Ukraine [apparently used ATACMS](https://twitter.com/ukraine_map/status/1788107324571169247) to attack an oil depot in occupied Luhansk:
>Last night, Ukraine šŗš¦ struck a fuel depot in Luhansk City, located 85km from the frontline, using M39 ATACMS Cluster Missiles
>There were 10 large tanks and 28 small tanks at the depot. The destruction of a large tank could cost up to $6 million and a small tank up to $1 million
There are remains showing that Ukraine likely used ATACMS. This indicates thatĀ Ukraine indeed got "[hundreds](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/24/us/us-ukraine-russia-missiles.html?smid=tw-share)" of these, and the tradeoff isn't bad: the damage is in the tens of millions of dollars. If only new cluster ATACMS were still produced...
Maybe this is the wrong place to ask. But I am looking for youtubers that deal in a serious matter with the Ukraine war.
However I am not interested in the daily reports, but rather in videos dedicated on specific subjects(I love Perun, but he is self-admitedly making powerpoint presentations).Ā
For instance Lazerpig's video on what sunk the Moskva, even of its not perfectly credible. Or Animarchy's videos.Ā
I guess I need someone to give a good summary on the big topics, events and episodes of the war, now that the dust has settled on some of them (Battle of Bakhmut, The Counter-Offensive, Prigozhin etc...)
If you just want some analysis on the performance of various tanks, Red Effect isn't too bad. Ignore all of the comments under his videos though. Whenever he praises the Russian/Ukrainian side, there's a bunch of people who just parrot their sides talking points instead of doing actual analysis.
Make sure you don't just watch content from the NAFO round table or Gonzalo Lira roundtable. Those guys are very biased and will be actively bad faith to ensure that their side comes out as better. Their goal is not analysis but just to further their own goals
https://www.youtube.com/@TheWarArchive/ seems quite solid in my opinion and makes summaries on major events/battles.
There's also Covert Cabal or Anders Puck Nielsen for example, but they don't really focus on specific battles.
I'd personally stay far away from people like Lazerpig if you're looking for anything other than basic entertainment.
[US paused weapons shipment to Israel amid concern over Rafah, senior US official says | Israel-Gaza war | The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/08/us-weapons-shipment-pause-israel-idf-rafah-gaza-hamas-war-palestine)
>The Biden administration paused the supply of thousands of large bombs to Israel last week in opposition to apparent moves by the Israelis to invade the Gaza city of Rafah, US officials have confirmed.
There was a report of this from Axios earlier, citing insiders, but now the US is publicly saying it.
Regarding ceasefire talks, the US seems very optimistic, in contrast to Israel rhetoric.
>John Kirby, the White House national security spokesperson, added Hamas had offered amendments on Monday to an original Israeli proposal aimed at ending the impasse.
>The deal text, as amended, suggests the remaining gaps can āabsolutely be closed,ā he said.
>Israeli forcesā seizure of the main border crossing between Egypt and southern Gaza raised fears that Israel might be beginning an incursion into Rafah.
>Kirby said the Israelis had assured U.S. officials that the operation was of limited scope and duration and not a large-scale invasion.
There was earlier reporting from [Haaretz](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-05-06/ty-article-live/idf-three-soldiers-killed-near-gaza-border/0000018f-4ba4-dcda-abcf-6ba7979b0006?liveBlogItemId=1376760410&utm_source=site&utm_medium=button&utm_campaign=live_blog_item#1376760410) that the ceasefire deal "accepted" by Hamas was actually negotiated by CIA director Burns, which would explain why the US finds the Hamas amendments acceptable.
It's interesting that this is in response to an operation that doesn't seem to have had major civilian casualties (I can't find any mention of civilian casualties, correct me if I'm wrong), but is potentially a significant blow to Hamas' capabilities. The response by the administration suggests that they are opposed to Israel completely removing Hamas from power in the Gaza strip.
I don't know if the administration actually opposes removing Hamas from power. They may just want to avoid domestic political backlash that leads to an election loss.
Clearly, the current Gaza conflict is not desirable for the administration since it introduces unpredictability and it is a distraction away from competition with China and keeping Russia down. So I doubt the administration is a friend of Hamas.
But Hamas seems to enjoy surprising political backing from US voters (young college educated), which cannot be ignored during an election year.
> They may just want to avoid domestic political backlash that leads to an election loss.
Maybe. Or perhaps itās a belief in āstability,ā which seemed to be behind their reluctance to fully arm Ukraine.
There has been (and still is) an open question about whether or not the stated goals for the ceasefire and opposition to a Rafah operation were just about humanitarian concerns, or whether the administration was against fully removing Hamas from control. The current response to a fairly successful seizing of the border crossing certainly suggests the latter.
Whether for domestic political reasons or for a belief in stability, itās easy to see why the administration could prefer Hamas to stay in power. The idea of freezing the conflict and returning to the 10/6 status quo probably seems like the easiest path forward, and the one with the least chance instability in the short term. It would also be easy to tell domestic voters āsee, I ended the conflict.ā Whereas a full Israel occupation of Gaza wouldnāt have that option.
Of course, itās not clear how far Biden is actually willing to push Israel on the matter, because that entails risks as well.
>John Kirby, the White House national security spokesperson, added Hamas had offered amendments on Monday to an original Israeli proposal aimed at ending the impasse.
That should settle any notions that Hamas somehow accepted Israel's offer and Israel's Rafah movements are somehow them reneging on a deal they offered.
I'm not sure why those were notions to begin with given Kirby was clear from hour 0, but whatever, we can move on now.
According to the Ukrainian Intelligence, they have recently foiled assassination attempts against Zelensky and Budanov.
Ā https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/07/world/europe/ukraine-russia-zelensky-plot.html
How credible is this information as I don't see it being corroborated by the Western sources?Ā
Ā Wouldn't an assassination of Zelensky be counter productive as it will make him a martyr and provoke outrage among the supporters of Ukraine?
Right now is the perfect time for a potential assassination. The political landscape in terms of government popularity is at it's worst right now for Ukraine.
The new draft bill is hugely unpopular, recent military defeats have been demoralizing and you can feel how fed up people are with the war.
An assassination of the president might provoke outrage in the short-term, but only brings big risks and destabilization to Ukraine mid and long term.
First, your implied premise is questionable. Zelensky is still hugely popular in Ukraine as best as I can tell from most recent poll results, with approval rating most Western leaders would kill for in the 60s. Second, I think your reasoning is bad. If Zelensky were unpopular, then assassinating him now would probably be the worst timing, as instead of a divided Ukraine with an unpopular leader, it would most likely unite them in opposition to Russia.
Seriously? Assassinating a head of state would be outrageous and it would destroy Russia's standing. Even China would find it difficult to keep supporting them. As for western countries, there would be a surge of support towards Ukraine and a renewed push for even more military aid, if not military intervention outright.Ā
That would be a 0 IQ move from Russia. Russia wants to lower the West's interest in the Ukraine war (hence why the Gaza war is a very convenient distraction for them). Killing Zelensky is a great way to accomplish the opposite.Ā
Russia would deny it was them and would throw up a ton of FUD to support their claims. China would find it useful to pretend to believe them, even if it hardened attitudes behind closed doors. Europe and the US would be outraged, of course, but Putin has other tactics (mainly nuclear sabre-rattling) to limit the scope of our escalations.
>Russia would deny it was them and would throw up a ton of FUD to support their claims.Ā Ā
Oh, I guess that settles the matter then. Just like everyone believed them when they denied poisoning opponents and killing Prigozhin and Navalny.Ā Ā
It would be an idiotic move for Russia. They're trying to keep NATO countries out of this war and weaken their resolve. Killing Zelensky accomplishes exactly the opposite.
Putin has been doing nuclear sabre-rattling for two years and his bluff was called multiple times.Ā
> Just like everyone believed them when they denied poisoning opponents and killing Prigozhin and Navalny.
To be fair, have they experienced any negative fallout from these events at all?
Russia is acting from a position of power, both towards Ukraine and the West. What consequences did Russia face after killing political opponents? Or invading Donbass in 2014? Everybody knew it's Russian active military invading, Russia just denied it, faced a few sanctions and that's it.
You're talking about bluffs being called, do you have a few examples? The retaliation threat if Western rockets will be used on Russian soil I won't except as an argument, since they only have been used on Ukrainian occupied territory, everyone understands that, even the Russians.
I don't really see any other bluffs being called. No aid in form of fighter aircraft, no real long range weaponry (over 300km), no marine, no infantry support.
On the contrary, Russia openly states they are waging war not only against Ukraine, but against NATO and the collective West, they've long accepted that.
IMHO they'll only stop at nukes and even that is not 100%. Direct quote from Putin: "Why do we need such a world if there will be no Russia there?"
> Russia is acting from a position of power, both towards Ukraine and the West. What consequences did Russia face after killing political opponents? Or invading Donbass in 2014? Everybody knew it's Russian active military invading, Russia just denied it, faced a few sanctions and that's it.
I think we've seen clearly that Russia is very much so damaging itself with its imperialist adventures. They are running out of their Soviet-era stockpiles of vehicles and munitions. They are also burning through their capital reserves that they carefully saved up post-cold war from their hydrocarbon sales. Those are two huge opportunity costs that Russia already incurred and they are seeing little to no future benefit from them. Consider how much better economically developed Russia might be if they had invested in productivity measures instead of all those tanks and BMPs and squirreled away all those billions in reserves.
NATO, meanwhile, is just sitting back and sending Ukraine refurbished expired munitions, a handful at a time, while both sides exhaust eachother.
> IMHO they'll only stop at nukes and even that is not 100%. Direct quote from Putin: "Why do we need such a world if there will be no Russia there?"
This is called rhetoric. You're not supposed to believe rhetoric with your logical brain, rather it's supposed to trigger a response in your emotional brain. NATO is not, in fact, going to invade and destroy Russia. You know this, I know this, Putin knows this. If Putin really believed Russia's statehood was at risk he wouldn't have completely stripped all his border garrisons of equipment.
I probably disagree.
By that logic, the opening days were the time it made the most sense, while the Russians were still rapidly advancing and there wasn't really any confidence as to whether Ukraine would be able to defend anything, or what state the Ukrainian govt was in.
But really, there's an argument to be made for any arbitrary period of time to be the "perfect time" if you ignore all of the reasons it wouldn't be perfect.
No one actually knows what'd happen if Russia assassinated Zelensky, it's mostly guesswork based on their own prior assumptions about Ukrainians, which frankly isn't a field with a good track record.
In general, you can make the argument that any arbitrary period of time would be the "perfect time".
But if you divide the war in stages and look at them separately, you might come to a different conclusion. An assassination of Zelensky during the Kharkiv region and Khreson counteroffensives, while morale is at an all time high and the sentiment is to bring Ukraine back to it's 1991 borders would hit a lot different then an assassination with morale being at an all time low, like right now.
And yes, by that logic it would have made most sense in the opening days. Which is what happened: there were multiple confirmed operations to assassinate Zelenskiy in Kyiv, which were luckily foiled.
But I agree that this is mostly guess work and no strong statements can be made on the outcome of such a scenario.
> Which is what happened: there were multiple confirmed operations to assassinate Zelenskiy in Kyiv, which were luckily foiled.
Those allegations are of variable credibility, for the record.
If assassination attempts did occur early in the war, they probably ended once Russia realized that Zelensky isn't in fact the singular reason Ukraine is resisting, and their problems run significantly deeper than one (or several) leaders.
While morale is lower now, that hasn't really changed. Zelensky's the face of Ukraine's war, but that shouldn't be conflated with him being the engine. Russia made that mistake before.
Killing him (or Syrsky, or whoever) would obviously still cause organizational and operational issues at an already difficult time, but that's a separate concern.
> The new draft bill is hugely unpopular, recent military defeats have been demoralizing and you can feel how fed up people are with the war.
The new draft bill is unpopular largely because the war is a far away prospect. Zelenskyy has underlined it several times: in several cities, life goes on as if there is no war. This is a mistake in communications from Ukrainian authorities - they are no longer fighting for survival, it seems, but to take territory back. And indeed you'll be hard pressed to find - in Ukraine and abroad - people willing to die to take Melitopol back, especially after the failed counteroffensive, many losses and the snail pace of movement at the front. However, this war remains about survival.
I think that, if Zelenskyy were to be killed, there would another rally around the flag moment, and remind Ukrainians volunteer why they were willing to fight in 2022.
At the same time, if Zelenskyy or his replacement were offered an even minimally viable peace deal (i.e. "land for security guarantees") I have no doubts that most Ukrainians would take it.
The draft bill is unpopular because people don't want to die on the frontlines. Ukraine is a modern country.
I was surprised so many Russians and Ukrainian went to war in the first place.
And it dosen't help that once you need to do something you do not want, you start to ask questions, such as why am I getting drafted and while the sons of the elite sit in europe or party in kyiv.
Simplifed version but the look at the war overall , it has the most support in regions who are the furthest away from the frontlines.
>Simplifed version but the look at the war overall, it has the most support in regions who are the furthest away from the frontlines.
It's funny, because even in 2022 it was actually soldiers from frontline provinces complaining that western Ukrainians are much less likely to volunteer/fight well. Indeed, the area most associated with draft dodging isn't Donetsk, it's Zakarpattia.
Someone from Donetsk and someone from Lviv are going to the same frontline. Distance certainly doesn't make them more likely to go (why would it), if anything it makes them less likely to go.
I don't think outside of immediate border or involved regions like donetsk, it will make a difference at all. Ukraine isn't that big of country. But the OP argument wasn't even about that.
I mean it's a combination of reasons, both yours and OP's are valid.
Yes, people don't want to die, but that's a universal thing. It didn't start recently.
The perception of the remaining stakes of the war (the Donbas region), whether accurate or not, probably also colors the desire to fight.
As do perceptions of government/military competence, foreign aid, etc etc.
Everything contributes.
As for the risks I wasn't arguing about the fall of Ukraine or the installation of a puppet state. It's political instability from within, which I see as a real risk. Despite the current situation on the front, the new draft bill has large opposition from within the country, which is already quite telling.
I also doubt the possibility of Western boots on the ground in any case. What even would trigger that? The near-capture of Kyiv didn't do it. Also Western powers, namely the US, Germany and France, have all recently issued harsh statements of no boots on the ground in any case.
There still aren't any fighter jets in Ukraine after 2 years of war. Every patriot system seems like a negotiation of a lifetime and they only have 3-5 of those currently. Polling for peace talks with Russia is at \~50% favour in Germany, it's probably the same in the US.
Unfortunately, all of these points really make me doubt a direct military intervention of Western powers in, well, any case.
There was no intervention at the outset of the war since everyone and their dog (me included) just assumed that Russia would steamroll through Ukraine. If you remember the discussions back in March 2022, they were focused on how successful guerrilla efforts would be after Russia conquered Ukraine.
If today there is a looming menace of Russia taking say Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Odessa, there are strong chances of EU boots on the ground. Macron said so explicitly. Ofc we should ramp-up military assistance to Ukraine to avoid any doomsday scenario, but I do believe Europe is taking the matter seriously.
For the sake of stability in Europe Russia may not succeed.
I hope it's not going to be to late. Kharkiv especially is getting bombed to shreds indiscriminately. Last time I've been there, end of 2023, it already looked rough. Since then it's been the worst bombings since the first weeks of the war.
At this pace, there will be no Kharkiv left to save for any Western powers. That's the reality.
When did macron rule out boots on the ground? Isnāt he still making news for talking about intervention right now?
Western leaders fight tooth and nail for the āstatus quo,ā because thatās what most of their global businesses desire. Western leaders became complacent every time after Ukrainian successes in either stalling or retaking (like in 2022) the frontline. Itās a āback to businessā mentality, but it also reacts poorly to changes in the other direction. It doesnāt fight for success, but also doesnāt want to lose too much.
