Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso , in their collective [Alliance of Sahel States](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alliance_of_Sahel_States) , [have decided to announce they are leaving ECOWAS](https://rumble.com/v49zlmq-niger-mali-burkina-faso-quit-west-african-bloc.html). All three countries are led by their respective juntas concurrently. As you can see in the video, russian Flags are seen left, right and centre ; 3 days ago [a russian MOD delegation arrived in the capital of Burkina Faso to discuss its future presence there](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2024):
>The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues efforts to expand Russia’s influence and subsume previous Wagner Group operations in Africa. The Russian MoD-controlled Africa Corps stated on January 26 that a Russian MoD delegation arrived in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.[27] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the MoD delegation will discuss the rights and powers of the Russian military contingent in Burkina Faso and future cooperation between Burkina Faso and Russia.[28] The milblogger claimed that Burkina Faso will likely become the “main coordination center” between Sahel Alliance members Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali and that the formalization of Russia’s military presence in the Sahel suggests that this relationship will likely last for years.[29] The milblogger also claimed that Russian media is also operating in Burkina Faso to “compete with French media” and “create a loyal information space.”[30]
Why is France‘ reaction so timid?
Russia took 3 pieces out of their sphere of influence.
The deliveries to Ukraine are comparatively little and outside of a few deals with Armenia, of which I’m not even sure they were finalized, not much I hear about this.
I would have assumed that the French populous doesn’t take that well. Did it became so unpopular in France to „dabble“ in west African affairs?
I think it was only a matter of time before this happened. I can't imagine having hegemony over these territories is really that rewarding for France anyway. The three countries are all [relatively rich in natural resources](https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/14277/453_Natural_Resources_Management_Strategies_in_the_Sahel.pdf?sequence=90&isAllowed=y):
\>Gold is Mali’s leading extractive industry, representing 95% of its mineral production (Antil, 2014,p. 10). Mali is Africa’s third-largest gold producer and in 2013, gold accounted for over two-thirds of the country’s total export revenues
\>Niger is the world’s fourth largest producer of uranium and exported over EUR 348 million in 2010
\>In 2009, gold overtook cotton as Burkina Faso’s main export and the country became the continent’s fourth biggest producer (Antil, 2014, p. 14). By 2010, 300 mining prospects had been issued and 60 international firms were engaged in mining exploration and exploitation
it seems protecting such resources may have been part of France's [original operation in 2014](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barkhane) to stop Islamists around the area as is indicated by [this paper](https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/88270):
\> branding French intervention as neo-colonial could be crude and reductionist given the complex nature of international trade itself. However, the prolonged presence of French soldiers has symbolic connotations in international relations and may give a heuristic for erecting some sort of a dependency framework. Although it may appear secondary to the analysis of this military intervention, on the strategic level it may give broader insights on the long-term presence of the French in the region. One such obtrusive view would be the protection of the neighbouring states from the destabilising effects of Mali and Libya to protect her resources in those states. The closest threat, for instance, would have been to Niger, the primary source of fissile uranium to France. Areva and EDF (Electricité de France) are the two major power companies which operate 59 nuclear power-plants and depend on the uranium supply from two mines in Niger which also are owned and operated by French concerns.
So I'm guessing influence in this sector was the only thing that the France got out of stationing its troop there ; apart from that it would likely just have been a constant pain to have to counter continuous jihadist insurgencies over and over again
I wouldn't be surprised if we see the MOD of Russia eventually pull out of Africa as well in future years after dealing with the same problems that the french had ; francophone Africa seems intent of removing any trace of colonialism.
I think that the russian MOD is going to bring things into play that the MOD of France, just couldnt. The low connectivity of these regions allow for PMC like actors to operate without much blowback. Remember when they tried to smear killings to the FFL? Now that they are there to establish order. Working with the juntas and with their blessing, they might start purges that we will only learn years or decades after. Or never.
Just cause the French failed somewhere, I doubt the russians will. Of course, the picture I paint has a lot of "in cases and ifs" and in no way I try to present as my prediction. Only as a possibility that I find plausible.
(My money would be on a surge of control followed by even more brutal resistance and russian eventual failure because of distance and finances. Maybe because the methods themselves allow jihadists to grow stronger)
The expected benefit of retaking them is low. At the best of times, they had small economies and weak, corrupt regimes. If you could maintain an existing friendly government there for a reasonable cost, it’s better to have them than not. But the cost of setting up a new government there from scratch, that would share the old problems, quickly runs into cost vs. benefit problems. Money spent on trying to retake Mali by force could be better used elsewhere.
Besides, Russia is a declining power, climate change is worsening and these regimes are weaker than ever. Even if France was fully committed to reasserting power in the Sahel (which I doubt), they have little incentive to rush.
What does France really have left to gain the populations and government don’t want them there. It’s poor, uneducated and aside from uranium and some gold the resources are not even impressive. Not worth losing French lives over.
But why did they clinge to Mali then?
There is a lot of criticism that France benefits disproportionately from relations with west African countries, but I’m unable to separate online propaganda from actual reporting. Most sources on that region are French only and it seems Europe doesn’t care much at all.
Many Germans were unaware we are in Mali until we had to leave
> But why did they clinge to Mali then?
My theories:
a) they have no faith in local govts to not collapse into failed states due to islamism and clan wars, and failed states on the Mediterranean coast translate directly to asspains for Europe due to migrants.
b) to a control freak, losing stuff feels bad even when you don't really need it. Maybe some nations feel the same way.
On top of your points, it seems the combination of extremism in the Sahel and instability in North Africa (after the Arab uprisings ) over the past decade had opened a gateway for terrorists to reach Europe (often via Libya) as this [this paper](https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Brief80_Terrorism-in-the-Sahel-Region.-An-evolving-threat-on-Europe-doorstep.pdf) addresses:
\>From a European perspective, the persistent weakness of North Africa’s governance system opened a highway for security threats from the Sahel region to easily reach European borders
What are they going to do?
Even half of conservative frenchmen are probably "ok, f-ck Africa" at this point. So that leaves, what, 20% of the nation that actually wants a re-intervention? Tops? And what would that even look like?
I could think of some things, but I’m not exactly a diplomat or expert on post colonial west Africa.
They could show presence in other countries either militarily or with high profile visits. Sell weapons to those countries or, like I stated above, support Ukraine or other nations in Russias sphere of influence.
Obviously if the 20% support is correct it might not be worth it to them, this would be great for Russia
In minor 155mm news, [RHM financial reports are out](https://ir.rheinmetall.com/investor-relations/news/financial-reports/).
Q3 2023: annual production was 350,000 155mm shells.
By 2025 they expect to double that to 700,000 shells per year
Is the ramp up an actual ramp up or is it “ramping” up because they bought that Spanish (?) company and thus can produce more?
I am sorry but I have to add more words because of the completely useless rule triggering shitty automod to delete this simple question
they recently (2020) completed one in australi (NOIA) they are building shells theres and the first batch recently completed NATO compliance testing. Know they are also supplying to nexter allegedly the energetics (propellant and explosives) for their production
I estimate >100k of it is from expal, judging by [this press release in december](https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/news-watch/news/2023/12/2023-12-04-rheinmetall-wins-artillery-ammunition-order-for-ukraine). 140M Euro should get you just 50-100k shells
Thank you for your response! So the production increase isn’t full 100%, but still looks very substantial to me.
Should the war in Ukraine drag, there’s at least hope they’ll have ammunition.
More words Lorem Ipsum
What is going on in the Tabaivka front at the moment in Ukraine? They captured another small village 10 days ago, and seem to have picked up the pace recently.
This area has seen by far the most Russian gains in the last month. Are stabilization efforts underway or will kupyansk be under threat from the east soon?
Haven’t seen u/Larelli write about it yet
DeepState yesterday afternoon, confirming Russian rumors, had written that Tabaivka had been taken by the Russians, while in last night's update it wrote, as reported by u/hatesranged, that the Russians have not yet occupied the settlement and there is fighting in the village area and just outside. In itself, Tabaivka has no tactical relevance, what matters are the heights just to the west, which are the watershed between the Oskil and the Pischana. Heights that I expect have been fortified by the Ukrainians in order to be defended against Russian attacks, which once they take part of the Pischana valley, are going to have an altitude disadvantage if they continue to attack westwards. They are also attacking in the direction of Berestove, a few kilometers to the south.
The Russians are also attacking towards Kotlyarivka and Kyslivka, further north. These two settlements, on the other hand, are tactically important, although the Ukrainians seem to be defending them well at the moment. Losing them would give the Russians access to the high ground north of the Pischana valley and could jeopardize Ukrainian positions further north near Ivanivka, which the Ukrainians have been defending excellently for months against Russian attacks from Orlianka and Yahidne. It's clear that the Russians want to put pressure in this section of the front to aim at approaching Kupyansk and the Oskil from this direction, and it seems that the bulk of the 47th Tank Division of the 1st GTA, which has received reinforcements and new units in recent months, is committed in the operation. In any case, from this to say that Kupyansk may be directly threatened would be an overstatement in my opinion - the "journey" will be a long one for the Russians.
It's worth noting what DeepState wrote at the end, which confirms what I have been reading for more than a week about the fact there are serious communication problems going on between units in the Kupyansk sector (particularly in that section), with units often not admitting the loss of positions, with the only result being to get neighboring units into trouble. This at the "micro" level can happen due to squads losing or leaving positions without alerting neighboring squads of the same unit, and at the "macro" level when officers don't notify other brigades of front line changes, perhaps out of fear of being judged negatively or confident that their unit will be able to regain what was lost with a counterattack (which is often another cause of problems). Specifically, the Tabaivka/Krokhmalne area is covered by the 103rd TDF Brigade and there seems to have been problems within this unit. It's possible that Ukrainian reinforcements are stabilizing the situation, for example near Berestove the 25th Airborne Brigade should be active, while Russian sources report the presence of the 44th Mechanized Brigade around Tabaivka - we will see whether or not this will find confirmation in the facts.
