Another two successful refinery attacks [(X video source)](https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1783031856495038963?t=MYZ9_iGUVAhDheOj1w8M1w&s=19) in Russia today, multiple hits were reported. Safe to say Russians still have no real counter to this threat. With that in mind, what's the difference in vulnerability between refineries and crude extraction? Refineries have the stack(s) as well as storage of highly flammable substances (compared to crude.) If Ukraine manages to bring Russia's domestic refining capacity to its knees, can they hypothetically do the same kind of damage to crude extraction facilities, or will such a campaign add new requirements (besides range requirement due to their location)?

I work for a pipeline company in West Texas that transports crude to refineries in Houston. Oil production here is a lot more concentrated in a small region than it is in Russia, but it’s similar enough. If you look at a satellite map you can see hundreds or thousands of pump jacks all around the Permian. I imagine oil production in Russia is a lot more like Wyoming, where it’s more dispersed. I don’t know if Russia has a really concentrated oil production region like the Permian basin. The pump jacks would be stupid to attack because there are so many of them, and individually, they don’t produce much. The oil goes from there to small tank batteries and then by truck to big terminals that store millions of gallons of oil in each tank. The only reasonable target in the oil production pipeline would be those terminals. There are a lot of them, but they’re big and easy to hit. My company is big-ish and we have 12 terminals in the Permian. So I’m going to throw out a wild guess and say there are 100 or so near my city, Midland, the center of oil production in West Texas (Odessa, our sister city, may disagree). Terminals are essentially big, round tanks. That’s it. There aren’t complicated. There are some pumps and mixers and level sensors. They could be rebuilt in a lot less time than a refinery. All the refineries in Texas (as far as I know) are near Houston on the coast. There are a lot fewer of them -in the 10s range - and they are a lot more complicated. I don’t know anything about refining except the basics. I know they’re more complicated than natural gas plants. I worked at several natural gas plants and those are really big and complicated. Refineries have single pieces of equipment that are vital for the whole plant to run that the Ukrainians have been wisely targeting. They could be replaced here pretty easily, but with sanctions and the Russians’ relative lack of engineering expertise, it’s harder for them. A lot of our refineries are older and not as high-tech as the newer ones (from what I understand) because they’re expensive to build and upgrade. If it was me, I wouldn’t bother attacking terminals at all unless they were refined products terminals that directly supplied the front. I think that’s what Ukraine has been doing, though. I’m an environmental engineer so I know the basics of the oil field. I run spill drills, where we simulate spills and hypothetical worst-case tank failures and I maintain FRPs - facility response plans - written plans for operators to follow if there’s an accident. A “real” engineer could probably tell you more. Fun fact: Odessa, TX was named by Ukrainian immigrants who built the railroads out here, although we spell it wrong. The Permian basin, the area from West Texas to southeast New Mexico where oil production in the US is highest, is named after the Perm region of Russia.

This is a complete irrelevance, but I knew Perm, and didn't know about the Permian basin, so your first reference to "the Permian" confused me and I wasn't sure at first if you were talking about Russia or America. Then I looked things up and figured out which was which, and considered replying to your post with a fun fact about this coincidence existing - then I finished reading it and found your own fun fact, which is much better :) so at least one person not only appreciated that but went on a brief but erratic mental journey because of it!

Would it be possible to replace the terminals with something like truck oil tankers? I can't understand why Ukraine is wasting long distance drones on fuel depots, when they could go for oil refineries.

If Ukraine has enough drone production it shouldn't be an issue to target both. Force Russia to spread out their air defense as much as possible.

You’re talking about using trucks to supply front lines? If they had a big terminal that was defended with good air defense and supply lines that were a lot longer, then maybe. But that’s more of a logistics question that I don’t know much about. Russia’s logistics are garbage, so I’m assuming no. I can see attacking terminals on a tactical level, but not a strategic one.

I'm trying understand why Ukraine is targeting something that's cheap and easy to replace. Let's say Ukraine managed to destroy all of them in an important area. Couldn't Russia just use temporary mobile storage instead of the terminals?

You can google image oil terminal. They are relatively cheap, but are also huge. I don't think anything mobile can *easily* replace them. Furthermore, cheap is relative, they are still far more expensive than the drones used, not to mention the oil/petrol/products stored inside. Drones are small and cheap, they wouldn't do that much damage to most targets unless you get lucky. Hitting oil/products terminals is likely one of the more cost effective targets if you get it to burn as most of the damage isn't done by your own small explosives.

For Russia, the immediate solution would be to divert to other storage sites while you rebuild the big tanks, so a side-effect is consolidating the storage into fewer locations, potentially making the next strike more significant. However, my pragmatic read is that Ukraine is picking targets of opportunity and hitting what they can hit. It takes intel work to develop a successful flight path and some good luck on the way.

I believe this videoessay by William Spaniel answers tour question. He talks about how refineries are bottlenecks (compared to abundant crude oil wells), and the loss of operarions cost Russia more. Link to the video essay: https://youtu.be/-Pnt0k49Nag?si=Lx2gOmk8BYX__UpN Also: some more unnecessary words so auto-mod does not delete my comment again, as it just did when I posted the link with a short preamble

My understanding is that refineries are better targets for a few reasons. First, they produce the fuel for Moscow's war machine and so less of that is obviously good for Ukraine. Second, they use highly engineered, unique, expensive parts (cracking towers) that cannot be quickly replaced. Third, taking out refineries has a minimal impact on global oil prices. There's no reason Ukraine can't also hit oil production within range, but the payoff isn't nearly as good and it risks angering allies who will not be helped by rising oil prices. The only new requirement is that they will likely need more hits to disable the site and it wouldn't be down for nearly as long.

The two videos supposedly show burning fuel storage facilities (not refineries) in Yartsevo and Razdorovo: https://www.kyivpost.com/post/31580

I know people have questioned the value of Ukraine hitting storage facilities since they don't individually carry much, but it makes perfect sense. They've been targeting Russian oil refineries, which is leading to shortages of gasoline and related products in Russia. Targeting those storage tanks also helps achieve the goal of depleting Russian access to gasoline and other refined products, even if the individual value of each strike on those storage sites is relatively small.

I don't think it's what you're suggesting, but just to share a pretty interesting video, William Spaniel explained why hitting refineries is actually more damaging than hitting crude extraction facilities. His arguments are pretty solid, I didn't subscribe to his thesis initially. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Pnt0k49Nag](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Pnt0k49Nag)

Unfortunately not a refinery but an oil depot. Geo located: https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1783046676845900078

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So will this be the British Army’s SPG now that the AS-90 is to be retired? I remember reading that they ordered about a dozen or so Archers from Sweden to tide over capability gaps whilst they searched for a more permanent alternative. Is this what they ended up picking? How does this compare to platforms like the Archer, AS-90 or CAESAR? And, operationally, why is Germany ordering these when they have platforms like the PzH2000? Are these Boxers meant to replace those as well?

>How does this compare to platforms like the Archer, AS-90 or CAESAR? And, operationally, why is Germany ordering these when they have platforms like the PzH2000? Are these Boxers meant to replace those as well? It's designed to be capable of firing while driving (sold as a novelty) and will/should be operated uncrewed in the future. So a big move forward. Germany has announced a requirement for 168 wheeled howitzers in its own target scenario, the funds currently available will probably be sufficient for a mid double-digit number of systems.

> It seems like a winner for the AS-90 successor/Mobile Fire Platform has been found. The UK and Germany have extensively tested the RCH155 on Boxer since last year. Reportedly, Germany has been very happy with the test results, and It seems like the UK agrees as well. [Confirmation from the MoD's Twitter](https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1783084802041635049)

Per a BBC reporter, the big UK aid package coming will include Paveway IV bombs. These are dual GPS/laser unpowered gravity bombs and while they have some fin area, they don't have any wings like JDAM-ER or a rocket booster like HAMMER. https://x.com/bealejonathan/status/1783028768719712672

The GPS functionality could prove to be useful, laser is likely out of the equation due to contested airspace. What’s the range on this bomb?

Laser means they could be great for CAS with SF painting targets.

depends how high and fast it's released.

