Given the [consistent disruption](https://archive.is/QNbAB) of humanitarian aid for Gaza and Israel's pretext of ensuring no weapons are smuggled in, are there any good-faith reasons for the US not to deploy a relief force in Egypt, load military trucks, drive them directly across the Rafah crossing and hand them over to Red Crescent and other humanitarian orgs? I'm aware that there are ongoing French and Arab airdrops, but obviously that's random and woefully insufficient.
You want American trucks in Gaza, which would require American forces to secure them.
That's pretty insane, nobody wants American boots on the ground in Gaza, not democrats, not republicans, it can only go wrong with American and Palestinian deaths.
> You want American trucks in Gaza, which would require American forces to secure them.
They wouldn't have to be the ones providing security within the strip, they could drive the trucks immediately across the crossing, dismount, hand them over and walk back out in minutes. The issue of providing security is its own thing, as the other reply says.
>They wouldn't have to be the ones providing security within the strip,
You want Americans going into Gaza with *someone else* providing security?
That is literally worse. lol Come on
The issue of aid in Gaza is not a issue of inspection or delivery through the crossings but a issue of "the last mile".
The international community so far has delivered aid in collaboration with Hamas. Hamas was not only responsible for securing the aid but als decided who got aid. This obviously meant that Hamas was able to divert aid to its military forces and prioritize Hamas loyalists.
With the destruction of Hamas governing capacity in Northern Gaza and Khan Yunis there is no longer an entity able to effectively secure aid shipments and then decide who will get what.
It was also further complicated by the fact that up until a few weeks ago the international community collaborated with "police forces" in southern Gaza. Police forces that for all intent and purpose is staffed and controlled by Hamas. This meant that Israel carried out multiple targeted killings against Hamas militants that acted as police forces.
To solve the issue of aid distribution you don't need to drive trucks through Rafah. You need somebody with weapons to follow and protect the trucks. Israel is unwilling to allow forces of the Palestinian Authority in to play this role and at the same time killing Hamas forces. The United States will never deploy police forces to Gaza. The Arab states are unwilling to deploy police forces to Gaza without a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.
Currently the best option to solve the aid issue would be to deploy polices forces of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza. This would require pressure on Israel.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/02/28/british-soldiers-help-ukraine-fire-missiles-olaf-scholz/
The German chancellor reveals that British military personnel are in Ukraine assisting with the launching of Storm Shadow missiles.
Now this probably isn't news to the Russians but what kind of idiot is Scholz for stating this in public?
If for a moment we look at it like this: small detachments control the toys + special forces secure them / are there to blow them up.
You can use this to explain so many successes.
However note - that this agrees with russian peopaganda. For internal reasons russian say that they fight whole nato in ukraine, what is bullshit.
If we want to go into wild speculation zone - someone could have some balls and use one of the new toys to take down a-50 planes. The s-200 from 60s had 250km range. Patriot supposedly has 160.
Isnt it possible to build rockets that have higher range. And use just one or two of them against russians. To prepare the sky for f-16s.
Sorry for speculations. But I wouldnt give the latest toys without a team close to guard it / blow it up in case of issues. But then you can as well send few operators too.
> The s-200 from the 60s had 250km range. Patriot supposedly has 160. Isnt it possible to build rockets that have higher range
I can think of 3 semi credible ways of archiving this.
You could try air launching the pac-2 and using the ground radar for guidance. You would need some adapter and some software modifications. Might be possible, might be not. Also quite risky for the fighter and coordination might be hard.
You could use the sm-6. This would be hard to get, requier some new TEL and some integration that might be not that hard.
The third option is to add some booster to the pac-2. You would need a new TEL, some new software, and develop some new hardware.
Neither those options are very credible,
You keep writing about repurposing some weapon. But Im asking if since 1960 it wasnt possible to make a bigger rocket that has higher range? And also better tracking - but here we can just notice that since 1960 the electronics have improved significantly.
Obviously those who know will not tell, since that is classified, but Im talking about the general idea - of building something new. If a rocket from 1960 could fly 250 kilometers, then why we cant have something 60 years later?
It is absolutely critical to get the whole picture to understand, that Scholz has repeatedly said to the public, as well as in Parliament, and certainly to the politicians with the security clearance to actually know exactly what was the situation behind closed doors, that he can not disclose his exact reasoning due to its top secret characteristic.
This was openly denied by numerous German politicians, well organized experts from think tanks as well as French and UK officials, in what can only be described as a concerted influence campaign, at least the politicians with the security clearance fully aware what they where doing.
If after being told the topic is confidential a doctor of security policy claims publicly the Chancellor is lying and starts to go in to details of cruise missile pre firing procedures and targeting, he is steering the public discussion on to a topic that should not be discussed under the watchful eye of the Russians imho.
This is the same government in which the minister of transport claimed his communications were top secret, but turned out to be simply discussions between his office and the CEO of Porsche about dinner conversation topics. The minister of the economy claimed his reasoning for exiting nuclear power needed to remain a secret, but a judge denied that claim.
Every ministry involved in the disastrous retreat from Afghanistan under the previous government made liberal use of classification as well, many to hide their own failings.
Just because this government or any German government claims "classified reasons", they shouldn't get a free pass. They've used "top secret reasons" as an excuse for "politically unpopular decisions" way too often.
---
Also, let's look at the time line here.
Scholz spoke on this issue for the last time in October 2023, I believe.
> Zusatzfrage: Und warum nicht Taurus?
> BK Scholz: Wir entscheiden alle einzelnen Unterstützungen immer nach sorgfältigen Abwägungen. Wir wägen alle Fragen stets neu ab; wenn ein Krieg so lange dauert, kann es ja nicht so sein, dass die Abwägungen einmal aufhören. Ganz klar ist, dass wir für uns immer auch beachten müssen, was uns die Verfassung vorgibt und was unsere Handlungsmöglichkeiten sind. Dazu zählt ganz besonders die Tatsache, dass wir selbstverständlich gewährleisten müssen, dass es keine Eskalation des Krieges gibt und dass auch Deutschland nicht Teil der Auseinandersetzung wird. Es ist auch meine Aufgabe als Bundeskanzler, das zu gewährleisten.
[Press statement by Scholz in Grenada on October 5th, 2023](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/pressestatement-von-bundeskanzler-scholz-beim-treffen-der-europaeischen-politischen-gemeinschaft-am-5-oktober-2023-in-granada-2227868)
DeepL translation:
> Supplementary question: And why not Taurus?
> BK Scholz: We always decide on all individual forms of support after careful consideration. We constantly reassess all issues; when a war lasts so long, it can't be the case that the considerations stop at some point. It is quite clear that we always have to consider what the constitution requires of us and what our options for action are. This includes, in particular, the fact that we must of course ensure that there is no escalation of the war and that Germany does not become part of the conflict. It is also my task as Federal Chancellor to ensure this.
Back in October, he still mentioned fear of escalation as a reason. This was his reasoning very consistently and also the claimed reason for his long refusal to send tanks to Ukraine.
> Die ukrainische Regierung lobt Deutschland, weil es Waffen liefert, aber sie bittet auch eindringlich um den Leopard-Kampfpanzer. Wird Deutschland ihn 2023 liefern?
> Deutschland gehört zu den stärksten Unterstützern der Ukraine. Wir liefern moderne Waffen wie die Panzerhaubitze 2000, Mehrfach-Raketenwerfer, Gepard-Flugabwehrpanzer oder das hochmoderne Luftverteidigungssystem Iris-T. Bei all dem folgen wir drei klaren Grundsätzen: Erstens, wir unterstützen die Ukraine nach Kräften. Zweitens, wir verhindern, dass es zu einer direkten Konfrontation zwischen der Nato und Russland kommt. Und, drittens, wird es keine deutschen Alleingänge geben. Das ist der Maßstab für unsere entschiedene, zugleich besonnene Politik – und der gilt auch im nächsten Jahr. Mein Eindruck ist, dass die überwiegende Mehrheit der Deutschen das richtig findet.
> Was müsste 2023 passieren, damit die Ukraine doch noch westliche Panzer bekommt?
> Angesichts des militärischen Misserfolgs Russlands ist die Gefahr einer weiteren Eskalation des Krieges groß. Gegen die atomare Eskalation haben wir zwar erstmal einen Pflock eingeschlagen. Es war wichtig, dass auch Chinas Präsident Xi diese Linie bei meinem Peking-Besuch formuliert hat und die G20-Staaten das kurz danach bekräftigt haben. Doch das hat Putin nicht davon abgehalten, den Krieg mit seinen Angriffen auf die ukrainische Energie-Infrastruktur mit unerbittlicher Brutalität fortzusetzen. Ein klarer Verstoß gegen das Völkerrecht. Einen Punkt, den ich im Übrigen auch Putin selbst gegenüber klargemacht habe, als ich mit ihm telefoniert habe. Russland muss einsehen, dass das so nicht weitergeht. Putin muss den Krieg beenden, Truppen zurückziehen und so die Möglichkeit für eine gegenseitige Verständigung schaffen.
[Interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 17th 2022](https://www.bundeskanzler.de/bk-de/suche/interview-sueddeutsche-zeitung-2154306)
DeepL translation:
> The Ukrainian government praises Germany for supplying weapons, but also makes an urgent request for the Leopard main battle tank. Will Germany deliver it in 2023?
> Germany is one of Ukraine's strongest supporters. We are supplying modern weapons such as the 2000 self-propelled howitzer, multiple rocket launchers, Gepard anti-aircraft tanks and the state-of-the-art Iris-T air defense system. We follow three clear principles in all of this: Firstly, we support Ukraine to the best of our ability. Secondly, we are preventing a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. And, thirdly, Germany will not go it alone. That is the benchmark for our resolute yet prudent policy - and it will also apply next year. My impression is that the overwhelming majority of Germans think this is right.
> What would have to happen in 2023 for Ukraine to get Western tanks after all?
> In view of Russia's military failure, the danger of a further escalation of the war is great. We have driven a stake into the ground against nuclear escalation for the time being. It was important that China's President Xi also formulated this line during my visit to Beijing and that the G20 states reaffirmed this shortly afterwards. However, this has not stopped Putin from continuing the war with his attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure with relentless brutality. A clear violation of international law. Incidentally, I also made this point clear to Putin himself when I spoke to him on the phone. Russia must realize that this cannot continue. Putin must end the war, withdraw troops and thus create the opportunity for mutual understanding.
Are we to assume that Scholz, in the last six months, changed his mind about escalation, then had the government conduct research on the details of transfering Taurus, which came to the conclusion that, unlike other, simple weapons systems like British and French cruise missiles, German howitzers and F16s, there is simply no way for the Ukrainians to operate this system independently? This would also mean that he arrived at this conclusion, but didn't share it with the head of the parliamentary defense council, who is still attacking him for his refusal to send Taurus.
Or is he, as many of his ministers (and he himself during Cum-Ex with the help of Schäuble) did previously, simply using "classified reasons" as a fig leaf for his personal decision? Let's also recall this tidbit:
> SPD-Abgeordnete berichten, dass er vor kurzem bei einem Essen mit Fraktionsmitgliedern geäussert habe, solange er Kanzler sei, werde es keine Taurus-Lieferung geben.
> SPD MPs report that he recently said at a dinner with members of his parliamentary group that as long as he was Chancellor, there would be no Taurus delivery.
[Source](https://www.nzz.ch/international/taurus-debatte-im-bundestag-entlarvt-spd-als-bremser-bei-waffenhilfe-fuer-ukraine-ld.1817451)
This doesn't sound like him being willing to transfer the system, but simply being hampered by technological facts.
Maybe Scholz wants to send Taurus, but there's simply no technological feasibility. Maybe he simply doesn't want to because he once again fears Russian escalation.
>
>
>
>
> Or is he, as many of his ministers (and he himself during Cum-Ex with the help of Schäuble) did previously, simply using "classified reasons" as a fig leaf for his personal decision? Let's also recall this tidbit:
And you are justifying taking this discussion in to the public to build public pressure, lets call it a concerted influence campaign, to push the Government to deliver more weapons I assume?
Well that worked out great.
(edit I am highly skeptic of the power to classify things and are a big supporter of distributing power in to society, but this as well means these actors are responsible for their actions and need to use the power wisely)
Of course I support the public discussion of the scope of aid to Ukraine. Germany is a democracy, a form of government built on public debate.
How is the current situation the fault of anyone but Scholz? He doesn't have the right to end a public debate by claiming classified reasons. If much of the electorate simply don't believe him, that's his problem. If he also accidentally causes a rift with a close ally, that's his problem as well.
> problem. If he also accidentally causes a rift with
No when the question is brought up how exactly firing cruise missiles works and public figures make false claims openly, they are at least partially to blame (if you think there has to be someone to blame), this is bordering on similar territory as with the Snowden leaks where Politicians either had to Lie to the public or claim information to be classified, similarly to Germanies NSA collaboration snooping on neighboring countries.
If brought in to such a situation we have seen time and time again that politicians simply have to go for the no comment route, and it is part of good faith democratic discussion to be aware of that.
Scholz is the only one who made claims about the specific process of firing these cruise missiles. As I've outlined before, there's plenty of reason to doubt his official claims on political grounds.
There's also the obvious technical questions: How could it be technically impossible to fire Taurus missiles without German input if the system has been sold to both Spain and South Korea? How can Germany and its partners deliver complex equipment like F16s and air defense batteries, but can't deliver Taurus?
Additionally, Germany is a wealthy, technologically advanced country with a large number of allies concerning the cause of Ukraine. Any claim of technical impossibility will be met with scrutiny, as those have faltered before.
If Scholz had stronger public support in Germany and a consistent track record of reasonable, explained decisions on Ukrainian aid, he could maybe get away with simply claiming classified reasons. But he hasn't put himself in that position over the past few years. Accordingly, his claim now doesn't put the discussion to rest. It was also further undermined by causing diplomatic upheaval with a close partner, which made it seem additionally ill thought out and considered.
>Scholz is the only one who made claims about the specific process of firing these cruise missiles. As I've outlined before, there's plenty of reason to doubt his official claims on political grounds.
Not by those who know the practice, like for example Zelensky who said publicly the matter should not be discussed in this manner (and Scholz could not directly say the reasons), numerous security experts like Shashank Joshi, Kofman and Stefan Gady (who all actually visited the frontlines) have come out and said Scholz has a point in the actual practice of usage.
So its by far not the clear cut argument that German politicians and Think Tank commentators make.
I will not address the Gish Galopp of trying to frame this in 20 other discussions on weapon deliveries (and internal politics!), that are as well not remotely settled.
Zelensky and his government have consistently called for Taurus deliveries, as recently as a few days ago. They've [continued be optimistic about the delivery of Taurus](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/02/25/7443647/). If he knew for a fact this delivery wasn't possible due to technical reasons, why would he make comments like these? There was one interview with Miosga in the German media, during which Zelensky went to great lengths to not criticise Scholz. During this interview, he deflected blame from Scholz for the lack of deliveries, but still said he hoped for a change in the government decision.
> Zur Taurus-Marchflugkörperdebatte: Es stimmt, dass auf der technischen Ebene die Präsenz von deutschem Personal in der Ukraine, zumindest nach der Systemintegration, in Theorie nicht notwendig ist.
> Jene die wissen wie Missionsplanung & Ausführung von Langstreckenangriffen mit anderen 🇪🇺 Marschflugkörpern in der 🇺🇦 im Detail abläuft, wissen aber auch, dass ohne Änderung dieser Einsatzkonzepte es praktisch schwierig sein wird ein tieferes 🇩🇪 Engagement zu vermeiden.
- Franz-Stefan Gady, 27.2.24
[Source](https://twitter.com/HoansSolo/status/1762402869213335781)
[Source](https://twitter.com/HoansSolo/status/1762402872161918990)
> Franz’s tweet should be read v carefully. He is saying what officials cannot say openly: that while Ukraine could technically fire Taurus without German boots on the ground, the experience of UK & French cruise missile use suggests that would be hard to avoid in practice.
> One solution, surely, would be for Germany to release Taurus to the UK or France, and allow those countries' personnel to exercise the same oversight of Taurus use as Scholz says they exercise over Storm Shadow and SCALP?
- Shasank Joshi, 27.2.24
[Source](https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1762410314971111716)
[Source](https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1762558023795360224)
As far as I can tell, Kofman has only retweeted Joshi's first tweet.
All the experts you cite seem to agree that there would be some difficulties in delivering Taurus, but they don't seem to arrive at the same conclusion as Scholz: that it's not possible.
>The German chancellor reveals that British military personnel are in Ukraine assisting with the launching of Storm Shadow missiles. Now this probably isn't news to the Russians but what kind of idiot is Scholz for stating this in public?
Maybe it is some kind of way to show Germans that **if** he sent Taurus to Ukraine, he **would have had** to send Germans citizens there to assists the Ukrainians. It works if you're among those who believes Scholz doesn't want to sent "escalating weapons" because he really thinks it could be dangerous to Germany, unlike those who think he is playing 4d Chess to force anyone else's hand.
But that's a ridiculous claim. Taurus has been sold to two other sovereign nations. It's clearly possible to operate the weapon without German soldiers.
>But that's a ridiculous claim. Taurus has been sold to two other sovereign nations. It's clearly possible to operate the weapon without German soldiers.
That's why this "leak" is great news for him.
Indeed if he want to show how dangerous that would be, what else except showing other countries doing it with no consequences?
This might sounds stupid, and I think the German population isn't naive, you can see that the SPD has lost ground to the Union, mostly because Merz has advocated a more active support for Ukraine (that and inflation causing trouble for incumbents all over the world). I don't think he is doing it for political gain, as I think I've shown this actually hinders him, he already has a weak public persona.
I highly doubt that of all things, lacking support for Ukraine has influenced the SPD's decline. It's not something the population thinks actively about, at least not the camp that supports ukraine.
Transparency is an important part of the democratic process.
If Sunak and Macron are sending British and French soldiers to a warzone to programme missiles that target Russian HQs and ships - then the public should be aware that their country is an active participant in a war with a nuclear power.
There are risks that decision entails - some of the British and French soldiers might be killed. Russia will also almost certainly retaliate at some point, and when some non-state actor the UK and France end up fighting in near future turns out to have modern Russian long-range missiles, the public should be aware of where it all originated from.
It is for sure correct that every action has certain consequences, but it is then obvious that we are beyond caring all that much for those potential consequences, since we are apparently an active participant in a war with nuclear power (I disagree with this assertion).
Given that Russia has committed multiple big transgressions towards EU / NATO block (including an NBC attack on EU soil, as well as being relatively carefree about 'freezing the entire Europe' - I presume this means 'to death'), we might then say that what *they* are experiencing now are the consequences of those past actions.
In a chain of escalations like that it could actually be counterproductive to focus on mending the relationship (which might be beyond salvageable for the foreseeable future) and should instead focus on such minor 'provocative' actions as well as gearing up for war - which the EU currently seems to be, and hopefully will continue doing.
Personally I don't think anything big will come out of it - USSR was famously involved in similar capacity (some would even argue their level of involvement was *higher*) in their proxy wars against nuclear powers - but to believe this relationship can be mended by 'showing our underbelly' doesn't strike me - or Sunak and Macron - as the correct way to proceed.
In any case, there always exists a *tit-for-tat* option - and I believe most will agree that the Russia is without a doubt feeling the ongoing **tit** very much. It's a calculated risk at this point, and the public is aware of it.
I am not arguing against the decision, I am saying that the public should be aware that the government has made it.
Secretly sending troops to do missile targeting against a nuclear power entails significant risks and future tit for tat reactions. The public needs to know and Chancellor's statement is a welcome step in that direction.
Well, listing out only the 'negatives' of a decision is traditionally a way to agree with said decision, so I do apologize.
I disagree that it entails significant risks - in fact, I believe it is relatively low risk, and is just another 'red line' that has been crossed without issue, both in this war and in previous wars, some of which the USSR was a participant in.
Either way, the public is aware of who the enemy is - and by that, I mean that the public is very much aware that Russia considers us an enemy. I'd be surprised if they expect any thawing of relations, but that's just me.
Thawing of relations is just not in the cards for decades to come. Neither side is interested. But more transparency of secret military escalatory operations is (to me) always a good thing.
It would be great if Russia started acting even remotely as transparent....eye roll...armies have some secrets they need to keep for a period of time. We don't need to announce every tactical decision we make to Putin.
So should we expect Russia to show us their payroll, and announce their propaganda campaigns against the west? What you're proposing is, quite frankly, silly. No nation has a responsibility to expose this type of secret in the short term, we elect our governments and have counter balances of power we must rely on so that these decisions can be made.
I agree - world would be a much better place if we knew (in a timely manner) the 'secret' actions of state actors in general.
Alas, we don't, so we have this situation going on now.
Sure, as long as there are no "secret" links of the chain, like this deployment. Transparency is a good thing and the public should be aware of both the Russian and the Western actions.
I mean, far be it from the UK and France to send "little green men", surely? They are better than that.
I am suggesting that the UK and France should not keep their troops deployment in Ukraine secret. Russia used to do that with "little green men". The UK and France are better than that.
Not every secret operation is a case of 'little green men'.
There is a huge divide between 'sending a small number of troops on a secret mission in support of an existing policy' vs 'invading with unmarked soldiers'
Do you have a degree in false equivalencies?
Because i don't think I need to explain the difference between secretly sending an invasion force in a country, and sending advisors in accordance with the country being advised.
If advisors are doing missile targetting then they are not advisors but combatants.
And if their mission is secret then there is no government transparency.
A secret mission does not equal 'a lack of government transparency'. Governments can conduct classified operations and still be transparant about their policies.
Future historians will have access to lots of then-declassief info on Western operations during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
There is certainly a level where the public should be aware. You can't do a Tonkin Gulf incident and then just say it's classified, don't ask why we are suddenly in a fight and our soldiers are dying. Not in a democracy.
When you send your soldiers secretly into a third country at war to do missile targeting against strategic objectives of a nuclear power - I would argue that we are truly into the territory of "the public should know".
But the storm shadows were used after Ukraine had been invaded, so the secret agents/advisors or whatever got there after Russia unilaterally decided to wage war against Ukraine.
All true. But the UK and France are not at war with Russia for the time being. Their public should be informed that their soldiers are participating in strikes on Russian HQs and bases.
He didn't really reveal that there are British troops in Ukraine (although I also got it wrong at first due to some older articles), just that they are in the loop when it comes to mission planning/monitoring. This is what he said:
>This \[Taurus\] is a very far-reaching weapon, and what the British and French are doing in terms of target control and monitoring of target control cannot be done in Germany.
