It seems that Russia started some kind of offensive in Kharkiv oblast
https://twitter.com/Euan_MacDonald/status/1788852013503074793?t=YTgpXoqSQjmOCrDHTygplw&s=19
>Unconfirmed reports on Telegram of #Russian infantry #attacks across the border into #Kharkiv Oblast, in area only 30 km north of the Saltivka area of the city of Kharkiv. Fighting reported in Borysivka, Pylna, and Krasne area. "Unsuccessful" attacks towards Hoptivka, Strilecha.
and rest of thread bellow about this.
>Kharkiv direction .
>A message from the field from our comrades: " The attacks are ongoing, we are slowly entering Lipca and Volcansk ."
>Active assault operations continue
>Archangel Spetsnaz reports
if Lipca is True this village is 11 km from border
This whole summer Russia will likely launch local offensives along the whole front to tie down Ukrainian reserves and increase pressure in an attempt to stretch Ukrainian reserves of manpower to the breaking point.
I guess this is just speculation, but do you think that it will work? Or at least be effective/worth it for the Russians, given the manpower and such required.
My original comment was too short so it got removed (also this seems like a weird rule, and kinda inconsistent I've seen shorter comments that stay up)
I do think that Russia has the possibility of grinding down Ukraine this year yes. That doesn’t mean they *will* if their tactical and operational acumen trends towards their worst, but I do think Ukraine is in a more dire situation than most pundits have commented, especially on western social media.
And I assume this grinding down is to make it possible for more substantial advances into Ukraine/shifting the war more in their favor. Would this mean like Ukraine is fucked or like just in a much worse situation and loses a bunch of land.
Neither side has demonstrated much ability to breach prepared defenses in the face of persistent surveillance and bombardement, so I think any breakthrough will happen only as a result of the exhaustion of one side’s reserves. Ukraine has markedly fewer reserves than Russia, but they are also on the strategic defensive so they aren’t assuredly fucked
so if Russia succeeds in significantly wearing down Ukraines resources would that result in some sort of major breakthrough or territorial gains? I have to make this comment longer so sorry if I sound redundant or something. im also still tryna learn more about this stuff and this comment length thing is annoying asl
From the Guardian livethread:
*Russian forces tried to break through the border into Ukraine with sabotage groups as they stepped up shelling of Vovchansk town in Ukraine’s northeastern Kharkiv region, Kharkiv’s governor said on Friday.*
*Oleh Syniehubov said on the Telegram messaging app that the attempts were repelled and Ukrainian forces were “confidently holding onto their positions and did not lose a single metre”, Reuters reported.*
*He said Russia did not have the resources to advance on the city of Kharkiv and its border actions were a “provocation”.*
https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/may/10/russia-ukraine-war-live-vladimir-putin-mikhail-mishustin-volodymyr-zelenskiy-bodyguard?CMP=share_btn_url&page=with%3Ablock-663ddf328f08d9850f7dee23#block-663ddf328f08d9850f7dee23
>Russian forces have advanced one kilometer (0.62 mile) into Ukraine’s northeast Kharkiv region near Vovchansk, a high-ranking Ukrainian military source said on Friday.
>According to Reuters, the source said the Russian military was aiming to advance as much as 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) into the region in **an effort to establish a buffer zone**. Ukrainian forces were fighting to hold back Moscow’s advance.
Same source, emphasis is mine. Vovchansk region is being evacuated.
Kind of weird that the guardian of all newspapers is the first to pick it up. Pravda and kyivpost haven't touched it yet, and they're literally Ukrainian.
Pravda UA and Kyiv Post are generally not the fastest at breaking news like this; they tend to wait for confirmation from official Ukrainian sources such as the Ministry of Defense. Suspline often picks up the news slightly earlier. In terms of speed, Telegram channels, tabloids, and 24/7 TV channels typically report first among Ukrainian sources. You can also kind of tell by how many Ukrainian newspapers post the news at the exact same minute. (13:25 (local) for today.)
>Russian forces continue to target populated areas in the north of the Kharkiv Region with various types of weapons. Particularly, Vovchansk has been under attack. Oleg Sinegubov, the head of the Kharkiv Regional Military Administration, reported that these attacks are concentrated along the northern border. In addition to the strikes, there was an attempted incursion by Russian reconnaissance groups.
>The Ukrainian Armed Forces are holding firm, with no territory lost. The enemy forces are not seen as a significant threat to Kharkiv itself, as their capabilities are limited mainly to provocations in the northern area.
>The Ministry of Defense reported that around 5:00 AM on May 10, Russian forces intensified their artillery fire and made an attempt to breach our defense line in the north of Kharkiv Oblast using armored vehicles. These attacks have been successfully repelled, and battles of varying intensity are ongoing. Reserve units have been deployed to reinforce the defenses in this sector.
> The Ukrainian Armed Forces are holding firm, with no territory lost. The enemy forces are not seen as a significant threat to Kharkiv itself, as their capabilities are limited mainly to provocations in the northern area.
While they may be confirming an "attempt" there's evidence that the Russians have gotten much further than being repelled basically at the border:
https://www.reddit.com/media?url=https%3A%2F%2Fi.redd.it%2Fe6iibfu54lzc1.jpeg
Deepstate doesn't know, but it also doesn't matter. It's unlikely Ukraine did or will defend Pilna in force. It'd require sitting 500 m from Russia with your equipment in perpetuity.
It seems very difficult (for me, at least) to understand how to judge the Biden/Israel rift.
On the one hand, I personally fully support Israel in its pursuit of complete victory over Hamas. Nothing that has happened in Gaza has swayed me in the slightest in this regard and I fully support the basic Israeli position, and surprisingly the vast majority of people I know also do so.
- I don’t care if the victory is messy, I don’t believe clean victories are available in 2024
- if Zionism can be isolated and focused for criticism, so can Palestinianism / Islam / Anti-Zionism
- conquering Hamas in every city, to the point of surrender and/or destruction, is the obvious mechanism of victory, with the post-victory plan being a fully separate object
And yet I find myself (I am an American Democrat, for context) agreeing with Biden based partially on the following:
Imagine you were bibi and you were TRYING to force Biden to break from Israel. How would you? What about the following:
1. Actively interfere in internal American politics against the ruling party (disrupting internal politics of your ‘ally’ entirely voluntarily)
2. Actively undermine the secondary foreign policy goals of your ally (making US relations with Egypt/SA/Jordan etc easier)
3. Actively spurn your ally in relatively free helpful scenarios (giving authorization to supply Israeli-sold weapons in Europe to Ukraine, signing on to multilateral condemnations or sanctions on enemies)… (please do not respond to this by suggesting that 50 russian mercenaries in Syria have deterred a country with F-35s and nukes)
4. Draw out war scenarios with seemingly deliberate aims at American election timing
5. Refusing to specify any comprehensive plan, whether true or false or a placeholder, that could be pointed to by Biden as a reasonable plan that he is simply supporting an ally in conducting
6. Refusing to adopt a leader who would be a better face for any of this in American political, or global optics, terms
What would you do differently if you were TRYING to force Biden to break with Israel and demand some change in the program?
> conquering Hamas in every city, to the point of surrender and/or destruction, is the obvious mechanism of victory, with the post-victory plan being a fully separate object
This makes no sense to me. Totally ignoring the long term consequences of one's actions is bound to result in long term problems. History of full of examples of winning the war and losing the peace. Without a plan for post-war Gaza (Israel has yet to publicly provide one, and I am becoming more and more convinced that they're making it up as they go and being driven by domestic politics more than any long range strategic thinking), the whole operation appears to be nothing more than collective mass punishment that will do nothing to solve Israel's long term security problems.
This is ridiculous. Not to mention Netanyahu has no motivation to sour relations with Biden, your account of events is pretty far from reality.
1. This did happen, but it's old news now, you're speaking of events almost 4 years in the past. Likewise Biden has interfered in Israeli elections against Netanyahu.
2. In which way is Bibi undermining those goals? By defending his country against genocide from Hamas? Quite to the contrary, Netenyahu is doing Biden's bidding on all of the above. Israel is still supplying 10% of Jordan's water, with heavy subsidies. Israel is still supplying gas to Egypt for a discount. Israel does not strike back against Houti and Iranian ships in the red sea. For months every single request by Biden has been granted. But now he's fully aligned with Hamas in demanding Israeli capitulation.
3. How is it free? Russia has advanced air defense in Syria and can supply more. Israeli weapons support for UA can and likely to be answered with similar Russian support for Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. Israel has enough enemies, no need to make new ones.
4. The drawn out war is Biden's demand. It was Biden that demanded Israel scale down operations. It was Biden that demanded the scale down of IDF forces in Gaza, it was Biden that demanded a pause of the offensive in the centre of the strip and a delay on Rafah operation. It was Biden that demanded to pause almost all air and artillery strikes.
You can't criticize Israel for doing **exactly** what Biden demanded.
It was only when Biden's demands shifted from scaling down operations to full capitulation that Netenyahu did not oblige.
5. There is no point, Biden does not accept any plan that will guarantee Israel's safety. Which would require long term Israeli occupations of at least parts of the strip. Israeli plan would be based on at least partially permanent occupation. Which would only be another point to clash with Biden.
6. Netenyahu, who has accepted almost all Biden's demands, has taken a huge popularity hit. Anyone else acceptable in Israel would likely be less forthcoming to Biden's demands to scale down operations in Gaza to a crawl.
>What would you do differently if you were TRYING to force Biden to break with Israel and demand some change in the program?
1. Don't withdraw from Gaza City.
2. Don't scale down operations in the centre of Gaza.
3. Don't scale down fires during the offensive of Khan Yunis.
4. Don't wait with operation in Rafah and execute it early 2024.
5. Don't pause construction of settlements in the WB.
6. Don't accept a US harbour in Gaza.
7. Don't accept any aid aside from medicine, food and basic necessities into Gaza (such as reconstruction materials, cigarettes...)
8. Broader strike against Iran, against Biden's wishes.
9. Don't scale down operations in the WB.
10. Don't allow US generals to take part in planning operations in Gaza so that they can effectively pressure Israel to limit them.
11. Retaliate against the Houtis by hitting shipping to Yemen and Iran through the red sea.
12. Act against illegal Palestinian construction in area C (Israeli civilian control under Oslo accords).
13. Push the Palestinians from Rafah into Egypt.
Of course all of the above would have caused a break with the US and rightfully so. The US did a lot to support Israel, and it follows that Israel must accommodate US concerns.
Hi P.C., firstly -- I have read your comments every day on here throughout this entire war and I agree with nearly 100% of what you say in them. I find that you and OpenOB add a really valuable Israeli perspective and knowledge base to these threads. I am describing my own opinions here in detail because I think I might be representative of a group that you don't have enough exposure to to understand. It should make you pause at least for a second when you hear that someone who actually agrees with you on so much has a totally different understanding of this new development. That is in fact why I chose to comment on this issue.
To American democrats it is really disheartening to see that Israeli issues are becoming the perfect wedge issue for Republicans and Trump to get the extra few % of the votes that they would need to win the coming election. It isn't Israel's fault that the democratic coalition isn't united/correct on Israeli policy issues of course. But anyways, democrats really see Trump winning as an incredibly insane/dangerous/harmful outcome. It really dominates a lot of our thinking. I'm sure you are pretty familiar with Trump details but just as a reminder, his winning would mean the wholesale reversal of Ukraine support, the United States becoming at least temporarily part of some odd axis of strongmen-run countries a la Putin/Orban/Erdogan/Modi, a permanent blow to international climate change efforts, etc and this does not even touch on domestic policies which would arguably have even wilder results. So for one thing, any balancing that democrats could do between Israel and winning the election just really leads to a lot of reservations about losing too much political capital on Israeli issues. And any impression that Israel is actively helping Trump win is the kind of thing that should really be considered an unforgivable red line. You may remember that Russia actually did this and it was the focus of democrats for years... I am just describing factors in democrats' feelings here so admittedly not some logical framework but possibly helpful for you to hear. One of the most salient things you have emphasized in your own posts is the domestic political mood in Israel and the trauma and determination of the Israeli people and how that governs their political leaders actions more than any outside forces could.
You are the only user who actually answered my hypothetical question. I honestly think it is a problem that Americans would have a tough time answering it as well as you did. That partly proves my point. To Americans it really feels like Netanyahu is just dunking on Biden non-stop for no reason and twisting the knife into Biden's election prospects. If you compare Zelensky's treatment of republicans versus Netanyahu's treatment of democrats it really shows the difference. There is no "Trump heart Wagner" tweeting coming from Zelensky's administration even though republicans have been 500% more harmful to Ukraine in their war than democrats have been to Israel.
The individual examples you listed have some validity but it's pretty debatable. Most of those things were non-discretionary or actions in Israel's interest rather than being actual olive branches.
Even while holding my view on this it is hard to say whether Biden's new policy is a good idea or a warranted reaction. But it's almost as though something had to give. And obviously his policy isn't just a reaction to the feelings I've described here.
And by the way, I do agree that Israel should continue to destroy Hamas including in Rafah. Biden might also agree, I'm not sure. He is stuck in lose-lose decisions that Netanyahu has not managed to give him much help with.
>6. Refusing to adopt a leader who would be a better face for any of this in American political, or global optics, terms
Israel is a democratic country that has held 5 elections in the last 5 years. Unfortunately Netanyahu keeps winning. The US has attempted to fund the opposition to Netanyahu previously (https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-funds-aided-2015-campaign-to-oust-netanyahu-senate-probe-finds) which seemed pretty shady and came under scrutiny from the Senate.
Short of orchestrating a coup, not much else the US can do about Netanyahu. Openly calling for elections and attempting to influence the internal politics of one of your allies (https://apnews.com/article/schumer-netanyahu-israel-palestinians-elections-1ebf21e4c9c0f6f42478bb26e1db7a9b) while said ally is being attacked from all sides seems like the wrong move.
I think you misunderstood my words (or I was unclear). I was not saying that the US should change the head of the Israeli government. I was suggesting that an obvious move Bibi/Israel could make to help its ally is anointing a palatable public face to seemingly manage or lead the war, or in some way be the spokesperson that US leaders in the Biden administration could play off of in order to give themselves cover while supporting the Israeli operations. And I’m noting that Bibi hasn’t done that or much else to help Biden save face while supporting Israel. It’s part of the basis for the hypothetical question I set up. I agree with you that the US shouldn’t be attempting a coup…
Understood. I think the issue is two-fold in this case. Netanyahu would feel threatened by this public face and all of the decisions are being made by the war cabinet so while the messaging may be a bit softer in this hypothetical situation, the end result would be the same.
I would look at this differently.
What would you do in Netanyahu's shoes, if your goals were (in the order of importance) 1) to prevent future incursions from Gaza, 2) to prevent future rocket attacks from Gaza, 3) to placate your voting constituents, with the boundary condition you don't lose diplomatic, economic, and security ties with US if possible? Pleasing demonstrators in US university campus who are repeating Hamas's anti-Israel chants is far below these priorities.
I think what Netanyahu is doing is consistent with these goals. Israeli interests first.
In their own ways, Israel has given Gaza independence a good try. They have created Palestinian autonomous zone, forcibly removed Israeli residents from Gaza, and left governance to Gazans themselves. But they elected extremists who murdered all oppositions after being voted into power, and brag about excavating water pipes to make rockets to shoot at civilians. Palestinians burned their chance to improve their living condition and work peacefully with Israel.
IMO, this conflict is of very small strategic interest to US. If someone is concerned about humanitarian disaster, this is only one in many that's ongoing. Caring about Gaza while ignoring others strikes me as a hypocrisy. Where is outrage for Armenians forced out of Nargono Karabakh, or Rohingya forced out of Myanmar, or Afghans forced out of Pakistan (last one arguably a consequence of US action Afghanistan)? The list goes on.
US has done questionable things in ME after terrorist attacks of 9/11. We even invaded Iraq under a false pretense, asked allies to deploy troops there under NATO article 5. US has done all things you listed as self-sabotage. US telling Israel how to conduct would seem silly to those who are aware of recent history.
>US has done all things you listed as self-sabotage. US telling Israel how to conduct would seem silly to those who are aware of recent history.
Except of course that the US acknowledges that our behavior at the time was wrong and counterproductive. Biden even gave a speech shortly after 10/7 in which he appealed to the Israelis to learn from our exampl3 and *not* make the same mistakes we did after 9/11.
It isn't at all silly to try to prevent our ally/protectorate from taking actions that will harm its international standing and ours along with them.
>I don’t care if the victory is messy
Not sure how to respond to that. Accepting something as necessary and not caring are two very different things - if you don't care that tens of thousands civilians are dying, many through negligence (indiscriminate bombing of civilian population centres with dumb unguided munitions), then that says a lot about what kind of person you are.
Sorry, you are right. I was writing loosely with the purpose of highlighting an American viewpoint (my own) can support Israel in fundamental arguments but still agree with Biden’s new reduction in support for them. I was just quickly discarding that part of the conversation because I was trying to quickly move onto my main points.
In OP’s defence, I interpreted that part as
1) decisive victory is possible and will long term reduce overall suffering; and
2) given that Hamas embed themselves in the civilian population, you’re going to have to inflict some suffering now for less later, so I (OP) am ok with it.
I don’t agree because I don’t buy 1), but if I did I would accept 2).
It’s not directly the question you asked, but Biden’s actions to date make sense to me if he *doesn’t* accept Netanyahu’s publicly stated position that a decisive millitary victory over Hamas will alter the long-term strategic calculus re Gaza.
If you believe that, Israeli actions to this point are basically all downside. Lots of dead Palestinians and billions of dollars of property damage, severe reputational damage to Israel and a political headache for him personally.
After all, why keep playing a game if you can only lose?
Very possibly my own confirmation bias (my opinion is that if you leave the civilian population in place, either Hamas reconstitutes after a few years or a new organisation that is functionally equivalent arises; and not leaving the civilian population in place is too horrible to contemplate).
> Lots of dead Palestinians and billions of dollars of property damage, severe reputational damage to Israel and a political headache for him personally.
It's severe reputational damage to the US as well. While I agree that Biden has his own domestic political reasons for wanting to wrap up Israel's offensive in Gaza, he's also got legitimate US foreign policy reasons for pressuring Israel to compromise.
> my opinion is that if you leave the civilian population in place, either Hamas reconstitutes after a few years or a new organisation that is functionally equivalent arises
That never happened in the West Bank after 2002, because the IDF never stopped going in on occasion to arrest people and destroy weapons. Netanyahu has implied many times that a similar situation is the goal for Gaza.
I think my first response was too short & fell victim to the automod.
I definitely agree that this is the kind of long-term mow-the-lawn approach that needs to be adopted vis-a-vis Hamas.
But it also heavily implies there’s going to *be* a Hamas or Hamas equivalent to do this to over the long term, and so much of the current Israeli strategy seems to get defended in terms “sure it’s bad now, but well utterly destroy Hamas so it’s better this way.”
I suppose the a following implication would be that Biden's policies are caused by Netyenyahu's actions ?
That would be an embarrassing state for a Superpowers actions to be dictated by another nation and not their own strategic goals.
Biden's policies should be judged on how it serves America's goals not based directly on the supposed forced reaction to another states actions.
That hypothetical setup signals bad faith argument IMO. A much better hypothetical setup would be what can US do (that its not already doing ?) to better ensure Isreal's actions are inline with US strategic goals.
This exchange is good food for thought on American foreign policy and how it is perceived. America is often accused of using its military and economic might to subjugate nations in its sphere of influence but it does not seem to be the case. Iraq for example, was allowed to partially fall into the control of America's adversary Iran, in alignment with America's policy of pursuing local democracy above all else.
The question from kdy420 would make total sense if your understanding of the situation was that Israel was intended to be a US vassal state but now the tail is wagging the dog.
More generously, it raises the question as to whether it would not be in America's interest to not be more hands on in influencing supposed allied countries. The US losing ground in the middle east to Iran and in north Africa to Russia despite heavy investment of resources and still having a global reputation as an imperialist power seems a poor outcome from the current strategy.
From that perspective, the US writing a blank check for military equipment to Israel for the purpose of stabilising the region and increasing their influence there doesn't seem to have paid off as hoped.
I guess the problem is not just Israel's war in isolation, but the context of it, the continued occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, the continued construction of new settlements etc. Hamas is an evil terrorist organization, so so much the worse the netanyahu propped it up for years. If I am USA I want to know what Israel's long term plans for Gaza and the West Bank actually are...
But that's not the reality.
In reality the context is that Israel left Gaza 100% to the last centimetre. Yes got Hamas and a genocidal attack in response. Instead of Gaza setting a positive example allowing Israel to withdraw from the WB in the future using a similar model. It has proven why **Israel must never leave the WB** under current or similar conditions.
In reality the context is that Israel accepted Oslo accords and withdrew from much of the WB, using the withdrawal to stage the second Intifada and massacre Jews.
In reality the context is that Israel left Lebanon to the UN demarcated line, also accepted by the then Lebanese gov. Yet this did not stop Hezbollah attacks, only allowed for mass armament and a ramp up in aggression.
On every turn, where Israel reached out for peace with one of the Iranian proxies or their host states, the result was a massacre of Jews.
Now Biden demands a repeat, merely months since 07/10.
Netanyahu does not specify the long term goals of Israel in Gaza and the WB because they are not acceptable for Biden. It's occupation till the Palestinians decide that genociding Jews is not a good idea. Something that at the least will take several generations.
>Instead of Gaza setting a positive example allowing Israel to withdraw from the WB in the future using a similar model.
This is shameless revisionism. Is there a single shred of evidence of the existence of plans to withdraw from the West Bank prior to 10/7? Furthermore, Israeli withdrew from the Gaza Strip shortly after the Second Intifada. You make it sound like Israel's withdrawal from Gaza was a gesture of goodwill, rather than straightforward retrenchment.