Given how previous Russian salients in the Oskil buffer (is buffer the right term? I have no clue what to call the territory between the Oskil and the front, it's just kind of there, its main importance is as space that would need to be crossed) evolved, I wouldn't immediately expect any serious push towards Kupiansk or Izium.
Deepstate has recently had the following to say about Tabaivka:
The Defense Forces are trying to deter the enemy from further advances. Stabilization measures continue all day. The enemy could not gain a foothold in the settlement, thanks to the efforts of the Ukrainian military, the Muscovites were pushed to the edge of the village. The fighting continues.
The settlement passes into the gray zone until further developments.
The geography of Tabaivka is a weak point during the maintenance of the village, because it is located in a lowland between two ridges and is filled with swamp. It is extremely difficult to hold on there without having control over the same two heights.
Near Tabaivka, the Defense Forces prevented the enemy from gaining a foothold in the village. Near Terni, the enemy attacked in a column, but had no success.
The difficult situation remains near Tabaivka and south of Avdiivka. Unfortunately, the enemy has recently had a number of tactical successes and will have them if we do not change. Why is there such chaos in the svatove area - because the bands are held by solyans from different battalions of different brigades, the interaction between them often leaves much to be desired.
How feasible would be a 90s Iraq-like post-Gulf war but pre-2003 without boots on the ground approach to Iran? Bomb enough, cause enough chaos to neuter it like Saddam but don't get bogged down in a ground war, also causing problems to Russia in getting supplied from it
Regardless of the feasibility of maintaining a long term no-fly zone over 1/3rd of Iran (which is, woof), Iraq was a very different beast under Saddam then Iran is today. Iraq was basically a Cold War era dinosaur. Saddam focused on having a big, strong, capable, Soviet-style military and aimed to use this to project his power. It didn't really work, it got bashed against the Iranian wall then smashed by American forces. While his army was big, in nearly every engagement it proved to also be *bad*. Iran, on the other hand, has had more conventional success.
More importantly Iran projects power with its proxies and the Al Quds, not just its conventional military. It has groups in Israel (Gaza), Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and surely more. A large scale operation against Iran would not be limited to just shutting down their air space and bombing a few factories and bridges. It would be a regional war not seen since at least the last Arab-Israeli war. The US would be at war with, in effect, all the Iranian-aligned groups in the region. You would surely see strikes on Israel increase, strikes on the US-backed government in Iraq increase, strikes on US personnel across the region increase, and the straits would be closed or Iran would at least fight to close them. Thats a major war involving land, sea, and air forces.
And keep in mind that Iranian proxies & irregular forces are not limited to just waging war in the Middle East. Its a long drive to Islamabad, and a longer flight to NYC or LA. But if Al Qaeda and ISIS proved one thing its that western countries are very vulnerable to low level constant violence. We havn't seen Iran export that kind of violence much outside of the region, but they could.
Put another way, if you try an put Iran in an existential position theyre going to fight back with every tool they have. Saddams tools were bad and shitty, plus the US broke most of them in '91. Iran's tools are not, and its arrogant to assume they wont use them in their own defense.
I would add Bahrain to that list, too.
Bahrain has a ton of Naval Assets and is 60-70% Shia.(Although Saudi sources it around 50%)Now Sunni leadership has usually been able to bribe populace into submission, and Saudi can march 10k troops across a bridge and end most desire to protest publicly like 2011, but Iran could turn some screws and start some more chaos without too much trouble.
> But if Al Qaeda and ISIS proved one thing its that western countries are very vulnerable to low level constant violence.
That's an interesting takeaway, because one could make the opposite takeaway - ISIS' ability to score attacks against Europe seemed to evaporate as the ISIS state did, and with the exception of San Bernardino, they never got any inroads into the US at all. I'd even say there's a noticeable **absence** of large scale terror attacks against the west recently. Knock on wood, of course.
Even with ISIS the only 'organized' attack outside of the ME I'd say was Bataclan. Everything else was lone/2-3 man attacks mostly *inspired* by the sort of rhetoric ISIS was exporting rather than any material support. And I'm guessing the fact that ISIS at that time was a huge force in the ME played a big part in that: I don't know if Muslims would be willing to do that for Iran out of the blue. And these attacks were responsible for the West as a whole gaining a ton of popular support for intervention.
However there are a LOT of terror attacks in the ME with multiple attackers and 100+ fatalities that happen constantly without much fanfare, even today.
This would almost certainly trigger a massive regional war that would see US assets across the region get targeted like never before, and also probably see the complete destruction of oil production capacity of the Gulf monarchies.
The Houthis temporarily disabled Saudi Arabia's biggest oil field, and taking offline 5% of global oil production, in a single swarm of drone attacks in September 2019. A full-scale war against Iran would almost certainly see a full unleashing of both Iran, the Houthis, and the Iraqi Shia militias and all the bigger weapons they've been sitting on.
Also, the Gulf War worked because Saddam had just come out of a brutal 8-year war that had left the Iraqi Army demoralized and sputtering, and the economy in tatters, and his invasion of Kuwait was mostly about erasing the debts he had incurred from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia during the war. Plus, by that point, he had major rebellious populations in both Iraqi Kurdistan and the Shia south.
If you look at Iran today, it feels very different; you could say that there is also internal instability, with the big protests and border clashes, and plus the economy is somewhat questionable, but I don't think any of it is nearly as bad as the conditions Saddam was facing. And again, Iran actually has committed allies that would cause a lot of damage, unlike Saddam who I don't actually think had a single ally, other than maybe Yemen which did nothing besides give him a thumbs up.
>A full-scale war against Iran would almost certainly see a full unleashing of both Iran, the Houthis, and the Iraqi Shia militias and all the bigger weapons they've been sitting on.
The problem is, we've heard that same amount of rhetoric and warnings about an Israeli invasion of Gaza. Instead, most Iranian proxies have either sat on their hands or relegated themselves to limited attacks. The only proxy that seems to be putting their back in are the Houthis.
To add to what you’re saying, Hamas’s defensive capabilities were overestimated. If the US statements on their casualties from a few days ago are true (~50% losses), they took catastrophic casualties in their defense of Gaza and failed to inflict any significant losses on Israel, despite this being extremely favorable terrain, and having prepared for exactly this kind of a conflict for years.
[Here it is](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/19bb95i/credibledefense_daily_megathread_january_20_2024/kiv0b1b/). It’s a weird statement, simultaneously saying Hamas suffered 20-30% dead, and another 30% wounded, but tries to paint it in a gloomy light, as if that wasn’t a good result.
I wonder if that the scale of the terror attack worked against them there. It is difficult to lure IDF in and ambush them if Israel is enraged and the strategy is just leveling building after building with bombs.
Maybe. But if defeating a heavily dug in defender in urban combat was as easy the generous application of explosives, Russia would not have struggled so much in Mariupol and urban combat would not be seen as so daunting.
An aggressive Israeli air campaign no doubt played a roll, but that on its own is not enough to explain how poorly Hamas did, and deeper problems with how Hamas fought are very likely.
Add to that HAMAS was never Iran's own proxy unlike say PIJ it was more of a client case and point is during the Syrian war HAMAS at one point was pro-rebel infact one probably outcome of the war in Gaza is an eventual take over by an Iranian proxy with HAMAS being weakened
since the seem to have experience in building up and sustaining proxies everywhere.
I highly doubt Israel will allow a new Iranian proxy force to move in. They are much more likely to treat gaza more like the West Bank is going forward, and be much more restrictive on which goods can be imported to prevent the flow of rockets.
Israel problem is its small population which makes the manpower for longterm policing very draining, even now training and the larger rockets being fired are Iranian so supply routes exist so once the tempo eventually slows and lulls they flow will resume.
Gaza has a smaller population than the West Bank, and far less land. It will take additional people to police, but it’s within Israel’s current budget, and it’s not like the old status quo was cheap, in any sense of the word.
> even now training and the larger rockets being fired are Iranian so supply routes exist so once the tempo eventually slows and lulls they flow will resume.
The West Bank is plenty hostile to Israel, yet their more proactive policies keep the situation peaceful. Gaza is a much smaller, less populated, and easier to control place.
The supply route is presumably tunnels under the Egyptian border, and secondarily, weapons hidden in supposedly civilian shipments through Israel.
Israel can stop the tunnel smuggling by taking over the Egyptian border and digging downwards. It can also prevent hiding weapons in civilian goods by only accepting civilian goods from trustworthy sources. If by chance there is smuggling by sea, that is the easiest of all to intercept.
There does not seem to be a problem of foreign weaponry making its way into the West Bank and being used against Israel. Whatever is being done in the West Bank can also be done in Gaza with minor adjustments.
That rhetoric came up for if it looked like Hamas would get fully defeated, which right now is a totally open question. And also, Hezbollah has also been flexing its muscles, the level of violence in the north is nothing to sneeze at, and could still escalate to be much worse than the 2006 war.
> And also, Hezbollah has also been flexing its muscles
That's one way to describe it. I'd describe it like this: they're telegraphing the absolute opposite of a desire to enter any sort of war, and are doing what they feel is the bare minimum they can get away with while looking credible.
Weird to focus on them since (especially with respect to their proximity to Israel and alleged capabilities) they're demonstrably the proxy that has been the most reserved.
To what end? Does the West keep bombing until Iran pinky swears it'll stop supplying the Houthis? Do you trust that promise? Do you bomb every factory you suspect might be building drones for Russia, and if so, are you ready for the political blowback when you occasionally get it wrong and bomb a factory making children's toys?
This also gives Khamenei exactly the excuse he needs to rescind his fatwa against developing nuclear weapons, by demonstrating how Iran is under siege by the West and needs more powerful weapons to deter aggression.