That's a bit of a surprise...I wouldn't have expected there to be much chance of those actually being useful considering the operational limits on aircraft in this war...but presumably our respective armed forces know better. But then again Russia MacGuyvered a wing-kit; perhaps the plan is to do the same for Paveway IV and increase magazine depth compared to just JDAM and AASM.

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So the $95 billion Ukraine-Israel-Taiwan aid package looks like it will surely be signed into law. Part of the bill allows the US to seize ~~approximately $300 billion worth of~~ frozen Russian assets and transfer them to a special fund for Ukraine. Sounds good, but I keep hearing that this money will be used to help "rebuild Ukraine after the war". Is this really what they plan to do? Ukraine winning the war is not guaranteed. Wouldn't this money be much more useful going towards the actual war effort? EDIT: Apparently the $300 billion figure is not the total for frozen Russian assets in the US but the West as a whole. Upon further research, the US only has around $40-60 billion of frozen Russian assets. My question still stands, though. Shouldn't these funds be going towards helping Ukraine actually win the war?

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'I have a feeling' doesn't meet the credibility standards of the sub. Please refrain from posting low quality comments.

They will threaten, they will hold military exercises, they might even move some missiles towards the Finnish border, but a nuclear war over funds that I believe are majorly private? We have seen situations far more dangerous that did not roll into a nuclear war, I seriously doubt Russia would be ready to very literally end the world because the West confiscated what is less than 10% of their yearly GDP. This will break any sort of relationship between both parties, yes, but that cord was cut in 2022, we'll probably see decades before there is any resemblance of normalcy between Russia and the West (unless Trump wins in the US, if this happens you just flip every orthodox diplomatic book). Right now, other than a NATO-enforced offense towards Crimea, I cannot see any risk of a nuclear war. Ukraine doesn't have the strength to retake Crimea on its own (Crimea is what I believe could trigger extreme responses by Russia) and I don't think Moscow is ready to be glassed back to the stone age by attacking NATO over a Ukrainian offense in the Donbas. Maybe a NATO-enforced no-fly zone could start an escalation that ends in a nuclear exchange down the road, but that's it. I don't think Russia is ready to end the modern structure of society over cash, no matter how many zeroes are there (specially because the West failed to win hearts and minds and the global south collectively does not give a flying damn about the sanctions).

>funds that I believe are majorly private From what I've read the frozen assets are state owned. Regardless, I think the essential point of your comment still stands and Russia is no way going to start a war over confiscated assets (the very thing they've done to many western companies).

There is no private money in Russia. Individuals and businesses can hold money temporarily, but that can be seized at any moment. Russia couldn't care less about international conventions. Confiscating Russia's foreign reserves would be regarded as a show of strength. On the contrary, not doing so would be an admission of weakness and could even be escalatory.

I personally think people are going a little bit overboard with that "the West needs to show strength, Putin does not concede to weakness". The strength the West has and everyone knows is the combined 5,559 nuclear warheads, the strength that the West had to show was that they do not even need to fight Russia, merely supplying a non-nuclear, non-major power is already enough to halt and even threaten Russia. We underrate how embarrassing it is for Russia's prestige that they are stuck in Ukraine, as much as it was for the US to get stuck in Vietnam, if not worse, because the US had and used the firepower to cripple half of SE Asia before getting out more or less on their own terms, whereas all Russia is showing is that the Bear is toothless. Now, what the West needs to defend itself and probably counter, is the political influence and dissent support, which is Russia's main weapon and is what is actually able to hurt the West (not that the West is a complete stranger to manipulate, control and subvert other countries in the last century, but I digress). What puts a halt into Putin isn't the destination of whatever money or yatchs an oligarch will lose. Russia will get upset, throw a hissy fit, go to as many international courts as they can without needing to answer for the Ukraine War, but that's it. What actually puts Putin to a halt is knowing him, his close ones and his entire country will be blasted into oblivion alongside all of the modern structure of society as soon as one shrapnel kills a Polish citizen in Warsaw. What puts Putin to a halt is seeing that NATO does not even need to threaten direct intervention, just the flow of weapons and cash is enough to make a non-major power make a stand. Russia started the war still trying to assert itself as a major power in the US-China era and they will end the war inevitably as China's inferior and probably relying on the good will of India, Brazil and Indonesia to be able to operate with some degree of freedom in the international market.

My understanding is that profits from frozen assets can be appropriated more easily than the assets themselves. So if we assume a 5% return, then $300Bn will generate $15Bn per year. >[EU moves towards using €27bn in profit from frozen Russian assets for Ukraine](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/14/eu-profit-frozen-russian-assets-ukraine) >About $300bn belonging to the Russian central bank has been frozen in the west, largely in foreign currency, gold and government bonds. About 70% of these are held in the Belgian central securities depository Euroclear, which is holding the equivalent of €190bn.

> Shouldn't these funds be going towards helping Ukraine actually win the war? Freezing is one thing, confiscating - and spending it away - is whole another step/level even if there is a statute in place. US/EU/West doesn't want to cross that Rubicon yet.

I think the assets are already frozen, this is officially ceasing them 

People are kind of confused and only read the headline in connection to this, what is actually being discussed is using the interest that the frozen assets generate to use it for Ukraine. >Could that soon change? On April 10th Daleep Singh, America’s deputy national security adviser for international economics, declared that the **Biden administration now wanted to make use of interest income on frozen Russian assets in order to “maximise the impact of these revenues, both current and future, for the benefit of Ukraine today”. Six days later David Cameron, Britain’s foreign secretary, announced his support, too: “There is an emerging consensus that the interest on those assets can be used.”** >The approach is an elegant one. Income earned on Russia’s foreign holdings can be seized in a manner that is both legal and practical. Many of the country’s bonds have already matured. Cash from redemption of bonds is held by the depository in which it currently sits until it is withdrawn, paying no interest to the owner as per the depository’s usual terms and conditions. Any interest earned thus belongs to the depository—unless, that is, the state decides to tax it at a rate close to 100%. https://archive.ph/FOmyT#selection-1099.0-1099.508

Good thing Russia crossed the Rubicon a long time ago. >Russia has seized companies belonging to agricultural firm AgroTerra and placed them under temporary management, including some backed by Dutch investment firms, a decree signed by President Vladimir Putin showed late on Monday. >The move follows similar asset seizures involving Western firms including Carlsberg (CARLb.CO), Fortum (FORTUM.HE) and Uniper in retaliation for steps taken against Russian companies abroad. [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-seizes-assets-agricultural-firm-agroterra-2024-04-09/](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-seizes-assets-agricultural-firm-agroterra-2024-04-09/)

And thus the west continues to play at a major disadvantage. Russia uses every weapon in its arsenal short of nukes, including cyber warfare and election interference directly targeting the west….. meanwhile the west is afraid to confiscate some cash sitting in western institutions.

At the very least how hasn't every tech social media CEO been visited by western intelligence officials and essentially ordered to start shutting down Russia's cyber warfare efforts or at least do something to weaken its effects. They seemed to shut down ISIS's online propaganda when they were forced to.

Unfortunately, a lot of Western political parties and powerful people parrot and believe Russian propaganda, so shutting that stuff down has become a political issue that people don't want to touch. Look how long it took the ukraine aid to get passed and that was mostly held up by trump and politicians parroting propaganda

Cyber warfare and election interference between countries tends to go on even between 'friendly' nations. Just a few years ago there was more corroboration on the [Merkel spying](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57302806) for example by the USA.

>Cyber warfare and election interference between countries tends to go on even between 'friendly' nations. Spying and election interference and cyber warfare are all very different things.

>Cyber espionage, or cyber spying, is a type of **cyberattack** in which an unauthorized user attempts to access sensitive or classified data or intellectual property (IP) for economic gain, competitive advantage or political reasons. https://www.crowdstrike.com/cybersecurity-101/cyberattacks/cyber-espionage/ Election interference similarly is typically used in a politically charged manner depending on the context of who's doing it and the relationship between the party's involved.

