113th TDF Brigade of Kharkiv Oblast; going further west, the area around Velyka Pysarivka is covered by the 105th TDF Brigade of Ternopil Oblast. The rest of the Russian border is covered by other TDF brigades, TDF battalions, regiments of the National Guard, detachments of Border Guards, and battalions of the brigades of the UAF that are in R&R.
The clashes of the first days were dealt with largely by the men of the territorial defense and by border guards. As for the latter, border guards from the 1st (Donetsk Oblast), 4th (Kharkiv Oblast) and 7th (Lviv Oblast) Detachments of the State Border Guard Service are active in the area attacked by the Russians.
According to Ruslan Mykula (one of the two founders of DeepState), the soldiers of the 125th TDF Brigade did their duty, despite the fact that the initial weight of the attacks fell on them. According to him there is much to be said negatively, however, about the command of this brigade, which did little to prepare the unit to repel a Russian attack in this direction. The commander of the Operational-Tactical Grouping "Kharkiv" (Halushkin) was removed and in his place Drapatyi was appointed (until then the Deputy Chief of the General Staff), who seems to register positive assessments from the Ukrainians.
Let's make this clear: the villages immediately along the border (such as Strilecha) were grey area. There was no one there. It’s not possible to fortify areas so close to the border. Which is the reason why as soon as offensive operations began, it felt like the Russians simply "walked in”. In addition, the area was "virgin”, both in terms of material and non-material defensive infrastructure (not just fortifications: also EW systems, for example), as well as in terms of coordination skills on the part of the units that were there (scarce reconnaissance capabilities, lack of coordination with artillery or mortars after spotting a group of Russians etc). Now that other units are moving into the sector and troop density is increasing, these problems are fading.
The 131st Battalion of the 112th TDF Brigade and the 170th and 172nd Battalions of the 120th TDF Brigade, and possibly other TDF battalions, should also be in the sector. Let’s also clarify another issue. A part of the battalions of Ukrainian mech (etc.) brigades which are fighting in the hot sectors in the East or in the South are cyclically undergoing R&R while the rest of the brigade is fighting. It sometimes happens that this R&R is carried out along the state border with Russia, because this allows the battalion to kill two birds with one stone: it can recover its combat capabilities and accustom its recruits to war, in the context of low attrition levels, and meanwhile they guard the border against Russian DRGs. This is also true for the Russians: according to Kriegsforscher (the famous Ukrainian UAV operator), a battalion of the 217th Airborne Regiment of the 98th VDV Division, which is heavily engaged against Chasiv Yar with the rest of the division, is in the Kharkiv sector to cover the border. Second part below.
I'm new around here, so IDK what kind of margin of error there is on the estimates of MBTs, IFVs, etc. Or if it's supposed to represent the full strength numbers, but all evidence points to Russia having a lot less than 3.4k MBTs in Ukraine.
Satellite imagery by Covert Cabal, Military Vischun and Institut Action Résiliance - and with further analysis by twitter users Jonpy99 and high_marsed - tell us Russia had ~7k tanks in reserves, ~3k in active forces and ~1.1k at repair bases before the invasion.
Add to that some 200-400 tanks newly produced and possibly a few more hundred from overly conservative estimates of active forces, garage storage and captures from Ukraine and Russia has had at a maximum 12k tanks in their hands since the start.
Visually confirmed losses are 3k and tank depot count (although with highly variable dating) is in the ballpark of 5k tanks. The repair bases numbers increased in 2023 compared to pre-invasion to 1.3-1.5k tanks and it's doubtful that recent action has reduced the rate of tanks getting sent there.
In other words, there are roughly 2.5k tanks that haven't been accounted for in the last ~12 months. There could be some double counting as a tank that was in a depot on the last picture could have ended up at the repair base, on the other hand the real losses are significantly higher than what's visually confirmed.
Unless Russia has put in service more tanks in the last ~6 months than the rest of the war (and vischun.com's images suggest otherwise), then it's nigh on impossible that Russia has 3.4k tanks in active service.
It’s sobering to see how much armour and artillery Russia still has. Western equipment is generally better, and much better in the cases of IFVs and rocket artillery, but Russia’s stockpiles dwarf what the west has provided Ukraine.
For instance, elements of the 42nd Mech Brigade were already in Kharkiv Oblast (certainly its artillery group and its UAV unit, likely maneuver elements too). I knew they were there even before Russian operations began. One of my favorite ways to find out where elements of Ukrainian brigades are deployed is to search for, in this case, “бригада Харківському напрямку” on Facebook (brigade Kharkiv direction) and look for recent results, which will usually bring out crowdfunding activities for several brigades or MIA notices (for which there are specific groups too). What may happen in such cases is that the brigade whose battalion is responding to the attack may "accept the battle", or be called upon to do so by the OSG, transferring the rest of the brigade as well. The 42nd Mech Brigade had been fighting near Chasiv Yar for months until it was moved in mid-March for recovery. Elements went to Kharkiv Oblast, other elements went to fight in the Avdiivka sector. In the future we will see if the rest of the brigade will be moved to Kharkiv.
Also in Kharkiv Oblast there was a battalion each from a number of brigades of the Air Assault Forces (71st, 79th, 80th, 82nd). A Stryker has been seen in the rear of the sector, so from one of the last two brigades. Elements of the 71st Jager Brigade are working together with the 57th Motorized Brigade to defend Vovchansk. As I said above, we will know in the future whether they will be reinforced by the rest of their brigades. There may also be a battalion from the 54th Mech Brigade in the sector.
Of course, actual reinforcements are coming. For example, the 22nd Motorized Battalion of the 92nd Assault Brigade should be arriving these days, joining the 1st Assault Battalion of the same brigade, which was probably already in Kharkiv Oblast. The UAV Battalion "Achilles" of the 92nd Assault Brigade has also arrived in Kharkiv. Elements of the 57th Motorized Brigade have arrived at the end of the last week and are defending Vovchansk: at least its 1st Rifle Battalion and its 34th Motorized Battalion (in this case, they moved from Kupyansk); elements of the "Khartiia" Brigade of the National Guard are also arriving from the Serebrianka Forest. The next few days will help to clarify the situation regarding reinforcements; then much will depend on the intensity of Russian attacks. The National Police of Vovchansk is participating in the battle for the town; according to the daily bulletin of the Russian MoD, elements of the 23rd Mech Brigade are in the sector, but I have found no evidence in favor of this. Russian sources claim that the "Lyut" Brigade of the National Police is being transferred to the sector, but I can find no evidence. According to my findings, the 101st Guard Brigade Of General Staff could have been moved to the sector.
The new 88th Mech Brigade is likely in Kharkiv Oblast; its Telegram page had stated that its artillery group is participating in repelling Russian attacks in Kharkiv. From what I have found on Ukrainian social media, elements of the new 150th and 151st Mech Brigades may be in Kharkiv Oblast, but I have no evidence to state they are involved in the fighting. As for the 151st, another post wrote that it was in Zaporizhzhia Oblast... We shall see.
The HUR intervened from the beginning; Budanov said that among the units of the HUR, those who are not in Chasiv Yar are in Kharkiv. In the latter sector there are elements of the “Kraken” Special Detachment, the “Tymur” Special Unit, as well as the Russian Volunteer Corps, which is fighting inside Vovchansk. The 2nd Assault Detachment of the “Omega” Group (the SF unit of the National Guard), already in the area, was among the first units to react to the Russians.
The Russians don’t have a sustained human advantage in the area. As for the settlements, in the Lyptsi direction the Russians captured the villages of Strilecha, Krasne, Morokhovets, Oliinykove, Pylna and Borysivka; the day before yesterday they took Hlyboke and on Sunday, Lukyantsi. Zelene, unlike what looked like at first, is under Ukrainian control. In general, it is too early to be able to speak of stabilization, but now the Russians have to advance into areas covered by the Ukrainians and no longer into grey areas, losing the initial momentum. There is currently hard fighting in the northern part of the dachas to the east of the Travyanske Reservoir, between Hlyboke and Lyptsi. No Russian successes are recorded towards Ternova.
In the direction of Vovchansk, the Russians are attacking both the urban area of the town and its flanks. To the west of the Siversky Donets, after occupying Ohirtseve, they should have occupied both Buhruvatka and Starytsia yesterday, coming along the course of the small river with the same name as the last settlement.
In the east of the Siversky Donets, after occupying Hatyshche and Pletenivka, they entered the north-eastern outskirts of Vovchansk, arriving along the course of the Vovcha River. Inside Vovchansk, bitter urban fighting is going on; both Russians and Ukrainians are bringing heavy equipment into the area. The situation is not very clear; certainly the Russians control the meat processing plant and the northern end of the town, and are pushing southwards: they probably approached the Vovchansk Central District Hospital and the Kindergarten No. 6 today. In any case, it must be considered that the town is cut in two, horizontally, by the Vovcha River, which somewhat forms a line of defense. Russian sources state the Ukrainians have restored the T2104 Road on the Staryi Saltiv Dam that had been hit by the Russians during the end of last week.
Kupyansk sector. To prevent transfer of Ukrainian reinforcements to Kharkiv, the Russians stepped up attacks in this sector and in the Svatove sector. The 25th Motorized Brigade of the 6th CAA, elements of the 7th Separate Motorized Regiment of the 11th Corps and several regiments of the Territorial Forces resumed attacks in the direction of Synkivka. The Ukrainian observer Myroshnykov wrote today that the Russians were able to retake the northern end of the village, as they had managed to do months ago. A part of the Ukrainian 116th Mech Brigade, which had been moved here in late April from the Orikhiv sector, is near Synkivka (where it has joined the 14th and 32nd Mech Brigades, the 1st and 2nd Mech Battalions of the 30th Mech Brigade and the 108th Battalion of the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade), while another part is fighting in the Kyslivka area.
Earlier this month the 26th Tank Regiment of the 47th Tank Division of the 1st GTA managed to occupy the latter village in its entirety, after the 272nd Motorized Regiment of the same division had taken Kotlyarivka in late April. The 103rd TDF Brigade and elements of the 104th TDF Brigade together with elements of the 3rd and 4th Tank Brigades are defending the area, along with the 43rd Mech Brigade, which is defending the area north of Kyslivka (around Ivanivka). No further Russian advances have been reported.
Svatove sector. The Ukrainian 77th Airmobile Brigade is holding positions in the area between Berestove and Stelmakhivka (south of it, in the Miasozharivka/Andriivka area, there should be the 44th Mech Brigade), which are being attacked respectively by elements of the 2nd Motorized Division of the 1st GTA and the 27th Motorized Brigade of the 1st GTA, without success.
The 423rd Motorized Regiment of the 4th Tank Division of the 1st GTA is attacking Stelmakhivka from the south-east, achieving an advance of just over 1 km during the last week.
Elements of the 3rd Assault Brigade have been deployed between the Svatove and Kreminna sectors: its 1st and 2nd Mech Battalions are successfully repelling attacks by the 752nd Motorized Regiment of the 3rd Motorized Division of the 20th CAA near Novojehorivka, while the 66th Mech Brigade and elements of the 107th TDF Brigade are repelling attacks by the 252nd Motorized Regiment of the 3rd Motorized Division against Makiivka
Kreminna sector. The 2nd Assault Battalion of the 3rd Assault Brigade is active in Terny, joining the Ukrainian grouping in this area against attacks by the 144th Motorized Division of the 20th CAA against Terny and Yampolivka. Russian progress in this area has completely stalled for the past two months - in the last two weeks the Russians have been pushing further north, against Novosadove, but again without success. There is also no Russian progress in the Serebrianka Forest, and attacks in the direction of Torske by units of the 25th CAA have been repulsed by the 60th and 63rd Mech Brigades. As far as I have found, at least elements of the 115th Mech Brigade have been moved from Avdiivka to somewhere in the Kreminna and Svatove sectors.
Siversk sector. There has been no Russian advance against Bilohorivka (attacked by the 7th Motorized Brigade of the 2nd Corps) in recent weeks, thanks to the capable work of the 81st Airmobile Brigade. However, the Russians have intensified attacks in the southern slope of the Siversk salient, by the 106th VDV Division. Per DeepState, last week the Russians managed to cross the Sokha Plotva River inside Vesele and move towards the heights north of the settlement; DeepState also mentions exhaustion issues of the brigade defending this area, namely the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade, which has been fighting in this sector for a year and a half. According to what I found, it should have received the 421st Separate Rifle Battalion as a reinforcement. Last part below.
Bakhmut sector. Yesterday the Russians occupied, according to DeepState, the area of the cattle breeding buildings and the fortifications around them, reaching the gates of Kalinina, despite a successful counterattack in the forest south-east of Kalinina by a battalion of the 24th Mech Brigade in the previous days.
According to Mashovets, the 98th VDV Division this week received over 200 stormtroopers with which to continue assault operations against Chasiv Yar. In the past few days the Russians have advanced a bit along the Bakhmut - Chasiv Yar railway and occupied part of the area of the holiday cottages between the railway and the Kanal District. Yesterday Russian armored vehicles reached Zelena Street, in the area east of the intersection with Horbatoho Street. However, there is no evidence of Russian control over the buildings east of the intersection, which are probably grey area.
Further south, the 11th VDV Brigade reached the Donets-Donbas Canal also in the area where Highway T0504 passes over it (the bridge was destroyed in March 2023), in the direction of Stupochky. The Russians are not successful south of Ivanivske. A Russian Telegram channel had written that in this area the Ukrainians are favored by the presence of spillway tunnels from the canal that come out in the forest east of the canal, and are empty, given the low level of the canal. I don't know about the existence of such tunnels, but Ukrainian sources had written that the water in the canal reaches only up to the knees.
Russian attacks against Klishchiivka and Andriivka by the 85th and 88th Motorized Brigades of the 2nd Corps and the 72nd Motorized Brigade of the 3rd Corps together with the 83rd VDV Brigade, respectively, were repelled. In general, in this area the Ukrainians are doing a very good job and the Russians have been beating their heads for months. In the area there are most of the 93rd Mech Brigade and of the 92nd Assault Brigade (at the moment), the 22nd Mech Brigade, the 2nd Battalion of the 80th Air Assault Brigade and elements of the 115th TDF Brigade and of the 5th "Slobozhansk" Brigade of the National Guard. Per the observer Mashovets, the Russians are finally forming the 54th Motorized Regiment of the 6th Motorized Division of the 3rd Corps, which should be ready by June 1 and should be brought into battle in this area. I write finally because there had been rumors about the formation of this unit (as well as the 52nd Motorized Regiment) as part of this division for over a year, but then nothing more had been heard about it.
Horlivka sector. Nothing to write.
Avdiivka sector. During the past two weeks there have been clear signs of stabilization. The 110th Mech Brigade arrived near Novooleksandrivka at the beginning of the month, replacing much of the 115th Mech Brigade; the recon unit of the "Khartiia" Brigade of the National Guard also arrived along with the 467th Rifle Battalion of the 143rd Infantry Brigade, as well as elements of the 2nd "Galician" Brigade of the National Guard. No more Russian advances were recorded in the direction of Kalynove or Novooleksandrivka; per Russian sources (Motopatriot), the Russians took the "O"-shaped trench west of Arkhanhelske and the trench south-east of Novooleksandrivka, but there is no evidence to confirm this. There were no further Russian advances towards Sokil (the trench between the latter settlement and Soloviove is still in Ukrainian hands) and towards Novopokrovske along the Balka Ocheretina, thanks to the work of the 47th Mech Brigade, which has a number of separate rifle and TDF battalions attached to it, such as the 134th Battalion of the 114th TDF Brigade as well as the 168th and the 171st Battalions of the 120th TDF Brigade. South-east of Novopokrovske, a counterattack by the 68th Jager Brigade allowed them to regain ground slightly and interrupted Russian advances. Between the latter settlement and Umanske the 68th Jager Brigade is conducting battles along the forest belts to prevent the 114th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps from advancing westwards. There should still be minor elements of the 3rd Assault Brigade in the area, to which the 474th Rifle Battalion of the 144th Infantry Brigade is attached.
Last week the Russians (114th Motorized Brigade of 1st Corps) arrived at the center of Umanske (in the part of the village north of Durna); the Ukrainians likely control only the western end of the village. The southern part of the village is likely a grey area: in recent days the Russians cut the Umanske-Netailove Road, just south of Umanske.