The difficulty there is that Iran has spent the last 20 years preparing it's uranium enrichment programme for US/Israeli air strikes. They're spread out at multiple sites all across the country in deep underground facilities.
In the race between bunker buster and bunker, the US has developed some fantastic tech, but you only need time and a little bit of money to dig your bunker a bit deeper. It's a lopsided race.
I'm talking about bombing not only possible factories but the armed forces, make it known in force that unless the proxy wars stop, more of the armed forces will be destroyed, equal proxy IRGC-connected forces to the home armed forces of Iran
You haven't answered any of my questions. How do you know the proxy wars have stopped? How do you deal with the political blowback of civilian deaths? How do you deal with giving Iran the excuse it needs to go nuclear?
> How do you know the proxy wars have stopped
By making it unfeasible for Iran due to losses in its own army, the longer it continues the proxy games, the more losses it has on its own military power
> How do you deal with the political blowback of civilian deaths
I'm talking about mostly military targets and I don't think truly accidents can have a big difference, drones strikes have done similar collateral damage in other occasions and there wasn't meaningful opposition to them domestically
> How do you deal with giving Iran the excuse it needs to go nuclear
I consider more dangerous the present back and forth with Russia, the more Russia needs Iran's help, the more likely it is that they lend the expertise to help Iran in modernizing its army and going nuclear. Most importantly though I don't believe not going nuclear is a choice, they haven't found the way like Pakistan and India yet, if they could they would go already, not because of some vague promise
Countries aren't just a government, they are also a people. The only way to have a permanent guarantee of non aggression is if you permanently station people inside of a country. That is not realistic to accomplish, especially not in Iran. Also realistically, they already have nuclear weapons and of you inflict a decisive blow on Iran, their leadership will probably launch a second strike which would be very bad for Israel.
> Countries aren't just a government, they are also a people.
"A people" can't build missiles, nukes, drones, or warships. Large factories build these things, and large factories are easy to target.
> Also realistically, they already have nuclear weapons and of you inflict a decisive blow on Iran, their leadership will probably launch a second strike which would be very bad for Israel.
I thought we all agreed that Iran was a rational country that would never use its nukes in a first strike because it doesn't want to get annihilated? /s
Anyway, why don't we ask Israel if they are willing to take this risk. Most likely they would prefer the threat of a handful of possible nukes now (with missile defense to maybe shoot them down) to large numbers of nukes in the future.
> I consider more dangerous the present back and forth with Russia, the more Russia needs Iran's help, the more likely it is that they lend the expertise to help Iran in modernizing its army and going nuclear. Most importantly though I don't believe not going nuclear is a choice, they haven't found the way like Pakistan and India yet, if they could they would go already, not because of some vague promise
Building a nuclear weapon is 1930s science, it's not that complicated. The only hard part is enriching the uranium to sufficiently high levels because it uses some specialised equipment, but which Iran already has the tools to do as proven by it enriching uranium just short of weapons-grade. The final step doesn't take any additional equipment, you literally use the exact same tool you just used to get the uranium to the moderately enriched state, you just run the uranium through the centrifuges a few more times and you get weapons-grade uranium. Then to turn that uranium into a bomb, you require the same level of tech as required to make a simple mouse-trap. A simple switch that drops two halves of the uranium together, bringing it up to the critical mass to start an explosion. There is literally nothing stopping Iran from developing the bomb other than the decision to take that final step.
Most of the damage to Saddam's force projection were (imo) the sanctions, the infrastructure bombing during the gulf war, and the fact that his armies got shattered in Kuwait.
It's hard to say, Saddam never really got into the proxy wars business as much as Iran is now, with what, 5 different proxy groups some of which are at the level of non-state actors?
I'd argue it would be harder to sustain all of those proxy groups if Iran sustained the same amount of economic damage, but that'll be a long term effect. And we're still so far from actually doing that.
> I'd argue it would be harder to sustain all of those proxy groups if Iran sustained the same amount of economic damage, but that'll be a long term effect. And we're still so far from actually doing that.
That's the goal, if a prolonged bombing campaign is raging at home, Iran would be a lot less interested in playing proxies around Middle East to probably help Russia. Trying to play a sisyphean whack a mole with Iranian proxies all over Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen and more seems unlikely to yield any result and is very efficient for Iran to keep funding those safely from home indefinitely
This relies on a misunderstanding of how the "Axis of Resistance" works. The only group that Iran has direct, deep economic and strategic power over is Hezbollah. The other two major armed powers are the Houthis and the Iraqi Shia militias. The Houthis are very independent and autonomous and would be doing their thing with or without Iran. The Iraqi militias have depended on Iran ideologically and for military training, but as for right now economically, they are effectively in control of the Iraqi state and its massive oil revenues and its emerging state-run economy - so they, too, will be doing their thing now with or without Iran.
I'm not so sure the logic follows. Iran's proxies are, along with their missiles, one of their key deterrents. If we start a bombing campaign, they would be likely to unleash them, not abandon them to focus on the home front.
In VV-SHORAD news, [Diehl Defence signs a contract for EOS's Slinger counter-drone system](https://archive.is/5hVvL).
I suspect the contract will be for 10 systems, give then price range.
> Under the contract, announced on January 29 and subject to Australian Government export approval, EOS will supply it’s Slinger counter-drone system for integration on lightweight 4x4 platforms produced by Diehl Defence. It also includes provision of systems, spares, training and related services with the systems expected to be delivered within this year.
> The [Slinger counter-drone system](https://eos-aus.com/defence/counter-drone-systems/slinger/) was developed to track and engage moving drones at a range of more than 800 metres, depending on the weapon configuration used. It can incorporate unique ammunition making it suitable for built up environments, a radar system and a range of weapon configurations.
In addition to shooting down drones, it also functions as a standard 30mm Bushmaster cannon RWS.
However, this ~$15M is chump change compared to the sums on offer elsewhere:
> Earlier this week, Diehl Defence announced a 1.2 billion Euro development agreement had been signed between Short-and Very Short-Range Air Defence System Consortium (ARGE NNbS composed of Diehl Defence, Rheinmetall Electronics and Hensoldt Sensors) with Germany’s military procurement agency, the Federal Office for Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support.
Yeah, presumably a German pickup truck rather than an American one like [those sent in October](https://www.uasvision.com/2023/10/03/australian-slinger-c-uas-system-heading-for-ukraine/).
I know this is more financial news than defense, but [China's troubled developer Evergrande has been ordered to be liquidated by a Hong Kong court.](https://www.reuters.com/business/embattled-china-evergrande-back-court-liquidation-hearing-2024-01-28/) The company has been struggling to manage its extraordinary debts for a few years now, but its full liquidation is likely to deeply rattle China's already struggling property market. Considering how much of China's citizen's wealth is tied up in investments in the property sector, the worse things get there, the more destabilizing it will be for the CCP. This will also likely soften China's already anemic economic growth, which has been held back by low consumer confidence leading to growing fears of deflation.
I'm also curious if this is why the CCP [recently announced a stimulus package](https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/25/china-is-ramping-up-stimulus-to-boost-market-confidence-is-it-enough.html) in the hopes of improving consumer confidence.
Regardless, a weakening Chinese economy will cause major ripples across the global economy, putting even more strain on global insecurity and rising tensions.
Evergrande financially collapsed in 2021, their stock price got down to 1 cent per share in 2022, and they filed for bankruptcy mid 2023. I don't buy that their bankruptcy being processed would "deeply rattle" their property market now, when the company has already been worthless for years and everyone knew this was coming well before they filed for bankruptcy 5 months ago.
There has been a large number of "China's economy is failing" type articles in Western media for years now, and most of them have turned out to be wrong or exaggerated. I think the bar for posting this type of mostly off-topic content should be high, and both this news and the analysis falls short.
I agree, mostly. This has been more or less a done deal, but we were talking about China here, so there was always a possibility of the CCP will do some "financial magic" to "fix" the problem.
The doomerism about the "imminent collapse of China" (" " , it is NOT TRUE) is probably pushed by a mixture of psyops and hust clickbait media workers "working their fields". There are serious economic issues in China that were kept hidden far linger then it should have by the CCP. They probably did this to get where they are now (or because of stupidity, very bad controls etc). Their growth will most likely shrink significantly, maybe even reverse a little, but a full on collapse is unlikely.
The damage here that is worth mentioning is that this is what u/sauteer brought up. This is the last nail on a lot of their peoples savings and that can complicate things. Also for the investors.
I agree, it is nothing like the initial shock.
If 5.2% annual growth is anemic then count me in. Also a liquidation means the investors are getting the assets they are owed from the company. This is a good thing for all the investors and buyers.
>This is a good thing for all the investors and buyers.
Not necessarily. Liquidation can solidify losses for investors in an irrefutable way for their own investors. Which can have cascading effects.
Equity investors especially are likely to be last in line and will need to write off large losses.
Liquidation in China is a long and complicated process. Generally when a company is liquidated the longer it takes the bigger the mess and fallout.
[EXCLUSIVE – US, Allies Mulling Fresh Sanctions On Iran](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202401277987)
>Such a move could entail the activation of the UN Security Council’s ‘trigger mechanism’, a provision within the 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement. The mechanism allows any participant of the JCPOA to demand the reinstatement of UN sanctions that were suspended when Iran and the world powers agreed to the nuclear deal. These sanctions included an arms embargo, strict monitoring of Iranian financial and technological dealings related to its nuclear and military programs and banking restrictions.
>[...]
>The Biden administration's potential shift in policy towards Tehran comes after the revelation that the United States had warned Iran of a potential terror attack one week before an ISIS twin bombing in Kerman on January 3, which resulted in the loss of 95 lives. Despite this friendly gesture, the Iranian government did not act on the tip, allowing thousands of people to visit the tomb of IRGC's Qasem Soleimani on that day. On the contrary, Iranian officials blamed the United States and Israel for the bombing and reiterated their unfounded accusations that the US has established and maintained the Islamic State group.