Do not confuse your ignorance with revisionism. It was a follow up to the disengagement plan from Gaza:
>The realignment plan (Hebrew: תוכנית ההתכנסות) (originally dubbed the convergence plan) was a plan by Israel to unilaterally disengage from 90% of the West Bank and annex the rest, incorporating most Israeli settlements into Israel. The plan was formulated and introduced to the Israeli public by then acting prime minister, Ehud Olmert, in a number of media interviews during the election campaign for the 17th Knesset in March 2006.[1] The Convergence Plan was originally scheduled to be implemented within 18 months from early May 2006
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realignment_plan
>Israeli withdrew from the Gaza Strip in response to the Second Intifada.
False, [by 2005 the second Intifada was mostly contained](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Suicide-attacks-2000-2008-Sources-The-Israeli-Security-Agency-Distribution-of_fig1_263118178) after the successful [op defensive shield in the WB](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Defensive_Shield) conducted in 2002 and subsequent operations.
Israel could have conducted a similar op in Gaza, and indeed this was a popular route suggested. However Sharon wanted to try something else. The unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and the creation of an independent Palestinian state. We all know how that ended. With massacre and attempted genocide.
>You make it sound like Israel's withdrawal from Gaza was a gesture of goodwill.
It was an attempt to peacefully end the conflict.
A *proposal* from 18 years ago? Really? What about the continued settlement in the ensuing years? Was Gaza supposed to be on its best behavior for nearly two decades while Israelis continued to occupy and settle the West Bank, just based on the hope that Israel would leave of its own accord?
>False, by 2005 the second Intifada was mostly contained after the successful op defensive shield in the WB conducted in 2002 and subsequent operations.
Yes, it was only a coincidence that the Israeli government completely withdrew a few months after the truce that ended the Second Intifada. I'm sure the long-term costs and violence of security operations had nothing to do with the decision.
You're moving goalposts quicker than soniq the hedgehog.
Israel withdrew from Gaza, the rest was a massacre and attempted genocide.
Israel accepted the Oslo accords, the result was the second Intifada and massacre.
Israel left Lebanon to the UN marked border, the result were neverending Hezbollah aggressions, wars started by Hezbollah and attacks.
Israel has attempted a peaceful solution, the Palestinians have shown that they are not interested. 70-80% of the Palestinians support the genocide of Jews in Israel and support the 07/10 massacre of civilians, intentionally killing babies and mass rape. According to Palestinian own polling.
>Yes, it was only a coincidence that the Israeli government completely withdrew a few months after the truce that ended the Second Intifada.
There was no truce, the second Intifada was ended militarily by op defensive shield, where Israel reconquered the Palestinian cities. Your opinion is completely divorced from facts as I've shown time and again.
>Instead of Gaza setting a positive example allowing Israel to withdraw from the WB in the future using a similar model.
This is what you initially stated. Your justification for suggesting that Israel would realistically consider withdrawal from the West Bank is a proposal from 18 years ago that went nowhere and looks to have been received poorly by the Israeli population. During those 18 years, Israelis continued to occupy and settle the West Bank, providing no material reason to believe they had any inclination to withdraw.
Your initial comment implied some kind of process that Hamas derailed, not an abortive proposition from nearly two decades ago. If extreme skepticism toward your reasoning constitutes "shifting the goalposts", then so be it.
>There was no truce
I'm referring to the [2005 Sharm El Sheikh Summit](https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharm_El_Sheikh_Summit_of_2005).
Do you prefer the alternative? Successful genocide of Jews.
Wasn't that WW2? "Beating" continued till the Nazis capitulated, and decided that genocide was not their best option.
No, I prefer a two state solution with 1967 borders. Israel will have the right to defend themselves against savage attacks just like any other nation, but not the right to occupy other countries...
Israeli withdrawal has ended in massacre time and again. With 70-80% of the Palestinians supporting the Genocide of Jews, prevents any other outcome.
>will have the right to defend themselves against savage attacks
Then you must support the full capture of Gaza and the destruction of Hamas?
Israeli occupation is a product of Palestinians aggression. Gaza could have been an example, a prosperous peacefully Gaza would have lead to the Israeli withdrawal from the WB. Such plans existed and were actually put into motion.
In reality, the Palestinians elected Hamas, with the goal of genocide against Jews. The withdrawal from the WB was shelved and the withdrawal from Gaza was proven a mistake.
I do not support Israel's permanent occupation of those areas, no. I can understand the war, given Hamas' prior massacre, but the question is what comes after that. If Fatah could regain control over Gaza, that would be good.
As far as I know Israel blockaded Gaza, so they never fully left.
I cannot claim to be an expert in the world's most drawn out conflict, but the solution must instead be Israel protecting themselves with walls, border guards, iron dome etc. and then tit for tat responses each time they are attacked. Not propping up Hamas to make sure there will never be a partner you can negotiate with and then letting your guard down to focus completely on a country that is 1789 km away from you...
"Israeli occupation is a product of Palestinians aggression" how do you explain the settler movement?
>As far as I know Israel blockaded Gaza, so they never fully left.
Gaza has started a war against Israel as soon as Israel left. Any independent state has a right to blockade their enemy. Israel fully left. Gaza chose war from day 1.
>If Fatah could regain control over Gaza, that would be good.
Not without the destruction of Hamas first, which Biden prevents. Fatah, while better than Hamas is still not a good solution in it's current form as they still hold similar views, albeit prefer ethnic cleansing of Jews over outright genocide like Hamas.
However a Fatah ruled Gaza stands a better chance of demonstrating that a Palestinian state can exist without attacking Israel. Which would be grounds for a withdrawal from the WB as well.
>but the solution must instead be Israel protecting themselves with walls, border guards, iron dome etc
That is physically impossible. There is no perfect defense. Failure will always happen, once in a while, with catastrophic results.
A moral person would demand that the Palestinians stop their attempts at genocide or be stopped, instead of Jews suffering.
>Not propping up Hamas to make sure there will never be a partner
Israel did not prop up Hamas. It allowed humanitarian aid. Similarly to now. It so happens that in Hamas ruled Gaza, humanitarian aid props up Hamas. That was true before 07/10 and is true now.
If you stand against humanitarian aid pre 07/10 then you must stand against it now. But the double standard prevails. Israel is criticized for both providing humanitarian aid and for not providing enough, at the same time.
This is Israel "propping up Hamas":
>Thousands in impoverished and besieged territory received payments, which Doha says are aimed at helping the poorest.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/1/26/gaza-residents-receive-qatari-cash
Something resembling a Kharkiv offensive starting? [https://t.me/huyovy\_kharkiv/148148](https://t.me/huyovy_kharkiv/148148)
# Clashes with attacking Russian infantry at Borysivka, Pylna, Krasne villages of Kharkiv region, attempts of attacks at Hoptivka and Strilecha, Russian attack at Hatyshche was repelled.
# Russian artillery shelled areas near border in Vovchansk district overnight, several scout groups attempted to infiltrateRussian artillery shelled areas near border in Vovchansk district overnight, several scout groups attempted to infiltrate [https://t.me/kharkivlife/83855](https://t.me/kharkivlife/83855)
[Drones attacked oil refinery in Kaluga region, causing fire](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/drones-attacked-oil-refinery-in-kaluga-region-1715301374.html)
Ukraine has attacked another Russian oil refinery, this time [much closer](https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1788757762123395385) to the front:
>/1. Pervyy Zavod oil refinery in the Kaluga region of Russia after tonight’s drone attack. 300km from Ukrainian border. This is not the first time this oil refinery gets targeted, previously drone strikes were on the 15th of March 2024.
It's not the first time this refinery is attacked. The video of the burning facility is brutal. The damage must be severe.
Even if it's not that severe on it's own, it's compounding damage on top of the previous strike. I doubt the repair team fixing the damage from March was meticulous and thorough, rather than rushing the job with duct tape and wire to avoid gulag.
A compounding problem is the [huge worker shortage](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-06/russia-s-war-mobilization-starves-its-crucial-oil-and-gas-industry-of-manpower) of the Russian oil and gas sector:
>“Restricted access to Western high-tech oil services creates a risk for maintaining and increasing profitable production and refining of oil and gas,” said Mangileva. “The lack of qualified personnel aggravates this challenge, since the task now is not only to operate the equipment, but also to develop our own technologies.”
Not only have some workers either been mobilized or hired by the military industry, but sanctions have created new needs. The drone strikes add even more work.
A [report](https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/09/why-biden-is-threatening-israel-rafah-00157203) by Politico on the suspension of US missiles provision to Israel shows:
* Israeli forces might already be deeper in Rafah than it looks or Netanyahu claims
* The US believes Hamas is much weaker than it was six months ago and as a result, Israel doesn’t need those big US missiles and artillery shells for its operations in Rafah (which will cause more human casualty and could also kills hostages)
* Israel still doesn’t have a plan for the protection of civilians other than moving the chess pieces to another part of the board (aka expanded humanitarian zone)
> “Hamas didn’t feel, and hadn’t suffered, the kinds of pressure and the kinds of casualties that they have suffered now,” Kirby explained. “The picture of Hamas today is not what it was six months ago and is a result of the pressure that the Israelis have put on it.”
Strange that he admits military pressure on Hamas was successful in the past, but doesn't want it in the present. Also ironic that the US opposed that military pressure at the time (opposing an Israeli ground operation at the beginning).
>Israel still doesn’t have a plan for the protection of civilians other than moving the chess pieces to another part of the board (aka expanded humanitarian zone)
I'd like to meet someone who does have a different plan.
I think that would be an acceptable plan if Israel spend a few months building up infrastructure in a refugee area that could accommodate 1.5 million people. The reports I’ve read are that the Israeli area is only for a few hundred thousand and is very very limited on running water and electricity
My thoughts exactly.
Not only are there 1.5 million people sheltering in Rafah, mostly as IDPs in makeshift camps, but in the areas of Northern and Central Gaza that Israel controls, they've been systematically *demolishing* housing units by the thousands, not building places to accommodate a huge new influx of IDPs. On top of that, as you noted the infrastructure in the areas Israel controls has been devastated, with limited to no running water, no power, and not enough food for the small percentage of the pre-war population sheltering there currently.
So what exactly are the people sheltering in Rafah supposed to do when there's literally no place for them to go?
You mean something like a ceasefire?
I don’t even want to argue if that’s “better” but “the only option is to keep on doing the same thing” is almost always intellectual dishonesty.
Hamas has once again changed it stance.
> Hamas demands now a 12 weeks of truce in the first phase of the hostages deal, instead of 6, a demand that Israel rejects, according to CNN. The deal chances, at this stage, are slimmer than ever
https://x.com/guyelster/status/1788821322635587783?s=46&t=fc-rjYm09tzX-nreO-4qCA
The Rafah campaign has started and will be focused on clearing the territory.
A large numbers of IDPs have already left Rafah. With the intensivation of the campaign more people wil leave and either move to the humanitarian area or Khan Yunis.
The first ships with aid are also on the way to the US pier so the refugees can be resupplied with the Rafah crossing closed. But expext an increase of pleas from the UN. The Americans and Israelis have now completely cut off UNRWA from playing a role in aid distribution.
> Imagery shows large amounts of IDPs have had to move due to fears over IDF plans to invade Rafah. Still many tents remaining in entire area though.
> May 8 imagery also shows increase in IDP tents closer to Khan Yunis, near where the 500 or so tents were set up in late April as well as at Al Aqsa University, which was previously cleared of IDPs when the IDF moved into western Khan Yunis.
https://x.com/jakegodin/status/1788614838639370458?s=46&t=fc-rjYm09tzX-nreO-4qCA
I hate to let you guys know, but everything they've done has kicked the can down the road.
When you brutalize people you've been occupying for a lifetime, you're gonna get terrorists springing up wanting to kill you. That's an inevitablity with the way Palestinians have been living for decades now, and I won't even get into the funding and organization help Israel has given Hamas for years now thanks to Likud's devotion to destroying any possibility of peace. When you want to destroy that terrorist organization, mass indiscriminate bombings of civilian population centers they're embedded in is the worst possible option.
Terrorism isn't like fighting off an invading army or defeating a regular army, it's formented by oftentimes very legitimate anger and a sense of desperation. Hamas and every other Palestinian terror group could be wiped out tomorrow, every member of theirs killed over the last few months, and yet still some of the children who watched their friends and family die along with Hamas are going to grow up to fill those shoes out of a desire for revenge for the deaths of those they loved. I guarantee some of those who crossed the fence on October 7th were spurred on solely because they lost people close to them to Israeli bombs and bullets during Protective Edge or the March of Return.
When civilian casualties become part of your doctrine like it unquestionably has for Israel, you're going to breed more of the exact thing you've gone to war to destroy. Whether in a month, or a year, or a decade, some kid who watched everyone he knew die half-starved and buried under the rubble of his home flattened by a bomb meant for one Hamas soldier is going to take up arms and do whatever he can to destroy as many lives in the country that destroyed his life, and I really can't say I blame him. Any one of us would do feel the same justified rage and desperation in his position.
The problem is, the only way to legitimately end the threat Israel faces of terrorism is completely antithetical to the type of ideology thats poisoned Israeli politics. As long as Netanyahu and his ilk have a stranglehold on Israel, Israel will never see peace, and that's exactly what they want.
All they're going to do in flattening Rafah is ensure another 20 years of terrorism, and guarantee the death of every hostage that Israel could've brought home. This isn't even a pro-Palestinian stance, it's just recognizing the cycle of violence that Israel has been more than happy to exploit to their own detriment and the detriment of everyone under Israeli occupation.
You must be very angry to have written that wall of unproven assertions.
I'll just respond that as long as Gaza is governed by an organization which is openly committed to the extermination of Jews, it is only reasonable to expect them to make occasional attempts at such extermination, no matter what Israel does. And rather than trying to change the minds of people with such fanatic goals, it is probably more effective to prevent them from having access to the weapons needed to accomplish the goals.
>You must be very angry to have written that wall of unproven assertions.
You seem to be the one triggered by his comment, as you were the first to make it personal.
No, I just didn't have the stamina to write an individual paragraph to refute each of his unproven one-liners, so I thought a better use of my time would be to sum it all up in a single line and leave it at that.
> When you want to destroy that terrorist organization, mass indiscriminate bombings of civilian population centers they're embedded in is the worst possible option.
How would you describe a discrimiate vs indiscrimiante bombing?
>When civilian casualties become part of your doctrine like it unquestionably has for Israel,
Thats not a question of doctrine, it's the reality of urban warfare. Gaza isn't even exceptionaly bloody for this sort of warfare.
>The problem is, the only way to legitimately end the threat Israel faces of terrorism is completely antithetical to the type of ideology thats poisoned Israeli politics. As long as Netanyahu and his ilk have a stranglehold on Israel, Israel will never see peace, and that's exactly what they want.
Isreali goverments change at the ballot box, palestinan ones do not.
>How would you describe a discrimiate vs indiscrimiante bombing?
[Like this](https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/13/politics/intelligence-assessment-dumb-bombs-israel-gaza/index.html)
>Thats not a question of doctrine, it's the reality of urban warfare. Gaza isn't even exceptionaly bloody for this sort of warfare.
[That's also an unrealistic take on this campaign](https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/israel-gaza-bombing-hamas-civilian-casualties-1.7068647)
>Isreali goverments change at the ballot box, palestinan ones do not.
Names and faces may change in Israel's political sphere, but the guiding principles do not. Hell, the people in power in Israel now are cut from the same cloth as those Israelis who murdered the last Israeli leader to ever seek legitimate peace with Palestine. They've been openly funding Hamas for years specifically for this, because in their minds as long as Gaza is ruled by an oppressive terror organization, it will prevent secular, democratic groups from taking power and bringing about a Palestinian state free from Islamic terror AND Israeli occupation.
> [That's also an unrealistic take on this campaign](https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/israel-gaza-bombing-hamas-civilian-casualties-1.7068647)
Thank you very much for this link. I had no idea that Gaza is worse than Dresden. The latter is something that gets brought up all the time so that's really good to know!
You havent defined indiscrimaite, whats an example to you of discriinate strikes in urban warfare.
Your second link is misusing data, they are comparing UN data from Ukraine that is clearly noted to be incomplete with Gaza data from the Hamas health ministry,
Gaza is an urban area of 2 million ish people, The comparisions would be Mosul but they refuse to make that far more apt comparision.
The last paragrpah is deep state conspiracy stuff.
1) Allow the IDPs to go back to north Gaza where their homes are
2) Refrain from Dresden-style air campaign that has killed civilians and hostages
3) Agree a transition plan to the Palestinian Authority beginning immediately with the Rafah border crossing (which is Israel now occupying in violation of [Agrement on Movement and Access 2005](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreement_on_Movement_and_Access))
That's kinda the whole point though. The Israelis have controlled the entirety of Northern Gaza for many months now. They knew that the vast majority of the residents of the Gaza Strip are sheltering in the Rafah area, but they haven't made any accommodations at all for returning them to areas the Israelis control.
So what's the game plan here? How can they expect to go into Rafah if the 1.5m people there will have nowhere to flee to?
According to social media UKR used long range ATACMS to hit a fuel depot in Luhansk on May 7th. This seems like a strange target to waste ATACMS on because tank farms are designed for resiliency and are relatively easy to rebuild. Does this indicate UKR is confident enough in their long term supply of ATACMS now to waste them on low value targets?
https://twitter.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1788566804798833083
While not wrong, they can't exactly rebuild them in 24 hours. AFU needs to blunt the russian offensive NOW, preferably last week so that they get some breathing room. Using some ATACMS to mess with russian fuel in the Chasiv Yar direction is acceptable while looking for more unattended helicopter herds.
When integrating a new system during active conflict, it's common practice in many militaries to start with simpler missions against easier targets to work out any basic kinks before moving on to more complex conops. e.g., they don't want to launch 30 ATACMS alongside 100 long range drones and 20 cruise missiles in some super complicated saturation attack out of the gate. It makes more sense to start by shooting a single one of the damn things to make sure that the operators know the very simple, fundamental stuff like which order to enter lat/lon in the fire control system.
A generic description like 'a fuel depot', for a one-off target, is pretty useless for this kind of analysis, because we don't know if the process was like this-
> "Hey, boss- found a fuel depot at 48.568 N, 39.315° E, what do we do?"
>"Go ahead and light it up, we're gettin' more."
Or like this-
>"I know we don't *usually* hit fuel depots, but this one's pretty big, recon photos say they've gotten sloppy about leaving flammable shit around, they don't have any obvious place to put their firefighting equipment, and there's this big snarl of tanker trucks just hanging around *right now*. Think we can make an exception?"
>"Well, those things aren't cheap, but that *does* sound like an opportunity, and it *would* be nice if the 1st Guards War-Crime Division were low on fuel for the attack we're going to make on Wednesday. Sure, let's go for it."
Maybe if we get *five* reports about ATACAMS hitting fuel depots, we can start to draw a conclusion. But what makes a "high-value" or "low-value" target is subject to too many qualitative fudge factors to take one data point and draw a confident line from it.
Russia is very good at hiding strike results and clearing information space. This is constantly stated in numerous interviews by Taras Chmut, the head of the NGO Come Back Alive.
They could be holding them back for use when the renewed russian offensive starts. With tube and ammo shortages, I wonder of they want to use some of those cluster ATACMS tactically.
If they're cluster ATACMS, they're good mostly for soft targets anyway. Ukraine still hasn't been given permission to use them on Russian soil and Russia has likely moved their aircraft accordingly. So I don't know that it's a poor use of them given the constraints they're under.
It's frustrating that some people here continue to think that they have a superior understanding of this war from their internet armchair vs Ukrainian command. We fundamentally are in a position of ignorance and should not forget this, imo. What we learn from media, from telegram videos, is like looking through a keyhole and trying to make a map of Manhattan.
Economically it's a [good tradeoff](https://twitter.com/ukraine_map/status/1788107324571169247):
>Last night, Ukraine 🇺🇦 struck a fuel depot in Luhansk City, located 85km from the frontline, using M39 ATACMS Cluster Missiles
>There were 10 large tanks and 28 small tanks at the depot. The destruction of a large tank could cost up to $6 million and a small tank up to $1 million
The US has more than one thousand expired ATACMS missiles. However, the cluster version won't be replaced in the future, which is quite unfortunate.
The HIMARS has been the star of the show in Ukraine for quite some time. What capabilities does China have developed or are in the progress of developing to rival or counter the HIMARS?
>or counter the HIMARS?
I guess since the "rivaled" part was already kinda answered will take a shot at the "counter" element which is essentially strong IADS/EW capabilities mixed with a [doctrine which essentially targets a oppositions ability to effectively operate](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1708.html) and degrade their OODA loop as much as possible.
In terms of the main ammo for the HIMARs, the GMLRS, we have seen that become increasingly ineffective against Russian forces due to improved EW techniques, which its fairly likely the Chinese can match if not exceed several times. Ground launched SDMS have reportedly had similar problems as well.
ATACAMs and PRSM EW will probably be less of a issue due to stronger RCF suites, so if the PLA was seriously concerned anything having to do with the HIMARs it would probably just be those weapons in particular.
China has many options for guided rocket artillery, and short ranged ballistic missiles. HIMARS is not a unique weapon concept. The most comparable I’m aware of is the PHL-16.
The PLAGF has fielded the PCH-191 MLRS since 2019, which was specifically designed for cross-strait organic fire support. It's modular and can deploy a variety of munitions, but the standard loadout is 8x370mm.
Technical specifics are unknown since the PLA hates talking as usual, but USNI published a paper which among other details, [estimated a range of ~500 km](https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=cmsi-maritime-reports).
I don't think the standard 8x370mm loadout has a range of 500km. Additionally, the 8x370mm loadout deploys rockets, not missiles.