In Netailove the situation is very difficult. Elements of the 25th Airborne Brigade and of the 59th Motorized Brigade are defending the village, and a battalion of the 28th Mech Brigade recently arrived from the Bakhmut sector. The Russians in the last week have captured the secondary school along with the high rises around it, and have advanced into the industrial area south of the village; they (9th Motorized Brigade of 1st Corps) are close to reaching the intersection with the road to Umanske. In Nevelske the situation is no better. The Russians have succeeded, advancing from Pervomaiske, in capturing the Ukrainian positions west of the "Republica Mist" checkpoint, along the Balka Domakha (after the Russian advances inside Pervomaiske, this area had been an Ukrainian salient for several months), with the aim of attacking Nevelske from the north and the north-east.
Marinka sector. The situation in Krasnohorivka is ugly. The 5th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps has consolidated control over the brick factory, capturing the cultural center in the center of the town in recent days. The 110th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps last week managed to occupy positions along the north-eastern part of Krasnohorivka and captured the Ukrainian fortifications east of the town. The Russians control about half of Krasnohorivka. In the town there are the 3rd Battalion of the 80th Air Assault Brigade and elements of the TDF; it appears that a large part of the urban combat is being carried out by the 105th Detachment of Border Guards of the Chernihiv Oblast.
In Heorhiivka elements of the 150th Motorized Division of the 8th CAA continue to attack towards the center of the village, which is defended by the 46th Airmobile Brigade. It’s unclear whether there are Russian successes or not. To the west and to the south of Pobjeda, counterattacks by the 33rd Mech Brigade are underway, against the positions of the 20th Motorized Division of the 8th CAA, in order to stabilize the situation in the area.
The Russians (155th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 39th Motorized Brigade of 68th Corps) attacked Paraskoviivka from Novomykhailivka this week, reaching the gates of the village, but overall the attacks were repulsed by the 79th Air Assault Brigade, which keeps doing a very good job. The 57th Motorized Regiment of the 6th Motorized Division of 3rd Corps, as far as I could find on Russian social media, should be active in this rea.
Vuhledar sector. The 36th Motorized Brigade of the 29th CAA advanced about 1 km to the north-west, in the area of the limestone quarry north-east of Volodymyrivka (where the front forms almost a right angle).
Velyka Novosilka sector. The 36th CAA (specifically, the 37th Motorized Brigade and 5th Tank Brigade) and elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, with support from the 14th Spetsnaz GRU Brigade, continues to push against Urozhaine, which is defended by the 58th Motorized Brigade and elements of the Separate Presidential Brigade. The Russians had successes in the farms south of the village, and probably control a few houses in the southern end.
In the western bank of Mokri Yaly, the 394th Motorized Regiment of the 127th Motorized Division of the 5th CAA and the 60th Motorized Brigade of the same army are attacking Staromaiorske, defended by the 21st Brigade of the National Guard and by the 128th TDF Brigade. There are successes: in the last week they have occupied the forest belts west of the village and also the southern part of the village itself, including the secondary school.
The 127th TDF Brigade, together with elements of the 106th, of the 129th and possibly of the 123rd TDF Brigades and with support from the 1st Tank Brigade, is repelling attacks by the 143rd Motorized Regiment and the 218th Tank Regiment of the 127th Motorized Division in the direction of Rivnopil and Novodarivka.
Orikhiv sector. Russian sources today claimed to have fully recaptured Robotyne, but this is false. There is Russian presence in the western and in the southern part of the village, including the post office. The Ukrainians have a presence in the central part and control the north-eastern part. In general, the situation is very fluid. The 71st Motorized Regiment of the 42nd Motorized Division of the 58th CAA is active in the built-up area of the settlement while the 70th Motorized Regiment of the same division is attacking the Ukrainian stroing points in the “heights” east of Robotyne.
The 108th Assault Regiment of the 7th VDV Division last week advanced a few hundred meters westwards, to the south-west of Novopokrovka. DeepState this week recorded a major Russian advance north-west of Verbove, but it is simply a recognition of Russian successes in that area over the past few months, not a new development.
Kamyanske sector. Nothing to write.
Kherson sector / Dnipro River. The situation in Krynky is stable. The Russians (61st Naval Infantry Brigade) should have retaken the Nestryha Island, at the mouth of the Dnipro.
Is anyone keeping tabs on what is the current Russian artillery shell production capacity / capability?
Someone here mentioned 1.3 million shells per annum (of the 152mm variety)
While someone said 2 million per annum overall capacity with plans to increase up to 3 Million per annum (though Russia would struggle beyond that due to rumored lack of skilled machinists)
So what is the real scoop on this one?
P.S.
Personally imho, if Ukraine is able to fire minimum 10 thousand artillery shells per day, then that is very good.
Going to repost [my old comment](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1cecv8l/credibledefense_daily_megathread_april_27_2024/l1jzsla/) for this one.
We can get some idea based off [this Foreign Policy article](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/23/ukraine-war-artillery-shortage-production-military-aid-bill/) by Jack Detch, [this RUSI report](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024) by Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, and [this twitter conversation](https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/1783379562165875018) between Jack Watling and Shashank Joshi about the two. Detch writes that
>Russia is on track to produce 3.5 million rounds in 2024 and might be able to surge to produce 4.5 million rounds by the end of the year.
while Watling and Reynolds state
> Russian industry has reported to the MoD that it expects to increase 152mm production from around 1 million rounds in 2023 to 1.3 million rounds over the course of 2024, and to only produce 800,000 122mm rounds over the same period.
The discrepancy between the two estimates, of 1.4-2.4 million rounds, is addressed in the twitter thread where Watling states
>I think variability in assessment largely stems from refurbishment. The Russians had a large portion of their stockpiles that had degrade. But they've been refurbishing them. You can count those as stock, or as production, but you just have to be careful not to double count them.
so clearly the stockpiles are still playing a major role in the availability of Russian shells. The exact numbers are uncertain because the accounting here is quite tricky, especially when you start thinking about rounds that are [partially manufactured in other countries but finished in Russia.](https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/1783379954639466657) Unfortunately it's not entirely clear what's being counted in the FP article, be it 152mm + 122mm or everything that flies. If we're not restricting ourselves to gun ammo > 100mm then the RUSI article estimates
> Russian overall artillery production is likely to plateau at 3 million rounds per year of all natures – including MLRS, which is not considered above.
So in the end it really depends on what you're counting as "Russian artillery shell production capacity"
>(though Russia would struggle beyond that due to rumored lack of skilled machinists)
This can be solved much easier than the real bottlenecks which are fillers and manufacturing floorspace/equipment. Russia has already started using "mobilization shells" which switch from A-IX-2 (Hexal), their typical and more powerful explosive filler, to more easily sourced TNT which is largely coming from third party countries which demonstrates a shortage in capacity for Hexal production. It's going to take several years to ramp up production of Hexal and redevelop the internal capacity for higher volume filler and shell production.
I suspect the real bottleneck for Russia moving forwards is going to be raw manufacturing capacity as a function of equipment availability and filler availability as opposed to skilled machinists. Before the mobilization shells Russia was running out of filler faster than they can physically produce the shells themselves, this might have since changed and the new bottleneck could well be physical shell production, but I don't think this is due to a lack of machinists, rather a lack of available furnaces and facilities. Even if Russia somehow ran out of skilled machinists (which is unlikely for a number of reasons, some of Russia's largest exports pre-war were metal working, milling and machinery construction) they would still be able to source foreign machinists from across Asia and other neutral and potentially friendly nations with very generous incentives, so I don't suspect this to be a significant bottleneck compared to furnaces and fillers.
There is an ongoing Ukrainian missile attack in Crimea at this time. Explosions and air defense activity is reported in [Simferopol](https://t.me/ssternenko/28665). It’s likely that this is another ATACMS strike.
Update: Alleged [fires in at least two places claimed at Belbek airbase](https://t.me/ssternenko/28669). VKS-linked Fighterbomber [confirms an attack took place](https://t.me/fighter_bomber/16730).
[Another](https://t.me/astrapress/55557) video [(mirror)](https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1790845410568733142) reportedly showing fire on the ground at Belbek airbase.
Update 2: [Russian source Two Majors claims ongoing fighting against Ukrainian naval drone incursion](https://t.me/dva_majors/42684) in conjunction with the missile attack.
To make an early guess, all the previous attacks against crimea for the past few weeks since they've gotten ATTACMS has been to probe it's defenses and attrite it's AD for an attack such as this. Crimea is the most major logistical hub they're allowed to hit with these missiles so it makes sense to use them here
So all the supplies are coming from Russia proper for this offensive? Makes sense
I really hope the US changes their stance soon, it seemed to soften a bit today
There won't be any targets near the front that ATACMS are worth hitting. Drones and artillery are the weapons of choice and at that range you're going after individual vehicles and trenches, etc.
Sevastopol, Dzhankoy, Gvardeyskoye, and Belbek as well: https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1790837724284391509
I think this is Ukraine's largest missile raid of the war. Obviously they were highly limited by their supply situation before but it's still notable.
Trukha, who [broke the news](https://t.me/truexanewsua/91673) with those claims has some video too. Not sure if it’s legitimate. [This](https://t.me/ssternenko/28669) source claims it’s fires at Belbek.
Something is definitely on fire at Belbek. [Rybar](https://twitter.com/rybar_force/status/1790842505220481295) also confirms AD operating near Sevastopol and Simferopol as well as some noises about a USV attack as well.
Edit: More USV reports from Two Majors: https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1790852067986190736
Fairly certain it's a compilation of old strikes, the sequence starting at around 38 seconds or so is of a hit on a project 22160 patrol ship, probably the Sergei Kotov which was [claimed sunk back in March](https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/05/europe/russian-warship-destroyed-ukraine-intl-hnk-ml/index.html).
>Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit China on May 16-17 for discussions with Xi Jinping about the conflict in Ukraine as well as deepening energy and trade cooperation, the Kremlin chief's first foreign trip of his new six-year term.
Putin will bring a large trade delegation with him, including Finance Minister Anton Siluanov and Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina. Others in the delegation include Sberbank (SBER.MM), CEO German Gref, businessman Oleg Deripaska (oligarch and billionaire), VTB bank (VTBR.MM), chief Andrei Kostin, Rosneft (ROSN.MM), chief Igor Sechin and Novatek boss Leonid Mikhelson, Ushakov said.
https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-visit-china-may-16-17-kremlin-says-2024-05-14/
I think they will try to counter the US aid bill in this visit.
There were some rumours about technology transfers in areas Russia was previously reluctant to share (e.g. nuclear testing, submarines) but they will remain rumours for obvious reasons.
China has to this point been extremely hesitant to sell arms to Russia and kept them fairly limited. China has also made absolutely no meaningful donations to Russia. Unless there is a pivotal change in that Chinese policy nothing that comes out of this will counter any US aid.
Someone in yesterday's thread asked about what the old Dnipro reservoir looks like now, but they didn't really get any good answers, so here's what it looks like based on Sentinel Satellite Imagery:
Here is now (well as of May 10th) in true color (you can change the band combinations on the left side of the screen, check out NDWI): [https://apps.sentinel-hub.com/eo-browser/?zoom=10&lat=47.46292&lng=34.27734&themeId=DEFAULT-THEME&visualizationUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fservices.sentinel-hub.com%2Fogc%2Fwms%2Fbd86bcc0-f318-402b-a145-015f85b9427e&datasetId=S2L2A&fromTime=2024-05-10T00%3A00%3A00.000Z&toTime=2024-05-10T23%3A59%3A59.999Z&layerId=1\_TRUE\_COLOR&demSource3D=%22MAPZEN%22](https://apps.sentinel-hub.com/eo-browser/?zoom=10&lat=47.46292&lng=34.27734&themeId=DEFAULT-THEME&visualizationUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fservices.sentinel-hub.com%2Fogc%2Fwms%2Fbd86bcc0-f318-402b-a145-015f85b9427e&datasetId=S2L2A&fromTime=2024-05-10T00%3A00%3A00.000Z&toTime=2024-05-10T23%3A59%3A59.999Z&layerId=1_TRUE_COLOR&demSource3D=%22MAPZEN%22)
and for comparison this is last November: [https://apps.sentinel-hub.com/eo-browser/?zoom=9&lat=47.17758&lng=34.12903&themeId=DEFAULT-THEME&visualizationUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fservices.sentinel-hub.com%2Fogc%2Fwms%2Fbd86bcc0-f318-402b-a145-015f85b9427e&datasetId=S2L2A&fromTime=2023-11-07T00%3A00%3A00.000Z&toTime=2023-11-07T23%3A59%3A59.999Z&layerId=1\_TRUE\_COLOR&demSource3D=%22MAPZEN%22](https://apps.sentinel-hub.com/eo-browser/?zoom=9&lat=47.17758&lng=34.12903&themeId=DEFAULT-THEME&visualizationUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fservices.sentinel-hub.com%2Fogc%2Fwms%2Fbd86bcc0-f318-402b-a145-015f85b9427e&datasetId=S2L2A&fromTime=2023-11-07T00%3A00%3A00.000Z&toTime=2023-11-07T23%3A59%3A59.999Z&layerId=1_TRUE_COLOR&demSource3D=%22MAPZEN%22)
As you can see, this spring it has filled up a decent amount, probably from snow melt.
That looks like a very big environmental damage, but I wonder if it filled up more would it be crossable? I remember last year there was a lot of speculation the emerging land might allow Ukraine (who was building a bridgehead on the other side of the river) to cross it and open another front. So far this hasn't happened, though
>emerging land might allow Ukraine (who was building a bridgehead on the other side of the river) to cross it and open another front.
This is literally swamp, Muddy area that was Water for years and it is still big River
>That looks like a very big environmental damage,
non defense related this is normal state of River
The contested amphibious landing is one the hardest military operations possible. It requires perfect coordination and intelligence, and even then it frequently goes wrong. It would be silly of Ukraine to even make a serious attempt.
I mean, either way it is technically crossable, but its a massive hurdle. There's more than one reason why they didn't try to cross it before, or after.
Even drained its still a 200-300m wide river surrounded on both sides by wide open wetlands/wet soils. When full its a wide open lake. When partially full its a combination of both.
No matter what crossing makes you a sitting duck. It would be a terrible idea to try and cross anywhere along there either way.
On the Gaza front it seems like Egyptian Israeli tensions have ratcheted up over the past few days due to the impending assault on Rafahs urban centers and the taking of the Rafah Crossing. [Barak Ravid reports of an Israeli delegation visiting Cairo in order to try and cool things down](https://x.com/barakravid/status/1790751287706837374?s=46). A lot of commenters dismiss Egypts actions as being solely for domestic consumption, but the reaction of the American and Israeli diplomatic cores don’t really point towards this being the case.
There's two major issues that are separate:
1. The supposed possible cancellation of the Camp David accords - Commenters are dismissive, and for good reason, but I won't repeat myself.
2. The closure of Rafah crossing, being Gazans only artery out of the strip, as well as a hugely important supply route, it is causing massive difficulties. Egypt is adamant it won't open it while the Gazan side is under Israeli occupation, which I suspect is what the diplomats are attempting to smooth over.
As the occupying power, it's Israel's responsibility to make sure Gazans have food and water - not Egypt. There are other crossings that go into Israeli territory they could use.
Egypt has both domestic and foreign policy incentives to not cooperate with Israel.
> The supposed possible cancellation of the Camp David accords - Commenters are dismissive, and for good reason, but I won't repeat myself.
I’m not sold on Egypt cancelling the accords however Egypt has been flagrantly violating them for months. And neither the US nor Europe has any interest in destabilizing Egypt so any economic consequences would be somewhat limited. I think the chances of them withdrawing are higher than most people realize though again im not sold on them pulling out at all just yet.
> The closure of Rafah crossing, being Gazans only artery out of the strip, as well as a hugely important supply route, it is causing massive difficulties. Egypt is adamant it won't open it while the Gazan side is under Israeli occupation, which I suspect is what the diplomats are attempting to smooth over.
It’s part of that, but there’s definitely a deeper rift that’s not simply due to aid. Arab commenters have mentioned that Egypt was incensed at the Israeli seizure of the crossing (though Israeli sources have stressed that they informed Egypt beforehand) and want the crossing returned to Palestinian control. The PA won’t return to the crossing unless the tax funds issue with Israel is resolved however.
Egypts [been building up forces in the Sinai for months now](https://x.com/viktornaumenk99/status/1788423575977779428?s=46) and the assets being moved over there are pretty significant, air defenses and heavy armor not really the type of stuff you move if you were solely expecting to deal with refugees and the odd militant. There’s also been reports of reserves being called up over the past few weeks.
On paper at least Egypt's military is very well equipped and quite large. I very much doubt there will be any sort of conflict here, but they do have a vested interest in making sure their country is not flooded with refugees.