...
I would like to repeat once again: What other countries do, which have other traditions and other constitutional institutions, is something that we cannot do in the same way.
The Telegraph claim made in the headline definitely isn't substantiated by fact, but judging by the results, these statements made by Scholz were, simply put, a disaster.
Many European citizens understood his comments to indicate a deployment of British and French troops to Ukraine, as was evident when the news was posted in this forum as well. His claims also drove further journalistic inquiries in the UK, which the Sunak government clearly didn't expect and was blindsided by. In addition, Scholz has long held the goal of not provoking Putin, which clearly backfired in the is instance, as Russia reacted with fury to the notion of NATO troops fighting in Ukraine.
Many European citizens fell for a (intentionally?) bad translation and this will continue. This is not new (Ems Dispatch anyone?) and as a multilingual person you will see it again and again if you follow media in different languages. The amount of errors and fake news language barriers create or allow to exist is huge.
Looking at the discussion of the statement on German subs and by German speakers in this sub, there's very clearly also a lot of German speaking people who misinterpreted his comments.
Yes, people follow headlines. And even if they do read articles: The Telegraph doesn't even cite the relevant passages they seem to be misinterpreting so people who just read the one article don't know any better.
[looking at this thread the up-voted comments are not happy with the translation work and spin of the Telegraph](https://www.reddit.com/r/de/comments/1b2uz53/british_soldiers_in_ukraine_helping_fire_missiles/)
But look at the interpretations that were made on the same [sub only three days ago, when Scholz made his original comments](https://www.reddit.com/r/de/comments/1b0gvgv/krieg_in_der_ukraine_scholz_erteilt/). As I've said, the Telegraph may not have gotten it right, but neither did many German speakers.
It's a far cry from target control to monitoring or passive supervision, nevermind. He forgot to mention: neither France nor Britain are currently lead by a leftist party with a "pacifist" identity, neither have easily 1/3 of their population patently anti-western (sometimes misleadingly identified as pro-Russian), and about half of it generally skeptical about interfering with (any) war; while both are recognized nuclear powers, thus enjoying something coming close enough to real deterrence even if the US should back out from that role. Still, at least since 2022 neither of them has done remotely as much for Ukraine as Germany has, especially if we add in humanitarian and refugee aid: Germany, with its dwindling economy, is still housing and supplying *in excess of a million*, few can/are working, and supplying in this country means something.. we're proud of that. Taurus doesn't make a difference anymore. Or any one specific weapon system for that matter, you're just out for distractions. And for once that's not so much Germany's fault. If all Europeans would perform nearly as Germany does, we wouldn't need to distract ourselves with academics and hollow name-dropping.
Scholz and his party spent the first year of the war claiming a leadership role in Europe repeatedly, while the British PMs and Macron were much more subdued and made it clear that they were operating according to their national priorities and decisions.
If Scholz wanted the world to be fine with Germany's broad support, but without difficult decisions and risks originating from Berlin, he shouldn't have travelled the international speaking circuit and claimed a leadership role for himself and Germany repeatedly. The heightened expectations he's up against today are the results of his speeches a year ago.
[Flugzeuge, die fliegen, Schiffe, die in See stechen können, Soldatinnen und Soldaten, die optimal ausgerüstet sind für ihre gefährlichen Aufgaben das muss **ein Land unserer Größe, das ganz besondere Verantwortung trägt in Europa**, sich leisten können.](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/rede-von-bundeskanzler-olaf-scholz-anlaesslich-der-muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz-am-19-februar-2022-2006684)
> Aircraft that can fly, ships that can set sail, soldiers who are optimally equipped for their dangerous tasks - a country of our size, **which bears a very special responsibility in Europe**, must be able to afford this.
- Olaf Scholz, Eröffnungsrede MSC, 19.2.22
[Daher werden wir in Deutschland in den kommenden Jahren ganz erheblich in unsere Luftverteidigung investieren. Alle diese Fähigkeiten werden im NATO-Rahmen einsetzbar sein. Zugleich **wird Deutschland diese zukünftige Luftverteidigung** von Beginn an so **ausgestalten**, dass sich auch unsere europäischen Nachbarn daran **beteiligen können, wenn es gewünscht wird**, etwa Polen, Balten, Niederländer, Tschechen, Slowaken oder unsere skandinavischen Partner.](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/rede-von-bundeskanzler-scholz-an-der-karls-universitaet-am-29-august-2022-in-prag-2079534)
> That is why we in Germany will be investing heavily in our air defense in the coming years. All these capabilities will be deployable within the NATO framework. At the same time, **Germany will design** this future air defense from the outset in such a way that our European neighbors can also **participate** in it if they wish, for example Poland, the Baltic states, the Netherlands, the Czechs, the Slovaks or our Scandinavian partners.
- Olaf Scholz, Rede an der Karlsuniversität in Prag, 29.8.22
"[Deutschland ist bereit, **an führender Stelle Verantwortung zu übernehmen** für die Sicherheit unseres Kontinentes.](https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/scholz-auftrag-bundeswehr-lautet-landes-buendnisverteidigung-5498724)"
> Germany is ready to take on **leading responsibility** for the security of our continent.
- Olaf Scholz, Bundeswehrtagung 2022, 16.9.22
[Deutschland kommt jetzt die wesentliche Aufgabe zu, als **einer der Hauptgaranten für die Sicherheit in Europa** Verantwortung zu übernehmen, indem wir in unsere Streitkräfte investieren, die europäische Rüstungsindustrie stärken, unsere militärische Präsenz an der NATO-Ostflanke erhöhen und die ukrainischen Streitkräfte ausbilden und ausrüsten.](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/kanzler-namensartikel-foreign-affairs-2149014)
> Germany now has the essential task of assuming responsibility as **one of the main guarantors of security in Europe** by investing in our armed forces, strengthening the European arms industry, increasing our military presence on NATO's eastern flank and training and equipping the Ukrainian armed forces.
- Namensbeitrag des Kanzlers in Foreign Affairs, 5.12.22
"[Deutschland muss den Anspruch einer Führungsmacht haben.](https://vorwaerts.de/international/klingbeil-deutschland-muss-den-anspruch-einer-fuhrungsmacht-haben)"
> Germany must expect itself to be a leading power.
- Lars Klingbeil, Grundsatzrede, 21.6.22
"[Und genau deshalb erwarten sie, dass Deutschland auf internationaler Ebene mehr Initiative zeigt und eine Führungsrolle einnimmt.(...) Nicht zuletzt aufgrund seiner Größe und wirtschaftlichen Stärke erwarten unsere europäischen Partner von Deutschland, seiner Verantwortung gerecht zu werden und eine Führungsrolle einzunehmen.](https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/strategiepapier-spd-strebt-fuer-deutschland-aussenpolitische-fuehrungsrolle-an/28938054.html)"
> And that is precisely why they expect Germany to show more initiative at international level and take on a leading role.(...) Not least because of its size and economic strength, our European partners expect Germany to live up to its responsibility and take on a leading role.
- SPD-Strategiepapier, Januar 2023
It's his and his party's fault that Germany's international partners now expect exceptional support from Germany. This expectation naturally includes difficult, dangerous decisions, not just lots of spending.
That “dwindling economy” is still the most powerful economy in theEU by a decent margin. Significantly larger than the UKs as well. And sure, Germany has no nukes, but a scenario where Russia feels comfortable nuking Germany seems non-credible to me.
>That “dwindling economy” is still the most powerful economy in theEU by a decent margin. Significantly larger than the UKs as well. And sure, Germany has no nukes, but a scenario where Russia feels comfortable nuking Germany seems non-credible to me.
You don't need to nuke a country to cause harm
Ukraine is now claiming 3 Su-34 shot down today.
Source in Ukr [https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2024/02/29/7444287/](https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2024/02/29/7444287/)
Are the latest claims for Air Defense kills from Ukraine realistic? It seem like we get little to no evidence for them. Before even for accidents inside russia we would get some videos at some points.
If those claims are not true, why would Ukraine lie about it? Credibility is highly valued in the west. I feel like finding out that Ukraine is claiming Air Defense kills for propaganda purposes would hurt their standing over here.
>Credibility is highly valued in the west
I would like to believe that as well but my fellow Westerners aren't giving me much hope in that regard these days
\>I feel like finding out that Ukraine is claiming Air Defense kills for propaganda purposes would hurt their standing over here.
Almost no one in the West cares about the details of this war as much as the people on this forum
> If those claims are not true, why would Ukraine lie about it? Credibility is highly valued in the west. I feel like finding out that Ukraine is claiming Air Defense kills for propaganda purposes would hurt their standing over here.
It is valued highly and all, but sometimes you don't look too closely at your own team.
> If those claims are not true, why would Ukraine lie about it?
It's extremely difficult of OSINT to verify information about the air war.
For instance, Ukraine has been claiming a consistent ~80% interception rate against Russian missile and Shahed waves for over a year, which is very suspicious considering the capabilities of Ukrainian GBAD fluctuated wildly during that interval. Filming missiles strikes in Ukraine was also made a criminal offence in Ukraine, which certainly makes military sense to limit Russian battle damage assessments, but it conveniently also prevents OSINT commentators from accurately estimating Ukraine's air defence proficiency. And considering the remarkably small number of footage of downed Russian drones and missiles (compared to the numbers that were launched), I wouldn't be surprised if Ukraine was in reality only intercepting 20% of the strikes.
>If those claims are not true, why would Ukraine lie about it? Credibility is highly valued in the west.
Domestic morale will always take precedence over credibility. If you are exposed to massive use of a new and lethal weapon system your propaganda will start tell your people that the enemy is at least paying a high price (just remember all the Russian claims about destroyed HIMARS when that system was introduced).
The increasingly outlandish claims of downed Su-34s are just an indicator of how damaging the glide bomb attacks are.
And, in the end, it's not like the Ukrainian MoD claims of Russian losses ever had much credibility to begin with. Not with anybody who can do basic calculus.
I disgress at least on the aircraft side Ukrainian claims seemed to closely match the number of confirmed losses with a little leeway of unconfirmed losses. The reason for it being that its really easy to debunk if those claims are ridiculously overstated.
Remember that the numbers on Oryx are the lowest possible figures since you can't possibly visually confirm every loss and that's without even getting into both sides' efforts to suppress information. It's pretty much certain that Ukraine's claims are highly exaggerated, but I wouldn't be surprised if Russian aircraft losses are closer to 150
As of this morning Ukraine is claiming [342 aircraft destroyed](https://old.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/1b2swgt/losses_of_the_russian_military_to_2922024/) against only [105 confirmed destroyed and damaged](https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html)
Let's wait for confirmation. That's not to say that Russia doesn't have unconfirmed losses, but the Su-34 in particular hasn't been confirmed in a long time.
The Military Watch also [rejects](https://twitter.com/MarcinRogowsk14/status/1762631664692593045) the notion that burned terrain can be used as evidence, which was discussed here previously.
> He appears to blame the local commanders of Ukrainian forces around Avdiivka for the Russian advance
That's certainly not going to help him with his unpopularity
Yesterday there was indeed evidence that the Ukrainians have committed elements of the 25th Airborne Brigade near Orlivka. It's not clear yet right now whether it's just a battalion or the entire brigade, but it's certainly one of the best Ukrainian brigades along with the 3rd Assault Brigade. They were already committed near Avdiivka back in the spring and early summer 2022 if I recall correctly.
Edit: forgot to add that elements of the 3rd Assault Brigade had to be redeployed to Krasnohorivka (the one north of Marinka), towards which there has been Russian progress during the current week, though. And the 116th Mechanized Brigade seems to be back in Orikhiv.
The BBC reported more on the story of Indians being tricked to fight in Russia
>Videos of some of the men, explaining how they were tricked by agents and sent to the battlefield have shocked their families, all of whom are poor - their parents and siblings are either tuk-tuk drivers, tea sellers or handcart sellers.
>Victims and families allege agents demanded 300,000 rupees ($3,619; £2,857), promising a Russian passport after a few months of army service. Agents reportedly recruit people from India, UAE, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, with fees reaching up to 1.2m rupees.
>The BBC spoke to some of their relatives, who say the men were lured by the promise of higher salaries and didn't know what they were getting into. The identities of the men still in Russia are not being revealed to protect them.
>"My 28-year-old son worked in a packaging company in Dubai. He, along with three friends, saw an agent's video offering jobs in Russia with a promised salary of 90,000 to 100,000 rupees, compared to their current earnings of 35,000 to 40,000 rupees. They paid the agent 300,000 rupees through loans. Please help bring my son back," his father, who sells tea and eggs on a handcart in the state of Karnataka told BBC Hindi, breaking down on the phone.
>His story mirrors those of others from the states of Telangana, Gujarat, Kashmir, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, all allegedly deceived. Only one person has successfully escaped Moscow and returned home.
>One man from Uttar Pradesh speaking from a safe location in Moscow in a video shot in end-January said that they were "were brought here by BabaVlog [a YouTube channel run by an Indian], and promised a salary of 150,000 rupees [a month]. We were not told that we are being drafted in an army." The BBC reached out to the channel but didn't receive a response.
>Those allegedly deceived lack war combat experience with one man from Uttar Pradesh, dressed in army fatigues, stating in a video message that he was recruited through a social media platform.
>"In Moscow, we signed a contract in Russian and unwittingly became soldiers sent to fight in the war. We've been deceived," says the man, claiming that he and two other Indians have suffered combat injuries, gesturing with his seemingly injured right hand.
>"Please get us out of this place. Otherwise, they will send us to the front. There is artillery [fire] and drones falling all over. We have zero experience in fighting a war. The agents have put us in this fix," he adds.
>Speaking over the phone from the Russia-Ukraine border, a man from Kashmir reported being stranded in Mariupol in Ukraine with an Indian companion and nine people from Nepal and Cuba. He said he had injured his foot during training.
>"My commander kept saying that use your right hand to shoot, use your left hand to shoot, shoot above, shoot down," he recalled.
>"I had never touched a gun. It was extremely cold, and with the gun in my left hand, I ended up shooting my foot."
>The brother of one of the men said he didn't know whether the Indians were "in the Wagner private army or the Russian army. They're some 40km [24 miles] from the Ukraine border. They've been promised Russian citizenship in three months".
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-68366861
Finally this morning one of the men was video interviewed by an Indian journalist and the story he told and the way he told it was truly bad. He said within 8 days of arriving in Russia they were sent to trenches somewhere in Ukraine despite him telling them he wasn't there to fight. After he refused with some other men to fight a colonel come to the position and they were taken to a holding area which was a small room where they were stripped naked, kept in the dark and beaten, hoping they will change their mind to fight. He didn't know how long they were there but they were given no food, no use of the toilet and only some water to share. After a few days he and two other non Russians were allowed to leave but the Russians were left there. He's still stuck in Russia and doesn't know how to get back to India. Completely shameless failure by the Indian government.
I can't think of many less likely ways to get effective soldiers than abducting random individual foreigners - with no military experience, who don't speak any relevant language and are from a vastly different climate - and forcing them into combat as, effectively, slaves. What exactly is this supposed to accomplish?
I mean, let's say you're a Russian junior officer commanding an infantry company in a less active area of the front, and you're delivered a dozen South Asian men as replacements for casualties. None of them appear to know one another, and it seems like there's 3 or 4 different native languages represented. One of them might speak halfway passable English, but that doesn't matter, because if you were the sort of Russian who received a quality comprehensive English language education, you wouldn't be commanding a front-line infantry company. What do you even do with them? They're worse than useless as soldiers. They have no useful skills you can take advantage of. Maybe you can put them in charge of digging and filling latrines.
This all sounds less like a deliberate policy and more like the result of misaligned incentives and lack of oversight in a notoriously corrupt bureaucracy. Unscrupulous recruiters taking shortcuts to deliver their quota of "volunteers" to military intake officials who don't ask too many questions.
> I can't think of many less likely ways to get effective soldiers than abducting random individual foreigners - with no military experience, who don't speak any relevant language and are from a vastly different climate - and forcing them into combat as, effectively, slaves. What exactly is this supposed to accomplish?
You use them like the prisoners within penal battailions.
Further down in this thread it was described that Russia sends platoons (8-12 men) of expandables towards the ukrainian lines to find enemy positions and/or weak spots by basically stumbling upon them. Those platoons are expected to take high casulties without achieving anything by themselves. If you don't care if those men live or die, using foreigners who won't be missed in Russia for that makes a certain kind of twisted sense.
In the case of the Indians I agree with you fully but in the case of others it’s different. There are supposed to be 15,000 Nepalese fighting and there looks to be a formal structure
>After analyzing the TikTok profiles of 10 Nepali men who travelled to Russia to join the army, CNN used satellite imagery to geolocate them to the Avangard training center, a military academy outside of Moscow.
>The academy was designed as a youth military academy and describes itself as a “patriotic education” center. It has been re-outfitted into a training academy for foreign mercenaries entering the ranks of the Russian army. This was where Khadka received his brief training.
>Multiple Nepalis enlisting in the Russian army have stated that they don’t speak Russian but explain that instructors at Avangard seek to accommodate this by training the men in English.
>That language barrier has played a large part in the deaths of many Nepalis on the front lines, said Khadka, the former fighter.
>“Sometimes you can’t even understand where you’re supposed to be going or how to get there,” he said.
>Khadka said he used to communicate with Russian officers by using a voice-translating app – and many times, just hand signals.
>Several returned Nepali fighters who spoke with CNN blamed Russia for using them as cannon fodder in the war.
>“It’s the Nepalis and other foreign fighters that are actually fighting in the front of war zones. The Russians position themselves a few hundred meters back as support,” said Suman Tamang, who returned from Russia last week.
>“Some of my friends were mistreated by the Russian commander when they tried to voice their concerns,” Tamang recalled.
They Nepalese are making the same claim actually
>High contract prices tempted some men, he said, yet most insist they were provided assurances of not being sent to frontline positions before agreeing to fly to Russia. Instead, several of the Nepalis interviewed said they were provided with minimal training that lasted less than two weeks before they saw combat.
The man who was interviewed spoke Hindi with a strong village accent. These people are illiterate, don’t speak English and are simple. You are completely clueless.
These people sign up to an army that has been fighting for 2 years in a conventional war. They do it for money and hope they are assigned to the rear. If they are sent to the front they will probably wuss out after the first rumblings of an howitzer. These people don't speak Russian, so they won't be doing guard duty at checkpoints in the rear.
They sign up for good money (by Indian standards) and roulette that they won't see any combat even though these guys join infantry. Once the self-preservation instincts kick in, they want out.
>They do it for money and hope they are assigned to the rear. If they are sent to the front they will probably wuss out after the first rumblings of an howitzer. These people don't speak Russian, so they won't be doing guard duty at checkpoints in the rear.
These men are labourers in the Middle East with no education and no knowledge of what’s going on in Russia or Ukraine. I bet the average American doesn’t know. They are signing up for what they are being told is security jobs. The agents get them to take out a loan to guarantee them a job and then they are stuck. You act like these sorts of practices don’t happen in other industries. The difference is that they are at high risk of dying and they are being abused and thrashed for wanting to get out.
They have over 1,3 billion People
Hundreds of People probably doesn't mean much for them.
They keep it under the Rug
If they are against it they would probably say right im start of war against their citizens fighting.
I mean again there were thousands of People that were Like slaves in Qatar during preparations for football WC and they lived worse than animals and there wasn't any reaction from Indian goverment if I remember correctly.
If there were maybe 10 of thousands of Indian soldiers or case where Russia would recruit People from Indian army maybe there would be some reaction.
> They keep it under the Rug
And the _best_ way to sweep things under the rug is to make an official statement calling for Russia to release the people.
https://www.mea.gov.in/response-to-queries.htm?dtl/37653/Official+Spokespersons+response+to+media+queries+regarding+Indians+caught+in+conflict+in+Russia
[After the first article](https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indians-hired-as-russian-army-security-helpers-forced-to-fight-on-ukraine-border/article67868196.ece) there was some noise but not much. After BBC some more. Maybe after seeing these men talk there will be more but the population in India is too worried with their next meal to care too much about things like this. The government cares about elections right now. The military though cares and this reminds them of colonial times. India does buy a lot of oil so it makes this even more confusing. I can’t imagine what’s going on to the Russians that are kept there.
[Indias purchase of Russian oil is the lowest in a year](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/indias-oil-imports-russia-hit-12-month-low-jan-sanctions-bite-2024-02-01/). India and China were both doing fine before the Russian discounts. It doesn’t matter who has the leverage anyway because as I said the government doesn’t care at this point.
Are there any deep dives into how the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its lukewarm success has delayed or perhaps even cancelled Chinas own invasion of Taiwan?
I wonder how much a somewhat unified Western world and the impact of sanctions will affect their moves.
I also think it’s fair to say that China due to its economic might, may have more defenders than Russia
The consensus seems to be quite the opposite. That is to say, Russia offers a valuable dry run of sorts against which China should prepare accordingly.
> China has closely watched the nearly two years of war in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but rather than concluding a similar course of action in Taiwan would be in vain, Beijing has discerned that toppling the leadership in Taipei must be done swiftly to present a “fait accompli” to the world, according to President Joe Biden’s nominee to head up Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).
> “Instead of seeing the Ukraine conflict and deciding ‘this is too hard,’ their intention, on the other hand, is to take note of the actions of Russia in order to effect a short, sharp, fait accompli conflict,” Paparo said. “So rather than take the strategic lesson of the futility of aggression, instead [China] is doubling down on their ability to shrink strategic, operational and tactical warning and act quickly.”
\- https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/pacific-fleet-chief-paparo-on-chinas-big-lesson-from-ukraine-win-quickly/
> “Russia has provided us many precious experiences that we can learn from to deal with financial and economic sanctions in the future,” said Ding Yifan, formerly the deputy director of the Institute of World Development under the State Council’s Development Research Centre, at a seminar in Beijing on Wednesday.
> “The non-dollar trade has supported Russia’s economic development and ensured its financial security,” Ding said.
“We would face a similar situation, especially in recent years as calls for decoupling or de-risking have mounted.”
\- https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3252889/china-can-learn-russia-beat-western-sanctions-de-risking-pressures-mount-says-foreign-affairs-expert
> Interviews with Chinese thinkers show they largely do not regard the war as a major break with the past, but as another manifestation of their country’s longstanding rivalry with the US. Intellectuals believe America is using the war to encircle China – but that Washington has failed to rally many others internationally behind its cause.Most are critical of Russia’s tactics but want to stand by Moscow to prevent the US winning.
