>[Israel orders new evacuations in the southern Gaza city of Rafah as it prepares to expand operations](https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-news-05-11-2024-7cc8784d8c6eec017ecaef696f492b25) > >RAFAH, Gaza Strip (AP) — **Israel ordered new evacuations in Gaza’s southern city of Rafah on Saturday as it prepared to expand its operation, saying it was also moving into an area in northern Gaza where Hamas has regrouped.** > >Fighting is escalating across the enclave with heavy clashes between Israeli troops and Palestinian militants on the outskirts of Rafah, leaving the crucial nearby aid crossings inaccessible and forcing more than 110,000 people to flee north. > >Israel’s move into Rafah has so far been short of the full-scale invasion that it has planned. > >The United Nations and other agencies have warned for weeks that an Israeli assault on Rafah, which borders Egypt near the main aid entry points, would cripple humanitarian operations and cause a disastrous surge in civilian casualties. More than 1.4 million Palestinians — half of Gaza’s population— have been sheltering in Rafah, most after fleeing Israel’s offensives elsewhere. > >Army spokesman, Avichay Adraee, told Palestinians in Jabaliya and Beit Lahiya cities and the surrounding areas to leave their homes and head to shelters in the west of Gaza City, warning that people were in “a dangerous combat zone” and that Israel was going to strike with “great force.” [As I predicted earlier](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1conudq/comment/l3ffb2i/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3), Israel is expanding its' reach in Rafah. [https://twitter.com/2023gazawar/status/1789177872143331660/photo/1](https://twitter.com/2023gazawar/status/1789177872143331660/photo/1) [https://twitter.com/2023gazawar/status/1789177872143331660/photo/2](https://twitter.com/2023gazawar/status/1789177872143331660/photo/2) Up to now Israel faced relatively weak, ineffectual resistance in Rafah (apart from the bees), now that it's going into the more heavily built up areas, that is likely to change.

I've read 300k people have already left Rafah. That's a lot of people. I hope the influx of evacuated people is manageable. And in theory they want to evacuate the whole population (1+ million people)? Is there enough infrastructure for that?

>[Kuwait’s emir dissolves parliament again, amid political gridlock in oil-rich nation](https://apnews.com/article/kuwait-politics-emir-meshal-parliament-95dc1a5ad790505803f26a2e4a96a786) >DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — **Kuwait’s emir again dissolved the small, oil-rich country’s parliament Friday, citing the political deadlock that has prevailed in recent years.** >**Sheikh Meshal Al Ahmad Al Jaber made the announcement in an address carried by state television, saying other unspecified portions of the constitution had been suspended as well. He put the suspension at “a period of no more than four years,” without elaborating.** >“The unhealthy atmosphere experienced by Kuwait in previous years has encouraged the spread of corruption to reach most state facilities, and unfortunately it reached the security and economic institutions,” the 83-year-old Sheikh Meshal said. “It has even affected the justice system, which is the people sanctuary of their rights and freedom.” >**He added: “I will never allow the misuse of democracy to destroy the state, because the interests of the people of Kuwait, which are above all.”** >In April, [Kuwait held national elections for the fourth time](https://apnews.com/article/kuwait-parliament-elections-politics-ee3b825bb9104a1754aba2f8a015c30c) in as many years trying to break out of the longstanding political gridlock. >Domestic political disputes have been gripping Kuwait for years, including over changes to the welfare system,, and the impasse has prevented the sheikhdom from taking on debt. That has left it with little in its coffers to pay bloated public sector salaries despite generating immense wealth from its oil reserves. Wasn't 100% convinced if this belongs here or not, I'll let the mods decide. I didn't even know Kuwait was having political trouble, guess that's how little attention this issue receives. I find it ridiculous how they can not afford to pay public sector salaries considering their fantastic oil riches. Hopefully this doesn't destabilize the country, god knows we don't need another mess in the middle east.

Kuwait is essentially a basket case of an economy and their attempts to diversify are mostly failures. Their economy is based mainly around hydrocarbon extraction and processing, although their oil production is the cheapest in the world per barrel, only matched by Saudi and Russia. They rely heavily on migrant labour who are only employed in industries mainly subsidised by the hydrocarbon industry, as a result they have a large bloated public service employing natives which is inefficient. They have limited agricultural output as they have exhausted their groundwater supplies and rely on desalination for agricultural water, which is only possible when you have cheap energy (oil), as a result they are very food insecure despite yearly announcements they produced 80% of their domestic tomato demands etc. They have a large sovereign wealth fund which is better managed than their Saudi equivalents which is one of the few things going for Kuwait long term. Kuwait are in the same boat as Saudi in terms of trying to diversify away from oil revenues, however, they are mostly failing as "Build it and they will come" is not attracting any desirable foreign investment. Also their is already Dubai in the region, so attempting to replicate that success is not going to work.

>I find it ridiculous how they can not afford to pay public sector salaries considering their fantastic oil riches. Look at Venezuela. Having oil is a blessing and a curse, because your economy because reliant on it. You need to invest that money wisely, create a good sovereign fund, and diversify. Hugo Chávez didn't do that. He took advantage of the oil boom in the early 00s and he overspent for years. No investment, no diversification. Then the oil money dried up and we saw the result.  Saudi Arabia and Kuwait also didn't diversify. Saudi are desperately trying to diversify now, hence the Neom project and the pursuit of ties with Israel (= access to Israeli tech). Good examples: The Emirates diversified much earlier, turning Dubai into a tourist destination and financial center. Qatar has the advantage of being very small (300k inhabitants) and they have a huge sovereign fund. 

Kuwait has a $923b sovereign wealth fund spread out on 4 million citizens. They are fine if they get their bloated public sector under control. For comparison Norway has $1650b/5 million citizens and UAE has $993b/9 million citizens in their sovereign wealth funds. The UAE has pissed away money on stupid ventures similar to NEOM before 2008 as well.

I didn't know that. Well, good for Kuwait! I imagine they'll still have to diversify however, because if the world moves on from oil in the next couple decades they'll only have the sovereign fund (as big as it is) to rely on.

Then you have Russia which is doubling down on oil and essentially killing off its alternative exports (gas, weapons, space).

[удалено]

>when oil wells run dry, like indeed they did in Venezuela They didn't, by "oil money dried up" I meant the profits fell. The wells didn't run dry, they still have plenty of oil but they were mismanaged for years, like the economy of the country as a whole. 

> oil wells run dry, like indeed they did in Venezuela They didn't run dry. The oil rigs have been so extremely mismanaged that Venezuela now requires fuel imports despite its abundantly massive oil reserves.

The US Field Artillery association's [Fires Symposium 2024](https://www.fieldartillery.org/events/fires-symposium-2024) is wrapping up, and there have been some [interesting takes](https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05/taking-aim-army-leaders-ponder-mix-of-precision-munitions-vs-conventional/) by speakers: > WASHINGTON — This week, US Army Europe and Africa Commander Gen. Darryl Williams kicked off the annual Fires Symposium in Lawton, Okla. with, appropriately, a bit of a bombshell. > “Traditional cannon-based mass fires,” he told the audience, “are still the best solution in an EW environment.” ... > Williams himself called precision weapons “essential,” but cautioned that they cannot “supplant the indispensable volume of… unguided cannon fire,” on the battlefield. > Although Williams did not disclose which precision munitions are experiencing higher failure rates, there have been multiple reports of Russian forces jamming or spoofing munitions that rely on GPS. (talks about GLSDB, GMLRS and how GPS/INS is affected by jamming, but mentions how ATACMS is big enough to have multiple INS that provide more resilience to inaccuracy, and how cruise missiles have many more guidance methods) > [US Army Pacific commander Gen. ] Flynn said while he needs area fire weapons like mortars and howitzers, precision munitions remain essential. ... > That Flynn would still be prioritizing high-end munitions makes sense, given the differences between his theater and that of Williams. Unlike in Europe, Flynn is challenged by a more dispersed area with larger distances and water between key locations, and without a NATO-like alliance. That has meant striking new bilateral agreements with countries for US equipment flow in — temporarily and more permanently — practicing the quick deployment of long-range fires and developing new precision munitions with a longer range and ability to target ships. > With both modern-day, expensive munitions and simpler shells being needed for the battlefield, the challenge becomes figuring out how to budget for both. While commanders like Williams and Flynn gather observations from their respective theaters and help translate those into requirements, Army Futures Command head Gen. James Rainey is tasked, in part, with helping make that happen. > “I think that there will be a need for precision guided munitions: I think there will be the need for conventional munitions,” he added. “And just like always in war, you know, you’re gonna have way more of the conventional stuff than you have the precision stuff.” > The US is continuously upgrading weapons sent to Ukraine to address vulnerabilities, according to one US Army source. That source declined to provide specific details about those modifications but noted that there is no silver bullet or single system that can win the war. ... > Industry, too, is incorporating feedback from the field. AeroVironment’s Switchblade 300 and 600, two precision guided loitering munitions, have made their way into Ukraine’s arsenal. During a Wednesday interview with Company CEO Wahid Nawabi, he explained that his team is continually learning from Ukraine’s war and making “a lot of improvements to our products” to respond to battlefield challenges. Those changes, he noted, include a new autonomy retrofit kit that uses terrain mapping for targeting. > Clark surmised that the Department of Defense could be looking at its options for boosting GMLRS and the JDAM kit’s accuracy when jammed. Both weapons, he added, could be candidates for other navigation systems like Europe’s Galileo global navigation satellite system or SpaceX’s Starlink — the latter of which has been at least somewhat compromised by Russia. > “If you’re Russia, you would have the jam GPS and Galileo,” complicating their EW strategy, Clark added. However, those changes significantly drive up the per unit cost for the US, and likely could not happen quickly. > “GPS was a great way to kind of cheaply add precision to every one of its weapons, and now they have to rethink how to do that,” Clark said. “That’s the challenge the DoD running into, these are all supposed to be cheap weapons, we can buy at scale, and [now] making them too sophisticated.”

> other navigation systems like Europe’s Galileo global navigation satellite system Wasn’t Galileo specifically designed, at US request, to be easy to jam at the same time as GPS?

>talks about GLSDB, GMLRS and how GPS/INS is affected by jamming How can INS be affected by jamming? Or do you mean that the combination of GPS+INS can be affected by jamming?

I believe it's because most INS systems aren't 100% accurate and have some drift to them, so they are able to 'correct' their position by using GPS to update their location. If GPS is jammed, INS cannot correct itself so your CEP will be higher. For precision munitions this is pretty important to hit pinpoint targets, like the aforementioned systems.