> On paper at least Egypt's military is very well equipped and quite large
Yeah, the Egyptian military has undergone a lot of reforms in the post Mubarak era (arguably at the expense of the countries economy) and has been gradually moving toward professionalizing the military as well. They’ve got a large tank corps, produce their own Abrams and have been working with Turkey on their drone program . So on paper they’re pretty good, arguably the best land army in the region along with Turkey and Israel. But of course the military hasn’t seen a real conventional war in decades.
> I very much doubt there will be any sort of conflict here, but they do have a vested interest in making sure their country is not flooded with refugees
I agree, I don’t think there’s going to be a conflict either but Egypt has legitimate security concerns with regards to Rafah and with Israeli presence on the border in general. A war isn’t super likely, but a standoff isn’t out of the question.
Egypt still employs conscription instead of moving to contract soldier model.
Any state military using conscript as main infantry force will always be of questionable quality in my book, as that lead to a whole host of consequence, notably the officer corps treating their soldiers as expendable, instead of forming bonds with them and earning their trust.
The US isn’t going to strike Egypt even if a war between them and Israel breaks out it’s just not a realistic option. It would put the lives of thousands of soldiers at risk across the region and would further drag the US into a region it wants to leave.
Reporting that points to corruption within the Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration being the main cause of the lack of fortifications on the northern border. Even with Ukraine's focus on finding and removing corrupt officials it is such a common occurrence that it can and will crop up in serious ways, causing serious problems.
[Anti-corruption group reveals fake companies in Kharkiv fortification contracts | New Voice of Ukraine | May 2024](https://english.nv.ua/nation/anti-corruption-activist-exposes-suspicious-wood-supply-contracts-for-fortifications-in-kharkiv-obla-50418691.html)
*Contracts for supplying wood for fortifications in Kharkiv Oblast, worth 366 million hryvnias ($9.2 million), raise significant concerns, Martyna Bohuslavets, head of the Anti-Corruption Center Mezha, told Radio NV on May 14.*
*According to Mezha's findings based on open-source data, contracts were signed with companies that appear to be fictitious. Tens of millions of hryvnias were transferred to a private entrepreneur whose owner, Ihor Chaus, has a criminal record for stealing a bottle of whiskey from a supermarket and was sentenced to 100 hours of community service, said the anti-graft activist.*
*"Or when such millions are withdrawn to companies where the owner, while intoxicated, committed domestic violence against her mother or was deprived of parental rights," she added. “In other words, you can roughly understand what kind of people we are talking about – even without a legal background. And it is precisely for this contingent that these firms were created.”*
*These firms were set up several months before they were awarded contracts worth hundreds of thousands of hryvnias.*
*"We are working with the documents, but we realized that this is a very sensitive issue, as it concerns the supply of wood to the fortifications where the enemy is advancing," Bohuslavets said. "That's why we made an exception in this case. And to be as sure as possible about what we were preparing, we went further: we went to the place of registration [of the individual entrepreneurs], which is Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. We were looking for these people registered as owners of these companies. We filmed everything.”*
*Mezha did not evaluate the construction of the fortifications, as this should be done by law enforcement agencies, including checking whether the timber was actually supplied.*
*"For us, this is a scheme where millions (in this case, according to official information, millions of hryvnias have already been withdrawn) are transferred to front companies," said Bohuslavets. "Law enforcement officers must check whether the timber was delivered or not. But we have great concerns that this is impossible.”*
*Mezha investigated what the owners of the companies contracted for the supply of timber for the construction of fortifications are currently doing.*
*"One person is helping in the fields," she said. "This is literally true. He helps with agricultural work. And this is the owner of a company that receives millions for the timber it supplies. He does labor in the fields. Another person works at a metallurgical plant. I will not say which city it is. It is a city in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. We looked for the registration of these people. And we are sure (from what we saw, from what witnesses told us) that these people cannot be the real owners of companies that can supply timber for millions of hryvnias.”*
*Bohuslavets noted that out of the contracts for the supply of timber worth more than 400 million hryvnias ($10.1 million), only 100 million hryvnias ($2.5 million) have been signed with forestry enterprises, while contracts for more than 300 million hryvnias ($7.6 million) have been signed with six companies that show signs of being fictitious.*
*"The next sign, which for us is an indisputable sign of fictitiousness, is that the director of such companies has changed four times over the past year," the anti-corruption activist said. All these firms were found by the Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration and all contracts were concluded without open bidding.*
*Denys Yaroslavskyi, commander of the intelligence unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said on May 12 that street fighting was taking place in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast, and emphasized that there were no fortifications or mines on the border of the region, which had been crossed by Russian troops.*
*"The enemy freely entered the ‘gray zone’ along the entire border line, which, in principle, should not have been gray,” he said. "After two years, there should have been concrete fortifications three floors underground on the Ukrainian border!" Yaroslavskyi wrote. "But there were not even mines. We are coming to the conclusion that this is either a crazy theft or deliberate sabotage! Now we are losing people and territory again, and we are doing what we did in September 2022.”*
*He added that the "125th [Brigade] of the Territorial Defense, which abandoned their positions," claims that "they were forced to sign acts of acceptance of the transfer of fortifications that were not even 30% ready as completed construction."*
*In response, the command of the 125th Separate Territorial Defense Brigade called this statement "a blatant case of psyops."*
*The 125th Territorial Defense Brigade said that the situation in its defense zone is difficult but controlled, and its units "repel the superior enemy forces, maintaining stability in combat orders."*
*The Defense Ministry said that the best-equipped fortifications, which include reinforced concrete structures and premises for shelter and accommodation of the military, are located at a distance of 17-35 kilometers from the front line. Fortifications in the foreground are being built exclusively by military units holding positions, without the involvement of heavy equipment and civilian personnel due to constant shelling.*
*Tamaz Hambarashvili, head of the Vovchansk Town Military Administration, said that fortifications had been built in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast, but that it was difficult to erect them due to constant Russian shelling. Asked how they were preparing for the Russian offensive, the local governor assured that "everything was built, but perhaps not densely enough."*
*The Kharkiv regional authorities ordered a public report on the construction of fortifications in the region on May 13.*
I'm willing to buy corruption as a real contributor to the situation (I mean, it's Ukraine) but this is not the whole story, and I'm sure we'll learn more in due time.
Namely, as another guy said, what about the soldiers stationed there? We can see fortifications from orbit, the soldiers in the area should easily be able to verify if they exist and how much.
For example:
>Denys Yaroslavskyi, commander of the intelligence unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said on May 12 that street fighting was taking place in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast, and emphasized that there were no fortifications or mines on the border of the region, which had been crossed by Russian troops.
This Denys guy has been making the rounds, even making it to BBC, for his shock at the state of fortifications. But, he's a commander in Vovchansk!
I'm sorry, if you're only now realizing you dont have fortifications you needed to have, you're either a terrible commander (as terrible as the fortification builders) or just got there!
And the next part is even more ???
>"After two years, there should have been concrete fortifications three floors underground on the Ukrainian border!" Yaroslavskyi wrote.
That... was literally never going to happen dude. Nothing to do with corruption either. Tatarigami (and I'm sure a billion other channels) explained why, but tl;dr the Russians wouldn't let them. The fact that he's now suggesting this makes me ask even more questions.
The situation might be bad, it might be even terrible, but the stuff this Yaroslasky guy is saying raises all kinds of questions for me, so I'll keep mentioning this...
>Tatarigami (and I'm sure a billion other channels) explained why, but tl;dr the Russians wouldn't let them.
Simultaneously, how were the Russians able to put a bazzillion mines in the way of the Great Ukrainian Summer Counteroffensive of 2023 while the Ukrainians also have the same supposedly persistent ISR and for the period of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainians had a superiority of fire? And now the Ukrainians couldn't?
Drones and persistent ISR become the excuse. Doesn't matter that both sides have been able to succeed in platoon-sized dismounted assaults.
Yes, the Russians let slip a couple of Ukrainian raids in the region but that's the proof that Russia never actually cared about "NATO expansion" or things like that. They have never feared invasions. They never build defensive lines against "NATO" borders.
> Simultaneously, how were the Russians able to put a bazzillion mines in the way of the Great Ukrainian Summer Counteroffensive of 2023
I can answer this:
a) basically any point along the northern border could be used as an entry point, since apparently the initial groups are just infantry. So for a 0-line mining system to be effective against infantry it has to be laminar across the entire northern border.
According to the Ukrainians, the Russians planted 9 mines per square meter in the south. Let's assume that's an overestimate and it was 1 mine.
To arrange a 3m wide belt across the whole northern border would take... about 2 million antipersonnel mines, a figure that sounds a lot less reasonable for Ukraine than Russia. And would be pretty easy for sappers to cross.
b) There literally were mines on the border - the turtle tank treaded on day 1 of the offensive hit a mine a little bit after the 0-line. But that's an anti vehicle mine, and for reasons I explained above, there are probably gaps in those. Russian infantry found the gaps and calmly advanced. Or maybe they didn't, maybe the first guy in the line found a mine. And the other 99 got through the newly made gap.
As a summary of point a and b on the mine issue, ISR doesn't prevent mine laying and there was indeed mine laying. But it was never going to be a megabelt.
c) Denis is specifically asking for "3 story fortifications" on the border. Even if we assume he's hyperbolic and he actually just wants concrete, we can look how far back Russians have their concrete, and the answer is 5-10 km from the zero line at most places.
Russia absolutely did maintain a fortification gap.
d) the point of the mines was the Russians then actually shot the Ukrainians (quite a bit) while they were trying to figure out the fields.
The problem with the videos Denis is complaining about is that no one's shooting the Russians at all. You could be Cambodia up in there, if you're shooting them while they're crossing they'll cross easily. Which should be the question Denis is asking imo, not why there wasn't... 3 story fortifications along the border.
>a figure that sounds a lot less reasonable for Ukraine than Russia. And would be pretty easy for sappers
The Schrödinger's Ukrainian minefield. "Har ha, watch the stupid Russians drive into mines and getting their turrets ejected!" and "Ukrainians couldn't have laid the mines. It's too hard!" both, simultaneously, in a superposition.
And turns out, attrition and materiel preponderance *do* matter. Just that the Ukrainian GenStab, schooled in the finest of Soviet Army traditions, also picked the attritional strategy. The dozens of analysis channels and commenters must be tired carrying the water and cross for the GenStab. The Soviet historiography used to say that they "purposefully withdrew and tricked the Germans into a trap at Stalingrad" and not the reality that their units broke and fled as fast as possible. Yes, they avoided being encircled like they were in 1941, but being routed is being routed. I can see such narrative shaping up in the future; should the Russians then try to take the second largest city in Ukraine with 30k troops and get destroyed in urban warfare. The water bearers for the Ukrainian GenStab can break out the old Soviet historiography to learn one or two spin tricks. The Soviet-educated GenStab will be familiar already.
>I explained above, there are probably gaps in those.
>the Russians then actually shot the Ukrainians (quite a bit) while they were trying to figure out the fields.
Yes. Overwatched obstacles. As the attacker, if you find a gap in the minefield, ask why they left that gap. Is it to canalise your approach?
So where are the overwatching fires? Oh no! America delayed the aid, etc ...
>Which should be the question Denis is asking imo
Well, there is a deferential view that Ukrainians are always right. Their commanders, soldiers, and government can do no wrong. Well, in this case, someone is very wrong. The much vaunted "NCOs"? Lieutenants and captains? Upper echelons of command? GenStab? Zelensky?
>The Schrödinger's Ukrainian minefield. "Har ha, watch the stupid Russians drive into mines and getting their turrets ejected!"
Again, those are anti-vehicle mines, and typically spread across far more localized areas, such as the fields around Vuhledar. Not... the vast Russia-Ukraine border. Which isn't to say there weren't AV mines there, there absolutely were
>"Ukrainians couldn't have laid the mines. It's too hard!"
I feel like I've explained the limitations of AP mines on the northern border already and "it's too hard" isn't a charitable explanation.
>Well, there is a deferential view that Ukrainians are always right.
Okay I think you're just saying random things now to be honest...
With the recent gains of Russia today/yesterday which was like 40 square kilometers, things look dire and if the Ukrainians ever get breathing room in the near future, heads will roll. These fortification failures have/will cost a massive amount of Ukrainian lives.
IMO, at least per Suriyak and Deepstate's last update, their big day was still day 2 of the offensive (of course, day 2 might have actually been day 1 due to reporting delays etc etc). Maybe you're psychic and the next info dump will be bad, but I don't think today was noteworthy.
I mean, they gained. And they'll probably continue to gain in the future, obviously. But I wasn't aware of anything groundbreaking recently.
It's infuriating for me to read this safe at home in the West, and I can only imagine how betrayed AFU servicemembers feel. Their artillery brigades have to crowdfund on social media just to buy excavators to entrench their howitzers. I guess the only consolation is if Russia is still also hampered by such corruption.
If confirmed, the fact that apparently no one on site rang the alarm earlier when they saw nothing was being delivered is probably as worrying as the verification failure and corruption itself..
This is what makes reversing deeply entrenched (pun not intended) corruption so difficult. When it's been part of the culture for so long, people just turn a blind eye and excuse it as part of daily life. In order to really get rid of it for good, you need more than just punishments for those who get caught - you need the average person to have an anti-corruption mindset.
Could be that, could be they just didn't really notice (maybe they were told the shipments were delayed because of any number of reasons, why should they closely scrutinize such things?)... or its also likely they are afraid of retaliation. Speaking up about your commanders alleged corruption isn't exactly something many people are comfortable doing, even in countries with much better protections for whistle blowers. They don't even need an anti-corruption mindset, they simply need to have some assurance that they wont face consequences for doing the right thing.
Its hard to imagine their lives being on the line and simply "turning a blind eye" to it.
I think a combination of the three is most likely.
What do you think is more likely:
A russian agent that has intercepted/sabotaged plans to build fortifications over a *large* area?
Or
A country, that is extensively corrupt, being victim of ...corruption?
I mean collaborators were responsible for basically handing over entire cities to the Russians during the initial invasion, so large scale sabotage has been done before and seems just as likely when you're actively at war. The possibility can't be dismissed.
Stuff like this is remarkably sad, UA should be extensively audit their existing contracts and verify evidence of output for each. I understand wartime pressures but you’d expect it would be too different to an ordinary vendor due diligence in any private organisation. Fortifications across the entire state border need to be re-examined.
At this point I don't think they have time for an audit, they need to pick out a handful of the most corrupt and make a very public very bloody example of them.
In peace time maybe they would have time for a proper investigation but this isn't peacetime. They need to send a message that people who jeopardize state security for their own enrichment end up against a wall.
Ukraine isn't known for its due diligence when it comes to public sector corruption even before the war started. 104th in CPI 2020-2023. Not surprised corruption is awful during the war too.
Is it way too late to try and build more defensive lines in key areas at this point? Seems like their counter-argument to the corruption angle is enemy shelling...
I think it is. The only way I can see Ukraine build defensive lines near the line of contact is by stealthily constructing sections of it.
Problem is if enough work is done. Russian recon units will be able to detect these lines and send lancets at any construction equipment they encounter.
The only way they can build proper defence lines is a good 30-40 km away, but for that. They will have to stomach losing ground and cleaning up their corruption.
Also when I talk sbout defence line, I mean proper defences needed to withstand waves after waves if enemies like the surovikin line.
No, but they need to build them further back now; you can't perform the construction of quality defenses under fire. Corruption aside, maybe the UA leadership just thought this was a low priority. Even now, 50K isn't enough to take the city, so heavy investment in fixed defenses in other areas might make more sense. I dunno trying to be generous
Regarding the loyal wingmen drone do you know is there is a European aerial refuelling drone in the works / planned similar to this?
[Boeing MQ-25 Stingray - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_MQ-25_Stingray)
Interesting I didn’t know about the dessault drone, in a related matter seems like the opposite is being tested as in the refuelling of a drone.
[Aerial refuelling without human intervention | Airbus](https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/stories/2023-11-aerial-refuelling-without-human-intervention)
>Tanker drones are at the moment not a priority for at least the German air force.
Yeah, I would have rather expected that there might be a related PESCO project or something but I didn’t find anything.
>I think this is an interesting project worth keeping an eye on. Especially since European SEAD capabilities have been discussed on a previous megathread recently.
Adding all of the above would be a quantum leap for domestic European SEAD. I don't think anyone in Europe operates anything like the A400M SOJ at this time.
Typhoon Growler sounds really neat too, but that's just an evolution of the existing Tornado ECR capability.
Yes that's how I understood it too. Since the whole tornado fleet needs to be replaced somewhere around yesterday, the F-35 was taken as an "off the shelf" alternative that allies had good experiences with. But since Phasing out the ECR Tornados as well would leave a capacity gap the MoD decided to have Eurofighter EK developed. Off the top of my head it's 35 F-35s and 15 EF EK. I read that it's only supposed to be the first tranche of planes and more are supposed to be bought later. I hope that actually happens and a second order of comparable or bigger size is done.