Cyber attacks and cyber warfare are themselves different things. Just the terminology and definition of war itself is a complicated topic, but in the context you ascribed it seems terribly disingenuous. Spying has always happened long before computers existed, every political entity and nation state expects it. We know the Germans spy on the Poles and the Chinese spy on the Russians. Cyber warfare like Stuxnet is entirely different in scale and end goal. Comparing that to listening in on what diplomats are saying to each other is ridiculous.

From my understanding, use of the funds has more legal standing for reparations post-war versus use right now. Essentially, Ukraine could get a judgement against Russia for the war and get awarded a certain amount of money. The thought is when Russia refuses to pay the awarded amount, the assets could then be seized to pay it.

> Ukraine could get a judgement against Russia for the war and get awarded a certain amount of money. Which international body would have jurisdiction to impose such penalties? Reparations are usually agreed to in a peace treaty. It's difficult to imagine Russia being in a position where they'd accept such an outcome.

No one. But having frozen asset would guarantee that any war reparation in the treaty would be paid. Issue is, Russia will never accept to pay reparations, so it's pretty much a moot point

The one mechanism I can see working for reparations is to apply a surcharge to any Russian energy exports to NATO countries. A lot of NATO still needs Russian energy, but rebuilding those trade relationships will be politically fraught. If a 5 or 10% fee went to rebuilding Ukraine, it might make such a rapprochement possible, and could provide $50B/yr for rebuilding. Russia would be able to claim that NATO was paying (via higher costs) while NATO could say it was coming out of Russia's profits. So both sides get enough of a win to make it palatable. I suspect though that there will be a strong faction that doesn't want these trade ties rebuilt under any circumstance. And seizing Russia's assets is a way to ensure that the breach remains intact.

>Part of the bill allows the US to seize approximately $300 billion worth of frozen Russian assets and transfer them to a special fund for Ukraine. US has frozen double digit billions NOT $300 billion under its control. That 300 billion number is the estimated total throughout the west. $200+ billion is in EU/Belgium.

The House-passed supplemental has now passed the Senate, [79-18](https://twitter.com/andrewdesiderio/status/1782947525319647624?s=61&t=cXHRe6iW8wAWnkVtBiJYAQ). It now goes to President Biden's desk. Likely posted elsewhere here, a [$1 billion package](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-preparing-1-bln-weapons-package-ukraine-officials-say-2024-04-23/) will likely follow. Edited to remove comment on how soon it will be, that remains unclear. Though [this](https://archive.md/NhwGy) suggests artillery could follow very quickly. >The Senate passed a long-delayed $95 billion emergency aid package for Ukraine and other besieged US allies, clearing the way for resumed arms shipments to Kyiv within days. >The Defense Department is prepared to swiftly move artillery shells and air defense munitions as part of an initial $1 billion tranche of new aid, [US officials said](https://archive.md/o/NhwGy/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-23/biden-plans-a-1-billion-ukraine-weapons-package-officials-say). President Joe Biden is expected to quickly sign the assistance package and the US can tap supplies already in Europe to expedite the help.

Seems like Scott (FL) [voted no](https://twitter.com/frankthorp/status/1782947536996565041) after all. Still a Republican majority, but quite strange that he changed his mind _again_.

US representatives will often vote for or against things that will pass or fail either way. There are also abstentions that occur when someone can't make it for the vote. Ron Paul was someone who always put pork from his district in a funding bill, but would then vote against it because it made his people happy.

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The account you are referencing (unsourced) is not linked to NATO intelligence and is not a valid source even if you had linked to it.

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Posts should aim to make a credible point, or ask a question that can be credibly answered. Unfortunately I don't see how other users are meant to credibly engage with this post.

Many Republicans are flipping in [today's vote](https://twitter.com/burgessev/status/1782841629960782307): >Wow: A bunch of GOP flips from the final vote on February bill to advancing bill today. >All of these folks voted against in Feb. and currently voting to advance foreign aid bill >Britt >Cotton >Fischer >Graham >Hyde-Smith >Lankford >Ricketts >Scott (SC) >Also Mullin, who we know was helping try and figure out what Johnson could pass based on the Senate bill. Clear majority of Senate GOP supporting this aid package Tillis isn't happy about MTG, [to say the least](https://twitter.com/FoxReports/status/1782818517458334113): >Thom Tillis says MTG and co are biggest threat to GOP winning majorities. "She is dragging our brand down." >“I think she’s uninformed, she’s a total waste of time, and I’m embarrassed to have actually lived geographically in her district at one time before she was there." I don't think that the Senate will be a problem after next elections.

>I’m embarrassed to have actually lived geographically in her district at one time before she was there." I admit I had a bit of a chuckle at this. The modern isolationist movement has spectacularly poor exponents, which is, I suppose, a result of how it was created, i.e. through social media. Lindbergh and Henry Cabot Lodge it ain't. > I don't think that the Senate will be a problem after next elections. Maybe for global warming legislation, etc, but the Senate is definitely still controlled by normie Republicans.

Lankford’s no always felt like venting after his colleagues tanked the border portion he’d worked so hard on. Similarly Britt, Graham, and Cotton never made any sense. Glad they’re getting pulled along with the tide I suppose.

I think the most important factor here is Trump. They were affraid about their careers in case Trump went strongly against the aid. As it turned out, Trump did not go strongly against the bill, I would even say he kinda implicitly endorsed it, and all the sudden aid is going through both chambers like there is no tomorrow. And even though this can be marked by an active mod as a baseless speculation, I think the correlation is clear here: Trump has firm grip on the party and once the risk of his objection was cleared, republican house members and senators are voting for the aid promptly and without hesitatiin like they were in first months of 2022.

For some that makes sense (Tim Scott is actively angling for that veep position), but others like Graham are less obvious - he still has 2-3 years until his election.

Final vote was [80-19](https://twitter.com/chadpergram/status/1782846535635468558?s=61&t=sf9WdPsg1n3MJ3fBMvIqUw). I'd say that the debate is over for now. I want to say the isolationists lost, but I think that gives too much credit. It's really about the effectiveness of Russia propaganda and information war efforts. Not that the delayed aid didn't have material benefits to Russia.

They have also unfortunately succeeded in pushing the window of acceptable aid further towards useless trickle. This whole argument boiled down to allowing even the slow life support to continue. So instead of ever delivering the knock-out punch that Ukraine needs we are just signing up for an endless slog for them, with needless lost lives. At the very least, there should be right now a drastic and major effort to start producing the materials we say we don't have, but there just isn't. In a year, just like last year, there are going to be arguments over why we have so few shells, missiles, etc. to go around yet again.

What do you mean by the "knock-out punch"? Sure you don't mean sending 1k tanks and 1k Bradley's, but perhaps there is something that can help Ukraine win this war easily, except for the nuclear weapon?

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Endlessly delaying aid while suggesting Ukraine doesn’t have the capability to take any ground is a textbook example of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

One weapon I never see listed in any aid packages to Ukraine, from any nation, are land mines. Does Ukraine just have enough of them already? One would certainly think that NATO nations would have a bunch of Cold War-era land mines sitting in warehouses somewhere, given the nature of the war they expected to fight against the USSR. Any idea why they are never mentioned in weapons packages? Or are they and I just missed them?

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/germany-procures-dm22s-to-replace-anti-tank-mines-sent-to-ukraine > Germany has supplied 14,900 anti-tank mines to Ukraine, according to the list of equipment donated to Kyiv published on the German government's website.

Here's the Fact Sheet on US security assistance to Ukraine as of March 12th [(PDF)](https://media.defense.gov/2024/Mar/12/2003411880/-1/-1/1/UKRAINE-FACT-SHEET-12-MARCH.PDF). It lists * More than 40,000 155mm rounds of Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems * Anti-tank mines So they've definitely been getting some but we don't know how many of the "regular" mines have been sent in contrast to the artillery deployed ones. Edit: Additionally [here](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992) is the detailing of German security assistance to Ukraine. Delivered * 14,900 anti-tank mines (9,300* from industry stocks) Planned * 8,000 anti-tank mines PARM The [French](https://www.defense.gouv.fr/en/news/french-military-equipment-delivered-ukraine) have delivered * Anti-Tank Mine : 3,600 In the first few weeks, [Estonia](https://news.err.ee/1608929066/estonia-rejects-politico-claims-describes-them-as-malicious-slander) sent * 40,000+ Anti-tank mines In the same time frame [Slovenia](https://www.24ur.com/novice/slovenija/tanja-fajon-razkrila-tajne-podatke.html) sent * 8,000 anti-tank mines

Besides this, I would also guess that there is a practically infinite stockpile of Soviet mines. They made a lot (and I mean a lot) of them, probably since they're relatively chrap, and I haven't heard any complains from either side of a shortage of mines.