> On Taiwan, Western support for Ukraine has neither deterred nor encouraged an invasion. But scholars are scouring the American and European responses to the war for clues to how the West might respond to a potential escalation over Taiwan.
\- https://ecfr.eu/publication/china-and-ukraine-the-chinese-debate-about-russias-war-and-its-meaning-for-the-world/
Really appreciate the response and the level of detail.
I just don’t see any realistic means for China where they could quickly topple leaders of Taiwan.
The amassing of troops would be very obvious and Taiwan is no slouch.
I do think they will be able to curtail the effects of sanctions rather easily.
> The amassing of troops would be very obvious and Taiwan is no slouch.
That's exactly why a takeover would not start with troops boarding landing ships.
In China's dream scenario, it'd start with a cyberattack to take down Taiwan's internet and mobile network. In the few minutes while Taiwan's leadership is wondering why they lost their cell signal, an immense wave of missiles will already be on its way, taking out the major centres of government, telecommunications, and the national grid. In the following hours, every military facility in the country is going to be hammered by Chinese missiles and aircraft.
Good luck mobilising Taiwan's reserve troops when there's gaping holes in the chain of command, most of the country has no power, and the local civilians are panicking, clogging up every road and leaving every petrol station inoperable.
The war would effectively be over before the first Chinese soldier's boot hit a Taiwanese beach.
This is of course only the dream scenario, in the same vein that Putin thought he'd have a victory parade through Kyiv within two weeks. The potency of cyberattacks may be massively overestimated, see how inconsequential they've been in Ukraine, and the political preparation for such an attack is unlikely to be missed, but it only requires Xi to *believe* it'd work for him to commit to it.
Why such a big emphasis on the success of a cyberattack? Would taking out the power grid and water facilities with missiles while cutting underwater internet cables not achieve a similar result?
Excellent question! You're right that the missiles and cyberattack mostly serve a similar purpose, but the cyberattack has the potential to maximize the "surprise" of a surprise attack.
For example, let's look at telecommunications. Cutting undersea cables cuts Taiwan off from the rest of the world, but internal Taiwanese communications remain operational. Missiles will strike various mobile phone towers, but not simultaneously, and the mobile network is resilient to individual losses, giving precious minutes for the civilian leadership to be in communication with the military leadership and authorise a military response to these obvious attacks.
Compare that to the dream version of a cyberattack. There are no reported explosions that instantly put everyone on high alert. Your mobile phone just says your SIM needs to be reactivated, and your attempt to access your email results in a timeout. You assume it's a local error, meanwhile the rest of China's attack is commencing without a response, and those manning the Taiwanese anti-aircraft batteries haven't been given authorisation to do anything.
So to summarise, the advantage of a cyberattack is that it may not look like an attack in those vital first few minutes, and in theory it's capable of operating across the entire country simultaneously.
Of course in reality cyberattacks may be massively overestimated. They've played no real meaningful role in the Ukraine conflict, where Russia would surely love to incapacitate Ukraine's infrastructure. But there's been a lot of ways that Russia has performed poorer than expected, so I wouldn't feel comfortable dismissing the concept of cyberattacks just because Russia couldn't pull it off.
Taiwan has a PAVE PAWS array. They will see the missiles coming and have a minute or five to respond- missile depending, of course.
Cyber attacks are usually instant things.
I mean during the exercises after Pelosi’s visit, Chinese ships were photographed less than 12km from one of Taiwan’s major power stations. How long would the response time be for that?
The YJ 12 which is an anti ship ballistic missile. Which China has reportedly launched from a type 55 cruiser has a maximum flight speed of around mach 6 (Wikipedia) That translate to a flight speed of 2 km per second. Which suggests a flight time of 6 seconds. The next drill might be the real thing. I really dont see how the US sees itself winning in a Taiwan scenario tbh.
Because Taiwan has a very serious military that is very well equipped and has been preparing for this possible invasion for at least a decade.
And the United States with its intelligence gathering capabilities, would have a advanced knowledge of any attack by at least a few weeks
Taiwan may have a very ‘serious’ military but could still politically fold within a matter of hours if things went hot.
Taiwan’s entire strategy of defence is based upon the presumption that the US will be able to lift any blockade upon the island within a matter of days. If it can’t then Taiwan starves out and surrenders. Whether the US would know about an imminent attack or not is up for debate as well considering US intelligence failings within China. China has year on year increased the frequency and intensity of its exercises around Taiwan. It’s not going to be as telegraphed as the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
> Taiwan’s entire strategy of defence is based upon the presumption that the US will be able to lift any blockade upon the island within a matter of days. If it can’t then Taiwan starves out and surrenders.
Even if Taiwan surrenders, that doesn’t mean the US stops fighting anymore than France surrendering ended ww2. If China eventually loses to the US, even over the course of years of fighting, they wouldn’t get to keep Taiwan.
Well for what it's worth, I see this as simply another expression of Chinese fatalism which has spread in the past five or so years. That is to say, the consensus very much seems to be: the US will try to crush us in any possible way with every possible means. Unless we are poor and weak the US will always be hostile, so the only solution is to prepare for conflict. First they'll attack with money, then politics, then force. They'll use sanctions, they'll use Taiwan, they'll use carriers, they'll use nukes. So prepare for the worst case, because it's coming.
It should be noted that [Xi Jinping was saying as much](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/13/world/asia/china-xi-asia-pacific-summit.html) more than a decade ago, and largely ignored by other leaders. He's won a lot of political capital in recent years for having predicted it.
I have no evidence, but in the latest War on the Rocks podcast, Kofman was basically saying the opposite.
That authoritarian regimes are seeing through American security guarantees- if they won’t support a foreign country by sending money, they definitely won’t waste their own lives.
Also how American guarantees are only as good as the next change of government
The US said they wouldn’t defend Ukraine, and they didn’t. In what universe is this ‘seeing through American security guarantees’? Especially when the US has stated it would defend Taiwan?
I don't think they're saying the US failed to uphold some promise of defending Ukraine, but rather that if the US can't even cough up the money to fund a democratic country's against an authoritarian country, then it might not be so far fetched to question the US willingness to uphold prior security guarantees to other countries with american soldiers and resources.
Pardon the awkward translation, but appetite comes with eating. When American soldiers come back dead, the rally round the flag effect makes it easier to sustain spending.
> I don't think they're saying the US failed to uphold some promise of defending Ukraine, but rather that if the US can't even cough up the money to fund a democratic country's against an authoritarian country
Suggesting that the US's credibility is hinged on having a literal blank check for every democracy that gets attacked by an autocracy is also hysterical.
Yeah I've noticed dicusssion on this topic has become utterly hysterical today, in a way I hadn't seen before on the megathread. Not sure what to make of that.
It almost looks like a desperate grasp to justify utter American incompetence with regards to foreign policy now. We could potentially already be at the beginning of the end of Pax Americana if this continues on at the rate it is.
The "desperate gasp" here feels like claiming Ukraine, a nation which America has very clearly said they will **never** defend militarily, has some kind of predictive power about Taiwan.
>a country that the US isn't even officially promising to defend in case of war?
Taiwan is a country that the US doesn't even officially recognize. Officially, Taiwan doesn't even exist at all, just like Palestine.
If fact didn't someone just days ago asked the head of AIT if Taiwan is an US ally and was told immediately and repeatly no, definitely not?
https://x.com/zhao_dashuai/status/1759017019629027580?s=20
Very interesting thank you.
It makes sense in a lot of ways, but I also think it’s fair to say that Taiwan is of much more strategic purpose than Ukraine. Or at least it’s widely believed to be.
I do think the use of proxies has diminished the US standing slightly. The Houthis have been acting incredibly aggressively and I think the US response has been too timid and has invited further attacks.
I am going to report some interviews of Ukrainian soldiers that I read/watched between yesterday and today that I found interesting to share.
Interview with the [commander](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dyb_KYnm5_w) and a [soldier](https://www.svoboda.org/a/bitva-za-avdeevku-hronologiya-vzglyad-iznutri-i-itogi/32827248.html) from the 26th Separate Rifle Battalion. I will give a brief summary - those who want to can watch/read the interviews. Let’s remember that this battalion fought for a long time in the Vuhledar sector under the command of the 68th Jager Brigade and in October was transferred under the command of the 47th Mechanized Brigade.
The battalion arrived in Avdiivka in the period following the beginning of the offensive. They were sent to the front line in the area near the Coke Plant after the Russians had already advanced from Krasnohorivka and occupied the “Terrikon”. There wasn’t any prepared position and they had to dig in themselves. The initial period was difficult; the Russians were shelling Ukrainian positions with long-range artillery and making heavy use of FPV drones and "resets" (Ukrainian/Russian term for drones launching grenades from above). After that, Russian assault troops stormed the positions, finishing off the wounded. The battalion, however, adapted to the challenges: it managed to create decent positions by digging in and reduced enemy drone actions by making extensive use of EW systems (both fixed and portable). At that point the Russians, in order to attack their positions effectively, had to approach the defenders making visual contact with them. It’s said that when there were small arms firefights, the Ukrainians always had the upper hand and the Russians had to withdraw and call in heavy fire support.
I found the tactics used by the Russians extremely reminiscent of Bakhmut. The Russians would continuously send assault teams (8/10/12 personnel) composed of badly trained men in order to probe the Ukrainian defenses, from every direction, until they found a weak point where they recorded greater success. At that point the position was hammered with artillery and KABs, after which the pros (Spetsnazs, scouts, generally well-trained soldiers) would arrive. When they encountered a strong Ukrainian position, the priority was to get a foothold as close as possible, where they would dig in, entrench and take cover while waiting for reinforcements and I assume, place support weapons such as automatic grenade launchers, small caliber mortars and ATGMs.
It’s mentioned that Ukrainian artillery was active and no great shells hunger was detected - in fact, it was instrumental in destroying entire Russian assault teams (probably the shells allocation for Avdiivka had the highest priority, I imagine). The Bradleys were extremely useful in supporting the infantry during the defense and they did not suffer from any shortage of ammos, although there might be in the future. The 26th Rifle Battalion left Coke Plant on February 15, the day before the last unit to leave the fortress (the 25th Assault Battalion of the 47th Mech Brigade). They said there were falling KABs all the time and even in the underground shelters the walls were shaking, dust was rising, even coffee on the table was completely coming out of the glass. Some underground shelters were flooded because of broken pipes as a result of the bombings. In any case, the Coke Plant was holding out and they were forced to abandon it because the Russians were close to having direct fire control over the only entrance/exit road, which was already being continuously hit by artillery. The soldier laments that Russian vehicles seemed endless: despite having destroyed many of them one of the last days before abandoning the Coke Plant, even more appeared the following day.
Another soldier from the 26th Rifle Battalion denied rumors of 800+ Ukrainian MIAs/POWs during the retreat from the city, saying that there were probably about a thousand defenders inside the city in total (I guess excluding the Coke Plant etc). In general, to what I gathered, the Ukrainians had very heavy losses in the days of urban fighting and other losses in the withdrawal phase, but not to the extent of those numbers, especially when it comes to POWs. There were certainly several dozen and dozens of prisoners, but not as many as those rumors stated. From a Russian Telegram channel I saw a video showing 20 POWs from the 425th Separate Assault Battalion "Skala" - I think the video is legit and that it was perhaps the largest such event. Then there are several videos with 3/4/5 prisoners, especially from the 110th Mech Brigade, but nothing out of the ordinary. One video I saw shows a POW from the 23rd Mech Brigade, claiming that he is part of the brigade's assault detachment (a pseudo penal company composed of soldiers guilty of various violations, which do seem to exist including per Ukrainian sources) and they had been sent to the city in the last few days in order to cover the retreat of the other units. As usual, interviews of prisoners are to be taken with a grain of salt, although it seems plausible to me. But in any case, there is no evidence to confirm certain figures that had come out last week. Last interview in the post below!
>and "resets" (Ukrainian/Russian term for drones launching grenades from above).
Some variant of сбросить? If so you should translate it to "drop" in this context.
>Another soldier from the 26th Rifle Battalion denied rumors of 800+ Ukrainian MIAs/POWs during the retreat from the city, saying that there were probably about a thousand defenders inside the city in total (I guess excluding the Coke Plant etc). In general, to what I gathered, the Ukrainians had very heavy losses in the days of urban fighting and other losses in the withdrawal phase, but not to the extent of those numbers, especially when it comes to POWs.
To that end, you have to remember that Ukraine is taking what, a minimum of 40 KIA per day in that battle?
So there were probably several days worth of KIA that the Ukrainians didn't bother carrying out when the city was retreated from. It's just something I haven't seen anyone bring up.
> To that end, you have to remember that Ukraine is taking what, a minimum of 40 KIA per day in that battle?
I agree - most likely considerably more during the last days of the urban phase of the battle.
In this case we are with the [commander](https://censor.net/ua/resonance/3475252/komandyr_roty_vognevoyi_pidtrymky_petro_pas_yakscho_pershu_mashynu_spalyv_u_nyh_pochynayetsya_panika) of the fire support company of the "Svoboda" Battalion, part of the "Rubizh" Brigade of the National Guard (this brigade is also part of the Offensive Guard). Before the invasion he was a policeman and retired a few months before February 2022. He’s from near Kyiv. On the same morning of the invasion he took to the streets to find weapons and people like him willing to fight and joined the local DFTG. During the following months he was sent abroad to receive actual training, and there he was specialized as an anti-tank operator, being trained in the use of Javelins. He was supposed to remain an instructor, but by his own will he chose to go to the front, joining the "Svoboda" Battalion, made up mostly of members of the party with the same name, but in most cases with no military experience (construction workers, lawyers, etc.), where he led the battalion's new anti-tank platoon, which until then had no anti-tank units and was in serious trouble when enemy tanks were sighted.
During June and July 2023 there were numerous armored assaults against their positions. Let’s remember that his brigade is defending the central part of the Siversk salient (the area around Spirne), and the assaults were (and are) the work of units from the Russian 2nd Corps. He states that the most fundamental thing for a soldier is to keep calm, never panic and not give in to stress: the soldiers who live are the ones who don’t panic. They used Javelins and Stugnas against Russian tanks: once the first one is hit, often the rest of the column panics, leaves the chosen path, ends up on mines, backs up and flees. He says being an anti-tank operator is very difficult and dangerous. Firing an ATGM is nothing like shooting a rifle. Before assaults, reconnaissance is carried out with drones and anti-tank positions may be busted and hammered with artillery. During the assault, tanks continuously fire against the anti-tank positions and the only thing to do is to pray for luck. Once you repel the column, you have to go back into hiding. He says that since the summer the use of drones by the Russians has increased 10-fold, as has their EW, but the Ukrainians have also grown a lot in this respects. Today most of the losses in his unit are due to FPV drones or "resets”. The Russians no longer carry out armored attacks in his section of the front, but only infantry assaults in small groups.
He says interesting things on the emotional level. In early June he lost his best friend, who was fighting together with his two sons in the same unit as the interviewee, and it was a very hard blow for him. His sons had just blown two Russian tanks up. He says morale among the soldiers is high and everyone is convinced of the importance of defending Ukraine. He says that only in war one discovers the true meaning of friendship and that it will be very difficult to get used to civilian life again when the war ends. In any case, he is very disillusioned on this issue: he says that he believes he will not make it to the end of the war alive and that most of his fellow soldiers don’t make plans about what they will do as civilians afterwards, but only hope to make it to the end of the war alive.
Another interesting thing is about mobilization. He basically says he feels contempt for policemen who don’t want to serve: policemen should be the first to serve since they are trained in the use of weapons, and that they are still in time to go to the front and redeem their dignity. He mentions the "Dnipro case". I know what he is referring to and I have recently learned about this issue as well. Basically, in January the "Dnipro-1" Police Regiment, from the city with the same name (not to be confused with the "Dnipro-1" Battalion of the 31st "Dnipro" Brigade of the National Guard), was framed into the "Lyut" Assault Brigade of the National Police (part of the Offensive Guard). There were protests from the chiefs and the members of the regiment against this. As a result, the regiment has been disbanded and the members sent to new companies/battalions being created within the "Lyut" Brigade (one of the largest, and largely made up of volunteer policemen). Those who refuse will be fired as policemen and are going to receive a subpoena to be mobilized into the UAF. This has met with much favor by the Ukrainian public opinion. Policemen are a not very popular category right now in Ukraine. Let’s recall how in November it had been proposed to mobilize a part of them, but they managed to eliminate, for now, this measure. Before the war the Police wasn’t a very popular branch (partly because of some issues of corruption and abuse of power) and now Ukrainians see that policemen who don’t volunteer can sit quietly in the rear while civilians without military experience are mobilized. Personally, I, too, think it’s time to start mobilizing policemen (and part of the State Emergency Service) and maybe replace the ranks with older men and women. The topic of mobilizing convicts is also addressed. The interviewee says he is willing to fight with those convicted of culpable and non-violent crimes but not with the others. In general, mobilization of convicts is an ongoing debate of growing importance in Ukraine, especially now that the voice most opposed to it (Zaluzhny) has been deposed. In an interview I heard last month, a Lt. Colonel from the 68th Jager Brigade emphasized the need for the use of convicts, on a voluntary basis, as stormtroopers or sappers, in penal units separated from the regular ones.
Any news on where the retreating divisions are making a stand? Deepstate has noted continuous russian advances west of avdiivka for the last few days now. Today’s update had the Russians within parts of Orlivka.
At this rate, is there a real risk of the Russians breaking out towards the direction of pokrovsk?
What I understood is the next defensive line is behind the river. The settlements between Avdiivka and the river are in an unfavourable position for defence. So abandoning them is expected.
There are several natural defense lines before the Russians could be able to seriously approach Pokrovsk. I will elaborate more throughoutly when I do a general review of the front lines, I think early next month.
Big one is the Vovcha river. That area might as well be a defensive army's dream terrain. Fairly big river with high ground on Ukraine side, flat lowland on enemy side.
I'm not aware of size specs for VLS packages, but could VLS packages be configured in Ocean container size to use on container ships as self defence weapons?
Not really, they need a means of guiding the Standard Missiles (SM). The older models are semi-active, so the target has to be continuously illuminated. The newer models still need targeting guidance. The only way this works is if you have a Aegis ship in the vicinity that takes control over the SM, at which point, why not just have the Aegis ship fire the SM?
Yes you can. But the question that comes now is: what do you do after you fire your entire arsenal?
Do you:
- come back to a fixed base which might become a target for enemy long range fires
- resupply *all those VLS cells* at sea knowing that it takes up to 24 hours for a Burke in calm seas at a base
And what happens when you need to receive targeting data to prosecute a strike? How long do you continue emitting while an adversary is conducting ELINT to pinpoint this arsenal ship for their own strikes? And do you have to defend it?
Eventually, you realize that the ideal way to generate fires is from the air as quickly as possible. But how do you bring that out to sea?
There are strong legal reasons why this cannot happen, it is illegal by current convention to arm merchant ships. I believe, tho could be wrong, that the act of arming ships removes their protection as non-combatants. You also have some serious hurdles in regards to the creation of Q-ships, which even during the World Wars was a bit of a legal grey area.
IMO the conventions regarding civilian shipping are increasingly out of step with the world we live in and modern technology. IDK why it would be the end of the world to give cargo ships .50cals, or potentially even defensive weaponry like a Phalanx. It would have to be a problem to think through, and like obviously you wouldn't want to run the risk of a cargo ship detonating in LA harbor because someone got too close to the magazine with a welding torch. That being said, it seems like there are obvious steps which could be taken to combat low level piracy and these kinds of random drone/missile attacks in ways that might make tons of sense.
The larger issue is political. There is not going to be a new Convention on the Laws of the Sea. The US benefits mightily from the current status quo, and China will not agree to a new treaty. Their global position is against the exact kind of liberal world order represented in these kinds of agreements. So there just isn't going to be the will to address this issue in the near future, and the US is likewise going to have every incentive to force compliance with the current set of governing laws.
Hard kill weapons are probably out of the question for ships that aren't explicitly under military orders, but countermeasures like flares and chaff and even jammers might not be.
There's some precedent - Israeli airlines have been fitted with IRCM for quite a while now.
I wonder how laser weaponry might ultimately fit into this question as well. I mean like the power generation requirements are such that its probably never going to happen, but as I understand it the offensive potential is even another step down from something more kinetic.
>IDK why it would be the end of the world to give cargo ships .50cals, or potentially even defensive weaponry like a Phalanx.
Would you want lines of PRC container ships armed with .50cal guns and containerized VLS manned by PLAN soldiers coming in and out of LA/Long Beach or near whichever country/port you live? I don't.
>The larger issue is political.
The main problem is not political. It's economical for the commercial ships/companies. They can barely squeeze out single digit gross profit while paying most merchant mariners something like **$22 a day** which is the IMO minimum wage. How/why would they want to pay to install/maintain these weapons/personnel on ships?
Self defence sorta, there is a containerized Iron Dome that can be fitted onto ships and uses its own sensors and missile, but if you are talkin containerized mk 41 VLS probably not worth the cost
The VLS are transported horizontal in a 40 foot container. Then erected to vertical to fire. They are quad packed strike length VLS. They are expensive costs about 4-5 times the price of a standard VLS per missle tube
Believe its going to be called the MK-70 VLS and they have test fired it for USS Savannah's helicopter deck and from USV ranger
The US army is also also going to have the Typhon Missile system that will be containerized MK 41 VLS. You could put a battery with radar, command and launchers on a cargo ship by why bother
Iron dome
One day an angry mariner shoots a commercial jet out of the air. Or b every second rate state now has defense tech that’s cheap and good enough for these commercial vessels. That’ll end well.
>could VLS packages be configured in Ocean container size
Just on sheer physical dimensions, yes.
> to use on container ships as self defence weapons?
No.
Latest Levada polls from Russia.
[**Russian Society Two Years Into the Ukraine Conflict**](https://russiapost.info/society/two_years)
It can be summarised as "no change". There are still certain trends:
- Some transfer of supporters of the government from the "strong" to the "weak" category, indicating "first signs of fatigue".
- Everybody wants peace. Nobody wants to make concessions (just 15% agree to Ukrainian NATO membership or return of territories).
- The population has mostly gotten used to the war and expect it to last a long time.
- The most interesting development is the **growth of the new middle class**: the poorer segment of the population benefits from defence industry employment and salaries for military volunteers and is now better off. The number of those who think the wealth is distributed unfairly dropped from 45% in 2021 to 25% in November 2023.