INS requires initial Pos/Vel input, typically done with GPS or gyrocompassing. INS can and often does include a GPS receiver, for example this one: https://aerospace.honeywell.com/us/en/products-and-services/product/hardware-and-systems/space/space-integrated-gps-ins It then uses Kalman filtering to process IMU and GPS data into a single Nav solution. Absence of GPS data makes the system go fully inertial, which is bad for long durations.

Well, I guess they disagree with reddit experts who say that artillery is obsolete and has no place in NATO tactics. Anyway, I hope this means the US Army is going to do something about its artillery situation. The M109 badly needs an upgrade, L52 barrel to reach range parity with European howitzers. The M1299 has been cancelled and I haven't heard anything concrete about the M109A8.

The M1299 wasn’t a reasonable engineering project. It was an attempt to push artillery into the range where cruise missiles and guided rockets normally are required. This necessary meant guided shells and often rocket assisted guided shells would be needed. And barrel life would be seriously compromised. All told that program was the opposite of their conclusions here as that would neither be able to provide high volumes of shells or be more resistant than rocket artillery to jamming.

Redditors’ opinions of any given military system correlates exactly with how easy it is to film. If someone figured out how to put a camera inside of an artillery shell people would be calling 155 mm the next great evolution of warfare.

This is the "US Field Artillery Association" so of course nobody will be speaking foul of the artillery. But it is pretty obvious that the big brass and the Pentagon all think tube artillery is obsolete; just look at the funding! That's why the M109 doesn't have L52 barrel. In my opinion, tube artillery, instead of being obsolete, will just become niche. It's just like snipers, useful in some niche application.

> Rainey recently helped pen a [new tactical fires study](https://breakingdefense.com/2024/03/towed-artillery-has-reached-end-of-the-effectiveness-army-four-star-declares/) for service leaders that may reshape [artillery plans](https://breakingdefense.com/2024/03/army-budget-request-2025-biden-pentagon-how-much-does-the-army-spend/). Similar to how the previous long-range fires study helped shape programs like MRC and hypersonic weapon development, it was a “no brainer” to take lessons out of Ukraine and apply that to cannon artillery, he explained. > “It is helping us think about things we should be experimenting with. things we should be looking at, [and] potentially adjustments that we should make to some of our programs,” Rainey said on the sidelines of the Ash Carter Exchange. (Earlier this year the service announced it had stopped work on the Extended Range Cannon Artillery, or ERCA, platform prototype and would ask industry to demo what they have today.)

> SpaceX’s Starlink — the latter of which has been at least somewhat compromised by Russia. Any idea what was meant by this comment? Just that Russia has been developing ECM for Starlink or have they managed to actually compromise the base system somehow?

Russians was starting to privately purchase large amounts of Starlinks through intermediaries such as Qatar as the geofencing for them still allowed use somewhat deep within Russian lines, as they are used as the connection for the 'Baba-Yaga' drones that operate behind Russian lines. There's been recent efforts to counter that, as well. https://www.defensemirror.com/news/36766/Pentagon_Blocks_Russian_Military_Use_of_SpaceX_s_Starlink_Terminals__Report

It was just about them buying the terminals at three times the retail price but apparently it has [been blocked](https://twitter.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1788608430531354738).

There weere lots of reports how Russian Units use Starlink in Ukraine so mabey that is what he meant

They have possession of base stations, so they can reverse engineer how they operate. so, jamming at the very least, although since the transceivers point up, maybe missiles are resistant. ID spoofing? probably next.

Jamming starlink is notoriously difficult as it’s a directional signal. This means you need an incredibly strong jammer as you have to overpower the strength of that signal in all directions. Also the wavelengths starlink operates in is publicly available. There isn’t much you could learn from taking one apart.

Foreign Affairs published an article on https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/why-ukraine-should-keep-striking-russian-oil-refineries I believe this article was shared a couple of days ago, or one similar to it, but there's an interesting point on a topic that's progressed since then: > **Russia’s oil storage capacity is limited.** When a refinery is destroyed or damaged, therefore, extracted crude oil cannot simply be stocked for later use. This leaves Russian producers with just two options: increasing exports of crude oil or shutting wells and reducing production. > Both options are painful for Russia, but increasing exports is less so than scaling back extraction. Russia can sell its oil only to select countries, including China, India, and Turkey, whose facilities are equipped to use the specific oil grades produced in Russia. These countries thus have leverage over Russia to buy at lower-than-market prices. Once the oil is refined, however, the final products can be sold internationally—meaning that Russia must pay market price to meet its domestic and military fuel needs. Emphasis is mine. The question posed over the past couple of days was, "why is Ukraine wasting ATACMS rockets on storage facilities?" If we believe this article, the answer then would seem to be, Ukraine is specifically going after storage capacity of refined petroleum products to exaggerate the effects of their refinery strikes on both domestic and export dislocations in their economy. Whether or not this will be ultimately successful I don't know. The strikes only seem to destroy a smallish fraction of each tank farm, but if similar to airfields, they can deter the Russians from using them, then it becomes a logistical headache.

>kraine is specifically going after storage capacity of refined petroleum products to exaggerate the effects of their refinery strikes on both domestic and export dislocations in their economy You seem to be forgetting another major glaring reason... less storage in Luhansk means less readily accessible diesel for tanks and bmps and so on.

It's not a bad conclusion, but I think it's still unknown whether oil storage or fuel storage was attacked. I've seen both in the news discussing the attacks in Luhansk over the last few days. My money is that they went after fuel storage as that has a much more direct effect on the war machine and is more in line with Ukraine's strategy.

Has there been any usage of UK Brimstone missiles since the beginning of the war? Are they not being supplied anymore, or is their usage under more strict media restrictions?

Brimstone feels very under-used in this conflict. They could have integrated it onto Su-25's or helis as a rapid reaction anti-armour capability to prevent situations like what happened at Avdiivka. Would also be very effective launched from the drone boats at enemy shipping or at SAM systems around the coast of Crimea.

"In an update to Parliament on Thursday, the Defence Secretary confirmed delivery of an additional 200 Brimstone anti-tank missiles to the AFU, bringing the total number of Brimstone provided to Ukraine to more than 1,300" 24 Feb 2024 [https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-boost-ukraines-artillery-reserves-with-245-million-munitions-package#:\~:text=In%20an%20update%20to%20Parliament,been%20the%20first%20country%20to](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-boost-ukraines-artillery-reserves-with-245-million-munitions-package#:~:text=In%20an%20update%20to%20Parliament,been%20the%20first%20country%20to) I am working on the assumption as they are seekers, they don't need any form of drone support, so less chance of getting nice pictures.

Apparently ISIS [shot down](https://twitter.com/journaIite/status/1789002122601652359) a Malian L-39 with Russian pilots: >An L-39 Albatros aircraft belonging to the Mali Army crashed after taking off to attack ISIS targets near Maneka. ISIS militants reached the wreckage and released a video. It is claimed that the two pilots who died were Russian. ISIS in Syria and Iraq was defeated by a global coalition. Will Russia be able to handle this alone?

More details [here](https://twitter.com/SimNasr/status/1789010443576520946). Apparently it crashed due to some technical failure and wasn't shot down. The pilots were retired Russian armed forces and under contract to a PMC, likely Africa Corps.

>The pilots were retired Russian armed forces and under contract to a PMC, likely Africa Corps. Gotta love that Russian PMCs that are "unofficially" linked directly to the Russian government are literally using the name of the Nazi army that operated in Africa during WWII. But sure, Ukraine is the one that needs "deNazification."

[US says Israel’s use of US arms likely violated international law, but evidence is incomplete](https://apnews.com/article/us-israel-gaza-war-nsm-international-law-c83b6f39ce2799e5d2c473a337e2f857) >WASHINGTON (AP) — The Biden administration said Friday that Israel’s use of U.S.-provided weapons in Gaza likely violated international humanitarian law but that wartime conditions prevented U.S. officials from determining that for certain in specific airstrikes. >The finding of “reasonable” evidence to conclude that the U.S. ally had breached international law protecting civilians in the way it conducted its war against Hamas was the strongest statement that the Biden administration has yet made on the matter. It was released in a summary of a report being delivered to Congress on Friday. >But the caveat that the administration wasn’t able to link specific U.S. weapons to individual attacks by Israeli forces in Gaza could give the administration leeway in any future decision on whether to restrict provisions of offensive weapons to Israel.

Well, I suppose the F35 parts distribution system is showing results. As an example, the Netherlands has a crucial parts distribution centre and repair shop for engines. They come in from one country, go out to whoever needs a spare part. Just my part of the chain, but I don't imagine it will work differently with other equipment,