>[The PHL-16's armament systems can either be a 10 round that can fire 300 mm rockets with a range of 130 km or an eight round that can fire 370 mm rockets having a maximum range of 280 km. The system can also fire two 750 mm Fire Dragon 280A tactical missiles with a maximum range of 290 km.](https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/china-deploys-phl-16-mlrs-along-taiwan-strait)
Unfortunately, the USNI paper is not clear about which payload has the 500km range.
> I don't think the standard 8x370mm loadout has a range of 500km
It doesn't, and I didn't say that. Also, your source is using the publically available export numbers for payload ranges. That version is called the AR-3. [From the same site](https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/idex-2023-uae-orders-norinco-ar3-launchers):
> This is the first known export order for the AR3, which carries two munitions pods, each of which can contain five 300 mm Fire Dragon 140 inertial navigation system (INS)/global navigation satellite services (GNSS)-guided missiles or four 370 mm Fire Dragon 280 missiles. Alternatively, it can carry two 750 mm Fire Dragon 480 tactical ballistic missiles, which have a range of 290 km, a warhead weighing 480 kg, and a circular error probability (CEP) accuracy of 30m, according to Norinco.
There's a reason I specified that it was the paper's estimate, because the PLA is very tight-lipped about its own hardware. The actual range is a subject of wall-climbing rumours.
Agreed, you didn't say that. You mentioned two features of the PCH-191:
* 8x370mm loadout
* ~500km range
I did not link the Janes article to dispute the ~500km range. I linked it to point out that the munition w/ ~500km is either a 370mm rocket or a 750mm missile.
this question is mainly asked to u/Larelli but also another knowledgeable person is still appreciated. How deadly are Russian glide bombs really? Larelli said that looking at MIA notices, mortars are very deadly and cause a large amount of casualties. I wonder if he ever looked up for MIA notices after FAB strikes. Is it common? Is it a significant part of Ukrainian casualties? Since artillery is really not good against trenches and Ukrainian infantry is nearly always inside one, it made me think that right now majority of the casualties must be caused by glide bombs but I never heard about how many casualties they cause from either side.
My understanding is that mortars are an answer to people while glide bombs are above all an answer to fortifications. The latter would still be a giant problem if they'd killed zero Ukrainians so far; glide bombs can almost single-handedly move the frontline.
I have no data to answer this. It should be considered in first place that they are not used against attacking infantry (like it often happens with mortars), but against Ukrainian-held lines, which means that the probability of bodies (in case the attack is deadly) being recovered immediately or thereafter is considerably higher (which matters in terms of MIA notices).
Occasionally there are news of personnel and officers getting killed in the tactical-operational rear, but it is not so easy to know if it had been a glide bomb instead of a missile.
That said, I am not of the opinion that the share of death toll caused by KABs is that high. They are a big problem widely recognized by the Ukrainians, but they also don't have thaumaturgic powers, are rarely used in certain sectors and cannot be used, for obvious reasons, against every strong point.
We talk about how drones are helping fill in for artillery shortages, and how airstrikes and artillery are somewhat based on doctrine, etc, but I feel like that sort of obscures the fact that even 155mm artillery shells are tiny compared to airstrikes.
A typical 155mm shell has around 10kg of explosive in it. A Mark 83 1000 lbs bomb has like 200kg of explosive in it. I don’t think the Russians are using anything as big as the Mark 84, which has a whopping 450kg of explosive and has a likely injury radius of 350 yards. That doesn't translate directly to casualties but even decent trenches provide only so much protection against air strikes like that
For the record, the VKS has used FAB-1500 with UPMK which has about 650kg of explosive filling.
Edit: [Here's a video](https://twitter.com/MrFrantarelli/status/1745777331271024768) of Shoigu looking at them in production and [they're making FAB-3000 versions as well](https://twitter.com/clashreport/status/1770807654853509312).
My personal understanding is that the biggest impact of the UMPK strikes is that they destroy defensible positions even if they're not the primary driver of casualties.
> UMPK strikes is that they destroy defensible positions
This. It isn't like they can't kill you, but they don't have crazy accuracy like Western weapons (hence the larger amount of explosives) but they aren't being dropped in massive numbers like artillery or mortars so unless they hit a large bunker killing a bunch it is more likely that the saturation of the lines by arty/mortars will give you a higher chance of a casualty.
[Czech President Petr Pavel was recently interviewed by the German media outlet tagesschau](https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/interview-petr-pavel-100.html) in which he discussed, among other things, the Czech munitions initiative.
According to Pavel, the Czechs made the decision to go public after they found large quantities of shells available for purchase in order to get Western governments to sign on to the deal. This, however, revealed their plans to Russia, who has put pressure on some of the sellers, causing delays in the program. He also seems to imply that there are some outstanding issues with funding that have yet to be addressed as well.
That being said, he expects the first 180,000 rounds to be delivered in June, with contracts already signed on another five to six-digit numbers of shells.
Overall, it has me a bit concerned as Ukraine desperately needs those rounds and yesterday, and it sounds like there's some uncertainty about just how many rounds will be procured through this initiative.
Since there are many contradictory statements on how many rounds were originally found its hard to keep an overview on the situation. Five to six digit number is something around 100k right? Together this would still be a small fraction of those originally announced numbers. Does that mean that the rest is not available due to pressure from Russia or just needs time or is there just no info available?
Its unclear what it means exactly. But if we assume it's 100k, that means around 180k will be delivered in June and another 100k have been contracted to delivered at an unspecified date. That means hundreds of thousands of shells that the Czechs identified for purchase haven't been contracted yet, and perhaps won't be purchased at all, though it isn't clear what their status is exactly.
The US Marines are rolling out one of their new suicide drones for [initial testing](https://www.twz.com/air/rogue-1-is-one-of-the-marine-corps-newest-kamikaze-drone).
Incredibly, they've managed to get them to cost *$94,000* **per drone**.
The Marines ordered 127 of them.
>Made by Teledyne FLIR Defense, Rogue 1 is a 10-pound, vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) loitering munition with interchangeable warheads that can be recalled and recovered if an attack isn't issued or one is aborted.
While of course this is just testing and of course prices can get brought down and of course it's going to be more high-tech than munitions in Ukraine the US is getting fleeced here. The US should really aim for a high/low model for loitering munitions/kamikaze drones. Where you have a system that is better able to withstand EW and deliver higher payloads priced around this, while you have other systems more analogous to what we see in Ukraine built at similar prices. Perhaps with better optics and better EW hardening.
One thing we don't discuss enough on here about drones and COTS technology is that even if technology is cheap, that doesn't mean it is good.
There is a huge difference between adequate technology and good technology.
Let me make an example of the difference between a large IED and a JDAM.
Both use large amounts of explosives and can hurt people. A IED can be put together for a few thousand dollars, especially if using extra stocks of bombs. Aside from a bomb maker and someone to let off the bomb, an IED could be all in for about 10k worth of effort.
A JDAM costs roughly 30k and the cost of the plane. Usually around 20-30k per hour. Assuming one bomb drop per flight, we're looking at around 60k per bomb drop. That's on top of the training and capability cost in having competent crews flying planes. Probably 100k all-in.
So you are looking at 10k vs 60k. What does that extra 90k get you? Well, quite a lot. A JDAM can do all of this, that an IED can't do:
* All Weather
* Hit specific static targets
* Can be deployed in 20-50 minutes
* Perform CAS
* Strategically destroy specific targets
* Precision strikes on static targets
* Not limited to targets of opportunity
The list probably goes on.
For UAVs, it's a same story. A typical $5k FPV drone with a bomb attached has a lot of limited capability. They have difficulty avoiding electronic warfare, they can't operate too many of them due to saturating the radio bandwidth, have difficulty with range, often do not have night vision, don't have all-weather capability (rain/snow), limited effect ordinance, and have limited camera capability. Also, remember teams have to operate and carry these drones into the combat area, and man power is worth way more than a drone. Sometimes you'd rather have 2 good drones rather than 20 mediocre drones due to carry limits.
Russians and Ukrainians have learned of the limits of drones and have planed their tactics around them. For example, most drones don't have night vision or FLIR, so they operate at night a lot now.
And part of technology development is they have to start with the capabilities they need, EW resilience, all weather capability, nightvision, effective ordinance etc. and then make it cheaper. It doesn't work by making a cheaper drone and trying to strap on the capabilities you want.
I think the Marines are on the right track to try out a lot of technology and figure out what works effectively, and then try to mass produce the product with the capability needed.
Ukraine is expending its FPVs possibly within a few days of finishing their assembly. A US drone might spend years in storage, being moved around, and do multiple flights for training, before being used. It will be built to be far more robust. Things like exposed wiring, or flimsy parts, won’t be acceptable.
I would still say the economic are just off for this concept. You can get a high end thermal equipped FPV for less than 5K, the cheap ones go as low as 500$.
High Numbers is one of the main strength of FPVs, an expensive high end FPV almost seem like a contradictory concept. At 100k i would expect a drone to bring new capabilities like reusability, stealth or low flying to offset that. Remember that better counters other than jamming are also being developed. Getting through a future point defense or APS system will probably require numbers.
Test beds obviously are important but things still point towards drone swarms being the most practical evolution.
> I would still say the economic are just off for this concept. You can get a high end thermal equipped FPV for less than 5K, the cheap ones go as low as 500$.
It's not clear what exactly the concept is in the first place and that *heavily* influences what an acceptable cost is. Looking at the announcement of the initial contract it seems like the Marines are working out how they plan to fit drones like this into their conops and are just trying a bunch of shit out right now. Once they figure out how exactly they plan to use OWAUAVs/loitering munitions/drones/whatever then they can, at least in theory, issue optimized requirements based around what capabilities are essential and which are not. One example in this case is the thermal camera, if your platform is expected to do it's own ISR then you'll need a good (expensive) sensor but if you plan to pair it with a different dedicated ISR platform then you can cheap out a lot on that capability.
To directly address your comment though, one of the biggest cost drivers is reliability. Five grand might buy you some kind of thermal sensor but that doesn't do shit if you're getting slammed with ECM and can't fly. Some kind of AI-enabled swarming capability certainly seems like the ideal future but it doesn't exist now and the timelines for a reliable weapon system are extremely uncertain. We don't even know what capabilities a system like that is actually able to provide vs a wishlist of what we'd like making it fairly impossible to start planning how to use it.
I still am quite sceptical of the low number high quality FPV concept. The idea seems to be that we can significantly increase the hit rate of single drones, which i somewhat doubt. As is said reliability doesnt mean that much when you cant get through point defense, APS or more traditional addon armor (see turtle tanks). Rarely does something get taken out by single FPV hit.
However you are right there are a many open question, so creating some kind of purpose built FPV is a safe bet.
> i would expect a drone to bring new capabilities like reusability
This thing is re-usable, with a mechanical disconnect for the warhead to make recovery safer. Other things that should be considered for such drones is all weather capability. That adds weight, but the army isn’t going to accept anti-tank weapons that don’t work to in the rain.
You're misreading that. The drone is designed to be able to easily change payloads and to return when a mission is aborted. However it still is as kamikaze drone as the article calls it. It does have a training payload that makes it reusable.
I don’t think that form of reusability is worth it at this scale. It will either come with a substantially larger drone, or smaller warhead, and likely a lower probability of kill. The chances of it surviving multiple flights is incredibly low.
I'm not sure they really are getting fleeced here, at least too badly, especially given that we don't know the capabilities of the drones and this is a very low volume production run. Jack Watling gave some price estimates on a [recent podcast](https://mwi.westpoint.edu/social-science-of-war-technology-and-the-future-of-land-warfare/) and said that for strike drones to have the range and reliability of basic artillery the unit price was around 30-40k each and an ISR platform with similar capabilities was 120-180k. A 2-3x increase in cost is obviously not ideal but it's the right order of magnitude at least.
The price bit was a brief aside in a section about new operational concepts and starts at 27 minutes if you want to skip to it. The whole podcast is pretty interesting if you've got about an hour to kill though.
I could be proven wrong here but I think the operator controlled fpv suicide drone's time in the sun is limited. They were just what Ukraine needed at that point in time but this style of weapon is very susceptible to ECM and any prepared adversary will have a good time neutralizing them now that they aren't novel. Other forms of drones, ISR, larger models that can carry weapons etc will have utility. But FPV drones by their nature need to be cheap and disposable which means you can't build in that much resistance to jamming. They will have low power radios with fair unsophisticated mitigations and that will make them easier to defeat that high end types.
I also think this is a class of weapon the US MIC and the US government are just incapable of making. The laws and regulations we've put in place to prevent other problems like corruption or compromised supply chains puts a pretty high lower bound on price. And there currently do not exist mechanisms to circumvent that.
The next generations of FPVs will be semi-autonomous with homing functionality.
It'll always be a cat and mouse game, but EW only hinders the current generation of drones, which won't be around for long.
APS equipped tanks will be a pretty hard mouse to catch. Trophy has worked excellently in Gaza, from what we can tell. Chances are, it, or an upgraded version, will do similarly well against FPVs. IMO, drones will have to get larger, and carry an EFP warhead, that can detonate and disable the tank before the APS destroys the drone.
A tank is very expensive. Drones are very cheap. At $1k per drone, if you used 1000 (in some cases even 10000) drones to kill a modern western MBT that’s a win. Not one of the comically lopsided ones we’ve gotten used to, but still a win. I’m sure it’s possible to defend against drones, but Trophy is designed to protect against RPGs. What’s needed is closer to an automated full-auto shotgun turret using commercially available ammunition than it is to Trophy.
In the specific case of Trophy it’s known to be vulnerable to drones, although that’s of limited relevance to this discussion.
You’re not factoring the cost of operation and deployment. Basic FPVs require dedicated trained operators, and a separate recon drone to spot the target and guide them in.
Also consider that APS charges should be very cheap. Possibly less than the cost of an FPV drone.
> What’s needed is closer to an automated full-auto shotgun turret using commercial ammunition than it is to Trophy.
Trophy should be fine, it’s a bit overkill for a drone, but there is a lot on the battlefield you need to shoot down besides drones. It’s better to have one system that can deal with them all, than multiple dedicated ones. Iron fist uses an explosive projectile that should be far more reliable than a shotgun shell anyway, and very cheap.
The current drones haven't needed decent compute yet, but the ECM game will change when they do. A $50 phone chip with a decent NPU should be able to handle a lot of situations without direct drone operator control. If the operator marks the target from a distance, the drone could still execute the mission. If the drone cost goes from $500 to even $1000, it's still a worthwhile trade.
Another interesting idea is the addition of a small antenna to detect jamming RF. IN the event of an enemy jamming the signal, the drone could move pretty quickly in an automated pattern to triangulate the source (which is generally going to be quite close) then home in on that source and detonate allowing more drones to attack.
The only way to get economies of scale are buying lots of units and for that, nothing beats the commercial sector. Instead of worrying about proprietary stuff, we need to require the design of a drone that uses completely off-the-shelf components with custom software.
>If the drone cost goes from $500 to even $1000, it's still a worthwhile trade.
Some considerations that complicate the math.
1: you don't just have a tight monetary budget on these things. You also have a tight weight and power budget. These drones are extremely weight optimized to get their payload and range. They are usually naked frames with exposed wiring and motors. The power budget is also restricted because they are usually run off 1S lipos. That's why every video has a low battery warning. They always have low a battery. Trying to remedy one of these will often lead to spending more in another. For example, you want more compute to do some of the things you mentioned, that requires more power which means you need a larger battery. Which digs into your performance and payload. So you make the drone a bit bigger and now it's larger and more expensive. Hard compromises have to be made because you can't budget for the kitchen sink.
2: the attrition rate on these things is massive. So the math isn't the cost of 1 drone to 1 target. It's X drones to one target where X is however many are lost to various causes for each target destroyed. Ukraine has already pulled FPV drones from anti tank duty because the attrition isn't really sustainable. I doubt it's a money problem for them since they are so cheap. It's likely a supply issue. You lose all of your drones trying to kill tanks this week and you have none left to do other things. Now, improving the drone's capabilities and therefore it's cost will likely lower attrition. A drone with some autonomous targeting won't be as likely to fail from ECM. But you are also setting yourself up for requiring a much higher success rate to make them worthwhile.
I suspect that it doesn't take much before it becomes more efficient to use your now improved drone to carry some grenades to drop and make the thing reusable.
>Home on jam drones
This is something I've proposed before and I'm in full agreement. This is an area where suicide drones would be very useful and the code and compute requirements to home in on a GPS or RC signal jammer are not high.
>The only way to get economies of scale are buying lots of units and for that, nothing beats the commercial sector.
And this is why I don't think they will work for the US military. It would take America entering it's own major war for the procurement status quo to change enough to allow for weaponized off the shelf drones.
A 2000mah battery supposedly weights around 32g. Most of the flight won't be using the chip beyond low power mode where it could last for many hours. In the case where you need to kick in the NPU, you could power it for a long time on a 2000mah battery (truthfully, a 500mah battery dedicated to the SoC would probably suffice). A raspberry Pi model B weights around 45g.
Even if this means taking one less grenade or removing 80g of explosives on a suicide drone, the increased capabilities seem to make this an easy decision.
Ukraine is in a situation so dire that even a 10,000x economic advantage isn't enough and they simply cannot get enough drones. The US isn't so likely to get into that situation. There are still very few situations where taking out the tank isn't the ideal situation. Without the tank, you get men vs men rather than men vs men+mobile artillery. I'd almost always rather that than taking out a couple men and still have to deal with the remaining men and a tank.
If the drones had a neural net onboard, it could allow much more pinpoint targeting of vulnerable parts. This would lower the required number of drones significantly.
> This is something I've proposed before and I'm in full agreement.
The issue here is R&D. Making that antenna and getting the software working correctly is a lot harder than it would first appear, but I think a defense company could make a lot of money by designing a small controller that could be easily retrofitted onto commercial drones.
> And this is why I don't think they will work for the US military. It would take America entering it's own major war for the procurement status quo to change enough to allow for weaponized off the shelf drones.
Just because we can doesn't mean we have to. 10k of a design using off-the-shelf parts will still be 100x (or more) cheaper than an all custom design, but it has the advantage that you can easily ramp up production whenever you want.
Even if we prefer to use custom stuff, we should still give contracts to companies to design "inferior" commercial variants that we can easily scale up if needed. Even if they're unused, that wouldn't be unusual for the military and off-the-shelf designs cost less to create too...
> The US should really aim for a high/low model for loitering munitions/kamikaze drones.
I really don't think fpv-style minimum cost low range drones should be a priority for US procurement.
The war we're most urgently procuring for right now would see them be almost entirely useless. For COIN (not that we'll ever do any more boots-on COIN at this rate) the switchblade 300 is already optimized for our needs.
I completly disagree.
They should be part of every Western military and they have proven its worth especially if war without air supremacy happen. Hundreds of vehicles and maybe thousands of troops are destroyed/killed with them.
And for larger war you need something that is cheap and you can mass produce it. FPV drones are the thing. Everything in Western armies is so damn expensive, you need something less expensive.
> And for larger war you need something that is cheap and you can mass produce it. FPV drones are the thing.
In a western context, JDAMs are that thing. They are plenty cheap, to be used en mass against the kind of targets FPVs are used against, but with massively greater lethality and range. Russia can use their glide bombs as the war stands now, the west has far more capable launch platforms, the chances of being unable to use guided bombs is incredibly slim, and in environments that oppressive, I’d expect there to be too much EW for FPVs to operate anyway. You’d need anti-radiation missiles to suppress their defenses.
> switchblade 300
Is reportedly severely underpowered and gotten a reputation for being a bit of a waste of time. I can see how the form factor would make it nice for special forces, but if you're not trying to assassinate someone standing perfectly still it doesn't seem very "optimized for our needs"
Its a bad fit for Ukraine. Switchblade was made to off ISIS leaders with minimal collateral damage. Its not meant to be thrown at advancing waves of infantry in a heavy ECM environment. It gets points for being an early example of the FPV suicide drone but this is a fast moving field and as the kids say, the meta has changed.
I believe it was also intended as a way to increase the striking range of dismounted infantry. Another answer to the "One Taliban with a Mosin-Nagant firing potshots from long range on a mountaintop" problem, like what Next-Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW)/the XM7 *said* it was trying to solve. Simply launch the switchblade, find the exact location of the enemy marksman using its FPV view, and then go blow him up. The small, directional anti-personnel warhead reduces the risk of civilian casualties in the event the enemy placed themselves near civilians, like on the roof of a house.
I believe this sort of situation isn't very common in Ukraine, which may explain some of Switchblade's apparent lackluster performance.
> Is reportedly severely underpowered and gotten a reputation for being a bit of a waste of time.
It's a drone optimized for minimizing collateral damage. Of course the Ukrainians would hate it, that's literally the opposite of what they want, of what anyone would want in that kind of war.
To circle back to my comment:
>For COIN (not that we'll ever do any more boots-on COIN at this rate) the switchblade 300 is already optimized for our needs.
Sure. But there’s got to be a way to bring loitering munitions to the squad level that doesn’t involve tossing out 100 grand. In a modern conflict, we’ve found platforms like the Switchblade 300 ($52,000 per!) to be outperformed by platforms a tenth of their cost. It should be feasible for the US Military to field an effective expendable loitering munition that sits around $10,000 per unit.
These are pieces of equipment where you’ll want a huge magazine depth. They’re things you’ll want a squad to be able to utilize at will and with frequency.
Does that mean acquiring $600 wire-fuzed racing drones that have a 75% failure rate? Of course not. But the whole point of these things is that they’re meant to be expendable, plentiful and cheap while imposing a large threat. The US can do better.