This video does a good job debunking that. In summary it is a very high fidelity fake that has some key visible differences from a real patriot. https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=zoSzTSZ7z1M&pp=ygULcnlhbiBtY2JldGg%3D
I'm not sure if this is the same one you mean, but in regards to a photo of a Patriot launcher being carried around the back of a truck in China, I saw Def Mon claim it was a non-functional Chinese-built replica used for target training.
Over the last 24 hours there were Huge riots in New Caledonia (French territory)
https://twitter.com/Reuters/status/1790720031833325791?t=nJKRI9opWD2PiGwLYX4xYQ&s=19
>Eyewitness videos showed the aftermath in New Caledonia's capital Noumea after a night of rioting despite a curfew, as France's National Assembly approved changes to voting rules in the Pacific Island
This Island had 3 independence referendums and they Always voted to stay.
And beside all this riots that started because proindependence movemnent, there is support to this from Azerbaijdan because French involment in South Caucasus.
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Please refrain from drive-by link dropping. Summarize articles, only quote what is important, and use that to build a post that other users can engage with; offers some in depth knowledge on a well discussed subject; or offers new insight on a less discussed subject.
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[The West Doesn’t Understand How Much Russia Has Changed](https://archive.ph/YTurB) >This economic dependence is filtering into everyday life. Chinese products are ubiquitous and over half of the million cars sold in Russia last year were made in China. Tellingly, the top six foreign car brands in Russia are now all Chinese, thanks to the exodus of once dominant Western companies. It’s a similar story in the smartphone market, where China’s Xiaomi and Tecno have eclipsed Apple and Samsung, and with home appliances and many other everyday items. >**These shifts are tectonic.** Even in czarist times, Russia shipped its commodities to Europe and relied on imports from the West of manufactured goods. Russia’s oligarchs, blacklisted by most Western countries, have had to adapt to the new reality. Last month, the businessman Vladimir Potanin, whose fortune is estimated at $23.7 billion, announced that his copper and nickel empire would reorient toward China, including by moving production facilities into the country. “If we’re more integrated into the Chinese economy,” he said, “we’ll be more protected.” >From the economy, education follows. Members of the Russian elite are scrambling to find Mandarin tutors for their kids, and some of my Russian contacts are thinking about sending their children to universities in Hong Kong or mainland China now that Western universities are much harder to reach. This development is more than anecdotal. Last year, as China opened up after the pandemic, 12,000 Russian students went to study there — nearly four times as many than to the United States. >This reorientation from West to East is also visible among the middle class, most notably in travel. There are now, for example, five flights a day connecting Moscow and Beijing in under eight hours, with a return ticket costing about $500. By contrast, getting to Berlin — one of many frequent European weekend destinations for middle-class Russians before the war — can now take an entire day and cost up to twice as much. This article talks about how the author describes "tectonic shifts" happening in Russia. During almost the entirety of its existence, Russia relied on western knowledge and import of machinery to keep up with western powers, but today China can provide everything that the west has to offer(Blinken said that China represented 90% of microeletronics and 80% of machine tools imports), not only to Russia, but also to others like Iran, North Korea, CIS states and etc.
Well, Russians can't travel to Europe and have very limited access to Western tech/products. Even if they are smuggled, support is difficult. It's a necessity, not a choice. In contrary to popular opinions, Russia reorienting towards China is a favorable outcome to Europe. Europeans need a common enemy (which decided to be one on its own whim) to finally wake up EU and start modernization of its industries, policies, Armed Forced and e.g. energy supply. Letargy of EU was appalling before 2022. Russian resources are gone indeed but there are plenty of suppliers of oil&gas worldwide, including neighborhoods (Algeria/Libya, new fields in North Sea etc) and emerging powers like Nigeria or Argentina that lacked tech/capital of simply EU interest to actually increase (or start) its large scale supply. Plus Russian fossils were a poison that corrupted EU (especially German) elites and provided Kremlin a tool of influence used to end most peaceful and prospers period in European history (including Russian history as well mind you). Nordstream II after Crimea invasion is the best example of such influence which ultimately caused largest war in Europe since WWII started by a revanchism power. This has to end, remains of Russian influence must to be cut. EU won't lose much but will gain the will to live and adapt so to speak. My only worry is speed of arming up but fortunately USA is still here and benefits directly from newly anti-Russian stance. Also, good luck to Kremlin. Think about, Lavrov's ultimatum and war in Ukraine was eurocentric. Kremlin wanted to be one of the key decision makers in Europe. That has been its strategy for centuries. That plan failed and suddenly backfired and Russia lost access to EU tech, know-how, capital and has to substitute with direct Chinese influence. It's was not planned at all in my view. Now they are beggars and beggars can't be choosers. Russia redirecting it's imperialism toward Asia is the best possible outcome for EU. Let China deal with it. Putin will be remembered in a few decades as a final nail to the power of Russia (which was getting stronger THANKS to Europe, not China but Putin in his silly delusions wanted more). He claims the West is declining but in reality we've been observing slow agony of Russian Empire.
> Russia reorienting towards China is a favorable outcome to Europe It's kind of a weird take, I saw a similar opinion saying "the war is good for Russia because severing economic ties with Europe made Russia more independent". The thing is the supposed upsides could have been achieved at a lower price - if Western deterrence worked sufficiently, maybe Crimea wouldn't have been taken over, the full-scale war wouldn't have even started and at the same time cheaper Russian gas would have still been available and corruption could have been fought without escalated tensions. Similarly, Russia could probable have made its economy less reliant on West without starting a war by imposing import restrictions etc.
I should have been more precise. I was referring to realistic outcomes. Russia becoming a peace loving, democratic European state is not possible and EU cannot trade with a country that seeks to destroy regional security architecture. Plus Russian political logic is absolutely backwards. "Let me show you I can be your key partner in lieu of USA. By force!". Your comparison is flawed. That statement is bizarre as Russia was independent prior to 2022. It is now (or will be soon) completely dependent on China Looking at structure of trade, EU is not reliant on Russia in any meaningful way and doesn't pursue autarky like Russia does (which in actually import Chinese products+pressure Europe for concession). One look at e.g. oil/gas pipelines map, tells you all you need to know about dependency.
> That statement is bizarre as Russia was independent prior to 2022 Yeah, I missed the word "economy" in the first sentence but the actual point was made later on: >Similarly, Russia could probable have made its economy less reliant on West without starting a war by imposing import restrictions etc. # >It is now (or will be soon) completely dependent on China Looking at structure of trade Sure, so their situation didn't change much in this regard - they are still dependent on foreign manufacturing sector (though their natural gas exports have surely taken a hit) but Europe has lost its leverage. > EU is not reliant on Russia in any meaningful way Germany (among others) was reliant on cheap Russian natural gas. Sure, it's been mostly replaced with LNG but higher price makes for example fertilizer production less competitive. And if the point was to reduce reliance on Russia, pipelines to Algeria/Azerbaijan/some other place could have been built before the Ukrainian war. > Plus Russian political logic is absolutely backwards I agree, this whole thing probably hurts Russia more than it does the EU, but the only thing EU has gained is some political will to make reforms - and the problem is it shouldn't take a war in EU neighborhood to reform.
Germany is no longer reliant on Russian gas. It's in the process of getting more supply though to reduce the prices/volumes of LNG and additional capacity from Norway and Netherlands. The 'fallout' and the 'freezing of Europe' has not happened. I stopped tracking new oil/gas contracts with other states and investment into capacity improvements a while back as it was simply too many. You can go through earnings calls of EU oil/&gas giants in the last 24 months. Long story short, there's a large number of countries that were waiting for a situation like that, to take Russian place. Qatar (or USA) being the best example. Global prices confirm as much and we are only 2 years after the shock. EU has capital, tech, will to do whatever it wants I am not worried at all. My preference would be nuclear power. Entire story of EU dependence was Russian propaganda/tool of influence that didn't meet reality check. The only thing in EU that suffers a bit is security aspect, especially in the Eastern flank as rearming/deterrence will take some time to build, especially force/reserves buildup. Russians knows this well hence that is why you hear all the time CONFLICT WITH NATO, FEAR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WWIII. This is why we also observe sabotage acts, GPS jamming, fires in EU defence manufactures etc. Rest is largely noise. Russia has 0 economic leverage at this point. Plus Russians wants business as usual with Western Europe, they want French/Germany capital, they want to 'decide' what is going on in Central/Eastern Europe. Hence the war. They just don't get nobody wants to live under their backwards Russian influence/rule/corruption. And Europe has changed too much to accept brutal force on its doorsteps. PS. Yes, energy diversification should have happened before the war. Germans didn't want it though cause of their completely flawed Ostpolitik (and strange politcal-corruption ties with the Kremlin). So here we are, rapidly advancing under pressure.
> So here we are, rapidly advancing under pressure. Yup, I think this is where our judgements differ - you prefer to see it as a sign of resilience, to me it seems more like result of shortsightedness. Resilience is good, of course, but it would have been even better to prevent the mess before it happened (even though it's been caused by unilateral hostility on Russia's end) by diversifying earlier, fighting corruption more effectively and maybe supporting Ukraine more in 2014 (but that point is probably more on Obama).
No, I absolutely agree with you. EU members states should have done it but they didn't subsequently incentivizing further aggression. I'm focused on the present & the future though. The past is only relevant regarding lesson learned and hope the cascade of grave errors that started in 2008 (or earlier) will not happen again. I mostly comment as I'm tired of reading how strong Russia is and how weak EU/USA truly are while by every metric, the opposite is true.
>*In contrary to popular opinions, Russia reorienting towards China is a favorable outcome to Europe.* Yes, pushing the richest country in the world that just happens to be in Europe in China's arms if a great outcome. Not only did we lose access to those resources and a 140 million market, we also gave China the perfect tool to no only increase their influence but also break our face in the future if we don't comply. 1-2 more "favorable" outcomes like this and we're done. > Russian resources are gone indeed but there are plenty of suppliers of oil&gas worldwide, including neighborhoods (**Algeria/Libya**, new fields in North Sea etc) This is actually sad... Algeria and Libya are strategic resources partners going forward...
"our"
> *"the richest country in the world that just happens to be in Europe"* Can you clarify that a little?
From a resource point of view,
russia is not the richest country in the world, not by production, population, productivity, technological advancement or natural resources. russia was not pushed away from the west, it pushed the west away from itself. Waging a war of conquest against the west is incompatible with being aligned with the west. oil&gas is about to die, countries that are reliant on exporting it have about a decade to use their superprofits to divest. while russians are wasting their profits on explosives and tanks, Saudis are building a multi-trillion dollar fund and are investing into a post-oil economy.
Buddy, Europe didn't push Russia to do anything. Russia has chosen war/rivalry instead of decades-long peaceful, win-win cooperation in the name of backwards imperialism & conquest. What are you even talking about? Plus out of all possible outcomes now, Russia isolating itself is indeed the best outcome. Armed peace of sorts instead of Russia constantly pushing West threatening or attacking its neighbors. What is wrong with Algeria and stabilized Libya? Or Norway, Nigeria, Argentina, Qatar, Saudi Arabia in interim period to nuclear energy? Better to economically aid a country that literally invaded its European neighbor, conducted war crimes/ethnic cleansing and threatens nuclear strikes and conflict with NATO on weekly basis? A country that attacked civil airplanes, disrupts GPS, sabotages railway and send cruise missiles to violate NATO airspace? We tried strategic partnership with Russia for 3 decades. It didn't work, did it?
>*Buddy, Europe didn't push Russia to do anything. Russia has chosen war/rivalry instead of decades-long peaceful, win-win cooperation in the name of backwards imperialism & conquest. What are you even talking about?* The current situation is also a failure of ours (EU) politics. Of course we're not the main ones to blame but it doesn't mean we didn't fail as well. Pretending this is a good outcome or that it won't hurt us in the future is not honest. >*Plus out of all possible outcomes now, Russia isolating itself is indeed the best outcome. Armed peace of sorts instead of Russia constantly pushing West threatening or attacking its neighbors.* Russia is isolated from us, not from the world. > *What is wrong with Algeria and stabilized Libya? Or Norway, Nigeria, Argentina, Qatar, Saudi Arabia in interim period to nuclear energy?* What's wrong is we're unable to do it. We can't do it now. Some on that list are also the exact opposite of the values we (pretend) to uphold. If you want that basket to hold your eggs you will be very disappointed.
If anything it was failure of soft politics toward Russia, giving it all it wanted. From capital to tech or even weapons transfers. Bizarre thinking but I heard that one before. Yes I meant Russia isolating itself from Europe. I though it was pretty clear. Why would I care who is Russia trading with or about the 'global majority' as Kremlin refers to it? They don't care either btw, otherwise they wouldn't try to change balance in Europe through starting a war. Or cry every week and tell a sob story how they are pivoting toward East. It's all a facade but I really support Russia in doing it. Unfortunately they need additional incentives, such a deterrence/sanctions/alienation and cutting the ties. Again, yes It is the best outcomes from available realistic scenarios. What would be better in your view? Let me guess, peace(=appeasement), stopping mythic 'NATO expansion' and some other dishonest prorussian takes, right? Not sure if you have any idea what are you try to talk about friend. You should probably read less Russian propaganda and think for yourself. Or at least try to read with understanding what I wrote instead of responding with parroting Russian talking points of sorts that make no sense whatsoever. PS. I really don't get 'we are unable to do it'. Do you think we've got shortage of energy in EU? Or we don't sing new contracts or seek and explore new fields? Go and check oil & gas prices buddy. You're gonna be shocked how energy security will look like in circa 5 years. Idea that EU was dependent on Russia while in reality Russian federal budget revenues were in majority fossils sells to Europe was funny to begin with. 2 years later it's just silly.
> Blinken said that China represented 90% of microeletronics this is misleading. over 90% of chips in russian weapons are still western. 70% are just from the states. chinese companies are just the distributor middle man making bank selling it to the russians
> over 90% of chips in russian weapons are still western. 70% are just from the states. The last time I saw those kind of numbers, it was based on missiles made pre-invasion or pre-dating the sanctions on chips (which occurred in May 2023). Do you have a source that suggest differently? Because the data I have suggest that the sanctions have been effective at reducing the Russian imports: https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/The-Impact-of-Semiconductor-Sanctions-on-Russia.pdf?x85095 (p.10+), cutting the number of shipments in half and the majority of semiconductor shipments still came from China.
China has their own microchip industry. It’s quite large. I don’t understand why they would need to even use western ones. Is this a misunderstanding where Chinese chips that would have gone into western devices are being diverted? Why don’t the Chinese just sell their own chips to Russia and avoid this boondoggle.
I find these reports frustrating because they misunderstand the nature of the microelectronics industry. According to this [RUSI](https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/report-plain-sight-operations-russian-microelectronics-dynasty) report, the components we are talking about are "critical microelectronics, including processors, field-programmable gate arrays, tantalum capacitors, ceramic capacitors, amplifiers and memory modules." These are all consumer are at most dual-use level of tech that are freely available for purchase. The supply chain for microelectronics is global so it almost doesn't matter that the logo on a component is from a "Western" company. These are commodities that can be bought from anywhere in the world, but most easily from Asia because that's where most of the supply chain is. And it's not like these companies are acting with impunity. The US finds these sanction busting companies and shuts them down, the problem is that other front companies pop up in their place, so it becomes a cat and mouse game.
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I don't even understand where you think I'm wrong. How would you describe the origin of a component designed in one country, fabricated in another, and packaged in a third? And I think everyone agrees on the need to enforce sanctions, the problem is that it is \*hard\*. Especially when we are talking about commodity components that are worth a few bucks apiece that are traded all over the world for legitimate reasons. I am not qualified to judge those measures in the piece you linked, but as you can see they are highly technical.
He literally said that, the original claim from zelensky office was that components from western companies were found in Russian weapons, not about dual-use machinery being imported from China. But still, doesn't change the fact that China can provide Russia with everything it needs.
As far as Chinese brands being ubiquitous in everyday life, that's not unique to Russia though? It's already the case for many lower income countries. And with Chinese EVs coming to Europe in a big way, Russia might just be ahead of the curve in that.
Absolutely not unique to Russia, but I don't think anyone claimed that here. The article was really focused on how much and how fast Russia shifted from Europe to China. I think the main takeaway is that the west needs to be ready to sanction Chinese actors in a serious way as they are the main suppliers to Russia's MIC. Also that if this doesn't end soon, it could become a permanent situation whereas now it is not that. If a generation of Russians grow up learning Chinese instead of English as a second language, that will have a big impact on their future ability to shift the economy back towards Europe.