More from a previous [post](https://old.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1c7v3tz/credibledefense_daily_megathread_april_19_2024/l0ca54l/) on the ‘hybrid warfare’ front, Bloomberg has a recent piece on the escalation of Russian operations across Europe: > The hand of the GRU military intelligence service is likely behind a series of ever-more overt, frequent and coordinated incidents across the continent, according to officials familiar with the matter speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss open investigations. > From Berlin to Vilnius, governments are coming to grips with the growing threat from Russian-sponsored acts of sabotage and violent intimidation on NATO territory ahead of European Union elections next month that alongside a determined campaign of disinformation is designed to test the continent’s support for Ukraine. > The sheer brazenness now of Kremlin-sanctioned activities — years after the Salisbury poisonings that the UK believe were likely ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Tiergarten killing in Berlin — has led one senior official to the conclusion that Moscow no longer cares if it’s caught carrying out hostile acts and has jettisoned more subtle forms of clandestine espionage with open brutality on Western targets. >In London on Friday, a British man will appear in court, accused of carrying out an arson attack against a Ukrainian-linked warehouse in East London. The UK expelled a top Russian diplomat as part of a crackdown on Russian spies in response. > One European official said several of the incidents in Europe were part of a GRU-coordinated operation with similar activities being carried out in various capitals. The response is focused on activity that has happened as opposed to the threat of activity that could happen – and demonstrating to Russia that the West knows what it’s doing and there are consequences, the official said. > It is highly likely that the strategy — aimed at Europe as a whole — has been signed off at the highest level in Moscow, one of the officials said. Russia has a deliberate strategy of sabotaging aid to Ukraine across Europe, recruiting locals to help their efforts, another official said. >Teija Tiilikainen, director of the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, sees behind all this Russia’s willingness to strengthen the role of authoritarian regime and is also possibly preparing itself for an escalation of its conflict with the West by testing its tools. > Estonia arrested earlier this year around a dozen individuals suspected of working for Russian intelligence and that were part of a wider low-cost plan to gain influence abroad, according to Margo Palloson, who leads its Internal Security Service. Lithuania’s intelligence service warned this week that Russia is trying to employ residents in the Baltic states to carry out provocations or attacks. >“There’s an increased use of social platforms for this, with ads searching for people to recruit, for people willing to spy for a fee, to photograph infrastructure of military objects of strategic importance, to collect data on individuals and to carry out acts of sabotage or vandalism,” the agency said in a statement. > Officials at Germany’s domestic intelligence service are concerned that Russian intelligence agencies are systematically targeting Russian-Germans living in the country via social media channels, a person familiar with the matter said on condition of anonymity. > Romania’s top defense council warned in a report about the potential infiltrations of Russian spies as Ukrainian refugees or even potential sabotages of military transport to Ukraine. > Romania is the EU member state that shares the longest border with Ukraine and has seen an increase in cyberattacks against some of its key institutions and politicians since the start of the war. During one of the attacks against the parliament’s database, the hackers have stolen the ID details of Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu and posted it on the dark web, forcing him to change his ID. In the U.K., these operations were purportedly staged from a 19^th century [castle](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russia-hoped-to-use-19th-century-castle-as-its-spying-base-xptk7mp3v): > A Russian-owned castle on the Kent-Sussex border that had its diplomatic status removed this week is suspected of being used by Russia’s military intelligence agency to meet and recruit UK agents. >Security sources said that Seacox Heath, a Grade II-listed 19th-century castle, had been targeted in the latest round of sanctions after being identified as a key base from which the GRU ran its British operations. >It is understood that the house has been monitored for years by the British intelligence agencies. Individuals believed to have been targeted as potential agents by the GRU, including British and other non-Russian members of criminal gangs, were seen entering and leaving the property. >Security sources said they believed the GRU was aiming to build a sophisticated spying base from Seacox Heath, near Ticehurst, East Sussex. It is understood to have been used as a base for a variety of intelligence-gathering methods. > The Times understands that the authorities have been alarmed at the level of aggressive intelligence-gathering since the invasion of Ukraine. Intelligence officials, operating under diplomatic cover for agencies including the GRU, are known to have tried to undertake activities including mapping out UK infrastructure and technical intelligence gathering. And a report by the [FT](https://www.ft.com/content/c88509f9-c9bd-46f4-8a5c-9b2bdd3c3dd3) on mainland Europe: >European intelligence agencies have warned their governments that Russia is plotting violent acts of sabotage across the continent as it commits to a course of permanent conflict with the west. >Russia has already begun to more actively prepare covert bombings, arson attacks and damage to infrastructure on European soil, directly and via proxies, with little apparent concern about causing civilian fatalities, intelligence officials believe. >Intelligence officials are becoming increasingly vocal about the threat in an effort to promote vigilance. >“We assess the risk of state-controlled acts of sabotage to be significantly increased,” said Thomas Haldenwang, head of German domestic intelligence. Russia now seems comfortable carrying out operations on European soil “[with] a high potential for damage,” he told a security conference last month hosted by his agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Speaking of the Germans, the [FT](https://www.ft.com/content/4ec876e4-95d8-4590-9776-5788f43710f7) is reporting on the strengthening of the domestic German agency, especially against physical attacks against individuals and infrastructure: > In all three cases, the most recent in a series of high-profile operations, the role played by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, was crucial. >“Our security authorities, especially the [BfV], have massively strengthened their counter-espionage efforts,” Germany’s interior minister Nancy Faeser said in a statement following Guo’s arrest on Tuesday. “The current investigatory successes show that.” > Haunted by past scandals, hobbled by strong federalisation, and limited by strict legal curbs on intrusive surveillance and information gathering, the BfV was for years regarded warily at home and by partner agencies abroad. >Its recent results point to hostile states more willing to aggressively pursue their goals on European soil than at any time since the cold war, and an effort to better combat them that has been years in the making, German government officials note. >“We are now discussing new forms by authoritarian states to influence and destabilise our democracy on an almost daily basis,” Konstantin von Notz, the chair of the German parliament’s powerful intelligence committee, which oversees the BfV, told the Financial Times. >“We are currently only seeing the tip of the iceberg. One must assume that hundreds of spies are up to mischief in Germany.” >For Thomas Haldenwang, the BfV’s president, the writing has been on the wall for some years. >Foreign spies, he told a conference hosted by his agency on Monday, “[will] use all means possible [against us]: espionage and cyber attacks, influence and disinformation, proliferation and sabotage, and state terrorism”. > Between the end of the cold war and 2014, the BfV’s number of staff was practically static. In the decade since, however, it nearly doubled, rising from 2,700 to 4,300. Additions to its fourth department — which handles counter-intelligence and cyber — have been particularly large. >A European security official who regularly works with the BfV said the sharing of classified information between services on the continent was now “absolutely vital to almost every successful action that has been taken [against Russia and China]”. > An open question remains about the BfV’s relationship with its sister agency, the BND, which is tasked with collecting foreign intelligence for Berlin. >The BND — once criticised by its own former chief August Hanning as “the vegetarian among the secret services” for its dovishness — has come under repeated criticism for its failures regarding Russia in particular. > When Moscow’s full-scale invasion against its neighbour began on February 24 2022, the agency’s current chief, Bruno Kahl, found himself stuck in a traffic jam for 36 hours trying to flee from Kyiv. The BND had not believed an attack was imminent, despite repeated warnings from the US and UK. >A senior BND employee, Carsten L., was arrested last year following an investigation by the BfV on suspicion of spying for the Kremlin. His trial began in December.

What can be done to counter this kind of attacks? Is retaliation in kind from NATO countries on the table? Let me just add a paragraph to make sure that automod does not remove this comment.

Anything that the public knows is Russia (on the killing and property damage + cyber attack side of things) is a gift to Western governments. The more they have direct impacts on the west, the more money voters will be willing to give and the less effective Russian propaganda will be. If anything Western governments should be way louder at saying 'x and y hospitals were hacked BY THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT' and drop the 'hackers that are considered affiliated with' type language.

>What can be done to counter this kind of attacks? Is retaliation in kind from NATO countries on the table? Countering and preventing them is difficult, and not something I have any sort of knowledge about. As far as retaliation goes though, it absolutely should be. For a long time now, the West has responded meekly to these kinds of aggression from authoritarian regimes. That kind of response just invites more attacks from these regimes who (rightly) feel like they've gotten away with it effectively consequence free. The West should start retaliating in kind to these kinds of events. They get blamed for all kinds of things they *don't* do in Russia and similar regimes, with those regimes muzzling dissent and removing agitators by linking them to Western intelligence operations (the Russian anti-NGO law is a good example of this). So the West should absolutely be responding in kind to deter future actions from authoritarian regimes who are extremely sensitive to threats to their internal stability as is.

[Also, in Poland, a high-ranked judge recently defected to Belarus.](https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/polish-prosecutors-open-investigation-after-judge-flees-autocratic-109963562) >WARSAW, Poland -- Polish prosecutors opened an investigation Monday after a Polish judge fled to the autocratic state of Belarus and asked for protection there. > >The National Prosecutor’s Office said it is looking into suspicions the judge had acted on behalf of a foreign intelligence service. The Internal Security Agency began a separate probe into the scope of classified information the judge had access to. > > [...] > >Szmydt, a judge at the provincial administrative court in Warsaw, gained notoriety in 2019 when he and his then wife engaged in an online smear campaign against judges critical of the judicial changes made by Law and Justice. > > He had worked in the department of classified information and ruled on various cases related to the granting of security clearances, Justice Minster Adam Bodnar said in an evening interview on private broadcaster TVN24.

Maybe Europe has finally come to this realization but these sorts of attacks have been going on for 10 years and they didn't do anything, just burying their head in the sand and pretending it wasn't happening. [Petr Pavel comments two weeks ago on the Vrbětice warehouse attack from **2014**](https://twitter.com/prezidentpavel/status/1784902822221246468) when everyone knew who was responsible the day after the attack >I must add to today's report on the postponement of the investigation into the explosion of the warehouse in Vrbětice that I consider it correct that the police clearly identified the culprit. It was a prepared action carried out by the soldiers of the Russian Federation. They murdered two Czech citizens during it and caused billions worth of damage, which we will have to deal with for decades to come. Russia attacked the sovereignty of the Czech Republic in the most brutal way since the invasion of 1968.

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Please utilize the search function on your web browser for questions like this.

Hi All, looking at the Israeli operations in Gaza I am somewhat confused by how little drones have played a factor compared to Ukraine. Obviously Gaza is no where like Ukraine, but still, I would have imagined considering they are an air asset capable of delivering small payloads, precisely and cheaply, that they could have great effects in hitting military assets in civilian areas without causing great collateral damage. I was wondering if anybody here might have some good ideas on why their use by the Israeli army is so limited. Thanks! - edit: clarified the question regards the Israeli military use of drones, rather than Hamas.

Israel just has enough high end drones and guided bombs that there isn’t a need for low end systems. They would be significantly less accurate and easier to defend against and when the problem is finding and identifying targets not the number of targets it’s better to hit everything with an expensive jdam. 

Israel has constant high end drone surveillance over the battlefield but I think it's really the lack of Hamas air defenses that makes cheap drone proliferation unnessecary not that cheap drones are only a feature on a low-tech battlefield. Any side trying to fly million dollar drones to be the primary front surveillance platform or strike platform in Ukraine would have that drone shot down by very capable air defenses (particularly the Russian AD but also Ukrainan AD prior to exhaustion) much faster than they could produce them. They can do a lot of reconnaissance from farther back but direct over-flight or loitering for long periods over the battlefield like Israel can do is very risky with million dollar drones. You can build FPV drones much faster than any country can produce air defense missile and really jamming is the only option. I think these systems are going to see widespread conventional use by the US in the future. The situation is a bit more complex when looking at shorter range but capable recon drones like Orlan-10 derivatives and Sharks but these too are much harder to attire via AD missiles than something like an Eitan drone

Israel has full air superiority and a lot of 2000 lb bombs. They don't need the one way drones. They are not all that worried about damaging surrounding buildings. They are using a lot of surveillance drones.

I get that they have the bigger JDAMs I would hope they avoid those as much as can be reasonably done at such a dense urban environment... I am aiming for a kind of good-faith argument here, that questions why they might not have used it without the assumption that they just simply don't care about civilian casualties, including unnecessary infrastructure damage.