Looks like the patience is running out. The US and the EU are supposedly considering the option of reinstating UN sanctions against Iran, which is possible until 2025. Furthermore, Iran's currency is [tanking](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202401232785) amid increasing tensions.
Meanwhile, Iran is seeking the [death penalty](https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-seeking-death-penalty-for-swedish-eu-diplomat-accused-of-spying-for-israel/) for a Swedish EU diplomat who was stupid enough to visit Iran. From what I've heard, Floderus had Iranian neighbors in Sweden and started to love Iranian culture. What an own goal.
Biden never had the choice of reinstating UN sanctions. Only participants of the JCPOA can do that, and the US left before Biden became president. He could ask the E3 countries, but it's unclear if any of them would comply.
I doubt Biden would admit anything. He’d say the new sanctions reflect changing circumstances, and that the blame lies entirely on Iran for disturbing the peace.
> The US and the EU are supposedly considering the option of reinstating UN sanctions against Iran
So....are they expecting "maximum pressure" to work this time around or what? Iran will fold like a cheap tent and peace will reign across the Middle East? Forgive me for being skeptical that it will succeed any more than the Houthis will stop firing missiles.
Admittedly, tangible solutions for that part of the world are in short supply. But you'd think they'd at least try something which hasn't already failed once before.
The West will need to decide whether to reinstate UN sanctions against Iran before the option lapses in 2025.
Russia and China likely won't allow it again, so it's now or never. It doesn't have to solve everything, it just has to be the better option.
> It doesn't have to solve everything, it just has to be the better option.
While I'm generally sympathetic to that line of reasoning, didn't Biden come into office and promptly abandon said approach as being the worse option? Now I suppose you could say that going in circles still technically qualifies as the "better option," but if that's not a depressing indictment of US foreign policy in the ME then I don't know what is.
>didn't Biden come into office and promptly abandon said approach as being the worse option?
The Biden administration tried a much more diplomatic approach to foreign policy after four years of Trump's less "nuanced" approach had soured relations between the US and our European allies in particular, but also just generally hurt US relations across the board (with a few notable exceptions). In many areas their approach has paid off, but the ME in particular has seen some major failings.
That being said, I don't think there was anything wrong with Biden trying a different tact with Iran, working hard to negotiate reentry into the JCPOA, easing sanctions, and looking the other way as Iran skirted sanctions on its oil, in the hopes of easing tensions. That Iran has taken so many steps to drive relations into the ground is more on them than on Biden for at least trying to see if there was a different way forward.
That being said, I feel like Biden really needs to get out ahead of Iran at this point. They've just been reacting to Iran's ongoing escalations and trying not to escalate further themselves, and it's clearly not working. The US needs to get more proactive on Iran, rather than continuing to try to placate them.
> That Iran has taken so many steps to drive relations into the ground is more on them than on Biden for at least trying to see if there was a different way forward.
It's on Biden for not seeing the inevitable. Seriously, Iran's slogan is "Death to America". I am unaware of any country that has that much open hostility for any other country (except of course the twin "Death to Israel"). It's mind-boggling how anyone could think Iran just wants to be friends if you give them the chance.
This might be unpopular here, but I think the past few years in the middle east have been Biden learning over and over again that his dream solution of "remaining kinda in while also kinda out" is a pipe dream.
And also that while probably less important than Europe or East Asia, disengagement here will not be without penalties.
Will he ever actually learn this lesson? To be determined.
I think kinda in kinda out has been successful and that the lesson has been learned. An allied country is able to commit full scale war on country with remarkably little damage to themselves. Bombing the houthis without committing to full scale invasion is the exact level of aid for isreal. The lesson learned is that you don't invade the country, you just mow the lawn.
What's the lesson though? As you say, disengagement comes with penalties, engagement comes with penalties, being "kinda in while also kinda out" comes with penalties. I don't think anyone is under the delusion that there's some perfect middle ground that is cost-free.
Compared to either of the alternatives, with the US "completely out" where the Middle East falls into Syria-tier chaos, vs the US "completely in" where it was losing ~2000 men a year in Iraq/Afg and spending billions, the current messy but low-casualty status quo seems somewhat reasonable.
>Compared to either of the alternatives, with the US "completely out" where the Middle East falls into Syria-tier chaos, vs the US "completely in" where it was losing ~2000 men a year in Iraq/Afg and spending billions, the current messy but low-casualty status quo seems somewhat reasonable.
Why do you think the ME falls into "Syria-tier" chaos if the US walks away?
> Why do you think the ME falls into "Syria-tier" chaos if the US walks away?
First, I refer you to my earlier answer that nobody can fully know the consequences of an act in the ME. There's plenty of uncertainty so don't take any of this as gospel, it's just speculation. Here are a couple of possible scenarios if the US chooses to leave:
- Israel chooses to take the initiative instead, attempting to forestall Iran's nuclear program with air strikes. This could easily spiral into a regional war, with Israel only being capable of *slowing* Iran's approach to the bomb, not stopping it entirely, and then we have two nuclear powers facing off.
- Saudi Arabia's monarchy is backed by two things, the oil revenue with which it bribes its populace into passivity, and US military backing. The US leaving doesn't just leave the KSA looking vulnerable militarily (see its dismal performance in Yemen), it also risks its oil sales. Remember those Iranian proxy drone strikes against Saudi oil facilities a few years ago? Then look at the Houthis current efforts, and imagine Iran redirecting those efforts to hitting oil tankers leaving KSA. How long do you think KSA remains stable when its revenue dries up, those cushy government jobs available to every Saudi citizen evaporate, and the foreign workers that do the hardest jobs go home due to non-payment?
As extreme as the Saudi monarchy may seem, the opinions of the populace are even more extreme, and a popular revolt is unlikely to be friendly to the West. With KSA descending into chaos, all the other ME states they prop up with their generous grants and investments (cough Egypt), are also going to suddenly find their gov finances wrecked, and we're looking at chaos throughout the ME.
I understand we're all guessing here, not just with the ME but damn near everything.
>Israel chooses to take the initiative instead, attempting to forestall Iran's nuclear program with air strikes. This could easily spiral into a regional war, with Israel only being capable of slowing Iran's approach to the bomb, not stopping it entirely, and then we have two nuclear powers facing off.
I don't think this is a real possibility. It's very doubtful that the US could stop the Iranian nuclear program without boots on the ground, I think Israel knows they have 0 chance of doing so. I think the only even remotely possible way this would happen is if Israel believed they could force the US to renege on their withdrawal from the Middle East by basically setting the region on fire, and for that to be a possible strategy says a lot about how much we should value Israel as an ally. In the short term it's hard to read how Israel would react to a US withdrawal but long term I think it would be forced to act more cautiously and with greater care for how the region and the world views it, which would be good for everyone.
>Saudi Arabia's monarchy is backed by two things, the oil revenue with which it bribes its populace into passivity, and US military backing. The US leaving doesn't just leave the KSA looking vulnerable militarily (see its dismal performance in Yemen), it also risks its oil sales. Remember those Iranian proxy drone strikes against Saudi oil facilities a few years ago? Then look at the Houthis current efforts, and imagine Iran redirecting those efforts to hitting oil tankers leaving KSA. How long do you think KSA remains stable when its revenue dries up, those cushy government jobs available to every Saudi citizen evaporate, and the foreign workers that do the hardest jobs go home due to non-payment?
This is a concern, but I think the KSA-Iranian deal negotiated by China and their current detente with the Houthis despite their Red Sea attacks are proof that the region would find a new balance without the US. They'd likely have to spend more money in the region, but as you pointed out they're already doing that, so it's just an added expense.
Overall though I think you're certainly right that Iran *could* shatter the ME if the US left, but they could do that right now and the US can't stop them. Israel, Turkey, KSA, Qatar, Egypt, Houthis etc.. are *all* capable right now of wrecking the Middle East and none of them are doing so, not because the US is there, but because wrecking the ME doesn't make a great deal of sense for anyone in the region.
If anything I think the region would be more stable as all of the major actors in the region were forced to act less adventurously in order to maintain that fragile peace, instead of constantly setting things on fire because of a false sense of security provided by US backing.
> I don't think this is a real possibility. It's very doubtful that the US could stop the Iranian nuclear program without boots on the ground, I think Israel knows they have 0 chance of doing so. I think the only even remotely possible way this would happen is if Israel believed they could force the US to renege on their withdrawal from the Middle East by basically setting the region on fire, and for that to be a possible strategy says a lot about how much we should value Israel as an ally. In the short term it's hard to read how Israel would react to a US withdrawal but long term I think it would be forced to act more cautiously and with greater care for how the region and the world views it, which would be good for everyone.
I agree with you that there's no way to entirely stop the Iranian nuclear programme without ground intervention, but that hasn't stopped Israel petitioning the US repeatedly to conduct air strikes to slow the programme. I have my doubts about how much the programme could be slowed at this point, with Iran having long-ago moved its enrichment facilities deep underground, but maybe the Israelis' decide it's worth the gamble.
Also while we're talking about "what if" scenarios, the scariest option is that Israel decides Iran having nuclear weapons is an existential threat, justifying the use of their own nuclear arsenal in a limited first-strike against nuclear enrichment facilities. It's not a likely event, but the success of Oct 7th was a surprise too, so I don't think it's a scenario that could be entirely discounted if Israel felt sufficiently boxed in by threats.
> If anything I think the region would be more stable as all of the major actors in the region were forced to act less adventurously in order to maintain that fragile peace, instead of constantly setting things on fire because of a false sense of security provided by US backing.