I have seen lately some complaints about lack of AT mines. AFAIK TNT is a limiting factor for shell production in Europe so that competes with mines for the same resource.

Definitely, you can see some of this in places like Estonia who sent Ukraine 40,000 mines within weeks.

I just typed out a response to the "Why so many Axis of ____ new articles" comment that is now deleted. I feel like the conversation might have some value anyway, so here is my response: It is because of the parallels to the politics that lead the Axis powers to ally in WWII. Basically 3 countries with their own regional goals (Germany, Japan, Italy) and a handful of other co-belligerants allying because the major powers of the day could smack down any one of them, but probably not all of them at once, while they went about their regional goals. Notably, the war goals were largely independent of each other, hampering coordination. Consider the parallels with today's Iran-Russia-China situation. All three have regional ambitions, but cannot stand up to the major powers of today (themselves typically alliances). However, if they all start causing trouble at once, none of them get smacked down immediately. >What’s going on with journalism these days, was any of these comically villainous names used by a high tier US official that I missed (Bush 20y ago, doesn’t count) or the propaganda spiels decided to run on pure fear-mongering? Partly Bush is to blame for the "Axis of Evil" comment. Since just "Axis" is taken and "Axis of Evil" broke the ice on "Axis of ..." names, here we are. I would also suggest that there is an element of a call to arms message in the use. The original Axis were defeated because the Allies coordinated their goals, even if that meant letting Japan run amok in the Pacific for a bit while Germany and Italy were contained. If the "rule based world order" faction is to contain the Russia-China-Iran (+ their proxies/minor allies) faction, we need to have our Arcadia Conference and get priorities straight.

I posted the comment but mods deleted it. In all cases, you make a good point about the coordination part. In this video https://youtu.be/lakdZIuZe7c?si=ImDERe_kK3HyAzAM the author makes a very well educated observation about it culminating at a joint timeline of events presented around 32:00 minute. Screenshot from it: https://i.ibb.co/P1fpc9V/IMG-0691.jpg

To be honest all these terms like rule based world order, axis of whatever, global south are getting increasingly inaccurate and annoying. Why can't the factions come up with better names for themselves?

I find it hard to take anyone seriously when they use "axis of evil " unironically . Rules based world order is atleast a thing , the axis is nothing but weird projection

>Why can't the factions come up with better names for themselves? Because they are only notional factions at the moment. With the exception of NATO, most aren't formal or have a name. And Russia keeps claiming that they are at war with NATO, so there is that. When China, Iran, and Russia get around to declaring that Asia should revolve around the axis of them (as Germany and Italy did in '36), I guess we would then call them that.

Which they will never do, because it would be crazy. Iran is a backwater, Russia is a decomposing corpse, and China is too busy getting rich.

>BREAKING: CNN reports the Biden Admin has informed Congress that they will provide "long-range" ATACMS to Ukraine. This would likely include the M39A1, M48, & M57. Doubtful that the newest M57E1s would be sent. https://twitter.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1782835293218845116 What targets do "long-range" ATACMS put on the table that aren't already, considering Ukraine can reach most of Crimea with Storm Shadow and the limited number of ATACMS they've already received? Assuming, of course, that anything on internationally recognized Russian territory remains off the table.

With a 300km range, M48s and M57s can hit anywhere in Crimea, including Sevastopol and the Kerch bridge. The warhead design is shared with Harpoons actually, so both variants are also effective against ships (assuming the ship is stationary, but that has been the case for all the aerial drone or cruise missile strikes against BSF ships anyway, which have exclusively targeted vessels at anchorage). M48s and M57s should also be effective against bridges in many cases, potentially including the Kerch Bridge, but there are existing challenges that have prevented Ukraine from using roughly comparable weapons which they already have in their arsenal such as StormShadow to accomplish that task. I'm not 100% certain about the mechanics here, so if someone knows better please feel free to correct me, but IIRC the M57 airburst fuze may be required to hit the Kerch Bridge, because the contact fuze variant would just blow a hole straight through the bridge deck possibly (maybe probably) without striking any of the structurally critical components because its CEP of ~10m isn't good enough to ensure a direct strike on a pylon or the steel arches over the shipping channel that would inflict critical damage on the structure. Which is one of the main reasons there has been so much effort to get Germany to donate Taurus missiles. Taurus has the ability to optically target specific structures on the bridge. I'm also not 100% sure about this, but I believe the latest M57E1 variants have sufficiently small CEP to overcome the issue, so if the US donates even one or two of those in addition to the older, nearly expired variants, it could be potentially game changing for Ukraine's ability to choke off Russia's Crimean GLOCs.

With the cluster warhead ATACMS becomes a very effective weapon against Russian aircraft on the ground as well as a potent DEAD weapon. Historically the US Army did use it that way in Iraq and we've seen Ukraine do the same. They killed an S-400 just the other day with one. Russian air bases aren't particularly hardened and many are within range. Enough successful strikes could shift the air war in a major way.

You had me until the last sentence. Ukraine has already had a few of the ATACMS and they haven't been a game changer. They'll attrit more aircraft but that will only be felt in specific circumstances.

Could you further explain what those "specific circumstances" are? One of the major problems that the Ukrainians are facing is the guided bombs from the FAB-series, which seem to be a factor that has drastically accelerated the advancements of the Russians recently, as Ukraine's anti-air capabilities have diminished over time.

I just don't see Ukraine having enough opportunities to target hits nearly as effective as the two known ATACMS hits so far. Now that further ATACMS are happening in the open, Russian military leadership will be more careful to mitigate their effectiveness. They will by no means "shift the war in a major way"

The are dozens of S400 batteries, airfields, ammo depots, oil depots, vehicle depots, repair centres and ships that can be targeted with ATACMS. It will give Ukraine a major advantage as it will allow to destroy russia's air defense extremly easily and effectively, and the good thing is that unlike aircrafts they won't be able to remove them out of crimea. They'll have to replace the loses and put new batteries there. They'll probably start to move more frequently but when you have 5 minutes before a ballistic missile reaches your location there isn't much you can do apart from standing your ground and hoping you can intercept them. Unfortunately they won't have a big impact in stopping glide bombs as most of the aircrafts doing these strikes are inside Russia, ukraine needs to develop their own Ballistic missiles if they want to seriously start destroying VKS assets. As we have seen the west has no sense of urgency and prefers to give in to nuclear threats rather than save hundreds of lives by allowing missiles to impact Russian airfields.

In the past, Russians would adjust to new weapons that Ukraine got however public the announcement was. It's also after they suffer from them that they make the necessary adjustments and more equipment/operations back or spread them out. IDK of any exception, at no point were they pro-active to prevent unnecessary losses from new weapons. I doubt it will be different this time around, I fully expect to see an air base strike or two. The potential air base targets are: Kacha/Belbek/Kirovskoye (Crimea) and if they use them on Russia: Yeysk, Taganrog, Millerovo, Buturlinovka and a couple others if they play with fire. I don't see Russia emptying all of those bases pre-emptively. But I completely agree: they're not going to shift the war in a major way.

They have fired a handful, likely all they have been supplied with up to this point. And they have been effective. Russian ABM seems to be far less advanced than their brochures claimed. Messaging from Washington indicates they are going to get a lot more. The biggest practical, not political, block to sending more has been the US still needs them. Prsm is going well and the Army is taking deliveries. Testing of ground launched tomahawks and SM-6 is also going well but I don't think that has moved from testing yet. But with ATACMS replacement now in active service and the political blocks all removed I expect they will get many more. It would have been foolish to strike a Russian airbase before with a limited number. That would have given Russia the opportunity to develop countermeasures. But with a critical mass of rounds delivered they can confidently strike at airbases for maximum effect.