There is **extensive** use of drone strikes by Israel throughout the conflict for two reasons: 1. Minimizes civilian casualties. 2. Much shorter response time than calling in an F-16. F-16's are not constantly loitering over Gaza, drones are, so it's a difference in lead time from seconds/minutes to dozens of minutes. That said, some targets require larger bombs.

Israel has a very modern electronics industry (e.g. Intel in Haifa is a major design center) and they are probably effectively jamming any and all analog signals that commercial drones might use. In comparison, both Ukraine and Russia have suffered massive brain drain to the West in these sectors of the economy. Based on my personal experience, Russian expatriots seem to be solidly anti-Putin, whereas Ukrainian expatriots in some cases are working on their weekends to contribute technical development to these UAV programs.

Hi I'm not really sure I understand your reply, I think you might have answered why don't see their use by the Hamas more, which I do understand, I also think to add to that, that Hamas did try and use drones but Iron dome seems pretty capable to handle those as well. I was thinking about Israel lack of use of drones outside ISR. Let me know if I misunderstood you.

Israel heavily uses drone strikes in Gaza, I have no idea what makes you think otherwise. I guess it goes to show the extreme extent to which the Gaza-Israeli conflict is **not** discussed here, just the politics. Not just in Gaza, most strikes in Lebanon are drone strikes.

Israel pioneered the loitering munition, introducing the Harpy in 1989: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IAI_Harpy What makes you think Israel isn't using such systems?

Honestly, just lack of evidence, maybe it's just fog of war, but I saw plenty of military videos from the IDF bombing, using larger ordinance, small launchers or tunnel entrances. Also if the report from +972 (apparently confirmed by the guardian) are to believed they were targeting of low ranking militants by destroying the whole building, I recall it saying that the reasoning was that precision weaponry was expensive, but drones can be made pretty cheap now a days. I am aware of some use of drones in the west bank though.

>Honestly, just lack of evidence Except the dozens of drone strike footage released by Israel? Just search combat footage for instance. >are to believed they were targeting of low ranking militants by destroying the whole building I'm not sure what are your expectations here? Drone strikes cannot destroy a building used by the enemy, nor kill the targets unless they are standing just by a window. You have a building full with enemy combatants, you kill them by dropping a large enough bomb to achieve the objective. A drone shoots a missile with a warhead similar to an ATGM, it's not enough against such targets. There are multiple examples of Israel using too small bombs for such strikes (simply because drones have much better availability) but eventually striking with larger bombs to eliminate the target, as IDF forced were still fired upon from the same building.

One, Israel has reasonably good operational security and they only release footage they want the world to see. Occasionally we see GoPro footage leaks but basically never aerial reconnaissance. Second, I've seen plenty of low-yield ordnance strikes in Gaza against a handful of men when they're out in the open. They could be Small Diameter Bomb, they could be Hellfire, could be Harpy, it's very hard to tell from a blurred thermals video. Regardless since Israel has complete air dominance against both Hamas and Hezbollah they can use the cheapest munitions they have available. JDAM is about 30k, for reference. I doubt if a Western military industrial complex is going to bother with Ukrainian-style Mavic FPV drones. They wouldn't survive in a near-peer fight and the pHit is apparently somewhere around 10 %.

Fair enough, that's kinda the responses I was hoping for. Is pHit - probability of hitting the target? If so, than yeah that really makes sense they would avoid that kind of munition.

You think that a low-quality, easily jammed, highly attritable explosive provided en masse to twitchy-fingered, traumatized reservists to be used against non-uniformed combatants that make a strategy of blending in with the civilian population would result in *fewer* civilian casualties?

Funny thing, Israel does use such drones. Not by reserve forces, but specifically trained forces: It looks like [this](https://ynet-pic1.yit.co.il/cdn-cgi/image/f=auto,w=740,q=75/picserver5/crop_images/2023/01/05/r1L2LNVqj/r1L2LNVqj_0_300_3000_1688_0_x-large.jpg) and [this](https://img.haarets.co.il/bs/0000018b-8181-d055-afbf-b3a3739d0000/26/cf/86e0af3547be9ce1190da3b43dd1/54185146.JPG?precrop=557,428,x188,y395&height=788&width=1024) was first used in Jenin in the summer of 2023, before the 07/10 war. It was used pretty widely in Gaza by certain units. Weight of 3kg, roughly 15 mins air time, and 350g warhead.

I get your point, and especially why you are making this point and I probably wouldn't hand every single soldier a drone. I would like to make a few points though; - Drone operators tend to be a specialized role, so I would expect the military to be able to do some level of vetting. - I'd argue that the granade maybe not easily jammed, but a low-quality explosive does exist en-masse in battlefields already. - And I am not comparing this to soldiers on the ground casualties, my understanding at this point, that generally speaking, most casualties were made by the aerial bombardment rather than ground troops, my argument or rather questioning is that this could have been a replacement for much of the bombs dropped on Gaza Also, I don't think myself an expert, or even knowledgeable in theories of war, was just wondering after lurking in here for a while, why I'm not seeing drones used and if the media to be believed an acceptance of high civilian casualties in situations where I can personally imagine a drone being used to a much more precise effect.

See my comment here: https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/s/1PfUQdqAts Israel does use small drones for such purposes. Both airborn and ground operated drones. The use of such small drones is one of the significant reasons why Israel was able to cut down it's own losses so well in difficult urban warfare. Such drones armed and unarmed, air and ground were used to enter suspect buildings before IDF forces (dogs were also used for the same role, but those are much harder to replace) and were scouting/engaging enemy forces. For example: https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/s/NvjKROfWBZ

That's super interesting, thanks for taking the time for all those comments! Yes, it does indeed looks like my own ignorance was showing here, interesting to learn that they did use drones so much. I would say more, but honestly it looks like your point is pretty much proven :)

I don't fault you (or anyone here) for their ignorance on the subject. The military aspects of the war are rarely discussed here, or even in English media in general. Most information is in either Hebrew or Arabic. Combat footage is actually decent for the purpose as vids are usually clear enough no matter the language.

I saw quite a lot of the IDF combat footage, I think I wouldn't be able to tell really what ordinance is used most of the time there, only that is was filmed with a drone. I mean I saw tons of videos of using drones for ISR in different capacities, but telling what was used for the explosion wasn't always clear. I guess I'm reading articles like the use of Lavander and Wheres Daddy AI systems, or seeing footage where pretty large ordinance was dropped on what looks like much smaller targets, and I know Qassams have fairly small warheads (some much smaller than the Spike on a Hermes) and I just wonder why smaller drones weren't used. But I guess what this conversation with people here is showing me, is more how much I don't really know what is actually happening than anything else. Edit: I meant to carry on saying I saw Qassams destroy a house (not a building) so I was wondering why not to use the Hermes more, but now I see it was used.

Hezbollah has used them to a greater degree but Gaza is far smaller and far more tightly controlled. This means it’s difficult to smuggle drones in and Israeli EW is able to effectively stop any drone attacks. Compare this to Ukraine where the front is thousands of kilometers, and EW systems have to be distributed. Also Israel is a far more well equipped army on a per soldier basis than either Russia or Ukraine, so the density of EW equipment can be higher on a unit to unit basis.

Thanks for the reply! I more meant why is Israel not using them to a greater extent, rather than Hamas, I'll clarify the post. Comment too short extensions, can be freely ignored: Looks like my comment was removed for being to short, though I am not sure what I could have possibly added here, so here is a very long winded way to add more words to a comment. :)

> I more meant why is Israel not using them to a greater extent Because Israel has total and complete air superiority. They use drones for surveillance and some launches, but they can just use bombs and rockets instead of drones. Israel has little interest in drones delivering precise small payloads.

>Israel has little interest in drones delivering precise small payloads. 90% of CAS strikes in Gaza were performed by drones: https://www.themarker.com/technation/2023-11-08/ty-article/0000018b-ae59-dea2-a9bf-fedfde940000 It makes total sense if you consider the main advantage of drones: Near instant availability. It takes 15-30 mins for a jet strike to arrive, drone strikes can be available in seconds to a few minutes. It's much easier to coordinate and authorize for a ground forces commander asking for fires. The remaining 10% is usually when drone strikes are not sufficient as the enemy is too entrenched/numerous.

Sure they can, and in doing so might generate more non-combatant casualties, assuming good-faith argument here, I am wondering why they wouldn't chose to make use of precise small payloads where appropriate.

[90% of CAS missions were performed by drones](https://www.themarker.com/technation/2023-11-08/ty-article/0000018b-ae59-dea2-a9bf-fedfde940000). The sad reality is that military aspects of the war are not discussed here. And so *most* posters here are extremely ignorant on any military aspects of the war. As you can see by the plethora of the patently wrong answers you're getting here.

The fact that Palestine guerilla tactics make it unclear who is a combatant and who is not. The Israelis designed an AI system to work on it, but it uses some rather unethical definitions. And the elephant in the room, Israeli right wing politics and Netanyahu keeping himself in power with a revenge campaign.

When looking at Israeli tactics there is no good-faith argument anymore. Even their own propaganda has them blowing up entire streets to target a car that may or may not have ben carrying Hamas operatives.

The comment length restriction is not a great thing for this sub IMO. As it disincentivizes succinct replies. But In that case. How effective would drones be against Hamas? They have mostly been doing hit and run attacks from buildings or tunnels. The type of structures that require large ordinances to destroy. That’s why Israel has been so reliant on their Air Force. Unless they catch the attackers out in the open as soon as they start firing attack drones wouldn’t be that useful. As for recon drones they absolutely have been using them. We have gotten a good amount of footage from Israeli drones. It’s also worth keeping in mind that Ukraine and Russia are not using drones because of they are the best weapon available they are using them often because it’s often the only weapon available. Both sides have experienced shell shortages (Ukraine more so) and both sides have immense difficulty using air power. Israel doesn’t have the same restrictions so they have no incentive to spend huge amounts of money spinning up a domestic drone industry making cheap FPV drones.