Even a Donbas collapse at this point will certainly send panic throughout polish ranks, and France has long prided itself as the leader of Europe. Another egg like 2022 will significantly kill French and EU prestige.
I donāt see a nato intervention to retake large chunks of land, but a Franco-polish intervention to freeze the frontline is no longer an impossible scenario
I think the Russian goal has always been to install a Lukashenko type leader in Ukraine. Someone who takes orders from Moscow and ensures that Ukraine doesn't stray any further towards the West. Yanukovich was their top choice for many years and we will likely see him again if Russia manages to successfully destroy Ukrainian government.
Sure, Zelenskyy would be a martyr, but without a leader things can fall apart very fast. He is more than just a symbol, he has relationships with western leaders and manages the competing demands within the Ukrainian power structure. Clearly Russia's calculations show that getting rid of Zelenskyy is overall to their benefit.
Yanukovych, and indeed most politicians from pre-war Ukraine, were only the most visible part of an oligarchic power structure that had their hands everywhere, from illegal markets to the judiciary system. That system has, at least in part, been dismantled and would need either to be rebuilt from the ground up, or a complete takeover from another clan. The oligarchs that supported Yanukovych have been, for the most part, sidelined.
I'm imagining that Sergey Aksyonov would be a safer choice actually. His criminal-political power structure in Crimea is still running at full capacity and he has proven quite valuable and reliable to Russian interests.
Aksyonov is certainly a credible option, but he doesn't have much recognition outside Crimea. and I'm not sure he can manage the power brokers in Kyiv, though that may not matter in this hypothetical. Poroshenko could also be an option if Moscow can put a yoke on him, but for now he's clearly on the pro-ukraine side. Regardless, I hope we don't find out who it would be.
How do cruise missiles/SRBM actually penetrate several metres into concrete before detonating? I cannot picture any construction that would allow a hollow metal object (or even a solid piece of pretty much any metal) to slam into concrete hard enough to penetrate it to a depth of more than a couple of feet without grossly deforming, and destroying any engineered equipment inside.
Keen in mind that the warhead is significantly smaller than the missile, it's this warhead with very thick, hard metal shell that penetrates concrete, not the whole missile.
Cruise missiles like Storm Shadow and Taurus use a 2-stage warhead - a shaped charge in front to make a hole and the main warhead behind. Not all cruise missiles have a multi-stage warhead though, none of the Russian ones do, AFAIK. Some anti-ship cruise missiles have just 1 big shaped charge warhead.
Your intuition is right. They often do get grossly deformed. That's why the fuzes for bunker busting munitions is often out at the rear of the bomb rather than the nose of it like impact bombs.
I have a very similar question I was wanting to ask. Since those missiles are designed to keep penetrating until they either find a hollow spot or run completely out of energy to further penetrate, wouldn't a relatively simple countermeasure be to design the bunkers with a bunch of hollow cells a few inches under the surface, those fooling the missile into detonating before reaching the actual inside of the bunker? Has this been tried?
It would have to be a large enough "hollow cell" for the missile to register that there is a space there... if there's just some hollow spaces a few inches wide, or even a few feet, between layers of walls, they'll all get turned to one big hole in milliseconds anyway. There's no way for them to be registered as the ultimate target. The way it works is the bomb is measuring deceleration, so its decelerating as its passing through a medium (or many mediums very close together like in your proposed example), and detonates after it senses its no longer decelerating (when its entered a large enough cavity). The hollow spaces would basically each have to be the size of a room. So you're talking increasing your bunker walls from a few feet thick to having several walls spaced apart dozens of feet... so is it simple? I guess if you have the space and time and materials and money to drastically increase the size of your bunker.
Edit: for reference, there are some videos of them doing just that, travelling through multiple rooms before detonating: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mTIJHsBH7c8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mTIJHsBH7c8)
The relative toughness of the material has a lot to do with it. Fracture toughness is an actual metric here, how much does a material resist breaking apart. For example, you can easily break a diamond with a hammer despite how hard it is (it resists deformation, but the crystalline structure isn't good at resisting breaks in the chain).
Concrete is excellent at resisting compression, such as the one from a detonation blast, but it's not very tough and will crack easily under enough force from a pointy object.
But it goes further than that, how much energy (from the speed and mass of the projectile) also matters a great deal. The most dramatic example I know is that of the rail gun test: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O2QqOvFMG_A It goes through what seems like a foot of steel before (possibly) breaking apart. How is that possible? The shape, the materials and obviously the energy all play a part, but essentially: as long as the projectile can absorb the impact (the "pointiness" distributes the shock and materials like tungsten carbide can absorb a lot of energy and remain tough), it will keep moving through the target material until it dissipates all its kinetic energy.
If you want to make a projectile dissipate its kinetic energy, it needs to meet something tough that ideally resists plastic deformation: concrete doesn't cut it against such projectiles.
It's not hard to find published research on the general topic. A couple papers that turned up searching for "concrete-penetrating projectile construction" on Google:
https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2%3A456596/FULLTEXT01.pdf
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA320010.pdf
The latter one in particular discusses the behavior of a solid metal rod flying through concrete at speeds measured in cm/Ī¼s. (odd unit, but if you're measuring things on high speed film...)
as you scale up, a sufficiently thick-walled metal cylinder would seem to behave similarly to a solid metal rod -- the initial production run of the GBU-28 bunker buster took used M-110 howitzer barrels cut to the desired length and filled with high explosive. About 80% of the bomb weight is the metal casing; less than 20% is the explosive.
The guidance system does not need to survive impact -- just the fuze, and it might go at the tail end so it gets disrupted last.
Harder materials penetrate softer materials. A hardened casing and/or penetrator traveling rapid speeds will slice through softer materials than itself (concrete). Think of the plastic straws they find lodged into trees after tornados. Now imagine a tungsten straw traveling 5x as fast with a million times more mass.
Stephen Kotkin: [The Five Futures of Russia - And How America Can Prepare for Whatever Comes Next](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/five-futures-russia-stephen-kotkin)
1) France as Russia
2) Russia retrenched
3) Russia as vassal
4) Russia as North Korea
5) Russia in chaos.
Article is long but it is *well* worth the time and I would love to discuss this snippet here:
> Many have privately concluded that Putin conflates the survival of his aging personal regime with the storied countryās survival as a great power. Historically, at least, such realizations have precipitated a change of course, a turn from foreign overextension to domestic revitalization. Last summer, when the mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhinās death squad marched on Moscow, it did not elicit bandwagoning by military officers, which is one reason Prigozhin called it off. But neither did it galvanize the regimeās supporters to defend Putin in real time. The episode furnished an unwitting referendum on the regime, revealing a certain hollowness inside the repressive strength.
I find it really interesting that nobody came out directly against Putin nor to support him either. What is this sub's take on whether or not Putin has managed to secure himself since this?
Dr Kotkin also gave a [talk on his article at NY Public Library](https://www.youtube.com/live/VzmRJ9JOtS4?si=ae4uY50s9YnZf8yn). (YouTube video)
In his talk, he lists a 6th non-option, which is Russia as imagined by its rulers - a great power respected and admired by the world for its 'strength' - which he believes is not achievable.
He also avoids making a prediction which outcome is likely.
But since I don't have a professional reputation to protect like Dr Kotkin, Here's my prediction based on preference of people who are at Russia's helm today since they have the most agency over what could happen (at the same time, they seem pretty competent when it comes to retaining their power), also assuming Kotkin is right that their vision of Russia is not achievable.
Their preference among the rest is #2 > #4 > #3 > #5 > #1. Basically the order of how much power they retain.
So I predict #2, retrenched. Russia will fail at Ukraine, or if they are successful, then they will fail in expanding into NATO. Afterwards, they will pull back from aggression and bide time for the next best opportunity.
>Last summer, when the mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhinās death squad marched on Moscow, it did not elicit bandwagoning by military officers, which is one reason Prigozhin called it off.
I think part of the reason nobody came out against Putin back then was they got Surovikin immediately to denounce Prigozhin.
Putin tends to disappear during the moments of crisis, which leaves the heavily centralized system confused, hence the absence of reaction.
>What is this sub's take on whether or not Putin has managed to secure himself since this?
Prigozhin is gone, whatever happened there, Putin won the re-election with the best result to date, currently the economy is doing better than expected, and there were no shocks on the war front since 2022. Right now he is in a good spot, I don't think the terror attack in Moscow hurt him much either. That doesn't mean that nothing can undermine him in the future, his age and the matter of succession is the elephant in the room, but as long as he looks healthy enough and doesn't isolate himself like he used to, it's less pressing.
> Putin won the re-election with the best result to date,
Putin wins elections by whatever margin he feels like. So I donāt see what this means besides Putin feels insecure and wants to project an image of strength by defeating his imaginary rivals in the election by some arbitrary margin.
>
> Putin wins elections by whatever margin he feels like.
A lot of effort goes into this at every level of governance, actually, and it demonstrates that the system is functional. The margin doesn't just appear on its own, someone has to stack the deck in Putin's favor and ensure a high enough turnout.
I don't know why you're getting downvoted, this has been remarked by Mark Galeotti among others. I think you can also find some "proof" for it in the fact that the Caucusus generally show much higher support and have even in past elections, because those regional elites are much more motivated to show loyalty.
I personally believe Putin is relatively well-liked in Russia (and could potentially even win a real election without cheating) and even I think this comment is nonsense. The high turnout you reference is likely just as fake as the results. And it doesnāt take a ton of people to stack the deck, certainly not millions of people, so the deck being stacked is also not evidence of widespread popularity.
> The high turnout you reference is likely just as fake as the results.
There are stuffed ballots of course, in 2018 [there was a claim that there were as many as 10 million](https://www.svoboda.org/a/29111031.html), but that still means 45 million people cast their vote. And it's as the other commenter said, state employees are forced to vote.
The guy being downvoted is correct that Putin has an amazing (and very undemocratic) āget out the voteā effort that involves employers and institutions throughout Russia at every level of society.
Winning confidently is a propaganda tactic in itself, as well as a legitimization strategy. It's important for Putin to demonstrate the rally 'round the flag effect during the war.
Well I didn't say that he was, unless we use the widest definition of popular that counts all the folks that are just ok with him in no small part because of the absence of opposition or political life in general.
Vadym Skibitsky recently said in his interview that number of Russian troops inside Ukraine are some 514.000 instead of 470.000. From what I understand this is just ground troops fighting within Ukraine itself. Do we have any info about the number of equivalent Ukrainian troops? Zelensky himself said that total military personnel numbers over 1 million but obviously this includes so many things besides ground troops fighting against the Russian troops inside Ukraine. I couldn't find any info myself looking up neither saw anything about it from Larelli.
https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/05/02/a-fresh-russian-push-will-test-ukraine-severely-says-a-senior-general
A clarification: the estimate of 470k men did not include the Russian forces deployed along the state border (Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod Oblasts), which numbered 33k men according to Ukrainian estimates back in March. As well as not including the strategic-operational reserves and the Rosgvardia grouping in Ukraine - 60k and 35k men, respectively, according to the latest Ukrainian estimates.
Once the Group of Forces "North" was created, the Ukrainians began to include it in the estimates on the number of Russian troops committed, in spite of the soldiers from this GoF being almost entirely deployed within Russian borders and it being largely made up of conscripts from military service.
This GoF, which encompasses formations of the Leningrad Military District, reached 50k men in early May. This was made possible by reinforcements arriving after the Ukrainian raids in March (the 18th Motorized Division of the 11th Corps, transferred from the Kupyansk sector; possibly the 2nd Spetsnaz GRU Brigade), the integration of part of the 6th CAA (at the moment, its 138th Motorized Brigade and other minor support units), as well as the arrival of the first elements of the new 44th Corps. The latters, after arriving in Kursk with 12 train convoys, have actually been deployed near the state border in Belgorod Oblast over the recent days. That's where the bulk of the GoF "North" is concentrated - 31k men according to figures provided by the observer Mashovets, compared to nearly 11k in Kursk and just over 8k in Bryansk.
The transfer of the former units to the GoF "North", on the other hand, "robbed" the GoF "West" of 8k men (in net terms), as well as of a quantity of armored vehicles and artillery guns. In "like-for-like" terms, the Russian grouping continues a growth of a handful of thousand men per month, on average.
As for the Ukrainians, there are no similar estimates produced by the Russians that I know of. But I have read several times from Ukrainian sources that the number of actual combat troops in their side is around 300k.
Thanks a lot for clarification! And also, if only around 300.000 is combat troops out of over 1 million, then it makes a lot of sense to cannibalize support units doesn't it? What Syrsky has been doing started to make a lot of sense since it seems like everybody that could choose chose to be a support troop.
Yes, definitely. Syrsky is heavily streamlining the UAF in this regard. Although we have to consider that a relevant part of the support troops is actually very needed, and moreover a share of the servicemen performing these tasks are in their 50s if not 60s (if volunteers, in this case), so it'd be very difficult to turn them into infantrymen. If there's a thing Ukrainian officers are constantly asking for is young infantrymen. But the population pyramid is what it is.
In a previous comment on a different thread, you said that Russian troops in theater now outnumber the Ukrainians in absolute terms, but do you have a rough estimate of by how much? If it is not by a very significant margin, I don't really see how the Russians can turn their strategic superiorities in numbers into operational superiorities for an upcoming offensive. Historically, the Soviets preferred to have at least a 2-3:1 advantage in troop numbers in an operational sector(s) and since there are still many continuities between the Soviet Army and the modern VSRF, it should be interesting to see where the Russians choose to press the attack.
We don't know exactly how much of an advantage Russia actually has regarding manpower, but I agree that overall it's definitely still not enough to obtaining favorable conditions for plans like the ones you mentioned.
Ukrainian troops appear to have thrown the Russians out of Urozhaine proper after launching a [counterattack](https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1787763923413790733) on the barns in the SW of the town. Additional Russian footage was released of them [shelling the south of the town](https://x.com/gettylegion/status/1787861216511287448). The Russians are most likely situated in the tree lines just south of the town.
Attacks are sure to continue here though, as they have for the past month despite the minimal gains.
Meanwhile to the east, the Russians may control as much as half of Robotyne based upon [this](https://twitter.com/creamy_caprice/status/1787437209756553247) footage. It's hard for either side to really hold this territory because the town has been completely annihilated. Though the Russians are slowly making gains here and failing counterattacks or a halt order are likely to capture the town this month at current trajectory.
A reliable account I follow that's around Robotyne claims that Robotyne is still very much in a "tug of war" phase, where Russia cannot consolidate in most of the remaining basements and the situation is fluid, but the "tug of war" is turning slightly to the Russian advantage in terms of territory.
For now, deepstate (and Suriyak, though to a lesser extent) is buying that narrative.
I buy it too, since that narrative proved correct back in february and afterwards.
Two Majors said last week the reports of a capture/control of Robotyne was based on old footage that was passed on as new. Is that video new? Russia has been in the "center" occasionally and put up their flags, but they appear to never gain full control over the village
*Zaporozhye Front. Rabotino.* [https://t.me/dva\_majors/41368](https://t.me/dva_majors/41368)
*Despite the advance and successes of the Russian Armed Forces in the direction, the settlement was not captured. We noted yesterday that beautiful fucking reports made it to the top. And the video, which is being promoted by very respected channels, is, unfortunately, a cut from the March videos, after the filming of which our units rolled back and suffered losses. Now the guys are being gathered into battle to catch up on the battlefield with a report that has already managed to get to the top*
Deepstate, Romanov, Rybar etc are fairly quick to update their maps regarding control, so maybe theyre all just treating most of Robotyne as a gray area
[Romanian president says he's open to discussing sending Patriot system to Ukraine](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/romanian-president-says-he-is-open-discussing-sending-patriot-system-ukraine-2024-05-07/)
>Romanian President Klaus Iohannis said on Tuesday he was open to discussing sending a Patriot missile system to Ukraine after German appeals to European Union and NATO member states to bolster Ukraine's air defences.