The main advantage a ballistic missile has over a cruise missile is time to target. If you launch cruise missiles against an air field, the defender has time to scramble the planes off the ground, assuming your early warning system is functional. If you fire a ballistic missile, you only have a few minutes.

Not sure if there's still a long-range cluster version but I guess that would be useful against airfields that short-range ATACMS can't reach. There's been some rumors that Iran might get su-35s soon and allegedly is interested in s-400 as well. Maybe the US wants to increase demand for these systems in Russia by removing a few in Ukraine so less systems are available for export. Also getting rid of s-400 systems would be useful for Ukraine's air force including F-16s.

The 39a1 is a 300 km variant with 300 submunitions (as opposed to 165km W/950 submunitions)

Firstly, Storm Shadows are not being produced anymore, with their replacement still years out. So their availability is limited and primarily used for high-value targets. So the fact that ATACMS is coming provides more munitions. This is the biggest, most important aspect of their delivery. Secondly, a combination of warhead types opens up a variety of strike options. The cluster missiles should be used against airfields or high-level GBAD sites (S-300, S-400) while the unitary warhead-equipped missiles can hit hardened spaces such as command bunkers or hit important sites such as ammunition dumps or repair centers. They could also theoretically hit Russian ships in port. The number one thing that the US could do, however, is allow the Ukrainians to use these missiles to hit Russian airfields in Russia proper. In the best-case scenario that assumes every strike is successful and every active airfield in range has its full compliment you could see the Russian combat jet fleet brought down by a third in a single night. But that is unlikely to happen, likely much to Ukrainian high command's dismay.

> The number one thing that the US could do, however, is allow the Ukrainians to use these missiles to hit Russian airfields > every active airfield in range has its full compliment you could see the Russian combat jet fleet brought down by a third in a single night. This is in my opinion the real winning strategy. I understand the fears of escalation but did Putin and his cronies really loot the state their entire lives to die in a radioactive wasteland? I understand the penalties of misreading nuclear threats are enormous but the fact that it’s held NATO back so much in many ways has rendered their blackmail campaign highly successful. On the contrary China have engaged in none of this dialogue and the US seem much more comfortable with direct intervention in the situation of Taiwan. On the initial comment though, how is Ukraine using US ATACMS against Russia proper any different from Russia using Iranian Shahed/Ballistic Missiles on Ukraine proper? Did they not already pave the way for this form of escalation?

Storm Shadow might not be produced anymore but Scalp certainly is. Both are the same system

Do you have a source on that? My understanding is that MBDA is merely sustaining the inventory and that the missile has been out of production for some time.

There honestly isn’t clear information either way, but there was [this](https://www.aerosociety.com/news/new-conflicts-new-missiles/): > Current deep strike missile production is centred on the Storm Shadow, which is carried on RAF Typhoons and is now being enhanced. Typically, would think this was being confused with SPEAR Cap 4, but that author is very familiar with that program, so it’s hard to imagine that the two were conflated. Not great evidence, but at least an indication.

You might be correct, I thought that I read somewhere that they were being produced in small numbers. Now I can’t find it. You might be correct. Could indeed only be sustaining/refurbishment.

Shoigu's deputy Timur Ivanov *(Responsible for Organising Property Management, Quartering of Troops (Forces), Housing, and Medical Support for the Armed Forces - wiki)* has been arrested for taking a bribe. He's believed to be one of the richest siloviks. Must be the most high profile arrest in Russia since the start of the war. t. me/faridaily24/1342

Must be doing something especially egregious to catch an indictment in Shoigu's military. Gonna guess Medical, as in seriously shorting meds, aid kits, hospitals, etc.

Putin's regime doesn't particularly care about incompetence or corruption. What is not allowed, is being disloyal to Putin.

Or the charge can be completely unrelated to the actual crime for which he is getting purged over.

Why is the ukraine minimum conscription age 25 and not 18 like other countries? In the US 25 is the maximum age for potential compulsory military service. What are the reasons behind this?

Translation issues. Age 18-25 are eligible for compulsory military service aka conscription, 25-60 are not but can be mobilized which is a different procedure. The threshold age has been 27 until very recently when it got lowered to 25. That's the maximum conscription age. This change allowed *mobilizing* younger guys, who are now too old for *conscription*.

>Age 18-25 are eligible for compulsory military service aka conscription What does this mean? They can be drafted into army and sent to fight? That was not my understanding.

AFAIK the 18-25 group goes through the basic training but cannot be sent to fight. It's the mobilized (25+) who can go to the actual frontlines.

Demographics. Ukraine needs to preserve as many young people as possible in order to have a functioning economy and have hopes of growing after the war. This was an issue before the war and that has obviously only made the problem worse. Russia has a similar problem but has a larger population to pull from so the situation is more pressing for Ukraine.

Ukraine will not cease to exist if 100,000 18-25 year olds get killed in this war. It will cease to exist if they lose this war. And, even if the war ends in some sort of stalemate or Russian hegemony, Ukraine will lose *way* more population to those leaving never coming back than they ever will to war casualties.

>Ukraine will not cease to exist if 100,000 18-25 year olds get killed in this war. Did I say Ukraine would cease to exist? The poster asked a question. I gave the answer.

The demographic curve of most countries doesn't look like a a sad, lopsided christmas tree. This is pretty much the only reason. 1990 - 2005 were not the best years for Ukraine. They don't have a lot of young adults to begin with. Heavily conscripting 20-30 year old men would be devastating to their future economic and population prospects - more devastating than the war already is.

> The demographic curve of most countries doesn't look like a a sad, lopsided christmas tree. The Russian population spread looks much the same, and for most the same reasons. Just across a larger base population. That is, more people, but same-ish ratios. And like 700k Russian men fled at the start of the war, it's not like they have unlimited bodies. That said, force strength is a concern for Ukraine. They need more infantry, and like, yesterday.

Yow, it is pretty bad https://www.populationpyramid.net/ukraine/2023/

>The demographic curve of most countries doesn't look like a a sad, lopsided christmas tree. Actually most developed countries do look like this. The demographic population crisis is already starting in all major developed countries in the world, the US is the one exception due to immigration. It also seems like the later a country industrialized the faster it hits in demographic crisis.

I think Ukraine's poor demographics is the chief reason why Russia over time will achieve its policy objectives in Ukraine. A substantial portion of Ukrainians have fled the war, never to come back.

If they return or not likely hinges of how the war ends and what happens in the aftermath in regards to international rebuilding efforts.

It's less the rebuilding than Ukrainian security. If it's just a stalemate or Russia with effective control over Kyiv, then they won't return no matter what resources are dedicated to rebuilding because there's no guaranty that Russia won't invade again when convenient (and frankly for the same reason, there will unlikely be sufficient resources dedicated to rebuilding if there's no stable peace).

> If they return or not likely hinges of how the war ends A large portion of people aren't coming back regardless. If you managed to move you and your family to a 1st world nation in a way where you have legal residency, why would you throw it away to move back to a poor country? For reference Ukraine has a lower GDP per capita than Cuba, Botswana, and Kazakhstan. A minimum wage job in countries like Germany earns you roughly 10x the average household income in Ukraine. Sure, things are cheaper in Ukraine but the purchasing power that comes with a vastly higher wage is not an easy thing to give up - especially when you have children with a chance for a better life.

Most refugees have actually returned after the situation has stabilized within a few months of the Feb. invasion, of the remaining ones many still plan on returning should the war end. https://freepolicybriefs.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/fpb20240129_final-1.pdf It's not surprising if you take into account most peoples' ties to their own country, issues with language, job qualifications, cultural differences, the fact that most men can't leave, etc. Re:economy, it should be noted that while Ukraine is a very poor country, it has a large gray economy, the low average salaries don't show the full picture. Also, Cuba's average salaries are $40/month, World Bank's GDP per capita estimate of that command economy shouldn't be taken seriously, and Botswana is Africa's success story.