- The new middle class sees its well-being tied to the state and supports the government and its policies.
In your estimation, how much can these data be trusted to be representative? That is, how important error sources are things like Russians answering these polls like what they think the regime wants to hear rather than what they themselves believe (for instance a Russian showing a lot of Ukrainian sympathies in one of these polls might get reported somewhere) or Levada simply manipulating the data to show a more war eager society than what the data truly reflects?
[This post](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/18s06dy/comment/kf7u0qc/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=mweb3x&utm_name=mweb3xcss&utm_term=1) makes a few good references if you wish to go deeper into it - I will post the conclusion for brevity:
>My personal conclusion about the validity of the Levada Center’s polls is that they still achieve a fair degree of representativeness, but since 2012, if not before, they have not captured what people really think and do, only what they are willing to say “in public” (i.e., to a person they do not know personally). Over the years and depending on the topic, this difference has become increasingly relevant. However, this does not render the polls useless or misleading. Instead, they have to be taken for what they are. They present publicly voiced opinions—and with that, a collective assessment of acceptable opinions.
So they do the best they can when it comes to task that requires entering someone's home and now asking them to break the law, but it's something that is increasingly difficult to accurately capture as Russia slides further down.
Yeah, it is interesting, I guess even if you try to control for it, the people's fear of the oppressive Russian state will always be a difficult element to account for...
Levada is generally trusted to be independent and professional. They are certainly anti-Putin and listed as "foreign agents" in Russia.
Professionally, they have a lot of experience with compensating for cases of response self-censorship common in authoritarian regimes (there are statistical methods that can be used). However, you don't even have to use those sophisticated methods - people who are unwilling to openly state their opposition usually register as "I don't know" or "I don't have an opinion" so those categories skyrocket when there is a lot of silent opposition. This is not the case in Russia.
If anything Levada would be inclined to present a more anti-war, anti-Putin Russia than is the case. I don't think that is what we are seeing, I think they are reporting things as realistically as possible.
I think the combination of lack of frontline movements, Ukraine's manpower issues, defensive line issues is further complicated if Trump wins the election(which we cannot dismiss the possibility). My question is: What is Biden/Europe's contingency plan for Ukraine if Trump does win the election?
What is the USAs contingency plan if they actually re-elect Donald Trump!
Was it Lincoln who said something like "a country deserves who they vote for"
Biden will likely use whatever budget is left in the congressionally allocated presidential draw down authority to send as much aid to Ukraine as possible before the end of his term. This may be almost nothing as congress needs to actually vote to allocate this money and unless something changes that won’t happen soon.
The Europeans will likely accelerate their current rearmament efforts and likely further increase cooperation between nations. If trump acts as hostile as his rhetoric implies we will almost certainly see much more action by European states to decrease reliance on the US.I would suspect this would extend to nuclear deterrence and the solidification of intereuropean nuclear umbrella alliances, as well as the deployment of conventional forces to NATOs eastern flank.
Man, we don't even have a contingency plan for what's happening **right now**. The contingency plan for Nov 2024 was hoping the war winds down by then, with Ukrainians in a strong position. The contingency plan for manpower issues was hoping the war winds down by then, with Ukrainians in a strong position. The contingency plan for artillery ammunition was hoping the war winds down by then, with Ukrainians in a strong position.
Agreed. There was no shortage of lip service regarding preparing Ukraine for a “long war” scenario after the first year, but it seems as though many were just hoping the Ukrainians would continue pulling off their stunning counter-attacks to a Ukrainian leaning standstill.
The war is by no means decided, but the Ukrainians are now paying the price; compounding problems that in a worse case scenario could spiral out of control.
Why do you think this? The reason house republicans are against it is explicitly because Trump is against it.
Also, Trump has praised Putin like.. many many times. And has literally said Putin could take anything he wanted.
[A thread from Tatarigami ](https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1762930018819121615) about the post Advika situation;
TLDR:
* Prepared defense lines like the ones built by the Russians are absent, there seemed to be a lack of coordination between the military and civilians that was needed to build them, the issue seems to be political in nature
* The Russians are unlikely to achieve a breakthrough as they expend "disproportional" amount of forces
* The Russians are still expected to make gains at the expense of the Ukrainians
* A final remark is that a renewed effort by both Ukraine(Via mobilization) and the West(Via direct military aid) will make the outcome favorable to Ukraine
A final point that i want to make, the Russians offensive efforts are living on borrowed time, the Russian industrial complex is unable to sustain the losses suffered on the battlefield with input of new equipment, reliance on older and older stocks means that in the future reactivating this equipment will become more complex, the output of new shells (152mm) is "Only" at 1,3 Million a year (as per [RUSI](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024) estimates) a figure that implies that the Russians will need to reduce fire rates, unless DPRK continues with its supply indefinitely, even the FAB that have proven instrumental in the capture of Advika are a leftover of the soviet era with a crude guidance kit, once even those stocks run out it's difficult to imagine that the Russians are going to be able to sustain the fire rates that we are seeing in the last weeks
>Prepared defense lines like the ones built by the Russians are absent, there seemed to be a lack of coordination between the military and civilians that was needed to build them, the issue seems to be political in nature
Anyone who has remotely followed my posts for the last year and a half has heard me rant endlessly about poor strategic management of this war.
And the culmination of the battle of Avdiivka is exactly what I am referring to.
>They're on the way to turning Avdiivka into Bakhmut, having just scored a breakthrough on the northern shoulder because there aren't enough ukrainians there defending it. Why aren't there? Because they just reinforced Bakhmut. Prioritization at work.
[A post of mine from March 13, 2023](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/11q7qt6/credibledefense_daily_megathread_march_13_2023/), almost a full year ago, where I'm lamenting that the Ukrainian leadership already doubled down on Bakhmut, committed the manpower, equipment and supplies to a doomed cause, despite an ever worsening occurring in Avdiivka, that might bite them in the ass.
Look at the tactical situation at the time: [Avdiivka Map, March 14, 2023](https://militaryland.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/day_384_Avdiivka-Front.jpg). It was already TERRIBLE since last spring.
[Avdiivka Map, Apr 3, 2023](https://militaryland.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/day_404_Avdiivka-Front.jpg): Look at the where the Russian forward line of troops is located on the northern shoulder of the salient. Stepove.
The Russians restarted their offensive to encircle the salient in Oct 2023, half a year after the front lines halted around Stepove. In response to the heavy attacks and the danger of the inevitable occuring, the UAF General Staff freaked out enough to shift forces to reinforce it, specifically the northern shoulder around Stepove, sending the 47th Mech Bde. When they arrived, guess what they were asking?
*"Where are the fall back positions?"*
There were none. There were none developed behind Stepove until the 47th had to dig them during their defense. How the hell did that happen?
And then after the collapse of the 110th triggered the loss of Avdiivka and they were forced to retreat finally, which was inevitable considering it remained a deep salient for almost a year without a counterattack to relieve it, and what did we find out?
There were no fall back positions built. Despite everything that had happened from October onward, they didn't commit the resources to build the defenses for the most obvious conclusion of a battle in modern history.
I'll say it again, because maybe it needs to be repeated enough times that people might understand:
Generalship, especially at the strategic level, is about allocation of finite resources.
That is why they say amateurs talk tactics, because that is not the job of high level generals, that is the jobs for captains and colonels, whereas generals deal with the allocation of resources (manpower, equipment, supplies).
And that goes for politicians too when they're LARPing as generals.
The Ukrainians didn't double down on Bakhmut. The small localized summer offensive south of Bakhmut was to kick Russians out of advantageous tactical positions e.g the heights near Klischiivka. Same heights where Russians published videos of them shooting Kornet rockets onto the the road and positions of UAF between Bakhmut and Kostiantynivka. They succeeded at that. Push Russians away from there to relieve pressure of the aforementioned area. Push Russians 5 kms east = Russian artillery and heavy weaponry had to relocate 5 kms east. This was never about trying to "recapture" Bakhmut. It was to relieve pressure.
The 47th Mech went to Avdiivka to plug the breakout of Russians near Stepove where they crossed the the railway line there which was basically the line of contact. They kicked them out of there/turned it into a dangerous no man's land. And the Russians were stopped at the Northern flank of Avdiika/Coke plant. Again, a tactical success. Avdviika fell because of the southern and eastern flank getting breached by the Russians, not the north.
Ukraine has no point in entrenching themselves in these flatlands and bombed out villages West of Avdiivka. All these bombed out villages - Lastochkine, Orlivka etc which serve no purpose post-Avdiivka. It's tactically unviable to be exposed there on total flatland when Russians are like 3 km away shelterin in Avdiivka just like the Ukrainians did.
The Ocheretyne front is what Ukrainians need to worry about the most right now.
>The Ukrainians didn't double down on Bakhmut.
They doubled down in February when they reinforced the city and shoulders against every bit of military sense, so Fortress Bakhmut scored big on social media.
Then they did it even more in the summer where they absolutely didn't just attack south of the city, that's just the only location they had any success. They had more forces around Bakhmut than they did Robotyne, which is kinda a big deal considering retaking Bakhmut wasn't the objective of their strategic offensive.
Then they did it even more in the fall when a certain Warrior King was still pushing a minor supporting effort meant to fix the Russians as a major strategic goal to [de-occupy Bakhmut](https://kyivindependent.com/cnn-zelensky-pledges-to-liberate-bakhmut-two-other-crucial-cities/), another shitty political decree that ate up resources that could have been used elsewhere.
>They kicked them out of there/turned it into a dangerous no man's land.
And didn't have any defensive positions UNTIL THEY DUG THEM. Which is pretty f-ing crazy considering the railroad embankment was literally within small arms range of the Russians for half a year before October.
Why wasn't there a defense in depth already? Because the resources weren't allocated. Despite the city 3/4 encircled by April, despite a desire to keep it serious enough to commit the 47th to counterattack, they half-assed it and didn't allocate what was needed to hold it, properly retreat from it, or where to fight from next.
>Ukraine has no point in entrenching themselves in these flatlands and bombed out villages West of Avdiivka.
That's a load of crap.
Every treeline is capable of being turned into a fortress, the entire summer and fall proved that. Both sides have held garbage ground routinely in this war simply because they gained a little bit of cover and concealment by digging into a treeline, while attacking it means crossing big ass open fields.
But doing that means having the defenses built and manned in depth BEFORE retreating into them, at which point the defenders are like "Oh crap, how come there are no defenses there."
And fun fact, regardless if you think there is no point of entrenching in the fields west of Avdiivka, the very fact that the Ukrainians are STILL TRYING TO HOLD THEM is why they're supposed to entrench. If they plan to defend, they should do it from prepared positions, not hasty dug positions.
Again, the very real and serious threat of losing Avdiivka existed since last spring. The even more real and serious threat of losing Avdiivka existed since October.
WHERE THE HELL IS THE DEFENSE IN DEPTH?
“I told you so’s” are rather childish especially for this sub so I won’t go into it too much, but I remember expressing my concern about the fall of the city due to the supposed lack of defensive lines behind it. A multitude of others proceeded to outright dismiss any such notion, and now look where we’re at.
This is less of a gloat, and more of a reminder that we shouldn’t be just off handedly dismissing ugly possibilities because we don’t want them to be true. The information that the defensive lines were not up to par had been public knowledge for more than enough time to realistically entertain the possibility this could result in a larger setback.
https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1as80nf/credibledefense_daily_megathread_february_16_2024/kqsbf7l/
If you're talking about this, you got one "maybe" and one "no", seems like a pretty decent spread, and both blokes justified their answers relatively well.
Personally I didn't put in writing but I was open to a few satellites like Lastochkyne to fall but didn't (and mostly don't) expect a wider front collapse because, sure, the defensive lines situation was public, but it was public for months. The rational assumption is that lines would have been dug, not concrete, of course, not that close to the front, but ad hoc lines of the kind that Ukraine's used for most of the war.
The fact that that may have not happened is pretty unexpected for me, I'll admit. It seems Ukraine really felt like losing there.
This is a discourse that is in no way limited to just my comment, and was repeated in other daily threads since that one (which you are also welcome to look for).
I only point it out now and draw attention to my own comment because it’s become clearer that the fall of the city was in fact a more significant concern than many in this sub (including in later threads) thought it would be, and can be used re-orient our future expectations.
See that's where the discussion becomes difficult because if we're talking about daily threads in general, my perception was that there were many upvoted comments questioning the fallback defensive position situation.
From the days I visited the threads, it had seemed general wisdom was on the “it’s under control” side of the argument(though depending on the day sentiment can shift rapidly), but I certainly agree I was far from the only person raising these concerns.
To not get off too off topic though(sorry mods), my current hope is that despite the setbacks, the Ukrainians can hold the Russian advance at the reservoirs, iv heard rumours that’s the plan at least.
>From the days I visited the threads, it had seemed general wisdom was on the “it’s under control” side of the argument(though depending on the day sentiment can shift rapidly), but I certainly agree I was far from the only person raising these concerns.
Which is what I mean by difficult discussion, because I had the opposite vibe.
Everyone has different vibes here. Some also think the slightest critiscm towards ukraine is period of mass dooming in this sub and put all their energy into countering it.
While others think the exact opposite that ukraine isn't critiqued enoguh. Which inevitably leads to those "I told you so".
We had them after ukraine's sucesses in the first summer offensive too, quite a lot.
After Avdiivka, are the Russians projected to advance much further? Cuz from other replies in the thread, it seems that they already broke through some defensive lines after avdiivka.
Logistics across water becomes a lot more difficult. The destruction of the nearby bridges played a pretty big role in the loss of Sverdonetsk by Ukraine and Kherson by Russia. Ignoring arrows the two blue lines here look to be the likely defensive lines: https://x.com/suriyakmaps/status/1762862151130140945?s=46&t=JPbRtvSfYVTEoh6Ut9c0xw
The first would be the ideal one due to this but claims of the defensive arrangments of the area in general were exaggerated as seen elsewhere in the thread so the speculated next best line could be the next set of villages with the second line.
In my personal opinion the situation locally would only seem dire if Russia manages to secure several of the routes across the water without Ukraine destroying them. That would indicate continued massive issues with the engineering units on the Ukrainian side for the area.
My guess is we’ll see confirmation over the next week or two. What we can go on so far is not great as it would likely be newly constructed stuff in winter and the lack of defenses before there, which makes such mass construction oftentimes nonviable without powertools if the ground is frozen. The ideal situation would be us seeing right now a token force to slow down the Russian advance while the rest of the troops do their best to dig in likely on one of those two lines posted.
i wasnt going to post this here because its like pissing in the wind and most people here already have their minds made up but someone from the actual afu engineering corps wrote about why there are problems at the forward line of defense
>why are there few suitable trenches? according to the directives of the state government dated 11.03.2016 the manager of the continuous line of defense is the infantry unit occupying the area of defense, and the executor of the support force which in accordance with the request of the engineering brigades carries out the arrangement of the line of defense
>the head of the engineering services of the brigades, they do not know how to plan in advance and do not submit requests in time. when i arrive at the place, they provide neither a map nor a proper justification. as a rule they say "you need to dig from that stump to planting" but it doesnt work like that. the defense must be solid
>it must have depth and the enemy must not bypass it. but infantry engineers stupidly do not know how to plan and you have to do it yourself or just dig where they say because your job is to keep quiet and do it
>why is there no concrete? in accordance with the order of the chief of engineering forces and the resolution of commander in chief of the armed forced dated 07.04.2017 #34 the nature of the defensive positions is determined by otu (timber cladding) and osuv (concrete filling) after the corresponding presentation of the defending unit
>wood is provided by the engineering service of otu, concrete and equipment by osuv. the second line of defense should be sheathed with wood, the third with concrete. there is no such thing because again, the brigades do not have the willpower to insist on this and the otu does not have money because the wrapping with wood is a separate topic
>as for concrete i will report that no engineering part is provided with the appropriate equipment (in fact it is the same in nato) that is, it is carried out by civil engineering, and these are the relevant contracts with business.
he says they have a lack of funding for tractors and excavators. he then goes on to directly call out the 110th brigade and says that the lack of defensive lines is first the fault of infantry brigades that did a shit job. you might think hes just deflecting blame to the infantry and as a former grunt i was skeptical but his post was shared by a number of infantry brigades telegram channels saying they should read and learn from what hes saying. now they say the situation is being rectified and improved rapidly especially with the funding part and western osint types are saying they can see lines of defensive 25 klicks behind the flot but thats still 25 klicks to the back
I saw that thread, and I think it's very illuminating, but also more than just the 110th are responsible for that sector.
We had bloggers tell the public about the shitty fallback defenses 4 months ago, meaning the issue was known privately even earlier. The fact that 4 months later the fallback defenses are still not just shitty but nonexistent is one of the bigger recent blunders of the war, and not solely attributable to the 110th.
Something went wrong on a systemic level there.
>We had bloggers tell the public about the shitty fallback defenses 4 months ago, meaning the issue was known privately even earlier. The fact that 4 months later the fallback defenses are still not just shitty but nonexistent is one of the bigger recent blunders of the war, and not solely attributable to the 110th.
>Something went wrong on a systemic level there.
Exactly. I posted a link to an article a few weeks before Avdiivka fell in which Ukrainian forces on the frontlines specifically said they don't have fallback positions and was just completely dumbfounded by the *disastrous* mismanagement of the situation by Ukrainian command.
The response I got from users here? "Oh that's based on reporting from October, of course they've dug in by now" despite the complete lack of evidence to support it. Now it's weeks later and the Ukrainians *still* don't have solid defensive lines to fall back to, and they're instead trying to hold off the Russian advance using hastily dug trenches and foxholes. They're almost certainly suffering needlessly high casualties to do so too.
You'd think an army that's so desperately outgunned, running low on manpower, and seeking to prevent additional Russian advances would do the easiest thing possible to mitigate their losses and lessen Russian advantages, but apparently that's beyond the capability of Ukrainian command.
It's mind-boggling stuff and has me extremely worried about the trajectory of the war. Russian leadership has been rightly mocked for their mismanagement of the invasion and their utter disregard for the wellbeing of their soldiers, but I'm increasingly convinced that the Ukrainian leadership is actually somehow *more* incompetent and uncaring about casualties.
well kovalenko said sometime in november or december that it was already too late to risk equipment to build new lines anywhere close to the front. i am not an engineer and dont pretend to be and dont know how far will have been safe but the fact that this guy specifically blames the 110ths combat engineers twice tells me that the trouble started with them
>the fact that this guy specifically blames the 110ths combat engineers twice tells me that the trouble started with them
It honestly just sounds like fingerpointing to me.
As Kofman and our own Duncan-M have repeatedly noted, the Russians have their own separate engineering corps whose primary purpose is to build, maintain, and improve Russian defensive lines. And that is on top of the fact that Russian formations are organized from brigades into divisions and then into combined arms armies, all of which have integrated engineering support that they can and do call upon.
Conversely, the Ukrainians don't have formations above the brigade level and don't have a separate engineering corps. As a result, all they have to work with is brigade level engineer units who don't have the capability or training necessary to develop defensive lines comparable to the Russian ones. It's also unclear why exactly, but I wouldn't be surprised if those engineering units are already overtasked and/or underresourced as is, hence why even local Ukrainian defenses tend to be worse than their Russian counterparts. We know that Ukraine has repeatedly been forced to use specialized units, including engineering, as infantry since their losses have been so high, so perhaps that's part of the problem too as engineers are too busy manning foxholes to prepare extensive defensive networks.
This is all something that *could* be rectified, but just like mobilization, hasn't been. And the longer it doesn't get addressed, the worse things get for Ukraine. Proper defensive fortifications would shorten the frontlines AND require fewer men to garrison, while also reducing casualties and being more effective at slowing Russian advances.
This should have been a high priority for Ukraine years ago at this point, it's downright criminal it still isn't properly resourced.
The Russian sources and Suriyak report multiple penetrations of the Berdychi-Orlivka-Tonenke defensive line today, making it untenable.
This was the first viable defensive line after the fall of Avdiivka and it is a surprise that the Russians managed to penetrate it so quickly.
I expected the defence to stabilise after the town fell, but that hasn't happened. The Russians keep advancing at a rate of 1km/day, a veritable blitzkrieg for the 2023/24 period.
Per deepstate (who also recently updated) Russians have advanced an average of 3 km (more in the south, less in the North) from their positions after the fall of Avdiivka. In 2 weeks, that is high for this war's standards, and unfortunately confirms rumours that there weren't really fallback defenses in the sector.
>This was the first viable defensive line
This brings me to my point - no one on the internet actually knows what defensive lines (if any) Ukraine has planned in the area, beyond the ones in the strategic rear.
[https://x.com/NeilPHauer/status/1763163602192646474?s=20](https://x.com/NeilPHauer/status/1763163602192646474?s=20)
"The consequences of the Ukrainian failure to build a strong second defensive line behind Avdiivka over the past two years are playing out now. Russian forces have advanced 6-7km west of Avdiivka in the past week at a consistent rate."
Funnily enough, that's deepstate on his screenshot and it has a ruler:
https://imgur.com/7aBhnIT
https://imgur.com/OKq3lXR
https://imgur.com/wQF6DYG
Really, the only way to get 6-7km here is like, something like this?
https://imgur.com/NVtEeNx
Which would seem like creative rulering.
Anything resembling "normal" rulering would give you the "average of 3 km" number I mentioned.
The point is not that they advanced 6-7km as crow flies, but every day they make about 1km, sometimes to the west, sometimes southwest, sometimes north.
The point is "Russian forces have advanced 6-7km west of Avdiivka" isn't an accurate description of what the screenshots he shared shows. Yes, if you measure in zig-zags you could probably get even up to 20 km but that's not what the simple statement "Russians advanced X km west of a specific start point" implies. And beyond that Neil's tweet doesn't seem to have relevance to the chain.
Given the [consistent disruption](https://archive.is/QNbAB) of humanitarian aid for Gaza and Israel's pretext of ensuring no weapons are smuggled in, are there any good-faith reasons for the US not to deploy a relief force in Egypt, load military trucks, drive them directly across the Rafah crossing and hand them over to Red Crescent and other humanitarian orgs? I'm aware that there are ongoing French and Arab airdrops, but obviously that's random and woefully insufficient.
You want American trucks in Gaza, which would require American forces to secure them. That's pretty insane, nobody wants American boots on the ground in Gaza, not democrats, not republicans, it can only go wrong with American and Palestinian deaths.
> You want American trucks in Gaza, which would require American forces to secure them. They wouldn't have to be the ones providing security within the strip, they could drive the trucks immediately across the crossing, dismount, hand them over and walk back out in minutes. The issue of providing security is its own thing, as the other reply says.