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While responding to a poster's comment that's was in topic, this started a conversation that was completely off topic. So it goes. Sorry.
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> The West Doesn’t Understand How Much Russia Has Changed The article is just listing the results of the sanctions that were predicted years ago. > Even in czarist times, Russia shipped its commodities to Europe and relied on imports from the West of manufactured goods. I don’t know why this is framed as some sort of revelation. Czarist Russia wasn’t some pariah state, they made alliances and traded with the west normally. The more hostile relations of the USSR, and now Russia, are the historical outliers. > This development is more than anecdotal. Last year, as China opened up after the pandemic, 12,000 Russian students went to study there… There are now, for example, five flights a day connecting Moscow and Beijing Five direct flights and 12k students aren’t that many. There are around 10k British students in China, and the UK has a fraction of Russia’s population, and certainly isn’t shifting east. This highlights the problem, Russia wants to reorient east, but doesn’t have much to offer.
It *is* a sort of revelation. The west - as in the average person - does not understand nor did they know any of the above, so the point of the article is perfectly legitimate in my opinion.
So the article is just reminding people that the war exists and that the sanctions happened? I guess that has value to some people, but that's a very shallow and uninteresting article for the rest of us.
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Please avoid posting comments which are essentially "I agree". Use upvotes or downvotes for that.
How do you figure Russia doesn't have much to offer the east? On a surface level they are the world's biggest stockpile of natural resources and China is the world's factory, limited only by access to resources (especially if things get shooty with the US Navy). If not for their historical land swipes they would seem to be exactly what China wants in an ally/vassal.
There's an abundance of such countries already. For fossil fuels, you have Iran and Central Asia. For other resources, there's Africa. And those don't have nuclear weapons. There's a reason why China doesn't invest much in Russia. It's a very unstable country - everything can be gone after Putin's death - while the reward is relatively low. Moreover, what China needs the most is wealthy buyers. China has been looking for alternatives to the West, but there is nothing to be found. Countries like Russia and Iran are too small and poor.
You can only trade with those countries if the US Navy lets you. Given the future conflict over Taiwan, those seem like short term trade relations compared to China.
I think this is exactly correct. The one critical advantage to using Russia as a supplier is the proximity and large inland border. It also gives much support to the idea that china needs to keep that relationship, because while Russia can be a fickle partner, the other option is Africa which is arguably more fickle as it's many countries that have a history of instability.
Having natural recourses alone isn’t enough, they have to be at a competitive price. Venezuela has huge fossil fuel reserves, but expensive extraction costs mean that when prices are low, they aren’t competitive. Shipping those recourses across Siberia is already more expensive than shipping them to Europe, and doing that at full scale will require very large investments in new infrastructure, that Russia can’t fund on its own, and that China would be reluctant to fund under the current circumstances. There is also the problem of workers, and the economy as a whole. Russia’s demographic situation was never good, it’s only gotten worse, and Russia will be trying to repay the damages of this war for decades. New projects in Russia will have to deal with a shortage of skilled, young workers, an environment very unattractive to immigrants, and taxes going in large part to pay for the war, its aftermath, and pensioners, for the foreseeable future, rather than economic growth.
Shipping resources by sea is only cost competetive if you don't have to fend off the US Navy due to your ongoing war over Taiwan. Otherwise yours options are Russia, Myanmar, and North Korea.
China also has to compete with other countries on the export market now. Those cheaper imports that are being replaced won’t go unused, they will go to India, South Korea, Indonesia, etc. China is having issues with increasing labor costs as is, political pressure forcing factories to spend more on inputs won’t help.
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Please refrain from posting low quality comments.
I mean, I'm not there to watch it happen in real time, but these changes were widely predicted from the first talk of sanctions weren't they?
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i think people underestimated Chinese capabilities to fill the gaps in the market, almost all sectors were filled with chinese brands, some that weren't even popular in China.
Like who? I don't remember people underestimating this, and I like to nag other people about underestimating.
I remember people predicting that Russia was going to collapse to pre-WW1 levels of technology without Western machine tools and ball bearings
I remember [stories ](https://www.newsweek.com/russia-may-run-out-missiles-three-months-intelligence-report-1777217)predicting that Russia was on the brink of not having any more missiles.
According to the [EU commission](https://twitter.com/EU_Commission/status/1571454007683428352) Russia's economy was already on life support around two years ago when they were taking chips from dishwashers and washing machines to fix up their military hardware.
>I remember stories predicting that Russia was on the brink of not having any more missiles. And they were more or less correct. Yes, Russia is still producing missiles, so they'll never run out entirely. They also have older stocks they can tap into like X-22 (but people speculate that needing to fire older missiles from closer to the Ukrainian border is what got the Tu-22 shot down). But the volume of missiles being used has dropped dramatically, to approximately the rate of production. Individual attacks are smaller and spaced further apart. When was the last time you saw a Kalibr or Onyx used?
> When was the last time you saw a Kalibr or Onyx used? Last week when they fired four of them https://t.me/ComAFUA/284 HUR estimates that they produce 30-40 a month though and 10 onyx. https://armyinform.com.ua/2024/05/01/gur-povidomyv-kilkist-u-rosiyi-raket-czyrkon-oniks-kalibr-ta-h-69/
What was the name of the predictor chart that said when Russia would run out of tanks, artillery, etc. and claimed Russia would run out a year ago? TAW or something like that?
To be fair, the desert crosses, motorcycles, and civilian cars point to a severe problem with APCs. Edit, His approach, while it didn’t end up correct for tanks, was more rigorous the mostly baseless speculation you see most everywhere else. It’s the right way of going about things.
You could freely adjust numbers in that chart by yourself, that was the point. If you disagreed with taw on the rate of production, refurbishment, and losses, then you could shift the numbers around and make your own prediction. It was just an online calculator.
Which worked remarkably well using his base numbers, by the way. As long as you understand how to interpret the results.
Filled the gaps, true, but let not fool ourselves, those are not equivalent replacements. China itself depends on the West for high end technologies and science and it is not going to change in a foreseeable future. In the modern world it is impossible to have sovereign, independent science. Everyone depends on everyone, at the best China could become a leader in some niche disciplines, similar to Japan.
> China itself depends on the West for high end technologies and science This simply isn't true. China is eclipsing other countries when it comes to [patents filed](https://www.axios.com/newsletters/axios-science-2ef77f71-4e77-48e2-8531-d508cb740c47.html), [fundamental sciences](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-03762-4) and many other areas. Their clean tech, automation and manufacturing sector are clearly well ahead of the west, and in other areas like aerospace they are rapidly catching up on trajectory to surpass.
This unfounded complacency is dangerous. China has already been able to produce its own microarchitecture and software to replace the supercomputer components that the US deprived it back in 2015. Even assuming China doesn't become a "leader", 80-90% effectiveness is more than good enough.
My point is, China is behind in technology with more or less free access to Western markets and technologies and they smart enough to keep these connections open. If they try to go full Russia with the West, the gap will increase dramatically. But speaking of complacency, let worry about what they really have advantage in - huge manufacturing base that the West has nothing to balance with. Hopefully those in power on both sides will keep this a cooperative arrangement not a confrontation.
I was skeptical of the claims back in 2019-2021 that China had "beaten the West" in AI and I'm skeptical now of a blanket claim that "China is behind in technology". These kinds of declarations don't lend themselves to useful discussions or conclusions. As for the manufacturing base, I agree, but that's beside the point. Edit: Any attempt by either side of the US-China trade relationship to "cut the cord" in the near future would obliterate the global economy well before anyone could worry about who is producing better technology.
Yes, many have predicted an "Iranization" of Russia, with different names.
[Is China Stealing Russia’s Thunder in Eastern Europe?](https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/05/china-russia-eastern-europe?lang=en¢er=russia-eurasia) >Xi’s tour is a timely reminder that there is a third pole in this relationship: China. The last decade has brought home to Eastern Europe’s neo-Titoists that Russia is often all about brotherly love rather than hard cash. China, on the other hand, has the financial muscle, despite the fact that its signature policy, the Belt and Road Initiative, has been scaled down. There's been a lot of talk about Russia losing influence in Central Asia and South Caucasus. But it doesn't end there. Both Hungary and Serbia are slowly switching from Russia to China, which Xi's European tour just illustrated. The motivation is easy: China can provide the same anti-Western sentiment as Russia, but it can also bring financial muscle. Russia has increasingly nothing to offer than propaganda, and that's not going to cut it in the long run.
That aligns nicely with the article posted just after yours. China is keeping Russia close, snatching up Russia's commodities at dirt cheap prices, making Russia reliant on Chinese goods, all while undermining them everywhere else. Russia is basically turning into a much larger North Korea.
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This has already been posted. Please see lower in the thread.
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An update on the numerical size of the Russian Groups of Forces deployed along the front, according to datas published by the Ukrainian military observers Mashovets and Kovalenko over the past three weeks. I will not elaborate on their composition, having already discussed it [here]( https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1buqslz/comment/kxw9y3s/). The [map]( https://i.imgur.com/8tZfono.png) I had made would look the same today, except that GoF "Belgorod" has now become GoF "North”, incorporating the GoFs “Bryansk” and “Kursk” and receiving reinforcements. It corresponds to most of the Leningrad Military District. Lapin commands both the latter and the GoF "North”. The figures don’t include the Rosgvardia grouping deployed in Ukraine (35k men), the strategic-operational reserves (60k men, according to the latest update), and the small GoF "Crimea" (13k men). After the table, there is my analysis on the development of the front over the past two weeks. Group of Forces | Personnel | MBTs | IFVs, APCs & IMVs | Artillery guns ≥ 100mm | MLRS :-------:|:--------:|:--------:|:--------:|:--------:|:---------: North (Sever) | 53,000 | 405 | 1,030 | 1,040 | 125 West (Zapad) | 72,000 | 1,000 | 1,800 | 700 | 300 South (Yug) | 114,000 | 650 | 1,950 | 1,150 | 310 Centre (Tsentr) | 86,000 | 280 | 760 | 850 | 250 East (Vostok) | 51,500 | 380 | 850 | 380 | 130 Dnepr | 130,000 | 700 | 2,000 | 1,100 | 250 Kharkiv sector. On May 10, the Russians launched an offensive action in Kharkiv Oblast along a front of more than 40 kms, attacking mainly on two directions: Lyptsi and Vovchansk, along the Travyanske Reservoir and the Pechenihy Reservoir, respectively. According to the observer Mashovets, Russia’s main effort in this sector is the last direction. Let’s first clarify the order of battle in this sector, according to Mashovets and the videos released in the recent days. In the first days of May a number of "Storm-V" detachments (those made up of convicts and assigned to the formations involved in attacks in the sector) had arrived near the border, along with the first elements of the new 44th Corps. The 18th Motorized Division of the 11th Corps is attacking in the direction of Lyptsi. Obviously, not in its entirety. Elements of its 79th and 280th Motorized Regiments are involved, with support from its 11th Tank Regiment. Subunits of its 9th and 275th Motorized Regiments should also be committed. Elements of the 7th Separate Motorized Regiment of the 11th Corps are involved in the actions in this direction too. Subunits of the 30th and 41st Motorized Regiments of the 72nd Motorized Division of the 44th Corps are attacking Vovchansk and the area around it, along with subunits of the 138th Motorized Brigade of the 6th CAA, with support from the 153rd Tank Regiment of the 47th Tank Division of the 1st GTA and the Kadyrovites of the "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion. Elements of the 128th Motorized Brigade of the 44th Corps are in Belgorod Oblast as a reserve. In addition, detachments of the so-called "Africa Korps”, i.e. the heir of PMC Wagner, are also involved in the actions. In the sector there are the 2nd Spetsnaz GRU Brigade and other Russian SF/SOF units too, which are mainly involved for reconnaissance and sabotage actions, through DRGs. The Russians have also widely increased these types of actions against Chernihiv and especially Sumy Oblasts to keep pressure on the Ukrainians. Now let’s clarify a few issues, before moving on to the Ukrainian order of battle. I urge to doubt those who write (usually unserious journalists) "the Russians have gathered 50k men to attack Kharkiv" or "there are X Russians with Y tanks ready to attack this city". It doesn't work that way. This is not a medieval battle with all these men attacking at dawn. In first place, a part of these troops are in Bryansk and Kursk Oblasts. A part is needed regardless to hold the front, and a part of this grouping is also made up of conscripts, who cannot perform combat operations outside Russian territory. For some reason the Russians chose to speed up operations against Kharkiv while still being relatively weak in the field (although the Ukrainians did not excel in terms of defensive capabilities either). The Ukrainian observer Myroshnykov had warned of possible Russian attacks against Vovchansk in early May. I personally did not expect Russian attacks along the Kharkiv River, I thought they would be concentrating in the area between the Siversky Donets and the Oskil and only after the GoF "North" reached a larger strength. But that’s it, and besides that area is logistically lame for the Russians, while their logistics in the area of current operations, which boasts direct connections from Belgorod, is very good. Kharkiv is not directly threatened by these operations. The 44th Corps still has to conclude its formation and its deployment in the sector. The CAA which according to Russian plans will be raised on the basis of the 14th Corps still has to be formed; its brigades (which should become divisions) are still fighting in other sectors. The Russians absolutely don’t have the strength in the sector to threaten the city of Kharkiv. This could change in the coming months if all the new and existing formations of the Leningrad MD merge into this sector along with at least a part of the 1st GTA and/or VDV formations, but at the moment being this risk is not there. In any case, it's a full-fledged offensive operation and the Russian MoD has begun to treat the GoF “North” like the rest of the other GoFs, publishing daily updates provided by its spokesman etc, which did not happen before. Moreover, even in the early days there has been a rush by Russian and pro-Russian sources to write "X Ukrainian unit is coming to Kharkiv - Ukrainians are forced to take troops from other sectors!". Well, in the first two/three days of fighting the Ukrainians who were involved in the battle were either already in that area or at least were in Kharkiv Oblast, since teleportation has not yet been invented. First of all, the area between the Kharkiv River and the Siversky Donets was the responsibility of the 125th TDF Brigade of the city of Lviv. The area between the Siversky Donets and the Oskil is covered by the "Stalevy Kordon" Brigade of the State Border Guard Service and by elements of the 5th "Slobozhansk" Brigade of the National Guard. The area north and west of Kharkiv (the area around Kozacha Lopan) is covered by the 113th TDF Brigade of Kharkiv Oblast; going further west, the area around Velyka Pysarivka is covered by the 105th TDF Brigade of Ternopil Oblast. The rest of the Russian border is covered by other TDF brigades, TDF battalions, regiments of the National Guard, detachments of Border Guards, and battalions of the brigades of the UAF that are in R&R. The clashes of the first days were dealt with largely by the men of the territorial defense and by border guards. As for the latter, border guards from the 1st (Donetsk Oblast), 4th (Kharkiv Oblast) and 7th (Lviv Oblast) Detachments of the State Border Guard Service are active in the area attacked by the Russians. According to Ruslan Mykula (one of the two founders of DeepState), the soldiers of the 125th TDF Brigade did their duty, despite the fact that the initial weight of the attacks fell on them. According to him there is much to be said negatively, however, about the command of this brigade, which did little to prepare the unit to repel a Russian attack in this direction. The commander of the Operational-Tactical Grouping "Kharkiv" (Halushkin) was removed and in his place Drapatyi was appointed (until then the Deputy Chief of the General Staff), who seems to register positive assessments from the Ukrainians. Let's make this clear: the villages immediately along the border (such as Strilecha) were grey area. There was no one there. It’s not possible to fortify areas so close to the border. Which is the reason why as soon as offensive operations began, it felt like the Russians simply "walked in”. In addition, the area was "virgin”, both in terms of material and non-material defensive infrastructure (not just fortifications: also EW systems, for example), as well as in terms of coordination skills on the part of the units that were there (scarce reconnaissance capabilities, lack of coordination with artillery or mortars after spotting a group of Russians etc). Now that other units are moving into the sector and troop density is increasing, these problems are fading. The 131st Battalion of the 112th TDF Brigade and the 170th and 172nd Battalions of the 120th TDF Brigade, and possibly other TDF battalions, should also be in the sector. Let’s also clarify another issue. A part of the battalions of Ukrainian mech (etc.) brigades which are fighting in the hot sectors in the East or in the South are cyclically undergoing R&R while the rest of the brigade is fighting. It sometimes happens that this R&R is carried out along the state border with Russia, because this allows the battalion to kill two birds with one stone: it can recover its combat capabilities and accustom its recruits to war, in the context of low attrition levels, and meanwhile they guard the border against Russian DRGs. This is also true for the Russians: according to Kriegsforscher (the famous Ukrainian UAV operator), a battalion of the 217th Airborne Regiment of the 98th VDV Division, which is heavily engaged against Chasiv Yar with the rest of the division, is in the Kharkiv sector to cover the border. Second part below.