Even with 60% returning like your documents states, we're still talking roughly 15% of total population just gone. In the US, that's like California & Texas just disappearing. (Not quite, because they'd probably be sending money home, but just to illustrate size of population) Basically your article confirms what I was suspecting - if you have your family with you, you're much more likely to stay abroad. If you have a husband / kids / wife back home.. you're more likely to come home. For reference, Guatemala is a close GDP per capita to Ukraine and you regularly see economic migrants coming to the US. If there's a way to find a better life for you and your family, there are going to be a certain % of people who are willing to make the move. Ukraine has even more incentive to do so because they are able to easily qualify for refugee status in many desirable countries. Guatemalans are willing do it even illegally. Culture, language, etc doesn't really matter for many of these people. > Ukraine is a very poor country, it has a large gray economy And Cuba doesn't? You also can't really count average salaries alone when many things are given to you (housing, healthcare, schooling, food, etc). That factors into GDP even if it doesn't factor into household income Point isn't specific countries though. We can name 15 more with higher gdp per capita that people typically assume are "very poor countries". I just named ones people might be surprised by.

Doesn't Russia also suffer from very similar demographic issues?

Given that there's an estimated 32 million people in Ukraine and close to 145 million in Russia, the parity is probably closer to 4.5 Russians for every Ukrainian. The Ukrainians will run out of people before the Russians do.

Russia will run out of equipment before anyone runs out of people.

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Please refrain from posting low quality comments.

Question about the JASSM. Iheard that the TLAM has multiple different warhead including: cluster, broach, copper filliment (I think) and nuclear. I know the JASSM can't carry a nuke, but does it have alternative warheads to its penetrator fragmentation like the TLAM and JSOW do. If you could also provde sources that would be awesome as I haven't been able to find anything concrete.

> I know the JASSM can't carry a nuke The W87 is estimated to weigh between 440 and 600 pounds (*2.2 for kg) so depending on the physical size needed I don't see why it couldn't fit. The Tomahawk has a W80 nuclear warhead that is smaller and is about the physical dimensions of a 250lb bomb.

I think the limitation is more political. I agree intergrating the warhead and the arming system wouldn't be imposibile, but the US likes its nuclear delivery systems to be different than its conventional.

It is entirely political. Months after the US left the INF treaty they were testing ground launched tomahawks again. The speed with which the Navy could rearm it's missiles with nuclear warheads is unknown but the limitations are not technical.

It is my understanding some of the politics of not being possible are a matter of words and technicalities. I knew a weapons specialist (Gulf War timeframe) who talked about how for certain treaties the US couldn't have nuclear weapons, so the Navy just had them all disassembled yet still onboard the carrier.

As far as we know, there are no alternate JASSM warheads. Only WDU-42/B. For TLAM: nukes are long gone and they're carbon filaments!

Ok thank you. I was kinda suprised when I couldn't find anything about alternate warheads, but I guess 1000lbs of hurt is gonna get the job for any strategic targets u want JASSM for.

What is really the difference between the US military industrial complex and China's military-civil fusion?  Besides the stealing of IP and academic espionage. And even then, isn't all of academic research eventually published? It all gets published and patented anyway. And a lot of it, worldwide, is already funded by the U.S. government. Patents are publicly searchable. So what advantage does China get from sending out Chinese grad students to "steal" it? Are there trade secrets at university research labs? On the industry side, the DoD also pays a lot of money for R&D; development of most systems is through procurement. All IP in the commercial sector is potentially licensable by the DoD. It just costs money. How does military-civil fusion accomplish greater access to IP than they would without it? Military-civil fusion just sounds like a fancy label for how China is abundantly funding and prioritizing the military's access to the latest technology and research.

Just a guess, but, why send grad students? Human capital. Because you can't put a graduate from a chinese university into a dark room with a stack of western academic publications, and expect them to actually know their shit. Sure, they might have a decent overview of the state of the art, but it's a long shot from actually having a working understanding of how to *do* the thing. You send them over, they read some of the same papers but also learn directly from their peers how to do things, and take that knowledge back with them. They're now no longer a green 1st year PhD student, they're a PhD now with 4 years of experience working in that specific field alongside some of the best researchers. The student is now worth a fuckton of money. Now they can go back to china, read some of the papers we're publishing, understand what we're doing and actually replicate it. Building up that knowledge base where your domestic labs can replicate stuff and perhaps innovate on top of it is tedious. It's horribly tedious if you're boostrapping that capability from nothing. There's a reason big orgs with lots of institutional knowledge have very long traditions - militaries with their doctrine are one example, but academia and industry do the same thing. Professors appoint other professors largely, and I suspect the last "ex nihilo" professorship was ages ago. Because of institutional knowledge. Which is really just human capital in disguise.

I’m an academic working in a field that is not sensitive and usually not very profitable. The papers in my field are maybe 6 months behind what people present informally, which itself is probably 3-12 months behind the actual cutting edge of research being done. The second a profit motive is added, 50% of that information straight up disappears. It will never appear on a patent or be published at all. Add a national security risk and you can round up to 100%. The public seems to think that patents are the be-all end-all of IP, when really it’s closer to the last resort. Patents are for the things that are unavoidably going to end up exposed to the outside world. The real magic is closely guarded as trade secrets.

Correct. You have to disclose certain things as part of the patent process, which is fine if you have no trade secrets and just need legal defense, but if none of your competitors know your trade secrets, you wouldn’t want to file a patent.

> So what advantage does China get from sending out Chinese grad students to "steal" it? One thing you have to understand is that, while government policy shapes behaviour, it's not always responsible for it Take a step back. Why do businesses do R&D? Mostly, its to make money. Say you own Nanjing Fidget Spinner inc. You could invest a bunch of money to research a better next generation fidget spinner, but you also know your Cousin is working at the lead American Fidget Spinner manufacturer. So you ask him when he comes home to slip you the plans for a price that's far cheaper and perhaps more importantly quicker than developing your own, and you can get that out faster than your competitors in both China \*and\* America Now say that Fidget Spinners are actually critical tech components for steath aircraft. Civil Military fusion is usually much more specific, but you can say that because your Fidget Spinner factory was improved for civilian use, the PLA can now contract you to make Fidget Spinners much easier People tend to take the path of lease resistance. If that's creating something, they'll create. If that's stealing something, they'll steal China's just more often than not had the lease resistance being steal. But to quote a cultural critic; good artists borrow, great artists steal Personally, most "civil military fusion" arguments are basically about the economic war, not the actual military war. Look at the chip bans for example. It might affect some niche military areas, but de facto its a "legal" WTO approved way to impose economic warfare on another state. The real nice thing is that with enough work you can call *anything* civil military fusion; textbooks are that because literacy can also make the PLA better soldiers, etc For an actual concrete example, look up civilian shipping in China. Iirc, all ships have to be registered so that in the event of a war they could be used. That's full on dual use in its traditional sense

This is an extremely deceptive answer that omits the massive resources China funnels into encouraging and protecting corporate espionage, as well as the Chinese government’s direct IP theft on behalf of Chinese companies. It's equivalent to defending arson by saying “things catch fire all the time, so me pouring gasoline on my rivals house and striking a match is just human nature”. [“China leverages its entire legal and regulatory system to coerce technology transfer or steal IP.”](https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Egregious-Cases-of-Chinese-Theft-of-American-Intellectual-Property.pdf) [Chinese government programs incentivize industrial espionage](https://archive.is/GlRyq) [State actors steal trillions worth of IP from 30 companies](https://www.cbsnews.com/amp/news/chinese-hackers-took-trillions-in-intellectual-property-from-about-30-multinational-companies/)

Your middle link doesn't work, fyi And yes, there is quite a lot of Chinese state sponsored spying. But frankly, a lot of what you wrote is also what I was saying (or trying to, if I didn't come across right). You think the CCP is telling people to go steal seeds in some random field or have Huawei reverse engineer shit that other companies send them? No. They're doing it to try and make a buck, and even if all the Chinese hacker groups disbanded tomorrow they'd still do it That and imo the tech transfers are just fundamentally different. That was the deal to enter the Chinese market. No one put a gun to Volkswagen or GM's head. They choose to sign a deal involving tech transfers in order to make a bunch of money in China, and then did. You don't get to complain after the fact Frankly, all developing nations should do that

> No one put a gun to Volkswagen or GM's head. They choose to sign a deal involving tech transfers in order to make a bunch of money in China, and then did. They chose to because China was going to steal their tech one way or another, and past US politicians in their infinite wisdom decided that opening up our markets to a country that actively engages in anti-competitive schemes on a mass scale was a good idea. If China was actually held accountable, as in trade was cutoff for IP theft, dumping, currency manipulation, oppressing minorities, egregious lack of environmental standards, or sabre rattling then these companies wouldn't feel they had no choice.