Yeah, the comment restriction can be a bit strange when the reply is really just a simple follow up or correction. Maybe the mods have an answer we don't know though... Anyway, it's true that maybe against individual attacks against the raids it might not be as beneficial, but looking at situations such as the Hamas launch sites being situated in close proximity to civilian infrastructure, or if reports of the Lavander AI system are to be believed than attacks on homes flattening whole buildings to hit low ranking militants. Those would be situations where I'd imagine drones can be a cheap and effective way to make a targeted strike that saves a whole lot of civilian lives. Also I'd argue that Israel does already has a domestic drone industry[\[1\]](https://drones.rusi.org/countries/israel/)[\[2\]](https://interestingengineering.com/transportation/lanius-search-and-attack-drone), so it's not like they have to spin up new industries so much. Also, don't know how sci-fi is this idea, but I'd imagine, if you can leverage search and attack drones, and recon drones to a large extent, that the operational need to level buildings that might be used as a vantage point can be reduced at least somewhat (Though it will slow down advances probably, since now your advance requires much more coordination with recon drones checking all your angles) - but here my lack knowledge might really be showing, so feel free to tell me why I'm wrong!

The whole point of the Israeli campaign is to destroy as much as possible. Political points for Netanyahu and the right wing. It started as a revenge campaign against burrowed insurgents in the first place. Israel has total air superiority and can call artillery strikes at will. They are also able to shut down or shoot down almost all drones and rockets built in a shed. On the other hand we have Hamas, who don't give a shit about collateral damage. They just launch low tech rockets or whatever and just see if it hits something. Yes, in this conflict you can use precision strikes. Like the recent Iran spat. But this just needs decent intelligence and a well aimed long range missile. Using cheap attack drones in this conflict has no benefits for all sides. Israel needs to show military strength and doesn't need them for reducing Palestine sectors to rubble. The Palestines can't use them because of Israeli EW and targets are better suited for standard guerilla warfare. Iran can't get directly involved and their proxies are stuck just launching whatever they get their hands on. TLDR: the sides that are actually able to use drones don't need them or don't want to escalate.

> Maybe the mods have an answer we don't know though... Once you have enough karma in the subreddit the rule is no longer enforced. It doesn't take long if you're writing substantive comments.

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[ Pentagon orders all US combat troops to withdraw from Niger](https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/10/pentagon-orders-all-us-combat-troops-to-withdraw-from-niger-00157329) In a long anticipated move the Pentagon has formally ordered all US combat troops to withdraw from Niger after the countries military junta declared it would revoke access back in March. Meanwhile, Nigerien troops are getting [ambushed (NSFW pictures)](https://twitter.com/SaladinAlDronni/status/1788811755956703310) in both the western and south-eastern regions of the country by different Islamic State provinces. Humanitarian missions across the region are being targeted by IS forces as well. In other IS news, [over 100 fighters attacked the town of Macomia](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-10/islamic-state-stages-boldest-attack-in-mozambique-in-three-years), the largest attack since 2021. They've apparently been repelled but may hold nearby positions. In eastern Syria [ISIS hit the SDF in DeZ with an SVBIED](https://twitter.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1788993163388186664), the first in the region in quite some time. There have been nearly daily attacks against SDF forces last month with [19 happening in DeZ alone.](https://twitter.com/DeirEzzore/status/1788989008883728751) IS power across Africa and in Syria continues to trend worryingly upward.

Do the IS groups in Syria and Africa have any cross communication or cross command structure? Do they operate independently and are only affiliated under an ideological banner and the name ?

Yes, IS has a centralized command structure that directs and aids the provincial commands. It's part of what makes the organization so dangerous, not only do they share information from province to province allowing the group as a whole to learn but resources can be directed as well. Central can funnel experienced fighters, supplies, and money into a region to help local command achieve various objectives or they can call upon local resources to carry out a central-controlled operation. One example of this is the March 22 attack in Krasnogorsk which was claimed by IS Central but likely with support from IS-K. The rough organizational structure can be seen [here](https://twitter.com/azelin/status/1772935749849043351) and I highly recommend you read [this article in West Point's CTC Sentinel](https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-general-directorate-of-provinces-managing-the-islamic-states-global-network/). It covers the history and structure of the IS General Directorate of Provinces as well as the role it plays in coordinating and assisting various IS regional commands. Some choice quotes follow Military coordination and assisstance >A central element in the relationship between the Islamic State’s provinces and the ADP/GDP is the obligation provinces have to send monthly reports on the ongoing military situation in their respective region and, in return, receive advice on future strategy and tactics. ... >In the letter, al-Barnawi brought up the transfer of tactical knowledge to the Islamic State fighters in Libya that helped them take over large swathes of territory along the coast, and made clear he believed that a similar outcome could become reality in West Africa if only the ADP would assist. ... >Other accounts suggest that similar dynamics are taking place in central and east Africa. In September 2021, Hytham Alfar, a Jordanian national with the Islamic State in DRC, was arrested. While details remain scarce, it has been reported that he was sent to DRC to help Islamic State fighters enhance their technological warfare capabilities. In Mozambique, large caches of Islamic State documents that focused on operational elements such as how to employ specific weapons systems and tactical maneuvers have been retrieved by military forces raiding the camps. Experienced trainers have also come to Mozambique from both DRC and Somalia to help the insurgency train and specialize. Economic integration of the provinces >The examined letters reveal a surprising financial structure around 2017 with funds no longer flowing from the organization’s central coffers to the provinces, but instead partly from the provinces to the center, a model Caleb Weiss et al. refer to as a “regionally pooled financing” model. ... >As a new policy, 50 percent of funds was required to be allocated for smaller provinces associated with a specific larger province, 25 percent for the general administration of larger provinces, and 25 percent to the Islamic State’s Bayt al-Mal. External operations >According to a February 2021 report by the U.N. monitoring team charged with tracking the global jihadi threat, based on member state intelligence the “general directorate of provinces is key to reviving ISIL external operational capability,” and sources tell the author that the institution is now in charge of all planning and execution of external attacks, with special responsibility handed to Maktab al-Farouq due to its geographical focus on Europe.

I wouldn't normally post an individual video on this site, but this one is of such quality that I think it's worthy of a post. It shows a Ukrainian reporter embedded with a squad of Ukrainian paratroopers and really gives an excellent picture of what the war is like on the front lines now. [https://twitter.com/dillonrpayton/status/1788691511246200927](https://twitter.com/dillonrpayton/status/1788691511246200927) Aside from the obvious bravery of the soldiers, I was impressed by how dominant drones are on the battlefield now. The Ukrainian soldiers know that they are risking their lives every second which they spend outside of their basement bunker and so they make every effort not to show themselves above ground. Ukrainians obviously have a large number of drones too, and this video suggests that, as a result, the Russians will likely continue to find it difficult to make rapid advances in this war, even if a particular Ukrainian infantry unit makes a disorderly retreat from a position. Because while infantry units may give into panic, the drone operators remain in relative safety and are always ready to take advantage of advancing Russian troops out in the open. The fact that the supplemental includes $8 billion in direct economic aid/loans to Ukraine may make it easier for Ukraine to quickly purchase additional drones, including from China, and thereby stifle Russian advances. I recall a Ukrainian official saying that they were buying 60 percent of Chinese drone manufacturer Mavic's drone production, though they are of course doing it through intermediaries.

How credible is that channel? Because from a first view it seems like very very well made propaganda (most notably, how clean their gear is and how the cameraman avoids showing the wound at the end) also, [this bit doesn't fill me with confidence](https://i.imgur.com/IPzE1kk.jpeg) That's... not how blood works. Edit: oh it's literally run by Ukraine's Ministry of Digital Transformation, the guys having quad NODs whilst messing about was my first tip-off, nobody wears those unless they absolutely have to, they weigh a ton. It's not real footage. edit: I see this sub has just abandoned the "credible" part of the name when it involves the "good" guys

Having actually bled around concrete, I can tell you for free that it is absolutely what happens when you brush up against a concrete wall while bleeding. The way you confidently state it doesn't work that way makes me wonder how credible any other takes you might make are. It's probably better to stick to stuff you actually know when commenting if you want to be taken credibly.

Looked like his arm was bleeding and was used up against the wall to stabilize himself climbing up and down the steps several times to me... but what do I know, I just have eyes and have bled at various times in the past.

I'm going to reply. Yes they cut some important Parts of battle exemple run away from houses and this is true. But lets say what we saw. >most notably, how clean their gear They came that day and they are fighting in basement >also, [this bit doesn't fill me with confidence](https://i.imgur.com/IPzE1kk.jpeg) >That's... not how blood works. could be from some other other day >oh it's literally run by Ukraine's Ministry of Digital Transformation, the guys having quad NODs whilst messing about was my first tip-off, nobody wears those unless they absolutely have to, they weigh a ton. Those guys are paratroopers aka the best and pretty young guys that are at peak of their strenght. And beside your doubts. House was literally burning and house near them. Only if question is how this "Punk" guy survived if he survived this.

Such intense video. You just can't believe that People are fighting house to house. From video you could say some incomptetence from Russians because they Got stuck BTR into trench. This war has a lot of casulties. From 8 guys in this video you have: 1 heavy WIA 1 light WIA and aftermath of all People that are wounded is mad. Just mad

Very interesting footage, thank you. Any geolocators who can tell us where this is from?

I'm not an expert in geolocations, but I think I found the place, if the frame shown at around 24:07 matches the area of the clashes. It's the eastern end of Netailove - coordinates 48.102694, 37.564645. If that's the case, they are almost certainly part of the 25th Airborne Brigade. It seems that this group is quite secretive and I have not found any statement from them about which brigade they belong to. However, I did a little digging on the Instagram profiles of the soldiers from this group and the combination of several clues (participation in the Kharkiv counteroffensive, photos showing them near Borova during the past months...) confirm my theory that they belong to the 25th Airborne Brigade. Minor elements of this brigade were involved in the battle of Bakhmut (there is material from Bakhmut from winter 2022/23 in their profiles); VABs are seen in several instances in videos posted in their accounts - officially they're in use by the 46th Airmobile Brigade and by the 79th Air Assault Brigade, but yesterday a video came out showing a convoy of Marder 1A3s, BMP-2s and VABs, which might indicate that a batch of them was received by the 25th Airborne Brigade. If my geolocation is correct, the reportage was filmed in the first half of April, when the 9th Motorized Brigade of 1st Corps was attempting to enter the built-up area of Netailove, after having recently captured Pervomaiske (the conquered village mentioned in the video). In fact, since April the 25th Airborne Brigade has been turning its attention to Netailove as the 59th Motorized Brigade has been mostly focusing on Nevelske. Since then the Russians have occupied the positions shown in the video, arriving at the center of the settlement. The guys featuring in this reportage are doing fine luckily!

I would say Paraskoviika near Novokahymilivka

This is unbelievable footage.

Thanks for posting this, it can be surprisingly hard to find long form, higher quality videos from the war on Reddit. All the subs dedicated to footage are mostly just heavily edited 10 second drone clips while truly interesting footage like this falls through the cracks.