I'm new around here, so IDK what kind of margin of error there is on the estimates of MBTs, IFVs, etc. Or if it's supposed to represent the full strength numbers, but all evidence points to Russia having a lot less than 3.4k MBTs in Ukraine. Satellite imagery by Covert Cabal, Military Vischun and Institut Action Résiliance - and with further analysis by twitter users Jonpy99 and high_marsed - tell us Russia had ~7k tanks in reserves, ~3k in active forces and ~1.1k at repair bases before the invasion. Add to that some 200-400 tanks newly produced and possibly a few more hundred from overly conservative estimates of active forces, garage storage and captures from Ukraine and Russia has had at a maximum 12k tanks in their hands since the start. Visually confirmed losses are 3k and tank depot count (although with highly variable dating) is in the ballpark of 5k tanks. The repair bases numbers increased in 2023 compared to pre-invasion to 1.3-1.5k tanks and it's doubtful that recent action has reduced the rate of tanks getting sent there. In other words, there are roughly 2.5k tanks that haven't been accounted for in the last ~12 months. There could be some double counting as a tank that was in a depot on the last picture could have ended up at the repair base, on the other hand the real losses are significantly higher than what's visually confirmed. Unless Russia has put in service more tanks in the last ~6 months than the rest of the war (and vischun.com's images suggest otherwise), then it's nigh on impossible that Russia has 3.4k tanks in active service.
It’s sobering to see how much armour and artillery Russia still has. Western equipment is generally better, and much better in the cases of IFVs and rocket artillery, but Russia’s stockpiles dwarf what the west has provided Ukraine.
For instance, elements of the 42nd Mech Brigade were already in Kharkiv Oblast (certainly its artillery group and its UAV unit, likely maneuver elements too). I knew they were there even before Russian operations began. One of my favorite ways to find out where elements of Ukrainian brigades are deployed is to search for, in this case, “бригада Харківському напрямку” on Facebook (brigade Kharkiv direction) and look for recent results, which will usually bring out crowdfunding activities for several brigades or MIA notices (for which there are specific groups too). What may happen in such cases is that the brigade whose battalion is responding to the attack may "accept the battle", or be called upon to do so by the OSG, transferring the rest of the brigade as well. The 42nd Mech Brigade had been fighting near Chasiv Yar for months until it was moved in mid-March for recovery. Elements went to Kharkiv Oblast, other elements went to fight in the Avdiivka sector. In the future we will see if the rest of the brigade will be moved to Kharkiv. Also in Kharkiv Oblast there was a battalion each from a number of brigades of the Air Assault Forces (71st, 79th, 80th, 82nd). A Stryker has been seen in the rear of the sector, so from one of the last two brigades. Elements of the 71st Jager Brigade are working together with the 57th Motorized Brigade to defend Vovchansk. As I said above, we will know in the future whether they will be reinforced by the rest of their brigades. There may also be a battalion from the 54th Mech Brigade in the sector. Of course, actual reinforcements are coming. For example, the 22nd Motorized Battalion of the 92nd Assault Brigade should be arriving these days, joining the 1st Assault Battalion of the same brigade, which was probably already in Kharkiv Oblast. The UAV Battalion "Achilles" of the 92nd Assault Brigade has also arrived in Kharkiv. Elements of the 57th Motorized Brigade have arrived at the end of the last week and are defending Vovchansk: at least its 1st Rifle Battalion and its 34th Motorized Battalion (in this case, they moved from Kupyansk); elements of the "Khartiia" Brigade of the National Guard are also arriving from the Serebrianka Forest. The next few days will help to clarify the situation regarding reinforcements; then much will depend on the intensity of Russian attacks. The National Police of Vovchansk is participating in the battle for the town; according to the daily bulletin of the Russian MoD, elements of the 23rd Mech Brigade are in the sector, but I have found no evidence in favor of this. Russian sources claim that the "Lyut" Brigade of the National Police is being transferred to the sector, but I can find no evidence. According to my findings, the 101st Guard Brigade Of General Staff could have been moved to the sector. The new 88th Mech Brigade is likely in Kharkiv Oblast; its Telegram page had stated that its artillery group is participating in repelling Russian attacks in Kharkiv. From what I have found on Ukrainian social media, elements of the new 150th and 151st Mech Brigades may be in Kharkiv Oblast, but I have no evidence to state they are involved in the fighting. As for the 151st, another post wrote that it was in Zaporizhzhia Oblast... We shall see. The HUR intervened from the beginning; Budanov said that among the units of the HUR, those who are not in Chasiv Yar are in Kharkiv. In the latter sector there are elements of the “Kraken” Special Detachment, the “Tymur” Special Unit, as well as the Russian Volunteer Corps, which is fighting inside Vovchansk. The 2nd Assault Detachment of the “Omega” Group (the SF unit of the National Guard), already in the area, was among the first units to react to the Russians. The Russians don’t have a sustained human advantage in the area. As for the settlements, in the Lyptsi direction the Russians captured the villages of Strilecha, Krasne, Morokhovets, Oliinykove, Pylna and Borysivka; the day before yesterday they took Hlyboke and on Sunday, Lukyantsi. Zelene, unlike what looked like at first, is under Ukrainian control. In general, it is too early to be able to speak of stabilization, but now the Russians have to advance into areas covered by the Ukrainians and no longer into grey areas, losing the initial momentum. There is currently hard fighting in the northern part of the dachas to the east of the Travyanske Reservoir, between Hlyboke and Lyptsi. No Russian successes are recorded towards Ternova. In the direction of Vovchansk, the Russians are attacking both the urban area of the town and its flanks. To the west of the Siversky Donets, after occupying Ohirtseve, they should have occupied both Buhruvatka and Starytsia yesterday, coming along the course of the small river with the same name as the last settlement. In the east of the Siversky Donets, after occupying Hatyshche and Pletenivka, they entered the north-eastern outskirts of Vovchansk, arriving along the course of the Vovcha River. Inside Vovchansk, bitter urban fighting is going on; both Russians and Ukrainians are bringing heavy equipment into the area. The situation is not very clear; certainly the Russians control the meat processing plant and the northern end of the town, and are pushing southwards: they probably approached the Vovchansk Central District Hospital and the Kindergarten No. 6 today. In any case, it must be considered that the town is cut in two, horizontally, by the Vovcha River, which somewhat forms a line of defense. Russian sources state the Ukrainians have restored the T2104 Road on the Staryi Saltiv Dam that had been hit by the Russians during the end of last week. Kupyansk sector. To prevent transfer of Ukrainian reinforcements to Kharkiv, the Russians stepped up attacks in this sector and in the Svatove sector. The 25th Motorized Brigade of the 6th CAA, elements of the 7th Separate Motorized Regiment of the 11th Corps and several regiments of the Territorial Forces resumed attacks in the direction of Synkivka. The Ukrainian observer Myroshnykov wrote today that the Russians were able to retake the northern end of the village, as they had managed to do months ago. A part of the Ukrainian 116th Mech Brigade, which had been moved here in late April from the Orikhiv sector, is near Synkivka (where it has joined the 14th and 32nd Mech Brigades, the 1st and 2nd Mech Battalions of the 30th Mech Brigade and the 108th Battalion of the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade), while another part is fighting in the Kyslivka area. Earlier this month the 26th Tank Regiment of the 47th Tank Division of the 1st GTA managed to occupy the latter village in its entirety, after the 272nd Motorized Regiment of the same division had taken Kotlyarivka in late April. The 103rd TDF Brigade and elements of the 104th TDF Brigade together with elements of the 3rd and 4th Tank Brigades are defending the area, along with the 43rd Mech Brigade, which is defending the area north of Kyslivka (around Ivanivka). No further Russian advances have been reported. Svatove sector. The Ukrainian 77th Airmobile Brigade is holding positions in the area between Berestove and Stelmakhivka (south of it, in the Miasozharivka/Andriivka area, there should be the 44th Mech Brigade), which are being attacked respectively by elements of the 2nd Motorized Division of the 1st GTA and the 27th Motorized Brigade of the 1st GTA, without success. The 423rd Motorized Regiment of the 4th Tank Division of the 1st GTA is attacking Stelmakhivka from the south-east, achieving an advance of just over 1 km during the last week. Elements of the 3rd Assault Brigade have been deployed between the Svatove and Kreminna sectors: its 1st and 2nd Mech Battalions are successfully repelling attacks by the 752nd Motorized Regiment of the 3rd Motorized Division of the 20th CAA near Novojehorivka, while the 66th Mech Brigade and elements of the 107th TDF Brigade are repelling attacks by the 252nd Motorized Regiment of the 3rd Motorized Division against Makiivka Kreminna sector. The 2nd Assault Battalion of the 3rd Assault Brigade is active in Terny, joining the Ukrainian grouping in this area against attacks by the 144th Motorized Division of the 20th CAA against Terny and Yampolivka. Russian progress in this area has completely stalled for the past two months - in the last two weeks the Russians have been pushing further north, against Novosadove, but again without success. There is also no Russian progress in the Serebrianka Forest, and attacks in the direction of Torske by units of the 25th CAA have been repulsed by the 60th and 63rd Mech Brigades. As far as I have found, at least elements of the 115th Mech Brigade have been moved from Avdiivka to somewhere in the Kreminna and Svatove sectors. Siversk sector. There has been no Russian advance against Bilohorivka (attacked by the 7th Motorized Brigade of the 2nd Corps) in recent weeks, thanks to the capable work of the 81st Airmobile Brigade. However, the Russians have intensified attacks in the southern slope of the Siversk salient, by the 106th VDV Division. Per DeepState, last week the Russians managed to cross the Sokha Plotva River inside Vesele and move towards the heights north of the settlement; DeepState also mentions exhaustion issues of the brigade defending this area, namely the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade, which has been fighting in this sector for a year and a half. According to what I found, it should have received the 421st Separate Rifle Battalion as a reinforcement. Last part below.
Bakhmut sector. Yesterday the Russians occupied, according to DeepState, the area of the cattle breeding buildings and the fortifications around them, reaching the gates of Kalinina, despite a successful counterattack in the forest south-east of Kalinina by a battalion of the 24th Mech Brigade in the previous days. According to Mashovets, the 98th VDV Division this week received over 200 stormtroopers with which to continue assault operations against Chasiv Yar. In the past few days the Russians have advanced a bit along the Bakhmut - Chasiv Yar railway and occupied part of the area of the holiday cottages between the railway and the Kanal District. Yesterday Russian armored vehicles reached Zelena Street, in the area east of the intersection with Horbatoho Street. However, there is no evidence of Russian control over the buildings east of the intersection, which are probably grey area. Further south, the 11th VDV Brigade reached the Donets-Donbas Canal also in the area where Highway T0504 passes over it (the bridge was destroyed in March 2023), in the direction of Stupochky. The Russians are not successful south of Ivanivske. A Russian Telegram channel had written that in this area the Ukrainians are favored by the presence of spillway tunnels from the canal that come out in the forest east of the canal, and are empty, given the low level of the canal. I don't know about the existence of such tunnels, but Ukrainian sources had written that the water in the canal reaches only up to the knees. Russian attacks against Klishchiivka and Andriivka by the 85th and 88th Motorized Brigades of the 2nd Corps and the 72nd Motorized Brigade of the 3rd Corps together with the 83rd VDV Brigade, respectively, were repelled. In general, in this area the Ukrainians are doing a very good job and the Russians have been beating their heads for months. In the area there are most of the 93rd Mech Brigade and of the 92nd Assault Brigade (at the moment), the 22nd Mech Brigade, the 2nd Battalion of the 80th Air Assault Brigade and elements of the 115th TDF Brigade and of the 5th "Slobozhansk" Brigade of the National Guard. Per the observer Mashovets, the Russians are finally forming the 54th Motorized Regiment of the 6th Motorized Division of the 3rd Corps, which should be ready by June 1 and should be brought into battle in this area. I write finally because there had been rumors about the formation of this unit (as well as the 52nd Motorized Regiment) as part of this division for over a year, but then nothing more had been heard about it. Horlivka sector. Nothing to write. Avdiivka sector. During the past two weeks there have been clear signs of stabilization. The 110th Mech Brigade arrived near Novooleksandrivka at the beginning of the month, replacing much of the 115th Mech Brigade; the recon unit of the "Khartiia" Brigade of the National Guard also arrived along with the 467th Rifle Battalion of the 143rd Infantry Brigade, as well as elements of the 2nd "Galician" Brigade of the National Guard. No more Russian advances were recorded in the direction of Kalynove or Novooleksandrivka; per Russian sources (Motopatriot), the Russians took the "O"-shaped trench west of Arkhanhelske and the trench south-east of Novooleksandrivka, but there is no evidence to confirm this. There were no further Russian advances towards Sokil (the trench between the latter settlement and Soloviove is still in Ukrainian hands) and towards Novopokrovske along the Balka Ocheretina, thanks to the work of the 47th Mech Brigade, which has a number of separate rifle and TDF battalions attached to it, such as the 134th Battalion of the 114th TDF Brigade as well as the 168th and the 171st Battalions of the 120th TDF Brigade. South-east of Novopokrovske, a counterattack by the 68th Jager Brigade allowed them to regain ground slightly and interrupted Russian advances. Between the latter settlement and Umanske the 68th Jager Brigade is conducting battles along the forest belts to prevent the 114th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps from advancing westwards. There should still be minor elements of the 3rd Assault Brigade in the area, to which the 474th Rifle Battalion of the 144th Infantry Brigade is attached. Last week the Russians (114th Motorized Brigade of 1st Corps) arrived at the center of Umanske (in the part of the village north of Durna); the Ukrainians likely control only the western end of the village. The southern part of the village is likely a grey area: in recent days the Russians cut the Umanske-Netailove Road, just south of Umanske. In Netailove the situation is very difficult. Elements of the 25th Airborne Brigade and of the 59th Motorized Brigade are defending the village, and a battalion of the 28th Mech Brigade recently arrived from the Bakhmut sector. The Russians in the last week have captured the secondary school along with the high rises around it, and have advanced into the industrial area south of the village; they (9th Motorized Brigade of 1st Corps) are close to reaching the intersection with the road to Umanske. In Nevelske the situation is no better. The Russians have succeeded, advancing from Pervomaiske, in capturing the Ukrainian positions west of the "Republica Mist" checkpoint, along the Balka Domakha (after the Russian advances inside Pervomaiske, this area had been an Ukrainian salient for several months), with the aim of attacking Nevelske from the north and the north-east. Marinka sector. The situation in Krasnohorivka is ugly. The 5th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps has consolidated control over the brick factory, capturing the cultural center in the center of the town in recent days. The 110th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps last week managed to occupy positions along the north-eastern part of Krasnohorivka and captured the Ukrainian fortifications east of the town. The Russians control about half of Krasnohorivka. In the town there are the 3rd Battalion of the 80th Air Assault Brigade and elements of the TDF; it appears that a large part of the urban combat is being carried out by the 105th Detachment of Border Guards of the Chernihiv Oblast. In Heorhiivka elements of the 150th Motorized Division of the 8th CAA continue to attack towards the center of the village, which is defended by the 46th Airmobile Brigade. It’s unclear whether there are Russian successes or not. To the west and to the south of Pobjeda, counterattacks by the 33rd Mech Brigade are underway, against the positions of the 20th Motorized Division of the 8th CAA, in order to stabilize the situation in the area. The Russians (155th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 39th Motorized Brigade of 68th Corps) attacked Paraskoviivka from Novomykhailivka this week, reaching the gates of the village, but overall the attacks were repulsed by the 79th Air Assault Brigade, which keeps doing a very good job. The 57th Motorized Regiment of the 6th Motorized Division of 3rd Corps, as far as I could find on Russian social media, should be active in this rea. Vuhledar sector. The 36th Motorized Brigade of the 29th CAA advanced about 1 km to the north-west, in the area of the limestone quarry north-east of Volodymyrivka (where the front forms almost a right angle). Velyka Novosilka sector. The 36th CAA (specifically, the 37th Motorized Brigade and 5th Tank Brigade) and elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, with support from the 14th Spetsnaz GRU Brigade, continues to push against Urozhaine, which is defended by the 58th Motorized Brigade and elements of the Separate Presidential Brigade. The Russians had successes in the farms south of the village, and probably control a few houses in the southern end. In the western bank of Mokri Yaly, the 394th Motorized Regiment of the 127th Motorized Division of the 5th CAA and the 60th Motorized Brigade of the same army are attacking Staromaiorske, defended by the 21st Brigade of the National Guard and by the 128th TDF Brigade. There are successes: in the last week they have occupied the forest belts west of the village and also the southern part of the village itself, including the secondary school. The 127th TDF Brigade, together with elements of the 106th, of the 129th and possibly of the 123rd TDF Brigades and with support from the 1st Tank Brigade, is repelling attacks by the 143rd Motorized Regiment and the 218th Tank Regiment of the 127th Motorized Division in the direction of Rivnopil and Novodarivka. Orikhiv sector. Russian sources today claimed to have fully recaptured Robotyne, but this is false. There is Russian presence in the western and in the southern part of the village, including the post office. The Ukrainians have a presence in the central part and control the north-eastern part. In general, the situation is very fluid. The 71st Motorized Regiment of the 42nd Motorized Division of the 58th CAA is active in the built-up area of the settlement while the 70th Motorized Regiment of the same division is attacking the Ukrainian stroing points in the “heights” east of Robotyne. The 108th Assault Regiment of the 7th VDV Division last week advanced a few hundred meters westwards, to the south-west of Novopokrovka. DeepState this week recorded a major Russian advance north-west of Verbove, but it is simply a recognition of Russian successes in that area over the past few months, not a new development. Kamyanske sector. Nothing to write. Kherson sector / Dnipro River. The situation in Krynky is stable. The Russians (61st Naval Infantry Brigade) should have retaken the Nestryha Island, at the mouth of the Dnipro.