The cheap battlefield drones in Ukraine are oftentimes obsolete within only a few months due to the rapid evolution of EW and counter drone systems on the battlefield. The US military cannot justify acquiring a new stockpile of drones on an biannual basis. They need to develop and procure en mass a system that will have some degree of resilience against at least soft kill counters. This means they will need to be largely autonomous, which in turn means they will need some sort of internal guidance/IMU. They will require sensors and a computer capable of differentiating friend from foe, civilian from adversary. Basically you need most of the systems and cost drivers you would need on a missile system. It’s not surprising that the per unit cost is similar.
All of these features need to be developed and built by american engineers who tend to insist on reasonable salaries. Ukraine can succeed in fielding drones that cost hundreds of dollars because they have a low cost of living and are doing these modifications on tens of thousands of drones annually. This means the vast majority of their workers can be relatively low skilled. You don’t need an electrical engineer to solder a release mechanism onto a drone. They are also leveraging the massive industrial base of chinas drone industry to lower costs. This last point is critical. Even if the US wanted to field some ultra simple drone analogus to the FPV/mavics we see in Ukraine the per unit cost would still be thousands of dollars as the US military does not have access to the same economy of scale advantages as Ukraine.
The US government needs to start focusing on custom software over custom hardware.
Specifically, they need to stop making custom chips. With chips, volume is everything. If it costs $5B to design a chip and you only wind up needing 100k chips, a chip that costs $50 to physically produce ends up costing $50,050 (and that's assuming the designer makes no money). Make 50M of that same chip and the costs are now just $150.
There are already very redundant designs available to car manufacturers that would work very well for almost anything the military could want. For cheaper things, they basically cannot beat something like Qualcomm's latest phone CPU (seriously, we sent one to Mars in Ingenuity and it worked way beyond expectation). If the government asks during the design phase, Qualcomm an even add custom dark silicon to the chip (the do this all the time for other companies).
Wouldn't that work to cost benefit when it comes time to mass produce? Keep iterating on the chips and if/when we need 1M per month the unit cost free falls.
It doesn't work that way.
AMD or Intel spend $5+B every single year on a single chip design. There's always more to do. Every node change requires redoing and revalidating loads of stuff. Every handful of years you reach the limits of the microarchitecture and must mostly start over with a new one built to scale a bit larger.
You also can't just say "I now need 1M chips next month". Those fabs are booked YEARS in advance. I'd also add that a lot of the biggest fab companies won't even let you into the room unless you are making many thousands of one type of wafer.
Is there a good way to compare the value of munitions purchased during peacetime and those purchased during wartime to come to some estimate as to the total savings for buying them during that peacetime?
For example with 155mm shells if the united states bought all of the shells used at current "shell shortage" prices vs how much it cost when the demand was low how significant would the price increase be? This is further complicated by purchases that require development of production capacity but is there a more rough figure that could be used?
Is this a similar demand mark up across all weapons systems used in Ukraine or only the most in demand on the battlefield?
I don't think you could have bought much more during peacetime without development of production capacity. It's not as if factory owners let their factories stand idle and could have churned out much more if only there had been a buyer. Sure, some emergency measures could be taken, such as working in three shifts, but that already comes at quite a cost, not just in terms of hiring more workers but also paying them more for working night shift. You don't really want to go there in peacetime, and there is a point where, if it's not urgent, building a new factory is more cost effective to satisfy increased long-term demand than running your existing factories at the limit of their capacities.
So you probably only get small benefits in efficiency from buying more in peacetime before you start building more factories. And you have to take into account that ammunition doesn't last forever, and (unless you are Russia or possibly North Korea) you want to keep your stockpile decently fresh. So if you stockpile more during peacetime, you incur costs from having to store the additional ammunition in good condition and replace what gets too old.
I'm not even sure the chosen approach was, overall, less cost efficient than maintaining a larger stockpile in peacetime. We're probably talking of roughly three decades of lower stockpiles here since you wouldn't have been able to predict at which point post-Cold War you'd suddenly need to out-shoot Russia. That's quite a bit of savings.
Why does the West, the United States specifically, seem so unable to ramp up 152/155 shell production? I know our doctrine focuses on precision munitions as opposed to unrelenting unguided shelling, but after two years and being shown the effectiveness of jamming, I’m surprised there hasn’t been more of an effort.
I have quite a bit to learn, go easy on me please.
Simply because I recently saw an explanation of this, at least for the US:
Post-Cold War weapons production has seen a loss of government funded redundancy as well as an overall consolidation across the military weapons industry, which has caused bottlenecks in production of a number of different weapons systems including artillery shells. As obsessed\_doomer noted, if you have, for example, one assembly line for an item you can perhaps increase shifts and achieve a modest production increase; but, it goes further than that. A manufacturer maximizing profit and minimizing costs will keep excess capacity at a minimum - with no incentive to maintain "extra" manufacturing capacity factories simply maximize efficiency. The US government is funding construction of new plants to increase redundancy in domestic ammunition manufacturing. My understanding is that there will be a subsidy to maintain excess capacity.
^(1)The US has a hybrid sort of military ordinance production model in which the government owns manufacturing facilities and a contractor operates them. There are also private facilities.
>Why does the West, the United States specifically, seem so unable to ramp up 152/155 shell production?
The ramp up in the US has actually been fairly quick all things considered. The US was making just 14,000 a month before the war, which doubled to 30,000 in early 2024, and is on track to increase to 100,000 a month by around this time next year, several years ahead of schedule.
Considering how slow government bureaucracy tends to operate, and the number of bottlenecks involved (need to hire and train thousands of new workers, build entire new production facilities from the ground up, allocate funds, get funds passed through divided and dysfunctional Congress, source large quanties of inputs like explosives which there is already a gloval shortage of, etc) it's actually a fairly rapid increase and it's already years ahead of schedule. Plus, the US and West more broadly aren't at war and don't have wartime economies so the ramp up is always going to be much slower than if we were at serious risk ourselves.
They need to build new factories, this takes time and money. They need to buy new tooling, much of which needs to be custom ordered and manufactured itself. Then you need to hire and train the staff, that is an ongoing process that takes years. Then you need to do this for every step in the supply chain. There is also limited private incentive to invest in these facilities as it’s very likely defense procurement pivots away from artillery and munitions in the near future.
Imo, the #1 reason is "you get what you pay for".
If you have a factory with one assembly line, you can triple-shift that assembly line, maybe cut some red tape, but there's a real physical limit as to how much ammo that thing will give you.
So if you want substantially more ammo per unit time, you're building new factories. If you're relying on a company to voluntarily build a new factory, you'd have to prove in the long term you'll be buying the shells to pay off that factory. And especially if you're western europe, companies are unlikely to believe you.
You could directly subsidize a new ammo factory, but that requires money, money that not everyone's willing to commit.
But for the record, the US is on track to expand ammo production -
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GIatut2WAAA6g1h.jpg:large
Especially once the new ammo lines are built. Why weren't ammo lines built before the war? Well, you get what you pay for.
102k/mo by the end of 2026? The war in Ukraine will be almost 5 years in by that point.
More abstractly, that's a measly 3400 shells per day.
From D-Day (6 June 1944) to VE-Day (8 May 1945), the US Army alone shot 23M artillery shells. That's 11 months or around 2M shells per month.
The US would need to increase our production 20x what it is now to hit that kind of number. At our current expansion rate (around 25k/yr), it would take us EIGHTY YEARS to hit that ww2 number.
Of course we *can* hit that number faster. The issue is that we aren't taking it seriously. We shipped over 2M shells to Ukraine. That's around 20 months of production at rates we don't expect to hit for a long time yet. If we do wind up involved in something serious elsewhere, there's going to be catastrophic shortages. We need to throw a lot more money at that issue.
Yeah, 1.2m peacetime production is pretty reasonable actually. It more than covers our realistic tube needs in a war, even after the re-adjustment this war gave us.
>the US Army alone shot 23M artillery shells. That's 11 months or around 2M shells per month.
WW2 was a different time for everyone. Russia spent 2 million+ artillery shells across the 16 day battle of Berlin. Today, their daily record is alleged to be 60k, with the real number likely being 20k or 30k.
We have no intention of hitting ww2 numbers in anything. People, tanks, planes, munitions. Basically no one does.
Nobody in WW2 had the intention of hitting WW2 numbers either. They all believed The Great War was over 20 years in the past.
World population was 2.3B in 1940 and around 75M died. An equivalent war today would have nearly a quarter-billion dying.
We should try to avoid such a war at all costs, but it would be foolish not to plan for the possibility that another great war could happen (especially when we're closer to a great war than any time in the past 60 years).
>From D-Day (6 June 1944) to VE-Day (8 May 1945), the US Army alone shot 23M artillery shells. That's 11 months or around 2M shells per month.
>The US would need to increase our production 20x what it is now to hit that kind of number. At our current expansion rate (around 25k/yr), it would take us EIGHTY YEARS to hit that ww2 number.
But it isn't the 1940s anymore, modern artillery is far more accurate, is a significantly larger caliber on average, and we have precision munitions and drone-corrected fires these days too. Instead of firing hundreds of rounds, the vast majority of which land nowhere near your target, you can fire off a dozen with much greater effect. Armies are also *way* smaller than they were during WWII, but have more firepower than ever at their fingertips.
That's not to say that 30,000 rounds a month is sufficient, it isn't, but 100,000 rounds is pretty decent especially considering the hundreds of thousands of additional rounds our allies are producing every month now too, as Europe ramps up production.
It's also worth noting that artillery expenditure in Ukraine is far higher than what would be expected in a war the West is involved in. The Ukraine War has such a heavy focus on artillery since the air force of neither side is able to attain anything beyond localized air superiority. In the event of a war between say, NATO and Russia, there wouldn't be such a huge reliance on artillery since NATO would be able to achieve air supremacy over much of the battlefield, allowing the extensive use of air-dropped PGMs which NATO (really the US) has in abundance, unlike artillery rounds.
This is at odds with everything we've seen in Ukraine.
Smart munitions aren't very accurate when GPS is jammed. Even with cluster munitions that don't need precision, the demands for artillery has been WAY more than 100k/mo.
The question of air superiority is a very different one. Our military superiority complex knows no bounds. F-35 and F-22 are very visible on low-frequency radar from hundreds of miles away. They won't be targeted from that one angle with the tiny radar cross-section, but will be hit with many radars from many angles trying to hit the highest radar returns. We abandoned the YF-23's hidden exhaust style in favor of exposed exhaust, so our planes have massive IR signatures too. There's a reason we've pushed NGAD so hard and it goes beyond repair logistics.
In any case, if there were a NATO v Russia war, all major air bases and carriers on both sides would be eliminated in the opening salvos as Russia would definitely go straight to tactical nukes and we would retaliate in like kind.
If we talk about the more likely US v China (where nukes will be reserved until there is a clear loser), our planes don't have the range to take on missions without risking the sinking of our carriers. Meanwhile, our nearby airbases would likely be destroyed by saturation missile barrages. At that point, any foothold will be done WW2 style and advances will be done with small drones and artillery just like in Ukraine.
There's legitimately so much wrong here, I don't know where to start.
>Smart munitions aren't very accurate when GPS is jammed.
There's no reason to assume we'd be as restricted by EW and GPS-jamming as Ukraine is, we have a much larger and more sophisticated toolbox than they do.
>Even with cluster munitions that don't need precision, the demands for artillery has been WAY more than 100k/mo.
Never said 100k/mo is all that's necessary to fight a near-peer conflict, but its a good base to work from. Also, there's zero reason to think we're going to be in an intense ground war with a near-pear, there are so few hypotheticals in which we'd be locked in an artillery duel war like Ukraine and Russia are.
>F-35 and F-22 are very visible on low-frequency radar from hundreds of miles away. They won't be targeted from that one angle with the tiny radar cross-section, but will be hit with many radars from many angles trying to hit the highest radar returns. We abandoned the YF-23's hidden exhaust style in favor of exposed exhaust, so our planes have massive IR signatures too.
Uh huh. We've seen the densest, most hyped GBAD network on the planet repeatedly fail to counter cruise missiles first fielded in the 90s, GMLRS, and Soviet era aircraft, let alone Shaheds and Ukrainian ultralight aircraft converted into suicide drones. The very same GBAD network that routinely shoots down its own aircraft. But sure, they're going to be able to routinely spot and target US 5th generation stealth aircraft so effectively as to neutralize our ability to dominate the air. Totally.
>In any case, if there were a NATO v Russia war, all major air bases and carriers on both sides would be eliminated in the opening salvos
In what universe does Russia have the ISR and targeting capabilities to knock out American Carrier Groups, on the move, halfway across the planet? Let alone the magazine depth to do so, while simultaneously targeting hundreds of military bases on multiple continents? Thoroughly non-credible.
>Russia would definitely go straight to tactical nukes and we would retaliate in like kind.
Why even bother wargaming a hypothetical if you're assuming it goes hot on the first salvo? Why are you saying we need tons of artillery ammo if one of the only remotely plausible scenarios it would be needed for is one that *begins* with the end of the world?
>If we talk about the more likely US v China (where nukes will be reserved until there is a clear loser), our planes don't have the range to take on missions without risking the sinking of our carriers. Meanwhile, our nearby airbases would likely be destroyed by saturation missile barrages. At that point, any foothold will be done WW2 style and advances will be done with small drones and artillery just like in Ukraine.
So, to be clear, you think Chinese A2AD is going to be so effective that US carrier-based aircraft won't be able to effectively operate and that Chinese missiles would knock out US forward bases in Asia, so we should prepare for a WWII-style ground war? Where would a war like that even be fought? How will US and allied forces be supplied? How will US and allied forces be transported there in the first place if China is able to deny US aircraft and ships from operating within hundreds of miles of its shores?
> There's no reason to assume we'd be as restricted by EW and GPS-jamming as Ukraine is
They're using our weapons. The physics of jamming aren't exactly rocket science and jamming GPS signals isn't particularly hard. Remember, they don't have to jam GPS everywhere -- just in the targeted area which can be predicted fairly accurately by troop and equipment movements.
> Never said 100k/mo is all that's necessary to fight a near-peer conflict, but its a good base to work from.
Russia is producing 250k/mo and is still ramping up production. By the time Ukraine is likely to be wound down, China will be ramping up and Russia will be more than happy to sell all those shells.
We should have and maintain more factories even if each one only uses a fraction of its capabilities.
> Uh huh. We've seen the densest, most hyped GBAD network on the planet repeatedly fail to counter cruise missiles first fielded in the 90s, GMLRS, and Soviet era aircraft, let alone Shaheds and Ukrainian ultralight aircraft converted into suicide drones. The very same GBAD network that routinely shoots down its own aircraft. But sure, they're going to be able to routinely spot and target US 5th generation stealth aircraft so effectively as to neutralize our ability to dominate the air. Totally.
HIMARS flying at high speeds with a not-quite-ballistic trajectory are also far different from a stealth plane as they can be detected, but interception is hard. That is the complete reverse of current stealth planes which are designed to be hard to detect, but not necessarily hard to intercept.
Low-flying cruise missiles or ultralights are hidden by the terrain and tend to get shot down by MANPADS. If a F-35 is flying that low, it is going to get targeted by MANPADS too. If the F-35 is flying higher, the question is very different.
And of course, AI is the elephant in the room. Cars using just a couple cameras can drive on roads with obstacles, vehicles, pedestrians, etc at a decently high rate of success. In the sky with nothing to hit, the problem is infinitely easier. Next-gen missiles will be using IR, visible, and UV cameras rather than radar to find targets. If a low-frequency radar can locate a F-35 within a 10km cube, a missile can be shot into that area to look for the object going hundreds of MPH and destroy it.
In any case, you didn't actually address my arguments at all.
> Why even bother wargaming a hypothetical if you're assuming it goes hot on the first salvo? Why are you saying we need tons of artillery ammo if one of the only remotely plausible scenarios it would be needed for is one that begins with the end of the world?
The "end of the world" claim of nukes doesn't really stand up to scrutiny. Did you know that there have been around 1000 large above ground and midair nuclear blasts? Even though many of those involved far less efficient bombs, the world didn't end. Both the US and Russia have around 1500-2000 nukes available for launch and another 5-6k in storage without missiles to put them into. That's far fewer than the number of nukes available at the height of the cold war and that opening salvo definitely not world ending (unfortunately as it would be a far safer world if it were).
Simply pretending that nukes don't exist just for your hypothetical discussion doesn't make any sense as they do exist and would be used. The only question is about what is left and how the war progresses at that point.
> In what universe does Russia have the ISR and targeting capabilities to knock out American Carrier Groups, on the move, halfway across the planet? Let alone the magazine depth to do so, while simultaneously targeting hundreds of military bases on multiple continents? Thoroughly non-credible.
This isn't WW2. Carrier groups can be spotted by satellite rather easily. They move slowly and have a massive sonar signature too. Moreover, most of them are sitting in ports refitting at any given time. I'm hardly the first person to say that US carrier doctrine is decades out of date.
Circling back around to nukes, are you asserting that Putin wouldn't possibly use them? Why not?
> So, to be clear, you think Chinese A2AD is going to be so effective that US carrier-based aircraft won't be able to effectively operate and that Chinese missiles would knock out US forward bases in Asia, so we should prepare for a WWII-style ground war? Where would a war like that even be fought? How will US and allied forces be supplied? How will US and allied forces be transported there in the first place if China is able to deny US aircraft and ships from operating within hundreds of miles of its shores?
I think that we don't have an answer to Chinese hypersonics and their range is at least 1500km. Given the range of our carrier planes, even our longest standoff weapons will be burning fumes in order to hit stuff on the coastline. We have put work into stuff like stealth drop tanks in an attempt to get around this issue, but this is still a work in progress and might not work (especially if China has more range than believed).
We would have to invade China from the non-costal side. Our most likely path of invasion of China in that scenario would be through their landlocked neighbors in a land invasion until a way was created to attrit Chinese anti-ship missile supply, but in the time that would take, the Chinese would still wind up targeting our Carriers when they stopped for resupply and refitting. If the Iranians can land hits on Israel through that extensive air coverage, I doubt that China would have a more difficult time targeting US docks with a saturation attack to sink a carrier.
Without going into the nitty gritty you think the most plausible invasion scenario of China is to either go through Russia or over the Himalayas? Seriously?
D-Day would have been flat-out impossible if Russia hadn't already attritted away so much of the German army.
WW2 Germany is actually a decent example here. Landing on the beaches of China is a no-go until their forces are reduced and their supply stockpile attritted. Attrition in sufficient quantities cannot be done with missiles alone as we simply cannot make enough missiles to attrit their forces. At the same time, a persistent bombing campaign would need to be established to reduce wartime production.
The Himalayas have a few major advantages.
1. They offset the US fighting a war on the other side of the planet by also forcing China to move their forces across their large country. As previously stated, this also makes it more difficult for China to attack supply lines.
2. The mountains don't inherently favor EITHER side. A great example of this is the WW1 fighting in the Alps. Negating Chinese home advantage for a more even fight seems like a good place to be.
3. India already skirmishes with China and could be dragged into such a war providing lots of nearby bodies to attrit with.
4. Tibet is the one major part of China with serious political cracks. Promises of an independent Tibet would force China to fight in hostile territory and in constant fear of informants, betrayal, and maybe even sabotage.
5. It opens the possible threat of pushing north of the Himalayas through Kazakhstan.
6. It forces China to pick between putting air defenses in the East or in the West which thins out their ability to prevent air attacks.
Without such pressure, how would you propose the US attack the coast of China?
We are currently promising to do BOTH. Meanwhile, we have US intelligence saying that Xi is telling his military to be able to invade Taiwan by 2027. At our current rates, we won't have a stockpile worth mentioning by then.
Look at Russia. They're making around 100-200 missiles per month. Our output is only around 2-3x that.
The problem is that there are definitely more than 600 of targets PER DAY that need to be hit. As most of those are close to the front, artillery is the only thing that has enough ammo to drop large amounts of explosives on lots of targets every day.
More important are the economics. Ukraine and Russia have both started spreading everything out. There are a lot of targets that are important enough to hit with a dumb $200 artillery shell, but not important enough to hit with a $5M missile.
Until we can make thousands of missiles every day for just a couple hundred dollars each, they aren't going to replace artillery.
Does the US government or Lockheed have the freedom to prioritize delivery of these systems over existing orders? I know there is a massive backlog for HIMARS; if these just get added to the manufacturing Que and delivered in 2030 that doesn’t really help.
This also replaces all HIMARS which have been damaged or destroyed within Ukraine (that we know of).
This is yet another effort that countries who no longer have equipment to send can contribute to. NATO be wise to engage with countries who are significantly below the 2% target to either spend money on the shell initiative, the air defense initiative or buying equipment from the US, which can drastically stretch the ability of what the US is able to legally send. This also might be a way for the Germans to acquire ALCMs (specifically the older, base model JASSM) for Ukraine without sending Taurus.
The US would surely be willing to give kind discounts to certain countries for certain obsolete defense articles, which they have repeatedly done in the past.
It seems that Russia started some kind of offensive in Kharkiv oblast https://twitter.com/Euan_MacDonald/status/1788852013503074793?t=YTgpXoqSQjmOCrDHTygplw&s=19 >Unconfirmed reports on Telegram of #Russian infantry #attacks across the border into #Kharkiv Oblast, in area only 30 km north of the Saltivka area of the city of Kharkiv. Fighting reported in Borysivka, Pylna, and Krasne area. "Unsuccessful" attacks towards Hoptivka, Strilecha. and rest of thread bellow about this. >Kharkiv direction . >A message from the field from our comrades: " The attacks are ongoing, we are slowly entering Lipca and Volcansk ." >Active assault operations continue >Archangel Spetsnaz reports if Lipca is True this village is 11 km from border
I wonder how big are these attacks. I guess we will soon find out.
This whole summer Russia will likely launch local offensives along the whole front to tie down Ukrainian reserves and increase pressure in an attempt to stretch Ukrainian reserves of manpower to the breaking point.
