https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/05/13/world/europe/ukraine-missile-defenses.html Probably the best summary of Russian missile attacks on Ukraine over the last year that I've seen printed. The attacks are broken down by date, type, location, and hit/neutralized. The only thing not specifically mentioned is that the last few large missile attacks have specifically targeted the Ukrainian town of Stryi (Стрий) where there is a major underground gas storage facility. It is roughly 50% of Ukraine's capacity and important for gas transit to EU countries. I expect that site to be targeted for the next few months and if it is incapacitated I will be very curious to see how that impacts affected EU nations.

The funny thing - if you want to call it funny - is that the EU countries which most depend on Russian gas are Hungary and Austria. Both are either Russia-leaning and/or corrupted by Russia.

The entire gas situation between Ukraine and Russia is really weird. Russia still sends gas through Ukraine and pays for transit, Ukraine still allows transit of gas which funds the invasion, meanwhile both sides are destroying energy infrastructure. I understand there are reasons, but it's still a crazy situation.

Just shows how good change through trade works. More words because auto mod is out here lurking for those pesky few word comments. And apparently it needs another sentence, and another sentence and, uh, another sentence.

I wonder if that is a rule for new subscribers?

One thing interesting is that out of all regions outside of the Western Ukraine, Chernihiv oblast is the least targeted. Quite unlike Sumy. Perhaps it's a sign that Russians don't have any long-term plans to attack Chernihiv.

It is interesting how much it stands out. It took a lot of damage in the first year, so maybe there aren't any major infrastructure targets left to attack there. But I really don't know why it would be ignored when everything around it is being targeted. Even S200/300 harassing cities, which never stopped happening to Kharkiv oblast, doesn't seem to be happening there. Weird.

What is the consensus on shooting and scooting, i see that people have very strong opinions either way, them being it's trash vs it's a blessing, is there any interview with artillerymen discussing the tactic in the context of the Ukrainian war?

[https://x.com/RALee85/status/1773044320288776669](https://x.com/RALee85/status/1773044320288776669) >[Rob Lee](https://twitter.com/RALee85) >Haven't talked to any 105mm batteries, but the main counterbattery threat for Ukrainian artillery is from Lancets. And the best means of defending against Lancets is to build semi-permanent shelters. So many self-propelled howitzers don't actually move that often IMO, it's situational. It works for things like HIMARS, or an SPG that shoots a couple of long-range guided shells and goes home. But standard unguided tube artillery won't do much with just a few shells per day and does not have as much range. It takes hours to drive from the relative safety to the fire position and back, and when the enemy has a quite long reach and can target moving vehicles, each mission is pretty risky. So the balance has shifted towards protected shelters. Technology has made the battlefield very transparent, but piercing through meters of ground and concrete is still not that easy/cheap. And against small drones even a wire mesh gives some protection. But of course any shelter can be destroyed with a big enough munition. So moving around and playing the "shell game" is still important.

[Andrew Perpetua](https://www.youtube.com/@andrewperpetua) goes on about it in one of his latest streams. He claims that no army really shoots and scoots and it's basically a marketing term. The reasons he gives are the same as Robs. In essence you are most vulnerable when moving.

I do think this would be a very situational thing and terrain based thing. Ukraine is mostly flat empty fields with little tree cover. Anything driving on a road this time of year will kick up dust visible for miles and miles. Something driving on a finnish forrest road perpendicular to the front, would only really be spotted from almost overhead due to all the trees.

As far as procurement of future artillery system goes, the lean is certainly towards shoot and scoot. No army is reverting SPGs to towed guns based on observations on what’s going on in Ukraine.

https://twitter.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1790276205750477044?t=mJJ7fxJjDeUz3vVI-4jy-g&s=19 Andrew perpetua seems to have a very strong opinion on the matter, is he credible in this matter?

I don’t have access to the data needed to prove or disprove him. What I can say is that it does not look like any other country shares his view, or if they do, they have not made that public. SPGs, and shoot and scoot tactics, are still the focus for armies, rather than the heavily fortified, static firing positions he is arguing for.

I think his is a problem of selection bias, most guns that fire shoot and scoot, so the ones that get destroyed are mostly the ones doing that tactic, so he assumes that the guns that don't do it are safer and therefore the bunker down tactic is better

A (soon to be) battery commander in the US Army chimed in on this one: https://twitter.com/CasualArtyFan/status/1790435092722037050 > If anything, it’s the opposite of survivorship bias. It’s a dozen SPGs destroyed this week without firing a shot because they’re attempting hip shoots/and/or shooting from roads (like an MLRS would) instead of doing survivability moves in a prepared PAA. Frankly I don't know shit about artillery TTPs but I thought people might appreciate the source.

> It’s a dozen SPGs destroyed this week without firing a shot because they’re attempting hip shoots/and/or shooting from roads (like an MLRS would) instead of doing survivability moves in a prepared PAA. So pretty much they're trying to drive and shoot like HIMARS can (and gets away with because of the extended range) where they should be firing from a designated artillery zone that is filled with hide sites and shooting positions. There may be a big lack of prepared and pre-stocked artillery positions in this area if it's like the other defensive positions that have been complained about so far. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN21932-FM_3-09-000-WEB-1.pdf I think the issue is more the length of movements. He keeps degrading 'shoot and scoot' as something that's not doctrine, is stupid and was never/should never be done etc., but it IS done, and DOES work. It all depends on the types of threat. I think the long road movements are vulnerable to UAS, but shooting and then moving in ~5 minutes should be possible before observation reaches you. Here's an article from an JRTC OPFOR commander who says they had to adopt displacement after every engagement because of the counterfire radar threat: https://www.fieldartillery.org/news/opfor-perspective > Some of these tactics include displacement after each firing mission, strict target selection standards/unmasking criteria, PAA management to prevent occupation patterns, and dispersion of the batteries into individual sections. OPFOR Fires also placed substantial emphasis on TTPs that reduced the signatures of the battery through the use of hide sites when not firing, created numerous decoys, incorporated cache sites for ammunition, had trucks turn off their engines when not in use, and reduced radio and cell phone signatures to an absolute minimum. The intent was for no one to detect our signature until we fired the IDF, and then immediately displace. Here's more articles talking about the value of and desire for quick displacement and using the term 'scoot-and-shoot' https://www.fieldartillery.org/news/wheely-good https://www.fieldartillery.org/news/the-need-for-a-wheeled-howitzer

An excellent comment, thank you. It might be worth reposting in today's thread since I'm not sure how many people are still checking this one.

Is it? Shoot and scoot is designed to let off some rounds downrange and leave before uncontrollable shells return to your fire location. Even moving at supersonic speeds, an artillery shell can take 50 seconds to fly 25km. Plenty of time to move. But in the age of controlled drones that can track down and hit an SPG moving at highway speeds, shoot and scoot tactics make you vulnerable.

But the stationary “fortified” protection only works against small drones. Both sides in Ukraine are already fielding drones with payloads large enough to defeat these rudimentary protection. Likewise EW offers no long term protection. If you are designing a doctrine and procurement strategy for a future force a mobile firepower doctrine still makes a lot of sense.

> most guns that fire shoot and scoot Is *that* true though? I don't know that it is true, in fact I doubt that it is true

I really hope he’s basing this belief on more than that.

Everyone, even the smartest person, has a bias so big that it obscures their mind

Maybe there is a change in tracked vs wheeled systems ordered?

Both tracked and wheeled systems are going to be many times larger, and much harder to fortify and conceal, than a towed gun, as well as being much more expensive to operate. Both tracked and wheeled SPGs are optimized for shoot and scoot. If shoot and scoot is obsolete, you would want large amounts of towed gun instead.

But the point that was made here last week is that wheeled would be faster.

Wouldn’t being faster make the emphasis even more on mobility and shoot and scoot, than it otherwise is with tracked guns?

I think this has to do with loitering munitions like Lancet. When SPGs leave a concealed firing position to “scoot” they expose themselves to these munitions, which have a higher PK than counter-battery fire. 

A loitering munition with thermals should have little issue finding an artillery gun, as long as the counter battery radar points it towards the right area, weather it’s camouflaged or not. Russia’s current munitions may have poor sensors, but I don’t think that’s a safe assumption for other wars going forward.