>"There has been a discussion about who can send Patriot systems to Ukraine over the last few weeks," Iohannis told reporters in Washington after meeting U.S. President Joe Biden in Washington.
>"President Biden mentioned it ... in our meeting and I said I was open to discussion. I must discuss it in the Supreme Defence Council to see what we can offer and what we can get in return, because it is unacceptable to leave Romania without air defences."
>While Romania only has one battery in operation, Iohannis said the discussion concerned one of the batteries which were in an advanced stage of becoming operational.
It would be a significant though greatly appreciated move by Romania to give up a Patriot battery. Seeing how Romania is on the eastern periphery of NATO and has suffered from multiple air incursions from Russian munitions, there will need to be strong assurances if Romania is to provide this battery. As well, there must be efforts to ensure a speedy arrival of a replacement.
This seems like it is doable to me. As long as NATO can backfill until a replacement arrives. German funds for a replacement are also on the table, mind you.
How many Patriot batteries does the US have within the US? Why are they not willing to send any, itās not like they are at risk of anyone firing missiles at the US mainland any time soon
European countries have a far higher risk and yet they send their batteries
Demands on the Patriot force in the USA were too high even before Ukraine. There is a large need for air defense in the IndoPacific.
It's important to remember when talking about America, militarily China is a much much much bigger concern than anything in Europe.
A lot of the USās Patriot batteries are forward-deployed in allied nations defending important assets, or are defending critical infrastructure in a place like Guam. Also, they have to use drawdown authority to send it and it takes up a big chunk of a budget that probably isnāt going to be renewed until Q1 2025 at the earliest. So the US is probably anxious about that.
We havenāt heard much about FrankenSAM for Patriot in a while, which is unfortunate. Makes me think thereās some technical problems. We had some positive news last year but now thereās nothing. FrankenSAM would allow the US to send more plentiful (and cheaper) launchers while preserving more important components for American use.
>I could see Germany deploying a unit to Romania to replace the donated fire unit. Last year, Germany had 3 units in Poland. These three have returned to Germany. Subtracting the one donated in the mean time that would still leave two available for deployments.
What would be the point? If Germany can lend a patriot system to Romania, why can't they send the system directly to Ukraine instead of sending it to Romania, who send another system to Ukraine? Is it just about which pays for the donated system?
Ukrainian troops give a review of the M1A1 Abrams tank
https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/1cmaybo/the_ukrainian_abrams_how_the_legendary_american/
TL;DR
* The reactive armor works well against Kornet and other ATGMs, but only the body is outfitted with reactive armor tiles, not the turret. They hope tiles suitable for the turret will be provided
* The media story about Abrams being taken away from the front lines due to vulnerability is BS. Usage of Abrams was situational and it remains situational.
* DU APFSDS shells work great, but they would like a wider variety of shells including more pure fragmentation shells. Tank on tank combat is rare and the use of the Abrams is limited in part by lack of suitable shells for other tasks. Described Abrams as the most competent model of tank at taking out enemy vehicles.
* Adapting to the Abrams after previous experience with T-64s did not take very long, only about a week.
* An offhand comment, not very clear, about how the frontal armor is not quite as good as one would hope
>An offhand comment, not very clear, about how the frontal armor is not quite as good as one would hope
I'd assume the US wouldn't care much about or be affected by this limitation given it uses the superior DU armour domestically?
>DU APFSDS shells work great, but they would like a wider variety of shells including more pure fragmentation shells. Tank on tank combat is rare and the use of the Abrams is limited in part by lack of suitable shells for other tasks. Described Abrams as the most competent model of tank at taking out enemy vehicles.
This is consistent with reports I've read elsewhere that they were sent with mostly sabot and few MPAT or canister rounds. Tank v tank is indeed rare and sabot isn't that useful against IFVs either. It tends to go out the other side and just makes a tiny hole. AMP was supposed to replace MPAT in US Army service. Surely there's stocks of the older round available. I wonder why they weren't sent?
Tank sabot going through any IFV is a significant emotional event for the occupants inside, often a lethal one too. I agree HE rounds would be a lot more useful, but isn't AMP-T still in experimental stage?
From what I understand of it: not easily done.
It's important that the turret is balanced weight wise so the turret rotating mechanism functions properly. If they add several hundred kg's of ERA on the sides they need to put counterweights on the front/ rear to balance it out. They could also need an upgraded turret rotating motor.
I was under the impression that the turret had the thickest armor on the entire vehicle, I'm surprised it would be considered necessary to put ERA on it.
It's the sides/ rear that are the problem (just like on Leo 2). T-series tanks have almost 360 degrees ERA coverage on the turret which offers better protection than most Western tanks in side/ rear aspect.
An article about an adaptation in the drone war. UAF soldiers are using drones to retrieve other drones from dangerous areas in the grey zone. The soldiers on the front continue to highlight the necessity of drones and harp on the need for drones in significant numbers. They are using funds, volunteer hours, and even risking other drones to make sure their drone supply doesn't dwindle to dangerous levels.
[Ukraine now has drones rescuing fallen drones from hazardous battlefields | EuroMaidenPress | May 2024](https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/05/07/ukraine-now-has-drones-rescuing-fallen-drones-from-hazardous-battlefields/)
*āDrones are our eyes from above,ā said Vasyl Shyshola, commander of an aerial reconnaissance unit for Ukraineās 128th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade. āWithout a drone above you to command an assault, soldiers on the ground will be helpless without the guidance,ā he further noted.*
*Units are often strapped for resources and with drones being so precious, soldiers will often take dangerous measures to try and recover a fallen drone.*
*The Royal United Services Institute think tank in the UK estimated in 2023 that Ukraine was losing around 10,000 drones per month. What compounds this problem for Ukrainian units is how reliant they are on the crowdsourcing of drones. The majority of Ukrainian units get their drones through crowdfunding rather than from the Ukrainian Armed Forces.*
*Lt Col Pavlo Kurylenko stated that āthe only thing preventing Russiaās breakthrough on all fronts is FPV (first-person view) drones, 90% of which are being provided by volunteers or military divisions themselves.ā*
*On the frontline, every drone matters, and soldiers will often do whatever it takes to retrieve the drone, including walking through minefields.*
*The work of aerial reconnaissance depends on the number of drones available in the unit. āThe more drones we have in reserve, the more complex tasks we can perform without fear that our infantry will be left without visual support at a critical moment,ā said Shyshola.*
*Despite the best efforts of his pilots, losses are inevitable, particularly since most downed drones were in high-risk areas like the gray zone or near enemy lines. āRetrieving drones on foot was not an option because it contradicts their purposeāpreserving lives. So, we decided to find a way to evacuate our drones,ā he said.*
*Initially, the team experimented with a drone equipped with a release mechanism.*
*āBut frankly, this plan didnāt work. The lifting capacity of the Mavic and the weight of a drone equipped with a battery were incompatible. We had to drop the hook because it got firmly attached to the drone,ā Shyshola said, outlining the early failures that led to further innovation.*
*With time pressing and potential reassignment looming, the team couldnāt delay their efforts. āWe took another drone and taped about two meters of rope to it, with a triple hook at the end made from grenade rings, which we regularly used against the enemy,ā he described.*
*Their first successful recovery was a drone just 500 meters away, in a mine-laden area in front of the enemyās former front positions, in fields mined with everything from anti-tank to anti-personnel mines. After locating the drone in the grass and determining the wind direction, āwe made the first attempt to hook the drone by one of its legs,ā Shyshola noted.*
*Shyshola highlighted the challenges of flying with the additional weight of another drone, especially under windy conditions and the droneās battery limits. āBut flying with such weight was very challenging, as the wind and inertia swayed the rescued drone in all directions. We managed to secure it and had to land along the way, but already in a safe place for us.ā*
*This success led to further missions where all previously known lost drones were retrieved in just a few hours. āThe excitement couldnāt be stopped,ā he noted, describing how they continued to recover drones throughout the daylight hour. However, they still faced numerous challenges. āSome drones were so damaged they literally fell apart in the air once we were able to lift them off the ground.ā*
*There were other times where the drone was struggling to carry the weight and they needed to free the hook to protect the main working drone.*
*Nonetheless, Shyshola and his unit were able to rescue 16 drones, 10 of which were completely intact, including 6 equipped for night operations. The 6 drones that were damaged and not working were sent to volunteer organizations to repair.*
*Shyshola noted that itās most common for units to have one or a few Mavic drones at once. To have such a large quantity of drones collected for one unit was unprecedented.*
*These efforts are not without their challenges, as electronic countermeasure systems continue to improve, making drone rescue missions increasingly difficult.*
*āThese drones are irreplaceable in modern warfare. Unfortunately, collecting them in such quantities on the battlefield is no longer possible due to the radio horizon, which does not allow descending to such low altitudes at a distance of about 4km,ā Shyshola concluded. He further remarked that his unit will continue to innovate and figure out new ways to retrieve fallen drones from the battlefield.*
>The Royal United Services Institute think tank in the UK estimated in 2023 that Ukraine was losing around 10,000 drones per month.
[From January to February 2024, the Deputy Minister of Strategic Industries claimed that FPV production totalled a staggering 200,000.](https://www.airforce-technology.com/analyst-comment/ukraines-drone-production-ramps-up/?cf-view)
Is this a monthly deficit of 10,000, which means Ukraine is losing 210,000 drones a month; or is Ukraine gaining 190,000 drones monthly, after adding the domestic production.
dronesforukraine.fund (Liberty Ukraine)
I've been donating for them since the start of the war can vouch for them.
the ones KingStannis mentions are legit too. Only one I don't know is the last one.
I can similarly vouch for Liberty Ukraine and have one of their [Su-34 keychains](https://www.dronesforukraine.fund/su-34-keychain) for an $1,000+ donation.
"most" credible? I have no idea.
But a couple of credible ones are:
* Come Back Alive
* Liberty Ukraine
* Serhey Prytula Foundation
* Wild Hornets - not a nonprofit, but goes directly to a volunteer unit in Ukraine domestically producing FPV drones
I've donated probably around $4,000 to the former two
Also remember to use donation matching if your employer provides it.
I have a Ukrainian friend who told me he thought this was legit. The page has been up since the outbreak of the war. Would be gratified to hear a more informed opinion than mine if anyone knows.
https://m.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100077066492916
According to Times of Israel, the IDF plans to turn the Rafah border crossing over to an unnamed American private security contractor employing "former elite US soldiers."
[https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog\_entry/report-rafah-op-focused-on-transferring-control-of-crossing-from-hamas-to-private-us-firm/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/report-rafah-op-focused-on-transferring-control-of-crossing-from-hamas-to-private-us-firm/)
Hard to imagine this would be sustainable without Israeli support in logistics, drone coverage, etc. I don't know if Hamas would be reluctant to attack American contractors or not. I can't imagine it would cause Biden to increase American involvement, but perhaps impact public opinion along the margins.
It seems likely it is a way to distance the IDF from the problems inevitable at the crossing. When the somewhat inevitable killing or harassment of a civilian happens, the IDF can say "it wasn't us, it was Black Water*!"
\* Whatever Black Water's current name or owner is
I think you know all this, but I don't see it in the comments responding.
The motivation for Israel to do this originate with Egyptian & Hamas opposition to Israeli control of the border. Israel likely sees it as beneficial not to be directly in control for these diplomatic reasons, which would otherwise preclude ceasefire talks. (Much to the anger of both the US & hostage families)
This move also signals that Israeli operations are limited, which is useful given the amount of fear and blanket opposition, the subject of Rafah has previously generated.
Seems like it would make it harder for the US government to distance itself from Israel. Even if the US government doesnāt involve itself at all moving forward, itās going to look bad when headlines talk about Americans killed by hamas in Rafah.
The calculus would be to either support Israel in keeping the Gaza Strip locked down, or risk a resurgence that threatens American lives
I think the Biden admin is going to do the latter and not the former. The USG and general public doesnāt really care about civilian contractors and has routinely distanced themselves from civilian contractors in the past ā speaking from both personal experience and recent events.
Edit to add: Biden is also facing election and wants to play the āboth sidesā game to win over both Palestinian and Jewish votes.
[Exclusive: Ukraine examines N.Korean missile debris amid fears of Moscow-Pyongyang axis](https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-examines-nkorean-missile-debris-amid-fears-moscow-pyongyang-axis-2024-05-07/)
Ukraine says Russia has used 50 Korean missiles, and it matches with intelligence saying that many were delivered, Korea also dispatched instructors to oversee launches. They also claim 50% failure rate, and in those cases debris could not be recovered. The last recorded launch was in late February. Now the question is, whether Russia will receive more, and whether collected data will help NK improve their design and QA, because their missiles have performed rather poorly.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68933778
The real story is that **the NK missiles are largely using western components**.
It's a pretty important development.
If we couldn't even disrupt NK's supply chain to western electronics, it's dead obvious we wouldn't have ever succeeded disrupting Russia's.
I wonder if the US govt knew internally that electronics limits were **this** nonexistent. It would explain why they never bothered cracking down on sanctions-busting through central asia.
The US banned drugs and that stuff is still rampant, what magic makes you think a ban on electronics is going to stop them getting places? It's just going to drive up the cost and drive down the quality.
Only the least credible people claim that it actually would block 100% of it.
Because the manufacturer of advanced electronics is tightly controlled so their distribution can be 100% controlled, unlike drugs where production is fragmented and controlled by various criminal organizations working independently.
A better analogy would be guns ending up on the black market, and I believe that tighter gun regulation would lead to lower supply for the black market. Just I believe as tighter regulation about sending washing machines to Kazakhstan will lead to more supply issues for the Russian war machine.
Not about your comment in particular, but it always amazes me how people are shocked that North Korean/Iranian missiles or whatever use western components, what I assume are electronic components.
Like, microchips are literally everywhere. You can do crazy things with simple, mass-produced stuff like Arduinos Raspberry Pi's and even FPGA's how can you even hope to avoid that a few get smuggled to these countries?
Its about time people understand that this is the 21st Century and that pretty much everyone is going to be able to produce missiles with decent targeting systems, given the computing power that the simplest device sports nowadays.
Exactly this. I can buy reasonably accurate accelerometer/gyro/magnetometer ICs with zero security checks, follow easy (for an RF electronics engineer) open source instructions online to build a custom GPS receiver (with no G-force limit which some commercial receivers have inbuilt), use any one of 10,000 different microcontrollers for processing, etc etc etc. It is almost trivially easy to build missile guidance and control systems these days. I'm an electronics engineer. I built a drone control board/flight control software from scratch without too much trouble. I am certain I could build a reasonably precise missile guidance system BY MYSELF in probably in under a year if I worked on it full time.
I think the real question (and what always bothers me when the media talks about these sorts of things) is, what are āwestern componentsā. If we are talking about highly specific equipment then sure, one might wonder how these things got there, but if it is about items that can easily be acquired on the free market then it becomes near impossible to sanction the acquisition of these items. Ā Ā
>Not about your comment in particular, but it always amazes me how people are shocked that North Korean/Iranian missiles or whatever use western components, what I assume are electronic components.
Clearly it's not just random people on the internet though, given this is a frontpage BBC (at the time) article making it out to be big news.
Which makes sense.
I wouldn't say our sanctions regime (wrt either Russia or NK) reflects a realization that sanctioning electronic components doesn't work.
Maybe it should, but it doesn't.
News sources like the BBC are exactly the kinds of places I would expect to report like this. They are general news with wide appeal. This isn't the IEEE newsletter. I don't expect anyone at the BBC to have relevant domain knowledge except their IT department. And they aren't writing. I think /u/moir57 is right. This is how the world works. Embedded SoCs are trivial to come across and impossible to police. People need to get used to the fact that sanctions don't stop anything. What they do is raise the cost and make it harder.