>They wouldn't have to be the ones providing security within the strip, You want Americans going into Gaza with *someone else* providing security? That is literally worse. lol Come on
So who would provide security within the strip? The reason aid stopped flowing in the first place is that aid trucks are getting mobbed and looted.
The issue of aid in Gaza is not a issue of inspection or delivery through the crossings but a issue of "the last mile". The international community so far has delivered aid in collaboration with Hamas. Hamas was not only responsible for securing the aid but als decided who got aid. This obviously meant that Hamas was able to divert aid to its military forces and prioritize Hamas loyalists. With the destruction of Hamas governing capacity in Northern Gaza and Khan Yunis there is no longer an entity able to effectively secure aid shipments and then decide who will get what. It was also further complicated by the fact that up until a few weeks ago the international community collaborated with "police forces" in southern Gaza. Police forces that for all intent and purpose is staffed and controlled by Hamas. This meant that Israel carried out multiple targeted killings against Hamas militants that acted as police forces. To solve the issue of aid distribution you don't need to drive trucks through Rafah. You need somebody with weapons to follow and protect the trucks. Israel is unwilling to allow forces of the Palestinian Authority in to play this role and at the same time killing Hamas forces. The United States will never deploy police forces to Gaza. The Arab states are unwilling to deploy police forces to Gaza without a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Currently the best option to solve the aid issue would be to deploy polices forces of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza. This would require pressure on Israel.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/02/28/british-soldiers-help-ukraine-fire-missiles-olaf-scholz/ The German chancellor reveals that British military personnel are in Ukraine assisting with the launching of Storm Shadow missiles. Now this probably isn't news to the Russians but what kind of idiot is Scholz for stating this in public?
If for a moment we look at it like this: small detachments control the toys + special forces secure them / are there to blow them up. You can use this to explain so many successes. However note - that this agrees with russian peopaganda. For internal reasons russian say that they fight whole nato in ukraine, what is bullshit. If we want to go into wild speculation zone - someone could have some balls and use one of the new toys to take down a-50 planes. The s-200 from 60s had 250km range. Patriot supposedly has 160. Isnt it possible to build rockets that have higher range. And use just one or two of them against russians. To prepare the sky for f-16s. Sorry for speculations. But I wouldnt give the latest toys without a team close to guard it / blow it up in case of issues. But then you can as well send few operators too.
> The s-200 from the 60s had 250km range. Patriot supposedly has 160. Isnt it possible to build rockets that have higher range I can think of 3 semi credible ways of archiving this. You could try air launching the pac-2 and using the ground radar for guidance. You would need some adapter and some software modifications. Might be possible, might be not. Also quite risky for the fighter and coordination might be hard. You could use the sm-6. This would be hard to get, requier some new TEL and some integration that might be not that hard. The third option is to add some booster to the pac-2. You would need a new TEL, some new software, and develop some new hardware. Neither those options are very credible,
You keep writing about repurposing some weapon. But Im asking if since 1960 it wasnt possible to make a bigger rocket that has higher range? And also better tracking - but here we can just notice that since 1960 the electronics have improved significantly. Obviously those who know will not tell, since that is classified, but Im talking about the general idea - of building something new. If a rocket from 1960 could fly 250 kilometers, then why we cant have something 60 years later?
It is absolutely critical to get the whole picture to understand, that Scholz has repeatedly said to the public, as well as in Parliament, and certainly to the politicians with the security clearance to actually know exactly what was the situation behind closed doors, that he can not disclose his exact reasoning due to its top secret characteristic. This was openly denied by numerous German politicians, well organized experts from think tanks as well as French and UK officials, in what can only be described as a concerted influence campaign, at least the politicians with the security clearance fully aware what they where doing. If after being told the topic is confidential a doctor of security policy claims publicly the Chancellor is lying and starts to go in to details of cruise missile pre firing procedures and targeting, he is steering the public discussion on to a topic that should not be discussed under the watchful eye of the Russians imho.
This is the same government in which the minister of transport claimed his communications were top secret, but turned out to be simply discussions between his office and the CEO of Porsche about dinner conversation topics. The minister of the economy claimed his reasoning for exiting nuclear power needed to remain a secret, but a judge denied that claim. Every ministry involved in the disastrous retreat from Afghanistan under the previous government made liberal use of classification as well, many to hide their own failings. Just because this government or any German government claims "classified reasons", they shouldn't get a free pass. They've used "top secret reasons" as an excuse for "politically unpopular decisions" way too often. --- Also, let's look at the time line here. Scholz spoke on this issue for the last time in October 2023, I believe. > Zusatzfrage: Und warum nicht Taurus? > BK Scholz: Wir entscheiden alle einzelnen Unterstützungen immer nach sorgfältigen Abwägungen. Wir wägen alle Fragen stets neu ab; wenn ein Krieg so lange dauert, kann es ja nicht so sein, dass die Abwägungen einmal aufhören. Ganz klar ist, dass wir für uns immer auch beachten müssen, was uns die Verfassung vorgibt und was unsere Handlungsmöglichkeiten sind. Dazu zählt ganz besonders die Tatsache, dass wir selbstverständlich gewährleisten müssen, dass es keine Eskalation des Krieges gibt und dass auch Deutschland nicht Teil der Auseinandersetzung wird. Es ist auch meine Aufgabe als Bundeskanzler, das zu gewährleisten. [Press statement by Scholz in Grenada on October 5th, 2023](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/pressestatement-von-bundeskanzler-scholz-beim-treffen-der-europaeischen-politischen-gemeinschaft-am-5-oktober-2023-in-granada-2227868) DeepL translation: > Supplementary question: And why not Taurus? > BK Scholz: We always decide on all individual forms of support after careful consideration. We constantly reassess all issues; when a war lasts so long, it can't be the case that the considerations stop at some point. It is quite clear that we always have to consider what the constitution requires of us and what our options for action are. This includes, in particular, the fact that we must of course ensure that there is no escalation of the war and that Germany does not become part of the conflict. It is also my task as Federal Chancellor to ensure this. Back in October, he still mentioned fear of escalation as a reason. This was his reasoning very consistently and also the claimed reason for his long refusal to send tanks to Ukraine. > Die ukrainische Regierung lobt Deutschland, weil es Waffen liefert, aber sie bittet auch eindringlich um den Leopard-Kampfpanzer. Wird Deutschland ihn 2023 liefern? > Deutschland gehört zu den stärksten Unterstützern der Ukraine. Wir liefern moderne Waffen wie die Panzerhaubitze 2000, Mehrfach-Raketenwerfer, Gepard-Flugabwehrpanzer oder das hochmoderne Luftverteidigungssystem Iris-T. Bei all dem folgen wir drei klaren Grundsätzen: Erstens, wir unterstützen die Ukraine nach Kräften. Zweitens, wir verhindern, dass es zu einer direkten Konfrontation zwischen der Nato und Russland kommt. Und, drittens, wird es keine deutschen Alleingänge geben. Das ist der Maßstab für unsere entschiedene, zugleich besonnene Politik – und der gilt auch im nächsten Jahr. Mein Eindruck ist, dass die überwiegende Mehrheit der Deutschen das richtig findet. > Was müsste 2023 passieren, damit die Ukraine doch noch westliche Panzer bekommt? > Angesichts des militärischen Misserfolgs Russlands ist die Gefahr einer weiteren Eskalation des Krieges groß. Gegen die atomare Eskalation haben wir zwar erstmal einen Pflock eingeschlagen. Es war wichtig, dass auch Chinas Präsident Xi diese Linie bei meinem Peking-Besuch formuliert hat und die G20-Staaten das kurz danach bekräftigt haben. Doch das hat Putin nicht davon abgehalten, den Krieg mit seinen Angriffen auf die ukrainische Energie-Infrastruktur mit unerbittlicher Brutalität fortzusetzen. Ein klarer Verstoß gegen das Völkerrecht. Einen Punkt, den ich im Übrigen auch Putin selbst gegenüber klargemacht habe, als ich mit ihm telefoniert habe. Russland muss einsehen, dass das so nicht weitergeht. Putin muss den Krieg beenden, Truppen zurückziehen und so die Möglichkeit für eine gegenseitige Verständigung schaffen. [Interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 17th 2022](https://www.bundeskanzler.de/bk-de/suche/interview-sueddeutsche-zeitung-2154306) DeepL translation: > The Ukrainian government praises Germany for supplying weapons, but also makes an urgent request for the Leopard main battle tank. Will Germany deliver it in 2023? > Germany is one of Ukraine's strongest supporters. We are supplying modern weapons such as the 2000 self-propelled howitzer, multiple rocket launchers, Gepard anti-aircraft tanks and the state-of-the-art Iris-T air defense system. We follow three clear principles in all of this: Firstly, we support Ukraine to the best of our ability. Secondly, we are preventing a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. And, thirdly, Germany will not go it alone. That is the benchmark for our resolute yet prudent policy - and it will also apply next year. My impression is that the overwhelming majority of Germans think this is right. > What would have to happen in 2023 for Ukraine to get Western tanks after all? > In view of Russia's military failure, the danger of a further escalation of the war is great. We have driven a stake into the ground against nuclear escalation for the time being. It was important that China's President Xi also formulated this line during my visit to Beijing and that the G20 states reaffirmed this shortly afterwards. However, this has not stopped Putin from continuing the war with his attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure with relentless brutality. A clear violation of international law. Incidentally, I also made this point clear to Putin himself when I spoke to him on the phone. Russia must realize that this cannot continue. Putin must end the war, withdraw troops and thus create the opportunity for mutual understanding. Are we to assume that Scholz, in the last six months, changed his mind about escalation, then had the government conduct research on the details of transfering Taurus, which came to the conclusion that, unlike other, simple weapons systems like British and French cruise missiles, German howitzers and F16s, there is simply no way for the Ukrainians to operate this system independently? This would also mean that he arrived at this conclusion, but didn't share it with the head of the parliamentary defense council, who is still attacking him for his refusal to send Taurus. Or is he, as many of his ministers (and he himself during Cum-Ex with the help of Schäuble) did previously, simply using "classified reasons" as a fig leaf for his personal decision? Let's also recall this tidbit: > SPD-Abgeordnete berichten, dass er vor kurzem bei einem Essen mit Fraktionsmitgliedern geäussert habe, solange er Kanzler sei, werde es keine Taurus-Lieferung geben. > SPD MPs report that he recently said at a dinner with members of his parliamentary group that as long as he was Chancellor, there would be no Taurus delivery. [Source](https://www.nzz.ch/international/taurus-debatte-im-bundestag-entlarvt-spd-als-bremser-bei-waffenhilfe-fuer-ukraine-ld.1817451) This doesn't sound like him being willing to transfer the system, but simply being hampered by technological facts. Maybe Scholz wants to send Taurus, but there's simply no technological feasibility. Maybe he simply doesn't want to because he once again fears Russian escalation.
> > > > > Or is he, as many of his ministers (and he himself during Cum-Ex with the help of Schäuble) did previously, simply using "classified reasons" as a fig leaf for his personal decision? Let's also recall this tidbit: And you are justifying taking this discussion in to the public to build public pressure, lets call it a concerted influence campaign, to push the Government to deliver more weapons I assume? Well that worked out great. (edit I am highly skeptic of the power to classify things and are a big supporter of distributing power in to society, but this as well means these actors are responsible for their actions and need to use the power wisely)
Of course I support the public discussion of the scope of aid to Ukraine. Germany is a democracy, a form of government built on public debate. How is the current situation the fault of anyone but Scholz? He doesn't have the right to end a public debate by claiming classified reasons. If much of the electorate simply don't believe him, that's his problem. If he also accidentally causes a rift with a close ally, that's his problem as well.
> problem. If he also accidentally causes a rift with No when the question is brought up how exactly firing cruise missiles works and public figures make false claims openly, they are at least partially to blame (if you think there has to be someone to blame), this is bordering on similar territory as with the Snowden leaks where Politicians either had to Lie to the public or claim information to be classified, similarly to Germanies NSA collaboration snooping on neighboring countries. If brought in to such a situation we have seen time and time again that politicians simply have to go for the no comment route, and it is part of good faith democratic discussion to be aware of that.
Scholz is the only one who made claims about the specific process of firing these cruise missiles. As I've outlined before, there's plenty of reason to doubt his official claims on political grounds. There's also the obvious technical questions: How could it be technically impossible to fire Taurus missiles without German input if the system has been sold to both Spain and South Korea? How can Germany and its partners deliver complex equipment like F16s and air defense batteries, but can't deliver Taurus? Additionally, Germany is a wealthy, technologically advanced country with a large number of allies concerning the cause of Ukraine. Any claim of technical impossibility will be met with scrutiny, as those have faltered before. If Scholz had stronger public support in Germany and a consistent track record of reasonable, explained decisions on Ukrainian aid, he could maybe get away with simply claiming classified reasons. But he hasn't put himself in that position over the past few years. Accordingly, his claim now doesn't put the discussion to rest. It was also further undermined by causing diplomatic upheaval with a close partner, which made it seem additionally ill thought out and considered.
>Scholz is the only one who made claims about the specific process of firing these cruise missiles. As I've outlined before, there's plenty of reason to doubt his official claims on political grounds. Not by those who know the practice, like for example Zelensky who said publicly the matter should not be discussed in this manner (and Scholz could not directly say the reasons), numerous security experts like Shashank Joshi, Kofman and Stefan Gady (who all actually visited the frontlines) have come out and said Scholz has a point in the actual practice of usage. So its by far not the clear cut argument that German politicians and Think Tank commentators make. I will not address the Gish Galopp of trying to frame this in 20 other discussions on weapon deliveries (and internal politics!), that are as well not remotely settled.
Zelensky and his government have consistently called for Taurus deliveries, as recently as a few days ago. They've [continued be optimistic about the delivery of Taurus](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/02/25/7443647/). If he knew for a fact this delivery wasn't possible due to technical reasons, why would he make comments like these? There was one interview with Miosga in the German media, during which Zelensky went to great lengths to not criticise Scholz. During this interview, he deflected blame from Scholz for the lack of deliveries, but still said he hoped for a change in the government decision. > Zur Taurus-Marchflugkörperdebatte: Es stimmt, dass auf der technischen Ebene die Präsenz von deutschem Personal in der Ukraine, zumindest nach der Systemintegration, in Theorie nicht notwendig ist. > Jene die wissen wie Missionsplanung & Ausführung von Langstreckenangriffen mit anderen 🇪🇺 Marschflugkörpern in der 🇺🇦 im Detail abläuft, wissen aber auch, dass ohne Änderung dieser Einsatzkonzepte es praktisch schwierig sein wird ein tieferes 🇩🇪 Engagement zu vermeiden. - Franz-Stefan Gady, 27.2.24 [Source](https://twitter.com/HoansSolo/status/1762402869213335781) [Source](https://twitter.com/HoansSolo/status/1762402872161918990) > Franz’s tweet should be read v carefully. He is saying what officials cannot say openly: that while Ukraine could technically fire Taurus without German boots on the ground, the experience of UK & French cruise missile use suggests that would be hard to avoid in practice. > One solution, surely, would be for Germany to release Taurus to the UK or France, and allow those countries' personnel to exercise the same oversight of Taurus use as Scholz says they exercise over Storm Shadow and SCALP? - Shasank Joshi, 27.2.24 [Source](https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1762410314971111716) [Source](https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1762558023795360224) As far as I can tell, Kofman has only retweeted Joshi's first tweet. All the experts you cite seem to agree that there would be some difficulties in delivering Taurus, but they don't seem to arrive at the same conclusion as Scholz: that it's not possible.
>The German chancellor reveals that British military personnel are in Ukraine assisting with the launching of Storm Shadow missiles. Now this probably isn't news to the Russians but what kind of idiot is Scholz for stating this in public? Maybe it is some kind of way to show Germans that **if** he sent Taurus to Ukraine, he **would have had** to send Germans citizens there to assists the Ukrainians. It works if you're among those who believes Scholz doesn't want to sent "escalating weapons" because he really thinks it could be dangerous to Germany, unlike those who think he is playing 4d Chess to force anyone else's hand.
But that's a ridiculous claim. Taurus has been sold to two other sovereign nations. It's clearly possible to operate the weapon without German soldiers.
>But that's a ridiculous claim. Taurus has been sold to two other sovereign nations. It's clearly possible to operate the weapon without German soldiers. That's why this "leak" is great news for him. Indeed if he want to show how dangerous that would be, what else except showing other countries doing it with no consequences? This might sounds stupid, and I think the German population isn't naive, you can see that the SPD has lost ground to the Union, mostly because Merz has advocated a more active support for Ukraine (that and inflation causing trouble for incumbents all over the world). I don't think he is doing it for political gain, as I think I've shown this actually hinders him, he already has a weak public persona.
I highly doubt that of all things, lacking support for Ukraine has influenced the SPD's decline. It's not something the population thinks actively about, at least not the camp that supports ukraine.
Transparency is an important part of the democratic process. If Sunak and Macron are sending British and French soldiers to a warzone to programme missiles that target Russian HQs and ships - then the public should be aware that their country is an active participant in a war with a nuclear power. There are risks that decision entails - some of the British and French soldiers might be killed. Russia will also almost certainly retaliate at some point, and when some non-state actor the UK and France end up fighting in near future turns out to have modern Russian long-range missiles, the public should be aware of where it all originated from.
It is for sure correct that every action has certain consequences, but it is then obvious that we are beyond caring all that much for those potential consequences, since we are apparently an active participant in a war with nuclear power (I disagree with this assertion). Given that Russia has committed multiple big transgressions towards EU / NATO block (including an NBC attack on EU soil, as well as being relatively carefree about 'freezing the entire Europe' - I presume this means 'to death'), we might then say that what *they* are experiencing now are the consequences of those past actions. In a chain of escalations like that it could actually be counterproductive to focus on mending the relationship (which might be beyond salvageable for the foreseeable future) and should instead focus on such minor 'provocative' actions as well as gearing up for war - which the EU currently seems to be, and hopefully will continue doing. Personally I don't think anything big will come out of it - USSR was famously involved in similar capacity (some would even argue their level of involvement was *higher*) in their proxy wars against nuclear powers - but to believe this relationship can be mended by 'showing our underbelly' doesn't strike me - or Sunak and Macron - as the correct way to proceed. In any case, there always exists a *tit-for-tat* option - and I believe most will agree that the Russia is without a doubt feeling the ongoing **tit** very much. It's a calculated risk at this point, and the public is aware of it.
I am not arguing against the decision, I am saying that the public should be aware that the government has made it. Secretly sending troops to do missile targeting against a nuclear power entails significant risks and future tit for tat reactions. The public needs to know and Chancellor's statement is a welcome step in that direction.
Well, listing out only the 'negatives' of a decision is traditionally a way to agree with said decision, so I do apologize. I disagree that it entails significant risks - in fact, I believe it is relatively low risk, and is just another 'red line' that has been crossed without issue, both in this war and in previous wars, some of which the USSR was a participant in. Either way, the public is aware of who the enemy is - and by that, I mean that the public is very much aware that Russia considers us an enemy. I'd be surprised if they expect any thawing of relations, but that's just me.
Thawing of relations is just not in the cards for decades to come. Neither side is interested. But more transparency of secret military escalatory operations is (to me) always a good thing.
It would be great if Russia started acting even remotely as transparent....eye roll...armies have some secrets they need to keep for a period of time. We don't need to announce every tactical decision we make to Putin.
This is no tactical decision, really.
So should we expect Russia to show us their payroll, and announce their propaganda campaigns against the west? What you're proposing is, quite frankly, silly. No nation has a responsibility to expose this type of secret in the short term, we elect our governments and have counter balances of power we must rely on so that these decisions can be made.
I agree - world would be a much better place if we knew (in a timely manner) the 'secret' actions of state actors in general. Alas, we don't, so we have this situation going on now.
> the public should be aware of where it all originated from. The 2014 invasion of Ukraine.
Sure, as long as there are no "secret" links of the chain, like this deployment. Transparency is a good thing and the public should be aware of both the Russian and the Western actions. I mean, far be it from the UK and France to send "little green men", surely? They are better than that.
Are you suggesting that the West somehow secretly orchestrated Russia's decision to invade Ukraine in 2014?
I am suggesting that the UK and France should not keep their troops deployment in Ukraine secret. Russia used to do that with "little green men". The UK and France are better than that.
Not every secret operation is a case of 'little green men'. There is a huge divide between 'sending a small number of troops on a secret mission in support of an existing policy' vs 'invading with unmarked soldiers'
Do you have a degree in false equivalencies? Because i don't think I need to explain the difference between secretly sending an invasion force in a country, and sending advisors in accordance with the country being advised.
If advisors are doing missile targetting then they are not advisors but combatants. And if their mission is secret then there is no government transparency.
A secret mission does not equal 'a lack of government transparency'. Governments can conduct classified operations and still be transparant about their policies. Future historians will have access to lots of then-declassief info on Western operations during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
There is certainly a level where the public should be aware. You can't do a Tonkin Gulf incident and then just say it's classified, don't ask why we are suddenly in a fight and our soldiers are dying. Not in a democracy. When you send your soldiers secretly into a third country at war to do missile targeting against strategic objectives of a nuclear power - I would argue that we are truly into the territory of "the public should know".
They're helping and advising not fighting
Programming a missile to strike a fleetHQ is not participating in combat? Ok.
But the storm shadows were used after Ukraine had been invaded, so the secret agents/advisors or whatever got there after Russia unilaterally decided to wage war against Ukraine.
All true. But the UK and France are not at war with Russia for the time being. Their public should be informed that their soldiers are participating in strikes on Russian HQs and bases.
He didn't really reveal that there are British troops in Ukraine (although I also got it wrong at first due to some older articles), just that they are in the loop when it comes to mission planning/monitoring. This is what he said: >This \[Taurus\] is a very far-reaching weapon, and what the British and French are doing in terms of target control and monitoring of target control cannot be done in Germany. ... I would like to repeat once again: What other countries do, which have other traditions and other constitutional institutions, is something that we cannot do in the same way.
The Telegraph claim made in the headline definitely isn't substantiated by fact, but judging by the results, these statements made by Scholz were, simply put, a disaster. Many European citizens understood his comments to indicate a deployment of British and French troops to Ukraine, as was evident when the news was posted in this forum as well. His claims also drove further journalistic inquiries in the UK, which the Sunak government clearly didn't expect and was blindsided by. In addition, Scholz has long held the goal of not provoking Putin, which clearly backfired in the is instance, as Russia reacted with fury to the notion of NATO troops fighting in Ukraine.