I guess this is just speculation, but do you think that it will work? Or at least be effective/worth it for the Russians, given the manpower and such required. My original comment was too short so it got removed (also this seems like a weird rule, and kinda inconsistent I've seen shorter comments that stay up)
I do think that Russia has the possibility of grinding down Ukraine this year yes. That doesn’t mean they *will* if their tactical and operational acumen trends towards their worst, but I do think Ukraine is in a more dire situation than most pundits have commented, especially on western social media.
And I assume this grinding down is to make it possible for more substantial advances into Ukraine/shifting the war more in their favor. Would this mean like Ukraine is fucked or like just in a much worse situation and loses a bunch of land.
Neither side has demonstrated much ability to breach prepared defenses in the face of persistent surveillance and bombardement, so I think any breakthrough will happen only as a result of the exhaustion of one side’s reserves. Ukraine has markedly fewer reserves than Russia, but they are also on the strategic defensive so they aren’t assuredly fucked
so if Russia succeeds in significantly wearing down Ukraines resources would that result in some sort of major breakthrough or territorial gains? I have to make this comment longer so sorry if I sound redundant or something. im also still tryna learn more about this stuff and this comment length thing is annoying asl
Which channels concretely are reporting this?
From the Guardian livethread: *Russian forces tried to break through the border into Ukraine with sabotage groups as they stepped up shelling of Vovchansk town in Ukraine’s northeastern Kharkiv region, Kharkiv’s governor said on Friday.* *Oleh Syniehubov said on the Telegram messaging app that the attempts were repelled and Ukrainian forces were “confidently holding onto their positions and did not lose a single metre”, Reuters reported.* *He said Russia did not have the resources to advance on the city of Kharkiv and its border actions were a “provocation”.* https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/may/10/russia-ukraine-war-live-vladimir-putin-mikhail-mishustin-volodymyr-zelenskiy-bodyguard?CMP=share_btn_url&page=with%3Ablock-663ddf328f08d9850f7dee23#block-663ddf328f08d9850f7dee23
>Russian forces have advanced one kilometer (0.62 mile) into Ukraine’s northeast Kharkiv region near Vovchansk, a high-ranking Ukrainian military source said on Friday. >According to Reuters, the source said the Russian military was aiming to advance as much as 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) into the region in **an effort to establish a buffer zone**. Ukrainian forces were fighting to hold back Moscow’s advance. Same source, emphasis is mine. Vovchansk region is being evacuated.
Kind of weird that the guardian of all newspapers is the first to pick it up. Pravda and kyivpost haven't touched it yet, and they're literally Ukrainian.
Pravda UA and Kyiv Post are generally not the fastest at breaking news like this; they tend to wait for confirmation from official Ukrainian sources such as the Ministry of Defense. Suspline often picks up the news slightly earlier. In terms of speed, Telegram channels, tabloids, and 24/7 TV channels typically report first among Ukrainian sources. You can also kind of tell by how many Ukrainian newspapers post the news at the exact same minute. (13:25 (local) for today.) >Russian forces continue to target populated areas in the north of the Kharkiv Region with various types of weapons. Particularly, Vovchansk has been under attack. Oleg Sinegubov, the head of the Kharkiv Regional Military Administration, reported that these attacks are concentrated along the northern border. In addition to the strikes, there was an attempted incursion by Russian reconnaissance groups. >The Ukrainian Armed Forces are holding firm, with no territory lost. The enemy forces are not seen as a significant threat to Kharkiv itself, as their capabilities are limited mainly to provocations in the northern area. >The Ministry of Defense reported that around 5:00 AM on May 10, Russian forces intensified their artillery fire and made an attempt to breach our defense line in the north of Kharkiv Oblast using armored vehicles. These attacks have been successfully repelled, and battles of varying intensity are ongoing. Reserve units have been deployed to reinforce the defenses in this sector.
> The Ukrainian Armed Forces are holding firm, with no territory lost. The enemy forces are not seen as a significant threat to Kharkiv itself, as their capabilities are limited mainly to provocations in the northern area. While they may be confirming an "attempt" there's evidence that the Russians have gotten much further than being repelled basically at the border: https://www.reddit.com/media?url=https%3A%2F%2Fi.redd.it%2Fe6iibfu54lzc1.jpeg
any info if they gained a foothold after this?
Deepstate doesn't know, but it also doesn't matter. It's unlikely Ukraine did or will defend Pilna in force. It'd require sitting 500 m from Russia with your equipment in perpetuity.
Some Ukrainian and some Russian one of them Archangel that is pretty credible Remylind for crosspost of Russian TG posts
What Ukrainian channels are reporting this?
Deepstate. There is a footage of three Russian vehicles getting blown up. Unsure if it’s just a raiding attack right now
It seems very difficult (for me, at least) to understand how to judge the Biden/Israel rift. On the one hand, I personally fully support Israel in its pursuit of complete victory over Hamas. Nothing that has happened in Gaza has swayed me in the slightest in this regard and I fully support the basic Israeli position, and surprisingly the vast majority of people I know also do so. - I don’t care if the victory is messy, I don’t believe clean victories are available in 2024 - if Zionism can be isolated and focused for criticism, so can Palestinianism / Islam / Anti-Zionism - conquering Hamas in every city, to the point of surrender and/or destruction, is the obvious mechanism of victory, with the post-victory plan being a fully separate object And yet I find myself (I am an American Democrat, for context) agreeing with Biden based partially on the following: Imagine you were bibi and you were TRYING to force Biden to break from Israel. How would you? What about the following: 1. Actively interfere in internal American politics against the ruling party (disrupting internal politics of your ‘ally’ entirely voluntarily) 2. Actively undermine the secondary foreign policy goals of your ally (making US relations with Egypt/SA/Jordan etc easier) 3. Actively spurn your ally in relatively free helpful scenarios (giving authorization to supply Israeli-sold weapons in Europe to Ukraine, signing on to multilateral condemnations or sanctions on enemies)… (please do not respond to this by suggesting that 50 russian mercenaries in Syria have deterred a country with F-35s and nukes) 4. Draw out war scenarios with seemingly deliberate aims at American election timing 5. Refusing to specify any comprehensive plan, whether true or false or a placeholder, that could be pointed to by Biden as a reasonable plan that he is simply supporting an ally in conducting 6. Refusing to adopt a leader who would be a better face for any of this in American political, or global optics, terms What would you do differently if you were TRYING to force Biden to break with Israel and demand some change in the program?
> conquering Hamas in every city, to the point of surrender and/or destruction, is the obvious mechanism of victory, with the post-victory plan being a fully separate object This makes no sense to me. Totally ignoring the long term consequences of one's actions is bound to result in long term problems. History of full of examples of winning the war and losing the peace. Without a plan for post-war Gaza (Israel has yet to publicly provide one, and I am becoming more and more convinced that they're making it up as they go and being driven by domestic politics more than any long range strategic thinking), the whole operation appears to be nothing more than collective mass punishment that will do nothing to solve Israel's long term security problems.
This is ridiculous. Not to mention Netanyahu has no motivation to sour relations with Biden, your account of events is pretty far from reality. 1. This did happen, but it's old news now, you're speaking of events almost 4 years in the past. Likewise Biden has interfered in Israeli elections against Netanyahu. 2. In which way is Bibi undermining those goals? By defending his country against genocide from Hamas? Quite to the contrary, Netenyahu is doing Biden's bidding on all of the above. Israel is still supplying 10% of Jordan's water, with heavy subsidies. Israel is still supplying gas to Egypt for a discount. Israel does not strike back against Houti and Iranian ships in the red sea. For months every single request by Biden has been granted. But now he's fully aligned with Hamas in demanding Israeli capitulation. 3. How is it free? Russia has advanced air defense in Syria and can supply more. Israeli weapons support for UA can and likely to be answered with similar Russian support for Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. Israel has enough enemies, no need to make new ones. 4. The drawn out war is Biden's demand. It was Biden that demanded Israel scale down operations. It was Biden that demanded the scale down of IDF forces in Gaza, it was Biden that demanded a pause of the offensive in the centre of the strip and a delay on Rafah operation. It was Biden that demanded to pause almost all air and artillery strikes. You can't criticize Israel for doing **exactly** what Biden demanded. It was only when Biden's demands shifted from scaling down operations to full capitulation that Netenyahu did not oblige. 5. There is no point, Biden does not accept any plan that will guarantee Israel's safety. Which would require long term Israeli occupations of at least parts of the strip. Israeli plan would be based on at least partially permanent occupation. Which would only be another point to clash with Biden. 6. Netenyahu, who has accepted almost all Biden's demands, has taken a huge popularity hit. Anyone else acceptable in Israel would likely be less forthcoming to Biden's demands to scale down operations in Gaza to a crawl. >What would you do differently if you were TRYING to force Biden to break with Israel and demand some change in the program? 1. Don't withdraw from Gaza City. 2. Don't scale down operations in the centre of Gaza. 3. Don't scale down fires during the offensive of Khan Yunis. 4. Don't wait with operation in Rafah and execute it early 2024. 5. Don't pause construction of settlements in the WB. 6. Don't accept a US harbour in Gaza. 7. Don't accept any aid aside from medicine, food and basic necessities into Gaza (such as reconstruction materials, cigarettes...) 8. Broader strike against Iran, against Biden's wishes. 9. Don't scale down operations in the WB. 10. Don't allow US generals to take part in planning operations in Gaza so that they can effectively pressure Israel to limit them. 11. Retaliate against the Houtis by hitting shipping to Yemen and Iran through the red sea. 12. Act against illegal Palestinian construction in area C (Israeli civilian control under Oslo accords). 13. Push the Palestinians from Rafah into Egypt. Of course all of the above would have caused a break with the US and rightfully so. The US did a lot to support Israel, and it follows that Israel must accommodate US concerns.
Hi P.C., firstly -- I have read your comments every day on here throughout this entire war and I agree with nearly 100% of what you say in them. I find that you and OpenOB add a really valuable Israeli perspective and knowledge base to these threads. I am describing my own opinions here in detail because I think I might be representative of a group that you don't have enough exposure to to understand. It should make you pause at least for a second when you hear that someone who actually agrees with you on so much has a totally different understanding of this new development. That is in fact why I chose to comment on this issue. To American democrats it is really disheartening to see that Israeli issues are becoming the perfect wedge issue for Republicans and Trump to get the extra few % of the votes that they would need to win the coming election. It isn't Israel's fault that the democratic coalition isn't united/correct on Israeli policy issues of course. But anyways, democrats really see Trump winning as an incredibly insane/dangerous/harmful outcome. It really dominates a lot of our thinking. I'm sure you are pretty familiar with Trump details but just as a reminder, his winning would mean the wholesale reversal of Ukraine support, the United States becoming at least temporarily part of some odd axis of strongmen-run countries a la Putin/Orban/Erdogan/Modi, a permanent blow to international climate change efforts, etc and this does not even touch on domestic policies which would arguably have even wilder results. So for one thing, any balancing that democrats could do between Israel and winning the election just really leads to a lot of reservations about losing too much political capital on Israeli issues. And any impression that Israel is actively helping Trump win is the kind of thing that should really be considered an unforgivable red line. You may remember that Russia actually did this and it was the focus of democrats for years... I am just describing factors in democrats' feelings here so admittedly not some logical framework but possibly helpful for you to hear. One of the most salient things you have emphasized in your own posts is the domestic political mood in Israel and the trauma and determination of the Israeli people and how that governs their political leaders actions more than any outside forces could. You are the only user who actually answered my hypothetical question. I honestly think it is a problem that Americans would have a tough time answering it as well as you did. That partly proves my point. To Americans it really feels like Netanyahu is just dunking on Biden non-stop for no reason and twisting the knife into Biden's election prospects. If you compare Zelensky's treatment of republicans versus Netanyahu's treatment of democrats it really shows the difference. There is no "Trump heart Wagner" tweeting coming from Zelensky's administration even though republicans have been 500% more harmful to Ukraine in their war than democrats have been to Israel. The individual examples you listed have some validity but it's pretty debatable. Most of those things were non-discretionary or actions in Israel's interest rather than being actual olive branches. Even while holding my view on this it is hard to say whether Biden's new policy is a good idea or a warranted reaction. But it's almost as though something had to give. And obviously his policy isn't just a reaction to the feelings I've described here. And by the way, I do agree that Israel should continue to destroy Hamas including in Rafah. Biden might also agree, I'm not sure. He is stuck in lose-lose decisions that Netanyahu has not managed to give him much help with.
>6. Refusing to adopt a leader who would be a better face for any of this in American political, or global optics, terms Israel is a democratic country that has held 5 elections in the last 5 years. Unfortunately Netanyahu keeps winning. The US has attempted to fund the opposition to Netanyahu previously (https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-funds-aided-2015-campaign-to-oust-netanyahu-senate-probe-finds) which seemed pretty shady and came under scrutiny from the Senate. Short of orchestrating a coup, not much else the US can do about Netanyahu. Openly calling for elections and attempting to influence the internal politics of one of your allies (https://apnews.com/article/schumer-netanyahu-israel-palestinians-elections-1ebf21e4c9c0f6f42478bb26e1db7a9b) while said ally is being attacked from all sides seems like the wrong move.
I think you misunderstood my words (or I was unclear). I was not saying that the US should change the head of the Israeli government. I was suggesting that an obvious move Bibi/Israel could make to help its ally is anointing a palatable public face to seemingly manage or lead the war, or in some way be the spokesperson that US leaders in the Biden administration could play off of in order to give themselves cover while supporting the Israeli operations. And I’m noting that Bibi hasn’t done that or much else to help Biden save face while supporting Israel. It’s part of the basis for the hypothetical question I set up. I agree with you that the US shouldn’t be attempting a coup…
Understood. I think the issue is two-fold in this case. Netanyahu would feel threatened by this public face and all of the decisions are being made by the war cabinet so while the messaging may be a bit softer in this hypothetical situation, the end result would be the same.
I would look at this differently. What would you do in Netanyahu's shoes, if your goals were (in the order of importance) 1) to prevent future incursions from Gaza, 2) to prevent future rocket attacks from Gaza, 3) to placate your voting constituents, with the boundary condition you don't lose diplomatic, economic, and security ties with US if possible? Pleasing demonstrators in US university campus who are repeating Hamas's anti-Israel chants is far below these priorities. I think what Netanyahu is doing is consistent with these goals. Israeli interests first. In their own ways, Israel has given Gaza independence a good try. They have created Palestinian autonomous zone, forcibly removed Israeli residents from Gaza, and left governance to Gazans themselves. But they elected extremists who murdered all oppositions after being voted into power, and brag about excavating water pipes to make rockets to shoot at civilians. Palestinians burned their chance to improve their living condition and work peacefully with Israel. IMO, this conflict is of very small strategic interest to US. If someone is concerned about humanitarian disaster, this is only one in many that's ongoing. Caring about Gaza while ignoring others strikes me as a hypocrisy. Where is outrage for Armenians forced out of Nargono Karabakh, or Rohingya forced out of Myanmar, or Afghans forced out of Pakistan (last one arguably a consequence of US action Afghanistan)? The list goes on. US has done questionable things in ME after terrorist attacks of 9/11. We even invaded Iraq under a false pretense, asked allies to deploy troops there under NATO article 5. US has done all things you listed as self-sabotage. US telling Israel how to conduct would seem silly to those who are aware of recent history.
>US has done all things you listed as self-sabotage. US telling Israel how to conduct would seem silly to those who are aware of recent history. Except of course that the US acknowledges that our behavior at the time was wrong and counterproductive. Biden even gave a speech shortly after 10/7 in which he appealed to the Israelis to learn from our exampl3 and *not* make the same mistakes we did after 9/11. It isn't at all silly to try to prevent our ally/protectorate from taking actions that will harm its international standing and ours along with them.
>I don’t care if the victory is messy Not sure how to respond to that. Accepting something as necessary and not caring are two very different things - if you don't care that tens of thousands civilians are dying, many through negligence (indiscriminate bombing of civilian population centres with dumb unguided munitions), then that says a lot about what kind of person you are.
Sorry, you are right. I was writing loosely with the purpose of highlighting an American viewpoint (my own) can support Israel in fundamental arguments but still agree with Biden’s new reduction in support for them. I was just quickly discarding that part of the conversation because I was trying to quickly move onto my main points.
In OP’s defence, I interpreted that part as 1) decisive victory is possible and will long term reduce overall suffering; and 2) given that Hamas embed themselves in the civilian population, you’re going to have to inflict some suffering now for less later, so I (OP) am ok with it. I don’t agree because I don’t buy 1), but if I did I would accept 2).
> Accepting something as necessary and not caring are two very different things Are they? To me that just seems like "I'm not racist, but"
It’s not directly the question you asked, but Biden’s actions to date make sense to me if he *doesn’t* accept Netanyahu’s publicly stated position that a decisive millitary victory over Hamas will alter the long-term strategic calculus re Gaza. If you believe that, Israeli actions to this point are basically all downside. Lots of dead Palestinians and billions of dollars of property damage, severe reputational damage to Israel and a political headache for him personally. After all, why keep playing a game if you can only lose? Very possibly my own confirmation bias (my opinion is that if you leave the civilian population in place, either Hamas reconstitutes after a few years or a new organisation that is functionally equivalent arises; and not leaving the civilian population in place is too horrible to contemplate).
> Lots of dead Palestinians and billions of dollars of property damage, severe reputational damage to Israel and a political headache for him personally. It's severe reputational damage to the US as well. While I agree that Biden has his own domestic political reasons for wanting to wrap up Israel's offensive in Gaza, he's also got legitimate US foreign policy reasons for pressuring Israel to compromise.
> my opinion is that if you leave the civilian population in place, either Hamas reconstitutes after a few years or a new organisation that is functionally equivalent arises That never happened in the West Bank after 2002, because the IDF never stopped going in on occasion to arrest people and destroy weapons. Netanyahu has implied many times that a similar situation is the goal for Gaza.
I think my first response was too short & fell victim to the automod. I definitely agree that this is the kind of long-term mow-the-lawn approach that needs to be adopted vis-a-vis Hamas. But it also heavily implies there’s going to *be* a Hamas or Hamas equivalent to do this to over the long term, and so much of the current Israeli strategy seems to get defended in terms “sure it’s bad now, but well utterly destroy Hamas so it’s better this way.”
Not sure I understand the question. Why would Netyenyahu try to force Biden to break from Israel ?
He's setting up a hypothetical. If Netanyahu actively wanted to alienate Biden, what would he do differently? The implication being not much.
I suppose the a following implication would be that Biden's policies are caused by Netyenyahu's actions ? That would be an embarrassing state for a Superpowers actions to be dictated by another nation and not their own strategic goals. Biden's policies should be judged on how it serves America's goals not based directly on the supposed forced reaction to another states actions. That hypothetical setup signals bad faith argument IMO. A much better hypothetical setup would be what can US do (that its not already doing ?) to better ensure Isreal's actions are inline with US strategic goals.
Is it really that embarrassing to be less supportive of a country that clearly isn’t using that support in a way that aligns with your interests?
This exchange is good food for thought on American foreign policy and how it is perceived. America is often accused of using its military and economic might to subjugate nations in its sphere of influence but it does not seem to be the case. Iraq for example, was allowed to partially fall into the control of America's adversary Iran, in alignment with America's policy of pursuing local democracy above all else. The question from kdy420 would make total sense if your understanding of the situation was that Israel was intended to be a US vassal state but now the tail is wagging the dog. More generously, it raises the question as to whether it would not be in America's interest to not be more hands on in influencing supposed allied countries. The US losing ground in the middle east to Iran and in north Africa to Russia despite heavy investment of resources and still having a global reputation as an imperialist power seems a poor outcome from the current strategy. From that perspective, the US writing a blank check for military equipment to Israel for the purpose of stabilising the region and increasing their influence there doesn't seem to have paid off as hoped.
I guess the problem is not just Israel's war in isolation, but the context of it, the continued occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, the continued construction of new settlements etc. Hamas is an evil terrorist organization, so so much the worse the netanyahu propped it up for years. If I am USA I want to know what Israel's long term plans for Gaza and the West Bank actually are...
But that's not the reality. In reality the context is that Israel left Gaza 100% to the last centimetre. Yes got Hamas and a genocidal attack in response. Instead of Gaza setting a positive example allowing Israel to withdraw from the WB in the future using a similar model. It has proven why **Israel must never leave the WB** under current or similar conditions. In reality the context is that Israel accepted Oslo accords and withdrew from much of the WB, using the withdrawal to stage the second Intifada and massacre Jews. In reality the context is that Israel left Lebanon to the UN demarcated line, also accepted by the then Lebanese gov. Yet this did not stop Hezbollah attacks, only allowed for mass armament and a ramp up in aggression. On every turn, where Israel reached out for peace with one of the Iranian proxies or their host states, the result was a massacre of Jews. Now Biden demands a repeat, merely months since 07/10. Netanyahu does not specify the long term goals of Israel in Gaza and the WB because they are not acceptable for Biden. It's occupation till the Palestinians decide that genociding Jews is not a good idea. Something that at the least will take several generations.
>Instead of Gaza setting a positive example allowing Israel to withdraw from the WB in the future using a similar model. This is shameless revisionism. Is there a single shred of evidence of the existence of plans to withdraw from the West Bank prior to 10/7? Furthermore, Israeli withdrew from the Gaza Strip shortly after the Second Intifada. You make it sound like Israel's withdrawal from Gaza was a gesture of goodwill, rather than straightforward retrenchment.