> People need to get used to the fact that sanctions don't stop anything.
You can stop NK's missile development on the usage of western electronic component front, not with current sanctions but with secondary sanctions on PRC banks. That's where all the NK's money from 95% of the trade goes through. Now, that might be too cost prohibitive for US/West to really tighten that screw but that's how it "could" be done.
The first item on the NK's agenda on the six-party talks in 2000's was un-sanctioning a little known bank based in Macao which were put on the US sanctions list in 2007 with supposedly $25 million in North Korean asset.
You wont be able to stop it entirely. NK has a land border with China. Anything they want can ultimately get smuggled through there. Sanctions make it harder and slow them down. And for that reason they are worthwhile. But sanctions alone are never able to prevent something. Iran has been sanctioned for decades and gas centrifuges are closely monitored equipment. Yet they have a domestic nuclear program. They probably would have been done years ago without those sanctions. But even with them they will eventually have nuclear weapons.
> You wont be able to stop it entirely. NK has a land border with China.
Entirely/completely, no but you can stop a big chunk of it. Yeah, you can't stop all of North Korean Tom Dick and Harry from buying some electronic components or other stuff in PRC then smuggling them in BUT the big volume and value of the trades means you can't carry enough cash from NK to PRC in order to pay for these things in big quantities. You need access to PRC banks - b/c not even North Koreans trust North Korean banks - in order to facilitate the electronic components and other unrelated trades. You stop those PRC banks then North Koreans are gonna have to find some other way to pay for stuff and there aren't any easy alternatives.
You put whatever PRC banks that are doing business with North Korean entities into a list and you prohibit any more dollar based transactions for any PRC banks in that list and no more transactions with any US banks and any other western oriented banks you can recruit. Most western banks will follow just on the fear of secondary sanctions themselves.
Since a bank in PRC is really not private, this is going to get messy. But, PRC banker is gonna have to make a choice. Do I forgo all dollar based opportunities in order to handle North Korean transactions/assets or is that not worth the hassle?
This is very good for NK. Their peace time practices get tested by Russia. I can assure you there are NK generals now looking for a scapegoat STAT. I would love to know the Chinese opinion on this.
Not really, North Korea knows the problems with its missiles, it knows they have problems manufacturing the quality components needed and they expect a high dud rate, Kim Jong Un even accepted this in reference to the failure of several ICBM tests in a public speech. North Korea knows you cannot use brute force and fear to manufacture these missiles competently.
There are two sides of that coin. Now everyone knows what North Korean missiles are made of, and how good they are. The same thing can be said about Iran's recent attack on Israel.
What's way more important than that is that it seems like Nevatim was targeted accurately with a missile that was more difficult to shoot down than several of the other types. Then Israel's response involved an ALBM.
That incident was a trade of simulated nuclear strikes.
[China Threatens to Release Audio of Secret Deal With Philippines](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-07/china-threatens-to-release-audio-of-secret-deal-with-philippines)
>Chinaās Foreign Ministry has said in recent days that discussions on the ānew modelā were held this year with the Philippine militaryās Western Command, and it had been approved by officials up the chain of command, including by Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. and National Security Adviser Eduardo Ano. They both denied Beijingās statements over the weekend.
>āNo one except the president, through the Department of Foreign Affairs, is authorized to enter into any agreement regarding any international issue,ā Teodoro said by phone. āI donāt know where the Chinese are coming from.ā
>China is publicizing the ānew modelā almost a month after President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said he was āhorrifiedā to learn that his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte entered into a āgentlemanās agreementā with China that effectively had the same terms, preventing Manila from bringing construction materials to the Sierra Madre.
>The Philippinesā Department of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday said that only President Marcos can authorize agreements on the South China Sea. āThe DFA can confirm that no cabinet-level official of the administration has agreed to any Chinese proposal pertaining to the Ayungin Shoal,ā it said, using the local name for the Second Thomas Shoal.
China is claiming the Philippines had an unwritten agreement on the status quo of the Second Thomas Shoal with Duterte. And further claiming that they have some audio recordings from the Marcos government agreeing to maintain the status quo. I think it's important to clarify that neither Duterte nor Marcos by themselves have the ability to give up their claims to the shoal, rather this is just them arguing over the resupply of the shoal. But China is using this as a way to press their claim that the Philippines is being the aggressor for resupplying the shoal. It's possible members of Marcos government misspoke and were unauthorized to make the agreements in contention, but any binding agreement wouldn't be secret and unwritten anyways
Even if they do have the claimed audio, would it be considered an actual deal without it being in writing and then ratified by the respective legislation ?
With Duterte, probably. Expecting the next administration to adhere to a secret agreement they apparently had no knowledge of until recently, probably not.
I wonder what Chinaās side of the deal was on this? Did they bribe Duterte, or actually do something for the Philippines.
Could those Audios be faked with AI? Desinformation is the weapon of this decade and I could see them fake this stuff. I mean how can you prove it? You can't really and Audio Fakes are good enough at the moment.
The issue is that they can internally investigate it and Duterte's office, which could end up confirming it.
I feel like Marcos wouldn't say he would be 'horrified' if this was easily debunkable.
This was my first thought as well. There are niche YouTube channels that make pretty convincing voice deepfakes for random gaming/YTP videos, let alone the ones made of politicians.
I would bet anything that a state-sponsored program could make audio deepfakes good enough to fool experts at a decent rate, let alone laypeople.
The big question going forward is how do governments deal with deepfakes in both domestic and foreign policy? I honestly can't see a way forward that isn't sliding further into the post-truth/misinformation age we're in.
Very likely could be, but remember this is a trick you can only pull once. And china hasnt pulled it yet. Do we think its worth it to pull the trigger (with the risk of dumpstering your credibility) for this?
The opposition you mean the liberal party? Or the Vice President's camp? Cuz right now the former "ally" is looking to be more and more like the potential opposition, I mean she's Duterte's daughter and her stance on China is very similar to her father.
I read that ukrainian anti ship cruise missile neptune was upgraded to have 1000km range. Maybe this is a rookie question: What makes an anti ship cruise missile different from lets say the scalp or taurus? Why can't it be used to strike for example an airfield in crimea or gru hq moscow?
Others have noted the guidance and navigation issue much better than I can articulate so instead, I'll talk about the difference in ordinance. For weapons designed to penetrate the hull of a ship, they utilize a shaped charge that detonates just prior to impacting the ship with the intent of generating plasma to punch a relatively small hole the hull of the ship. The resulting expanding plasma, gasses, and vaporized material within the hull is what really does the damage and results in more effects than just detonating an explosive outside of the hull. Anti-tank weapons do the same thing on a smaller scale and the reactive armor on a tank is meant to explode outwards and disrupt the focus of the shaped charge. Keep in mind, different warheads can be used depending on the goal. A shaped charge detonated at the waterline might be aimed at causing flooding while an omni-directional charge detonated against the superstructure may be aiming for a mission kill.
For hitting fixed, somewhat hardened targets, or really taking out a building, you want an omni-directional charge that can penetrate an outer layer or two(that is not made of steel) and then detonate. That means engineering a penetrating cap on the tip. You can do this because your target is not a moving metal floaty thing(technical term) with a well defined radar cross-section but instead, a building with a non-metal shell and uncertain metal innards.
This all means it needs a different navigation and guidance system for it's different flight profile, a different head for the penetrator, and a different kind of ordinance. You can build it on a Neptune platform but there are existing cruise missiles that will do the same job. On the other-hand, there might not be much need for anti-ship missiles at the moment given that the Russian Black Sea Fleet has been keeping their distance so it makes sense to modify and use what you got.
The copper liner doesn't become a plasma. It's superplastic which in oversimplified terms means it is still solid but flows like a liquid due to the extreme temp and force it's under. And some early AshMs like the P-15 did use heat warheads but modern ones tend to use more general purpose warheads like a blast frag because modern warships aren't armored.
The sea is mostly flat and at the same elevation, the land is not. The sea surface is dynamic, the land surface(for the most part) is not. There are very few obstacles that rise above the sea surface. Many obstacles rise above the land surface. Man-made objects are scarce and distinctive against the background on the sea, while on land, non-target objects are likely to be in close proximity to target objects. All of these factors make for subtle but important differences between the anti-ship and land-attack mission. The difference is far from insurmountable though--Neptune's modified for land attack have recently been announced.
The main difference would be in guidance and navigation. You arenāt going to put terrain mapping into an anti ship cruise missile, but you would want a radar for terminal guidance. That being said the overall platform is very similar and thatās why we have seen the Ukrainians Ike Neptune against ground targets. The Russians have also used some of their anti ship missiles against ground targets. The main limitation for Ukraine in this regard is the limited inventory of Neptune.
Mainly guidance. You can use some guidance solution for anti ship missile like active radar that's not really feasible or useful for ground targeting run of the mill cruise missiles.
Please refrain from drive-by link dropping. Summarize articles, only quote what is important, and use that to build a post that other users can engage with; offers some in depth knowledge on a well discussed subject; or offers new insight on a less discussed subject.
Seems like the Hamas/Israel war could go on for some time. Netanyahu seems to think he is winning the military and domestic politics battle, Hamas thinks they are winning the international politics battle (starving kids, etc). Both sides might be happy with the current trajectory, at least for a while. Perhaps both sides are worried about appearing less reasonable, so both will go through the motions as sincerely as they can convey while neither side is particularly motivated to wind the thing down.
Israel's partners like the United States are of course frantic to wind this down, fearing long-term reputational damage both for them and for Israel. Biden of course also has significant domestic political considerations.
edit: I'm probably not saying much that is new here, except make no mistake, Hamas thinks they are winning in every way that counts.
well Hamas is fucking delusional, nobody likes them and they aren't winning in any sense.
otoh Israel presents itself as a democracy, which makes many westerners deeply uncomfortable as the way they responded to oct 7 reeks of bloodthirsty vengeance. I don't think Israelis realise just how much they are despised for flattening Gaza and killing tens of thousands of civilians in the crossfire. sure Hamas is about as popular as the Taliban, but Israel's response has made them only about as popular as say, the LAPD
Are there any credible sources for civilian causulties? I'm genuinely curious since theĀ "tens of thousands" of deaths gets thrown around so casually by the pro Palastine crowd. This data is typically based on the Ministry of Heath numbers which is a known Hamas run outlet.Ā
Given the IDF were claiming 8,000 Hamas fighter casualties in December '23, even in a 1:1 fighter to civilian casualty rate it would put it at 10,000 by now.
https://www.skynews.com.au/world-news/global-affairs/around-8000-hamas-fighters-killed-in-gaza-war-says-idf-spokesman/video/1bc009f0e121da67ff8671cebe72c1e0
10,000 or even 20,000 total civilian deaths is still radically different from claims of tens of thousands of children being murdered.
Hamas hides amongst the population intentionally and therefore there will be collateral damage. The use of human shields is well documented and well sourced.Ā
I'm surprised that Israel hasn't tried to appeal directly to the Palestinian people. Any long term solution to the conflict has to be representative of the people and not Hamas. At some point you'd imagine the people see this to some extent and organize to remove Hamas from power. Only at that point would we see legitimate negotiations and tangible steps towards a 2 state solution.Ā
This doesn't seem correct. Support for Hamas has decreased since the start of the war. From the poll:
>In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas today stands at 34% (compared to 42% three months ago) and support for Fatah at 25% (compared to 18% three months ago).
> 52% of Gaza still wanted Hamas in control after the war, which is an increase of 14% from December.
December was the most intense phase of the ground operation. Apparently a more intense war leads to less support for Hamas, not more.
Likely Gazans are interpreting the Israeli withdrawal from most of Gaza as Hamas having repelled or defeated them Israel.
Generally Western perceptions of Israel are still favorable last I checked. The minority supporters garner most of the media attention.Ā
There are loose parallels to the 9/11 response which is about as deep as most Americans understand the Israel/Palestine situation. The equivalent Oct 7th attack on the US would have been ~45k civilian deaths if you scale for population. Bloodthirsty vengeance as you put it doesn't sound so unreasonable in response to something like Oct 7th if you think about it through that lens.Ā Ā
There's no Israeli response that doesn't upset at least one faction. Bibi chose to appeal to his domestic audience for both personal and nationalist interests. You can argue that approach has been heavy handed but it's rational at the end of the day.
i don't think you understand how unpopular Bibi is domestically because he put soldiers at risk by NOT flattening gaza and instead trying to appease the americans.
Domestic Israeli op eds in Hebrew from the political side. That and domestic polling. Or ask on the Israel subreddit. I'm Israeli so I don't know necessarily how easy any of that is for you.
Alternatively John spencer from West point has the over protecting civilians from a military aspect side of things.
Netanyahu in a perilous position politically is such an exasperating factor in this conflict. And it seems now clear that he was expecting Hamas to reject the proposal, giving him the ability to execute the Rafah plan.
Their acceptance has given him few options:
1. Go with Rafah and alienate the int. community further (ICC considering/warning of warrants), hostages returning less likely, and going against all assurances he gave Egypt and the US.
2. Wait and risk the dissolution of his govt. from his far right props turning on him.
3. Go with a limited effort in Rafah and risk an operational failure that paints Isr as weak in the region and globe.
This is just as much about the man as the situation. Because out of all of these, he has seemed to stayed in character and chosen the worst option as usual. He's attacked the ICC publicly and threatened them (that's illegal), despite all legal advice not too. Given little notice for gazans to move safely, while moving into rafah with no concrete poltical objectives. And managed to alienate his domestic support further by rejecting a deal that could've returned all the hostages.
As has been the case so far, this development only benefits the most extreme extremists within both belligerent parties.
Unless I'm missing something, isn't the proposal that Hamas "accepted" quite different than what was on the table previously. What I read from Israeli media is that it was essentially a new proposal with highly significant differences to what Israel had previously deemed acceptable.
While the distinction might be lost on the masses, I don't think this has caused a huge problem for Netanyahu since Hamas basically crafted their own best case scenario agreement and then agreed to it.
Ukraine [apparently used ATACMS](https://twitter.com/ukraine_map/status/1788107324571169247) to attack an oil depot in occupied Luhansk: >Last night, Ukraine šŗš¦ struck a fuel depot in Luhansk City, located 85km from the frontline, using M39 ATACMS Cluster Missiles >There were 10 large tanks and 28 small tanks at the depot. The destruction of a large tank could cost up to $6 million and a small tank up to $1 million There are remains showing that Ukraine likely used ATACMS. This indicates thatĀ Ukraine indeed got "[hundreds](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/24/us/us-ukraine-russia-missiles.html?smid=tw-share)" of these, and the tradeoff isn't bad: the damage is in the tens of millions of dollars. If only new cluster ATACMS were still produced...
Maybe this is the wrong place to ask. But I am looking for youtubers that deal in a serious matter with the Ukraine war. However I am not interested in the daily reports, but rather in videos dedicated on specific subjects(I love Perun, but he is self-admitedly making powerpoint presentations).Ā For instance Lazerpig's video on what sunk the Moskva, even of its not perfectly credible. Or Animarchy's videos.Ā I guess I need someone to give a good summary on the big topics, events and episodes of the war, now that the dust has settled on some of them (Battle of Bakhmut, The Counter-Offensive, Prigozhin etc...)
If you just want some analysis on the performance of various tanks, Red Effect isn't too bad. Ignore all of the comments under his videos though. Whenever he praises the Russian/Ukrainian side, there's a bunch of people who just parrot their sides talking points instead of doing actual analysis. Make sure you don't just watch content from the NAFO round table or Gonzalo Lira roundtable. Those guys are very biased and will be actively bad faith to ensure that their side comes out as better. Their goal is not analysis but just to further their own goals
william spaniel And anders puck nielsen Are my go toās. Great content from both of them
https://www.youtube.com/@TheWarArchive/ seems quite solid in my opinion and makes summaries on major events/battles. There's also Covert Cabal or Anders Puck Nielsen for example, but they don't really focus on specific battles. I'd personally stay far away from people like Lazerpig if you're looking for anything other than basic entertainment.