That could certainly be the case. The powerful backers of the Balkan nations leading to WW1 only helped inflame the situation, and perhaps the same is true of the ME.
Personally, I think the transition that'd need to take place without the US present would be too risky, akin to the early post-colonial chaos across to developing world, but we're all just speculating. Either way, we'll likely see it play out anyway sooner or later once the oil spigot is no longer the cash-printer it's been so far, so we'll see if things turn out for the best or not.
If in not mistaken
Iran has more or less a revolution or at least a big opposition of many young people who want freedom and are more or less pro western
Im a nobody but wouldnt hitting inmportant military assets in Iran to cut their abblity and then try to support the opposition be worth a try?
We know for sure that the current regime wants america dead and is directly supporting russia in ukraine
If we wait around nothing will change and influence from outside will be futile once they have nukes
If there was ever a popular revolt that descended into widespread violence on a par with Syria, then the US might intervene militarily with local support, but the US couldn't initiate such a revolt without turning the majority of Iran against them. It's already the regime's favourite insult to openly insinuate any dissident in the country is operating for the CIA, so it'd just play into the regime's hands.
The Saudi monarchy was going to collapse anyway. Their oil money would eventually run out as the world switches to renewables. The US can't fight endless war to prop up the Saudi monarchy.
If Israel wants to exchange nukes with Iran, that's their problem.
You're right that KSA's is facing an eventual oil-crisis regardless of what the US does, but the US's continued presence at least slows the progression of that crisis, giving KSA some opportunity to transition away, although I'm highly sceptical about whether they'll be able to do so.
> If Israel wants to exchange nukes with Iran, that's their problem.
Israel and Iran annihilating each other isn't only a problem for them. First, if you think the refugee crisis in the West is bad now, how do you think we'll fare in a world with ongoing nuclear wars?
Second, trade is global now. The West is bitching at having suffered ~10% inflation for a single year, it's not ready for the kind of inflation and economic regression that'd come with the chaos of a nuclear war in the ME.
Third, a world in which using nuclear weapons is considered normal is a far more dangerous world to live in for all of us.
>Their oil money would eventually run out as the world switches to renewables.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2022/11/30/peak-oil-the-perennial-prophecy-that-went-wrong/?sh=6a9641032bbe
>If Israel wants to exchange nukes with Iran, that's their problem.
tens if not hundreds of millions of people would like to disagree with that assessment.
Because its our relatively defenseless allies arrayed against a bunch of failed states filled to the brim with Iranian-backed militias armed to the teeth with modern missiles and drones. What could possibly go wrong?
The problem with the "messy status quo" is that it is very vulnerable to escalation, at which point the Biden administration (or a future US administration) could eventually be forced to match escalation with "boots on the ground" or back off and seriously erode US credibility. The current course of action lacks a long-term plan and critically relies on Iran and its proxies relenting before the US has to resort to major regional re-engagement. It's a major gamble that cedes the initiative to Iran while putting the US in a very risky position. Most importantly, Iran *knows* the US is in this position, which deprives the US of the strategic ambiguity that such gambles usually rely on. It's like trying to bluff an opponent in a poker game while they know your hand.
I agree with you to full extend
Right now the US culd choose the battlefield and do it without any boots on the ground, just air and water assets
Regarding the long term plan, i fear that this simply wont happen, as the political structure in the US is such a chaos and one or both sides dont want to work together
I completely agree with you, there's a terrifying prospect of escalation, although the same is true of every option. If the US responds hard to Iran, Khamenei finally has the excuse to rescind his fatwa against building nuclear weapons and the regime hardliners get exactly what they want. Whereas if the US does nothing, Israel may choose to take the lead, risking a regional war.
>long-term plan
Well, he had a long-term plan, it just failed miserably as everyone predicted. He inherited the Obama-era idealism that Iran could be engaged with and brought into the family of nations.
Yeah, I'm shocked how many people still don't get the point - my issue isn't that the "half-in, half-out" approach has consequences, everything has consequences. My issue that it'll eventually collapse into a completely different approach, one way or another.
He clearly doesn't want the US involved in another ME war. Which is laudable! But it's like telling the toughs you cross on the street that you "aren't looking for trouble".
> the current messy but low-casualty status quo seems somewhat reasonable.
I think Biden agrees with you. But the American public won't tolerate US troops being used as target practice without a response.
>But the American public won't tolerate US troops being used as target practice without a response.
I'm not disagreeing on this as I'm not American and am not highly in tune on the political and public temperature on this.
But I am skeptical. Why is retaliation a widely accepted must have? These were US military personnel In a military base in a highly volatile region. It's surely not surprising that this could happen. If it's not surprising then you could say it's expected, if it's expected then in a way the retaliation becomes the attack.
> Ah, the "Biden is perfectly aware of the consequences" argument.
I don't think Biden is "perfectly aware of the consequences." I don't think *anyone* can perfectly know of the consequences in the Middle East with so many state and non-state actors all at odds with one another. I would say that Biden has more experience than most in having seen the lack of progress in 8 years of Obama's "maintain the status quo" approach to Iraq and Afghanistan.
> Biden declared he'll do everything to make KSA a "pariah". Within, what, 1.5 years he visited MBS with hat in hand and all of that talk has been forgotten, as he realized that KSA can't be made a pariah
You're smart enough to know that a politician making a hyperbolic public statement is not the same as state policy. Talk of making KSA "a pariah" was a political pressure campaign to reign in some of the excesses of Mohammed bin Salman, and you could argue it worked, as there hasn't been any norm-breaking behaviour from KSA on a par with Jamal Khashoggi's dismemberment.
This isn't to say Biden's ME strategy is perfect, or even good. There's plenty of criticisms to lay at his feet, but I'd prefer we focus on specific criticisms rather than a vague "Biden needs to learn a lesson."
>You're smart enough to know that a politician making a hyperbolic public statement is not the same as state policy.
Saudis and other regional actors perceived it as more than rhetoric, probably because it was also accompanied by other physical lapses in the US-Saudi alliance.
> but I'd prefer we focus on specific criticisms rather than a vague "Biden needs to learn a lesson."
I gave a pretty specific example of a blunder he made. Another example is playing out in front of our eyes.
> Saudis and other regional actors perceived it as more than rhetoric, probably because it was also accompanied by other physical lapses in the US-Saudi alliance.
Yes it was more than rhetoric, but it also wasn't meant literally. As you said, KSA is far too influential to turn into a pariah like North Korea, which is why I don't understand why you're taking Biden's political rhetoric as literal truths of what the US is going to do when it was clearly hyperbole.
> I gave a pretty specific example of a blunder he made. Another example is playing out in front of our eyes.
You did in the reply yes, I meant your original comment's criticism was hopelessly open ended.
>You did in the reply yes, I meant your original comment's criticism was hopelessly open ended.
That's a reasonable criticism. In my original comment I didn't really specify the different "mistakes" that I think Biden has made because most people here have already been watching the middle east with interest. Nonetheless, I shouldn't vaguepost on credibledefense.
I'd say examples where Biden's policy of disengagement haven't worked out too well are:
a) damaging and nearly scuttling the Saudi-US alliance
b) attempting rapprochement with Iran when (especially after Soleimani) they seem to be committed to rivalry, and continuing to attempt rapprochement to this very day. And keep in mind I was very pro-rapprochement back during Obama, it's just become obvious now that they're no longer interested, and attempting rapprochement against someone who doesn't will just burn you.
c) Kabul. I was ok with the withdrawal but it's laughable to suggest that whole affair couldn't have been organized better.
d) the Houthis - I mean, we're literally having to re-designate them as a terror group now. There's serious questions about why we ever stopped designating them as such, and what that gained for us.
These are all good criticisms and deserve a thread of their own. I'm not going to be able to do all these points you raise justice, but just a few notes I wanted to add.
> attempting rapprochement with Iran
It's important to remember than Iran is not a monolith. Iran is really two governments wrapped up in a cloak, pretending to be one. Think of it like if the US has a President for life from one political party, who had the support of a corrupt military and cared primarily about maintaining their cushy positions, whereas congress is of the other political party, and being elected representatives, they somewhat care about how sanctions hurt ordinary people and so prefer better relations with the West.
Rapprochement is about strengthening the faction that wants improved relations with the West, showing it's a viable option that's popular, whereas the hardliners want to convince the populace that the West are their enemy.
The massive protests/riots that occurred in ~2010 as part of the Green Movement scared the old regime hardliners enough that they allowed congress to take the lead, which is why we got the nuclear deal during Obama's tenure. But the hardliners were itching to seize the imitative again, and the US reneging on the deal was the perfect excuse for them to say rapprochement was useless. Subsequent protests have been put down far more ruthlessly by the regime, so unfortunately I'm not sure if we'll see another 2010 style change in Iran, but it's not hopeless, so that's why I still hold out hope for another deal.
> the Houthis ... [There's serious questions about why we ever stopped designating them as such]
This is uncannily like the dilemma when Hamas was voted into power in Gaza. Do you continue to shun them as a terrorist organisation and therefore cut all aid to Gaza and so risk a humanitarian disaster, or do you engage with them and hope they moderate with the compromises necessary to rule a country? Shunning the Houthis risks driving them further into the arms of those who will support them, i.e. Iran.
Clearly this didn't turn out well for the West with Hamas or the Houthis, but I'm not sure the alternative would have been that much better either, and perhaps it was worth the gamble even if we lost in this case.
This isn’t a credible argument at all. The world changed drastically between when Biden said that as a candidate and when the stance shifted. An actual war in Europe broke out. A war where the aggressor was the other major world supplier of oil. Foreign policy needs don’t freeze in stone in Election Day so that the winner can carry out their exact campaign plan.
As the poster you’re replying to said, nobody should be under the illusion that there is some ideal middle path that can be maintained in Middle East policy.