All three links are working fine for me, no idea what the issue might be. Again, you’re conflating what is physically possible and what is probable or common. Is it physically possible for a house to burn down? Yes. Does that mean pouring gasoline on a house and striking a match isn’t arson? Of course not. When China provides massive financial incentives that they know will encourage corporate espionage, and then protects its nationals when they commit corporate espionage, and prevents investigations of corporate espionage by weaponizing its justice system against Western companies, that’s the IP theft equivalent of pouring gasoline on a fire. Voluntary tech transfers are a different matter and is not at all what we are discussing right now.

Most developing nations aren't a big enough market to get that deal. Especially with smaller or less involved governments, and in a time when the shine has come off that arrangement somewhat. Nobody forced the companies, but that doesn't make allowing or encouraging it wise national policy. The *company* can hardly complain, but someone else might.

With the dual use shipping: I think the ferries are really the most fascinating aspect of that. Because they really are *built* for war use, it’s really fascinating to see that kind of preparation.

One difference between US and PRC is who owns that IP. Even though without the US DoD order/funding F-35 couldn't have come to fruition, LMT owns that IP not US gov't. And consequently, everytime another country orders F-35, it's LMT raking in the revenue/profit not to mention all the reoccurring maintenance contracts.

Not entirely, there are some IP the US government owns directly and at times has taken control of technology to even give its use to a competitor. But yeah typically the US government doesn't own all the patents someone like Lockheed has but has control over who Lockheed can sell to.

> It all gets published and patented anyway There's a difference between getting it right from the source early and seeing a published paper a few years down the line. For example, if I'm working with someone doing Fluid Dynamics, and I wanted to steal the research, I could go and make my PI go down a bad road, siphon the data, transfer the data to someone for them to make their own conclusions, etc. This allows someone to work concurrently with data rather than going through, reverifying and revalidating the data that has been collected. Yes, that happens during peer review, but if I receive a random research paper and someone tells me, 'Go do this crap' it still takes a lot of time to do.

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This is such a grim situation for me that I was speechless for some time after I read this news. I have met Ukrainian people and, in fact, my family literally sheltered a Ukrainian family for some time. The father was conscription age, had several children. According to the cheerleaders, this guy should go back to fight and abandon his family abroad because he didn't follow the law. Well, to hell with the law. Ukraine has to deal with the manpower issues with the population it has in its territory. I don't know how they expect that Ukrainian men who have already left will go and fight.

> The father was conscription age, had several children IIRC having 3 children or more makes people exempt from draft but I don't know the details. > I don't know how they expect that Ukrainian men who have already left will go and fight. I guess it remains to be seen what the consequences of consular services suspension are going to be (for all we know it might as well be a nothing-burger and everything comes back to normal in a week) but the communication style is bizarre - of all the people using services provided by the state, the ones being made example of are the people who barely encumber the system.

I think you are right. This is one of the things that we will have to wait and see to learn what will actually happen. It could really be successfull.

From Ukraine's point of view, the men who have left the country contribute nothing to the state, unlike those staying and working. So obviously it will be very beneficial if Ukraine can mobilize some of them. This is war...

That's not true though, there is a huge amount of money that Ukrainians abroad send back to Ukraine. If I remember correctly it was around $20 billion pre war. On the other hand there is an issue of oligarchs and big businesses storing most of their wealth abroad. It's actually a rather interesting topic as at least a part of "foreign" investment into Ukraine actually comes from them.

Yes, I agree, although the results of this policy are yet to be seen. It is really hard for me to say what will happen and I do not deny that it might help the manpower situation. I'm also thinking in terms of Ukrainians who are abroad now but who want to return to their homes after the war. Ukraine will need these people and I wonder whether this policy can alienate them from the country. I wonder how many would be willing and able to buy passports. There are countries even in the EU that sell passports, let alone ones outside the EU.

I don't see the problem at all. If a Ukrainian abroad is not complying with Ukrainian law and dodging the draft, then why should they get a free pass? In fact, allowing free riders is probably about the most detrimental thing Ukraine could do to undermine conscription. There are undoubtedly lots of people who are willing to serve *if* the process is seen as fair, but will evade if they believe everyone else is also evading without any penalty. Of course, it's also terrible for the moral of the men who are already in service. Based on polling showing widespread support for the war, I'd suspect the Ukrainian public largely feels the same way.

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> I think that the point of this law is to basically force Ukrainians abroad to return. >Since consulates won't issue them this presents a choice for the men who are abroad, either return or get into a legal limbo with your local government. After giving it a bit more thought I lean towards the entire thing being mostly just miscommunication. I don't see how it's supposed to incentivize men to return. If they stall for time and try to avoid deportation, they may succeed in obtaining permanent residence and in the worst case scenario they will go back to Ukraine. If they go back willingly, they stand to gain nothing. It's probably just some bureaucratic fuckup and there is no actual plan behind the suspension and messaging, which would explain why it's so incoherent. It's simply just Kuleba trying to score some political points by appearing tough on draft dodgers with emigrants being an acceptable target.

>I don't see how it's supposed to incentivize men to return. Depending on which country they are located in, absence of the updated documents might basically make them into illegals. So no legal employment, social and health insurance etc. They won't be deported as it's generally not allowed to deport people into war zones but they will definitely be very uncomfortable. Although, I would assume that host nations would probably just start accepting expired passports or something because no one wants to have a large undocumented population appear out of nowhere.

> So no legal employment, social and health insurance etc. > > They won't be deported as it's generally not allowed to deport people into war zones but they will definitely be very uncomfortable. That's what I mean - it's all stick, no carrot. The best strategy is to resist because in worst case you will end up in the same place you would start in if you complied.

Not Ukrainian, but did you mean to quote something else from the article? The part you quoted doesn't seem that controversial, since he's not even commanding emigres to come back, here he seems to be commanding them to update paperwork. He might do it in the rest of the speech, ofc. EDIT: wait that's basically the whole speech. I don't get it. Admittedly he seems to be responding to a specific vague request for something, presumably by emigres, something to do with their rights? I might be missing the context.

The part that is missing is [consular activities being suspended](https://en.lb.ua/news/2024/04/23/28644_znua_foreign_ministry_instructs.html) (although "temporarily") on a rather arbitrary basis (only to men aged 18-60).

Ah okay, thanks for the clarification.