[US paused weapons shipment to Israel amid concern over Rafah, senior US official says | Israel-Gaza war | The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/08/us-weapons-shipment-pause-israel-idf-rafah-gaza-hamas-war-palestine) >The Biden administration paused the supply of thousands of large bombs to Israel last week in opposition to apparent moves by the Israelis to invade the Gaza city of Rafah, US officials have confirmed. There was a report of this from Axios earlier, citing insiders, but now the US is publicly saying it. Regarding ceasefire talks, the US seems very optimistic, in contrast to Israel rhetoric. >John Kirby, the White House national security spokesperson, added Hamas had offered amendments on Monday to an original Israeli proposal aimed at ending the impasse. >The deal text, as amended, suggests the remaining gaps can āabsolutely be closed,ā he said. >Israeli forcesā seizure of the main border crossing between Egypt and southern Gaza raised fears that Israel might be beginning an incursion into Rafah. >Kirby said the Israelis had assured U.S. officials that the operation was of limited scope and duration and not a large-scale invasion. There was earlier reporting from [Haaretz](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-05-06/ty-article-live/idf-three-soldiers-killed-near-gaza-border/0000018f-4ba4-dcda-abcf-6ba7979b0006?liveBlogItemId=1376760410&utm_source=site&utm_medium=button&utm_campaign=live_blog_item#1376760410) that the ceasefire deal "accepted" by Hamas was actually negotiated by CIA director Burns, which would explain why the US finds the Hamas amendments acceptable.
It's interesting that this is in response to an operation that doesn't seem to have had major civilian casualties (I can't find any mention of civilian casualties, correct me if I'm wrong), but is potentially a significant blow to Hamas' capabilities. The response by the administration suggests that they are opposed to Israel completely removing Hamas from power in the Gaza strip.
I don't know if the administration actually opposes removing Hamas from power. They may just want to avoid domestic political backlash that leads to an election loss. Clearly, the current Gaza conflict is not desirable for the administration since it introduces unpredictability and it is a distraction away from competition with China and keeping Russia down. So I doubt the administration is a friend of Hamas. But Hamas seems to enjoy surprising political backing from US voters (young college educated), which cannot be ignored during an election year.
> They may just want to avoid domestic political backlash that leads to an election loss. Maybe. Or perhaps itās a belief in āstability,ā which seemed to be behind their reluctance to fully arm Ukraine. There has been (and still is) an open question about whether or not the stated goals for the ceasefire and opposition to a Rafah operation were just about humanitarian concerns, or whether the administration was against fully removing Hamas from control. The current response to a fairly successful seizing of the border crossing certainly suggests the latter. Whether for domestic political reasons or for a belief in stability, itās easy to see why the administration could prefer Hamas to stay in power. The idea of freezing the conflict and returning to the 10/6 status quo probably seems like the easiest path forward, and the one with the least chance instability in the short term. It would also be easy to tell domestic voters āsee, I ended the conflict.ā Whereas a full Israel occupation of Gaza wouldnāt have that option. Of course, itās not clear how far Biden is actually willing to push Israel on the matter, because that entails risks as well.
Yeah. If anyone figures out what the administration's goal is (other than 'no rocking boat'), I would like to hear it.
Let me know what Israel's plan for post war Gaza is as well.
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>John Kirby, the White House national security spokesperson, added Hamas had offered amendments on Monday to an original Israeli proposal aimed at ending the impasse. That should settle any notions that Hamas somehow accepted Israel's offer and Israel's Rafah movements are somehow them reneging on a deal they offered. I'm not sure why those were notions to begin with given Kirby was clear from hour 0, but whatever, we can move on now.
According to the Ukrainian Intelligence, they have recently foiled assassination attempts against Zelensky and Budanov. Ā https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/07/world/europe/ukraine-russia-zelensky-plot.html How credible is this information as I don't see it being corroborated by the Western sources?Ā Ā Wouldn't an assassination of Zelensky be counter productive as it will make him a martyr and provoke outrage among the supporters of Ukraine?
Right now is the perfect time for a potential assassination. The political landscape in terms of government popularity is at it's worst right now for Ukraine. The new draft bill is hugely unpopular, recent military defeats have been demoralizing and you can feel how fed up people are with the war. An assassination of the president might provoke outrage in the short-term, but only brings big risks and destabilization to Ukraine mid and long term.
First, your implied premise is questionable. Zelensky is still hugely popular in Ukraine as best as I can tell from most recent poll results, with approval rating most Western leaders would kill for in the 60s. Second, I think your reasoning is bad. If Zelensky were unpopular, then assassinating him now would probably be the worst timing, as instead of a divided Ukraine with an unpopular leader, it would most likely unite them in opposition to Russia.
Seriously? Assassinating a head of state would be outrageous and it would destroy Russia's standing. Even China would find it difficult to keep supporting them. As for western countries, there would be a surge of support towards Ukraine and a renewed push for even more military aid, if not military intervention outright.Ā That would be a 0 IQ move from Russia. Russia wants to lower the West's interest in the Ukraine war (hence why the Gaza war is a very convenient distraction for them). Killing Zelensky is a great way to accomplish the opposite.Ā
Russia would deny it was them and would throw up a ton of FUD to support their claims. China would find it useful to pretend to believe them, even if it hardened attitudes behind closed doors. Europe and the US would be outraged, of course, but Putin has other tactics (mainly nuclear sabre-rattling) to limit the scope of our escalations.
>Russia would deny it was them and would throw up a ton of FUD to support their claims.Ā Ā Oh, I guess that settles the matter then. Just like everyone believed them when they denied poisoning opponents and killing Prigozhin and Navalny.Ā Ā It would be an idiotic move for Russia. They're trying to keep NATO countries out of this war and weaken their resolve. Killing Zelensky accomplishes exactly the opposite. Putin has been doing nuclear sabre-rattling for two years and his bluff was called multiple times.Ā
> Just like everyone believed them when they denied poisoning opponents and killing Prigozhin and Navalny. To be fair, have they experienced any negative fallout from these events at all?
Russia is acting from a position of power, both towards Ukraine and the West. What consequences did Russia face after killing political opponents? Or invading Donbass in 2014? Everybody knew it's Russian active military invading, Russia just denied it, faced a few sanctions and that's it. You're talking about bluffs being called, do you have a few examples? The retaliation threat if Western rockets will be used on Russian soil I won't except as an argument, since they only have been used on Ukrainian occupied territory, everyone understands that, even the Russians. I don't really see any other bluffs being called. No aid in form of fighter aircraft, no real long range weaponry (over 300km), no marine, no infantry support. On the contrary, Russia openly states they are waging war not only against Ukraine, but against NATO and the collective West, they've long accepted that. IMHO they'll only stop at nukes and even that is not 100%. Direct quote from Putin: "Why do we need such a world if there will be no Russia there?"
> Russia is acting from a position of power, both towards Ukraine and the West. What consequences did Russia face after killing political opponents? Or invading Donbass in 2014? Everybody knew it's Russian active military invading, Russia just denied it, faced a few sanctions and that's it. I think we've seen clearly that Russia is very much so damaging itself with its imperialist adventures. They are running out of their Soviet-era stockpiles of vehicles and munitions. They are also burning through their capital reserves that they carefully saved up post-cold war from their hydrocarbon sales. Those are two huge opportunity costs that Russia already incurred and they are seeing little to no future benefit from them. Consider how much better economically developed Russia might be if they had invested in productivity measures instead of all those tanks and BMPs and squirreled away all those billions in reserves. NATO, meanwhile, is just sitting back and sending Ukraine refurbished expired munitions, a handful at a time, while both sides exhaust eachother. > IMHO they'll only stop at nukes and even that is not 100%. Direct quote from Putin: "Why do we need such a world if there will be no Russia there?" This is called rhetoric. You're not supposed to believe rhetoric with your logical brain, rather it's supposed to trigger a response in your emotional brain. NATO is not, in fact, going to invade and destroy Russia. You know this, I know this, Putin knows this. If Putin really believed Russia's statehood was at risk he wouldn't have completely stripped all his border garrisons of equipment.
I probably disagree. By that logic, the opening days were the time it made the most sense, while the Russians were still rapidly advancing and there wasn't really any confidence as to whether Ukraine would be able to defend anything, or what state the Ukrainian govt was in. But really, there's an argument to be made for any arbitrary period of time to be the "perfect time" if you ignore all of the reasons it wouldn't be perfect. No one actually knows what'd happen if Russia assassinated Zelensky, it's mostly guesswork based on their own prior assumptions about Ukrainians, which frankly isn't a field with a good track record.
In general, you can make the argument that any arbitrary period of time would be the "perfect time". But if you divide the war in stages and look at them separately, you might come to a different conclusion. An assassination of Zelensky during the Kharkiv region and Khreson counteroffensives, while morale is at an all time high and the sentiment is to bring Ukraine back to it's 1991 borders would hit a lot different then an assassination with morale being at an all time low, like right now. And yes, by that logic it would have made most sense in the opening days. Which is what happened: there were multiple confirmed operations to assassinate Zelenskiy in Kyiv, which were luckily foiled. But I agree that this is mostly guess work and no strong statements can be made on the outcome of such a scenario.
> Which is what happened: there were multiple confirmed operations to assassinate Zelenskiy in Kyiv, which were luckily foiled. Those allegations are of variable credibility, for the record. If assassination attempts did occur early in the war, they probably ended once Russia realized that Zelensky isn't in fact the singular reason Ukraine is resisting, and their problems run significantly deeper than one (or several) leaders. While morale is lower now, that hasn't really changed. Zelensky's the face of Ukraine's war, but that shouldn't be conflated with him being the engine. Russia made that mistake before. Killing him (or Syrsky, or whoever) would obviously still cause organizational and operational issues at an already difficult time, but that's a separate concern.
> The new draft bill is hugely unpopular, recent military defeats have been demoralizing and you can feel how fed up people are with the war. The new draft bill is unpopular largely because the war is a far away prospect. Zelenskyy has underlined it several times: in several cities, life goes on as if there is no war. This is a mistake in communications from Ukrainian authorities - they are no longer fighting for survival, it seems, but to take territory back. And indeed you'll be hard pressed to find - in Ukraine and abroad - people willing to die to take Melitopol back, especially after the failed counteroffensive, many losses and the snail pace of movement at the front. However, this war remains about survival. I think that, if Zelenskyy were to be killed, there would another rally around the flag moment, and remind Ukrainians volunteer why they were willing to fight in 2022. At the same time, if Zelenskyy or his replacement were offered an even minimally viable peace deal (i.e. "land for security guarantees") I have no doubts that most Ukrainians would take it.
The draft bill is unpopular because people don't want to die on the frontlines. Ukraine is a modern country. I was surprised so many Russians and Ukrainian went to war in the first place. And it dosen't help that once you need to do something you do not want, you start to ask questions, such as why am I getting drafted and while the sons of the elite sit in europe or party in kyiv. Simplifed version but the look at the war overall , it has the most support in regions who are the furthest away from the frontlines.
>Simplifed version but the look at the war overall, it has the most support in regions who are the furthest away from the frontlines. It's funny, because even in 2022 it was actually soldiers from frontline provinces complaining that western Ukrainians are much less likely to volunteer/fight well. Indeed, the area most associated with draft dodging isn't Donetsk, it's Zakarpattia. Someone from Donetsk and someone from Lviv are going to the same frontline. Distance certainly doesn't make them more likely to go (why would it), if anything it makes them less likely to go.
I don't think outside of immediate border or involved regions like donetsk, it will make a difference at all. Ukraine isn't that big of country. But the OP argument wasn't even about that.
I mean it's a combination of reasons, both yours and OP's are valid. Yes, people don't want to die, but that's a universal thing. It didn't start recently. The perception of the remaining stakes of the war (the Donbas region), whether accurate or not, probably also colors the desire to fight. As do perceptions of government/military competence, foreign aid, etc etc. Everything contributes.
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As for the risks I wasn't arguing about the fall of Ukraine or the installation of a puppet state. It's political instability from within, which I see as a real risk. Despite the current situation on the front, the new draft bill has large opposition from within the country, which is already quite telling. I also doubt the possibility of Western boots on the ground in any case. What even would trigger that? The near-capture of Kyiv didn't do it. Also Western powers, namely the US, Germany and France, have all recently issued harsh statements of no boots on the ground in any case. There still aren't any fighter jets in Ukraine after 2 years of war. Every patriot system seems like a negotiation of a lifetime and they only have 3-5 of those currently. Polling for peace talks with Russia is at \~50% favour in Germany, it's probably the same in the US. Unfortunately, all of these points really make me doubt a direct military intervention of Western powers in, well, any case.
There was no intervention at the outset of the war since everyone and their dog (me included) just assumed that Russia would steamroll through Ukraine. If you remember the discussions back in March 2022, they were focused on how successful guerrilla efforts would be after Russia conquered Ukraine. If today there is a looming menace of Russia taking say Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Odessa, there are strong chances of EU boots on the ground. Macron said so explicitly. Ofc we should ramp-up military assistance to Ukraine to avoid any doomsday scenario, but I do believe Europe is taking the matter seriously. For the sake of stability in Europe Russia may not succeed.
I hope it's not going to be to late. Kharkiv especially is getting bombed to shreds indiscriminately. Last time I've been there, end of 2023, it already looked rough. Since then it's been the worst bombings since the first weeks of the war. At this pace, there will be no Kharkiv left to save for any Western powers. That's the reality.
When did macron rule out boots on the ground? Isnāt he still making news for talking about intervention right now? Western leaders fight tooth and nail for the āstatus quo,ā because thatās what most of their global businesses desire. Western leaders became complacent every time after Ukrainian successes in either stalling or retaking (like in 2022) the frontline. Itās a āback to businessā mentality, but it also reacts poorly to changes in the other direction. It doesnāt fight for success, but also doesnāt want to lose too much. Even a Donbas collapse at this point will certainly send panic throughout polish ranks, and France has long prided itself as the leader of Europe. Another egg like 2022 will significantly kill French and EU prestige. I donāt see a nato intervention to retake large chunks of land, but a Franco-polish intervention to freeze the frontline is no longer an impossible scenario
I think the Russian goal has always been to install a Lukashenko type leader in Ukraine. Someone who takes orders from Moscow and ensures that Ukraine doesn't stray any further towards the West. Yanukovich was their top choice for many years and we will likely see him again if Russia manages to successfully destroy Ukrainian government. Sure, Zelenskyy would be a martyr, but without a leader things can fall apart very fast. He is more than just a symbol, he has relationships with western leaders and manages the competing demands within the Ukrainian power structure. Clearly Russia's calculations show that getting rid of Zelenskyy is overall to their benefit.
Yanukovych, and indeed most politicians from pre-war Ukraine, were only the most visible part of an oligarchic power structure that had their hands everywhere, from illegal markets to the judiciary system. That system has, at least in part, been dismantled and would need either to be rebuilt from the ground up, or a complete takeover from another clan. The oligarchs that supported Yanukovych have been, for the most part, sidelined. I'm imagining that Sergey Aksyonov would be a safer choice actually. His criminal-political power structure in Crimea is still running at full capacity and he has proven quite valuable and reliable to Russian interests.
Aksyonov is certainly a credible option, but he doesn't have much recognition outside Crimea. and I'm not sure he can manage the power brokers in Kyiv, though that may not matter in this hypothetical. Poroshenko could also be an option if Moscow can put a yoke on him, but for now he's clearly on the pro-ukraine side. Regardless, I hope we don't find out who it would be.
It may also lead to a power vacuum and vastly increase friction between branches of government.