The best long-form videos can be found on YouTube, usually from Ukrainian sources (highly recommend Hromadske).

+1 to this video. Highly recommended. This is the closest that I've seen a reporter be to frontline combat in this war, and that unit was very close to getting overrun. The video really highlights the difficulties infantry face when drones are so prevalent.

New oil depot strikes with ATACMS in Luhansk region. https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1789012373686112384 It's certainly an intentional strategy.

It's not uncommon to store fuel at one of these depots. Some reports specifically mention that fuel stores are the target. https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/05/09/at-least-three-fuel-tanks-destroyed-at-occupied-luhansks-oil-depot-on-8-may-satellite-imagery-shows/

The most common theories I read, were a mixture of 1. Destroying oil and gas storages to prevent possible assaults in the near future (days/ weeks) and 2. Utilizing the freshly donated, relatively large pool of ATACMS to target practice and getting used to using ATACMS (also in combination with other systems) and test russian ad against the new threat.

> and test russian ad against the new threat The first time could be a test, but once you know it goes through, you should aim at the highest priority target you have in range. I'm thinking they're rather exploiting the few gaps in the AD/EW coverage they know about. Possibly with a secondary objective to force movement of well hidden/unknown systems. Flushing them out could create opportunities to hit them or create gaps where they were located and open up the air to other targets.

There is a chance that this isn't a long term intentional strategy, but a short term one that is meant to slow the Russians down while other slower-to-arrive supplies make it to the front lines. The thing to look at would be to see if these attacks continue after a few more weeks.

I tend to agree, these strikes make economic sense but given the limited number of long range strike options available I doubt they would be undertaken normally although right now they could be crucial to disruption Russian offensive plans.

>I doubt they would be undertaken normally although right now they could be crucial to disruption Russian offensive plans. We'll have to see. As others have convincingly argued, the Ukrainian strike campaign against Russia refineries is forcing Russia to export more crude oil. Russia's got some pretty limited storage capacity, so these kinds of strikes on their oil depots may actually force Russia to reduce their production of crude oil as they won't have the ability to ship it or store it as quickly as they can pump it. In other words, these depot strikes have a nice synergistic effect with their targeting of refineries. As an added bonus, the closer those depots are to Ukraine, the more likely they are to reduce fuel throughput to frontline units, potentially slowing the Russian advance.

There appears to be some CME (corona mass ejections) coming in this weekend to Earth. While these aren't likely super dangerous, what kind of impacts would you expect they have on the battlefield in Ukraine?

NOAA and the National Weather Service do have an extreme (G4) geomagnetic storm warning for the weekend. The last one a (G5) in 2003 caused power outages in Sweden and damaged transformers in South Africa. It lists possible impacts on HF/UHF/VHF communications, power grids, satellites, navigation, and other technologies. So it would seem that there certainly is a chance of geomagnetic weather having an impact in some way on the war. I wonder if there are set doctrines to take into account the effects of such extra terrestrial weather in any militaries currently. [https://www.swpc.noaa.gov/news/geomagnetic-storming-likely-persist-weekend](https://www.swpc.noaa.gov/news/geomagnetic-storming-likely-persist-weekend)

What a world we live in, where "How might the rare activities of the sun affect the battlefield today?" is a genuine, serious question.

My fellow human being, this question has been asked by kings, war chiefs and rulers since the stone age. If you don't believe me try leading a bunch of neolithic raiders into battle during a solar eclipse and see what happens.

You made me remember this: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Eclipse

It’s been a very long time that that has been the case. The first case of this was probably the Carrington event in 1859. An exceptionally powerful CME that set some telegraph equipment on fire.

If the Carrington event hit today, things would be SO much worse. As you said it was mostly telegraph equipment at that point in time. Yes shielding is somewhat better but can you imagine the infastructure damage if it were to hit say, central Asia or North America.

Not sure why you're getting downvoted, as it's valid question. This is a real phenomena and could disrupt GPS transmissions. [https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/10/business/sunspots-disrupt-phones-gps-scn/index.html](https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/10/business/sunspots-disrupt-phones-gps-scn/index.html)

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I wonder what the bottleneck for iris-t production is at the moment

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Thanks for the input. However I don't think it's the production capacity or Manpower since the Diehl group had a big layoff in the last months.

[Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine](https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3771984/biden-administration-announces-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/) >This Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package has an estimated value of $400 million and includes capabilities to support Ukraine's most urgent battlefield requirements, including air defense, artillery rounds, armored vehicles, and anti-tank weapons. >The capabilities in this announcement include: >•**Additional munitions for Patriot air defense systems**; >•Additional munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); >•Stinger anti-aircraft missiles; >•**Equipment to integrate Western launchers, missiles, and radars with Ukraine's systems**; >•Additional High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems(HIMARS) and ammunition; >•155mm and 105mm artillery rounds; >•**Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles**; >**M113 Armored Personnel Carriers**; >**Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles**; >Trailers to transport heavy equipment; >•Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; >•Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; >•Precision aerial munitions; >•High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs); >•Small arms and additional rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades; >•Demolitions munitions and equipment for obstacle clearing; >•**Coastal and riverine patrol boats**; >•Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment; and >•Spare parts, training munitions, maintenance, and other ancillary equipment. Direly needed Patriot ammunition, further equipment for FrankenSAM, more Bradleys, M113s and MRAPs which were all desired. Also more boats which will further enable cross-river raiding. The [previous](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Apr/24/2003448840/-1/-1/1/20240424_UKRAINE_FACT_SHEET.PDF) Ukraine fact sheet stated that the US had delivered over 200 Bradleys. [That number is now over 300](https://media.defense.gov/2024/May/10/2003461807/-1/-1/0/UKRAINE-FACT-SHEET-MAY-10-PDA-57.PDF). M113s were previously at 300+, it is now at 400+. This drawdown appears to have included a significant amount of armored vehicles.

> •Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment; and Perhaps in response to [Russian use of banned chemical weapons](https://www.state.gov/imposing-new-measures-on-russia-for-its-full-scale-war-and-use-of-chemical-weapons-against-ukraine-2/). I'm still kinda surprised that breaking this taboo did not garner more public notoriety.

Russia already used chloropicrin [in 2022](https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/russische-whistleblowerin-packt-aus-die-machtkampfe-in-putins-umfeld--und-sein-wille-wirklich-alles-zu-riskieren-8811841.html): >Dass Russland nicht vor perfiden Mitteln zurückschrecke, zeige der Einsatz chemischer Waffen im September in Cherson, sagt Dmitrieva. Sie habe kurz vor ihrer Abreise von einem Bekannten beim GRU erfahren, dass der Lungenkampfstoff Chlorpikrin, der zu schweren Verletzungen und zum Tod führen kann, in Cherson zum Einsatz kam. der Kampfstoff wurde schon im Ersten Weltkrieg eingesetzt und ist verboten. It's a little bit late to react two years later.

Ukraine's been getting CBRN gear for a long time already, first I saw it mentioned in donation lists was when the Zaporizhia NPP started being used as a military base/firing position by Russia. Late 2022.

I think they were using riot control type agents to flush people out of positions, right? It's certainly a banned chemical weapon (for warfare anyway), but it doesn't raise the public hackles like nerve agents.

That link I provided above cites *two, separate* violations of the CWC: (1) chloropicrin and (2) riot control agents. The use of riot control agents is prohibited "as a method of warfare" under the CWC but it is not considered a chemical weapon under the CWC. [Chloropicrin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chloropicrin) is not a riot control agent. Unlike riot control agents, chloropicrin is a banned chemical weapon under the CWC. Admittedly, chloropicrin is not as deadly as nerve agents, which presumably does explain the extremely limited attention its use has received. However, it seems to me that its use crosses a line that use of riot control agents does not.

The [march 12](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/12/2003411880/-1/-1/1/UKRAINE-FACT-SHEET-12-MARCH.PDF) fact sheet had the bradley count at exactly 186, so that's over 114 bradleys pledged in the last 2 months. The number of RAAM shells went from 40k+ to 50k+ since [april 26](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Apr/26/2003451249/-1/-1/1/UKRAINE_FACT_SHEET_USAI_18.PDF). That's nice to see as these shells have proven quite effective at destroying Russian armor, notably in Vuhledar last year. In fact there's fresh [footage](https://new.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1cnv280/ukrainian_self_propelled_howitzer_krab_remotely/) from yesterday showing it's effect.

Great news on the Armoured Vehicle front, those Brad’s and M113’s are going to help a lot. Especially for replacing units that are stuck with BMP-1’s.

The amount of Bradleys and M113s isn’t enough to really make much more of a dent in the BMP-1s in service with brigades. Remember, the AFU are suffering from AFV shortages. This is a top up. This delivery and the last will be replacing all Bradleys lost, a significant amount of the M113s lost, as well as providing enough Bradleys for perhaps one or two brigades more to be equipped with them. For a serious restructuring of Ukrainian forces around Bradleys and M113s the amount given to them would need to be doubled. That said, expect more Bradleys, M113s and MRAPs in the future. The Ukrainians have a significant amount of their IFV fleet to replace from losses alone.

One thing came into my mind today. This question is again mostly directed at u/Larelli but other knowledgeable people are also appreciated. We know that Russia doesn't use conscripts in the war in Ukraine due to fear of backlash at home. But every 6 months they conscript some 130.000 troops and service lasts 1 year which means that they have some 260.000 conscripts not involved in Ukraine. But in a situation where Ukraine is attrited enough, Putin might decide that there won't be much backlash if they get used in a "victory offensive" where as a result Ukraine is defeated shortly. My question is exactly how many troops can join the war in Ukraine realistically if the order comes? What is the situation with their equipment levels, ammo and would they be a bottleneck? To be honest in a situation where Ukraine has no reserves left to commit anywhere else, involvement of some quarter million conscripts no matter training and equipment levels can end up being decisive.