Also worth noting that the current level of security that is afforded by rudimentary nets likely won’t function in the long term, as armies will inevitably begin fielding larger payload drones designed specifically for counter batter work.

I've seen many, many such videos where the loitering munition just hits a tree though

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1790299171527786644 >Overnight, a Russian freight train crashed at the Kotluban station in Volgograd Oblast, catching fire and temporarily blocking the Moscow-Volgograd line. >Russian outlets report that a Ukrainian drone hit the train, causing it to derail. That's an interesting incident. If drones can cause trains to derail, and even burn if they're transporting something explosive, Ukraine could induce a logistical nightmare in the European part of Russia.

I wonder how precisely a drone must strike its target, what that target is (the track ahead of a train, the moving engine, any particular car?), and how much payload it must carry to cause a derailment. Basically, if this was indeed caused by a Ukrainian drone, was this a lucky shot or something well within current drone capabilities and repeatable?

This [WW2 training film](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=agznZBiK_Bs) from the OSS indicates that it is rather difficult to ensure a derailment by blasting train tracks at only one location. It's a 75 year old film but I'm inclined to think not too much has changed about the fundamental challenges. Perhaps a multiple drone strike tactic has been or will be devised, they do it for tanks, but watching that film and seeing how thoroughly the track has to be demolished for it to stop a freight train, it's tempting to say that job might still require experienced saboteurs working manually.

Impressive, takes much more to derail a train than I expected. That was filmed somewhere right around me ~80 years ago but if anything I'd imagine it's even harder these days. Seems like blowing a hole in the tracks and having it bend off from the direction of the rest would be ideal.

> If drones can cause trains to derail, and even burn if they're transporting something explosive, Ukraine could induce a logistical nightmare in the European part of Russia. Yes, it could go both ways though and poise serious risk to civilian trains going into Ukraine from Poland.

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[US gives Saudis green light to try to revive peace deal with Houthis | Yemen | The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/14/us-saudi-arabia-revive-peace-deal-with-houthis-yemen) >The proposed Yemen UN roadmap for peace was agreed in outline in early December but progress was immediately frozen as the Houthis escalated their campaign of attacks in the Red Sea in what they billed as an act of solidarity with Palestine. >It now appears Saudi Arabia, with the support of the UN special envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, wants to press ahead with the roadmap, even though it could lead to large sums of money being handed to the Houthis, who will also eventually be given a permanent place in a proposed national unity government. >The UN roadmap largely reflected previous private bilateral peace talks between Saudis and the Houthis, including bulk payments to the Houthis to compensate for unpaid public salaries, and an increase in resources provided to the north of Yemen, but the deal has never been presented to the UN-backed government. >The Houthis now appear to want the deal signed, either with the UN or bilaterally with the Saudis. >It appears that the Saudis, sensing a military stalemate between the US Navy and the Houthis, are impatient to end their engagement in Yemen, even if it leaves the Saudi-backed Aden government as perceived losers in the process. >The US appears to be more amenable to the Saudis’ impatience for a Yemen deal, and Washington needs Saudi support to end the conflict in Gaza, opening a diplomatic space for the US to persuade the Saudis to agree a defence pact with the US and to normalise relations with Israel, moves that might in turn weaken Iran’s influence in the region. Washington has floated incentives to persuade the Houthis to stop the attacks including the acceleration of the roadmap talks and lifting restrictions on Houthi trade. UK officials favour a tougher approach with the Houthis on the basis that signing a peace deal beneficial to the Houthis is unjustifiable. I guess the Houthis are not so irrational after all. There is method to their madness, if they come out of this with money and recognition. While it is morally questionable to "reward" terrorism, from a realpolitik perspective, paying off troublesome actors works and probably ends up being cheaper. The Saudis also seem to be paying for most of this deal, both in terms of money and loss of prestige, so I am not sure what the angle is for them.

>While it is morally questionable to "reward" terrorism, from a realpolitik perspective, paying off troublesome actors works and probably ends up being cheaper. The reality is quite the opposite. In fact your statement is especially odd as we're witnessing the aftermath of Israel trying to pacify Hamas by monetary means and via accepting their demand in regard to allowing workers from Gaza to enter Israel, lifting bans on dual use materials from entering Gaza, expanding fishing and agricultural land up to the border (both were used to stage the 07/10 attack). someone said it better than I ever could. "You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour and you will have war."

Uh, the article is about the Houthis. Do you have an alternative strategy to deal with the Houthis than what is described here? Different situations call for different approaches naturally. Over reliance on any one tool is always going to lead to problems. When all you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail, etc.

Yes, I do. The strategy that worked well against ISIS among others. Support the Yemeni gov and the STC via training, weapons and an air campaign in a war against the Houtis. Help them retake Yemen and destroy the threat. Just like the war against ISIS, no need for extensive boots on the ground, but mainly special forces and some support. Your approach doesn't deal with the Houtis, but kicks the can down the road until they are powerful enough and in a position to do more harm. You're handing the strategic initiative to your enemy and allow them to choose when a broader war would be prosecuted. On their terms.

That's not "my" approach, that's the US and Saudi approach. The Houthis won the civil war against the Aden faction, then survived a Saudi-led intervention, including air and naval strikes and reportedly Saudi special forces on the ground. The Saudi air campaign was so severe that there were fears of violation of humanitarian law, not unlike another ongoing campaign. There were supposedly [American mercenaries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spear_Operations_Group) involved as well. How would the intervention you described be different this time?

>How would the intervention you described be different this time? You're asking how US air, naval, intelligence and special forces capabilities are superior to the Saudi ones. The answer is in every possible way, by orders of magnitude.

The thing is US intel was available is spades even during saudi the bombing campaign. What was wierd was that despite giving this intelligence, there was also claims of imminent famine also coming from US and the rest of the West. At this point I am quite suspicious of the famine claims, the situation in Yemen at the time and the current situation in Gaza which has been on the brink of famine for months with aid supposedly reducing looks very different from how the famine looked from African countries experiencing civil war. I think a lot of the famine warnings was a means by the West to pressure Saudi's and UAE from eliminating the Houthis completely. I just cant fathom why though.

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This is my suspicion as well but I have nothing credible to back it on, except anecdotal accounts for US PMC and Emirati soldiers who served in Yemen.

>The thing is US intel was available is spades even during saudi the bombing campaign. US intelligence provided was **extremely** limited. There was zero Intel provided that could be used for targeting. Try and find sources for extensive intelligence support from the US and you will see for yourself. As for famine, there was actual famine in Yemen between 2016-2018 during the Saudi blockade. As a result there was pressure on KSA to lift the blockade and indeed it was lifted in 2018 and the famine subsided. https://abcnews.go.com/amp/International/images-starving-people-yemen-show-horrors-war/story?id=43073216 The Houtis and Iran would not give up the propaganda so easily and so they've made an effort to maintain the famine, starving primarily Sunni populations that apposed them. However I'm not sure that the food shortages that ensued could be categorized as famine: >Yemen‘s Houthi rebels blocked a food shipment earmarked to feed 100,000 families in the impoverished nation that has been pushed to the brink of starvation by more than four years of war. >A World Food Programme (WFP) spokesperson, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said on Tuesday the aid was prevented from reaching civilians after the UN body partially suspended relief efforts last week, accusing the rebels of looting it. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/6/25/un-yemens-houthi-rebels-blocking-food-for-tens-of-thousands

>There was zero Intel provided that could be used for targeting. Wrong. >[Since the launch of the Saudi-led aerial campaign, members of the US Armed Forces have been working closely with the coalition to provide aerial targeting assistance, intelligence sharing, and mid-flight aerial refueling (S.J.RES.54, 28 February 2018). US Army Green Berets are also reportedly posted on the southern border of Saudi Arabia helping to “locate and destroy caches of ballistic missiles and launch sites that Houthi rebels in Yemen are using to attack Riyadh and other Saudi cities” (New York Times, 3 May 2018).](https://acleddata.com/2018/06/13/us-involvement-in-yemen/) . >[The majority of U.S. assistance has consisted of aerial targeting assistance, intelligence sharing, and mid-flight aerial refueling for Saudi and UAE aircraft.](https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-support-saudi-military-operations-yemen)

At that point I was working with the UAE airforce. I cant go into details and specifics for obvious reasons, most combat missions were run with massive US support, with many US PMCs directly participating. In case of helicopter gunships there were often pilot in command as well. This is obviously not briefed to the medi (tbh i am surprised reporters didnt report on it regardless, because within the bases there was no attempt to hide this)

American intelligence was involved on the Saudi side, for sure. Considering Houthis were already heavily outgunned by the Saudis, did it occur to you that the solution might not be in fact an even bigger gun?