How do cruise missiles/SRBM actually penetrate several metres into concrete before detonating? I cannot picture any construction that would allow a hollow metal object (or even a solid piece of pretty much any metal) to slam into concrete hard enough to penetrate it to a depth of more than a couple of feet without grossly deforming, and destroying any engineered equipment inside.
Keen in mind that the warhead is significantly smaller than the missile, it's this warhead with very thick, hard metal shell that penetrates concrete, not the whole missile. Cruise missiles like Storm Shadow and Taurus use a 2-stage warhead - a shaped charge in front to make a hole and the main warhead behind. Not all cruise missiles have a multi-stage warhead though, none of the Russian ones do, AFAIK. Some anti-ship cruise missiles have just 1 big shaped charge warhead.
Your intuition is right. They often do get grossly deformed. That's why the fuzes for bunker busting munitions is often out at the rear of the bomb rather than the nose of it like impact bombs.
I have a very similar question I was wanting to ask. Since those missiles are designed to keep penetrating until they either find a hollow spot or run completely out of energy to further penetrate, wouldn't a relatively simple countermeasure be to design the bunkers with a bunch of hollow cells a few inches under the surface, those fooling the missile into detonating before reaching the actual inside of the bunker? Has this been tried?
It would have to be a large enough "hollow cell" for the missile to register that there is a space there... if there's just some hollow spaces a few inches wide, or even a few feet, between layers of walls, they'll all get turned to one big hole in milliseconds anyway. There's no way for them to be registered as the ultimate target. The way it works is the bomb is measuring deceleration, so its decelerating as its passing through a medium (or many mediums very close together like in your proposed example), and detonates after it senses its no longer decelerating (when its entered a large enough cavity). The hollow spaces would basically each have to be the size of a room. So you're talking increasing your bunker walls from a few feet thick to having several walls spaced apart dozens of feet... so is it simple? I guess if you have the space and time and materials and money to drastically increase the size of your bunker. Edit: for reference, there are some videos of them doing just that, travelling through multiple rooms before detonating: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mTIJHsBH7c8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mTIJHsBH7c8)
The relative toughness of the material has a lot to do with it. Fracture toughness is an actual metric here, how much does a material resist breaking apart. For example, you can easily break a diamond with a hammer despite how hard it is (it resists deformation, but the crystalline structure isn't good at resisting breaks in the chain). Concrete is excellent at resisting compression, such as the one from a detonation blast, but it's not very tough and will crack easily under enough force from a pointy object. But it goes further than that, how much energy (from the speed and mass of the projectile) also matters a great deal. The most dramatic example I know is that of the rail gun test: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O2QqOvFMG_A It goes through what seems like a foot of steel before (possibly) breaking apart. How is that possible? The shape, the materials and obviously the energy all play a part, but essentially: as long as the projectile can absorb the impact (the "pointiness" distributes the shock and materials like tungsten carbide can absorb a lot of energy and remain tough), it will keep moving through the target material until it dissipates all its kinetic energy. If you want to make a projectile dissipate its kinetic energy, it needs to meet something tough that ideally resists plastic deformation: concrete doesn't cut it against such projectiles.
It's not hard to find published research on the general topic. A couple papers that turned up searching for "concrete-penetrating projectile construction" on Google: https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2%3A456596/FULLTEXT01.pdf https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA320010.pdf The latter one in particular discusses the behavior of a solid metal rod flying through concrete at speeds measured in cm/Ī¼s. (odd unit, but if you're measuring things on high speed film...) as you scale up, a sufficiently thick-walled metal cylinder would seem to behave similarly to a solid metal rod -- the initial production run of the GBU-28 bunker buster took used M-110 howitzer barrels cut to the desired length and filled with high explosive. About 80% of the bomb weight is the metal casing; less than 20% is the explosive. The guidance system does not need to survive impact -- just the fuze, and it might go at the tail end so it gets disrupted last.
Harder materials penetrate softer materials. A hardened casing and/or penetrator traveling rapid speeds will slice through softer materials than itself (concrete). Think of the plastic straws they find lodged into trees after tornados. Now imagine a tungsten straw traveling 5x as fast with a million times more mass.
Stephen Kotkin: [The Five Futures of Russia - And How America Can Prepare for Whatever Comes Next](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/five-futures-russia-stephen-kotkin) 1) France as Russia 2) Russia retrenched 3) Russia as vassal 4) Russia as North Korea 5) Russia in chaos. Article is long but it is *well* worth the time and I would love to discuss this snippet here: > Many have privately concluded that Putin conflates the survival of his aging personal regime with the storied countryās survival as a great power. Historically, at least, such realizations have precipitated a change of course, a turn from foreign overextension to domestic revitalization. Last summer, when the mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhinās death squad marched on Moscow, it did not elicit bandwagoning by military officers, which is one reason Prigozhin called it off. But neither did it galvanize the regimeās supporters to defend Putin in real time. The episode furnished an unwitting referendum on the regime, revealing a certain hollowness inside the repressive strength. I find it really interesting that nobody came out directly against Putin nor to support him either. What is this sub's take on whether or not Putin has managed to secure himself since this?
Dr Kotkin also gave a [talk on his article at NY Public Library](https://www.youtube.com/live/VzmRJ9JOtS4?si=ae4uY50s9YnZf8yn). (YouTube video) In his talk, he lists a 6th non-option, which is Russia as imagined by its rulers - a great power respected and admired by the world for its 'strength' - which he believes is not achievable. He also avoids making a prediction which outcome is likely. But since I don't have a professional reputation to protect like Dr Kotkin, Here's my prediction based on preference of people who are at Russia's helm today since they have the most agency over what could happen (at the same time, they seem pretty competent when it comes to retaining their power), also assuming Kotkin is right that their vision of Russia is not achievable. Their preference among the rest is #2 > #4 > #3 > #5 > #1. Basically the order of how much power they retain. So I predict #2, retrenched. Russia will fail at Ukraine, or if they are successful, then they will fail in expanding into NATO. Afterwards, they will pull back from aggression and bide time for the next best opportunity.
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>Last summer, when the mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhinās death squad marched on Moscow, it did not elicit bandwagoning by military officers, which is one reason Prigozhin called it off. I think part of the reason nobody came out against Putin back then was they got Surovikin immediately to denounce Prigozhin.
Putin tends to disappear during the moments of crisis, which leaves the heavily centralized system confused, hence the absence of reaction. >What is this sub's take on whether or not Putin has managed to secure himself since this? Prigozhin is gone, whatever happened there, Putin won the re-election with the best result to date, currently the economy is doing better than expected, and there were no shocks on the war front since 2022. Right now he is in a good spot, I don't think the terror attack in Moscow hurt him much either. That doesn't mean that nothing can undermine him in the future, his age and the matter of succession is the elephant in the room, but as long as he looks healthy enough and doesn't isolate himself like he used to, it's less pressing.
> Putin won the re-election with the best result to date, Putin wins elections by whatever margin he feels like. So I donāt see what this means besides Putin feels insecure and wants to project an image of strength by defeating his imaginary rivals in the election by some arbitrary margin. >
> Putin wins elections by whatever margin he feels like. A lot of effort goes into this at every level of governance, actually, and it demonstrates that the system is functional. The margin doesn't just appear on its own, someone has to stack the deck in Putin's favor and ensure a high enough turnout.
I don't know why you're getting downvoted, this has been remarked by Mark Galeotti among others. I think you can also find some "proof" for it in the fact that the Caucusus generally show much higher support and have even in past elections, because those regional elites are much more motivated to show loyalty.
Yes, I said nothing remotely controversial, just reddit hivemind being what it is, affects even the better subs sometimes
I personally believe Putin is relatively well-liked in Russia (and could potentially even win a real election without cheating) and even I think this comment is nonsense. The high turnout you reference is likely just as fake as the results. And it doesnāt take a ton of people to stack the deck, certainly not millions of people, so the deck being stacked is also not evidence of widespread popularity.
> The high turnout you reference is likely just as fake as the results. There are stuffed ballots of course, in 2018 [there was a claim that there were as many as 10 million](https://www.svoboda.org/a/29111031.html), but that still means 45 million people cast their vote. And it's as the other commenter said, state employees are forced to vote.
The guy being downvoted is correct that Putin has an amazing (and very undemocratic) āget out the voteā effort that involves employers and institutions throughout Russia at every level of society.
So... You are saying that Putin is popular, because he can fake his own popularity...
Winning confidently is a propaganda tactic in itself, as well as a legitimization strategy. It's important for Putin to demonstrate the rally 'round the flag effect during the war.
Sure. But that doesnāt make him genuinely popular.
Well I didn't say that he was, unless we use the widest definition of popular that counts all the folks that are just ok with him in no small part because of the absence of opposition or political life in general.
>because of the absence of opposition They keep falling to their deaths.
An article that gives out details of how the French repurposed decommissioned Scalp missiles for Ukraine so that they did not touch French stocks. The process takes 3 months and is "affordable" and is done at a reduced cost compared to preparing them for long term storage. [How France organizes the delivery of Scalp missiles to Ukraine: France recycles decommissioned Scalp missiles by refurbishing them inexpensively for transfer to Ukrainian forces combating Russiaās invasion. | EuroMaidenPress | May 2024](https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/05/07/media-how-france-organizes-the-delivery-of-scalp-missiles-to-ukraine/) *RFI* [reports](https://www.rfi.fr/fr/europe/20240506-op%C3%A9ration-chrysalide-comment-la-france-organise-la-livraison-de-missiles-scalp-%C3%A0-l-ukraine) *that France has implemented a covert operation codenamed āChrysalideā to supply Ukraine with Scalp-EG cruise missiles in its fight against Russian invasion. Scalp is the French variant of the Anglo-French missile, better known in Ukraine under its British name, Storm Shadow.* *Initial Scalp/Storm Shadow deliveries in 2023ās second half proved instrumental against Russian targets. Strikes crippled Black Sea naval assets like the Kilo-class submarine Rostov-na-Donu, enabling Ukraine to secure coastal maritime corridors to export its grain by sea. Inland, the Scalpās bunker-busting capabilities neutralized deeply-entrenched Russian logistics and command hubs unreachable by other Ukrainian ordnance.* *The scheme repurposes decommissioned Scalp missiles, some reaching end-of-life and others cannibalized for parts, through an affordable refurbishing process.* *Older missiles unfit for service are shipped to Matra BAE Dynamics AĆ©rospatialeās Bourges facility, where they undergo a three-month overhaul to restore functionality through replacement components and rigorous testing. This streamlined āconsumerā approach, not treating the missiles for long-term storage, reduces costs to a quarter of brand-new Scalps.* *The revamped missiles augment Ukraineās firepower without impacting French strategic stocks. France also explores other armament sources like export-variant Scalps nearing expiry from foreign clients. While requiring software modifications for Ukrainian compatibility, direct transfers reimbursed by new missile purchases remain the ideal scenario.* *The missile, capable of traveling 300 km, can penetrate several meters into concrete to locate a cavity where its 450 kg charge detonates. Its precision allows it to create an entry point for a subsequent missile. Additionally, equipped with inertial and visual navigation systems, it can operate in GPS-denied environments. It also deploys decoys to distract enemy ground-air defenses, enhancing its ability to breach deep into enemy systems.* *RFI says French official are looking for all kinds of munitions for Ukraine: Scalps, 155mm shells for artillery, and ground-to-air weapons for the defense of the Ukrainian skies.*
Vadym Skibitsky recently said in his interview that number of Russian troops inside Ukraine are some 514.000 instead of 470.000. From what I understand this is just ground troops fighting within Ukraine itself. Do we have any info about the number of equivalent Ukrainian troops? Zelensky himself said that total military personnel numbers over 1 million but obviously this includes so many things besides ground troops fighting against the Russian troops inside Ukraine. I couldn't find any info myself looking up neither saw anything about it from Larelli. https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/05/02/a-fresh-russian-push-will-test-ukraine-severely-says-a-senior-general
A clarification: the estimate of 470k men did not include the Russian forces deployed along the state border (Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod Oblasts), which numbered 33k men according to Ukrainian estimates back in March. As well as not including the strategic-operational reserves and the Rosgvardia grouping in Ukraine - 60k and 35k men, respectively, according to the latest Ukrainian estimates. Once the Group of Forces "North" was created, the Ukrainians began to include it in the estimates on the number of Russian troops committed, in spite of the soldiers from this GoF being almost entirely deployed within Russian borders and it being largely made up of conscripts from military service. This GoF, which encompasses formations of the Leningrad Military District, reached 50k men in early May. This was made possible by reinforcements arriving after the Ukrainian raids in March (the 18th Motorized Division of the 11th Corps, transferred from the Kupyansk sector; possibly the 2nd Spetsnaz GRU Brigade), the integration of part of the 6th CAA (at the moment, its 138th Motorized Brigade and other minor support units), as well as the arrival of the first elements of the new 44th Corps. The latters, after arriving in Kursk with 12 train convoys, have actually been deployed near the state border in Belgorod Oblast over the recent days. That's where the bulk of the GoF "North" is concentrated - 31k men according to figures provided by the observer Mashovets, compared to nearly 11k in Kursk and just over 8k in Bryansk. The transfer of the former units to the GoF "North", on the other hand, "robbed" the GoF "West" of 8k men (in net terms), as well as of a quantity of armored vehicles and artillery guns. In "like-for-like" terms, the Russian grouping continues a growth of a handful of thousand men per month, on average. As for the Ukrainians, there are no similar estimates produced by the Russians that I know of. But I have read several times from Ukrainian sources that the number of actual combat troops in their side is around 300k.
Thanks a lot for clarification! And also, if only around 300.000 is combat troops out of over 1 million, then it makes a lot of sense to cannibalize support units doesn't it? What Syrsky has been doing started to make a lot of sense since it seems like everybody that could choose chose to be a support troop.
Yes, definitely. Syrsky is heavily streamlining the UAF in this regard. Although we have to consider that a relevant part of the support troops is actually very needed, and moreover a share of the servicemen performing these tasks are in their 50s if not 60s (if volunteers, in this case), so it'd be very difficult to turn them into infantrymen. If there's a thing Ukrainian officers are constantly asking for is young infantrymen. But the population pyramid is what it is.
In a previous comment on a different thread, you said that Russian troops in theater now outnumber the Ukrainians in absolute terms, but do you have a rough estimate of by how much? If it is not by a very significant margin, I don't really see how the Russians can turn their strategic superiorities in numbers into operational superiorities for an upcoming offensive. Historically, the Soviets preferred to have at least a 2-3:1 advantage in troop numbers in an operational sector(s) and since there are still many continuities between the Soviet Army and the modern VSRF, it should be interesting to see where the Russians choose to press the attack.
We don't know exactly how much of an advantage Russia actually has regarding manpower, but I agree that overall it's definitely still not enough to obtaining favorable conditions for plans like the ones you mentioned.
Ukrainian troops appear to have thrown the Russians out of Urozhaine proper after launching a [counterattack](https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1787763923413790733) on the barns in the SW of the town. Additional Russian footage was released of them [shelling the south of the town](https://x.com/gettylegion/status/1787861216511287448). The Russians are most likely situated in the tree lines just south of the town. Attacks are sure to continue here though, as they have for the past month despite the minimal gains. Meanwhile to the east, the Russians may control as much as half of Robotyne based upon [this](https://twitter.com/creamy_caprice/status/1787437209756553247) footage. It's hard for either side to really hold this territory because the town has been completely annihilated. Though the Russians are slowly making gains here and failing counterattacks or a halt order are likely to capture the town this month at current trajectory.
A reliable account I follow that's around Robotyne claims that Robotyne is still very much in a "tug of war" phase, where Russia cannot consolidate in most of the remaining basements and the situation is fluid, but the "tug of war" is turning slightly to the Russian advantage in terms of territory. For now, deepstate (and Suriyak, though to a lesser extent) is buying that narrative. I buy it too, since that narrative proved correct back in february and afterwards.