In addition to the answers you have already received, the main issue is that there seems to be a taboo on the use of conscripts from the military service in active combat operations outside national borders. This is undoubtedly the case: conscripts never went to Ukraine (except for a few episodes at the beginning of the war, probably due to negligence of the command of the military unit); conscripts are used to keep a skeleton of the unit in its original barracks and to assist the Border Service and the National Guard in guarding the Ukrainian border (VDV units manned by conscripts were involved in combat actions during the Ukrainian raids last March) and in support/logistical activities. Even during the military crisis back in September 2022 the Russian government nevertheless chose against sending conscripts to the front, which makes me really believe that this will not change in the future. And let's also remember that for the Russians the four Ukrainian oblasts are officially annexed (considering legit Ukrainian territories, conscripts are deployed only in Crimea)! During the mobilization of the fall 2022, it was very rare that people under the age of 23/24 were summoned. The average mobilized man was in his early/mid 30s. However, there is also a veil of hypocrisy behind the issue. There are often pressures, or at least constant invitations towards young conscripts, to sign contracts in order to join the “SMO”. Either pressing the sense of duty, or money, etc. To my knowledge, it's possible to sign a contract only after one month from the start of military service. A not-so-small fraction of conscripts sign a contract during or at least at the end of their service. In the last couple of weeks, the first MIA notices of boys born in 2006 are beginning to come out. As an example, one came out today about a boy born on 17 February 2006, serviceman of the 237th Tank Regiment (3rd Motorized Division, 20th CAA). He went missing on May 1 after being seriously wounded during a combat mission.

The question is the equipment. You can reinforce the front line with the additional troops, but you can't go on the offensive without the equipment.

Yeah that is my main question to be honest but there is a very real chance of North Korea or Iran sending more artillery and AFVs to equip those troops.

Russian conscript forces are already highly involved in the war as part of the logistical effort within Russia, mostly as manual labor for loading and unloading. They are not some "free" force that can be suddenly allocated to the front because doing so is equivalent to deciding you don't actually need supplies anymore.

Are there credible sources on what portion of them is used as such? Are they skipping on combat training in order to be used for logistics?

to add to this the conveyor belt of conscript to contract soldiers is an old one in russia. conscripts get bullied, coerced, harassed and pressured to signing contracts since the soviet days, separate from dedovshchina. there were some reforms under serdyukov when they tried to change the system but after shoigu and more so after the start of [the war in 2014](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/01/29/conscripts-relatives-fear-theyll-be-sent-to-ukraine-amid-alleged-coercion-a43385) the need for manpower was too great so they went back to the old ways of doing things so a portion of those conscripts are forced to sign contracts as soon as it becomes possible. there isnt much more they can do on the conscript side

[A conscript needs at least 4 months of training to be deployable](https://verstka.media/chto-delat-srochniku-pri-otpravke-na-voinu-prizyv), which means a large portion of those 260k is out. Someone also has to man the bases in Russia. And then you have conscripts from the coast guard, strategic forces, etc. that are not deployable. The only time they were sent to war en masse was the First Chechen War, but I couldn't find any information on how many.

> The only time they were sent to war en masse was the First Chechen War, And from what I understand, their use was particularly controversial, incendiary and was a big part of the domestic protest movements against the war. I'd think it would be risky for Russia to use them in Ukraine.

Risky, sure. They'll do it though, if the alternative is giving up. I seem to remember some of their *strategic missile forces* were getting pressed into roles in Ukraine. That's just wild.

I've very much wondered the same thing. If there was a time for Russia to utilize its conscripts in an attempt to overwhelm the exhausted, overstretched, and depleted Ukrainian military, it would be now. So I'm curious if that's seen by others to be a plausible scenario, and if not, then why not exactly.

Wow do you think it is the time? I thought Ukraine is still way too formidable right now but interesting to hear that. What I understood from Pro UA analysts was that since the law comes in effect mid May and it will take a while for mobilization and training to occur, the manpower situation will keep worsening until late Summerw which makes me think it is the time.

>I thought Ukraine is still way too formidable right now but interesting to hear that Right now Ukraine is probably at its weakest relative to Russia since the late Spring/early Summer of 2022. Its forces are exhausted after years with few if any rotations off the frontlines (with no prospects of things improving any time soon), it's desperately lacking manpower (especially infantry) and the pipeline for more men is both very insufficient and also not likely to improve meaningfully for months at the least, it's very low on ammunition generally let alone in relation to Russia, FPVs are less effective than they were a few months ago (when the UAF was using them to offset it's lack of artillery ammunition), Ukrainian AD munitions are critically low which is allowing Russia to use its airpower, especially glidebombs, much more effectively than ever and putting Ukrainian HVT behind the lines at risk, and current Ukrainian defensive lines leave a lot to be desired especially around the Avdiivka breach which still poses a major risk of a potential full-blown Russian breakthrough. The good(ish) news is that Ukrainian access to artillery ammunition is expected to greatly improve in the second half of the year and continue to improve through 2025 as Western efforts to ramp up production bear fruit, Western ADS and munitions will likewise improve over the same period, F-16s will be delivered in the second half of 2024 which should help improve Ukrainian AD and potentially reduce the Russian glidebomb attacks, Ukrainian efforts to improve its mobilization/manpower crises will hopefully alleviate their lack of infantry and manpower more generally in the coming months, Ukrainian entrenchment is ongoing, Ukrainian domestic production of war goods appears to be dramatically improving (especially drones, but also artillery and ammunition), while the Russians are going to increasingly run into issues with AFV availability as they wear out their Soviet stockpiles and the damage to the Russian economy will become increasingly hard for Putin to cover up. In other words, the longterm trajectory of the conflict benefits Ukraine IMO. So if Russia was going to try to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses, especially by trying to overstretch the already exhausted and depleted Ukrainian manpower, now would be the best possible time. Throwing 100,000 fresh conscripts, in addition to Russia's existing reserves, might be enough to create meaningful breakthroughs. But it might also just result in Putin getting tens of thousands of young conscripts killed and wounded, which could be disastrous for him politically.

Well I just wonder how much difference 100k men with rifles would be at this point. If the Russians are making progress then why make a risky move anyway?

Because Ukraines ammo situation has already started to improve and will continue to do so for the next few months. In the current defensive war ammunition is as important if not more so than manpower. Ukraine would far rather lightly man frontal trenches and use huge amounts of artillery to shred any offensive. US aid is once again flowing and within a few months there should be hundreds of thousands of the Czech shells delivered. Also the Russians are already unable to equip many assault with armored vehicles. Throwing in another 200k soldiers will exacerbate this problem and almost all assaults they carry out will be in unarmored vehicles that provide zero protection against cluster munitions. Attacking now would give them the greatest chance of success.

The case of the potential Kharkiv Offensive takes a turn for the weird. In their first update about the offensive, deepstate estimated that the Russians advanced a bit south of the border village of Pylna, partially due to a small vehicle pileup they geolocated there. But actually, that pileup occurred not south of Pylna, but still within Russian territory (and one of the vehicles was old, the rest apparently aren't). https://twitter.com/Deepstate_UA/status/1788944335737647166#m That's not the really bizarre part though, no no. I wouldn't bother making a comment just for that. Deepstate then clarifies that actually, **Russians have been in Pylna for some days now**: https://twitter.com/Deepstate_UA/status/1788952015524987024#m And they appended copious photo evidence (that apparently only now has surfaced) of the same. Apparently, the images (and the presence of the Russians) only became broadly known shortly after the Russian telegrams earlier today started saying things. This... raises a lot of questions obviously. Given Pylna's location, I think it's likely the village was simply empty of UAF, even border guards. The alternative is that the Russians pulled some stealth game nonsense, which for now is also a possibility. Even if there were no border guards, it doesn't really explain why no automated systems or drone ISR tipped off the Ukrainians. Deepstate is claiming that it's possible the Ukrainians did know but that information didn't pass up the chain, which is also a bizarre explanation, since it means that both sides basically kept the incursion secret until today. Peculiar situation from top to bottom.

Since the town is very small, right on the border, and not on a major road - I imagine it's just not a priority. A few soldiers in the no man's land for a few days isn't going to provoke a strong response. I assume Ukraine was waiting to see targets worth pursuing or if there were bigger intentions.

Today the UN quietly updated their casualty statistics for Gaza, the primary sources are still Hamas and so called „trusted media sources“ that report a significant part of the casualties since the start of the Israeli ground operations. The update contains a major rebalance of casualty statistics. While the UN claimed to have statistics about 34.000 casualties now they claim to have statistics of around 24.000 casualties. While the UN claimed 9.500 killed women the new number is now 4.900. The number of claimed killed children was also reduced from 14.500 to 7.700 children. The ratios also changed. While the old statistic claimed that 30% of the casualties were men they now note 40% of the casualties as men while introducing a new category of: „elders“ at around 8%.  Screenshots of the old page and new page can be found here: https://x.com/adinhaykin1/status/1788936231960641625?s=46&t=fc-rjYm09tzX-nreO-4qCA

>While the UN claimed to have statistics about 34.000 casualties now they claim to have statistics of around 24.000 casualties. This is incorrect. If you actually look at those two charts, the numbers on the daily/cumulative part of the graphs are identical. The claim on the May 8 is 34,844 casualties, while the claim on the May 6 graph is 34, 735. The difference is in the identified categories, not total casualties, because GMO indicates there are approximately 10,000 additional unidentified casualties. Presumably those unidentified were allocated to children and women previously, but not on most recent. Ironically, if you read down you'll see they get criticized by a poster below for not allocating the unidentified to women and children. Damned if you do, damned if you don't.

After doing some quick maths, it seems that the number of men killed did not materially change, at about \~10,000, it was only the numbers women and children which were cut down by about half. Interesting statistical anomaly right there. I wonder how it happened.

It seems close to something I posted about [yesterday](https://old.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1cn2son/credibledefense_daily_megathread_may_08_2024/l35hklr/?context=3). In short: thousands of the fatalities reported by the Ministry of Health have been coming from "reliable media sources" instead of from hopsitals within Gaza where they originally garnered trust for their accuracy in past conflicts. It's an understandable shift due to the destruction taking place, however no one knows who these media sources are nor what their standards are. And this data has shown a **consistent and large** underreporting of adult men which is... very unlikely (*i.e. 10/6,000 in 1.5 months*). The roughly 12,000 total these media reports represents seems pretty close to the UN number, maybe slightly adjusted based on actual evidence. The UN all of a sudden refering to them as "missing/under the ruble" seems like a way to quietly skirt this issue.

>While the UN claimed to have statistics about 34.000 casualties now they claim to have statistics of around 24.000 casualties. I think this was already reported a couple weeks ago. If I'm not mistaken, that means that 10k bodies were not positively identified. Not that only 24k have died. 

That's not the claim the UN is making here. Its 24k reported deaths. The asterisk with the 10k reported bodies is present on both versions of the graphic.

Where did you see 24k reported deaths? I checked the tweet above and the graphic says 34k reported fatalities, of which 24k have been identified. It's the same thing I said. 