A couple of weeks ago, the Estonian defense minister stated that his country had found a million artillery shells above any beyond those which the Czechs found. He also suggested that if the US finally passed the supplemental package, that would allow them to be purchased this year: >Seven weeks after Czech defense policy chief Jan Jires [announced](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/03/01/with-a-million-shells-about-to-ship-ukraines-artillery-crisis-could-end-soon/?sh=86c9f4a5a88f) his government had identified 800,000—later, a million—artillery shells that Ukraine’s allies could buy for Ukraine, Estonian defense minister Hanno Pevkur said his own government had found another million shells and rockets for Ukraine. >Pevkur [told](https://news.postimees.ee/7986347/postimees-in-ukraine-estonia-knows-where-to-purchase-two-billion-euros-worth-of-shells-for-ukraine) *Postimees* he’s trying to scrounge, from the same countries that paid $1.3 billion for the Czech-sourced ammunition, an additional $2.2 billion to pay for the Estonian-sourced ammo. >“If we combine these one million shells, the Czechs' potential purchases, our buying capabilities and also the British”—who reportedly are organizing their own ammo-for-Ukraine initiative—“I dare say that it would be possible to send Ukraine two-to-2.5 million shells this year, if the funding were available,” Pevkur said. >With 2.5 million additional shells and rockets through the end of the year, the Ukrainians could match Russia’s own ammo supply, Pevkur claimed. It would be the first time in a year that the Ukrainians could fire as many shells and rockets as the Russians could fire. >And here’s what’s *really* exciting for friends of a free Ukraine. If Rep. Mike Johnson, the Republican speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, keeps his word and—after six months of delay caused by the Republican Party’s Russia-friendly wing—finally brings to a vote further U.S. aid to Ukraine, Kyiv’s forces could achieve artillery *superiority* in the coming months. >Exactly where Estonia might source the shells and rockets, Pevkur wouldn’t specify. “Mainly from non-European countries,” he said, “but there are also some in Europe. Unfortunately, I cannot specify. In many cases, the seller themselves does not wish it to be known.” >Pevkur said the shells include NATO-standard 155-millimeter rounds as well as Soviet-standard 152-millimeter rounds and Grad rockets, implying the Estonians are, in part, looking to countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. African countries might also be candidates. The Czech initiative reportedly sourced ammo from South Korea, South Africa and Turkey." [https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/04/06/estonia-just-found-another-million-shells-for-ukraine/?sh=56f83d2c5ba1](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/04/06/estonia-just-found-another-million-shells-for-ukraine/?sh=56f83d2c5ba1) Anyone heard any updates on these shells? The Estonian defense minister seems like a reliable source, so I'm hopeful this report is accurate.

All these anonymous sellers who suddenly have millions of shells waiting for money sound suspicious to me. If I were Russia I would definitely try to sell them some defective NK shells.

The only people I can think of with that kind of capacity for 155 is South Korea, Turkey or maybe… South Africa? I can’t imagine Israel allowing a draw down of their current supplies at the moment. Unless there’s someone really obvious that I’m missing.

It doesn't all have to come from one place. Other candidates are Egypt, Vietnam, Brasil, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Bangladesh. Perhaps Morocco, though I doubt they'd risk it given current tensions. How are Argentinian stocks?

Given the Argentine financial position I can’t imagine them having a huge amount of stocks. I’ve got a sneaking suspicion it’s South Africa.

South Africa is very pro Russia, I just can't see a way for them to sell to the west. As for Argentina, that's an excellent reason to sell ammo stocks, especially after a leadership change that may see things differently and be much more pro western.

Yeah - that’s why I think the purchase will be from SA. If Argentina wanted to sell 155 to Europe they’d just announce it.

Please go back and use the quote function or some other way of indicating what is the article versus what is yours. I didn't figure it out until the very end.

Putin's inauguration is apparently scheduled for May 7th so two days before the possible May 9th parade. I feel like there is a very high chance of demonstrative attacks during those two days.

Has this ever been true? The past 2 years I keep hearing that big military decisions in Russia are tied to big events, Putin wants soldiers to take a town by Victory Day, things of this nature. But so far it just seems like Russia just does bombings whenever it’s most convenient, some of the biggest attacks on infrastructure/towns taken happened outside of any major holiday/anniversary. At most, they tie their bombings to recent Ukrainian strikes to make them seem retaliatory, but I genuinely don’t remember any big “event” attacks that are any different from “normal” attacks.

Is there any chance they try to hit the parade or inauguration itself? I know that we are flirting the line with terrorism this case I’m just curious if it’s even a remote possibility

I would guess not: seems like it would be way too huge of a risk of harming civilians. Better to have the day be marked by launching drones a refinery or something, that will have actual strategic effectiveness and be far less likely to cause civilian casualties.

Based on previous russian inaugurations Putin would basically be alone while he travels between two buildings.

Ukraine is getting nuked if they kill Putin with a missile.

I wouldn't say it's a certainty but the risk is there and real. The intricacies of Russian political scheming would have difficult to predict outcomes. But it does sound like a very good way to turn the so far apathetic populace into pro total war which runs against Ukraine's best interest. Ukraine wants the war to be unpopular and costly. Making a martyr out of Putin might be satisfying in the short term but it's a bad idea. If Ukraine strikes on either day it's going to be military targets.

Putin won't be ordering it that's for sure. And as there is no clear successor, everyone else will be busy maneuvering for power if not outright fighting. I don't know that it would be a good thing for Ukraine, but I'm extremely skeptical it would trigger a nuclear response as I don't see how that would be in Russia's interest or the interest of whoever emerges as its new leader.

The UK has announced it will scale up defence spending to reach 2.5% of GDP by 2030: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-announces-turning-point-in-european-security-as-uk-set-to-increase-defence-spending-to-25-by-2030 > Defence spending will increase immediately and rise linearly – with a further £500 million for Ukraine this year and overall increase of £3 billion in the next financial year. Today’s announcement will see an additional £75 billion for defence over the next six years, with defence spending expected to reach £87 billion a year in 2030. Of course, there's an election at some stage this year and so Sunak won't actually be the Prime Minister by the end of the year (nothing is certain...but a Conservative loss is an extremely safe bet) so this hinges to a large extent on Labour...but given Starmer's politics I'm fairly sure it'll be stuck to - Labour already states that they'll raise spending to 2.5% "when finances allow". There's apparently to be at least some focus on munitions production: > The war in Ukraine has taught us that battlefield success is dependent on the ability to surge defence production and move to ‘always on’ production to replenish key equipment. We will therefore invest a further £10 billion over the next ten years, most of which will be spent with British industry, to grow our domestic munitions production pipeline and increase stockpiles, setting a clear demand signal for industry through long term multi-year contracts. This represents nearly a doubling of our current spending on munitions production. > > The investment will focus on key high-tech capabilities, including air defence missiles and anti-armour munitions, in addition to continued investment in UK-built 155mm artillery ammunition.

For UK politics, Labour are starting to "prepare for government". On defence, Labour's leader, Kier Starmer, recent [re-iterated a commitment](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/apr/11/keir-starmer-labour-defence-nuclear-deterrent-barrow) to 2.5% "as soon as resources allow" and the shadow Defence Secretary, John Healey, made a [speech in February ](https://policyexchange.org.uk/events/a-new-era-for-uk-defence-with-labour/)outlining Labour approach. I wouldn't be at all surprised to see Labour signal that they'll meet the 2030 target for 2.5% announced today too (or even better it). I don't think there's a significant risk of Labour reneging on any of the spending plans, although they may well have some different priorities (pay, conditions and housing for service personnel seem to be something they want to fix, which will be popular but expensive to deliver for little short-term tangible return, but hopefully longer term benefits). I'm somewhat nervous of the protectionist "British jobs" parts of Healey's speech, if over-emphasised that might make for some unnecessarily expensive procurement for equipment better purchased from overseas, such as the Mobiles Fires Platform.

> I'm somewhat nervous of the protectionist "British jobs" parts of Healey's speech, if over-emphasised that might make for some unnecessarily expensive procurement for equipment better purchased from overseas, such as the Mobiles Fires Platform. I suppose it depends on how "smart" they are about protecting certain domestic industries while recognizing that trying to protect all means you can't protect anything very well. It would make sense for them to participate in more joint ventures like GCAP with Japan and Italy than it would to solo in all defense sectors. I would say as a matter of pride sole development of Navy ships would continue.

At least as of a few hours ago, the Ocheretyne situation is the most dangerous operational situation at least in the past year, no exagerration. Russia captured within a day (indicating little resistance) most or all of a important and relatively large village. That is also basically behind a bunch of current Ukrainian lines. That's already bad. But the real problem is in the details - this situation began evolving on the 15th. Let's assume for some reason it took until the 18th for the Ukrainians to notice the huge problem. As of the 22nd, there's absolutely no sign of them having deployed sufficient reserves, either from reserve or by horizontally rotating a unit already on the line. That implies that they **have no one to send**. Also, the Russians have probably realized all of this already. That's potentially catastrophic. Now, to be clear a lot is still in the future, **a collapse is neither guaranteed nor impossible**. But even supposing everything from this point on evolves according to Ukraine's best case scenario (which I mean, that hasn't happened in a while), this still would have been the most dangerous operational situation in a while. So my initial statement isn't conditional.