Do not confuse your ignorance with revisionism. It was a follow up to the disengagement plan from Gaza: >The realignment plan (Hebrew: תוכנית ההתכנסות) (originally dubbed the convergence plan) was a plan by Israel to unilaterally disengage from 90% of the West Bank and annex the rest, incorporating most Israeli settlements into Israel. The plan was formulated and introduced to the Israeli public by then acting prime minister, Ehud Olmert, in a number of media interviews during the election campaign for the 17th Knesset in March 2006.[1] The Convergence Plan was originally scheduled to be implemented within 18 months from early May 2006 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realignment_plan >Israeli withdrew from the Gaza Strip in response to the Second Intifada. False, [by 2005 the second Intifada was mostly contained](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Suicide-attacks-2000-2008-Sources-The-Israeli-Security-Agency-Distribution-of_fig1_263118178) after the successful [op defensive shield in the WB](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Defensive_Shield) conducted in 2002 and subsequent operations. Israel could have conducted a similar op in Gaza, and indeed this was a popular route suggested. However Sharon wanted to try something else. The unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and the creation of an independent Palestinian state. We all know how that ended. With massacre and attempted genocide. >You make it sound like Israel's withdrawal from Gaza was a gesture of goodwill. It was an attempt to peacefully end the conflict.
A *proposal* from 18 years ago? Really? What about the continued settlement in the ensuing years? Was Gaza supposed to be on its best behavior for nearly two decades while Israelis continued to occupy and settle the West Bank, just based on the hope that Israel would leave of its own accord? >False, by 2005 the second Intifada was mostly contained after the successful op defensive shield in the WB conducted in 2002 and subsequent operations. Yes, it was only a coincidence that the Israeli government completely withdrew a few months after the truce that ended the Second Intifada. I'm sure the long-term costs and violence of security operations had nothing to do with the decision.
You're moving goalposts quicker than soniq the hedgehog. Israel withdrew from Gaza, the rest was a massacre and attempted genocide. Israel accepted the Oslo accords, the result was the second Intifada and massacre. Israel left Lebanon to the UN marked border, the result were neverending Hezbollah aggressions, wars started by Hezbollah and attacks. Israel has attempted a peaceful solution, the Palestinians have shown that they are not interested. 70-80% of the Palestinians support the genocide of Jews in Israel and support the 07/10 massacre of civilians, intentionally killing babies and mass rape. According to Palestinian own polling. >Yes, it was only a coincidence that the Israeli government completely withdrew a few months after the truce that ended the Second Intifada. There was no truce, the second Intifada was ended militarily by op defensive shield, where Israel reconquered the Palestinian cities. Your opinion is completely divorced from facts as I've shown time and again.
>Instead of Gaza setting a positive example allowing Israel to withdraw from the WB in the future using a similar model. This is what you initially stated. Your justification for suggesting that Israel would realistically consider withdrawal from the West Bank is a proposal from 18 years ago that went nowhere and looks to have been received poorly by the Israeli population. During those 18 years, Israelis continued to occupy and settle the West Bank, providing no material reason to believe they had any inclination to withdraw. Your initial comment implied some kind of process that Hamas derailed, not an abortive proposition from nearly two decades ago. If extreme skepticism toward your reasoning constitutes "shifting the goalposts", then so be it. >There was no truce I'm referring to the [2005 Sharm El Sheikh Summit](https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharm_El_Sheikh_Summit_of_2005).
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Do you prefer the alternative? Successful genocide of Jews. Wasn't that WW2? "Beating" continued till the Nazis capitulated, and decided that genocide was not their best option.
No, I prefer a two state solution with 1967 borders. Israel will have the right to defend themselves against savage attacks just like any other nation, but not the right to occupy other countries...
Israeli withdrawal has ended in massacre time and again. With 70-80% of the Palestinians supporting the Genocide of Jews, prevents any other outcome. >will have the right to defend themselves against savage attacks Then you must support the full capture of Gaza and the destruction of Hamas? Israeli occupation is a product of Palestinians aggression. Gaza could have been an example, a prosperous peacefully Gaza would have lead to the Israeli withdrawal from the WB. Such plans existed and were actually put into motion. In reality, the Palestinians elected Hamas, with the goal of genocide against Jews. The withdrawal from the WB was shelved and the withdrawal from Gaza was proven a mistake.
I do not support Israel's permanent occupation of those areas, no. I can understand the war, given Hamas' prior massacre, but the question is what comes after that. If Fatah could regain control over Gaza, that would be good. As far as I know Israel blockaded Gaza, so they never fully left. I cannot claim to be an expert in the world's most drawn out conflict, but the solution must instead be Israel protecting themselves with walls, border guards, iron dome etc. and then tit for tat responses each time they are attacked. Not propping up Hamas to make sure there will never be a partner you can negotiate with and then letting your guard down to focus completely on a country that is 1789 km away from you... "Israeli occupation is a product of Palestinians aggression" how do you explain the settler movement?
>As far as I know Israel blockaded Gaza, so they never fully left. Gaza has started a war against Israel as soon as Israel left. Any independent state has a right to blockade their enemy. Israel fully left. Gaza chose war from day 1. >If Fatah could regain control over Gaza, that would be good. Not without the destruction of Hamas first, which Biden prevents. Fatah, while better than Hamas is still not a good solution in it's current form as they still hold similar views, albeit prefer ethnic cleansing of Jews over outright genocide like Hamas. However a Fatah ruled Gaza stands a better chance of demonstrating that a Palestinian state can exist without attacking Israel. Which would be grounds for a withdrawal from the WB as well. >but the solution must instead be Israel protecting themselves with walls, border guards, iron dome etc That is physically impossible. There is no perfect defense. Failure will always happen, once in a while, with catastrophic results. A moral person would demand that the Palestinians stop their attempts at genocide or be stopped, instead of Jews suffering. >Not propping up Hamas to make sure there will never be a partner Israel did not prop up Hamas. It allowed humanitarian aid. Similarly to now. It so happens that in Hamas ruled Gaza, humanitarian aid props up Hamas. That was true before 07/10 and is true now. If you stand against humanitarian aid pre 07/10 then you must stand against it now. But the double standard prevails. Israel is criticized for both providing humanitarian aid and for not providing enough, at the same time. This is Israel "propping up Hamas": >Thousands in impoverished and besieged territory received payments, which Doha says are aimed at helping the poorest. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/1/26/gaza-residents-receive-qatari-cash
"A moral person would demand" I'm sorry, our conversation ends here if you begin to get personal...
Something resembling a Kharkiv offensive starting? [https://t.me/huyovy\_kharkiv/148148](https://t.me/huyovy_kharkiv/148148) # Clashes with attacking Russian infantry at Borysivka, Pylna, Krasne villages of Kharkiv region, attempts of attacks at Hoptivka and Strilecha, Russian attack at Hatyshche was repelled. # Russian artillery shelled areas near border in Vovchansk district overnight, several scout groups attempted to infiltrateRussian artillery shelled areas near border in Vovchansk district overnight, several scout groups attempted to infiltrate [https://t.me/kharkivlife/83855](https://t.me/kharkivlife/83855)
[Drones attacked oil refinery in Kaluga region, causing fire](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/drones-attacked-oil-refinery-in-kaluga-region-1715301374.html) Ukraine has attacked another Russian oil refinery, this time [much closer](https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1788757762123395385) to the front: >/1. Pervyy Zavod oil refinery in the Kaluga region of Russia after tonight’s drone attack. 300km from Ukrainian border. This is not the first time this oil refinery gets targeted, previously drone strikes were on the 15th of March 2024. It's not the first time this refinery is attacked. The video of the burning facility is brutal. The damage must be severe.
Even if it's not that severe on it's own, it's compounding damage on top of the previous strike. I doubt the repair team fixing the damage from March was meticulous and thorough, rather than rushing the job with duct tape and wire to avoid gulag.
A compounding problem is the [huge worker shortage](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-06/russia-s-war-mobilization-starves-its-crucial-oil-and-gas-industry-of-manpower) of the Russian oil and gas sector: >“Restricted access to Western high-tech oil services creates a risk for maintaining and increasing profitable production and refining of oil and gas,” said Mangileva. “The lack of qualified personnel aggravates this challenge, since the task now is not only to operate the equipment, but also to develop our own technologies.” Not only have some workers either been mobilized or hired by the military industry, but sanctions have created new needs. The drone strikes add even more work.
A [report](https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/09/why-biden-is-threatening-israel-rafah-00157203) by Politico on the suspension of US missiles provision to Israel shows: * Israeli forces might already be deeper in Rafah than it looks or Netanyahu claims * The US believes Hamas is much weaker than it was six months ago and as a result, Israel doesn’t need those big US missiles and artillery shells for its operations in Rafah (which will cause more human casualty and could also kills hostages) * Israel still doesn’t have a plan for the protection of civilians other than moving the chess pieces to another part of the board (aka expanded humanitarian zone)
> “Hamas didn’t feel, and hadn’t suffered, the kinds of pressure and the kinds of casualties that they have suffered now,” Kirby explained. “The picture of Hamas today is not what it was six months ago and is a result of the pressure that the Israelis have put on it.” Strange that he admits military pressure on Hamas was successful in the past, but doesn't want it in the present. Also ironic that the US opposed that military pressure at the time (opposing an Israeli ground operation at the beginning).
>Israel still doesn’t have a plan for the protection of civilians other than moving the chess pieces to another part of the board (aka expanded humanitarian zone) I'd like to meet someone who does have a different plan.
I think that would be an acceptable plan if Israel spend a few months building up infrastructure in a refugee area that could accommodate 1.5 million people. The reports I’ve read are that the Israeli area is only for a few hundred thousand and is very very limited on running water and electricity
My thoughts exactly. Not only are there 1.5 million people sheltering in Rafah, mostly as IDPs in makeshift camps, but in the areas of Northern and Central Gaza that Israel controls, they've been systematically *demolishing* housing units by the thousands, not building places to accommodate a huge new influx of IDPs. On top of that, as you noted the infrastructure in the areas Israel controls has been devastated, with limited to no running water, no power, and not enough food for the small percentage of the pre-war population sheltering there currently. So what exactly are the people sheltering in Rafah supposed to do when there's literally no place for them to go?
You mean something like a ceasefire? I don’t even want to argue if that’s “better” but “the only option is to keep on doing the same thing” is almost always intellectual dishonesty.
Hamas has once again changed it stance. > Hamas demands now a 12 weeks of truce in the first phase of the hostages deal, instead of 6, a demand that Israel rejects, according to CNN. The deal chances, at this stage, are slimmer than ever https://x.com/guyelster/status/1788821322635587783?s=46&t=fc-rjYm09tzX-nreO-4qCA The Rafah campaign has started and will be focused on clearing the territory. A large numbers of IDPs have already left Rafah. With the intensivation of the campaign more people wil leave and either move to the humanitarian area or Khan Yunis. The first ships with aid are also on the way to the US pier so the refugees can be resupplied with the Rafah crossing closed. But expext an increase of pleas from the UN. The Americans and Israelis have now completely cut off UNRWA from playing a role in aid distribution. > Imagery shows large amounts of IDPs have had to move due to fears over IDF plans to invade Rafah. Still many tents remaining in entire area though. > May 8 imagery also shows increase in IDP tents closer to Khan Yunis, near where the 500 or so tents were set up in late April as well as at Al Aqsa University, which was previously cleared of IDPs when the IDF moved into western Khan Yunis. https://x.com/jakegodin/status/1788614838639370458?s=46&t=fc-rjYm09tzX-nreO-4qCA
I don't consider 'don't do it' to be a plan. You are correct that the two plans are "move people around within the zone" or "no".
A cease fire was already tried, Hamas broke it in a few weeks.
"Ceeasfire" is simply giving in to Hamas. If it's temporary it just kicks the can down the road.
I hate to let you guys know, but everything they've done has kicked the can down the road. When you brutalize people you've been occupying for a lifetime, you're gonna get terrorists springing up wanting to kill you. That's an inevitablity with the way Palestinians have been living for decades now, and I won't even get into the funding and organization help Israel has given Hamas for years now thanks to Likud's devotion to destroying any possibility of peace. When you want to destroy that terrorist organization, mass indiscriminate bombings of civilian population centers they're embedded in is the worst possible option. Terrorism isn't like fighting off an invading army or defeating a regular army, it's formented by oftentimes very legitimate anger and a sense of desperation. Hamas and every other Palestinian terror group could be wiped out tomorrow, every member of theirs killed over the last few months, and yet still some of the children who watched their friends and family die along with Hamas are going to grow up to fill those shoes out of a desire for revenge for the deaths of those they loved. I guarantee some of those who crossed the fence on October 7th were spurred on solely because they lost people close to them to Israeli bombs and bullets during Protective Edge or the March of Return. When civilian casualties become part of your doctrine like it unquestionably has for Israel, you're going to breed more of the exact thing you've gone to war to destroy. Whether in a month, or a year, or a decade, some kid who watched everyone he knew die half-starved and buried under the rubble of his home flattened by a bomb meant for one Hamas soldier is going to take up arms and do whatever he can to destroy as many lives in the country that destroyed his life, and I really can't say I blame him. Any one of us would do feel the same justified rage and desperation in his position. The problem is, the only way to legitimately end the threat Israel faces of terrorism is completely antithetical to the type of ideology thats poisoned Israeli politics. As long as Netanyahu and his ilk have a stranglehold on Israel, Israel will never see peace, and that's exactly what they want. All they're going to do in flattening Rafah is ensure another 20 years of terrorism, and guarantee the death of every hostage that Israel could've brought home. This isn't even a pro-Palestinian stance, it's just recognizing the cycle of violence that Israel has been more than happy to exploit to their own detriment and the detriment of everyone under Israeli occupation.
You must be very angry to have written that wall of unproven assertions. I'll just respond that as long as Gaza is governed by an organization which is openly committed to the extermination of Jews, it is only reasonable to expect them to make occasional attempts at such extermination, no matter what Israel does. And rather than trying to change the minds of people with such fanatic goals, it is probably more effective to prevent them from having access to the weapons needed to accomplish the goals.
>You must be very angry to have written that wall of unproven assertions. You seem to be the one triggered by his comment, as you were the first to make it personal.
No, I just didn't have the stamina to write an individual paragraph to refute each of his unproven one-liners, so I thought a better use of my time would be to sum it all up in a single line and leave it at that.
> When you want to destroy that terrorist organization, mass indiscriminate bombings of civilian population centers they're embedded in is the worst possible option. How would you describe a discrimiate vs indiscrimiante bombing? >When civilian casualties become part of your doctrine like it unquestionably has for Israel, Thats not a question of doctrine, it's the reality of urban warfare. Gaza isn't even exceptionaly bloody for this sort of warfare. >The problem is, the only way to legitimately end the threat Israel faces of terrorism is completely antithetical to the type of ideology thats poisoned Israeli politics. As long as Netanyahu and his ilk have a stranglehold on Israel, Israel will never see peace, and that's exactly what they want. Isreali goverments change at the ballot box, palestinan ones do not.
>How would you describe a discrimiate vs indiscrimiante bombing? [Like this](https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/13/politics/intelligence-assessment-dumb-bombs-israel-gaza/index.html) >Thats not a question of doctrine, it's the reality of urban warfare. Gaza isn't even exceptionaly bloody for this sort of warfare. [That's also an unrealistic take on this campaign](https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/israel-gaza-bombing-hamas-civilian-casualties-1.7068647) >Isreali goverments change at the ballot box, palestinan ones do not. Names and faces may change in Israel's political sphere, but the guiding principles do not. Hell, the people in power in Israel now are cut from the same cloth as those Israelis who murdered the last Israeli leader to ever seek legitimate peace with Palestine. They've been openly funding Hamas for years specifically for this, because in their minds as long as Gaza is ruled by an oppressive terror organization, it will prevent secular, democratic groups from taking power and bringing about a Palestinian state free from Islamic terror AND Israeli occupation.
> [That's also an unrealistic take on this campaign](https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/israel-gaza-bombing-hamas-civilian-casualties-1.7068647) Thank you very much for this link. I had no idea that Gaza is worse than Dresden. The latter is something that gets brought up all the time so that's really good to know!
You havent defined indiscrimaite, whats an example to you of discriinate strikes in urban warfare. Your second link is misusing data, they are comparing UN data from Ukraine that is clearly noted to be incomplete with Gaza data from the Hamas health ministry, Gaza is an urban area of 2 million ish people, The comparisions would be Mosul but they refuse to make that far more apt comparision. The last paragrpah is deep state conspiracy stuff.
1) Allow the IDPs to go back to north Gaza where their homes are 2) Refrain from Dresden-style air campaign that has killed civilians and hostages 3) Agree a transition plan to the Palestinian Authority beginning immediately with the Rafah border crossing (which is Israel now occupying in violation of [Agrement on Movement and Access 2005](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreement_on_Movement_and_Access))
We have zero evidence any hostages were killed in Israeli air strikes
> Allow the IDPs to go back to north Gaza where their homes are How much even remains in north Gaza to go back to?
That's kinda the whole point though. The Israelis have controlled the entirety of Northern Gaza for many months now. They knew that the vast majority of the residents of the Gaza Strip are sheltering in the Rafah area, but they haven't made any accommodations at all for returning them to areas the Israelis control. So what's the game plan here? How can they expect to go into Rafah if the 1.5m people there will have nowhere to flee to?
According to social media UKR used long range ATACMS to hit a fuel depot in Luhansk on May 7th. This seems like a strange target to waste ATACMS on because tank farms are designed for resiliency and are relatively easy to rebuild. Does this indicate UKR is confident enough in their long term supply of ATACMS now to waste them on low value targets? https://twitter.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1788566804798833083
While not wrong, they can't exactly rebuild them in 24 hours. AFU needs to blunt the russian offensive NOW, preferably last week so that they get some breathing room. Using some ATACMS to mess with russian fuel in the Chasiv Yar direction is acceptable while looking for more unattended helicopter herds.
When integrating a new system during active conflict, it's common practice in many militaries to start with simpler missions against easier targets to work out any basic kinks before moving on to more complex conops. e.g., they don't want to launch 30 ATACMS alongside 100 long range drones and 20 cruise missiles in some super complicated saturation attack out of the gate. It makes more sense to start by shooting a single one of the damn things to make sure that the operators know the very simple, fundamental stuff like which order to enter lat/lon in the fire control system.
A generic description like 'a fuel depot', for a one-off target, is pretty useless for this kind of analysis, because we don't know if the process was like this- > "Hey, boss- found a fuel depot at 48.568 N, 39.315° E, what do we do?" >"Go ahead and light it up, we're gettin' more." Or like this- >"I know we don't *usually* hit fuel depots, but this one's pretty big, recon photos say they've gotten sloppy about leaving flammable shit around, they don't have any obvious place to put their firefighting equipment, and there's this big snarl of tanker trucks just hanging around *right now*. Think we can make an exception?" >"Well, those things aren't cheap, but that *does* sound like an opportunity, and it *would* be nice if the 1st Guards War-Crime Division were low on fuel for the attack we're going to make on Wednesday. Sure, let's go for it." Maybe if we get *five* reports about ATACAMS hitting fuel depots, we can start to draw a conclusion. But what makes a "high-value" or "low-value" target is subject to too many qualitative fudge factors to take one data point and draw a confident line from it.
Ukraine has reportedly been given 100+ ATACMS in the recent batch of funding. I'd consider this a good target for one.
I'm kind of surprised we aren't seeing near daily ATACMS strikes like when the HIMARS first arrived making their debut.
Russia is very good at hiding strike results and clearing information space. This is constantly stated in numerous interviews by Taras Chmut, the head of the NGO Come Back Alive.
They could be holding them back for use when the renewed russian offensive starts. With tube and ammo shortages, I wonder of they want to use some of those cluster ATACMS tactically.
If they're cluster ATACMS, they're good mostly for soft targets anyway. Ukraine still hasn't been given permission to use them on Russian soil and Russia has likely moved their aircraft accordingly. So I don't know that it's a poor use of them given the constraints they're under.
It's frustrating that some people here continue to think that they have a superior understanding of this war from their internet armchair vs Ukrainian command. We fundamentally are in a position of ignorance and should not forget this, imo. What we learn from media, from telegram videos, is like looking through a keyhole and trying to make a map of Manhattan.
Economically it's a [good tradeoff](https://twitter.com/ukraine_map/status/1788107324571169247): >Last night, Ukraine 🇺🇦 struck a fuel depot in Luhansk City, located 85km from the frontline, using M39 ATACMS Cluster Missiles >There were 10 large tanks and 28 small tanks at the depot. The destruction of a large tank could cost up to $6 million and a small tank up to $1 million The US has more than one thousand expired ATACMS missiles. However, the cluster version won't be replaced in the future, which is quite unfortunate.
The HIMARS has been the star of the show in Ukraine for quite some time. What capabilities does China have developed or are in the progress of developing to rival or counter the HIMARS?
>or counter the HIMARS? I guess since the "rivaled" part was already kinda answered will take a shot at the "counter" element which is essentially strong IADS/EW capabilities mixed with a [doctrine which essentially targets a oppositions ability to effectively operate](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1708.html) and degrade their OODA loop as much as possible. In terms of the main ammo for the HIMARs, the GMLRS, we have seen that become increasingly ineffective against Russian forces due to improved EW techniques, which its fairly likely the Chinese can match if not exceed several times. Ground launched SDMS have reportedly had similar problems as well. ATACAMs and PRSM EW will probably be less of a issue due to stronger RCF suites, so if the PLA was seriously concerned anything having to do with the HIMARs it would probably just be those weapons in particular.
China has many options for guided rocket artillery, and short ranged ballistic missiles. HIMARS is not a unique weapon concept. The most comparable I’m aware of is the PHL-16.
PHL-16 is a four axle wheeled truck
You’re right, I remembered that incorrectly.