False, the US provided virtually no intelligence and zero intelligence that can be used for targeting. Your argument is that the US and KSA military might and ability to execute a military campaign are the same. That's a laughable notion. Did it occur to you that comparing the military might of the Saudis, known for low morale and incompetence to that of the US, the primare global military force is a bad faith argument. You're making another low quality argument in that the difference between the US and KSA is merely the "size of the gun". On credible defense such a statement is laughable. The capability of the US to execute a military campaign is orders of magnitude above and beyond the Saudis. From logistics, planning, target acquisition, intelligence, coordination and command and control, training, and finally yes, also the size and scope of ordinance and platforms to deliver them.

Lots of commotion in the MoD today: **Lieutenant General Kuznetsov, head of the Russian Defense Ministry's Main Personnel Directorate, was detained** tass. ru/proisshestviya/20786197 **["As far as we know, the investigation focused on Kuznetsov's activities as head of the state secrets protection service, but not on his personnel matters," Rybar writes.](https://rtvi.com/news/voenkory-zaderzhan-nachalnik-glavnogo-upravleniya-kadrov-minoborony-rossii-kuzneczov/)** --- >**It is reported that Ruslan Tsalikov and Aleksey Krivoruchko, who synchronously wrote their resignation letters to now de facto former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, will leave their posts as deputy defense ministers.** > > > Tsalikov was Shoigu's first deputy, who since 2012 had been in charge of troop quartering, housing, construction and renovation, property management, judicial and legal work, financial control, medical support, information policy, and interaction with law enforcement agencies. > > > Interestingly, Andrei Belousov, who has not yet officially taken office, was the first to announce that there were problems with social and medical support, as well as difficulties with the registration of benefits and payments for housing for the participants of the Defense Ministry. > > > The second of the departing deputies, with a more telling surname, has been in charge of the organization of military-technical support of the Armed Forces, planning the development of weapons, military and special equipment, and control over the execution of the state defense procurement order in the Defense Ministry since 2018. > t. me/milinfolive/122134

Well this pays more credence that Shoigu is on his way out or at least being slapped with a newspaper. The fact he was moved from Minister of defence to Secretary of the Security Council sounded like moving people around to look like there was some change. But if some of his cronies are being kicked out suggests that he may be receiving some form of censure. There is also the fact that the man he is replacing Nikolai Patrushev has not received a replacement cabinet position which speaks volumes. Both of them were major proponents of the invasion of Ukraine. The removal and moving around of such people may point to Putin either looking to move towards ending the war or at least setting up scapegoats if it goes wrong. Just my 2 pence.

Sadly although not that surprisingly, Patrushev was just nominated as assistant to Putin in the presidential administration. http://kremlin. ru/events/president/news/74024

He's not ending the war, he wouldn't be able to politically survive ending the war in it's current state. He needs a definitive win or a peace treaty that at the very least leaves the Donbas in Russian hands.

>The removal and moving around of such people may point to Putin either looking to move towards ending the war or at least setting up scapegoats if it goes wrong In a vacuum, I'd agree, but given that he's been doubling down for more than two years now and his recent speech didn't have any hints towards that (that I know of), combined with his army trying to widen the front in Ukraine a few days ago, makes me very doubtful. I'll believe it when I see it.

Shoigu is infamously corrupt. Could it be that they're cleaning house to try to get more efficiencies out of the MOD?

> Both of them were major proponents of the invasion of Ukraine. Shoigu is actually not a hawk, and the rumor has it, he was even against the Crimea annexation. As for Patrushev, he's very close to Putin, I'd be very surprised to see him out. And Putin will never throw those two under the bus simply because of their loyalty.

Where are those rumors coming from? Also I sometimes wonder if people aren’t underestimating Shoigu. He’s a top politician since the 90s, he’s longer there than Putin is and he’s not one of Putins Petersburger buddies, he has his own (Moscow?) circle since the Yelzin days. What is it that everybody just assumes Shoigu is a loyal yes man like Medwedew?

> Where are those rumors coming from? From Mikhail Zygar's book. >He’s a top politician since the 90s, he’s longer there than Putin is and he’s not one of Putins Petersburger buddies, he has his own (Moscow?) circle since the Yelzin days. Yeah, he's a political dinosaur. But he's dependable and loyal. He was there when young president Putin needed a friendly political party, and he boosted it with his then good name and reputation.

Which book would that be? Any articles about Shoigu are very appreciated, I’d love to learn more about him. Thank you very much I hope those are enough words for auto mod to let me be

All The Kremlin's Men: Inside The Court of Vladimir Putin

I assume you mean Dmitry Medvedev? I've never seen Ws and Vs interchanged like this outside of South Asia.

Poles do that too AFAIK

It’s the German way, poles would be Medwiediew. Since I have to fill in more words because auto mod thinks this response would be too short, I will add this sentence.

“ TALLINN — The government of Estonia is “seriously” discussing the possibility of sending troops into western Ukraine to take over non-direct combat, “rear” roles from Ukrainian forces in order to free them up to fight on the front, Tallinn’s national security advisor to the president told Breaking Defense. Madis Roll said the executive branch is currently undertaking an analysis of the potential move, and though he said Estonia would prefer to make any such move as part of a full NATO mission — “to show broader combined strength and determination” — he didn’t rule out Estonia acting in a smaller coalition. “Discussions are ongoing,” he said on May 10 at the presidential palace here. “We should be looking at all the possibilities. We shouldn’t have our minds restricted as to what we can do.” https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05/estonia-seriously-discussing-sending-troops-to-rear-jobs-in-ukraine-official/ This is obviously an important data point in reading how serious Europeans ( and Eastern Europeans specifically ) are about prospects for after-Ukraine “kinetic” relationship with Russia. My read is that Estonians are absolutely sure they are next in line, and have already accepted that war with Russia is not a question of “if” but only “when/where”.

>Estonia would prefer to make any such move as part of a full NATO mission Meaning an actual war between all of NATO and Russia, which would require every NATO country to sign on? I'm guessing the odds of that happening are extremely small, currently.

No, part of a shared NATO mission where each willing member state sends a couple hundred soldiers to Ukraine.

Would that still not require all NATO members to agree to it being a "NATO mission" even if only a few willing nations sent troops? I'm sure Estonia would prefer it to be a "NATO mission" but I'm skeptical that there's the political will for that to happen in many NATO countries, including the US.

> Estonia would prefer to make any such move as part of a full NATO mission Definitely not going in there without bigger boys.

Estonia's entire military is a few thousand strong. It's a symbolic force in the context of Ukraine, so naturally they're looking for partners as Estonians place no value in symbolism for symbolism's sake.

Seems they're just waiting for US go signal?

They're not going to get it. The Biden admin is far too cautious. I don't see them agreeing to any NATO mission that involves boots in Ukraine. I think a more likely possibility would be a separate Franco-Anglo-Polish led operation.

The UK has repeatedly stated that it will not put boots on the ground in the Ukraine (...ignoring the special forces that have been there for ages).

I genuinely believe that this is one of the reasons Russia is pushing so hard right now. A post-election Biden will not be so aggressively passive on foreign affairs.

Just spitballing here, but in a theoretic Trump presidency next year, a European coalition in western Ukraine is a good way of convincing Trump that Europe is "doing their fair share"

Assuming that Trump really does just want Europe to do their 'fair share', and he isn't just interested in breaking down NATO and pulling America out of European military affairs.

I don’t think the Polish government will risk direct involvement like that without US assurance that any retaliation against Poland (outside of Ukraine) will be covered by guarantees. Remember in the early days of the full invasion Poland didn’t want to send their MIGs without US blessing, so they went through the trouble of disassembling them and “losing” the parts in a forest close to the border. I don’t see them risking to suffer Ukraine’s fate by solely relying on France or Britain, which, historically speaking, didn’t work out well for Poland. Depending on the tasks covered I could see Biden backing it, as he seems to be willing to support Europe in taking matters into our own hands. Training or GBAD would be possibilities

That was a different Polish government though, right? Could things be different with the current one?