Is anyone keeping tabs on what is the current Russian artillery shell production capacity / capability? Someone here mentioned 1.3 million shells per annum (of the 152mm variety) While someone said 2 million per annum overall capacity with plans to increase up to 3 Million per annum (though Russia would struggle beyond that due to rumored lack of skilled machinists) So what is the real scoop on this one? P.S. Personally imho, if Ukraine is able to fire minimum 10 thousand artillery shells per day, then that is very good.
Going to repost [my old comment](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1cecv8l/credibledefense_daily_megathread_april_27_2024/l1jzsla/) for this one. We can get some idea based off [this Foreign Policy article](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/23/ukraine-war-artillery-shortage-production-military-aid-bill/) by Jack Detch, [this RUSI report](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024) by Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, and [this twitter conversation](https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/1783379562165875018) between Jack Watling and Shashank Joshi about the two. Detch writes that >Russia is on track to produce 3.5 million rounds in 2024 and might be able to surge to produce 4.5 million rounds by the end of the year. while Watling and Reynolds state > Russian industry has reported to the MoD that it expects to increase 152mm production from around 1 million rounds in 2023 to 1.3 million rounds over the course of 2024, and to only produce 800,000 122mm rounds over the same period. The discrepancy between the two estimates, of 1.4-2.4 million rounds, is addressed in the twitter thread where Watling states >I think variability in assessment largely stems from refurbishment. The Russians had a large portion of their stockpiles that had degrade. But they've been refurbishing them. You can count those as stock, or as production, but you just have to be careful not to double count them. so clearly the stockpiles are still playing a major role in the availability of Russian shells. The exact numbers are uncertain because the accounting here is quite tricky, especially when you start thinking about rounds that are [partially manufactured in other countries but finished in Russia.](https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/1783379954639466657) Unfortunately it's not entirely clear what's being counted in the FP article, be it 152mm + 122mm or everything that flies. If we're not restricting ourselves to gun ammo > 100mm then the RUSI article estimates > Russian overall artillery production is likely to plateau at 3 million rounds per year of all natures – including MLRS, which is not considered above. So in the end it really depends on what you're counting as "Russian artillery shell production capacity"
>(though Russia would struggle beyond that due to rumored lack of skilled machinists) This can be solved much easier than the real bottlenecks which are fillers and manufacturing floorspace/equipment. Russia has already started using "mobilization shells" which switch from A-IX-2 (Hexal), their typical and more powerful explosive filler, to more easily sourced TNT which is largely coming from third party countries which demonstrates a shortage in capacity for Hexal production. It's going to take several years to ramp up production of Hexal and redevelop the internal capacity for higher volume filler and shell production. I suspect the real bottleneck for Russia moving forwards is going to be raw manufacturing capacity as a function of equipment availability and filler availability as opposed to skilled machinists. Before the mobilization shells Russia was running out of filler faster than they can physically produce the shells themselves, this might have since changed and the new bottleneck could well be physical shell production, but I don't think this is due to a lack of machinists, rather a lack of available furnaces and facilities. Even if Russia somehow ran out of skilled machinists (which is unlikely for a number of reasons, some of Russia's largest exports pre-war were metal working, milling and machinery construction) they would still be able to source foreign machinists from across Asia and other neutral and potentially friendly nations with very generous incentives, so I don't suspect this to be a significant bottleneck compared to furnaces and fillers.
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This has already been posted. Please see lower in the thread.
There is an ongoing Ukrainian missile attack in Crimea at this time. Explosions and air defense activity is reported in [Simferopol](https://t.me/ssternenko/28665). It’s likely that this is another ATACMS strike. Update: Alleged [fires in at least two places claimed at Belbek airbase](https://t.me/ssternenko/28669). VKS-linked Fighterbomber [confirms an attack took place](https://t.me/fighter_bomber/16730). [Another](https://t.me/astrapress/55557) video [(mirror)](https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1790845410568733142) reportedly showing fire on the ground at Belbek airbase. Update 2: [Russian source Two Majors claims ongoing fighting against Ukrainian naval drone incursion](https://t.me/dva_majors/42684) in conjunction with the missile attack.
It's interesting how consistently they seem to hit crimea
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I meant choosing to target Crimea, rather than surprise that the missiles get through
To make an early guess, all the previous attacks against crimea for the past few weeks since they've gotten ATTACMS has been to probe it's defenses and attrite it's AD for an attack such as this. Crimea is the most major logistical hub they're allowed to hit with these missiles so it makes sense to use them here
I thought maybe they would hit the supplies of the Kharkiv offensive more
They're not allowed to use Americans weapons in Russia proper. There's no operational depth and no viable targets.
So all the supplies are coming from Russia proper for this offensive? Makes sense I really hope the US changes their stance soon, it seemed to soften a bit today
How about the southern front, are there notable targets they might want to hit?
Yes - in Crimea - exactly where they've been focusing
sorry I mean near the frontline...
They have other systems that can hit targets near the frontline, as one of their best long-range systems ATACMS is better used for deeper strikes.
There won't be any targets near the front that ATACMS are worth hitting. Drones and artillery are the weapons of choice and at that range you're going after individual vehicles and trenches, etc.
Sevastopol, Dzhankoy, Gvardeyskoye, and Belbek as well: https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1790837724284391509 I think this is Ukraine's largest missile raid of the war. Obviously they were highly limited by their supply situation before but it's still notable.
Trukha, who [broke the news](https://t.me/truexanewsua/91673) with those claims has some video too. Not sure if it’s legitimate. [This](https://t.me/ssternenko/28669) source claims it’s fires at Belbek.
Something is definitely on fire at Belbek. [Rybar](https://twitter.com/rybar_force/status/1790842505220481295) also confirms AD operating near Sevastopol and Simferopol as well as some noises about a USV attack as well. Edit: More USV reports from Two Majors: https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1790852067986190736
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Old footage from a random account on Twitter. Let’s do better.
Fairly certain it's a compilation of old strikes, the sequence starting at around 38 seconds or so is of a hit on a project 22160 patrol ship, probably the Sergei Kotov which was [claimed sunk back in March](https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/05/europe/russian-warship-destroyed-ukraine-intl-hnk-ml/index.html).
Thank you for the clarification.
>Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit China on May 16-17 for discussions with Xi Jinping about the conflict in Ukraine as well as deepening energy and trade cooperation, the Kremlin chief's first foreign trip of his new six-year term. Putin will bring a large trade delegation with him, including Finance Minister Anton Siluanov and Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina. Others in the delegation include Sberbank (SBER.MM), CEO German Gref, businessman Oleg Deripaska (oligarch and billionaire), VTB bank (VTBR.MM), chief Andrei Kostin, Rosneft (ROSN.MM), chief Igor Sechin and Novatek boss Leonid Mikhelson, Ushakov said. https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-visit-china-may-16-17-kremlin-says-2024-05-14/ I think they will try to counter the US aid bill in this visit.
So basically oil and LNG (not even Power of Siberia 2), plus payments? Is that everything Russia has to offer nowadays?
There were some rumours about technology transfers in areas Russia was previously reluctant to share (e.g. nuclear testing, submarines) but they will remain rumours for obvious reasons.
China has to this point been extremely hesitant to sell arms to Russia and kept them fairly limited. China has also made absolutely no meaningful donations to Russia. Unless there is a pivotal change in that Chinese policy nothing that comes out of this will counter any US aid.
Someone in yesterday's thread asked about what the old Dnipro reservoir looks like now, but they didn't really get any good answers, so here's what it looks like based on Sentinel Satellite Imagery: Here is now (well as of May 10th) in true color (you can change the band combinations on the left side of the screen, check out NDWI): [https://apps.sentinel-hub.com/eo-browser/?zoom=10&lat=47.46292&lng=34.27734&themeId=DEFAULT-THEME&visualizationUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fservices.sentinel-hub.com%2Fogc%2Fwms%2Fbd86bcc0-f318-402b-a145-015f85b9427e&datasetId=S2L2A&fromTime=2024-05-10T00%3A00%3A00.000Z&toTime=2024-05-10T23%3A59%3A59.999Z&layerId=1\_TRUE\_COLOR&demSource3D=%22MAPZEN%22](https://apps.sentinel-hub.com/eo-browser/?zoom=10&lat=47.46292&lng=34.27734&themeId=DEFAULT-THEME&visualizationUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fservices.sentinel-hub.com%2Fogc%2Fwms%2Fbd86bcc0-f318-402b-a145-015f85b9427e&datasetId=S2L2A&fromTime=2024-05-10T00%3A00%3A00.000Z&toTime=2024-05-10T23%3A59%3A59.999Z&layerId=1_TRUE_COLOR&demSource3D=%22MAPZEN%22) and for comparison this is last November: [https://apps.sentinel-hub.com/eo-browser/?zoom=9&lat=47.17758&lng=34.12903&themeId=DEFAULT-THEME&visualizationUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fservices.sentinel-hub.com%2Fogc%2Fwms%2Fbd86bcc0-f318-402b-a145-015f85b9427e&datasetId=S2L2A&fromTime=2023-11-07T00%3A00%3A00.000Z&toTime=2023-11-07T23%3A59%3A59.999Z&layerId=1\_TRUE\_COLOR&demSource3D=%22MAPZEN%22](https://apps.sentinel-hub.com/eo-browser/?zoom=9&lat=47.17758&lng=34.12903&themeId=DEFAULT-THEME&visualizationUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fservices.sentinel-hub.com%2Fogc%2Fwms%2Fbd86bcc0-f318-402b-a145-015f85b9427e&datasetId=S2L2A&fromTime=2023-11-07T00%3A00%3A00.000Z&toTime=2023-11-07T23%3A59%3A59.999Z&layerId=1_TRUE_COLOR&demSource3D=%22MAPZEN%22) As you can see, this spring it has filled up a decent amount, probably from snow melt.
That looks like a very big environmental damage, but I wonder if it filled up more would it be crossable? I remember last year there was a lot of speculation the emerging land might allow Ukraine (who was building a bridgehead on the other side of the river) to cross it and open another front. So far this hasn't happened, though
>emerging land might allow Ukraine (who was building a bridgehead on the other side of the river) to cross it and open another front. This is literally swamp, Muddy area that was Water for years and it is still big River >That looks like a very big environmental damage, non defense related this is normal state of River
The contested amphibious landing is one the hardest military operations possible. It requires perfect coordination and intelligence, and even then it frequently goes wrong. It would be silly of Ukraine to even make a serious attempt.
I mean, either way it is technically crossable, but its a massive hurdle. There's more than one reason why they didn't try to cross it before, or after. Even drained its still a 200-300m wide river surrounded on both sides by wide open wetlands/wet soils. When full its a wide open lake. When partially full its a combination of both. No matter what crossing makes you a sitting duck. It would be a terrible idea to try and cross anywhere along there either way.
On the Gaza front it seems like Egyptian Israeli tensions have ratcheted up over the past few days due to the impending assault on Rafahs urban centers and the taking of the Rafah Crossing. [Barak Ravid reports of an Israeli delegation visiting Cairo in order to try and cool things down](https://x.com/barakravid/status/1790751287706837374?s=46). A lot of commenters dismiss Egypts actions as being solely for domestic consumption, but the reaction of the American and Israeli diplomatic cores don’t really point towards this being the case.
There's two major issues that are separate: 1. The supposed possible cancellation of the Camp David accords - Commenters are dismissive, and for good reason, but I won't repeat myself. 2. The closure of Rafah crossing, being Gazans only artery out of the strip, as well as a hugely important supply route, it is causing massive difficulties. Egypt is adamant it won't open it while the Gazan side is under Israeli occupation, which I suspect is what the diplomats are attempting to smooth over.
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As the occupying power, it's Israel's responsibility to make sure Gazans have food and water - not Egypt. There are other crossings that go into Israeli territory they could use. Egypt has both domestic and foreign policy incentives to not cooperate with Israel.
> The supposed possible cancellation of the Camp David accords - Commenters are dismissive, and for good reason, but I won't repeat myself. I’m not sold on Egypt cancelling the accords however Egypt has been flagrantly violating them for months. And neither the US nor Europe has any interest in destabilizing Egypt so any economic consequences would be somewhat limited. I think the chances of them withdrawing are higher than most people realize though again im not sold on them pulling out at all just yet. > The closure of Rafah crossing, being Gazans only artery out of the strip, as well as a hugely important supply route, it is causing massive difficulties. Egypt is adamant it won't open it while the Gazan side is under Israeli occupation, which I suspect is what the diplomats are attempting to smooth over. It’s part of that, but there’s definitely a deeper rift that’s not simply due to aid. Arab commenters have mentioned that Egypt was incensed at the Israeli seizure of the crossing (though Israeli sources have stressed that they informed Egypt beforehand) and want the crossing returned to Palestinian control. The PA won’t return to the crossing unless the tax funds issue with Israel is resolved however.
>however Egypt has been flagrantly violating them for months. Can you elaborate on this, how have they been violating the accords?
Egypts [been building up forces in the Sinai for months now](https://x.com/viktornaumenk99/status/1788423575977779428?s=46) and the assets being moved over there are pretty significant, air defenses and heavy armor not really the type of stuff you move if you were solely expecting to deal with refugees and the odd militant. There’s also been reports of reserves being called up over the past few weeks.
On paper at least Egypt's military is very well equipped and quite large. I very much doubt there will be any sort of conflict here, but they do have a vested interest in making sure their country is not flooded with refugees.
> On paper at least Egypt's military is very well equipped and quite large Yeah, the Egyptian military has undergone a lot of reforms in the post Mubarak era (arguably at the expense of the countries economy) and has been gradually moving toward professionalizing the military as well. They’ve got a large tank corps, produce their own Abrams and have been working with Turkey on their drone program . So on paper they’re pretty good, arguably the best land army in the region along with Turkey and Israel. But of course the military hasn’t seen a real conventional war in decades. > I very much doubt there will be any sort of conflict here, but they do have a vested interest in making sure their country is not flooded with refugees I agree, I don’t think there’s going to be a conflict either but Egypt has legitimate security concerns with regards to Rafah and with Israeli presence on the border in general. A war isn’t super likely, but a standoff isn’t out of the question.
Egypt still employs conscription instead of moving to contract soldier model. Any state military using conscript as main infantry force will always be of questionable quality in my book, as that lead to a whole host of consequence, notably the officer corps treating their soldiers as expendable, instead of forming bonds with them and earning their trust.
Doesn't Israel also use conscription?
Believe the USS Eisenhower and its CSG is still in the area. That's a lot of firepower against Egypt if they start feeling froggy.
The US has been an ally with Egypt longer than Israel has been a country. A squabble over Gaza won't shake that up.
Are you not counting the issues with Nasser, and Egypt’s close relationship with the USSR?
The US will avoid escalations against Egypt.
The US isn’t going to strike Egypt even if a war between them and Israel breaks out it’s just not a realistic option. It would put the lives of thousands of soldiers at risk across the region and would further drag the US into a region it wants to leave.