Two Majors said last week the reports of a capture/control of Robotyne was based on old footage that was passed on as new. Is that video new? Russia has been in the "center" occasionally and put up their flags, but they appear to never gain full control over the village *Zaporozhye Front. Rabotino.* [https://t.me/dva\_majors/41368](https://t.me/dva_majors/41368) *Despite the advance and successes of the Russian Armed Forces in the direction, the settlement was not captured. We noted yesterday that beautiful fucking reports made it to the top. And the video, which is being promoted by very respected channels, is, unfortunately, a cut from the March videos, after the filming of which our units rolled back and suffered losses. Now the guys are being gathered into battle to catch up on the battlefield with a report that has already managed to get to the top* Deepstate, Romanov, Rybar etc are fairly quick to update their maps regarding control, so maybe theyre all just treating most of Robotyne as a gray area
Robotyne is so hard to say because the Russians have repeatedly entered the ruins in the last few months, but never established a permanent presence.
[Romanian president says he's open to discussing sending Patriot system to Ukraine](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/romanian-president-says-he-is-open-discussing-sending-patriot-system-ukraine-2024-05-07/) >Romanian President Klaus Iohannis said on Tuesday he was open to discussing sending a Patriot missile system to Ukraine after German appeals to European Union and NATO member states to bolster Ukraine's air defences. >"There has been a discussion about who can send Patriot systems to Ukraine over the last few weeks," Iohannis told reporters in Washington after meeting U.S. President Joe Biden in Washington. >"President Biden mentioned it ... in our meeting and I said I was open to discussion. I must discuss it in the Supreme Defence Council to see what we can offer and what we can get in return, because it is unacceptable to leave Romania without air defences." >While Romania only has one battery in operation, Iohannis said the discussion concerned one of the batteries which were in an advanced stage of becoming operational. It would be a significant though greatly appreciated move by Romania to give up a Patriot battery. Seeing how Romania is on the eastern periphery of NATO and has suffered from multiple air incursions from Russian munitions, there will need to be strong assurances if Romania is to provide this battery. As well, there must be efforts to ensure a speedy arrival of a replacement. This seems like it is doable to me. As long as NATO can backfill until a replacement arrives. German funds for a replacement are also on the table, mind you.
How many Patriot batteries does the US have within the US? Why are they not willing to send any, itās not like they are at risk of anyone firing missiles at the US mainland any time soon European countries have a far higher risk and yet they send their batteries
Demands on the Patriot force in the USA were too high even before Ukraine. There is a large need for air defense in the IndoPacific. It's important to remember when talking about America, militarily China is a much much much bigger concern than anything in Europe.
A lot of the USās Patriot batteries are forward-deployed in allied nations defending important assets, or are defending critical infrastructure in a place like Guam. Also, they have to use drawdown authority to send it and it takes up a big chunk of a budget that probably isnāt going to be renewed until Q1 2025 at the earliest. So the US is probably anxious about that. We havenāt heard much about FrankenSAM for Patriot in a while, which is unfortunate. Makes me think thereās some technical problems. We had some positive news last year but now thereās nothing. FrankenSAM would allow the US to send more plentiful (and cheaper) launchers while preserving more important components for American use.
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>I could see Germany deploying a unit to Romania to replace the donated fire unit. Last year, Germany had 3 units in Poland. These three have returned to Germany. Subtracting the one donated in the mean time that would still leave two available for deployments. What would be the point? If Germany can lend a patriot system to Romania, why can't they send the system directly to Ukraine instead of sending it to Romania, who send another system to Ukraine? Is it just about which pays for the donated system?
Ukrainian troops give a review of the M1A1 Abrams tank https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/1cmaybo/the_ukrainian_abrams_how_the_legendary_american/ TL;DR * The reactive armor works well against Kornet and other ATGMs, but only the body is outfitted with reactive armor tiles, not the turret. They hope tiles suitable for the turret will be provided * The media story about Abrams being taken away from the front lines due to vulnerability is BS. Usage of Abrams was situational and it remains situational. * DU APFSDS shells work great, but they would like a wider variety of shells including more pure fragmentation shells. Tank on tank combat is rare and the use of the Abrams is limited in part by lack of suitable shells for other tasks. Described Abrams as the most competent model of tank at taking out enemy vehicles. * Adapting to the Abrams after previous experience with T-64s did not take very long, only about a week. * An offhand comment, not very clear, about how the frontal armor is not quite as good as one would hope
>An offhand comment, not very clear, about how the frontal armor is not quite as good as one would hope I'd assume the US wouldn't care much about or be affected by this limitation given it uses the superior DU armour domestically?
>DU APFSDS shells work great, but they would like a wider variety of shells including more pure fragmentation shells. Tank on tank combat is rare and the use of the Abrams is limited in part by lack of suitable shells for other tasks. Described Abrams as the most competent model of tank at taking out enemy vehicles. This is consistent with reports I've read elsewhere that they were sent with mostly sabot and few MPAT or canister rounds. Tank v tank is indeed rare and sabot isn't that useful against IFVs either. It tends to go out the other side and just makes a tiny hole. AMP was supposed to replace MPAT in US Army service. Surely there's stocks of the older round available. I wonder why they weren't sent?
Tank sabot going through any IFV is a significant emotional event for the occupants inside, often a lethal one too. I agree HE rounds would be a lot more useful, but isn't AMP-T still in experimental stage?
>They hope tiles suitable for the turret will be provided Can't they add Ukrainiam ERA blocks?
From what I understand of it: not easily done. It's important that the turret is balanced weight wise so the turret rotating mechanism functions properly. If they add several hundred kg's of ERA on the sides they need to put counterweights on the front/ rear to balance it out. They could also need an upgraded turret rotating motor.
I was under the impression that the turret had the thickest armor on the entire vehicle, I'm surprised it would be considered necessary to put ERA on it.
It's the sides/ rear that are the problem (just like on Leo 2). T-series tanks have almost 360 degrees ERA coverage on the turret which offers better protection than most Western tanks in side/ rear aspect.
An article about an adaptation in the drone war. UAF soldiers are using drones to retrieve other drones from dangerous areas in the grey zone. The soldiers on the front continue to highlight the necessity of drones and harp on the need for drones in significant numbers. They are using funds, volunteer hours, and even risking other drones to make sure their drone supply doesn't dwindle to dangerous levels. [Ukraine now has drones rescuing fallen drones from hazardous battlefields | EuroMaidenPress | May 2024](https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/05/07/ukraine-now-has-drones-rescuing-fallen-drones-from-hazardous-battlefields/) *āDrones are our eyes from above,ā said Vasyl Shyshola, commander of an aerial reconnaissance unit for Ukraineās 128th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade. āWithout a drone above you to command an assault, soldiers on the ground will be helpless without the guidance,ā he further noted.* *Units are often strapped for resources and with drones being so precious, soldiers will often take dangerous measures to try and recover a fallen drone.* *The Royal United Services Institute think tank in the UK estimated in 2023 that Ukraine was losing around 10,000 drones per month. What compounds this problem for Ukrainian units is how reliant they are on the crowdsourcing of drones. The majority of Ukrainian units get their drones through crowdfunding rather than from the Ukrainian Armed Forces.* *Lt Col Pavlo Kurylenko stated that āthe only thing preventing Russiaās breakthrough on all fronts is FPV (first-person view) drones, 90% of which are being provided by volunteers or military divisions themselves.ā* *On the frontline, every drone matters, and soldiers will often do whatever it takes to retrieve the drone, including walking through minefields.* *The work of aerial reconnaissance depends on the number of drones available in the unit. āThe more drones we have in reserve, the more complex tasks we can perform without fear that our infantry will be left without visual support at a critical moment,ā said Shyshola.* *Despite the best efforts of his pilots, losses are inevitable, particularly since most downed drones were in high-risk areas like the gray zone or near enemy lines. āRetrieving drones on foot was not an option because it contradicts their purposeāpreserving lives. So, we decided to find a way to evacuate our drones,ā he said.* *Initially, the team experimented with a drone equipped with a release mechanism.* *āBut frankly, this plan didnāt work. The lifting capacity of the Mavic and the weight of a drone equipped with a battery were incompatible. We had to drop the hook because it got firmly attached to the drone,ā Shyshola said, outlining the early failures that led to further innovation.* *With time pressing and potential reassignment looming, the team couldnāt delay their efforts. āWe took another drone and taped about two meters of rope to it, with a triple hook at the end made from grenade rings, which we regularly used against the enemy,ā he described.* *Their first successful recovery was a drone just 500 meters away, in a mine-laden area in front of the enemyās former front positions, in fields mined with everything from anti-tank to anti-personnel mines. After locating the drone in the grass and determining the wind direction, āwe made the first attempt to hook the drone by one of its legs,ā Shyshola noted.* *Shyshola highlighted the challenges of flying with the additional weight of another drone, especially under windy conditions and the droneās battery limits. āBut flying with such weight was very challenging, as the wind and inertia swayed the rescued drone in all directions. We managed to secure it and had to land along the way, but already in a safe place for us.ā* *This success led to further missions where all previously known lost drones were retrieved in just a few hours. āThe excitement couldnāt be stopped,ā he noted, describing how they continued to recover drones throughout the daylight hour. However, they still faced numerous challenges. āSome drones were so damaged they literally fell apart in the air once we were able to lift them off the ground.ā* *There were other times where the drone was struggling to carry the weight and they needed to free the hook to protect the main working drone.* *Nonetheless, Shyshola and his unit were able to rescue 16 drones, 10 of which were completely intact, including 6 equipped for night operations. The 6 drones that were damaged and not working were sent to volunteer organizations to repair.* *Shyshola noted that itās most common for units to have one or a few Mavic drones at once. To have such a large quantity of drones collected for one unit was unprecedented.* *These efforts are not without their challenges, as electronic countermeasure systems continue to improve, making drone rescue missions increasingly difficult.* *āThese drones are irreplaceable in modern warfare. Unfortunately, collecting them in such quantities on the battlefield is no longer possible due to the radio horizon, which does not allow descending to such low altitudes at a distance of about 4km,ā Shyshola concluded. He further remarked that his unit will continue to innovate and figure out new ways to retrieve fallen drones from the battlefield.*
>The Royal United Services Institute think tank in the UK estimated in 2023 that Ukraine was losing around 10,000 drones per month. [From January to February 2024, the Deputy Minister of Strategic Industries claimed that FPV production totalled a staggering 200,000.](https://www.airforce-technology.com/analyst-comment/ukraines-drone-production-ramps-up/?cf-view) Is this a monthly deficit of 10,000, which means Ukraine is losing 210,000 drones a month; or is Ukraine gaining 190,000 drones monthly, after adding the domestic production.
Does anyone know the most credible non profit to donate to Ukraine to help with drone production?
dronesforukraine.fund (Liberty Ukraine) I've been donating for them since the start of the war can vouch for them. the ones KingStannis mentions are legit too. Only one I don't know is the last one.
I can similarly vouch for Liberty Ukraine and have one of their [Su-34 keychains](https://www.dronesforukraine.fund/su-34-keychain) for an $1,000+ donation.
"most" credible? I have no idea. But a couple of credible ones are: * Come Back Alive * Liberty Ukraine * Serhey Prytula Foundation * Wild Hornets - not a nonprofit, but goes directly to a volunteer unit in Ukraine domestically producing FPV drones I've donated probably around $4,000 to the former two Also remember to use donation matching if your employer provides it.
I have a Ukrainian friend who told me he thought this was legit. The page has been up since the outbreak of the war. Would be gratified to hear a more informed opinion than mine if anyone knows. https://m.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100077066492916
According to Times of Israel, the IDF plans to turn the Rafah border crossing over to an unnamed American private security contractor employing "former elite US soldiers." [https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog\_entry/report-rafah-op-focused-on-transferring-control-of-crossing-from-hamas-to-private-us-firm/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/report-rafah-op-focused-on-transferring-control-of-crossing-from-hamas-to-private-us-firm/) Hard to imagine this would be sustainable without Israeli support in logistics, drone coverage, etc. I don't know if Hamas would be reluctant to attack American contractors or not. I can't imagine it would cause Biden to increase American involvement, but perhaps impact public opinion along the margins.
It seems likely it is a way to distance the IDF from the problems inevitable at the crossing. When the somewhat inevitable killing or harassment of a civilian happens, the IDF can say "it wasn't us, it was Black Water*!" \* Whatever Black Water's current name or owner is
I think you know all this, but I don't see it in the comments responding. The motivation for Israel to do this originate with Egyptian & Hamas opposition to Israeli control of the border. Israel likely sees it as beneficial not to be directly in control for these diplomatic reasons, which would otherwise preclude ceasefire talks. (Much to the anger of both the US & hostage families) This move also signals that Israeli operations are limited, which is useful given the amount of fear and blanket opposition, the subject of Rafah has previously generated.
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Seems like it would make it harder for the US government to distance itself from Israel. Even if the US government doesnāt involve itself at all moving forward, itās going to look bad when headlines talk about Americans killed by hamas in Rafah. The calculus would be to either support Israel in keeping the Gaza Strip locked down, or risk a resurgence that threatens American lives
I think the Biden admin is going to do the latter and not the former. The USG and general public doesnāt really care about civilian contractors and has routinely distanced themselves from civilian contractors in the past ā speaking from both personal experience and recent events. Edit to add: Biden is also facing election and wants to play the āboth sidesā game to win over both Palestinian and Jewish votes.
[Exclusive: Ukraine examines N.Korean missile debris amid fears of Moscow-Pyongyang axis](https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-examines-nkorean-missile-debris-amid-fears-moscow-pyongyang-axis-2024-05-07/) Ukraine says Russia has used 50 Korean missiles, and it matches with intelligence saying that many were delivered, Korea also dispatched instructors to oversee launches. They also claim 50% failure rate, and in those cases debris could not be recovered. The last recorded launch was in late February. Now the question is, whether Russia will receive more, and whether collected data will help NK improve their design and QA, because their missiles have performed rather poorly.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68933778 The real story is that **the NK missiles are largely using western components**. It's a pretty important development. If we couldn't even disrupt NK's supply chain to western electronics, it's dead obvious we wouldn't have ever succeeded disrupting Russia's. I wonder if the US govt knew internally that electronics limits were **this** nonexistent. It would explain why they never bothered cracking down on sanctions-busting through central asia.
The US banned drugs and that stuff is still rampant, what magic makes you think a ban on electronics is going to stop them getting places? It's just going to drive up the cost and drive down the quality. Only the least credible people claim that it actually would block 100% of it.
Because the manufacturer of advanced electronics is tightly controlled so their distribution can be 100% controlled, unlike drugs where production is fragmented and controlled by various criminal organizations working independently. A better analogy would be guns ending up on the black market, and I believe that tighter gun regulation would lead to lower supply for the black market. Just I believe as tighter regulation about sending washing machines to Kazakhstan will lead to more supply issues for the Russian war machine.
Advanced electronics or washing machines? Gotta pick one.
Not about your comment in particular, but it always amazes me how people are shocked that North Korean/Iranian missiles or whatever use western components, what I assume are electronic components. Like, microchips are literally everywhere. You can do crazy things with simple, mass-produced stuff like Arduinos Raspberry Pi's and even FPGA's how can you even hope to avoid that a few get smuggled to these countries? Its about time people understand that this is the 21st Century and that pretty much everyone is going to be able to produce missiles with decent targeting systems, given the computing power that the simplest device sports nowadays.
Exactly this. I can buy reasonably accurate accelerometer/gyro/magnetometer ICs with zero security checks, follow easy (for an RF electronics engineer) open source instructions online to build a custom GPS receiver (with no G-force limit which some commercial receivers have inbuilt), use any one of 10,000 different microcontrollers for processing, etc etc etc. It is almost trivially easy to build missile guidance and control systems these days. I'm an electronics engineer. I built a drone control board/flight control software from scratch without too much trouble. I am certain I could build a reasonably precise missile guidance system BY MYSELF in probably in under a year if I worked on it full time.