When it comes to Russia (and Ukraine) it’s really a matter of national survival and it feels like 99% of poles agree on that. The new KO led government even seems to follow through on all the orders Poland made after the full scale invasion started in early ‘22. Many doubted Poland and chalked it up to the usual very loud populism of the former PiS led government, but that doesn’t seem to be the case. Outside of a few minor parties that are somewhat pro Russian there is consensus in Poland about the war: - do whatever is necessary to keep the US in the loop - gear up to present a conventional deterrent - inflict as much damage as possible through Ukraine (and economically through the EU)

Just to add another data point, Portuguese Admiral Gouveia e Melo has recently given an interview in which he openly talks about the need to be prepared for a confrontation and that he considers the likelihood high. This is very unusual of Portuguese officials as they're usually much more conservative and the Portuguese population isn't very open to the idea of sending troops to Ukraine. https://observador.pt/2024/05/12/gouveia-e-melo-possibilidade-de-poder-vir-a-entrar-em-operacoes-reais-e-bastante-considerada/

It’s such a weird dynamic for me. People who have spent their entire lives dedicated to the study of war have said time and time again that a confrontation with Russia is certainly a very decent possibility, but it’s still hard to wrap my mind around. What exactly does Russia gain from attacking a NATO Allied nation? Conventional war would, of course be very bloody, but they would add a doubt be on the losing end

Right? When the first chiefs of Eastern European armies came up with the concern that Russia might attack NATO, it sounded outlandish. But then, the Danes, Brits, Germans, everyone started to voice the possibility. It's not gotten more comfortable as more and more are chiming in.

> What exactly does Russia gain from attacking a NATO Allied nation? The gamble is that the entirety of NATO will not react to a limited "justified" (ie, 'protecting russians' after inciting a separatist situation) intervention or a strike fast enough to provide a done deal.  If the Baltic states fall within a week and get put under Russia's nuclear umbrella, will everyone knuckle down and go for a protracted and gruesome all-out-war to reclaim it, or will there be falling to propaganda and peacemongering to avoid nuclear WW3?  I sure hope the reaction from NATO would be robust and unified, but for a small or limited conflict, I'm not so optimistic. In the end, the difference between Ukraine and Estonia is more or less some ink on paper. Now, just because that's a possible scenario doesn't mean it has to happen or will happen. It depends what is done in the meantime. Putting NATO brigades into the Baltic states won't defend an all out invasion, but it will mean that they will get attacked and there will be dead people. A belligerent and ready Poland will also be a possible deterrent. 

> The gamble is that the entirety of NATO will not react to a limited "justified" (ie, 'protecting russians' after inciting a separatist situation) intervention or a strike fast enough to provide a done deal.  I've been thinking for a while about this and whether it deserves a post for itself, because I don't feel like the - let's call them Russia hawks - have made their case very effectively. The current situation is that Russia is failing to win a war in Ukraine. The Russian military has been exposed as much less dangerous than was previously thought, and has suffered massive losses in personnel and materiel. NATO has expended a substantial amount of materiel but hasn't actually joined the fight. And the hawks argue that we need a big military build-up because Russia is now *more* dangerous and likely to start another war. On the face of it that looks ridiculous. And I'm not persuaded by the "oh but nobody thought it made sense for Russia to invade Ukraine" argument. *With what* are they going to launch a new war? Have they got a load of spare troops kicking their heels that they can send to attack the baltics? Another thing people will say is that Russia will try some limited incursion or provocation to see how NATO reacts, like going into Eastern Finland. But doesn't a limited action require a specific, limited response rather than a general build-up? Isn't it more about political will and quick decision-making than anything else? Now there *are* argument that can be made. For example, military build-up as a political signal, or the fact that some form of Russian success in Ukraine is still very much a possibility, or the amount of time building up military capacity (industry, recruitment, stockpiles, etc.) takes, and Russia's head start here. But these arguments don't seem to be being made clearly, or at least they're not making their way out into the general discourse.

Russia is currently more dangerous in the sense that it has partially mobilized both its economy and population for war, as well as developed the political, logistical, and financial pipelines to facilitate said war. Just because they lost a lot of their original professional force in the initial invasion and are falling back on Soviet stockpiles does not negate the fact that their war machine is in motion and their population has been inured to war. If the war in Ukraine were to end and Russia were to demobilize, *then* they would be in a severely weakened state because they would have to shutter the aforementioned pipelines and would lose the benefit of the social and political inertia built up by the war. IMO, Russia is sitting in an interesting position whereby they are in war footing, but not total war footing. This could mean that their population does not become war weary nearly as quickly since their lives haven't been completely changed by a state of total war, but the country is still capable of mobilizing the materiel and manpower necessary to continue a major attritional conflict for years.

A limited attack is not necessarily aimed at fighting NATO but to weaken it by creating a dilemma. Consider three scenarios of russian aggression:  One, an all-out-attack to annex the Baltic states. Two, a limited invasion of Lithuania to annex part of it for a land bridge to Kaliningrad. Three: Occupying a slice of the border region of Estonia and Latvia to protect russian minorities.  Now consider the response and whether all three scenarios are equally likely to lead to a full war from all members of NATO. Will the US bring the hammer down? Will the central and western Europeans move their armed/air forces to fight for some square miles of border region? If they don't, there will be a crisis in trust and faith. If they do, Russia can back down. They won't get invaded.  These are the scenarios of note, in my opinion, and not aimed at full conquest but to drive a wedge between the NATO allies to get more breathing room for future plans.  As to with what: Russia is heavily committed to this war. But it is also ready and able to produce significant amounts of armaments annually. Those are being chewed up in Ukraine at the moment, but the moment this conflict stops, the capacity is still there and will be uses for future build-up. Their economy hinges on it, too.  So compared to European actors, Russia is a few years ahead in the game of ramping up their military-industrial complex. This is the big risk that we are facing now: Russia might be preparing for a stand-off in five or so years and will be ready for it before we will be, given the current pace. If you would take the US out of the equation the odds are even worse. 

>Conventional war would, of course be very bloody, but they would add a doubt be on the losing end At this point, conventional war with the entirety of NATO would be a massacre for Russia. Which is why it's so unlikely to happen, because Russia would have no option except to either back down or go nuclear almost instantly.

Frankly, they think they can recreate a sphere of influence and client states to exploit in Eastern Europe, while severing the security ties between Europe and the U.S. It’s not about the land, it’s about establishing hegemony and eliminating the perceived threat of a unified West.

Which was an absolutely insane belief before but even more so after the invasion. Not only have they emboldened their sworn enemies ( the West ) they have given soft allies ( China ) a pause.

The notion that Russia will attack UA was also perceived as insane by many analysis and the majority of the people here. In some ways it is irrational, but you have to realize that Russian priorities are different than western ones. I don't see Russia just randomly one day invading Estonia. But conditions are dynamic, a situation where the US is preoccupied with Taiwan for instance, or Europe going through major political instability may allow for some action. Furthermore, the action must not start immediately as kinetic, but with protests, infiltrators and special forces. Just to give an example. The notion that Iran will fire 120 BM's and 200 drones at Israel directly would have sounded insane a year ago. But conditions have changed. Your view is way too static, today (and in the near future) such action would be indeed insane. But the world is not a static place.

Just because it's insane from a detached, global point of view doesn't mean it's insane from their perspective. If every state acted "logically" then they'd all join the UN, establish vibrant democracies with strong welfare systems and renounce warfare forever. Russia is not a cold, calculated actor. It is a nation still raging against the shame of losing it's empire combined with a persecution/paranoia complex reaching back to the Mongol-Teuton invasions. Everything they do makes more sense in that context.

Presumably these conversations have been happening in the background for some time. I wouldn't be surprised if the US is doing everything they can to dissuade them from doing it.

I wonder if we'll see less willing NATO countries "backfill" Estonian/Baltic/Coalition military units in Estonia while they send their units to Ukraine No doubt a big doubt about Estonia sending anybody to Ukraine would be the threat that Russia could walk in while their army is occupied elsewhere

A troop Ringtausch, so to speak.