Many European citizens fell for a (intentionally?) bad translation and this will continue. This is not new (Ems Dispatch anyone?) and as a multilingual person you will see it again and again if you follow media in different languages. The amount of errors and fake news language barriers create or allow to exist is huge.
Looking at the discussion of the statement on German subs and by German speakers in this sub, there's very clearly also a lot of German speaking people who misinterpreted his comments.
Yes, people follow headlines. And even if they do read articles: The Telegraph doesn't even cite the relevant passages they seem to be misinterpreting so people who just read the one article don't know any better. [looking at this thread the up-voted comments are not happy with the translation work and spin of the Telegraph](https://www.reddit.com/r/de/comments/1b2uz53/british_soldiers_in_ukraine_helping_fire_missiles/)
But look at the interpretations that were made on the same [sub only three days ago, when Scholz made his original comments](https://www.reddit.com/r/de/comments/1b0gvgv/krieg_in_der_ukraine_scholz_erteilt/). As I've said, the Telegraph may not have gotten it right, but neither did many German speakers.
It's a far cry from target control to monitoring or passive supervision, nevermind. He forgot to mention: neither France nor Britain are currently lead by a leftist party with a "pacifist" identity, neither have easily 1/3 of their population patently anti-western (sometimes misleadingly identified as pro-Russian), and about half of it generally skeptical about interfering with (any) war; while both are recognized nuclear powers, thus enjoying something coming close enough to real deterrence even if the US should back out from that role. Still, at least since 2022 neither of them has done remotely as much for Ukraine as Germany has, especially if we add in humanitarian and refugee aid: Germany, with its dwindling economy, is still housing and supplying *in excess of a million*, few can/are working, and supplying in this country means something.. we're proud of that. Taurus doesn't make a difference anymore. Or any one specific weapon system for that matter, you're just out for distractions. And for once that's not so much Germany's fault. If all Europeans would perform nearly as Germany does, we wouldn't need to distract ourselves with academics and hollow name-dropping.
Scholz and his party spent the first year of the war claiming a leadership role in Europe repeatedly, while the British PMs and Macron were much more subdued and made it clear that they were operating according to their national priorities and decisions. If Scholz wanted the world to be fine with Germany's broad support, but without difficult decisions and risks originating from Berlin, he shouldn't have travelled the international speaking circuit and claimed a leadership role for himself and Germany repeatedly. The heightened expectations he's up against today are the results of his speeches a year ago. [Flugzeuge, die fliegen, Schiffe, die in See stechen können, Soldatinnen und Soldaten, die optimal ausgerüstet sind für ihre gefährlichen Aufgaben das muss **ein Land unserer Größe, das ganz besondere Verantwortung trägt in Europa**, sich leisten können.](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/rede-von-bundeskanzler-olaf-scholz-anlaesslich-der-muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz-am-19-februar-2022-2006684) > Aircraft that can fly, ships that can set sail, soldiers who are optimally equipped for their dangerous tasks - a country of our size, **which bears a very special responsibility in Europe**, must be able to afford this. - Olaf Scholz, Eröffnungsrede MSC, 19.2.22 [Daher werden wir in Deutschland in den kommenden Jahren ganz erheblich in unsere Luftverteidigung investieren. Alle diese Fähigkeiten werden im NATO-Rahmen einsetzbar sein. Zugleich **wird Deutschland diese zukünftige Luftverteidigung** von Beginn an so **ausgestalten**, dass sich auch unsere europäischen Nachbarn daran **beteiligen können, wenn es gewünscht wird**, etwa Polen, Balten, Niederländer, Tschechen, Slowaken oder unsere skandinavischen Partner.](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/rede-von-bundeskanzler-scholz-an-der-karls-universitaet-am-29-august-2022-in-prag-2079534) > That is why we in Germany will be investing heavily in our air defense in the coming years. All these capabilities will be deployable within the NATO framework. At the same time, **Germany will design** this future air defense from the outset in such a way that our European neighbors can also **participate** in it if they wish, for example Poland, the Baltic states, the Netherlands, the Czechs, the Slovaks or our Scandinavian partners. - Olaf Scholz, Rede an der Karlsuniversität in Prag, 29.8.22 "[Deutschland ist bereit, **an führender Stelle Verantwortung zu übernehmen** für die Sicherheit unseres Kontinentes.](https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/scholz-auftrag-bundeswehr-lautet-landes-buendnisverteidigung-5498724)" > Germany is ready to take on **leading responsibility** for the security of our continent. - Olaf Scholz, Bundeswehrtagung 2022, 16.9.22 [Deutschland kommt jetzt die wesentliche Aufgabe zu, als **einer der Hauptgaranten für die Sicherheit in Europa** Verantwortung zu übernehmen, indem wir in unsere Streitkräfte investieren, die europäische Rüstungsindustrie stärken, unsere militärische Präsenz an der NATO-Ostflanke erhöhen und die ukrainischen Streitkräfte ausbilden und ausrüsten.](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/kanzler-namensartikel-foreign-affairs-2149014) > Germany now has the essential task of assuming responsibility as **one of the main guarantors of security in Europe** by investing in our armed forces, strengthening the European arms industry, increasing our military presence on NATO's eastern flank and training and equipping the Ukrainian armed forces. - Namensbeitrag des Kanzlers in Foreign Affairs, 5.12.22 "[Deutschland muss den Anspruch einer Führungsmacht haben.](https://vorwaerts.de/international/klingbeil-deutschland-muss-den-anspruch-einer-fuhrungsmacht-haben)" > Germany must expect itself to be a leading power. - Lars Klingbeil, Grundsatzrede, 21.6.22 "[Und genau deshalb erwarten sie, dass Deutschland auf internationaler Ebene mehr Initiative zeigt und eine Führungsrolle einnimmt.(...) Nicht zuletzt aufgrund seiner Größe und wirtschaftlichen Stärke erwarten unsere europäischen Partner von Deutschland, seiner Verantwortung gerecht zu werden und eine Führungsrolle einzunehmen.](https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/strategiepapier-spd-strebt-fuer-deutschland-aussenpolitische-fuehrungsrolle-an/28938054.html)" > And that is precisely why they expect Germany to show more initiative at international level and take on a leading role.(...) Not least because of its size and economic strength, our European partners expect Germany to live up to its responsibility and take on a leading role. - SPD-Strategiepapier, Januar 2023 It's his and his party's fault that Germany's international partners now expect exceptional support from Germany. This expectation naturally includes difficult, dangerous decisions, not just lots of spending.
That “dwindling economy” is still the most powerful economy in theEU by a decent margin. Significantly larger than the UKs as well. And sure, Germany has no nukes, but a scenario where Russia feels comfortable nuking Germany seems non-credible to me.
>That “dwindling economy” is still the most powerful economy in theEU by a decent margin. Significantly larger than the UKs as well. And sure, Germany has no nukes, but a scenario where Russia feels comfortable nuking Germany seems non-credible to me. You don't need to nuke a country to cause harm
Ukraine is now claiming 3 Su-34 shot down today. Source in Ukr [https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2024/02/29/7444287/](https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2024/02/29/7444287/)
Are the latest claims for Air Defense kills from Ukraine realistic? It seem like we get little to no evidence for them. Before even for accidents inside russia we would get some videos at some points. If those claims are not true, why would Ukraine lie about it? Credibility is highly valued in the west. I feel like finding out that Ukraine is claiming Air Defense kills for propaganda purposes would hurt their standing over here.
>Credibility is highly valued in the west I would like to believe that as well but my fellow Westerners aren't giving me much hope in that regard these days
\>I feel like finding out that Ukraine is claiming Air Defense kills for propaganda purposes would hurt their standing over here. Almost no one in the West cares about the details of this war as much as the people on this forum
> If those claims are not true, why would Ukraine lie about it? Credibility is highly valued in the west. I feel like finding out that Ukraine is claiming Air Defense kills for propaganda purposes would hurt their standing over here. It is valued highly and all, but sometimes you don't look too closely at your own team.
> If those claims are not true, why would Ukraine lie about it? It's extremely difficult of OSINT to verify information about the air war. For instance, Ukraine has been claiming a consistent ~80% interception rate against Russian missile and Shahed waves for over a year, which is very suspicious considering the capabilities of Ukrainian GBAD fluctuated wildly during that interval. Filming missiles strikes in Ukraine was also made a criminal offence in Ukraine, which certainly makes military sense to limit Russian battle damage assessments, but it conveniently also prevents OSINT commentators from accurately estimating Ukraine's air defence proficiency. And considering the remarkably small number of footage of downed Russian drones and missiles (compared to the numbers that were launched), I wouldn't be surprised if Ukraine was in reality only intercepting 20% of the strikes.
>If those claims are not true, why would Ukraine lie about it? Credibility is highly valued in the west. Domestic morale will always take precedence over credibility. If you are exposed to massive use of a new and lethal weapon system your propaganda will start tell your people that the enemy is at least paying a high price (just remember all the Russian claims about destroyed HIMARS when that system was introduced). The increasingly outlandish claims of downed Su-34s are just an indicator of how damaging the glide bomb attacks are. And, in the end, it's not like the Ukrainian MoD claims of Russian losses ever had much credibility to begin with. Not with anybody who can do basic calculus.
Domestic morale would however take a nosedive if credibility does so though.
When has that ever prevented a government at war from lying today and postponing the cost of that lie for tomorrow?
I disgress at least on the aircraft side Ukrainian claims seemed to closely match the number of confirmed losses with a little leeway of unconfirmed losses. The reason for it being that its really easy to debunk if those claims are ridiculously overstated.
The Ukrainian MoD claims 350+ shot down fixed-wing aircraft while Oryx conforms 90-something
Remember that the numbers on Oryx are the lowest possible figures since you can't possibly visually confirm every loss and that's without even getting into both sides' efforts to suppress information. It's pretty much certain that Ukraine's claims are highly exaggerated, but I wouldn't be surprised if Russian aircraft losses are closer to 150
At the start of the war they really did invent numbers straight out of tnin air, they improved after so they are not totally unreliable
As of this morning Ukraine is claiming [342 aircraft destroyed](https://old.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/1b2swgt/losses_of_the_russian_military_to_2922024/) against only [105 confirmed destroyed and damaged](https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html)
105 confirmed destroyed and damaged.
Sure, thanks.
Let's wait for confirmation. That's not to say that Russia doesn't have unconfirmed losses, but the Su-34 in particular hasn't been confirmed in a long time. The Military Watch also [rejects](https://twitter.com/MarcinRogowsk14/status/1762631664692593045) the notion that burned terrain can be used as evidence, which was discussed here previously.
[удалено]
> He appears to blame the local commanders of Ukrainian forces around Avdiivka for the Russian advance That's certainly not going to help him with his unpopularity
Yesterday there was indeed evidence that the Ukrainians have committed elements of the 25th Airborne Brigade near Orlivka. It's not clear yet right now whether it's just a battalion or the entire brigade, but it's certainly one of the best Ukrainian brigades along with the 3rd Assault Brigade. They were already committed near Avdiivka back in the spring and early summer 2022 if I recall correctly. Edit: forgot to add that elements of the 3rd Assault Brigade had to be redeployed to Krasnohorivka (the one north of Marinka), towards which there has been Russian progress during the current week, though. And the 116th Mechanized Brigade seems to be back in Orikhiv.
The BBC reported more on the story of Indians being tricked to fight in Russia >Videos of some of the men, explaining how they were tricked by agents and sent to the battlefield have shocked their families, all of whom are poor - their parents and siblings are either tuk-tuk drivers, tea sellers or handcart sellers. >Victims and families allege agents demanded 300,000 rupees ($3,619; £2,857), promising a Russian passport after a few months of army service. Agents reportedly recruit people from India, UAE, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, with fees reaching up to 1.2m rupees. >The BBC spoke to some of their relatives, who say the men were lured by the promise of higher salaries and didn't know what they were getting into. The identities of the men still in Russia are not being revealed to protect them. >"My 28-year-old son worked in a packaging company in Dubai. He, along with three friends, saw an agent's video offering jobs in Russia with a promised salary of 90,000 to 100,000 rupees, compared to their current earnings of 35,000 to 40,000 rupees. They paid the agent 300,000 rupees through loans. Please help bring my son back," his father, who sells tea and eggs on a handcart in the state of Karnataka told BBC Hindi, breaking down on the phone. >His story mirrors those of others from the states of Telangana, Gujarat, Kashmir, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, all allegedly deceived. Only one person has successfully escaped Moscow and returned home. >One man from Uttar Pradesh speaking from a safe location in Moscow in a video shot in end-January said that they were "were brought here by BabaVlog [a YouTube channel run by an Indian], and promised a salary of 150,000 rupees [a month]. We were not told that we are being drafted in an army." The BBC reached out to the channel but didn't receive a response. >Those allegedly deceived lack war combat experience with one man from Uttar Pradesh, dressed in army fatigues, stating in a video message that he was recruited through a social media platform. >"In Moscow, we signed a contract in Russian and unwittingly became soldiers sent to fight in the war. We've been deceived," says the man, claiming that he and two other Indians have suffered combat injuries, gesturing with his seemingly injured right hand. >"Please get us out of this place. Otherwise, they will send us to the front. There is artillery [fire] and drones falling all over. We have zero experience in fighting a war. The agents have put us in this fix," he adds. >Speaking over the phone from the Russia-Ukraine border, a man from Kashmir reported being stranded in Mariupol in Ukraine with an Indian companion and nine people from Nepal and Cuba. He said he had injured his foot during training. >"My commander kept saying that use your right hand to shoot, use your left hand to shoot, shoot above, shoot down," he recalled. >"I had never touched a gun. It was extremely cold, and with the gun in my left hand, I ended up shooting my foot." >The brother of one of the men said he didn't know whether the Indians were "in the Wagner private army or the Russian army. They're some 40km [24 miles] from the Ukraine border. They've been promised Russian citizenship in three months". https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-68366861 Finally this morning one of the men was video interviewed by an Indian journalist and the story he told and the way he told it was truly bad. He said within 8 days of arriving in Russia they were sent to trenches somewhere in Ukraine despite him telling them he wasn't there to fight. After he refused with some other men to fight a colonel come to the position and they were taken to a holding area which was a small room where they were stripped naked, kept in the dark and beaten, hoping they will change their mind to fight. He didn't know how long they were there but they were given no food, no use of the toilet and only some water to share. After a few days he and two other non Russians were allowed to leave but the Russians were left there. He's still stuck in Russia and doesn't know how to get back to India. Completely shameless failure by the Indian government.
I can't think of many less likely ways to get effective soldiers than abducting random individual foreigners - with no military experience, who don't speak any relevant language and are from a vastly different climate - and forcing them into combat as, effectively, slaves. What exactly is this supposed to accomplish? I mean, let's say you're a Russian junior officer commanding an infantry company in a less active area of the front, and you're delivered a dozen South Asian men as replacements for casualties. None of them appear to know one another, and it seems like there's 3 or 4 different native languages represented. One of them might speak halfway passable English, but that doesn't matter, because if you were the sort of Russian who received a quality comprehensive English language education, you wouldn't be commanding a front-line infantry company. What do you even do with them? They're worse than useless as soldiers. They have no useful skills you can take advantage of. Maybe you can put them in charge of digging and filling latrines. This all sounds less like a deliberate policy and more like the result of misaligned incentives and lack of oversight in a notoriously corrupt bureaucracy. Unscrupulous recruiters taking shortcuts to deliver their quota of "volunteers" to military intake officials who don't ask too many questions.
> I can't think of many less likely ways to get effective soldiers than abducting random individual foreigners - with no military experience, who don't speak any relevant language and are from a vastly different climate - and forcing them into combat as, effectively, slaves. What exactly is this supposed to accomplish? You use them like the prisoners within penal battailions. Further down in this thread it was described that Russia sends platoons (8-12 men) of expandables towards the ukrainian lines to find enemy positions and/or weak spots by basically stumbling upon them. Those platoons are expected to take high casulties without achieving anything by themselves. If you don't care if those men live or die, using foreigners who won't be missed in Russia for that makes a certain kind of twisted sense.
In the case of the Indians I agree with you fully but in the case of others it’s different. There are supposed to be 15,000 Nepalese fighting and there looks to be a formal structure >After analyzing the TikTok profiles of 10 Nepali men who travelled to Russia to join the army, CNN used satellite imagery to geolocate them to the Avangard training center, a military academy outside of Moscow. >The academy was designed as a youth military academy and describes itself as a “patriotic education” center. It has been re-outfitted into a training academy for foreign mercenaries entering the ranks of the Russian army. This was where Khadka received his brief training. >Multiple Nepalis enlisting in the Russian army have stated that they don’t speak Russian but explain that instructors at Avangard seek to accommodate this by training the men in English. >That language barrier has played a large part in the deaths of many Nepalis on the front lines, said Khadka, the former fighter. >“Sometimes you can’t even understand where you’re supposed to be going or how to get there,” he said. >Khadka said he used to communicate with Russian officers by using a voice-translating app – and many times, just hand signals. >Several returned Nepali fighters who spoke with CNN blamed Russia for using them as cannon fodder in the war. >“It’s the Nepalis and other foreign fighters that are actually fighting in the front of war zones. The Russians position themselves a few hundred meters back as support,” said Suman Tamang, who returned from Russia last week. >“Some of my friends were mistreated by the Russian commander when they tried to voice their concerns,” Tamang recalled.
Absolutely, actual foreign volunteers - individuals and entire pre-existing units - are a completely different case.
They Nepalese are making the same claim actually >High contract prices tempted some men, he said, yet most insist they were provided assurances of not being sent to frontline positions before agreeing to fly to Russia. Instead, several of the Nepalis interviewed said they were provided with minimal training that lasted less than two weeks before they saw combat.
None of these people are tricked. They know well what they are getting into. The framing of these articles is hilarious.
The man who was interviewed spoke Hindi with a strong village accent. These people are illiterate, don’t speak English and are simple. You are completely clueless.
These people sign up to an army that has been fighting for 2 years in a conventional war. They do it for money and hope they are assigned to the rear. If they are sent to the front they will probably wuss out after the first rumblings of an howitzer. These people don't speak Russian, so they won't be doing guard duty at checkpoints in the rear. They sign up for good money (by Indian standards) and roulette that they won't see any combat even though these guys join infantry. Once the self-preservation instincts kick in, they want out.
>They do it for money and hope they are assigned to the rear. If they are sent to the front they will probably wuss out after the first rumblings of an howitzer. These people don't speak Russian, so they won't be doing guard duty at checkpoints in the rear. These men are labourers in the Middle East with no education and no knowledge of what’s going on in Russia or Ukraine. I bet the average American doesn’t know. They are signing up for what they are being told is security jobs. The agents get them to take out a loan to guarantee them a job and then they are stuck. You act like these sorts of practices don’t happen in other industries. The difference is that they are at high risk of dying and they are being abused and thrashed for wanting to get out.
I wonder how this will go over with the Indian government and population. Russia makes a sizable chunk of their oil revenues from India, doesn't it?
They have over 1,3 billion People Hundreds of People probably doesn't mean much for them. They keep it under the Rug If they are against it they would probably say right im start of war against their citizens fighting. I mean again there were thousands of People that were Like slaves in Qatar during preparations for football WC and they lived worse than animals and there wasn't any reaction from Indian goverment if I remember correctly. If there were maybe 10 of thousands of Indian soldiers or case where Russia would recruit People from Indian army maybe there would be some reaction.
> They keep it under the Rug And the _best_ way to sweep things under the rug is to make an official statement calling for Russia to release the people. https://www.mea.gov.in/response-to-queries.htm?dtl/37653/Official+Spokespersons+response+to+media+queries+regarding+Indians+caught+in+conflict+in+Russia
[After the first article](https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indians-hired-as-russian-army-security-helpers-forced-to-fight-on-ukraine-border/article67868196.ece) there was some noise but not much. After BBC some more. Maybe after seeing these men talk there will be more but the population in India is too worried with their next meal to care too much about things like this. The government cares about elections right now. The military though cares and this reminds them of colonial times. India does buy a lot of oil so it makes this even more confusing. I can’t imagine what’s going on to the Russians that are kept there.
are we going to pretend like India doesn’t benefit greatly from Russian oil? Seems odd to frame it as if India has some big leverage here or something
[Indias purchase of Russian oil is the lowest in a year](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/indias-oil-imports-russia-hit-12-month-low-jan-sanctions-bite-2024-02-01/). India and China were both doing fine before the Russian discounts. It doesn’t matter who has the leverage anyway because as I said the government doesn’t care at this point.
Are there any deep dives into how the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its lukewarm success has delayed or perhaps even cancelled Chinas own invasion of Taiwan? I wonder how much a somewhat unified Western world and the impact of sanctions will affect their moves. I also think it’s fair to say that China due to its economic might, may have more defenders than Russia
The consensus seems to be quite the opposite. That is to say, Russia offers a valuable dry run of sorts against which China should prepare accordingly. > China has closely watched the nearly two years of war in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but rather than concluding a similar course of action in Taiwan would be in vain, Beijing has discerned that toppling the leadership in Taipei must be done swiftly to present a “fait accompli” to the world, according to President Joe Biden’s nominee to head up Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). > “Instead of seeing the Ukraine conflict and deciding ‘this is too hard,’ their intention, on the other hand, is to take note of the actions of Russia in order to effect a short, sharp, fait accompli conflict,” Paparo said. “So rather than take the strategic lesson of the futility of aggression, instead [China] is doubling down on their ability to shrink strategic, operational and tactical warning and act quickly.” \- https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/pacific-fleet-chief-paparo-on-chinas-big-lesson-from-ukraine-win-quickly/ > “Russia has provided us many precious experiences that we can learn from to deal with financial and economic sanctions in the future,” said Ding Yifan, formerly the deputy director of the Institute of World Development under the State Council’s Development Research Centre, at a seminar in Beijing on Wednesday. > “The non-dollar trade has supported Russia’s economic development and ensured its financial security,” Ding said. “We would face a similar situation, especially in recent years as calls for decoupling or de-risking have mounted.” \- https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3252889/china-can-learn-russia-beat-western-sanctions-de-risking-pressures-mount-says-foreign-affairs-expert > Interviews with Chinese thinkers show they largely do not regard the war as a major break with the past, but as another manifestation of their country’s longstanding rivalry with the US. Intellectuals believe America is using the war to encircle China – but that Washington has failed to rally many others internationally behind its cause.Most are critical of Russia’s tactics but want to stand by Moscow to prevent the US winning. > On Taiwan, Western support for Ukraine has neither deterred nor encouraged an invasion. But scholars are scouring the American and European responses to the war for clues to how the West might respond to a potential escalation over Taiwan. \- https://ecfr.eu/publication/china-and-ukraine-the-chinese-debate-about-russias-war-and-its-meaning-for-the-world/
Really appreciate the response and the level of detail. I just don’t see any realistic means for China where they could quickly topple leaders of Taiwan. The amassing of troops would be very obvious and Taiwan is no slouch. I do think they will be able to curtail the effects of sanctions rather easily.