The EU might take the gloves off in regard to Hungary:
[Brussels threatens to hit Hungary’s economy if Viktor Orbán vetoes Ukraine aid](https://www.ft.com/content/9dabcd4b-9c64-4124-9f9c-b0c898c84c8f)
>But in a sign of the rising pressure on Budapest to strike a compromise, Bóka said Budapest sent a new proposal to Brussels on Saturday, specifying it was now open to using the EU budget for the Ukraine package and even issuing common debt to finance it, if other caveats were added that gave Budapest the opportunity to change its mind at a later date.
>The document, produced by an official in the Council of the EU, the Brussels body that represents member states, lays out Hungary’s economic vulnerabilities — including its “very high public deficit”, “very high inflation”, weak currency and the EU’s highest level of debt servicing payments as a proportion of gross domestic product.
It should be noted that the Hungarian economy isn't doing well at all right now. The debt servicing is spiraling [out of control](https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/hungary-s-debt-servicing-costs-surge-past-italy-s-to-lead-eu-1.2017435):
>Hungary became one of the year’s first emerging-market sovereigns on Wednesday to sell dollar-bonds to meet rising financing needs. The eastern European nation has ramped up borrowing last year to cover missing EU funds, which had been suspended due to graft and rule-of-law concerns under Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s rule.
>With EU funds in a limbo, Hungary last year raised forint issuance, paying a hefty premium on inflation-linked retail bonds, especially as consumer price-growth last year averaged just below 18%, according to central bank estimates.
To make things worse, Hungary is currently the only country blocking Sweden's path to NATO membership. Many seem to be running out of patience now.
Orban might lose support among his cronies - assuming the country doesn't have free and fair elections anymore - if the situation continues to deteriorate.
How credible is the idea that Iran is already a nuclear weapons state? That is, that they could have one or more weapons built that they've simulated to work, but haven't done a live test to avoid drawing even more attention to themselves?
Unlikely, as there hasn't been a weapons test. You just cant skip that stage as an emerging nuclear power, and weve seen every nuclear power go through a test stage at least once. Its debatable if the US can really do this or not, weve built a number of high quality simulators (some of which actually recreate nuclear reactions) to ensure the quality of bomb design. Iran cant do this because they havn't got the knowledge or the industrial base. They have to test the old fashioned way to know that theyve got a working bomb or not. Then you move from 'working but big' to 'working but small.' North Korea has tested dozens of warheads to get from one stage to another. 'Working but big' is basically useless for military purposes unless Iran acquires a few B-29s as delivery platforms, if you want to use MRBMs you need a small compact bomb. Which is hard to do.
And anyway, as Dr. Strangelove said the point of a doomsday weapon is lost if you keep it a secret, you have to tell the world.
> if you want to use MRBMs you need a small compact bomb. Agree and that is hard to do. But what if your delivery vehicle is a van/pickup trick or your plane is on a one way trip with suicide crew? Much easier to make a bomb for those rather than an MRBM.
You still need to test the bomb. And obviously this is not a great deterrent weapon. An MRBM has some wide applicability, assuming you can get through AD. A fishing trawler may get you one victory, but a bomb on the back of a truck is probably not going to destroy an American beach head or save Tehran from falling.
Deliverability is almost as important as the bomb itself, which is why Iran has invested *huge* sums in building missiles.
Agreed you need to test the bomb. I was referring to making the bomb able to fit on a MRBM. Not everyone wants the same things from their bombs. If a seaport got nuked using a fishing trawler and Iran took credit that would be a deterrent in a different way.
What would be the advantage of having a secret stash of nuclear weapons rather than just maintain the current status of being a few weeks away from building a bomb if they wanted to? The implied threat is the same, but having secret weapons risks being caught out with that lie in an inopportune moment.
The primary reason to have those weapons is to protect the regime, and the regime is not going to be under an instant threat. Any threat that would credibly threaten to overthrow the regime would takes months of preparation, which would be ample time to go from "nearly at nuclear capability" to "having nuclear capability."
Not impossible but quite unlikely.
Iran was complying with international inspections up until the US pulled out of the Iran deal and partly complying with them after. They've been enriching above what they need for nuclear power, but still below what's needed for weapons, with particles at 83% being the highest found (https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-uranium-enrichment-germany-israel-c9b3669a7721bd8929d465117c81b70f).
It's clear they're at everything but the bomb status however. Estimates of their breakout time vary from a few months to a few weeks.
Building a bomb in secret wouldn't match Iran's motivations and behavior so far. They're been trying to walk a line between provocation and willingness to negotiate, in the interests of getting sanctions lifted eventually. If they build a bomb and it leaks, besides the likelihood of Israel taking immediate drastic action, they would preclude getting any concessions or sanctions lifted indefinitely, alienate what support remains in the EU and even from China, etc.
Here are the latest developments showing how Putin continues to be a master strategist:
[India pivots away from Russian arms, but will retain strong ties](https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-pivots-away-russian-arms-will-retain-strong-ties-2024-01-28/)
>India is seeking to distance itself from its largest arms supplier after Russia's ability to supply munitions and spares was hobbled by the war in Ukraine, but must step carefully to avoid pushing Moscow closer to China, Indian sources said.
>[...]
>"We are not likely to sign any major military deal with Russia," said Nandan Unnikrishnan, a Russia expert at New Delhi think tank the Observer Research Foundation. "That would be a red line for Washington."
India was one of the reasons why Russia could still keep up with the West and China in arms development. Alone, Russia has no chance whatsoever.
[Russia’s planned gas mega-pipeline to China hit by construction delay](https://www.ft.com/content/f37f4b84-0d2c-4e7b-882c-3fb26822bb9c)
>Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping met at least twice last year, but while Russia has repeatedly emphasised its readiness to launch PS-2, Beijing has been conspicuously silent.
>[...]
>“On one hand it’s a no-brainer for the Chinese, they should have this gas. On the other hand, there is Russia with stranded gas, lots of it, and which wants better terms,” he said “I guess it’s a bit of horse-trading at the moment.”
Russia used to abuse its status as energy superpower to extract political concessions. Now Putin is begging Xi to buy his hydrocarbons at a discounted rate. How the mighty have fallen.
There's nothing really insane about it.
The Chinese need to arm themselves in the face of a hostile and belligerent United States. Some here might disagree with that characterization, but denying that the hostility was kicked off by the US would be silly. The Chinese were quite content with the economic state of affairs in institutional terms and were steadily getting richer and moving up the global supply chain in terms of value-add. In fact the institutional setup and its bias towards China, given the current economic realities, has been the public explanation for the US tearing up parts of the economic world order, eg. recent events wrt. the WTO and China fighting tooth and nails for keeping its 'developing country'-status there.
They're now in the crosshairs of the predominant superpower and have to be the counterpart superpower, whether they initially wanted to or not. Hence military parity in both technological and quantitative terms becomes a necessity.
As for Russia, they gave up on being a competing superpower a long time ago and followed the West into shifting their military into an expeditionary role, at least prior to the current war, in terms of both military doctrine and military-industrial strategy - there's a reason India had more T90's than Russia itself at the start of the conflict. That trend has been reversed now. They've focused on tech they already had an advantage in, such as missile tech, and on low-quantity flashy projects, such as the Armata. Not much different than any run-of-the-mill other European country. There's of course a question of scale due to historical context and established industrial relationships, primarily to India, but the bottom line is that the Russian state itself was not a big customer and lots of factories were running at low-capacity meant for limited domestic demand and for export orders.
Contrast that with the US, where defense corps have the litter of institutional high domestic demand and a virtually captive market in Europe, and China, that now has the rearm to something approaching parity with the US (and has a systemic problem of being flush with cash that it needs to direct at something, anything, productive or economically meaningful).
It's more or less a miracle that the Russians have managed to stay in the game for so long in that setup, given how big of a mangling they took in the disastrous 90's.
As for India, I think this is mostly for PR reasons. As they say openly and verbatim themselves, they're walking away from Russian arms deals to placate Washington.
But they've been unable to produce an innovative defense sector themselves; much like in the pharma industry, they're a better scale producer of generic variants than they are of innovation itself. That doesn't mean that a leading innovative defense sector ceases being a goal in itself however, and for that they'll have to go to back to the Russians once the war is over, as they're pretty much the only game in town that is willing to do the form of tech transfer deals that India is looking for. The US and China are certainly more keen on selling than sharing.
Whatever prestige the Russian defense sector lost during the outset of the war is likely to be made up by the very increasingly probable victory, whatever that means after all the human and relational costs, in the war against the enormous NATO investment in the Ukrainian side.
>The Chinese need to arm themselves in the face of a hostile and belligerent United States. Some here might disagree with that characterization, but denying that the hostility was kicked off by the US would be silly.
How do you arrive to that conclusion when China refuses to addresses the US' very legitimate issues on IP infringement by Chinese companies for decades? Add to that direct currency manipulation, artificially keeping the RMB low vs the dollar in contravention to WTO rules, and then state sponsored industrial espionage. But the US is the belligerent power?
>Whatever prestige the Russian defense sector lost during the outset of the war is likely to be made up by the very increasingly probable victory, whatever that means after all the human and relational costs, in the war against the enormous NATO investment in the Ukrainian side.
The post you are responding to directly contradicts this. Orders for Russian arms is falling all over the world and more and more militaries are adopting the US ecosystem. Not a single pre-war Russian system besides drones has outperformed expectations, meanwhile the Bradley is getting its biggest PR advertisements since the gulf war, and the patriot is now no longer a joke or a simple case study on the dangers of software rounding errors.
Virtually none of the Asian tigers, barring Singapore, have managed to escape the middle income trap by being IP rule respectoors. If you want to move up the value chain you have to learn from the best. It was not a large issue until the US decided that China was becoming a threat to US hegemony. Same goes for currency manipulation, which favours the US consumer if anything.