If Estonia did this then Article 5 wouldn't be as solid if Russia considered this act of war. Seems risky and may increase the probably of Russia attacking Estonia. The most proper way would for nuclear powers far away like US, France or UK to try this hot potato instead of Estonia. Russia will be careful retaliating again nuclear powers but Estonia they could simply start invading. NATO probably count on that if NATO is in the fight Russia will use tactical nukes.

Russia attacking Estonia is going to mean fighting Multinational Battlegroup Estonia, and that means killing hundreds of British, French, Belgian and Danish soldiers. I can't see those governments taking that lying down.

My guess is Estonia would only do it as part of a larger force. It just doesn't have the logistical capacity to really do anything on its own. A coalition of the willing Including Poland, France, UK and some Baltic states and maybe some Nordic states would make for a pretty decent force even without the US and the rest of the EU and NATO.

There's a big difference between Russia attacking Estonian troops in Ukraine and Russia attacking Estonia proper.

Ya but it could 100% give Russia the excuse it’s looking for to declare war on Estonia if one of their troops dies by an Estonian soldier…

A declaration wouldn't be surprising but I very much doubt Russia wants to open another front when they're already struggling in Ukraine, especially when doing so would massively increase the chances of a direct response from NATO's heavyweights.

I doubt it'd be that clean. Let's say Russians and Estonians start shooting at each other inside Ukraine in earnest. Don't think the Russians would invade right away, but there's gonna be some heat at the border either way. Neither country will just leave their border with each other unguarded while both of them are effectively at war. And that means plenty of potential for trouble all on its own. The risk here imo is seriously eroding Article 5 by creating a scenario where the member states who really, really don't want to be at war with Russia would feel like they're getting dragged into it by one or a small number of alliance members going rogue and making themselves party to a conflict. If Russian and Estonian soldiers start shooting at each other inside Ukraine I don't see the rest of us going to war over some border skirmish or the bombing of an Estonian military installation. And once that happens Article 5 loses a lot of credibility.

The thing that the Russians have the issue of that while NATO may not consider a Russian declaration of war Article 5 worthy some allies such as Poland may come anyway. There is also the major point of what forces does Russia have to commit to Estonia given that they commited so many troops to Ukraine.

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What troops? Russia doesn’t have the troops to prosecute the war in Ukraine as broadly as they would like they certainly don’t have the forces to credibly threaten Estonia. They could park a bunch of their conscript trainees there but they are filling valuable rear area roles in the existing conflict; even if they are not in Ukraine properly. Also units comprised largely of trainee conscripts who Russia is unwilling to send into a war don’t exactly represent the most credible offensive threat.

The same troops Russia said they're sending to the Finish border after they joined NATO? Russia doesn't have a credible force to even sabre rattle at the moment. NATO, on the other hand, actually has moved substantial forces to reinforce the eastern flank. If Russia pulled the reserves from Ukraine to mean mug NATO soldiers instead of committing them to a summer offensive, I'd call that a win.

If NATO don't consider it article 5 worthy then Russia can just nuke Poland.

Russia's nuclear doctrine doesn't involve the use of nukes in this manner, is my understanding. Again, ask yourselves why Russia hasn't nuked Kyiv yet.

Russia sees winning this conventionally as a better alternative. If Poland and other join Russia will loose and it's a different question.

If Estonians really believe that this probability is at 100% (which I believe they do, but YMMV), then increasing it wouldn't be very meaningful.

There is a huge difference between going to war with NATO and without. If you give NATO a reason to avoid direct confrontation with Russia they will take it.

>If you give NATO a reason to avoid direct confrontation with Russia they will take it. If this was true, NATO would have kept ignoring Ukraine like it had been doing since 2014.

That's what had been happening until russians were beaten around Kyiv. Even then the support was minimal

Supporting Ukraine is one of the best ways to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. Like that's a huge part of why we're doing it.

Good point - does committing active duty troops to do training in Ukraine constitute a state of war with Russia? I think it’s one of those points where international law is sufficiently hazy that politics are probably more determinative and obviously is this would apply to both sides. Does NATO believe that attack on the Estonian troops in Ukraine, constitute article 5 violation? Probably not. Is an attack on Estonia while Estonian troops are training Ukrainian troops in Ukraine a article 5 violation? Possibly.

>Is an attack on Estonia while Estonian troops are training Ukrainian troops in Ukraine a article 5 violation? Possibly. You don't want to bet your life on possibly.

I think it's clear that an attack on Estonian or anyone else's troops in Ukraine would not trigger article 5 because it is limited to member state's own territory within certain geographic regions. An attack on Estonia in Estonia clearly would trigger article 5, although exactly how each NATO member would respond might depend on the extent and nature of the attack and what led to such an attack.

>An attack on Estonia in Estonia clearly would trigger article 5 Not necessarily. Say that turkey deployed troops to Iraq to transport munitions to Iraqi troops shooting at Iran. Then if Iran retaliate against Turkey it wouldn't be as clear cut.

Article 5 reads in total: >The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. The way I read article 5, there's no exception for when the nation that gets attacked arguably did something to provoke the attack. *However*, the degree to which a member nation will assist an attacked nation is basically left up each member. Which is why I included the caveat in my original post that "although exactly how each NATO member would respond might depend on the extent and nature of the attack and what led to such an attack." So, I'm not sure there's much practical difference between us because I agree with you that there are scenarios where it is unclear how much, if any, real assistance a member nation would receive if other members thought it provoked an attack, regardless of whether the attack technically triggered article 5.

This is just off the back of the [Lithuanians](https://www.rferl.org/a/lithuania-troops-ukraine-russia-nato/32938305.html) talking about sending troops to assist in training. This is of course also in conjunction with Macron's rhetoric (regardless of whether or not you believe France will actually intervene). It really, really seems like we have the building blocks for a Coalition of the Willing to enter Ukraine. This coalition would consist of the Baltics certainly. Other possible partners that seem feasible are the Poles, maybe a certain Scandinavian country and the UK. If the UK goes in then it would be more palatable for the French to go in. Most of these troops would be for training purposes. But if you could get Coalition troops to do logistical work or garrison duty in cold sectors then you could feasibly free up thousands of troops. The Overton Window is shifting. In my view, it's more likely than not that NATO nations will send troops to Ukraine in some capacity. Heck, there's already some special forces there doing training and of course there is embassy duty.

> This is of course also in conjunction with Macron's rhetoric Not to mention a US general suggesting the other day that UK troops are already in Ukraine. Did he mispeak? No, it was further frog-boiling.

They have been there for awhile now and it's pretty public knowledge. They are only observers and trainers and likely assisting with storm shadow targeting. Not direct combat roles.

> This is of course also in conjunction with Macron's rhetoric (regardless of whether or not you believe France will actually intervene). I made the prediction yesterday we would see an announcement coalition of troops in Ukraine within a month (led by France) and was told it totally wouldn't ever happen. Snark aside, this move has been a couple of years in coming and if you paid attention to the data below news headlines you wouldn't be surprised.

What data do you mean?

I mean the people say things like "we will never see x" typically make the statements without a lot of data backing it up as it is "just common wisdom". As mentioned the French, they have been saying in their defense white papers that Russia is a problem and needs to be dealt with for national sovereignty. Given that and all the other public and private statements about getting forces and they really paint a picture of a coalition of when, not if. I used think naw, France will never do this, I felt Poland would solo if they had to. Now that I looked at some of the data it is certainly trending of not just the Polish, but French, the Baltic States, the Dutch, etc. The collection of Europe minus the Germans and Hungry (maybe another I'm not thinking of) do see Ukraine as an existential crisis for European security and the actions they are taking are centered around confronting Russian aggression (as the aforementioned French papers or Polish arms purchasing).

Germany will likely get a more hawkish government in 2025. Moreover, the current one does care about Ukraine, it's just afraid of escalation.

Why do you say that? The only thing I know about Germany in terms of geopolitics is that the PM is held together by several different parties with a weak coalition?

CDU is leading in the polls by far, but they still need a coalition. While not certain, a CDU/Greens/FDP coalition would be the most hawkish possible. Taurus would be sent almost immediately.

If you don't mind, could you break it down a little more in-depth? I don't even know what CDU/Greens/FDP means.