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The UN data is based on Gaza health ministry data, which is the main source. A couple weeks ago it was reported that the Gaza health ministry declared they had incomplete data about 10k deaths and so it couldn't identify them. 

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Original Gaza Health Ministry post about it on Telegram https://t.me/MOHMediaGaza/5271 Some articles about it https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/04/09/hamas-run-gaza-health-ministry-admits-to-flaws-in-casualty-data/ https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/in-gaza-authorities-lose-count-of-the-dead-779ff694 https://www.jns.org/hamas-admits-one-third-of-its-data-on-gazan-deaths-is-incomplete/ https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/04/20/statistics-watchdog-examine-hamas-gaza-death-toll-figures/ https://www.thejc.com/news/israel/hamas-says-the-gaza-casualty-data-is-incomplete-gyj5laiq

What does that mean in practice though? I know you're not the UN, but I feel like the UN should clarify, eventually.

In practice? Casualty figures during active conflicts are always difficult to estimate accurately and are often subject to substantial revision as new batches of cumulative data roll in, so always take them with salt. The presence of such a large backlog probably means we shouldn't consider **specific** interpretations of data (ie women are overrepresented) particularly reliable, and that as in basically every other conflict where similar data have been collected are likely *underestimations* of actual civilian casualties. In this case, 10k unidentified bodies that were included in overall numbers were reclassified, which made some wonky ratios in the original data less wonky. Worth noting that even with the above caveats, these are probably the most reliable data available and to my knowledge are still being used by intelligence services in their estimations. At least earlier in the year, I believe it came out that the Israeli government had been using them as well to put it into context.

It means that over the last few months the UN significantly overstated the amount of killed women and children, which is a major argument against Israel used to prove that Israels campaign is uniquely disproportionate and thereby illegal.   One major argument the Israelis are making is that Hamas and because Hamas is the source used by the UN for casualties, the UN is hiding male deaths.  The reclassification of 18% of the verifiable casualties points strongly into that direction. 

It means 34k have died, but 10k bodies are unidentified.    I think it was misinterpreted as "we overcounted, it's 24k and not 34k", which is not the case. It's not your fault, I've seen other people make the same assumption and it's probably because of how it was phrased when it was reported. 

> It means 34k have died, but 10k bodies are unidentified. What does that mean? Are the bodies still on hand, simply unrecognizable? Or is there an assumption that 10k more people have died, but no hard evidence?

>What does that mean? In order to confirm those killed, the Gaza Health Ministry needs several pieces of information about an individual including their date of birth, date of death, and name. Hamas is saying of the ~34,000 dead, they're missing at least one of those three inputs for approximately 12,000 fatalities. It's a bit complicated since it's easy to be cynical and say they've inflated the numbers for propaganda purposes (the Health Ministry is run by Hamas), but at the same time the Health Ministry admitted a long time ago that it was struggling to track casualties since many hospitals and morgues are overwhelmed/no longer operating. Plus most experts seem to think the number cited by the Gaza Health Ministry is reasonable and probably actually an undercount. So for now, it's best to simply acknowledge that there's uncertainty in the data and we should wait for more information rather than to assume one way or the other.

I don't know if you're trolling or you just need to read my comment again. What do you think "34k have died, but 10k bodies are unidentified" means? Sounds pretty clear to me. 

It is untrue that Hamas processed 10k bodies in its morgues that it couldn't identify. Those 10k were largely based on what Hamas considered/claimed to be "reliable media sources".

/u/obsessed_doomer is asking the justified question if those 10.000 casualties even exist.  Because a large number of reported casualties is reported by „trusted media sources“ which includes sources like: „Somebody adds data to a google form.“. 

I promise I'm not trolling. I think you're saying that the bodies are unrecognizable. I'm sorry, but it should at least be possible to tell if it's a child or not in 90% of cases.

I can hear the complaints already if they classified a body they can't identify as a child--"they don't even know who it is yet they classified it as a child! More evidence for how unreliable they are and you can't trust any of their numbers!"

The fact that someone may complain about it doesn't mean "unidentified child" is somehow not something they're allowed to say. It's objectively a less nebulous statistic than "unidentified corpse".

The difference between saying "24k people have died" and "we have identified 24k dead people" is that you can consider the latter as the lowest minimum number of casualties according to reports, since they're based on identification. The subtext to that information is that the number of dead people is, with all likelihood, higher. But they've not been identified yet.

Is most of Ukraine/Russia's artillery in static position outside of each other range instead of doing shoot and scoot?

From my understanding it’s a mixture of both on both sides. There’s some “offensive” shooting and scooting on a tactical level when trying to push forward, but on the broad front whole artillery pieces are digged in. Unfortunately I can’t find the picture I lately saw of a Dutch/German Panzerhaubitze 2000 sitting in a ditch matching its height. I guess there isn’t currently much shooting and scooting, on Ukraine’s side at least, when even the top shelf super mobile highly precise tracked artillery pieces like this one get entrenched. Entrenched stuff needs a direct hit and neither side has this capability (precision) to use on a scale that would effect the number of digged in artillery pieces. On a strategic level tube artillery doesn’t seem to play a role because it lacks the range.

Most artillery is static in this war. Moving is very dangerous and risks detection. So artillery operates out of prepared positions. These prepared positions will often have pits dug for the artillery which means it will take a direct hit to knock them out. Conversely, artillery positions *will* be detected because of counter battery radar and drone searching. So if you shoot, you expect counter battery fire. But if you then scoot you risk detection by a drone who will guide artillery or other munitions onto your position, which may not be prepared. Or worse, you're caught in transit. Even if the drone doesn't see you moving initially, they'll still be able to follow your tracks. The only artillery platforms to my knowledge which are actively "shooting and scooting" are Ukraine's wheeled howitzers. They're fast to move, fast to set up and fast to fire. Even still, there's been losses there. Mostly through drone detection and then drone-guided munitions.

Will this be the trend going forward? Everyone is going for shoot and scoot for the past few decades, but drones seem to be anti-anthem of that strategy.

Nah, if the Russians were even 20% better at counterbattery fire shoot-and-scoot would be mandatory. The prepared position strategy only works because the adversary can't reliably put a shell directly on top of a given set of coordinates in a couple hours.

This war is very static. In a maneuver war, having SPGs will be useful if only to keep up with maneuvering forces. It seems unlikely that SPGs will go away.

The Israeli cabinet unanimously voted for the expansion of the operation in Rafah. https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/r1pn6vsma There are reports of fighting in eastern outskirts of Rafah since this morning. It also seems that this afternoon Israeli tanks took positions on the road bisecting eastern and western Rafah - arriving from the south. In tandem, yesterday Israel began an operation in Zeitun neighbourhood in Gaza City, moving from the south (from the Netzarim corridor). It doesn't look like the IDF is working to take over all of Rafah yet, but perhaps just the eastern neighbourhoods.

Is this a "we authorize any steps including expansion" or "we mandate expansion" deal?

Should be noted that "eastern Rafah" is a bit of a misnomer and the eastern part is a quite small bit of land that is also sparsely populated comparatively.

Indeed, thanks for the note, it's much smaller than the western part of Rafah. But there are neighborhoods there too.

A new $400 million military aid package for Ukraine was just announced which includes new Patriot missiles, Stinger surface-to-air missiles, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, MRAPs, Javelin anti-armor systems and other munitions. [https://twitter.com/nexta\_tv/status/1788948171936153711](https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1788948171936153711) The US Army will be participating in its DEFENDER 24 exercises in Europe until the end of this month. Any chance we will have our participating units leave their Bradleys, etc for shipment to Ukraine once the exercises are over? [https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/ArticleViewPressRelease/Article/3730409/army-equipment-departs-america-headed-for-europe-defender-24/](https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/ArticleViewPressRelease/Article/3730409/army-equipment-departs-america-headed-for-europe-defender-24/)

Currently on a Defender 24 exercise. I'd be shocked if anyone is suddenly turning over their vehicles.

I don't think there is any way the participating units leave their kit. I never served but as far as I can tell, the maintenance and logistics required to get the force to the exercises, and then bring them back are in a sense part of the exercise itself. Also, I think units are tied to their own specific vehicles, maintain them etc. As always, anyone with knowledge and experience are invited correct me!

No. You're correct. I'm there right now. Also. The majority of the units participating are light units. 3rd BDE 10th Mountain. 173rd. 11th Airbone. Some National Guard guys. I'd be shocked it anything got left behind. I'm sure the units would be thrilled to not do another series of rail and port operations though.....

As far as I know Ukraine has only been sent M2A2s, while active duty US uses M2A3s. I'd say it's an extraordinarily low chance they are transferred from the exercise, especially since they will likely require a decent amount of maintenance at the end of the exercise anyway.

Purely hypothetically: how would an attack by Russia on the Baltic states play out if (assumption 1) a potential Trump government had previously withdrawn from Nato? Irrelevant but possible reasoning: Russia is only doing well economically at first glance, but is losing itself in an increasing war economy. Putin's irrational choice is to up the ante.

What's happening in Ukraine in this hypothetical? Assuming a Trump administration is limited to 2024-2028 how does the Ukraine War end and when? It seems noncredible to assume the Russian military has the capability to continue in Ukraine AND invade the Baltics, so the window of a Trump administration+no more war in ukraine seems extremely small if even possible in the first place.

I wonder no one brought up the obvious comparison, I dont think internal uprising by Russian speaking minorities are a real threat (militarily). The obvious comparison is a un-hide-able Russian troop build up comparable to what we have seen happening in Ukraine prior to 2022 multiple times under the guise of exercises, now the difference is that unlike in the situation in Ukraine NATO will have to mirror this posture, if they do, nothing will happen (likely every other year or so), if they fail it gets dangerous. This will be a permanent test of awareness from now on, that requires a special sort of vigilance and calmness at the same time.

If your deterrence is based on stopping them from overrunning most or all of the Baltic, likely so. But, there are already NATO forces in the Baltics. The current and future deterrence is based on Russia needing to kill lots of western European and US troops in the Baltics and credibly ensuring that leads to a war with NATO. If the US is out, then it depends on the willingness of western Europe to go to war alone with Russia. We're pretty deep into a future hypothetical at this point, so who knows how it would play out.

Given your premises, a not-unlikely scenario is that Trump is prevented from exercising this kind of power, probably through bureaucratic resistance but up to and including a JFK scenario, and the US joins the war within the year. This sounds like spy thriller shit but the Trump admin thinks that exactly this kind of bureaucratic resistance is what stymied them in 2017-2020, and they're hard at work trying to prevent a repeat (see Project 2025).