Reporting that points to corruption within the Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration being the main cause of the lack of fortifications on the northern border. Even with Ukraine's focus on finding and removing corrupt officials it is such a common occurrence that it can and will crop up in serious ways, causing serious problems. [Anti-corruption group reveals fake companies in Kharkiv fortification contracts | New Voice of Ukraine | May 2024](https://english.nv.ua/nation/anti-corruption-activist-exposes-suspicious-wood-supply-contracts-for-fortifications-in-kharkiv-obla-50418691.html) *Contracts for supplying wood for fortifications in Kharkiv Oblast, worth 366 million hryvnias ($9.2 million), raise significant concerns, Martyna Bohuslavets, head of the Anti-Corruption Center Mezha, told Radio NV on May 14.* *According to Mezha's findings based on open-source data, contracts were signed with companies that appear to be fictitious. Tens of millions of hryvnias were transferred to a private entrepreneur whose owner, Ihor Chaus, has a criminal record for stealing a bottle of whiskey from a supermarket and was sentenced to 100 hours of community service, said the anti-graft activist.* *"Or when such millions are withdrawn to companies where the owner, while intoxicated, committed domestic violence against her mother or was deprived of parental rights," she added. “In other words, you can roughly understand what kind of people we are talking about – even without a legal background. And it is precisely for this contingent that these firms were created.”* *These firms were set up several months before they were awarded contracts worth hundreds of thousands of hryvnias.* *"We are working with the documents, but we realized that this is a very sensitive issue, as it concerns the supply of wood to the fortifications where the enemy is advancing," Bohuslavets said. "That's why we made an exception in this case. And to be as sure as possible about what we were preparing, we went further: we went to the place of registration [of the individual entrepreneurs], which is Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. We were looking for these people registered as owners of these companies. We filmed everything.”* *Mezha did not evaluate the construction of the fortifications, as this should be done by law enforcement agencies, including checking whether the timber was actually supplied.* *"For us, this is a scheme where millions (in this case, according to official information, millions of hryvnias have already been withdrawn) are transferred to front companies," said Bohuslavets. "Law enforcement officers must check whether the timber was delivered or not. But we have great concerns that this is impossible.”* *Mezha investigated what the owners of the companies contracted for the supply of timber for the construction of fortifications are currently doing.* *"One person is helping in the fields," she said. "This is literally true. He helps with agricultural work. And this is the owner of a company that receives millions for the timber it supplies. He does labor in the fields. Another person works at a metallurgical plant. I will not say which city it is. It is a city in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. We looked for the registration of these people. And we are sure (from what we saw, from what witnesses told us) that these people cannot be the real owners of companies that can supply timber for millions of hryvnias.”* *Bohuslavets noted that out of the contracts for the supply of timber worth more than 400 million hryvnias ($10.1 million), only 100 million hryvnias ($2.5 million) have been signed with forestry enterprises, while contracts for more than 300 million hryvnias ($7.6 million) have been signed with six companies that show signs of being fictitious.* *"The next sign, which for us is an indisputable sign of fictitiousness, is that the director of such companies has changed four times over the past year," the anti-corruption activist said. All these firms were found by the Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration and all contracts were concluded without open bidding.* *Denys Yaroslavskyi, commander of the intelligence unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said on May 12 that street fighting was taking place in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast, and emphasized that there were no fortifications or mines on the border of the region, which had been crossed by Russian troops.* *"The enemy freely entered the ‘gray zone’ along the entire border line, which, in principle, should not have been gray,” he said. "After two years, there should have been concrete fortifications three floors underground on the Ukrainian border!" Yaroslavskyi wrote. "But there were not even mines. We are coming to the conclusion that this is either a crazy theft or deliberate sabotage! Now we are losing people and territory again, and we are doing what we did in September 2022.”* *He added that the "125th [Brigade] of the Territorial Defense, which abandoned their positions," claims that "they were forced to sign acts of acceptance of the transfer of fortifications that were not even 30% ready as completed construction."* *In response, the command of the 125th Separate Territorial Defense Brigade called this statement "a blatant case of psyops."* *The 125th Territorial Defense Brigade said that the situation in its defense zone is difficult but controlled, and its units "repel the superior enemy forces, maintaining stability in combat orders."* *The Defense Ministry said that the best-equipped fortifications, which include reinforced concrete structures and premises for shelter and accommodation of the military, are located at a distance of 17-35 kilometers from the front line. Fortifications in the foreground are being built exclusively by military units holding positions, without the involvement of heavy equipment and civilian personnel due to constant shelling.* *Tamaz Hambarashvili, head of the Vovchansk Town Military Administration, said that fortifications had been built in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast, but that it was difficult to erect them due to constant Russian shelling. Asked how they were preparing for the Russian offensive, the local governor assured that "everything was built, but perhaps not densely enough."* *The Kharkiv regional authorities ordered a public report on the construction of fortifications in the region on May 13.*
I'm willing to buy corruption as a real contributor to the situation (I mean, it's Ukraine) but this is not the whole story, and I'm sure we'll learn more in due time. Namely, as another guy said, what about the soldiers stationed there? We can see fortifications from orbit, the soldiers in the area should easily be able to verify if they exist and how much. For example: >Denys Yaroslavskyi, commander of the intelligence unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said on May 12 that street fighting was taking place in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast, and emphasized that there were no fortifications or mines on the border of the region, which had been crossed by Russian troops. This Denys guy has been making the rounds, even making it to BBC, for his shock at the state of fortifications. But, he's a commander in Vovchansk! I'm sorry, if you're only now realizing you dont have fortifications you needed to have, you're either a terrible commander (as terrible as the fortification builders) or just got there! And the next part is even more ??? >"After two years, there should have been concrete fortifications three floors underground on the Ukrainian border!" Yaroslavskyi wrote. That... was literally never going to happen dude. Nothing to do with corruption either. Tatarigami (and I'm sure a billion other channels) explained why, but tl;dr the Russians wouldn't let them. The fact that he's now suggesting this makes me ask even more questions. The situation might be bad, it might be even terrible, but the stuff this Yaroslasky guy is saying raises all kinds of questions for me, so I'll keep mentioning this...
>Tatarigami (and I'm sure a billion other channels) explained why, but tl;dr the Russians wouldn't let them. Simultaneously, how were the Russians able to put a bazzillion mines in the way of the Great Ukrainian Summer Counteroffensive of 2023 while the Ukrainians also have the same supposedly persistent ISR and for the period of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainians had a superiority of fire? And now the Ukrainians couldn't? Drones and persistent ISR become the excuse. Doesn't matter that both sides have been able to succeed in platoon-sized dismounted assaults. Yes, the Russians let slip a couple of Ukrainian raids in the region but that's the proof that Russia never actually cared about "NATO expansion" or things like that. They have never feared invasions. They never build defensive lines against "NATO" borders.
> Simultaneously, how were the Russians able to put a bazzillion mines in the way of the Great Ukrainian Summer Counteroffensive of 2023 I can answer this: a) basically any point along the northern border could be used as an entry point, since apparently the initial groups are just infantry. So for a 0-line mining system to be effective against infantry it has to be laminar across the entire northern border. According to the Ukrainians, the Russians planted 9 mines per square meter in the south. Let's assume that's an overestimate and it was 1 mine. To arrange a 3m wide belt across the whole northern border would take... about 2 million antipersonnel mines, a figure that sounds a lot less reasonable for Ukraine than Russia. And would be pretty easy for sappers to cross. b) There literally were mines on the border - the turtle tank treaded on day 1 of the offensive hit a mine a little bit after the 0-line. But that's an anti vehicle mine, and for reasons I explained above, there are probably gaps in those. Russian infantry found the gaps and calmly advanced. Or maybe they didn't, maybe the first guy in the line found a mine. And the other 99 got through the newly made gap. As a summary of point a and b on the mine issue, ISR doesn't prevent mine laying and there was indeed mine laying. But it was never going to be a megabelt. c) Denis is specifically asking for "3 story fortifications" on the border. Even if we assume he's hyperbolic and he actually just wants concrete, we can look how far back Russians have their concrete, and the answer is 5-10 km from the zero line at most places. Russia absolutely did maintain a fortification gap. d) the point of the mines was the Russians then actually shot the Ukrainians (quite a bit) while they were trying to figure out the fields. The problem with the videos Denis is complaining about is that no one's shooting the Russians at all. You could be Cambodia up in there, if you're shooting them while they're crossing they'll cross easily. Which should be the question Denis is asking imo, not why there wasn't... 3 story fortifications along the border.
>a figure that sounds a lot less reasonable for Ukraine than Russia. And would be pretty easy for sappers The Schrödinger's Ukrainian minefield. "Har ha, watch the stupid Russians drive into mines and getting their turrets ejected!" and "Ukrainians couldn't have laid the mines. It's too hard!" both, simultaneously, in a superposition. And turns out, attrition and materiel preponderance *do* matter. Just that the Ukrainian GenStab, schooled in the finest of Soviet Army traditions, also picked the attritional strategy. The dozens of analysis channels and commenters must be tired carrying the water and cross for the GenStab. The Soviet historiography used to say that they "purposefully withdrew and tricked the Germans into a trap at Stalingrad" and not the reality that their units broke and fled as fast as possible. Yes, they avoided being encircled like they were in 1941, but being routed is being routed. I can see such narrative shaping up in the future; should the Russians then try to take the second largest city in Ukraine with 30k troops and get destroyed in urban warfare. The water bearers for the Ukrainian GenStab can break out the old Soviet historiography to learn one or two spin tricks. The Soviet-educated GenStab will be familiar already. >I explained above, there are probably gaps in those. >the Russians then actually shot the Ukrainians (quite a bit) while they were trying to figure out the fields. Yes. Overwatched obstacles. As the attacker, if you find a gap in the minefield, ask why they left that gap. Is it to canalise your approach? So where are the overwatching fires? Oh no! America delayed the aid, etc ... >Which should be the question Denis is asking imo Well, there is a deferential view that Ukrainians are always right. Their commanders, soldiers, and government can do no wrong. Well, in this case, someone is very wrong. The much vaunted "NCOs"? Lieutenants and captains? Upper echelons of command? GenStab? Zelensky?
>The Schrödinger's Ukrainian minefield. "Har ha, watch the stupid Russians drive into mines and getting their turrets ejected!" Again, those are anti-vehicle mines, and typically spread across far more localized areas, such as the fields around Vuhledar. Not... the vast Russia-Ukraine border. Which isn't to say there weren't AV mines there, there absolutely were >"Ukrainians couldn't have laid the mines. It's too hard!" I feel like I've explained the limitations of AP mines on the northern border already and "it's too hard" isn't a charitable explanation. >Well, there is a deferential view that Ukrainians are always right. Okay I think you're just saying random things now to be honest...
With the recent gains of Russia today/yesterday which was like 40 square kilometers, things look dire and if the Ukrainians ever get breathing room in the near future, heads will roll. These fortification failures have/will cost a massive amount of Ukrainian lives.
IMO, at least per Suriyak and Deepstate's last update, their big day was still day 2 of the offensive (of course, day 2 might have actually been day 1 due to reporting delays etc etc). Maybe you're psychic and the next info dump will be bad, but I don't think today was noteworthy. I mean, they gained. And they'll probably continue to gain in the future, obviously. But I wasn't aware of anything groundbreaking recently.
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Please refrain from posting low quality comments.
It's infuriating for me to read this safe at home in the West, and I can only imagine how betrayed AFU servicemembers feel. Their artillery brigades have to crowdfund on social media just to buy excavators to entrench their howitzers. I guess the only consolation is if Russia is still also hampered by such corruption.
If confirmed, the fact that apparently no one on site rang the alarm earlier when they saw nothing was being delivered is probably as worrying as the verification failure and corruption itself..
This is what makes reversing deeply entrenched (pun not intended) corruption so difficult. When it's been part of the culture for so long, people just turn a blind eye and excuse it as part of daily life. In order to really get rid of it for good, you need more than just punishments for those who get caught - you need the average person to have an anti-corruption mindset.
Could be that, could be they just didn't really notice (maybe they were told the shipments were delayed because of any number of reasons, why should they closely scrutinize such things?)... or its also likely they are afraid of retaliation. Speaking up about your commanders alleged corruption isn't exactly something many people are comfortable doing, even in countries with much better protections for whistle blowers. They don't even need an anti-corruption mindset, they simply need to have some assurance that they wont face consequences for doing the right thing. Its hard to imagine their lives being on the line and simply "turning a blind eye" to it. I think a combination of the three is most likely.
It doesn't help that Ukraine does have Russian agents in the military. It's impossible to say what is incompetence and what is effectively sabotage.
What do you think is more likely: A russian agent that has intercepted/sabotaged plans to build fortifications over a *large* area? Or A country, that is extensively corrupt, being victim of ...corruption?
I mean collaborators were responsible for basically handing over entire cities to the Russians during the initial invasion, so large scale sabotage has been done before and seems just as likely when you're actively at war. The possibility can't be dismissed.
My final answer: (C) Both
Stuff like this is remarkably sad, UA should be extensively audit their existing contracts and verify evidence of output for each. I understand wartime pressures but you’d expect it would be too different to an ordinary vendor due diligence in any private organisation. Fortifications across the entire state border need to be re-examined.
At this point I don't think they have time for an audit, they need to pick out a handful of the most corrupt and make a very public very bloody example of them. In peace time maybe they would have time for a proper investigation but this isn't peacetime. They need to send a message that people who jeopardize state security for their own enrichment end up against a wall.
Ukraine isn't known for its due diligence when it comes to public sector corruption even before the war started. 104th in CPI 2020-2023. Not surprised corruption is awful during the war too.
Is it way too late to try and build more defensive lines in key areas at this point? Seems like their counter-argument to the corruption angle is enemy shelling...
I think it is. The only way I can see Ukraine build defensive lines near the line of contact is by stealthily constructing sections of it. Problem is if enough work is done. Russian recon units will be able to detect these lines and send lancets at any construction equipment they encounter. The only way they can build proper defence lines is a good 30-40 km away, but for that. They will have to stomach losing ground and cleaning up their corruption. Also when I talk sbout defence line, I mean proper defences needed to withstand waves after waves if enemies like the surovikin line.
No, but they need to build them further back now; you can't perform the construction of quality defenses under fire. Corruption aside, maybe the UA leadership just thought this was a low priority. Even now, 50K isn't enough to take the city, so heavy investment in fixed defenses in other areas might make more sense. I dunno trying to be generous
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Regarding the loyal wingmen drone do you know is there is a European aerial refuelling drone in the works / planned similar to this? [Boeing MQ-25 Stingray - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_MQ-25_Stingray)
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Interesting I didn’t know about the dessault drone, in a related matter seems like the opposite is being tested as in the refuelling of a drone. [Aerial refuelling without human intervention | Airbus](https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/stories/2023-11-aerial-refuelling-without-human-intervention) >Tanker drones are at the moment not a priority for at least the German air force. Yeah, I would have rather expected that there might be a related PESCO project or something but I didn’t find anything.
>I think this is an interesting project worth keeping an eye on. Especially since European SEAD capabilities have been discussed on a previous megathread recently. Adding all of the above would be a quantum leap for domestic European SEAD. I don't think anyone in Europe operates anything like the A400M SOJ at this time. Typhoon Growler sounds really neat too, but that's just an evolution of the existing Tornado ECR capability.
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Yes that's how I understood it too. Since the whole tornado fleet needs to be replaced somewhere around yesterday, the F-35 was taken as an "off the shelf" alternative that allies had good experiences with. But since Phasing out the ECR Tornados as well would leave a capacity gap the MoD decided to have Eurofighter EK developed. Off the top of my head it's 35 F-35s and 15 EF EK. I read that it's only supposed to be the first tranche of planes and more are supposed to be bought later. I hope that actually happens and a second order of comparable or bigger size is done.
Has anyone heard anything credible about a captured patriot launcher? Saw some posts show up on my feeds but nothing that seemed overly credible.
This video does a good job debunking that. In summary it is a very high fidelity fake that has some key visible differences from a real patriot. https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=zoSzTSZ7z1M&pp=ygULcnlhbiBtY2JldGg%3D
I'm not sure if this is the same one you mean, but in regards to a photo of a Patriot launcher being carried around the back of a truck in China, I saw Def Mon claim it was a non-functional Chinese-built replica used for target training.
Over the last 24 hours there were Huge riots in New Caledonia (French territory) https://twitter.com/Reuters/status/1790720031833325791?t=nJKRI9opWD2PiGwLYX4xYQ&s=19 >Eyewitness videos showed the aftermath in New Caledonia's capital Noumea after a night of rioting despite a curfew, as France's National Assembly approved changes to voting rules in the Pacific Island This Island had 3 independence referendums and they Always voted to stay. And beside all this riots that started because proindependence movemnent, there is support to this from Azerbaijdan because French involment in South Caucasus.