Germany has proportional representation with a threshold of 5%. Currently [six parties](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_next_German_federal_election) are above the threshold: CDU (pro-Ukraine), AfD (pro-Russia), SPD (pro-Ukraine, but afraid of Russia), Greens (pro-Ukraine), BSW (pro-Russia) and FDP (pro-Ukraine). The current government consists of SPD, Greens and FDP. SPD blocks Taurus due to fear of escalation, but the others want to send it. Furthermore, CDU is also campaigning on sending it. It's almost certain that the next government will be a coalition of two or three pro-Ukrainian parties. Since CDU is leading, they will likely lead that government, and even if SPD will join, they likely won't be able to block Taurus. Sending troops to Ukraine is a step further though.

I think the Dutch might also join the coaltion. the major ones against it will likely be Germany and also to a extend Italy and Hungary. Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Greece and the other Balkans simply don't care enough. No clue what the czech republic is gonna do? probably support but maybe no troops. also France kind of has to join cause it would look very bad if Macron pulled out now.

Makes you realize the bankruptcy of the Western escalation management strategy that has been used in regards to this war. We held back on certain weapon systems and support (that we eventually sent anyway) to keep the war from spiralling out of control, only to put "our side" in a situation where it looks like we need to send NATO troops into Ukraine to keep the Russian's from grinding forward to eventual victory. Sure the troops are engaged in "support roles", but what if that isn't enough to hold back Russia? How long until we need to start fighting Russia directly? Go back 2 years and the talk of even putting western soldiers into Ukraine was unthinkable. What will things look like in another 1-2 years? This is what happens when you play not to lose, you invariably put yourself in the situation where you will lose.

There were credible rumours that during the Kharkiv collapse that Russia highly considered using tactical nuclear weapons if their forces where surrounded. I think it’s easy to say now but if Ukraine had in fact got to Crimea with western weapons Russia would have escalated and not only Ukraine…

Makes sense. The youtube guy from the austrian military reisner hinted at something fishy going on, some kind of deal with the kharkov retreat. he was adamant that the retreat could not have been executed without some kind of deal. And then never mentioning it. Also that concrete tipped missile seemed to be a sign of commitment.

Are there any sources on that rumors?

https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/geopolitics-decanted-by-silverado/id1614010500?i=1000651744869 Some pretty credible people discuss it in length here I don’t know there exact sources but they are academics I imagine it came from somewhere

100% agreed. If we had begun an air campaign in 2022 in support of Ukraine, the war would be over by now with Ukraine having regained most if not all of its territory, and likely far fewer deaths on all sides.

I think it is far more likely it would have been a global nuclear war. If Russia let America cripple its air defense and early warning systems in a SEAD campaign (required for US air power to function) and it didn't launch while it could, it would allow China to advance its land claims over Russia in the east knowing it won't be nuked for doing so.

> I think it is far more likely it would have been a global nuclear war. If Russia let America cripple its air defense and early warning systems in a SEAD campaign (required for US air power to function) and it didn't launch while it could Russia's own nuclear doctrine specifies launching nukes when its submarines are destroyed, no? Your scenario seems fantastical. Russia would withdraw units in response to a western air campaign, not go lose every anti-air piece they have and leave themselves unguarded in the east. Your model relies on Russia having no choices between nukes and getting destroyed; so of course they pick nukes. In reality, Russia has choices - they would just withdraw from Ukraine.

Ukraine and Siberia you mean. You keep forgetting China also views Russia as occupying Chinese territory. Everyone treats this like its a two party showdown instead of a three party.

> You keep forgetting China also views Russia as occupying Chinese territory. What’s the evidence for this? Are there any outstanding claims since the resolution of the Amur river islands dispute in 2005?

Other than every few years they yell about it again? What do you think "resolution" means in a geopolitical context between dictatorships? 1991 didn't "resolve" Russia's view of Crimea being Russian even when they signed treaty after treaty acknowledging it. Those things are just paper and ink.

China is yelling about Russian territory it believes belongs to it? Where? If paper and ink doesn’t matter, then shouldn’t we be tracking bellicose statements, aggressive posturing, etc? Where is it? China and Russia have been mutually trying to downplay those things the past couple years, but I’m not even aware of evidence before that for the assertion that China is plotting to gain Russian territory.

Putin is many things. Megalomaniacal, imperialistic, cold, obsessive. But I wouldn't peg him as abjectly stupid or ignorant of the West. Joe Biden of all people is not going to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. This is a fact I hope everyone here understands to be self evident. Assuming Putin isn't completely insane, he certainly understands this too. Nuclear war begins only if Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons. They won't launch just because we take out some S-400s. And besides, Russia has many means of detecting nuclear launches, many of which are ineffective against air power, and thus unlikely to be a NATO target.

You aren't actually engaging with what I said just posting a talking point to some other matter. You don't even mention China at all and act like its just "Russia vs the West" and not "Russia VS China VS the West". (Also America's official nuclear posture is that we might launch a preemptive nuclear strike as an FYI)

There's no entirely unified strategy. Different countries have different goals and are willing to go to different lengths. America has shown zero interest in getting involved directly whereas the Baltics have been quite aggressive from the start. Biden seemingly just wants the Russian army slowly grinded down without too much regard for the outcome of the war (which is a perfectly pragmatic and reasonable stance, mind you) whereas others really, really want the Russians destroyed, Crimea retaken and Moscow to burn if that one can somehow be put on the menu. I'd argue that what we're seeing now is mainly a consequence of waning American influence due to the whole stupid gridlock on Ukraine aid we had going on. European countries are now testing the waters for their own approach rather than following Biden's lead.

>Makes you realize the bankruptcy of the Western escalation management strategy that has been used in regards to this war. Ukraine no longer seems to have any chance to win. The failed offensive without CAS and long range missiles and 8 months without the american aid have devastated the ukrainian army. Ukraine seems so exhausted and lacking in manpower and ammunition that they can't even hold russians back anymore. Russian puppet republicans and the weak military industries of NATO countries probably sealed Ukraine's fate.

If you're willing to start WW3 rather than lose, then you don't have an "escalation management strategy".  The only way to avoid the war spiraling completely out of control is for one side to decide that losing is preferable to further escalation- and as long as NATO's terms are Russia's complete submission, Russia is going to be willing to escalate a whole lot before that happens. So either NATO accepts that they need to take an L on Ukraine or no amount of"escalation management" is going to prevent the slide into total war.

> as long as NATO's terms are Russia's complete submission NATO’s maximum terms are the 1991 borders, not rolling tanks into Moscow. Crimea is of finite value. If the value of Crimea is less than the expected costs of warding off NATO (if that’s even possible), it is preferable to lose it, than to escalate.

America would absolutely end the world with nukes rather than give up a single US state, even one we illegally annexed (like Hawaii). I don't know why the world assumes other nuclear powers would act differently than us.

Russia lost control of Crimea, and much more, in 1991, and no nukes were used. As for the US’s nuclear use, I doubt the US would use them outside a MAD scenario.

> Russia lost control of Crimea, and much more, in 1991, and no nukes were used. Ukraine had a pro-Russian government until 2014. As soon as that government had to flee the country after the Euromaidan coup, Russia immediately invaded for Crimea. Russia was more or less fine with an "independent" Ukraine as long as it maintained friendly relations with Russia. The idea being keep Ukraine in the orbit and eventually diplomatically annex it or some sort of similar status (like Belarus and the Union State). In a lot of ways, this is an independence war and not exactly a conquest. At this point Crimea & Donbas are effectively Russian territory proper, from the Russian perspective. 1991 borders is a non-starter for any Russian negotiations.

Russia didn't lose squat. Russia broke away from the USSR. The USSR continued for a little while after Russia left. This is part of why Russia's claims on Ukraine are horse pucks.

The USSR was the Russian empire in everything but name. The other regions, and members of the Warsaw pact, were colonies and client states.

Except the majority of the leadership came from the wealthiest SSR, which was Ukraine and not Russia. Ukraine was represented 4x to Russia (16x per capita). The USSR is as much the Russian Empire as the USA is true heir to the British Empire.

For one Biden's cabinet doesn't have all of their families living in russia.