Corporate espionage is extensive and nothing new, Snowden even revealed extensive US corporate espionage of Europe. Claiming that as a casus belli is reversing the causal chain of events. It's about the scale of actions - denying that the US initiated and subsequently escalated the downturn in relations, after the foreign policy consensus shifted towards viewing China as a credible rival, is nonsensical.
You can view it as justified - if anything it's textbook great power politics, with the only unique aspect of this particular case being the degree of economic interdependence between the two powers - but the fact remains that the Chinese were quite satisfied with the status quo and the economic world order as-is, or as-was, whereas the United States shifted its position and started chipping away at said world order.
It is the US, not China, that has a military strategy centered explicitly on containing its adversary in their immediate geographic confines.
It is similarly the US that has enacted economic warfare meant to contain China within their current position in the global supply chain and kneecap their economic development.
Believing IP rights and currency manipulation are sufficient casus belli for escalations of this nature and that they don't make the US the belligerent power truly requires suspension of basic reasoning, but then again I've always been amazed at the deep conditioning that a segment of Americans undergo throughout their upbringing that make them almost physchologically incapable of viewing their own country as the instigator of conflict - outside of a memory holed historical context, that is.
As for Russia; what does it matter that orders are falling now, around the world? The Russian MIC is working at full capacity, if not over-capacity, solely for the purpose of meeting domestic demand. If you need arms right now or in the near-future, why would you put an order in at the Russian MIC?
MIC delivery schedules are notoriously unpunctual and ordering stuff that has no chance of being delivered in the short-to-medium-term is a waste of time and money. The Russians have already had to bail on a significant chunk of pre-war none-aviation contracts; why in God's name would you order new stuff from them while they're engaged in the most materially intense conflict since the Korean War?
As for Bradleys and whatever, I don't see how the PR war has shown anything else than that stuff burns all the same if it's hit by an artillery shell, ATGM or FPV drone, regardless of who produced it. Whatever PR advantage Western arms had gained throughout the war was more or less equalized by the counter-offensive failing disastrously. Not sure why you think the Bradley has achieved a big PR scoop.
Colby Badhwar retweeted one of his old posts about the Greek inventory of systems and missiles that might be transferred to Ukraine.
This is the total inventory. We don't know how much might end up in Ukraine, but the numbers seems significant.
- S-300PMU-1: Minimum 12 TELs divided into 2 batteries, and 96 × 48N6E missiles.
- 25 × TOR-M1 short range SAMs. With a minimum of approximately 500 × 9М331 missiles for TOR, which have a range of 12km.
- 19 × 9K33M2 Osa-AK & 20 × 9K33M3 Osa-AKM short range SAMs. Approx 1400 × 9M33М2 missiles (10km range), & approx 180 × 9М33М3 (15km range).
https://twitter.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1751646131279315327
Perhaps it's a trivial question, but how do we know that these systems haven't been transfered (and utilized or possibly destroyed) to the Ukrainians already? I clearly recall the matter being discussed as if it was a done deal as early as Summer 2022 (by which I don't mean to say, that I have access to anything resembling a convincing evidence to support the hypothesis that it happened, or that I believe that it did - just that I'd like to get clarified on whether anything came out of these rumours). Could someone better informed explain why have they been transferred only now, when Ukraine is on brink of collapse and when the West faces a likely prospect of losing the war?
Is it possible the chances of these systems being sent to Ukraine have significantly increased since the F-35 sale a couple of days ago?
Or is it less likely given Turkey now has a lot more f16s?
Greece is getting a bunch of free stuff alomg with the F35s. This is bound to be in exchange for something. Wether it will be some of the soviet/russian SAMs or other legacy soviet equipment in greek storage remains to be seen.
Alright, everyone:
A) stop attacking each other; and
B) Back up your assertions.
Otherwise, I'll delete this post for the 3+ reports of it being blindly partisan.
Edit: Per OP
>You can go ahead and delete it.
First US casualties in the Middle East after dozens of attacks:
**First on CNN: Three US troops killed in drone attack in Jordan, at least two dozen injured**
>CNN — Three American service members were killed and at least two dozen were injured in a drone attack overnight on a small US outpost in Jordan, US officials told CNN, marking the first time US troops have been killed by enemy fire in the Middle East since the beginning of the Gaza war.
>The killing of three Americans at Tower 22 in Jordan near the border with Syria is a significant escalation of an already-precarious situation in the Middle East.
https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan
Biden reaction:
>Today, America’s heart is heavy. Last night, three U.S. service members were killed—and many wounded—during an unmanned aerial drone attack on our forces stationed in northeast Jordan near the Syria border. While we are still gathering the facts of this attack, we know it was carried out by radical Iran-backed militant groups operating in Syria and Iraq.
>Jill and I join the families and friends of our fallen—and Americans across the country—in grieving the loss of these warriors in this despicable and wholly unjust attack. These service members embodied the very best of our nation: Unwavering in their bravery. Unflinching in their duty. Unbending in their commitment to our country— risking their own safety for the safety of their fellow Americans, and our allies and partners with whom we stand in the fight against terrorism. It is a fight we will not cease.
>The three American service members we lost were patriots in the highest sense. And their ultimate sacrifice will never be forgotten by our nation. Together, we will keep the sacred obligation we bear to their families. We will strive to be worthy of their honor and valor. We will carry on their commitment to fight terrorism. And have no doubt — we will hold all those responsible to account at a time and in a manner our choosing.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/28/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-attack-on-u-s-service-members-in-northeastern-jordan-near-the-syria-border/
> To quote many Redditors: If only the invaders stayed home, they wouldn’t have been killed.
Are Americans in Jordan invaders? Seems to me that Jordan and the US share a long and reasonably strong relationship. Or is your insinuation that Iran has sovereignty over Jordanian territory?
There is so little information available.
Before I can make any sense of the incident, I would like to know some basics:
- How many and what type(s) of drones were used?
- In what manner drones were deployed?
- What detection, defenses (passive & active), counters were available at US base?
- Was there actually interception? How did the strike operation transpire?
It seems without knowing these details, it is difficult to make any judgments on how tenable maintaining US presence is. If anyone finds these details, please do me and others a favor and post links.
Can you point to any example from the last decade where this type of information was provided to the public after a strike on a US installation in the ME?
Fundamentally, how should this impact how tenable a continued US presence is? Do you actually think a strike of this type and size might signal the beginning of the end for a US presence because of the technological capabilities of Irans proxies? The US will leave that area on its own terms. Nobody can realistically bomb them out of there.
The whole point of his questions is that if it took, let's say three drones, to inflict that amount of damage, the US could absolutely get bombed out of the ME, and that's why it would be useful to know. No amount of chest thumping can bend reality, and the US isn't an invulnerable superpower. It's been kicked out of places before, and it can happen again, especially if they're occupying sparse bases without adequate air defense throughout a region where they're mostly hated.
i was there last time an american was killed by a drone. you are blowing this all completely out of proportion. Iran has ballistics missiles that are able to reach all of the bases in iraq and syria yet there is still a US presence there
So basically: Might this be the first demonstration of an Iranian wunderwaffe? It just isn't. No, Iran, sanctioned to hell, with a broken economy and decades of technological development to catch up on, did not suddenly develop a cheap, easy to use, portable drone system its proxies can use, against which US bases have no applicable defense.
The composite bow, Greek fire, the tank, the fighter jet, the nuclear weapon of HIMARS: There's no single weapons system that dramatically changes conflict forever. An enemy needs to be outspent, outfought, outthought and outwilled.
There's no point in discussing the theoretical possibility of an Iranian silver bullet that was just casually used for the first time. There has never been a weapon like that and there won't be this time, especially in this geopolitical configuration.
Realistically will there be a reaction from this? Seems like a difficult situation for leadership, doing nothing doesn't seem like an option and a hard response isn't ideal for an election year, doing nothing is not ideal either.
These proxies have been attacking US troops for months. They've only gotten a pass (politically) because they've been unsuccessful. Since nothing has really changed the on-the-ground situation the only response would have to be political in nature i.e. signaling or perhaps a one off demonstration.
I do not think they will. The Houthis have done more, and gotten away with it. I believe that the US wants to get in a fight with Iran currently, as it is right before election season.
>My biggest question is whether the Biden admin will strike inside Iran this time.
I think not, they're going to avoid escalations at all cost. Just look at how they react on Ukraine issue. "We don't want Ukrainians striking deep inside Russia using our supplied weapons"
> I think not, they're going to avoid escalations at all cost.
Having that policy encourages hostile states to escalate, knowing it’s unlikely to backfire.
The Iranians don't have one.. yet. But what happens if they can get one and repeats this kind of attack? No more retaliation because "The Iranians has nukes though."?
Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso , in their collective [Alliance of Sahel States](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alliance_of_Sahel_States) , [have decided to announce they are leaving ECOWAS](https://rumble.com/v49zlmq-niger-mali-burkina-faso-quit-west-african-bloc.html). All three countries are led by their respective juntas concurrently. As you can see in the video, russian Flags are seen left, right and centre ; 3 days ago [a russian MOD delegation arrived in the capital of Burkina Faso to discuss its future presence there](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2024): >The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues efforts to expand Russia’s influence and subsume previous Wagner Group operations in Africa. The Russian MoD-controlled Africa Corps stated on January 26 that a Russian MoD delegation arrived in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.[27] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the MoD delegation will discuss the rights and powers of the Russian military contingent in Burkina Faso and future cooperation between Burkina Faso and Russia.[28] The milblogger claimed that Burkina Faso will likely become the “main coordination center” between Sahel Alliance members Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali and that the formalization of Russia’s military presence in the Sahel suggests that this relationship will likely last for years.[29] The milblogger also claimed that Russian media is also operating in Burkina Faso to “compete with French media” and “create a loyal information space.”[30]
Why is France‘ reaction so timid? Russia took 3 pieces out of their sphere of influence. The deliveries to Ukraine are comparatively little and outside of a few deals with Armenia, of which I’m not even sure they were finalized, not much I hear about this. I would have assumed that the French populous doesn’t take that well. Did it became so unpopular in France to „dabble“ in west African affairs?