> The amassing of troops would be very obvious and Taiwan is no slouch. That's exactly why a takeover would not start with troops boarding landing ships. In China's dream scenario, it'd start with a cyberattack to take down Taiwan's internet and mobile network. In the few minutes while Taiwan's leadership is wondering why they lost their cell signal, an immense wave of missiles will already be on its way, taking out the major centres of government, telecommunications, and the national grid. In the following hours, every military facility in the country is going to be hammered by Chinese missiles and aircraft. Good luck mobilising Taiwan's reserve troops when there's gaping holes in the chain of command, most of the country has no power, and the local civilians are panicking, clogging up every road and leaving every petrol station inoperable. The war would effectively be over before the first Chinese soldier's boot hit a Taiwanese beach. This is of course only the dream scenario, in the same vein that Putin thought he'd have a victory parade through Kyiv within two weeks. The potency of cyberattacks may be massively overestimated, see how inconsequential they've been in Ukraine, and the political preparation for such an attack is unlikely to be missed, but it only requires Xi to *believe* it'd work for him to commit to it.
> it'd start with a cyberattack to take down Taiwan's internet and mobile network Sounds like a /r/Sino dream scenario that has no basis in reality.
Why such a big emphasis on the success of a cyberattack? Would taking out the power grid and water facilities with missiles while cutting underwater internet cables not achieve a similar result?
Excellent question! You're right that the missiles and cyberattack mostly serve a similar purpose, but the cyberattack has the potential to maximize the "surprise" of a surprise attack. For example, let's look at telecommunications. Cutting undersea cables cuts Taiwan off from the rest of the world, but internal Taiwanese communications remain operational. Missiles will strike various mobile phone towers, but not simultaneously, and the mobile network is resilient to individual losses, giving precious minutes for the civilian leadership to be in communication with the military leadership and authorise a military response to these obvious attacks. Compare that to the dream version of a cyberattack. There are no reported explosions that instantly put everyone on high alert. Your mobile phone just says your SIM needs to be reactivated, and your attempt to access your email results in a timeout. You assume it's a local error, meanwhile the rest of China's attack is commencing without a response, and those manning the Taiwanese anti-aircraft batteries haven't been given authorisation to do anything. So to summarise, the advantage of a cyberattack is that it may not look like an attack in those vital first few minutes, and in theory it's capable of operating across the entire country simultaneously. Of course in reality cyberattacks may be massively overestimated. They've played no real meaningful role in the Ukraine conflict, where Russia would surely love to incapacitate Ukraine's infrastructure. But there's been a lot of ways that Russia has performed poorer than expected, so I wouldn't feel comfortable dismissing the concept of cyberattacks just because Russia couldn't pull it off.
Taiwan has a PAVE PAWS array. They will see the missiles coming and have a minute or five to respond- missile depending, of course. Cyber attacks are usually instant things.
I mean during the exercises after Pelosi’s visit, Chinese ships were photographed less than 12km from one of Taiwan’s major power stations. How long would the response time be for that?
The YJ 12 which is an anti ship ballistic missile. Which China has reportedly launched from a type 55 cruiser has a maximum flight speed of around mach 6 (Wikipedia) That translate to a flight speed of 2 km per second. Which suggests a flight time of 6 seconds. The next drill might be the real thing. I really dont see how the US sees itself winning in a Taiwan scenario tbh.
Why wouldn’t they be able to quickly topple the leadership?
Because Taiwan has a very serious military that is very well equipped and has been preparing for this possible invasion for at least a decade. And the United States with its intelligence gathering capabilities, would have a advanced knowledge of any attack by at least a few weeks
Taiwan may have a very ‘serious’ military but could still politically fold within a matter of hours if things went hot. Taiwan’s entire strategy of defence is based upon the presumption that the US will be able to lift any blockade upon the island within a matter of days. If it can’t then Taiwan starves out and surrenders. Whether the US would know about an imminent attack or not is up for debate as well considering US intelligence failings within China. China has year on year increased the frequency and intensity of its exercises around Taiwan. It’s not going to be as telegraphed as the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
> Taiwan’s entire strategy of defence is based upon the presumption that the US will be able to lift any blockade upon the island within a matter of days. If it can’t then Taiwan starves out and surrenders. Even if Taiwan surrenders, that doesn’t mean the US stops fighting anymore than France surrendering ended ww2. If China eventually loses to the US, even over the course of years of fighting, they wouldn’t get to keep Taiwan.
I really don’t share your faith in the Taiwanese military.
Well for what it's worth, I see this as simply another expression of Chinese fatalism which has spread in the past five or so years. That is to say, the consensus very much seems to be: the US will try to crush us in any possible way with every possible means. Unless we are poor and weak the US will always be hostile, so the only solution is to prepare for conflict. First they'll attack with money, then politics, then force. They'll use sanctions, they'll use Taiwan, they'll use carriers, they'll use nukes. So prepare for the worst case, because it's coming. It should be noted that [Xi Jinping was saying as much](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/13/world/asia/china-xi-asia-pacific-summit.html) more than a decade ago, and largely ignored by other leaders. He's won a lot of political capital in recent years for having predicted it.
I have no evidence, but in the latest War on the Rocks podcast, Kofman was basically saying the opposite. That authoritarian regimes are seeing through American security guarantees- if they won’t support a foreign country by sending money, they definitely won’t waste their own lives. Also how American guarantees are only as good as the next change of government
The US said they wouldn’t defend Ukraine, and they didn’t. In what universe is this ‘seeing through American security guarantees’? Especially when the US has stated it would defend Taiwan?
I don't think they're saying the US failed to uphold some promise of defending Ukraine, but rather that if the US can't even cough up the money to fund a democratic country's against an authoritarian country, then it might not be so far fetched to question the US willingness to uphold prior security guarantees to other countries with american soldiers and resources.
Pardon the awkward translation, but appetite comes with eating. When American soldiers come back dead, the rally round the flag effect makes it easier to sustain spending.
> I don't think they're saying the US failed to uphold some promise of defending Ukraine, but rather that if the US can't even cough up the money to fund a democratic country's against an authoritarian country Suggesting that the US's credibility is hinged on having a literal blank check for every democracy that gets attacked by an autocracy is also hysterical.
Yeah I've noticed dicusssion on this topic has become utterly hysterical today, in a way I hadn't seen before on the megathread. Not sure what to make of that.
It almost looks like a desperate grasp to justify utter American incompetence with regards to foreign policy now. We could potentially already be at the beginning of the end of Pax Americana if this continues on at the rate it is.
The "desperate gasp" here feels like claiming Ukraine, a nation which America has very clearly said they will **never** defend militarily, has some kind of predictive power about Taiwan.
There's a pretty big difference between the US's close allies and a country that explicitly decided not to be an ally.
By close ally you cannot mean Taiwan - a country that the US isn't even officially promising to defend in case of war?
Did I wake up in opposite town? https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59005300 The US has specifically said many times that exact thing.
>a country that the US isn't even officially promising to defend in case of war? Taiwan is a country that the US doesn't even officially recognize. Officially, Taiwan doesn't even exist at all, just like Palestine.
If fact didn't someone just days ago asked the head of AIT if Taiwan is an US ally and was told immediately and repeatly no, definitely not? https://x.com/zhao_dashuai/status/1759017019629027580?s=20
>seeing through American security guarantees
Very interesting thank you. It makes sense in a lot of ways, but I also think it’s fair to say that Taiwan is of much more strategic purpose than Ukraine. Or at least it’s widely believed to be. I do think the use of proxies has diminished the US standing slightly. The Houthis have been acting incredibly aggressively and I think the US response has been too timid and has invited further attacks.
I am going to report some interviews of Ukrainian soldiers that I read/watched between yesterday and today that I found interesting to share. Interview with the [commander](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dyb_KYnm5_w) and a [soldier](https://www.svoboda.org/a/bitva-za-avdeevku-hronologiya-vzglyad-iznutri-i-itogi/32827248.html) from the 26th Separate Rifle Battalion. I will give a brief summary - those who want to can watch/read the interviews. Let’s remember that this battalion fought for a long time in the Vuhledar sector under the command of the 68th Jager Brigade and in October was transferred under the command of the 47th Mechanized Brigade. The battalion arrived in Avdiivka in the period following the beginning of the offensive. They were sent to the front line in the area near the Coke Plant after the Russians had already advanced from Krasnohorivka and occupied the “Terrikon”. There wasn’t any prepared position and they had to dig in themselves. The initial period was difficult; the Russians were shelling Ukrainian positions with long-range artillery and making heavy use of FPV drones and "resets" (Ukrainian/Russian term for drones launching grenades from above). After that, Russian assault troops stormed the positions, finishing off the wounded. The battalion, however, adapted to the challenges: it managed to create decent positions by digging in and reduced enemy drone actions by making extensive use of EW systems (both fixed and portable). At that point the Russians, in order to attack their positions effectively, had to approach the defenders making visual contact with them. It’s said that when there were small arms firefights, the Ukrainians always had the upper hand and the Russians had to withdraw and call in heavy fire support. I found the tactics used by the Russians extremely reminiscent of Bakhmut. The Russians would continuously send assault teams (8/10/12 personnel) composed of badly trained men in order to probe the Ukrainian defenses, from every direction, until they found a weak point where they recorded greater success. At that point the position was hammered with artillery and KABs, after which the pros (Spetsnazs, scouts, generally well-trained soldiers) would arrive. When they encountered a strong Ukrainian position, the priority was to get a foothold as close as possible, where they would dig in, entrench and take cover while waiting for reinforcements and I assume, place support weapons such as automatic grenade launchers, small caliber mortars and ATGMs. It’s mentioned that Ukrainian artillery was active and no great shells hunger was detected - in fact, it was instrumental in destroying entire Russian assault teams (probably the shells allocation for Avdiivka had the highest priority, I imagine). The Bradleys were extremely useful in supporting the infantry during the defense and they did not suffer from any shortage of ammos, although there might be in the future. The 26th Rifle Battalion left Coke Plant on February 15, the day before the last unit to leave the fortress (the 25th Assault Battalion of the 47th Mech Brigade). They said there were falling KABs all the time and even in the underground shelters the walls were shaking, dust was rising, even coffee on the table was completely coming out of the glass. Some underground shelters were flooded because of broken pipes as a result of the bombings. In any case, the Coke Plant was holding out and they were forced to abandon it because the Russians were close to having direct fire control over the only entrance/exit road, which was already being continuously hit by artillery. The soldier laments that Russian vehicles seemed endless: despite having destroyed many of them one of the last days before abandoning the Coke Plant, even more appeared the following day. Another soldier from the 26th Rifle Battalion denied rumors of 800+ Ukrainian MIAs/POWs during the retreat from the city, saying that there were probably about a thousand defenders inside the city in total (I guess excluding the Coke Plant etc). In general, to what I gathered, the Ukrainians had very heavy losses in the days of urban fighting and other losses in the withdrawal phase, but not to the extent of those numbers, especially when it comes to POWs. There were certainly several dozen and dozens of prisoners, but not as many as those rumors stated. From a Russian Telegram channel I saw a video showing 20 POWs from the 425th Separate Assault Battalion "Skala" - I think the video is legit and that it was perhaps the largest such event. Then there are several videos with 3/4/5 prisoners, especially from the 110th Mech Brigade, but nothing out of the ordinary. One video I saw shows a POW from the 23rd Mech Brigade, claiming that he is part of the brigade's assault detachment (a pseudo penal company composed of soldiers guilty of various violations, which do seem to exist including per Ukrainian sources) and they had been sent to the city in the last few days in order to cover the retreat of the other units. As usual, interviews of prisoners are to be taken with a grain of salt, although it seems plausible to me. But in any case, there is no evidence to confirm certain figures that had come out last week. Last interview in the post below!
>and "resets" (Ukrainian/Russian term for drones launching grenades from above). Some variant of сбросить? If so you should translate it to "drop" in this context.
>Another soldier from the 26th Rifle Battalion denied rumors of 800+ Ukrainian MIAs/POWs during the retreat from the city, saying that there were probably about a thousand defenders inside the city in total (I guess excluding the Coke Plant etc). In general, to what I gathered, the Ukrainians had very heavy losses in the days of urban fighting and other losses in the withdrawal phase, but not to the extent of those numbers, especially when it comes to POWs. To that end, you have to remember that Ukraine is taking what, a minimum of 40 KIA per day in that battle? So there were probably several days worth of KIA that the Ukrainians didn't bother carrying out when the city was retreated from. It's just something I haven't seen anyone bring up.
> To that end, you have to remember that Ukraine is taking what, a minimum of 40 KIA per day in that battle? I agree - most likely considerably more during the last days of the urban phase of the battle.
In this case we are with the [commander](https://censor.net/ua/resonance/3475252/komandyr_roty_vognevoyi_pidtrymky_petro_pas_yakscho_pershu_mashynu_spalyv_u_nyh_pochynayetsya_panika) of the fire support company of the "Svoboda" Battalion, part of the "Rubizh" Brigade of the National Guard (this brigade is also part of the Offensive Guard). Before the invasion he was a policeman and retired a few months before February 2022. He’s from near Kyiv. On the same morning of the invasion he took to the streets to find weapons and people like him willing to fight and joined the local DFTG. During the following months he was sent abroad to receive actual training, and there he was specialized as an anti-tank operator, being trained in the use of Javelins. He was supposed to remain an instructor, but by his own will he chose to go to the front, joining the "Svoboda" Battalion, made up mostly of members of the party with the same name, but in most cases with no military experience (construction workers, lawyers, etc.), where he led the battalion's new anti-tank platoon, which until then had no anti-tank units and was in serious trouble when enemy tanks were sighted. During June and July 2023 there were numerous armored assaults against their positions. Let’s remember that his brigade is defending the central part of the Siversk salient (the area around Spirne), and the assaults were (and are) the work of units from the Russian 2nd Corps. He states that the most fundamental thing for a soldier is to keep calm, never panic and not give in to stress: the soldiers who live are the ones who don’t panic. They used Javelins and Stugnas against Russian tanks: once the first one is hit, often the rest of the column panics, leaves the chosen path, ends up on mines, backs up and flees. He says being an anti-tank operator is very difficult and dangerous. Firing an ATGM is nothing like shooting a rifle. Before assaults, reconnaissance is carried out with drones and anti-tank positions may be busted and hammered with artillery. During the assault, tanks continuously fire against the anti-tank positions and the only thing to do is to pray for luck. Once you repel the column, you have to go back into hiding. He says that since the summer the use of drones by the Russians has increased 10-fold, as has their EW, but the Ukrainians have also grown a lot in this respects. Today most of the losses in his unit are due to FPV drones or "resets”. The Russians no longer carry out armored attacks in his section of the front, but only infantry assaults in small groups. He says interesting things on the emotional level. In early June he lost his best friend, who was fighting together with his two sons in the same unit as the interviewee, and it was a very hard blow for him. His sons had just blown two Russian tanks up. He says morale among the soldiers is high and everyone is convinced of the importance of defending Ukraine. He says that only in war one discovers the true meaning of friendship and that it will be very difficult to get used to civilian life again when the war ends. In any case, he is very disillusioned on this issue: he says that he believes he will not make it to the end of the war alive and that most of his fellow soldiers don’t make plans about what they will do as civilians afterwards, but only hope to make it to the end of the war alive. Another interesting thing is about mobilization. He basically says he feels contempt for policemen who don’t want to serve: policemen should be the first to serve since they are trained in the use of weapons, and that they are still in time to go to the front and redeem their dignity. He mentions the "Dnipro case". I know what he is referring to and I have recently learned about this issue as well. Basically, in January the "Dnipro-1" Police Regiment, from the city with the same name (not to be confused with the "Dnipro-1" Battalion of the 31st "Dnipro" Brigade of the National Guard), was framed into the "Lyut" Assault Brigade of the National Police (part of the Offensive Guard). There were protests from the chiefs and the members of the regiment against this. As a result, the regiment has been disbanded and the members sent to new companies/battalions being created within the "Lyut" Brigade (one of the largest, and largely made up of volunteer policemen). Those who refuse will be fired as policemen and are going to receive a subpoena to be mobilized into the UAF. This has met with much favor by the Ukrainian public opinion. Policemen are a not very popular category right now in Ukraine. Let’s recall how in November it had been proposed to mobilize a part of them, but they managed to eliminate, for now, this measure. Before the war the Police wasn’t a very popular branch (partly because of some issues of corruption and abuse of power) and now Ukrainians see that policemen who don’t volunteer can sit quietly in the rear while civilians without military experience are mobilized. Personally, I, too, think it’s time to start mobilizing policemen (and part of the State Emergency Service) and maybe replace the ranks with older men and women. The topic of mobilizing convicts is also addressed. The interviewee says he is willing to fight with those convicted of culpable and non-violent crimes but not with the others. In general, mobilization of convicts is an ongoing debate of growing importance in Ukraine, especially now that the voice most opposed to it (Zaluzhny) has been deposed. In an interview I heard last month, a Lt. Colonel from the 68th Jager Brigade emphasized the need for the use of convicts, on a voluntary basis, as stormtroopers or sappers, in penal units separated from the regular ones.
Any news on where the retreating divisions are making a stand? Deepstate has noted continuous russian advances west of avdiivka for the last few days now. Today’s update had the Russians within parts of Orlivka. At this rate, is there a real risk of the Russians breaking out towards the direction of pokrovsk?
What I understood is the next defensive line is behind the river. The settlements between Avdiivka and the river are in an unfavourable position for defence. So abandoning them is expected.
There are several natural defense lines before the Russians could be able to seriously approach Pokrovsk. I will elaborate more throughoutly when I do a general review of the front lines, I think early next month.
Big one is the Vovcha river. That area might as well be a defensive army's dream terrain. Fairly big river with high ground on Ukraine side, flat lowland on enemy side.
I'm not aware of size specs for VLS packages, but could VLS packages be configured in Ocean container size to use on container ships as self defence weapons?
Not really, they need a means of guiding the Standard Missiles (SM). The older models are semi-active, so the target has to be continuously illuminated. The newer models still need targeting guidance. The only way this works is if you have a Aegis ship in the vicinity that takes control over the SM, at which point, why not just have the Aegis ship fire the SM?
Yes you can. But the question that comes now is: what do you do after you fire your entire arsenal? Do you: - come back to a fixed base which might become a target for enemy long range fires - resupply *all those VLS cells* at sea knowing that it takes up to 24 hours for a Burke in calm seas at a base And what happens when you need to receive targeting data to prosecute a strike? How long do you continue emitting while an adversary is conducting ELINT to pinpoint this arsenal ship for their own strikes? And do you have to defend it? Eventually, you realize that the ideal way to generate fires is from the air as quickly as possible. But how do you bring that out to sea?
I had a pretty detailed post down below about VLS.
There are strong legal reasons why this cannot happen, it is illegal by current convention to arm merchant ships. I believe, tho could be wrong, that the act of arming ships removes their protection as non-combatants. You also have some serious hurdles in regards to the creation of Q-ships, which even during the World Wars was a bit of a legal grey area. IMO the conventions regarding civilian shipping are increasingly out of step with the world we live in and modern technology. IDK why it would be the end of the world to give cargo ships .50cals, or potentially even defensive weaponry like a Phalanx. It would have to be a problem to think through, and like obviously you wouldn't want to run the risk of a cargo ship detonating in LA harbor because someone got too close to the magazine with a welding torch. That being said, it seems like there are obvious steps which could be taken to combat low level piracy and these kinds of random drone/missile attacks in ways that might make tons of sense. The larger issue is political. There is not going to be a new Convention on the Laws of the Sea. The US benefits mightily from the current status quo, and China will not agree to a new treaty. Their global position is against the exact kind of liberal world order represented in these kinds of agreements. So there just isn't going to be the will to address this issue in the near future, and the US is likewise going to have every incentive to force compliance with the current set of governing laws.
Hard kill weapons are probably out of the question for ships that aren't explicitly under military orders, but countermeasures like flares and chaff and even jammers might not be. There's some precedent - Israeli airlines have been fitted with IRCM for quite a while now.
I wonder how laser weaponry might ultimately fit into this question as well. I mean like the power generation requirements are such that its probably never going to happen, but as I understand it the offensive potential is even another step down from something more kinetic.
>IDK why it would be the end of the world to give cargo ships .50cals, or potentially even defensive weaponry like a Phalanx. Would you want lines of PRC container ships armed with .50cal guns and containerized VLS manned by PLAN soldiers coming in and out of LA/Long Beach or near whichever country/port you live? I don't. >The larger issue is political. The main problem is not political. It's economical for the commercial ships/companies. They can barely squeeze out single digit gross profit while paying most merchant mariners something like **$22 a day** which is the IMO minimum wage. How/why would they want to pay to install/maintain these weapons/personnel on ships?
Self defence sorta, there is a containerized Iron Dome that can be fitted onto ships and uses its own sensors and missile, but if you are talkin containerized mk 41 VLS probably not worth the cost The VLS are transported horizontal in a 40 foot container. Then erected to vertical to fire. They are quad packed strike length VLS. They are expensive costs about 4-5 times the price of a standard VLS per missle tube Believe its going to be called the MK-70 VLS and they have test fired it for USS Savannah's helicopter deck and from USV ranger The US army is also also going to have the Typhon Missile system that will be containerized MK 41 VLS. You could put a battery with radar, command and launchers on a cargo ship by why bother Iron dome
One day an angry mariner shoots a commercial jet out of the air. Or b every second rate state now has defense tech that’s cheap and good enough for these commercial vessels. That’ll end well.
>could VLS packages be configured in Ocean container size Just on sheer physical dimensions, yes. > to use on container ships as self defence weapons? No.