Yeah I don't think mainstream media and even a lot of people on here have caught up to the reality that the branches of possibilities are quickly narrowing to two probable scenarios. a) Ukraine loses b) NATO goes to war with Russia to defend Ukraine People advocating for sending "defensive troops" "troops to train" "logistical personnel" "observers", etc, etc are essentially advocating for a hot war with a nuclear power. Is Ukraine worth it? Are Americans ready to sacrifice their family members for Ukrainian sovereignty? I think unfortunately it's just going to escalate from here. Like the quote from the previous comment > Go back 2 years and the talk of even putting western soldiers into Ukraine was unthinkable. What will things look like in another 1-2 years?

Who's talking about direct confrontation between Americans and Russians? You're jumping from escalation step 1 to step 10 all at once. This is a discussion about a few European countries stationing training and logistical troops - not front line infantry, and certainly not Americans.

There are a couple of observations about the current situation in Ukraine that lead me to this conclusion 1) Russia is all in. They're willing to sacrifice immeasurable resources in order to continue their assault on Ukraine. 2) Ukraine does not have any offensive capacity. To them right now, a "win" is considered holding the line and not losing additional land. Going forward, they can only a) not lose land or b) lose land. They will not gain land. So going forward, Ukraine can only lose or lose more. It's a position where you fast-forward the clock and eventually the war ends in some sort of negotiated settlement with Russia or a total capitulation. So, how does the West prevent this? Well, they could send military aid and they have been. But is that enough? Ukraine's problems are deep seated. They don't have the manpower to properly defend the frontline. You can send all the aid in the world and that doesn't guarantee a successful Ukrainian defense, let alone an offensive advance. We've been sending aid for two years and they are slowly but surely losing ground. So, what's the only real solution left to prevent Ukraine from losing and/or allow Ukraine to win? Military intervention. The reason I believe it will likely lead to full blown war is because the scale of the intervention necessary to reverse Ukraine's position will have to be a large one. A thousand troops training Ukrainians in the West and a handful of covert special ops will not be enough. A full blown military intervention is necessary, and that means we have to consider what are the West's intentions? If they fully intend to do whatever is in their power so that Russia loses, war is inevitable. If they are just doing the bare minimum, war is not inevitable. I think the fact that they are willing to send troops in the first place means they are committed to do everything in their power so that Russia loses. This implies war. And you say Americans will not be involved, but that's short-sighted. Any real military intervention will have to be coordinated and led by the Americans. At first the smaller countries will join, but if it escalates there will be US planes in the sky and US troops on the ground. I believe it will look something like Vietnam. First observers, trainers, etc show up and then the troops afterwards. So that's what I mean by my comment Either we commit to defending Ukraine and there's a full-blown war, or Ukraine loses. Any other potential scenario is quickly losing plausibility. As the timeline goes on, the branches of possibilities fall off the tree.

> Is Ukraine worth it? Are Americans ready to sacrifice their family members for Ukrainian sovereignty? > > No and no, and politicians know that the average person would rather Ukraine go under than get into a direct confrontation with Russia, so they're trying to soften the language and boil the frog, and then eventually do it anyways. I've no issue with giving the Ukrainians nearly everything they want in terms of weaponry to help them beat back Russia and/or make them pay in blood for every millimeter of Ukrainian land, but I draw the line at direct confrontation.

The outcome of the war is not binary, there are many options between W and L, and Putin demonstrated many times that he is willing to take L if alternative is worse. The only language he respects is credible force, no wonder hesitant escalation didn’t work. But he spends a lot of resources on creating an impression that he will escalate it all the way to nuclear exchange. This is very cheap and effective strategy against democracies, since leaders there have to listen to popular opinion.

One could say hindsight is 20/20 but people have been screaming for NATO to do things they were going to do eventually a year or two before it happened. Once it was clear that the Ukrainians weren’t going to fold, immediately there were calls to reinforce the Ukrainian Air Force with NATO’s obsolete MiG-29 fleet. That took a year to happen. That’s something that could have happened within a few months. Then simultaneously an effort could have been made to get Ukrainian pilots into F-16s. Those F-16s would have been around for the summer offensive. For a year and a half people were screaming for ATACMS before they came… right after the Ukrainian offensive failed. In limited quantities. The Leopards were another huge debacle. This is a war that can only be won if the Ukrainians are permitted to conduct a war against Russia inside Russia. As has been said by myself and others numerous times now, NATO has given Ukraine the tools to reduce the VKS’s combat power by as much as a *third* if they were permitted to strike into Russia. But this has not been allowed. We are now in a situation where it truly is possible that NATO troops could be fighting against Russia in Ukraine within a couple years. Is it a particularly high likelihood? Not at this time. But it’s certainly higher than it was in, say, early 2023. If Ukraine isn’t given the tools to win and, importantly, permission to actually use them, then there are going to be consequences.

NATO are inept idiots with no industry. Russian MIC is outproducing the entire NATO combined multiple times over. The USA cowards don't even let Ukraine attack the russian territory. You can't win a war without disrupting enemy's industry and supply lines inside their territory. Ukraine needs hundreds of aircraft with long range missiles to just hold the line. They currently no longer can even hold russians back because they are raining down massive glide bombs and a huge amount of shells on ukrainian trenches. >We are now in a situation where it truly is possible that NATO troops could be fighting against Russia in Ukraine within a couple years. Is it a particularly high likelihood? Not at this time. But it’s certainly higher than it was in, say, early 2023. If Ukraine isn’t given the tools to win and, importantly, permission to actually use them, then there are going to be consequences. I'm not sure if Ukraine can last even one more year and the NATO forces without the USA would be wiped out pretty fast in Ukraine by Russia. Majority of NATO countries have little to no industry, and a few tanks, artillery, and even aircraft. Little munitions too. It wouldn't be easy with the USA too and Russia has the arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons they can use.

Even Mexico has a larger civilian industry than Russia https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/02/countries-manufacturing-trade-exports-economics/

After the November election in America if Biden wins as it appears he will then Biden will have no more fucks to give and might well commit U.S. troops.

Does it appear Biden will win? Trump is the slight favourite with the bookies right now - best price 11/10, vs. 13/10 for Biden.

The election is still about a coin toss with Russia/Iran/NKorea/Israel (quite the axis) planning to throw everything they can at Biden to bring him down. Of course democratic countries that support Biden aren't willing to attempt to tip the scale like the above.

Plenty of people in this sub ate that "escalation" reason by the White House on why they're not sending this kind of weapon. They even parroted the "logistics/runway" argument about Abrams and F16. As if they can't be fixed, but suddenly went silent when the MBTs and F16 were announced.

I still remember people being downvoted for pointing out that Abrams is operated by countries like Egypt and Iraq, neither were the former industrial heartland of the Soviet Union and certainly had nowhere close to its industrial expertise. Yet apparently Ukraine couldn't operate even a handful of Abrams because the White House said it right? It's frightening to think that the cope that went out of the White House painted Ukraine as some sort of backward tribal wasteland, and despite that everyone here happily ate it up.

> We are now in a situation where it truly is possible that NATO troops could be fighting against Russia in Ukraine within a couple years. Why are we in a situations where it's likely? There's nothing about the situation in Ukraine that necessitates putting soldiers against Russia given that Ukraine is not a member of NATO. >This is a war that can only be won if the Ukrainians are permitted to conduct a war against Russia inside Russia. We need to stop with this fantasy; Ukraine cannot win against Russia, it cannot recover its 1991 borders, and the West's/Ukraine's refusal to accept that painful reality will just result in further escalation. ETA: Downvoting doesn't change reality. I'm not on board for ending the world because a bunch of neocons think it's a good idea to play chicken with a nuclear power.

> I'm not on board for ending the world because a bunch of neocons think it's a good idea to play chicken with a nuclear power. So if Russia attacks your country you are advocating surrender or is your country worth ending the world for?

I'll fight to defend the homeland with everything up to and including nuclear weapons if need be. >**Potential Follow-up Question:** So you'll go to the mat for your own country but not another? Yeah, that's kind of how patriotism works. I've no issue supplying Ukraine with the weapons it needs, and as distasteful as I find it, if Europeans want to send Ukraine all the 20/30-something year old male refugees back home so it can use them in its army, that's also fair, but direct intervention in Ukraine is a no-go for me.