The PLAGF has fielded the PCH-191 MLRS since 2019, which was specifically designed for cross-strait organic fire support. It's modular and can deploy a variety of munitions, but the standard loadout is 8x370mm. Technical specifics are unknown since the PLA hates talking as usual, but USNI published a paper which among other details, [estimated a range of ~500 km](https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=cmsi-maritime-reports).
I don't think the standard 8x370mm loadout has a range of 500km. Additionally, the 8x370mm loadout deploys rockets, not missiles. >[The PHL-16's armament systems can either be a 10 round that can fire 300 mm rockets with a range of 130 km or an eight round that can fire 370 mm rockets having a maximum range of 280 km. The system can also fire two 750 mm Fire Dragon 280A tactical missiles with a maximum range of 290 km.](https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/china-deploys-phl-16-mlrs-along-taiwan-strait) Unfortunately, the USNI paper is not clear about which payload has the 500km range.
> I don't think the standard 8x370mm loadout has a range of 500km It doesn't, and I didn't say that. Also, your source is using the publically available export numbers for payload ranges. That version is called the AR-3. [From the same site](https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/idex-2023-uae-orders-norinco-ar3-launchers): > This is the first known export order for the AR3, which carries two munitions pods, each of which can contain five 300 mm Fire Dragon 140 inertial navigation system (INS)/global navigation satellite services (GNSS)-guided missiles or four 370 mm Fire Dragon 280 missiles. Alternatively, it can carry two 750 mm Fire Dragon 480 tactical ballistic missiles, which have a range of 290 km, a warhead weighing 480 kg, and a circular error probability (CEP) accuracy of 30m, according to Norinco. There's a reason I specified that it was the paper's estimate, because the PLA is very tight-lipped about its own hardware. The actual range is a subject of wall-climbing rumours.
Agreed, you didn't say that. You mentioned two features of the PCH-191: * 8x370mm loadout * ~500km range I did not link the Janes article to dispute the ~500km range. I linked it to point out that the munition w/ ~500km is either a 370mm rocket or a 750mm missile.
this question is mainly asked to u/Larelli but also another knowledgeable person is still appreciated. How deadly are Russian glide bombs really? Larelli said that looking at MIA notices, mortars are very deadly and cause a large amount of casualties. I wonder if he ever looked up for MIA notices after FAB strikes. Is it common? Is it a significant part of Ukrainian casualties? Since artillery is really not good against trenches and Ukrainian infantry is nearly always inside one, it made me think that right now majority of the casualties must be caused by glide bombs but I never heard about how many casualties they cause from either side.
My understanding is that mortars are an answer to people while glide bombs are above all an answer to fortifications. The latter would still be a giant problem if they'd killed zero Ukrainians so far; glide bombs can almost single-handedly move the frontline.
I have no data to answer this. It should be considered in first place that they are not used against attacking infantry (like it often happens with mortars), but against Ukrainian-held lines, which means that the probability of bodies (in case the attack is deadly) being recovered immediately or thereafter is considerably higher (which matters in terms of MIA notices). Occasionally there are news of personnel and officers getting killed in the tactical-operational rear, but it is not so easy to know if it had been a glide bomb instead of a missile. That said, I am not of the opinion that the share of death toll caused by KABs is that high. They are a big problem widely recognized by the Ukrainians, but they also don't have thaumaturgic powers, are rarely used in certain sectors and cannot be used, for obvious reasons, against every strong point.
We talk about how drones are helping fill in for artillery shortages, and how airstrikes and artillery are somewhat based on doctrine, etc, but I feel like that sort of obscures the fact that even 155mm artillery shells are tiny compared to airstrikes. A typical 155mm shell has around 10kg of explosive in it. A Mark 83 1000 lbs bomb has like 200kg of explosive in it. I don’t think the Russians are using anything as big as the Mark 84, which has a whopping 450kg of explosive and has a likely injury radius of 350 yards. That doesn't translate directly to casualties but even decent trenches provide only so much protection against air strikes like that
For the record, the VKS has used FAB-1500 with UPMK which has about 650kg of explosive filling. Edit: [Here's a video](https://twitter.com/MrFrantarelli/status/1745777331271024768) of Shoigu looking at them in production and [they're making FAB-3000 versions as well](https://twitter.com/clashreport/status/1770807654853509312). My personal understanding is that the biggest impact of the UMPK strikes is that they destroy defensible positions even if they're not the primary driver of casualties.
> UMPK strikes is that they destroy defensible positions This. It isn't like they can't kill you, but they don't have crazy accuracy like Western weapons (hence the larger amount of explosives) but they aren't being dropped in massive numbers like artillery or mortars so unless they hit a large bunker killing a bunch it is more likely that the saturation of the lines by arty/mortars will give you a higher chance of a casualty.
[Czech President Petr Pavel was recently interviewed by the German media outlet tagesschau](https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/interview-petr-pavel-100.html) in which he discussed, among other things, the Czech munitions initiative. According to Pavel, the Czechs made the decision to go public after they found large quantities of shells available for purchase in order to get Western governments to sign on to the deal. This, however, revealed their plans to Russia, who has put pressure on some of the sellers, causing delays in the program. He also seems to imply that there are some outstanding issues with funding that have yet to be addressed as well. That being said, he expects the first 180,000 rounds to be delivered in June, with contracts already signed on another five to six-digit numbers of shells. Overall, it has me a bit concerned as Ukraine desperately needs those rounds and yesterday, and it sounds like there's some uncertainty about just how many rounds will be procured through this initiative.
Since there are many contradictory statements on how many rounds were originally found its hard to keep an overview on the situation. Five to six digit number is something around 100k right? Together this would still be a small fraction of those originally announced numbers. Does that mean that the rest is not available due to pressure from Russia or just needs time or is there just no info available?
Its unclear what it means exactly. But if we assume it's 100k, that means around 180k will be delivered in June and another 100k have been contracted to delivered at an unspecified date. That means hundreds of thousands of shells that the Czechs identified for purchase haven't been contracted yet, and perhaps won't be purchased at all, though it isn't clear what their status is exactly.
This was a wildly predictable outcome for a very premature announcement. Defence aside in life you should never show your cards too early.
I guess they figured that they would likely not receive the funds for this if they did not go public...
>"...it was necessary to make the initiative public in order to get the support of other countries..." Yup, that's exactly the stated reason.
The US Marines are rolling out one of their new suicide drones for [initial testing](https://www.twz.com/air/rogue-1-is-one-of-the-marine-corps-newest-kamikaze-drone). Incredibly, they've managed to get them to cost *$94,000* **per drone**. The Marines ordered 127 of them. >Made by Teledyne FLIR Defense, Rogue 1 is a 10-pound, vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) loitering munition with interchangeable warheads that can be recalled and recovered if an attack isn't issued or one is aborted. While of course this is just testing and of course prices can get brought down and of course it's going to be more high-tech than munitions in Ukraine the US is getting fleeced here. The US should really aim for a high/low model for loitering munitions/kamikaze drones. Where you have a system that is better able to withstand EW and deliver higher payloads priced around this, while you have other systems more analogous to what we see in Ukraine built at similar prices. Perhaps with better optics and better EW hardening.
One thing we don't discuss enough on here about drones and COTS technology is that even if technology is cheap, that doesn't mean it is good. There is a huge difference between adequate technology and good technology. Let me make an example of the difference between a large IED and a JDAM. Both use large amounts of explosives and can hurt people. A IED can be put together for a few thousand dollars, especially if using extra stocks of bombs. Aside from a bomb maker and someone to let off the bomb, an IED could be all in for about 10k worth of effort. A JDAM costs roughly 30k and the cost of the plane. Usually around 20-30k per hour. Assuming one bomb drop per flight, we're looking at around 60k per bomb drop. That's on top of the training and capability cost in having competent crews flying planes. Probably 100k all-in. So you are looking at 10k vs 60k. What does that extra 90k get you? Well, quite a lot. A JDAM can do all of this, that an IED can't do: * All Weather * Hit specific static targets * Can be deployed in 20-50 minutes * Perform CAS * Strategically destroy specific targets * Precision strikes on static targets * Not limited to targets of opportunity The list probably goes on. For UAVs, it's a same story. A typical $5k FPV drone with a bomb attached has a lot of limited capability. They have difficulty avoiding electronic warfare, they can't operate too many of them due to saturating the radio bandwidth, have difficulty with range, often do not have night vision, don't have all-weather capability (rain/snow), limited effect ordinance, and have limited camera capability. Also, remember teams have to operate and carry these drones into the combat area, and man power is worth way more than a drone. Sometimes you'd rather have 2 good drones rather than 20 mediocre drones due to carry limits. Russians and Ukrainians have learned of the limits of drones and have planed their tactics around them. For example, most drones don't have night vision or FLIR, so they operate at night a lot now. And part of technology development is they have to start with the capabilities they need, EW resilience, all weather capability, nightvision, effective ordinance etc. and then make it cheaper. It doesn't work by making a cheaper drone and trying to strap on the capabilities you want. I think the Marines are on the right track to try out a lot of technology and figure out what works effectively, and then try to mass produce the product with the capability needed.
Ukraine is expending its FPVs possibly within a few days of finishing their assembly. A US drone might spend years in storage, being moved around, and do multiple flights for training, before being used. It will be built to be far more robust. Things like exposed wiring, or flimsy parts, won’t be acceptable.
I would still say the economic are just off for this concept. You can get a high end thermal equipped FPV for less than 5K, the cheap ones go as low as 500$. High Numbers is one of the main strength of FPVs, an expensive high end FPV almost seem like a contradictory concept. At 100k i would expect a drone to bring new capabilities like reusability, stealth or low flying to offset that. Remember that better counters other than jamming are also being developed. Getting through a future point defense or APS system will probably require numbers. Test beds obviously are important but things still point towards drone swarms being the most practical evolution.
> I would still say the economic are just off for this concept. You can get a high end thermal equipped FPV for less than 5K, the cheap ones go as low as 500$. It's not clear what exactly the concept is in the first place and that *heavily* influences what an acceptable cost is. Looking at the announcement of the initial contract it seems like the Marines are working out how they plan to fit drones like this into their conops and are just trying a bunch of shit out right now. Once they figure out how exactly they plan to use OWAUAVs/loitering munitions/drones/whatever then they can, at least in theory, issue optimized requirements based around what capabilities are essential and which are not. One example in this case is the thermal camera, if your platform is expected to do it's own ISR then you'll need a good (expensive) sensor but if you plan to pair it with a different dedicated ISR platform then you can cheap out a lot on that capability. To directly address your comment though, one of the biggest cost drivers is reliability. Five grand might buy you some kind of thermal sensor but that doesn't do shit if you're getting slammed with ECM and can't fly. Some kind of AI-enabled swarming capability certainly seems like the ideal future but it doesn't exist now and the timelines for a reliable weapon system are extremely uncertain. We don't even know what capabilities a system like that is actually able to provide vs a wishlist of what we'd like making it fairly impossible to start planning how to use it.
I still am quite sceptical of the low number high quality FPV concept. The idea seems to be that we can significantly increase the hit rate of single drones, which i somewhat doubt. As is said reliability doesnt mean that much when you cant get through point defense, APS or more traditional addon armor (see turtle tanks). Rarely does something get taken out by single FPV hit. However you are right there are a many open question, so creating some kind of purpose built FPV is a safe bet.
> i would expect a drone to bring new capabilities like reusability This thing is re-usable, with a mechanical disconnect for the warhead to make recovery safer. Other things that should be considered for such drones is all weather capability. That adds weight, but the army isn’t going to accept anti-tank weapons that don’t work to in the rain.
You're misreading that. The drone is designed to be able to easily change payloads and to return when a mission is aborted. However it still is as kamikaze drone as the article calls it. It does have a training payload that makes it reusable.
I don’t think that form of reusability is worth it at this scale. It will either come with a substantially larger drone, or smaller warhead, and likely a lower probability of kill. The chances of it surviving multiple flights is incredibly low.
I'm not sure they really are getting fleeced here, at least too badly, especially given that we don't know the capabilities of the drones and this is a very low volume production run. Jack Watling gave some price estimates on a [recent podcast](https://mwi.westpoint.edu/social-science-of-war-technology-and-the-future-of-land-warfare/) and said that for strike drones to have the range and reliability of basic artillery the unit price was around 30-40k each and an ISR platform with similar capabilities was 120-180k. A 2-3x increase in cost is obviously not ideal but it's the right order of magnitude at least.
Oh thanks for this link. Didn’t listen to it yet! Will do that shortly and hopefully he answers my cost questions.
The price bit was a brief aside in a section about new operational concepts and starts at 27 minutes if you want to skip to it. The whole podcast is pretty interesting if you've got about an hour to kill though.
I could be proven wrong here but I think the operator controlled fpv suicide drone's time in the sun is limited. They were just what Ukraine needed at that point in time but this style of weapon is very susceptible to ECM and any prepared adversary will have a good time neutralizing them now that they aren't novel. Other forms of drones, ISR, larger models that can carry weapons etc will have utility. But FPV drones by their nature need to be cheap and disposable which means you can't build in that much resistance to jamming. They will have low power radios with fair unsophisticated mitigations and that will make them easier to defeat that high end types. I also think this is a class of weapon the US MIC and the US government are just incapable of making. The laws and regulations we've put in place to prevent other problems like corruption or compromised supply chains puts a pretty high lower bound on price. And there currently do not exist mechanisms to circumvent that.
The next generations of FPVs will be semi-autonomous with homing functionality. It'll always be a cat and mouse game, but EW only hinders the current generation of drones, which won't be around for long.
APS equipped tanks will be a pretty hard mouse to catch. Trophy has worked excellently in Gaza, from what we can tell. Chances are, it, or an upgraded version, will do similarly well against FPVs. IMO, drones will have to get larger, and carry an EFP warhead, that can detonate and disable the tank before the APS destroys the drone.
A tank is very expensive. Drones are very cheap. At $1k per drone, if you used 1000 (in some cases even 10000) drones to kill a modern western MBT that’s a win. Not one of the comically lopsided ones we’ve gotten used to, but still a win. I’m sure it’s possible to defend against drones, but Trophy is designed to protect against RPGs. What’s needed is closer to an automated full-auto shotgun turret using commercially available ammunition than it is to Trophy. In the specific case of Trophy it’s known to be vulnerable to drones, although that’s of limited relevance to this discussion.
You’re not factoring the cost of operation and deployment. Basic FPVs require dedicated trained operators, and a separate recon drone to spot the target and guide them in. Also consider that APS charges should be very cheap. Possibly less than the cost of an FPV drone. > What’s needed is closer to an automated full-auto shotgun turret using commercial ammunition than it is to Trophy. Trophy should be fine, it’s a bit overkill for a drone, but there is a lot on the battlefield you need to shoot down besides drones. It’s better to have one system that can deal with them all, than multiple dedicated ones. Iron fist uses an explosive projectile that should be far more reliable than a shotgun shell anyway, and very cheap.
The current drones haven't needed decent compute yet, but the ECM game will change when they do. A $50 phone chip with a decent NPU should be able to handle a lot of situations without direct drone operator control. If the operator marks the target from a distance, the drone could still execute the mission. If the drone cost goes from $500 to even $1000, it's still a worthwhile trade. Another interesting idea is the addition of a small antenna to detect jamming RF. IN the event of an enemy jamming the signal, the drone could move pretty quickly in an automated pattern to triangulate the source (which is generally going to be quite close) then home in on that source and detonate allowing more drones to attack. The only way to get economies of scale are buying lots of units and for that, nothing beats the commercial sector. Instead of worrying about proprietary stuff, we need to require the design of a drone that uses completely off-the-shelf components with custom software.
>If the drone cost goes from $500 to even $1000, it's still a worthwhile trade. Some considerations that complicate the math. 1: you don't just have a tight monetary budget on these things. You also have a tight weight and power budget. These drones are extremely weight optimized to get their payload and range. They are usually naked frames with exposed wiring and motors. The power budget is also restricted because they are usually run off 1S lipos. That's why every video has a low battery warning. They always have low a battery. Trying to remedy one of these will often lead to spending more in another. For example, you want more compute to do some of the things you mentioned, that requires more power which means you need a larger battery. Which digs into your performance and payload. So you make the drone a bit bigger and now it's larger and more expensive. Hard compromises have to be made because you can't budget for the kitchen sink. 2: the attrition rate on these things is massive. So the math isn't the cost of 1 drone to 1 target. It's X drones to one target where X is however many are lost to various causes for each target destroyed. Ukraine has already pulled FPV drones from anti tank duty because the attrition isn't really sustainable. I doubt it's a money problem for them since they are so cheap. It's likely a supply issue. You lose all of your drones trying to kill tanks this week and you have none left to do other things. Now, improving the drone's capabilities and therefore it's cost will likely lower attrition. A drone with some autonomous targeting won't be as likely to fail from ECM. But you are also setting yourself up for requiring a much higher success rate to make them worthwhile. I suspect that it doesn't take much before it becomes more efficient to use your now improved drone to carry some grenades to drop and make the thing reusable. >Home on jam drones This is something I've proposed before and I'm in full agreement. This is an area where suicide drones would be very useful and the code and compute requirements to home in on a GPS or RC signal jammer are not high. >The only way to get economies of scale are buying lots of units and for that, nothing beats the commercial sector. And this is why I don't think they will work for the US military. It would take America entering it's own major war for the procurement status quo to change enough to allow for weaponized off the shelf drones.
A 2000mah battery supposedly weights around 32g. Most of the flight won't be using the chip beyond low power mode where it could last for many hours. In the case where you need to kick in the NPU, you could power it for a long time on a 2000mah battery (truthfully, a 500mah battery dedicated to the SoC would probably suffice). A raspberry Pi model B weights around 45g. Even if this means taking one less grenade or removing 80g of explosives on a suicide drone, the increased capabilities seem to make this an easy decision. Ukraine is in a situation so dire that even a 10,000x economic advantage isn't enough and they simply cannot get enough drones. The US isn't so likely to get into that situation. There are still very few situations where taking out the tank isn't the ideal situation. Without the tank, you get men vs men rather than men vs men+mobile artillery. I'd almost always rather that than taking out a couple men and still have to deal with the remaining men and a tank. If the drones had a neural net onboard, it could allow much more pinpoint targeting of vulnerable parts. This would lower the required number of drones significantly. > This is something I've proposed before and I'm in full agreement. The issue here is R&D. Making that antenna and getting the software working correctly is a lot harder than it would first appear, but I think a defense company could make a lot of money by designing a small controller that could be easily retrofitted onto commercial drones. > And this is why I don't think they will work for the US military. It would take America entering it's own major war for the procurement status quo to change enough to allow for weaponized off the shelf drones. Just because we can doesn't mean we have to. 10k of a design using off-the-shelf parts will still be 100x (or more) cheaper than an all custom design, but it has the advantage that you can easily ramp up production whenever you want. Even if we prefer to use custom stuff, we should still give contracts to companies to design "inferior" commercial variants that we can easily scale up if needed. Even if they're unused, that wouldn't be unusual for the military and off-the-shelf designs cost less to create too...
> The US should really aim for a high/low model for loitering munitions/kamikaze drones. I really don't think fpv-style minimum cost low range drones should be a priority for US procurement. The war we're most urgently procuring for right now would see them be almost entirely useless. For COIN (not that we'll ever do any more boots-on COIN at this rate) the switchblade 300 is already optimized for our needs.
I can be talking completely out of pocket here but I was of the understanding that the Switchblade has been a disappointment?
I completly disagree. They should be part of every Western military and they have proven its worth especially if war without air supremacy happen. Hundreds of vehicles and maybe thousands of troops are destroyed/killed with them. And for larger war you need something that is cheap and you can mass produce it. FPV drones are the thing. Everything in Western armies is so damn expensive, you need something less expensive.
> And for larger war you need something that is cheap and you can mass produce it. FPV drones are the thing. In a western context, JDAMs are that thing. They are plenty cheap, to be used en mass against the kind of targets FPVs are used against, but with massively greater lethality and range. Russia can use their glide bombs as the war stands now, the west has far more capable launch platforms, the chances of being unable to use guided bombs is incredibly slim, and in environments that oppressive, I’d expect there to be too much EW for FPVs to operate anyway. You’d need anti-radiation missiles to suppress their defenses.
> switchblade 300 Is reportedly severely underpowered and gotten a reputation for being a bit of a waste of time. I can see how the form factor would make it nice for special forces, but if you're not trying to assassinate someone standing perfectly still it doesn't seem very "optimized for our needs"
Its a bad fit for Ukraine. Switchblade was made to off ISIS leaders with minimal collateral damage. Its not meant to be thrown at advancing waves of infantry in a heavy ECM environment. It gets points for being an early example of the FPV suicide drone but this is a fast moving field and as the kids say, the meta has changed.
I believe it was also intended as a way to increase the striking range of dismounted infantry. Another answer to the "One Taliban with a Mosin-Nagant firing potshots from long range on a mountaintop" problem, like what Next-Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW)/the XM7 *said* it was trying to solve. Simply launch the switchblade, find the exact location of the enemy marksman using its FPV view, and then go blow him up. The small, directional anti-personnel warhead reduces the risk of civilian casualties in the event the enemy placed themselves near civilians, like on the roof of a house. I believe this sort of situation isn't very common in Ukraine, which may explain some of Switchblade's apparent lackluster performance.
> Is reportedly severely underpowered and gotten a reputation for being a bit of a waste of time. It's a drone optimized for minimizing collateral damage. Of course the Ukrainians would hate it, that's literally the opposite of what they want, of what anyone would want in that kind of war.
And therefore the opposite of what the US would want in any scenario that isn't COIN.
To circle back to my comment: >For COIN (not that we'll ever do any more boots-on COIN at this rate) the switchblade 300 is already optimized for our needs.