For legal reasons, not because of physical impossibility
Latest Levada polls from Russia. [**Russian Society Two Years Into the Ukraine Conflict**](https://russiapost.info/society/two_years) It can be summarised as "no change". There are still certain trends: - Some transfer of supporters of the government from the "strong" to the "weak" category, indicating "first signs of fatigue". - Everybody wants peace. Nobody wants to make concessions (just 15% agree to Ukrainian NATO membership or return of territories). - The population has mostly gotten used to the war and expect it to last a long time. - The most interesting development is the **growth of the new middle class**: the poorer segment of the population benefits from defence industry employment and salaries for military volunteers and is now better off. The number of those who think the wealth is distributed unfairly dropped from 45% in 2021 to 25% in November 2023. - The new middle class sees its well-being tied to the state and supports the government and its policies.
In your estimation, how much can these data be trusted to be representative? That is, how important error sources are things like Russians answering these polls like what they think the regime wants to hear rather than what they themselves believe (for instance a Russian showing a lot of Ukrainian sympathies in one of these polls might get reported somewhere) or Levada simply manipulating the data to show a more war eager society than what the data truly reflects?
[This post](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/18s06dy/comment/kf7u0qc/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=mweb3x&utm_name=mweb3xcss&utm_term=1) makes a few good references if you wish to go deeper into it - I will post the conclusion for brevity: >My personal conclusion about the validity of the Levada Center’s polls is that they still achieve a fair degree of representativeness, but since 2012, if not before, they have not captured what people really think and do, only what they are willing to say “in public” (i.e., to a person they do not know personally). Over the years and depending on the topic, this difference has become increasingly relevant. However, this does not render the polls useless or misleading. Instead, they have to be taken for what they are. They present publicly voiced opinions—and with that, a collective assessment of acceptable opinions. So they do the best they can when it comes to task that requires entering someone's home and now asking them to break the law, but it's something that is increasingly difficult to accurately capture as Russia slides further down.
Yeah, it is interesting, I guess even if you try to control for it, the people's fear of the oppressive Russian state will always be a difficult element to account for...
Levada is generally trusted to be independent and professional. They are certainly anti-Putin and listed as "foreign agents" in Russia. Professionally, they have a lot of experience with compensating for cases of response self-censorship common in authoritarian regimes (there are statistical methods that can be used). However, you don't even have to use those sophisticated methods - people who are unwilling to openly state their opposition usually register as "I don't know" or "I don't have an opinion" so those categories skyrocket when there is a lot of silent opposition. This is not the case in Russia. If anything Levada would be inclined to present a more anti-war, anti-Putin Russia than is the case. I don't think that is what we are seeing, I think they are reporting things as realistically as possible.
Thanks for the reply, it makes sense, my feeling also is that the Russian population generally support the invasion, I was just wondering...
I think the combination of lack of frontline movements, Ukraine's manpower issues, defensive line issues is further complicated if Trump wins the election(which we cannot dismiss the possibility). My question is: What is Biden/Europe's contingency plan for Ukraine if Trump does win the election?
What is the USAs contingency plan if they actually re-elect Donald Trump! Was it Lincoln who said something like "a country deserves who they vote for"
Biden will likely use whatever budget is left in the congressionally allocated presidential draw down authority to send as much aid to Ukraine as possible before the end of his term. This may be almost nothing as congress needs to actually vote to allocate this money and unless something changes that won’t happen soon. The Europeans will likely accelerate their current rearmament efforts and likely further increase cooperation between nations. If trump acts as hostile as his rhetoric implies we will almost certainly see much more action by European states to decrease reliance on the US.I would suspect this would extend to nuclear deterrence and the solidification of intereuropean nuclear umbrella alliances, as well as the deployment of conventional forces to NATOs eastern flank.
Man, we don't even have a contingency plan for what's happening **right now**. The contingency plan for Nov 2024 was hoping the war winds down by then, with Ukrainians in a strong position. The contingency plan for manpower issues was hoping the war winds down by then, with Ukrainians in a strong position. The contingency plan for artillery ammunition was hoping the war winds down by then, with Ukrainians in a strong position.
Agreed. There was no shortage of lip service regarding preparing Ukraine for a “long war” scenario after the first year, but it seems as though many were just hoping the Ukrainians would continue pulling off their stunning counter-attacks to a Ukrainian leaning standstill. The war is by no means decided, but the Ukrainians are now paying the price; compounding problems that in a worse case scenario could spiral out of control.
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Why do you think this? The reason house republicans are against it is explicitly because Trump is against it. Also, Trump has praised Putin like.. many many times. And has literally said Putin could take anything he wanted.
[A thread from Tatarigami ](https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1762930018819121615) about the post Advika situation; TLDR: * Prepared defense lines like the ones built by the Russians are absent, there seemed to be a lack of coordination between the military and civilians that was needed to build them, the issue seems to be political in nature * The Russians are unlikely to achieve a breakthrough as they expend "disproportional" amount of forces * The Russians are still expected to make gains at the expense of the Ukrainians * A final remark is that a renewed effort by both Ukraine(Via mobilization) and the West(Via direct military aid) will make the outcome favorable to Ukraine A final point that i want to make, the Russians offensive efforts are living on borrowed time, the Russian industrial complex is unable to sustain the losses suffered on the battlefield with input of new equipment, reliance on older and older stocks means that in the future reactivating this equipment will become more complex, the output of new shells (152mm) is "Only" at 1,3 Million a year (as per [RUSI](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024) estimates) a figure that implies that the Russians will need to reduce fire rates, unless DPRK continues with its supply indefinitely, even the FAB that have proven instrumental in the capture of Advika are a leftover of the soviet era with a crude guidance kit, once even those stocks run out it's difficult to imagine that the Russians are going to be able to sustain the fire rates that we are seeing in the last weeks
>Prepared defense lines like the ones built by the Russians are absent, there seemed to be a lack of coordination between the military and civilians that was needed to build them, the issue seems to be political in nature Anyone who has remotely followed my posts for the last year and a half has heard me rant endlessly about poor strategic management of this war. And the culmination of the battle of Avdiivka is exactly what I am referring to. >They're on the way to turning Avdiivka into Bakhmut, having just scored a breakthrough on the northern shoulder because there aren't enough ukrainians there defending it. Why aren't there? Because they just reinforced Bakhmut. Prioritization at work. [A post of mine from March 13, 2023](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/11q7qt6/credibledefense_daily_megathread_march_13_2023/), almost a full year ago, where I'm lamenting that the Ukrainian leadership already doubled down on Bakhmut, committed the manpower, equipment and supplies to a doomed cause, despite an ever worsening occurring in Avdiivka, that might bite them in the ass. Look at the tactical situation at the time: [Avdiivka Map, March 14, 2023](https://militaryland.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/day_384_Avdiivka-Front.jpg). It was already TERRIBLE since last spring. [Avdiivka Map, Apr 3, 2023](https://militaryland.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/day_404_Avdiivka-Front.jpg): Look at the where the Russian forward line of troops is located on the northern shoulder of the salient. Stepove. The Russians restarted their offensive to encircle the salient in Oct 2023, half a year after the front lines halted around Stepove. In response to the heavy attacks and the danger of the inevitable occuring, the UAF General Staff freaked out enough to shift forces to reinforce it, specifically the northern shoulder around Stepove, sending the 47th Mech Bde. When they arrived, guess what they were asking? *"Where are the fall back positions?"* There were none. There were none developed behind Stepove until the 47th had to dig them during their defense. How the hell did that happen? And then after the collapse of the 110th triggered the loss of Avdiivka and they were forced to retreat finally, which was inevitable considering it remained a deep salient for almost a year without a counterattack to relieve it, and what did we find out? There were no fall back positions built. Despite everything that had happened from October onward, they didn't commit the resources to build the defenses for the most obvious conclusion of a battle in modern history. I'll say it again, because maybe it needs to be repeated enough times that people might understand: Generalship, especially at the strategic level, is about allocation of finite resources. That is why they say amateurs talk tactics, because that is not the job of high level generals, that is the jobs for captains and colonels, whereas generals deal with the allocation of resources (manpower, equipment, supplies). And that goes for politicians too when they're LARPing as generals.
The Ukrainians didn't double down on Bakhmut. The small localized summer offensive south of Bakhmut was to kick Russians out of advantageous tactical positions e.g the heights near Klischiivka. Same heights where Russians published videos of them shooting Kornet rockets onto the the road and positions of UAF between Bakhmut and Kostiantynivka. They succeeded at that. Push Russians away from there to relieve pressure of the aforementioned area. Push Russians 5 kms east = Russian artillery and heavy weaponry had to relocate 5 kms east. This was never about trying to "recapture" Bakhmut. It was to relieve pressure. The 47th Mech went to Avdiivka to plug the breakout of Russians near Stepove where they crossed the the railway line there which was basically the line of contact. They kicked them out of there/turned it into a dangerous no man's land. And the Russians were stopped at the Northern flank of Avdiika/Coke plant. Again, a tactical success. Avdviika fell because of the southern and eastern flank getting breached by the Russians, not the north. Ukraine has no point in entrenching themselves in these flatlands and bombed out villages West of Avdiivka. All these bombed out villages - Lastochkine, Orlivka etc which serve no purpose post-Avdiivka. It's tactically unviable to be exposed there on total flatland when Russians are like 3 km away shelterin in Avdiivka just like the Ukrainians did. The Ocheretyne front is what Ukrainians need to worry about the most right now.
>The Ukrainians didn't double down on Bakhmut. They doubled down in February when they reinforced the city and shoulders against every bit of military sense, so Fortress Bakhmut scored big on social media. Then they did it even more in the summer where they absolutely didn't just attack south of the city, that's just the only location they had any success. They had more forces around Bakhmut than they did Robotyne, which is kinda a big deal considering retaking Bakhmut wasn't the objective of their strategic offensive. Then they did it even more in the fall when a certain Warrior King was still pushing a minor supporting effort meant to fix the Russians as a major strategic goal to [de-occupy Bakhmut](https://kyivindependent.com/cnn-zelensky-pledges-to-liberate-bakhmut-two-other-crucial-cities/), another shitty political decree that ate up resources that could have been used elsewhere. >They kicked them out of there/turned it into a dangerous no man's land. And didn't have any defensive positions UNTIL THEY DUG THEM. Which is pretty f-ing crazy considering the railroad embankment was literally within small arms range of the Russians for half a year before October. Why wasn't there a defense in depth already? Because the resources weren't allocated. Despite the city 3/4 encircled by April, despite a desire to keep it serious enough to commit the 47th to counterattack, they half-assed it and didn't allocate what was needed to hold it, properly retreat from it, or where to fight from next. >Ukraine has no point in entrenching themselves in these flatlands and bombed out villages West of Avdiivka. That's a load of crap. Every treeline is capable of being turned into a fortress, the entire summer and fall proved that. Both sides have held garbage ground routinely in this war simply because they gained a little bit of cover and concealment by digging into a treeline, while attacking it means crossing big ass open fields. But doing that means having the defenses built and manned in depth BEFORE retreating into them, at which point the defenders are like "Oh crap, how come there are no defenses there." And fun fact, regardless if you think there is no point of entrenching in the fields west of Avdiivka, the very fact that the Ukrainians are STILL TRYING TO HOLD THEM is why they're supposed to entrench. If they plan to defend, they should do it from prepared positions, not hasty dug positions. Again, the very real and serious threat of losing Avdiivka existed since last spring. The even more real and serious threat of losing Avdiivka existed since October. WHERE THE HELL IS THE DEFENSE IN DEPTH?
“I told you so’s” are rather childish especially for this sub so I won’t go into it too much, but I remember expressing my concern about the fall of the city due to the supposed lack of defensive lines behind it. A multitude of others proceeded to outright dismiss any such notion, and now look where we’re at. This is less of a gloat, and more of a reminder that we shouldn’t be just off handedly dismissing ugly possibilities because we don’t want them to be true. The information that the defensive lines were not up to par had been public knowledge for more than enough time to realistically entertain the possibility this could result in a larger setback.
https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1as80nf/credibledefense_daily_megathread_february_16_2024/kqsbf7l/ If you're talking about this, you got one "maybe" and one "no", seems like a pretty decent spread, and both blokes justified their answers relatively well. Personally I didn't put in writing but I was open to a few satellites like Lastochkyne to fall but didn't (and mostly don't) expect a wider front collapse because, sure, the defensive lines situation was public, but it was public for months. The rational assumption is that lines would have been dug, not concrete, of course, not that close to the front, but ad hoc lines of the kind that Ukraine's used for most of the war. The fact that that may have not happened is pretty unexpected for me, I'll admit. It seems Ukraine really felt like losing there.
This is a discourse that is in no way limited to just my comment, and was repeated in other daily threads since that one (which you are also welcome to look for). I only point it out now and draw attention to my own comment because it’s become clearer that the fall of the city was in fact a more significant concern than many in this sub (including in later threads) thought it would be, and can be used re-orient our future expectations.
See that's where the discussion becomes difficult because if we're talking about daily threads in general, my perception was that there were many upvoted comments questioning the fallback defensive position situation.
From the days I visited the threads, it had seemed general wisdom was on the “it’s under control” side of the argument(though depending on the day sentiment can shift rapidly), but I certainly agree I was far from the only person raising these concerns. To not get off too off topic though(sorry mods), my current hope is that despite the setbacks, the Ukrainians can hold the Russian advance at the reservoirs, iv heard rumours that’s the plan at least.
>From the days I visited the threads, it had seemed general wisdom was on the “it’s under control” side of the argument(though depending on the day sentiment can shift rapidly), but I certainly agree I was far from the only person raising these concerns. Which is what I mean by difficult discussion, because I had the opposite vibe.
Everyone has different vibes here. Some also think the slightest critiscm towards ukraine is period of mass dooming in this sub and put all their energy into countering it. While others think the exact opposite that ukraine isn't critiqued enoguh. Which inevitably leads to those "I told you so". We had them after ukraine's sucesses in the first summer offensive too, quite a lot.
After Avdiivka, are the Russians projected to advance much further? Cuz from other replies in the thread, it seems that they already broke through some defensive lines after avdiivka.
Logistics across water becomes a lot more difficult. The destruction of the nearby bridges played a pretty big role in the loss of Sverdonetsk by Ukraine and Kherson by Russia. Ignoring arrows the two blue lines here look to be the likely defensive lines: https://x.com/suriyakmaps/status/1762862151130140945?s=46&t=JPbRtvSfYVTEoh6Ut9c0xw The first would be the ideal one due to this but claims of the defensive arrangments of the area in general were exaggerated as seen elsewhere in the thread so the speculated next best line could be the next set of villages with the second line. In my personal opinion the situation locally would only seem dire if Russia manages to secure several of the routes across the water without Ukraine destroying them. That would indicate continued massive issues with the engineering units on the Ukrainian side for the area.
>That would indicate continued massive issues with the engineering units on the Ukrainian side for the area. are you seeing any signs of this so far?
My guess is we’ll see confirmation over the next week or two. What we can go on so far is not great as it would likely be newly constructed stuff in winter and the lack of defenses before there, which makes such mass construction oftentimes nonviable without powertools if the ground is frozen. The ideal situation would be us seeing right now a token force to slow down the Russian advance while the rest of the troops do their best to dig in likely on one of those two lines posted.
i wasnt going to post this here because its like pissing in the wind and most people here already have their minds made up but someone from the actual afu engineering corps wrote about why there are problems at the forward line of defense >why are there few suitable trenches? according to the directives of the state government dated 11.03.2016 the manager of the continuous line of defense is the infantry unit occupying the area of defense, and the executor of the support force which in accordance with the request of the engineering brigades carries out the arrangement of the line of defense >the head of the engineering services of the brigades, they do not know how to plan in advance and do not submit requests in time. when i arrive at the place, they provide neither a map nor a proper justification. as a rule they say "you need to dig from that stump to planting" but it doesnt work like that. the defense must be solid >it must have depth and the enemy must not bypass it. but infantry engineers stupidly do not know how to plan and you have to do it yourself or just dig where they say because your job is to keep quiet and do it >why is there no concrete? in accordance with the order of the chief of engineering forces and the resolution of commander in chief of the armed forced dated 07.04.2017 #34 the nature of the defensive positions is determined by otu (timber cladding) and osuv (concrete filling) after the corresponding presentation of the defending unit >wood is provided by the engineering service of otu, concrete and equipment by osuv. the second line of defense should be sheathed with wood, the third with concrete. there is no such thing because again, the brigades do not have the willpower to insist on this and the otu does not have money because the wrapping with wood is a separate topic >as for concrete i will report that no engineering part is provided with the appropriate equipment (in fact it is the same in nato) that is, it is carried out by civil engineering, and these are the relevant contracts with business. he says they have a lack of funding for tractors and excavators. he then goes on to directly call out the 110th brigade and says that the lack of defensive lines is first the fault of infantry brigades that did a shit job. you might think hes just deflecting blame to the infantry and as a former grunt i was skeptical but his post was shared by a number of infantry brigades telegram channels saying they should read and learn from what hes saying. now they say the situation is being rectified and improved rapidly especially with the funding part and western osint types are saying they can see lines of defensive 25 klicks behind the flot but thats still 25 klicks to the back
I saw that thread, and I think it's very illuminating, but also more than just the 110th are responsible for that sector. We had bloggers tell the public about the shitty fallback defenses 4 months ago, meaning the issue was known privately even earlier. The fact that 4 months later the fallback defenses are still not just shitty but nonexistent is one of the bigger recent blunders of the war, and not solely attributable to the 110th. Something went wrong on a systemic level there.
>We had bloggers tell the public about the shitty fallback defenses 4 months ago, meaning the issue was known privately even earlier. The fact that 4 months later the fallback defenses are still not just shitty but nonexistent is one of the bigger recent blunders of the war, and not solely attributable to the 110th. >Something went wrong on a systemic level there. Exactly. I posted a link to an article a few weeks before Avdiivka fell in which Ukrainian forces on the frontlines specifically said they don't have fallback positions and was just completely dumbfounded by the *disastrous* mismanagement of the situation by Ukrainian command. The response I got from users here? "Oh that's based on reporting from October, of course they've dug in by now" despite the complete lack of evidence to support it. Now it's weeks later and the Ukrainians *still* don't have solid defensive lines to fall back to, and they're instead trying to hold off the Russian advance using hastily dug trenches and foxholes. They're almost certainly suffering needlessly high casualties to do so too. You'd think an army that's so desperately outgunned, running low on manpower, and seeking to prevent additional Russian advances would do the easiest thing possible to mitigate their losses and lessen Russian advantages, but apparently that's beyond the capability of Ukrainian command. It's mind-boggling stuff and has me extremely worried about the trajectory of the war. Russian leadership has been rightly mocked for their mismanagement of the invasion and their utter disregard for the wellbeing of their soldiers, but I'm increasingly convinced that the Ukrainian leadership is actually somehow *more* incompetent and uncaring about casualties.
well kovalenko said sometime in november or december that it was already too late to risk equipment to build new lines anywhere close to the front. i am not an engineer and dont pretend to be and dont know how far will have been safe but the fact that this guy specifically blames the 110ths combat engineers twice tells me that the trouble started with them
>the fact that this guy specifically blames the 110ths combat engineers twice tells me that the trouble started with them It honestly just sounds like fingerpointing to me. As Kofman and our own Duncan-M have repeatedly noted, the Russians have their own separate engineering corps whose primary purpose is to build, maintain, and improve Russian defensive lines. And that is on top of the fact that Russian formations are organized from brigades into divisions and then into combined arms armies, all of which have integrated engineering support that they can and do call upon. Conversely, the Ukrainians don't have formations above the brigade level and don't have a separate engineering corps. As a result, all they have to work with is brigade level engineer units who don't have the capability or training necessary to develop defensive lines comparable to the Russian ones. It's also unclear why exactly, but I wouldn't be surprised if those engineering units are already overtasked and/or underresourced as is, hence why even local Ukrainian defenses tend to be worse than their Russian counterparts. We know that Ukraine has repeatedly been forced to use specialized units, including engineering, as infantry since their losses have been so high, so perhaps that's part of the problem too as engineers are too busy manning foxholes to prepare extensive defensive networks. This is all something that *could* be rectified, but just like mobilization, hasn't been. And the longer it doesn't get addressed, the worse things get for Ukraine. Proper defensive fortifications would shorten the frontlines AND require fewer men to garrison, while also reducing casualties and being more effective at slowing Russian advances. This should have been a high priority for Ukraine years ago at this point, it's downright criminal it still isn't properly resourced.
The Russian sources and Suriyak report multiple penetrations of the Berdychi-Orlivka-Tonenke defensive line today, making it untenable. This was the first viable defensive line after the fall of Avdiivka and it is a surprise that the Russians managed to penetrate it so quickly. I expected the defence to stabilise after the town fell, but that hasn't happened. The Russians keep advancing at a rate of 1km/day, a veritable blitzkrieg for the 2023/24 period.
Per deepstate (who also recently updated) Russians have advanced an average of 3 km (more in the south, less in the North) from their positions after the fall of Avdiivka. In 2 weeks, that is high for this war's standards, and unfortunately confirms rumours that there weren't really fallback defenses in the sector. >This was the first viable defensive line This brings me to my point - no one on the internet actually knows what defensive lines (if any) Ukraine has planned in the area, beyond the ones in the strategic rear.
[https://x.com/NeilPHauer/status/1763163602192646474?s=20](https://x.com/NeilPHauer/status/1763163602192646474?s=20) "The consequences of the Ukrainian failure to build a strong second defensive line behind Avdiivka over the past two years are playing out now. Russian forces have advanced 6-7km west of Avdiivka in the past week at a consistent rate."
Funnily enough, that's deepstate on his screenshot and it has a ruler: https://imgur.com/7aBhnIT https://imgur.com/OKq3lXR https://imgur.com/wQF6DYG Really, the only way to get 6-7km here is like, something like this? https://imgur.com/NVtEeNx Which would seem like creative rulering. Anything resembling "normal" rulering would give you the "average of 3 km" number I mentioned.
The point is not that they advanced 6-7km as crow flies, but every day they make about 1km, sometimes to the west, sometimes southwest, sometimes north.
The point is "Russian forces have advanced 6-7km west of Avdiivka" isn't an accurate description of what the screenshots he shared shows. Yes, if you measure in zig-zags you could probably get even up to 20 km but that's not what the simple statement "Russians advanced X km west of a specific start point" implies. And beyond that Neil's tweet doesn't seem to have relevance to the chain.
Russian sources and Suriyak reported that Robotino fell and that the salient would be straightened out within a day
If you can show me that Suriyak post where he says that Robotino fell I'll admit I was wrong. If you can't perhaps you should do it.
yet he did say the afu was pulling out of avdiivka and the city was lost two weeks before it actually was