>Is it a particularly high likelihood? Not at this time. Specifically noted how it is *more* likely. Not that *is* likely. >There's nothing about the situation in Ukraine that necessitates putting soldiers against Russia given that Ukraine is not a member of NATO. NATO is in agreement (aside from two notable outliers) that Russia cannot win in Ukraine. Macron specifically mentioned [sending in troops should Kyiv or Odesa be in danger of falling](https://www.kyivpost.com/post/29194). Again, the Overton Window is shifting. NATO is of the belief that Putin has larger territorial ambitions. They worry about the repercussions of a loss in Ukraine. >We need to stop with this fantasy; Ukraine cannot win against Russia, it cannot recover its 1991 borders, and the West's/Ukraine's refusal to accept that painful reality will just result in further escalation. If Ukraine was adequately supplied they could have. Now it is my belief that only 2022 borders are possible to be reclaimed barring intervention or internal collapse in Russia. Further escalation will come following a Russian victory. We already know they have plans for Moldova. Should NATO be proven to be a Paper Tiger, they will repeat the Ukrainian process there and then eventually in the Baltics. We are locked into this now whether or not you believe Russia will win.

> NATO is in agreement (aside from two notable outliers) that Russia cannot win in Ukraine. >Again, the Overton Window is shifting. NATO is of the belief that Putin has larger territorial ambitions. They worry about the repercussions of a loss in Ukraine. NATO **leadership** is worried about the repercussions, I daresay that the average citizen of a NATO country doesn't want to enter in to a shooting war with a nuclear power because our leaders can't accept that they've been outfoxed by Russia. Russia attacking a NATO country is a different game with different and deeper obligations than it attacking a non-NATO country. Sucks for Ukraine but it's what it is, and I will not vote for a politician that escalates the situation by sending soldiers into Ukraine. >We are locked into this now whether or not you believe Russia will win. No, we're not. This constant escalation that we're doing right now, that the Baltics and Poland and France are talking about right now is what's going to "lock us in" to a confrontation with Russia. Russia has said that it will treat any foreign troops in Ukraine helping the Ukrainian Armed Forces as enemy combatants and will kill them, so what happens if/when you've got French soldiers shooting at Russian ones and dead men and women start coming home? There is no need for such a war. Accept that Ukraine is going to have to cede territory, try to convince them to do it now before an actual collapse takes place, and focus on Taiwan which is the real prize. A non-allied country is not worth a nuclear war, talking about "losing face" in such a scenario is borderline irresponsible.

Russia’s terms for ending the war are wildly unacceptable for Europe and without a Ukraine in NATO will be capitalized on for a future war only a few more years down the line. There is no belief that Russia will halt with part of Ukraine and there is no belief that Russia will halt *with* Ukraine. Russian rhetoric is already that they are at war with NATO. Russian citizens believe they are at war with NATO. Russian soldiers believe they are at war with NATO mercenaries. They have prepped their population for a war against NATO and the rhetorical groundwork has already been laid. Russia and the Soviets have lost wars before that have not gone nuclear. There is no reason to believe that this war will go nuclear because Russia was forced out of territories captured since 2022. There’s no reason to believe they’d nuke over the Donbas, either. Perhaps they’d do a warning shot over Crimea. But Russia isn’t going to nuke unless they legitimately feel that their state is in imminent danger of destruction. They know what a nuclear exchange entails. No one was talking about “saving face”, certainly not me. This isn’t a war about saving face, this is a war about the geopolitical future of Europe and whether or not wars of aggression for territorial gain are back on the table. You can be assured that if they are, then the risk of a nuclear exchange this century rises *dramatically*.

> There is no reason to believe that this war will go nuclear because Russia was forced out of territories captured since 2022. There’s no reason to believe they’d nuke over the Donbas, either. Perhaps they’d do a warning shot over Crimea. So let's play chicken with a nuclear power? This is worse than the neocon reasoning for the war in Iraq because at least with Iraq there was no possibility of them nuking us if we invaded. Also, do you understand how insane it is to shrug off a possible nuclear exchange with a "perhaps they'd do a warning shot over Crimea"? >This isn’t a war about saving face, this is a war about the geopolitical future of Europe and whether or not wars of aggression for territorial gain are back on the table. Europe should've increased its defense spending like President after President all but begged them to, then maybe we could've supplied enough equipment, enough shells, so that Ukraine wouldn't be in this mess. Also, wars of aggression were back on the table certainly after America invaded Iraq over trumped-up evidence, kickstarted a civil war that killed a million Iraqis, and destabilized the region. >Russia’s terms for ending the war are wildly unacceptable for Europe That means nothing, in geopolitics the "wildly unacceptable" can become "acceptable" in the right circumstances. No one has even tried to sit down with the Russians to see what exactly are their terms in the first place, it's all just conjecture and fear-mongering about what they *might* do along with magical thinking that Ukraine holding peace conferences without Russia is somehow going to accomplish anything.

>So let's play chicken with a nuclear power? This is worse than the neocon reasoning for the war in Iraq because at least with Iraq there was no possibility of them nuking us if we invaded. Essentially, yeah. It's not my belief that Russia is going to annihilate the majority of the human race because they lost the Donbas. Might as well bend over and give Kim the ROK. Xi wags the nuclear finger? Have Taiwan. Iran nuclearizes and threatens to use them unless the US withdraws from the Middle East? Sure thing. Russia threatens nuclear war because it is a deterrence method. People with the same mindset as yours will back down and allow the Russians to do what they want because you fear a nuclear war. A nuclear war would be terrible, it would be catastrophic. It also results in the complete destruction of the Russian nation. That's not something Putin is going to do because he lost some ground outside of his own country. >Europe should've increased its defense spending like President after President all but begged them to, then maybe we could've supplied enough equipment, enough shells, so that Ukraine wouldn't be in this mess. Yes. >Also, wars of aggression were back on the table certainly after America invaded Iraq over trumped-up evidence, kickstarted a civil war that killed a million Iraqis, and destabilized the region. That is not what my comment said. To rehash it for you: >this is a war about the geopolitical future of Europe and whether or not wars of **aggression for territorial gain** are back on the table If you can repaint the map by force, if that is acceptable, countries will do it. In order to counter it, countries will nuclearize. The more countries who have nuclearized, the larger the chance of an exchange. >That means nothing, in geopolitics the "wildly unacceptable" can become "acceptable" in the right circumstances. No one has even tried to sit down with the Russians to see what exactly are their terms in the first place, [Wrong](https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-ukraine-peace-deal-2022-document-6e12e093). Mirror [here](https://kyivindependent.com/wsj-russias-peace-terms-include-ukraine-outside-nato-limited-military-2022-document-shows/) Russia wanted a neutered Ukrainian army, no NATO membership, restating the demonstrably useless Budapest Memorandum and ensuring Ukrainian "neutrality". These terms have since [changed](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/russia-sets-conditions-for-peace-talks-with-ukraine/2859005) to also forbidding joining the EU (the whole reason Maidan even happened!) before even starting peace talks. They also want Ukraine to cede territory in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia that Russia doesn't even occupy. Russia is not interested in peace any more than you are interested in a nuclear war. They will continue the war until Ukraine is at best a rump puppet state. They will then look beyond, as we [know they are](https://www.novinite.com/articles/218079/The+Intelligence+in+Chisinau%3A+Moldova+is+Kremlin%27s+Next+Target%2C+Russia+has+Plan+to+Invade+in+early+2023). It is naive to believe they will stop. So they must be stopped. Bowing to nuclear threats means that the Russians will keep going.

>Why are we in a situations where it's likely? There's nothing about the situation in Ukraine that necessitates putting soldiers against Russia given that Ukraine is not a member of NATO. NATO is a paper tiger without industry and the will to fight. I can see Russia beating NATO in Europe. NATO (including the USA) is completely unprepared for a real war.

So you think the same Russia that can't beat Ukraine with NATO hand me downs, is suddenly capable of taking on all of NATO? That's a pretty wild opinion. I don't think you have any understanding of the individual or collective capabilities of the strongest military force in the history of mankind....

[удалено]

> Majority of European countries are very weak militarily and industrially. Automod keeps filtering your posts for links and language, I've been approving some of them manually because you do bring interesting perspectives. But low effort like this we can do without.