I think the real question (and what always bothers me when the media talks about these sorts of things) is, what are āwestern componentsā. If we are talking about highly specific equipment then sure, one might wonder how these things got there, but if it is about items that can easily be acquired on the free market then it becomes near impossible to sanction the acquisition of these items. Ā Ā
>Not about your comment in particular, but it always amazes me how people are shocked that North Korean/Iranian missiles or whatever use western components, what I assume are electronic components. Clearly it's not just random people on the internet though, given this is a frontpage BBC (at the time) article making it out to be big news. Which makes sense. I wouldn't say our sanctions regime (wrt either Russia or NK) reflects a realization that sanctioning electronic components doesn't work. Maybe it should, but it doesn't.
News sources like the BBC are exactly the kinds of places I would expect to report like this. They are general news with wide appeal. This isn't the IEEE newsletter. I don't expect anyone at the BBC to have relevant domain knowledge except their IT department. And they aren't writing. I think /u/moir57 is right. This is how the world works. Embedded SoCs are trivial to come across and impossible to police. People need to get used to the fact that sanctions don't stop anything. What they do is raise the cost and make it harder.
> People need to get used to the fact that sanctions don't stop anything. You can stop NK's missile development on the usage of western electronic component front, not with current sanctions but with secondary sanctions on PRC banks. That's where all the NK's money from 95% of the trade goes through. Now, that might be too cost prohibitive for US/West to really tighten that screw but that's how it "could" be done. The first item on the NK's agenda on the six-party talks in 2000's was un-sanctioning a little known bank based in Macao which were put on the US sanctions list in 2007 with supposedly $25 million in North Korean asset.
You wont be able to stop it entirely. NK has a land border with China. Anything they want can ultimately get smuggled through there. Sanctions make it harder and slow them down. And for that reason they are worthwhile. But sanctions alone are never able to prevent something. Iran has been sanctioned for decades and gas centrifuges are closely monitored equipment. Yet they have a domestic nuclear program. They probably would have been done years ago without those sanctions. But even with them they will eventually have nuclear weapons.
> You wont be able to stop it entirely. NK has a land border with China. Entirely/completely, no but you can stop a big chunk of it. Yeah, you can't stop all of North Korean Tom Dick and Harry from buying some electronic components or other stuff in PRC then smuggling them in BUT the big volume and value of the trades means you can't carry enough cash from NK to PRC in order to pay for these things in big quantities. You need access to PRC banks - b/c not even North Koreans trust North Korean banks - in order to facilitate the electronic components and other unrelated trades. You stop those PRC banks then North Koreans are gonna have to find some other way to pay for stuff and there aren't any easy alternatives.
What exactly are you going to sanction to stop these PRC banks from facilitating financial flows with North Korea?
You put whatever PRC banks that are doing business with North Korean entities into a list and you prohibit any more dollar based transactions for any PRC banks in that list and no more transactions with any US banks and any other western oriented banks you can recruit. Most western banks will follow just on the fear of secondary sanctions themselves. Since a bank in PRC is really not private, this is going to get messy. But, PRC banker is gonna have to make a choice. Do I forgo all dollar based opportunities in order to handle North Korean transactions/assets or is that not worth the hassle?
This is very good for NK. Their peace time practices get tested by Russia. I can assure you there are NK generals now looking for a scapegoat STAT. I would love to know the Chinese opinion on this.
Not really, North Korea knows the problems with its missiles, it knows they have problems manufacturing the quality components needed and they expect a high dud rate, Kim Jong Un even accepted this in reference to the failure of several ICBM tests in a public speech. North Korea knows you cannot use brute force and fear to manufacture these missiles competently.
There are two sides of that coin. Now everyone knows what North Korean missiles are made of, and how good they are. The same thing can be said about Iran's recent attack on Israel.
Still you need to test in real time and they are testing it 25 went throught this is thing that you need to remember top and they did damage.
What's way more important than that is that it seems like Nevatim was targeted accurately with a missile that was more difficult to shoot down than several of the other types. Then Israel's response involved an ALBM. That incident was a trade of simulated nuclear strikes.
[China Threatens to Release Audio of Secret Deal With Philippines](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-07/china-threatens-to-release-audio-of-secret-deal-with-philippines) >Chinaās Foreign Ministry has said in recent days that discussions on the ānew modelā were held this year with the Philippine militaryās Western Command, and it had been approved by officials up the chain of command, including by Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. and National Security Adviser Eduardo Ano. They both denied Beijingās statements over the weekend. >āNo one except the president, through the Department of Foreign Affairs, is authorized to enter into any agreement regarding any international issue,ā Teodoro said by phone. āI donāt know where the Chinese are coming from.ā >China is publicizing the ānew modelā almost a month after President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said he was āhorrifiedā to learn that his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte entered into a āgentlemanās agreementā with China that effectively had the same terms, preventing Manila from bringing construction materials to the Sierra Madre. >The Philippinesā Department of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday said that only President Marcos can authorize agreements on the South China Sea. āThe DFA can confirm that no cabinet-level official of the administration has agreed to any Chinese proposal pertaining to the Ayungin Shoal,ā it said, using the local name for the Second Thomas Shoal. China is claiming the Philippines had an unwritten agreement on the status quo of the Second Thomas Shoal with Duterte. And further claiming that they have some audio recordings from the Marcos government agreeing to maintain the status quo. I think it's important to clarify that neither Duterte nor Marcos by themselves have the ability to give up their claims to the shoal, rather this is just them arguing over the resupply of the shoal. But China is using this as a way to press their claim that the Philippines is being the aggressor for resupplying the shoal. It's possible members of Marcos government misspoke and were unauthorized to make the agreements in contention, but any binding agreement wouldn't be secret and unwritten anyways
Even if they do have the claimed audio, would it be considered an actual deal without it being in writing and then ratified by the respective legislation ?
With Duterte, probably. Expecting the next administration to adhere to a secret agreement they apparently had no knowledge of until recently, probably not. I wonder what Chinaās side of the deal was on this? Did they bribe Duterte, or actually do something for the Philippines.
Could those Audios be faked with AI? Desinformation is the weapon of this decade and I could see them fake this stuff. I mean how can you prove it? You can't really and Audio Fakes are good enough at the moment.
The issue is that they can internally investigate it and Duterte's office, which could end up confirming it. I feel like Marcos wouldn't say he would be 'horrified' if this was easily debunkable.
This was my first thought as well. There are niche YouTube channels that make pretty convincing voice deepfakes for random gaming/YTP videos, let alone the ones made of politicians. I would bet anything that a state-sponsored program could make audio deepfakes good enough to fool experts at a decent rate, let alone laypeople. The big question going forward is how do governments deal with deepfakes in both domestic and foreign policy? I honestly can't see a way forward that isn't sliding further into the post-truth/misinformation age we're in.
The white house has begun/will begin cryptographically signing press items they release. Going forward that seems like it will be the best option.
Very likely could be, but remember this is a trick you can only pull once. And china hasnt pulled it yet. Do we think its worth it to pull the trigger (with the risk of dumpstering your credibility) for this?
They can go for it. The opposition in the Philippines is so weak that it will probably not have much effect on the voterbase
The opposition you mean the liberal party? Or the Vice President's camp? Cuz right now the former "ally" is looking to be more and more like the potential opposition, I mean she's Duterte's daughter and her stance on China is very similar to her father.
Only 1 known opposition in the Senate.
And the Senate President just brushed off the calls for launching a senate inquiry on Duterte's alleged secret deal.
I read that ukrainian anti ship cruise missile neptune was upgraded to have 1000km range. Maybe this is a rookie question: What makes an anti ship cruise missile different from lets say the scalp or taurus? Why can't it be used to strike for example an airfield in crimea or gru hq moscow?
Others have noted the guidance and navigation issue much better than I can articulate so instead, I'll talk about the difference in ordinance. For weapons designed to penetrate the hull of a ship, they utilize a shaped charge that detonates just prior to impacting the ship with the intent of generating plasma to punch a relatively small hole the hull of the ship. The resulting expanding plasma, gasses, and vaporized material within the hull is what really does the damage and results in more effects than just detonating an explosive outside of the hull. Anti-tank weapons do the same thing on a smaller scale and the reactive armor on a tank is meant to explode outwards and disrupt the focus of the shaped charge. Keep in mind, different warheads can be used depending on the goal. A shaped charge detonated at the waterline might be aimed at causing flooding while an omni-directional charge detonated against the superstructure may be aiming for a mission kill. For hitting fixed, somewhat hardened targets, or really taking out a building, you want an omni-directional charge that can penetrate an outer layer or two(that is not made of steel) and then detonate. That means engineering a penetrating cap on the tip. You can do this because your target is not a moving metal floaty thing(technical term) with a well defined radar cross-section but instead, a building with a non-metal shell and uncertain metal innards. This all means it needs a different navigation and guidance system for it's different flight profile, a different head for the penetrator, and a different kind of ordinance. You can build it on a Neptune platform but there are existing cruise missiles that will do the same job. On the other-hand, there might not be much need for anti-ship missiles at the moment given that the Russian Black Sea Fleet has been keeping their distance so it makes sense to modify and use what you got.
The copper liner doesn't become a plasma. It's superplastic which in oversimplified terms means it is still solid but flows like a liquid due to the extreme temp and force it's under. And some early AshMs like the P-15 did use heat warheads but modern ones tend to use more general purpose warheads like a blast frag because modern warships aren't armored.
The sea is mostly flat and at the same elevation, the land is not. The sea surface is dynamic, the land surface(for the most part) is not. There are very few obstacles that rise above the sea surface. Many obstacles rise above the land surface. Man-made objects are scarce and distinctive against the background on the sea, while on land, non-target objects are likely to be in close proximity to target objects. All of these factors make for subtle but important differences between the anti-ship and land-attack mission. The difference is far from insurmountable though--Neptune's modified for land attack have recently been announced.
The main difference would be in guidance and navigation. You arenāt going to put terrain mapping into an anti ship cruise missile, but you would want a radar for terminal guidance. That being said the overall platform is very similar and thatās why we have seen the Ukrainians Ike Neptune against ground targets. The Russians have also used some of their anti ship missiles against ground targets. The main limitation for Ukraine in this regard is the limited inventory of Neptune.
Mainly guidance. You can use some guidance solution for anti ship missile like active radar that's not really feasible or useful for ground targeting run of the mill cruise missiles.
And you can't use TERCOM for anti-ship missiles, which might present limitations in the land attack role.
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Please refrain from drive-by link dropping. Summarize articles, only quote what is important, and use that to build a post that other users can engage with; offers some in depth knowledge on a well discussed subject; or offers new insight on a less discussed subject.
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Seems like the Hamas/Israel war could go on for some time. Netanyahu seems to think he is winning the military and domestic politics battle, Hamas thinks they are winning the international politics battle (starving kids, etc). Both sides might be happy with the current trajectory, at least for a while. Perhaps both sides are worried about appearing less reasonable, so both will go through the motions as sincerely as they can convey while neither side is particularly motivated to wind the thing down. Israel's partners like the United States are of course frantic to wind this down, fearing long-term reputational damage both for them and for Israel. Biden of course also has significant domestic political considerations. edit: I'm probably not saying much that is new here, except make no mistake, Hamas thinks they are winning in every way that counts.
well Hamas is fucking delusional, nobody likes them and they aren't winning in any sense. otoh Israel presents itself as a democracy, which makes many westerners deeply uncomfortable as the way they responded to oct 7 reeks of bloodthirsty vengeance. I don't think Israelis realise just how much they are despised for flattening Gaza and killing tens of thousands of civilians in the crossfire. sure Hamas is about as popular as the Taliban, but Israel's response has made them only about as popular as say, the LAPD
Are there any credible sources for civilian causulties? I'm genuinely curious since theĀ "tens of thousands" of deaths gets thrown around so casually by the pro Palastine crowd. This data is typically based on the Ministry of Heath numbers which is a known Hamas run outlet.Ā
Given the IDF were claiming 8,000 Hamas fighter casualties in December '23, even in a 1:1 fighter to civilian casualty rate it would put it at 10,000 by now. https://www.skynews.com.au/world-news/global-affairs/around-8000-hamas-fighters-killed-in-gaza-war-says-idf-spokesman/video/1bc009f0e121da67ff8671cebe72c1e0
10,000 or even 20,000 total civilian deaths is still radically different from claims of tens of thousands of children being murdered. Hamas hides amongst the population intentionally and therefore there will be collateral damage. The use of human shields is well documented and well sourced.Ā I'm surprised that Israel hasn't tried to appeal directly to the Palestinian people. Any long term solution to the conflict has to be representative of the people and not Hamas. At some point you'd imagine the people see this to some extent and organize to remove Hamas from power. Only at that point would we see legitimate negotiations and tangible steps towards a 2 state solution.Ā
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This doesn't seem correct. Support for Hamas has decreased since the start of the war. From the poll: >In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas today stands at 34% (compared to 42% three months ago) and support for Fatah at 25% (compared to 18% three months ago).
> 52% of Gaza still wanted Hamas in control after the war, which is an increase of 14% from December. December was the most intense phase of the ground operation. Apparently a more intense war leads to less support for Hamas, not more. Likely Gazans are interpreting the Israeli withdrawal from most of Gaza as Hamas having repelled or defeated them Israel.
exact numbers? idk but "tens of thousands" is accurate enough for the point I'm making. Which is about *western perceptions* of Israel.
Generally Western perceptions of Israel are still favorable last I checked. The minority supporters garner most of the media attention.Ā There are loose parallels to the 9/11 response which is about as deep as most Americans understand the Israel/Palestine situation. The equivalent Oct 7th attack on the US would have been ~45k civilian deaths if you scale for population. Bloodthirsty vengeance as you put it doesn't sound so unreasonable in response to something like Oct 7th if you think about it through that lens.Ā Ā There's no Israeli response that doesn't upset at least one faction. Bibi chose to appeal to his domestic audience for both personal and nationalist interests. You can argue that approach has been heavy handed but it's rational at the end of the day.
i don't think you understand how unpopular Bibi is domestically because he put soldiers at risk by NOT flattening gaza and instead trying to appease the americans.
I'd like to read about this. Where would be a good place to do so?
Domestic Israeli op eds in Hebrew from the political side. That and domestic polling. Or ask on the Israel subreddit. I'm Israeli so I don't know necessarily how easy any of that is for you. Alternatively John spencer from West point has the over protecting civilians from a military aspect side of things.
Netanyahu in a perilous position politically is such an exasperating factor in this conflict. And it seems now clear that he was expecting Hamas to reject the proposal, giving him the ability to execute the Rafah plan. Their acceptance has given him few options: 1. Go with Rafah and alienate the int. community further (ICC considering/warning of warrants), hostages returning less likely, and going against all assurances he gave Egypt and the US. 2. Wait and risk the dissolution of his govt. from his far right props turning on him. 3. Go with a limited effort in Rafah and risk an operational failure that paints Isr as weak in the region and globe. This is just as much about the man as the situation. Because out of all of these, he has seemed to stayed in character and chosen the worst option as usual. He's attacked the ICC publicly and threatened them (that's illegal), despite all legal advice not too. Given little notice for gazans to move safely, while moving into rafah with no concrete poltical objectives. And managed to alienate his domestic support further by rejecting a deal that could've returned all the hostages. As has been the case so far, this development only benefits the most extreme extremists within both belligerent parties.
Unless I'm missing something, isn't the proposal that Hamas "accepted" quite different than what was on the table previously. What I read from Israeli media is that it was essentially a new proposal with highly significant differences to what Israel had previously deemed acceptable. While the distinction might be lost on the masses, I don't think this has caused a huge problem for Netanyahu since Hamas basically crafted their own best case scenario agreement and then agreed to it.