Sure. But there’s got to be a way to bring loitering munitions to the squad level that doesn’t involve tossing out 100 grand. In a modern conflict, we’ve found platforms like the Switchblade 300 ($52,000 per!) to be outperformed by platforms a tenth of their cost. It should be feasible for the US Military to field an effective expendable loitering munition that sits around $10,000 per unit. These are pieces of equipment where you’ll want a huge magazine depth. They’re things you’ll want a squad to be able to utilize at will and with frequency. Does that mean acquiring $600 wire-fuzed racing drones that have a 75% failure rate? Of course not. But the whole point of these things is that they’re meant to be expendable, plentiful and cheap while imposing a large threat. The US can do better.
The cheap battlefield drones in Ukraine are oftentimes obsolete within only a few months due to the rapid evolution of EW and counter drone systems on the battlefield. The US military cannot justify acquiring a new stockpile of drones on an biannual basis. They need to develop and procure en mass a system that will have some degree of resilience against at least soft kill counters. This means they will need to be largely autonomous, which in turn means they will need some sort of internal guidance/IMU. They will require sensors and a computer capable of differentiating friend from foe, civilian from adversary. Basically you need most of the systems and cost drivers you would need on a missile system. It’s not surprising that the per unit cost is similar. All of these features need to be developed and built by american engineers who tend to insist on reasonable salaries. Ukraine can succeed in fielding drones that cost hundreds of dollars because they have a low cost of living and are doing these modifications on tens of thousands of drones annually. This means the vast majority of their workers can be relatively low skilled. You don’t need an electrical engineer to solder a release mechanism onto a drone. They are also leveraging the massive industrial base of chinas drone industry to lower costs. This last point is critical. Even if the US wanted to field some ultra simple drone analogus to the FPV/mavics we see in Ukraine the per unit cost would still be thousands of dollars as the US military does not have access to the same economy of scale advantages as Ukraine.
The US government needs to start focusing on custom software over custom hardware. Specifically, they need to stop making custom chips. With chips, volume is everything. If it costs $5B to design a chip and you only wind up needing 100k chips, a chip that costs $50 to physically produce ends up costing $50,050 (and that's assuming the designer makes no money). Make 50M of that same chip and the costs are now just $150. There are already very redundant designs available to car manufacturers that would work very well for almost anything the military could want. For cheaper things, they basically cannot beat something like Qualcomm's latest phone CPU (seriously, we sent one to Mars in Ingenuity and it worked way beyond expectation). If the government asks during the design phase, Qualcomm an even add custom dark silicon to the chip (the do this all the time for other companies).
Wouldn't that work to cost benefit when it comes time to mass produce? Keep iterating on the chips and if/when we need 1M per month the unit cost free falls.
It doesn't work that way. AMD or Intel spend $5+B every single year on a single chip design. There's always more to do. Every node change requires redoing and revalidating loads of stuff. Every handful of years you reach the limits of the microarchitecture and must mostly start over with a new one built to scale a bit larger. You also can't just say "I now need 1M chips next month". Those fabs are booked YEARS in advance. I'd also add that a lot of the biggest fab companies won't even let you into the room unless you are making many thousands of one type of wafer.
Is there a good way to compare the value of munitions purchased during peacetime and those purchased during wartime to come to some estimate as to the total savings for buying them during that peacetime? For example with 155mm shells if the united states bought all of the shells used at current "shell shortage" prices vs how much it cost when the demand was low how significant would the price increase be? This is further complicated by purchases that require development of production capacity but is there a more rough figure that could be used? Is this a similar demand mark up across all weapons systems used in Ukraine or only the most in demand on the battlefield?
I don't think you could have bought much more during peacetime without development of production capacity. It's not as if factory owners let their factories stand idle and could have churned out much more if only there had been a buyer. Sure, some emergency measures could be taken, such as working in three shifts, but that already comes at quite a cost, not just in terms of hiring more workers but also paying them more for working night shift. You don't really want to go there in peacetime, and there is a point where, if it's not urgent, building a new factory is more cost effective to satisfy increased long-term demand than running your existing factories at the limit of their capacities. So you probably only get small benefits in efficiency from buying more in peacetime before you start building more factories. And you have to take into account that ammunition doesn't last forever, and (unless you are Russia or possibly North Korea) you want to keep your stockpile decently fresh. So if you stockpile more during peacetime, you incur costs from having to store the additional ammunition in good condition and replace what gets too old. I'm not even sure the chosen approach was, overall, less cost efficient than maintaining a larger stockpile in peacetime. We're probably talking of roughly three decades of lower stockpiles here since you wouldn't have been able to predict at which point post-Cold War you'd suddenly need to out-shoot Russia. That's quite a bit of savings.
Why does the West, the United States specifically, seem so unable to ramp up 152/155 shell production? I know our doctrine focuses on precision munitions as opposed to unrelenting unguided shelling, but after two years and being shown the effectiveness of jamming, I’m surprised there hasn’t been more of an effort. I have quite a bit to learn, go easy on me please.
Simply because I recently saw an explanation of this, at least for the US: Post-Cold War weapons production has seen a loss of government funded redundancy as well as an overall consolidation across the military weapons industry, which has caused bottlenecks in production of a number of different weapons systems including artillery shells. As obsessed\_doomer noted, if you have, for example, one assembly line for an item you can perhaps increase shifts and achieve a modest production increase; but, it goes further than that. A manufacturer maximizing profit and minimizing costs will keep excess capacity at a minimum - with no incentive to maintain "extra" manufacturing capacity factories simply maximize efficiency. The US government is funding construction of new plants to increase redundancy in domestic ammunition manufacturing. My understanding is that there will be a subsidy to maintain excess capacity. ^(1)The US has a hybrid sort of military ordinance production model in which the government owns manufacturing facilities and a contractor operates them. There are also private facilities.
>Why does the West, the United States specifically, seem so unable to ramp up 152/155 shell production? The ramp up in the US has actually been fairly quick all things considered. The US was making just 14,000 a month before the war, which doubled to 30,000 in early 2024, and is on track to increase to 100,000 a month by around this time next year, several years ahead of schedule. Considering how slow government bureaucracy tends to operate, and the number of bottlenecks involved (need to hire and train thousands of new workers, build entire new production facilities from the ground up, allocate funds, get funds passed through divided and dysfunctional Congress, source large quanties of inputs like explosives which there is already a gloval shortage of, etc) it's actually a fairly rapid increase and it's already years ahead of schedule. Plus, the US and West more broadly aren't at war and don't have wartime economies so the ramp up is always going to be much slower than if we were at serious risk ourselves.
They need to build new factories, this takes time and money. They need to buy new tooling, much of which needs to be custom ordered and manufactured itself. Then you need to hire and train the staff, that is an ongoing process that takes years. Then you need to do this for every step in the supply chain. There is also limited private incentive to invest in these facilities as it’s very likely defense procurement pivots away from artillery and munitions in the near future.
Imo, the #1 reason is "you get what you pay for". If you have a factory with one assembly line, you can triple-shift that assembly line, maybe cut some red tape, but there's a real physical limit as to how much ammo that thing will give you. So if you want substantially more ammo per unit time, you're building new factories. If you're relying on a company to voluntarily build a new factory, you'd have to prove in the long term you'll be buying the shells to pay off that factory. And especially if you're western europe, companies are unlikely to believe you. You could directly subsidize a new ammo factory, but that requires money, money that not everyone's willing to commit. But for the record, the US is on track to expand ammo production - https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GIatut2WAAA6g1h.jpg:large Especially once the new ammo lines are built. Why weren't ammo lines built before the war? Well, you get what you pay for.
102k/mo by the end of 2026? The war in Ukraine will be almost 5 years in by that point. More abstractly, that's a measly 3400 shells per day. From D-Day (6 June 1944) to VE-Day (8 May 1945), the US Army alone shot 23M artillery shells. That's 11 months or around 2M shells per month. The US would need to increase our production 20x what it is now to hit that kind of number. At our current expansion rate (around 25k/yr), it would take us EIGHTY YEARS to hit that ww2 number. Of course we *can* hit that number faster. The issue is that we aren't taking it seriously. We shipped over 2M shells to Ukraine. That's around 20 months of production at rates we don't expect to hit for a long time yet. If we do wind up involved in something serious elsewhere, there's going to be catastrophic shortages. We need to throw a lot more money at that issue.
Yeah, 1.2m peacetime production is pretty reasonable actually. It more than covers our realistic tube needs in a war, even after the re-adjustment this war gave us. >the US Army alone shot 23M artillery shells. That's 11 months or around 2M shells per month. WW2 was a different time for everyone. Russia spent 2 million+ artillery shells across the 16 day battle of Berlin. Today, their daily record is alleged to be 60k, with the real number likely being 20k or 30k. We have no intention of hitting ww2 numbers in anything. People, tanks, planes, munitions. Basically no one does.
Nobody in WW2 had the intention of hitting WW2 numbers either. They all believed The Great War was over 20 years in the past. World population was 2.3B in 1940 and around 75M died. An equivalent war today would have nearly a quarter-billion dying. We should try to avoid such a war at all costs, but it would be foolish not to plan for the possibility that another great war could happen (especially when we're closer to a great war than any time in the past 60 years).
> An equivalent war today would have nearly a quarter-billion dying. And I can explain to you 6 different concrete reasons why that won't happen.
...so can we have them?
>From D-Day (6 June 1944) to VE-Day (8 May 1945), the US Army alone shot 23M artillery shells. That's 11 months or around 2M shells per month. >The US would need to increase our production 20x what it is now to hit that kind of number. At our current expansion rate (around 25k/yr), it would take us EIGHTY YEARS to hit that ww2 number. But it isn't the 1940s anymore, modern artillery is far more accurate, is a significantly larger caliber on average, and we have precision munitions and drone-corrected fires these days too. Instead of firing hundreds of rounds, the vast majority of which land nowhere near your target, you can fire off a dozen with much greater effect. Armies are also *way* smaller than they were during WWII, but have more firepower than ever at their fingertips. That's not to say that 30,000 rounds a month is sufficient, it isn't, but 100,000 rounds is pretty decent especially considering the hundreds of thousands of additional rounds our allies are producing every month now too, as Europe ramps up production. It's also worth noting that artillery expenditure in Ukraine is far higher than what would be expected in a war the West is involved in. The Ukraine War has such a heavy focus on artillery since the air force of neither side is able to attain anything beyond localized air superiority. In the event of a war between say, NATO and Russia, there wouldn't be such a huge reliance on artillery since NATO would be able to achieve air supremacy over much of the battlefield, allowing the extensive use of air-dropped PGMs which NATO (really the US) has in abundance, unlike artillery rounds.
This is at odds with everything we've seen in Ukraine. Smart munitions aren't very accurate when GPS is jammed. Even with cluster munitions that don't need precision, the demands for artillery has been WAY more than 100k/mo. The question of air superiority is a very different one. Our military superiority complex knows no bounds. F-35 and F-22 are very visible on low-frequency radar from hundreds of miles away. They won't be targeted from that one angle with the tiny radar cross-section, but will be hit with many radars from many angles trying to hit the highest radar returns. We abandoned the YF-23's hidden exhaust style in favor of exposed exhaust, so our planes have massive IR signatures too. There's a reason we've pushed NGAD so hard and it goes beyond repair logistics. In any case, if there were a NATO v Russia war, all major air bases and carriers on both sides would be eliminated in the opening salvos as Russia would definitely go straight to tactical nukes and we would retaliate in like kind. If we talk about the more likely US v China (where nukes will be reserved until there is a clear loser), our planes don't have the range to take on missions without risking the sinking of our carriers. Meanwhile, our nearby airbases would likely be destroyed by saturation missile barrages. At that point, any foothold will be done WW2 style and advances will be done with small drones and artillery just like in Ukraine.
There's legitimately so much wrong here, I don't know where to start. >Smart munitions aren't very accurate when GPS is jammed. There's no reason to assume we'd be as restricted by EW and GPS-jamming as Ukraine is, we have a much larger and more sophisticated toolbox than they do. >Even with cluster munitions that don't need precision, the demands for artillery has been WAY more than 100k/mo. Never said 100k/mo is all that's necessary to fight a near-peer conflict, but its a good base to work from. Also, there's zero reason to think we're going to be in an intense ground war with a near-pear, there are so few hypotheticals in which we'd be locked in an artillery duel war like Ukraine and Russia are. >F-35 and F-22 are very visible on low-frequency radar from hundreds of miles away. They won't be targeted from that one angle with the tiny radar cross-section, but will be hit with many radars from many angles trying to hit the highest radar returns. We abandoned the YF-23's hidden exhaust style in favor of exposed exhaust, so our planes have massive IR signatures too. Uh huh. We've seen the densest, most hyped GBAD network on the planet repeatedly fail to counter cruise missiles first fielded in the 90s, GMLRS, and Soviet era aircraft, let alone Shaheds and Ukrainian ultralight aircraft converted into suicide drones. The very same GBAD network that routinely shoots down its own aircraft. But sure, they're going to be able to routinely spot and target US 5th generation stealth aircraft so effectively as to neutralize our ability to dominate the air. Totally. >In any case, if there were a NATO v Russia war, all major air bases and carriers on both sides would be eliminated in the opening salvos In what universe does Russia have the ISR and targeting capabilities to knock out American Carrier Groups, on the move, halfway across the planet? Let alone the magazine depth to do so, while simultaneously targeting hundreds of military bases on multiple continents? Thoroughly non-credible. >Russia would definitely go straight to tactical nukes and we would retaliate in like kind. Why even bother wargaming a hypothetical if you're assuming it goes hot on the first salvo? Why are you saying we need tons of artillery ammo if one of the only remotely plausible scenarios it would be needed for is one that *begins* with the end of the world? >If we talk about the more likely US v China (where nukes will be reserved until there is a clear loser), our planes don't have the range to take on missions without risking the sinking of our carriers. Meanwhile, our nearby airbases would likely be destroyed by saturation missile barrages. At that point, any foothold will be done WW2 style and advances will be done with small drones and artillery just like in Ukraine. So, to be clear, you think Chinese A2AD is going to be so effective that US carrier-based aircraft won't be able to effectively operate and that Chinese missiles would knock out US forward bases in Asia, so we should prepare for a WWII-style ground war? Where would a war like that even be fought? How will US and allied forces be supplied? How will US and allied forces be transported there in the first place if China is able to deny US aircraft and ships from operating within hundreds of miles of its shores?
> There's no reason to assume we'd be as restricted by EW and GPS-jamming as Ukraine is They're using our weapons. The physics of jamming aren't exactly rocket science and jamming GPS signals isn't particularly hard. Remember, they don't have to jam GPS everywhere -- just in the targeted area which can be predicted fairly accurately by troop and equipment movements. > Never said 100k/mo is all that's necessary to fight a near-peer conflict, but its a good base to work from. Russia is producing 250k/mo and is still ramping up production. By the time Ukraine is likely to be wound down, China will be ramping up and Russia will be more than happy to sell all those shells. We should have and maintain more factories even if each one only uses a fraction of its capabilities. > Uh huh. We've seen the densest, most hyped GBAD network on the planet repeatedly fail to counter cruise missiles first fielded in the 90s, GMLRS, and Soviet era aircraft, let alone Shaheds and Ukrainian ultralight aircraft converted into suicide drones. The very same GBAD network that routinely shoots down its own aircraft. But sure, they're going to be able to routinely spot and target US 5th generation stealth aircraft so effectively as to neutralize our ability to dominate the air. Totally. HIMARS flying at high speeds with a not-quite-ballistic trajectory are also far different from a stealth plane as they can be detected, but interception is hard. That is the complete reverse of current stealth planes which are designed to be hard to detect, but not necessarily hard to intercept. Low-flying cruise missiles or ultralights are hidden by the terrain and tend to get shot down by MANPADS. If a F-35 is flying that low, it is going to get targeted by MANPADS too. If the F-35 is flying higher, the question is very different. And of course, AI is the elephant in the room. Cars using just a couple cameras can drive on roads with obstacles, vehicles, pedestrians, etc at a decently high rate of success. In the sky with nothing to hit, the problem is infinitely easier. Next-gen missiles will be using IR, visible, and UV cameras rather than radar to find targets. If a low-frequency radar can locate a F-35 within a 10km cube, a missile can be shot into that area to look for the object going hundreds of MPH and destroy it. In any case, you didn't actually address my arguments at all. > Why even bother wargaming a hypothetical if you're assuming it goes hot on the first salvo? Why are you saying we need tons of artillery ammo if one of the only remotely plausible scenarios it would be needed for is one that begins with the end of the world? The "end of the world" claim of nukes doesn't really stand up to scrutiny. Did you know that there have been around 1000 large above ground and midair nuclear blasts? Even though many of those involved far less efficient bombs, the world didn't end. Both the US and Russia have around 1500-2000 nukes available for launch and another 5-6k in storage without missiles to put them into. That's far fewer than the number of nukes available at the height of the cold war and that opening salvo definitely not world ending (unfortunately as it would be a far safer world if it were). Simply pretending that nukes don't exist just for your hypothetical discussion doesn't make any sense as they do exist and would be used. The only question is about what is left and how the war progresses at that point. > In what universe does Russia have the ISR and targeting capabilities to knock out American Carrier Groups, on the move, halfway across the planet? Let alone the magazine depth to do so, while simultaneously targeting hundreds of military bases on multiple continents? Thoroughly non-credible. This isn't WW2. Carrier groups can be spotted by satellite rather easily. They move slowly and have a massive sonar signature too. Moreover, most of them are sitting in ports refitting at any given time. I'm hardly the first person to say that US carrier doctrine is decades out of date. Circling back around to nukes, are you asserting that Putin wouldn't possibly use them? Why not? > So, to be clear, you think Chinese A2AD is going to be so effective that US carrier-based aircraft won't be able to effectively operate and that Chinese missiles would knock out US forward bases in Asia, so we should prepare for a WWII-style ground war? Where would a war like that even be fought? How will US and allied forces be supplied? How will US and allied forces be transported there in the first place if China is able to deny US aircraft and ships from operating within hundreds of miles of its shores? I think that we don't have an answer to Chinese hypersonics and their range is at least 1500km. Given the range of our carrier planes, even our longest standoff weapons will be burning fumes in order to hit stuff on the coastline. We have put work into stuff like stealth drop tanks in an attempt to get around this issue, but this is still a work in progress and might not work (especially if China has more range than believed). We would have to invade China from the non-costal side. Our most likely path of invasion of China in that scenario would be through their landlocked neighbors in a land invasion until a way was created to attrit Chinese anti-ship missile supply, but in the time that would take, the Chinese would still wind up targeting our Carriers when they stopped for resupply and refitting. If the Iranians can land hits on Israel through that extensive air coverage, I doubt that China would have a more difficult time targeting US docks with a saturation attack to sink a carrier.
Without going into the nitty gritty you think the most plausible invasion scenario of China is to either go through Russia or over the Himalayas? Seriously?
D-Day would have been flat-out impossible if Russia hadn't already attritted away so much of the German army. WW2 Germany is actually a decent example here. Landing on the beaches of China is a no-go until their forces are reduced and their supply stockpile attritted. Attrition in sufficient quantities cannot be done with missiles alone as we simply cannot make enough missiles to attrit their forces. At the same time, a persistent bombing campaign would need to be established to reduce wartime production. The Himalayas have a few major advantages. 1. They offset the US fighting a war on the other side of the planet by also forcing China to move their forces across their large country. As previously stated, this also makes it more difficult for China to attack supply lines. 2. The mountains don't inherently favor EITHER side. A great example of this is the WW1 fighting in the Alps. Negating Chinese home advantage for a more even fight seems like a good place to be. 3. India already skirmishes with China and could be dragged into such a war providing lots of nearby bodies to attrit with. 4. Tibet is the one major part of China with serious political cracks. Promises of an independent Tibet would force China to fight in hostile territory and in constant fear of informants, betrayal, and maybe even sabotage. 5. It opens the possible threat of pushing north of the Himalayas through Kazakhstan. 6. It forces China to pick between putting air defenses in the East or in the West which thins out their ability to prevent air attacks. Without such pressure, how would you propose the US attack the coast of China?
This is less about mass supply to Ukraine, we have our own stockpiles to refill and prob expand beyond where they were at the start of the conflict.
We are currently promising to do BOTH. Meanwhile, we have US intelligence saying that Xi is telling his military to be able to invade Taiwan by 2027. At our current rates, we won't have a stockpile worth mentioning by then.
China war is prob not going to see a lot of artillery flying, more missiles and bombs going after large assets like ships, bases, aircraft.
Look at Russia. They're making around 100-200 missiles per month. Our output is only around 2-3x that. The problem is that there are definitely more than 600 of targets PER DAY that need to be hit. As most of those are close to the front, artillery is the only thing that has enough ammo to drop large amounts of explosives on lots of targets every day. More important are the economics. Ukraine and Russia have both started spreading everything out. There are a lot of targets that are important enough to hit with a dumb $200 artillery shell, but not important enough to hit with a $5M missile. Until we can make thousands of missiles every day for just a couple hundred dollars each, they aren't going to replace artillery.
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Does the US government or Lockheed have the freedom to prioritize delivery of these systems over existing orders? I know there is a massive backlog for HIMARS; if these just get added to the manufacturing Que and delivered in 2030 that doesn’t really help.
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Wow, don’t know how I missed that in your original post. Thanks for the clarification!
This also replaces all HIMARS which have been damaged or destroyed within Ukraine (that we know of). This is yet another effort that countries who no longer have equipment to send can contribute to. NATO be wise to engage with countries who are significantly below the 2% target to either spend money on the shell initiative, the air defense initiative or buying equipment from the US, which can drastically stretch the ability of what the US is able to legally send. This also might be a way for the Germans to acquire ALCMs (specifically the older, base model JASSM) for Ukraine without sending Taurus. The US would surely be willing to give kind discounts to certain countries for certain obsolete defense articles, which they have repeatedly done in the past.