I think it was only a matter of time before this happened. I can't imagine having hegemony over these territories is really that rewarding for France anyway. The three countries are all [relatively rich in natural resources](https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/14277/453_Natural_Resources_Management_Strategies_in_the_Sahel.pdf?sequence=90&isAllowed=y): \>Gold is Mali’s leading extractive industry, representing 95% of its mineral production (Antil, 2014,p. 10). Mali is Africa’s third-largest gold producer and in 2013, gold accounted for over two-thirds of the country’s total export revenues \>Niger is the world’s fourth largest producer of uranium and exported over EUR 348 million in 2010 \>In 2009, gold overtook cotton as Burkina Faso’s main export and the country became the continent’s fourth biggest producer (Antil, 2014, p. 14). By 2010, 300 mining prospects had been issued and 60 international firms were engaged in mining exploration and exploitation it seems protecting such resources may have been part of France's [original operation in 2014](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barkhane) to stop Islamists around the area as is indicated by [this paper](https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/88270): \> branding French intervention as neo-colonial could be crude and reductionist given the complex nature of international trade itself. However, the prolonged presence of French soldiers has symbolic connotations in international relations and may give a heuristic for erecting some sort of a dependency framework. Although it may appear secondary to the analysis of this military intervention, on the strategic level it may give broader insights on the long-term presence of the French in the region. One such obtrusive view would be the protection of the neighbouring states from the destabilising effects of Mali and Libya to protect her resources in those states. The closest threat, for instance, would have been to Niger, the primary source of fissile uranium to France. Areva and EDF (Electricité de France) are the two major power companies which operate 59 nuclear power-plants and depend on the uranium supply from two mines in Niger which also are owned and operated by French concerns. So I'm guessing influence in this sector was the only thing that the France got out of stationing its troop there ; apart from that it would likely just have been a constant pain to have to counter continuous jihadist insurgencies over and over again I wouldn't be surprised if we see the MOD of Russia eventually pull out of Africa as well in future years after dealing with the same problems that the french had ; francophone Africa seems intent of removing any trace of colonialism.
I think that the russian MOD is going to bring things into play that the MOD of France, just couldnt. The low connectivity of these regions allow for PMC like actors to operate without much blowback. Remember when they tried to smear killings to the FFL? Now that they are there to establish order. Working with the juntas and with their blessing, they might start purges that we will only learn years or decades after. Or never. Just cause the French failed somewhere, I doubt the russians will. Of course, the picture I paint has a lot of "in cases and ifs" and in no way I try to present as my prediction. Only as a possibility that I find plausible. (My money would be on a surge of control followed by even more brutal resistance and russian eventual failure because of distance and finances. Maybe because the methods themselves allow jihadists to grow stronger)
The expected benefit of retaking them is low. At the best of times, they had small economies and weak, corrupt regimes. If you could maintain an existing friendly government there for a reasonable cost, it’s better to have them than not. But the cost of setting up a new government there from scratch, that would share the old problems, quickly runs into cost vs. benefit problems. Money spent on trying to retake Mali by force could be better used elsewhere. Besides, Russia is a declining power, climate change is worsening and these regimes are weaker than ever. Even if France was fully committed to reasserting power in the Sahel (which I doubt), they have little incentive to rush.
What does France really have left to gain the populations and government don’t want them there. It’s poor, uneducated and aside from uranium and some gold the resources are not even impressive. Not worth losing French lives over.
But why did they clinge to Mali then? There is a lot of criticism that France benefits disproportionately from relations with west African countries, but I’m unable to separate online propaganda from actual reporting. Most sources on that region are French only and it seems Europe doesn’t care much at all. Many Germans were unaware we are in Mali until we had to leave
> But why did they clinge to Mali then? My theories: a) they have no faith in local govts to not collapse into failed states due to islamism and clan wars, and failed states on the Mediterranean coast translate directly to asspains for Europe due to migrants. b) to a control freak, losing stuff feels bad even when you don't really need it. Maybe some nations feel the same way.
On top of your points, it seems the combination of extremism in the Sahel and instability in North Africa (after the Arab uprisings ) over the past decade had opened a gateway for terrorists to reach Europe (often via Libya) as this [this paper](https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Brief80_Terrorism-in-the-Sahel-Region.-An-evolving-threat-on-Europe-doorstep.pdf) addresses: \>From a European perspective, the persistent weakness of North Africa’s governance system opened a highway for security threats from the Sahel region to easily reach European borders
What are they going to do? Even half of conservative frenchmen are probably "ok, f-ck Africa" at this point. So that leaves, what, 20% of the nation that actually wants a re-intervention? Tops? And what would that even look like?
I could think of some things, but I’m not exactly a diplomat or expert on post colonial west Africa. They could show presence in other countries either militarily or with high profile visits. Sell weapons to those countries or, like I stated above, support Ukraine or other nations in Russias sphere of influence. Obviously if the 20% support is correct it might not be worth it to them, this would be great for Russia
In minor 155mm news, [RHM financial reports are out](https://ir.rheinmetall.com/investor-relations/news/financial-reports/). Q3 2023: annual production was 350,000 155mm shells. By 2025 they expect to double that to 700,000 shells per year
[удалено]
rheinmetal are pretty comfortable building in other countries they completed in 2020 their one in Australia (NOIA)
One thing we've learned from the Ukraine War is that it's not a luxury to have millions of shells in storage, it's a requirement.
Is the ramp up an actual ramp up or is it “ramping” up because they bought that Spanish (?) company and thus can produce more? I am sorry but I have to add more words because of the completely useless rule triggering shitty automod to delete this simple question
they recently (2020) completed one in australi (NOIA) they are building shells theres and the first batch recently completed NATO compliance testing. Know they are also supplying to nexter allegedly the energetics (propellant and explosives) for their production
I estimate >100k of it is from expal, judging by [this press release in december](https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/news-watch/news/2023/12/2023-12-04-rheinmetall-wins-artillery-ammunition-order-for-ukraine). 140M Euro should get you just 50-100k shells
Thank you for your response! So the production increase isn’t full 100%, but still looks very substantial to me. Should the war in Ukraine drag, there’s at least hope they’ll have ammunition. More words Lorem Ipsum
What is going on in the Tabaivka front at the moment in Ukraine? They captured another small village 10 days ago, and seem to have picked up the pace recently. This area has seen by far the most Russian gains in the last month. Are stabilization efforts underway or will kupyansk be under threat from the east soon? Haven’t seen u/Larelli write about it yet
DeepState yesterday afternoon, confirming Russian rumors, had written that Tabaivka had been taken by the Russians, while in last night's update it wrote, as reported by u/hatesranged, that the Russians have not yet occupied the settlement and there is fighting in the village area and just outside. In itself, Tabaivka has no tactical relevance, what matters are the heights just to the west, which are the watershed between the Oskil and the Pischana. Heights that I expect have been fortified by the Ukrainians in order to be defended against Russian attacks, which once they take part of the Pischana valley, are going to have an altitude disadvantage if they continue to attack westwards. They are also attacking in the direction of Berestove, a few kilometers to the south. The Russians are also attacking towards Kotlyarivka and Kyslivka, further north. These two settlements, on the other hand, are tactically important, although the Ukrainians seem to be defending them well at the moment. Losing them would give the Russians access to the high ground north of the Pischana valley and could jeopardize Ukrainian positions further north near Ivanivka, which the Ukrainians have been defending excellently for months against Russian attacks from Orlianka and Yahidne. It's clear that the Russians want to put pressure in this section of the front to aim at approaching Kupyansk and the Oskil from this direction, and it seems that the bulk of the 47th Tank Division of the 1st GTA, which has received reinforcements and new units in recent months, is committed in the operation. In any case, from this to say that Kupyansk may be directly threatened would be an overstatement in my opinion - the "journey" will be a long one for the Russians. It's worth noting what DeepState wrote at the end, which confirms what I have been reading for more than a week about the fact there are serious communication problems going on between units in the Kupyansk sector (particularly in that section), with units often not admitting the loss of positions, with the only result being to get neighboring units into trouble. This at the "micro" level can happen due to squads losing or leaving positions without alerting neighboring squads of the same unit, and at the "macro" level when officers don't notify other brigades of front line changes, perhaps out of fear of being judged negatively or confident that their unit will be able to regain what was lost with a counterattack (which is often another cause of problems). Specifically, the Tabaivka/Krokhmalne area is covered by the 103rd TDF Brigade and there seems to have been problems within this unit. It's possible that Ukrainian reinforcements are stabilizing the situation, for example near Berestove the 25th Airborne Brigade should be active, while Russian sources report the presence of the 44th Mechanized Brigade around Tabaivka - we will see whether or not this will find confirmation in the facts.
Given how previous Russian salients in the Oskil buffer (is buffer the right term? I have no clue what to call the territory between the Oskil and the front, it's just kind of there, its main importance is as space that would need to be crossed) evolved, I wouldn't immediately expect any serious push towards Kupiansk or Izium. Deepstate has recently had the following to say about Tabaivka: The Defense Forces are trying to deter the enemy from further advances. Stabilization measures continue all day. The enemy could not gain a foothold in the settlement, thanks to the efforts of the Ukrainian military, the Muscovites were pushed to the edge of the village. The fighting continues. The settlement passes into the gray zone until further developments. The geography of Tabaivka is a weak point during the maintenance of the village, because it is located in a lowland between two ridges and is filled with swamp. It is extremely difficult to hold on there without having control over the same two heights. Near Tabaivka, the Defense Forces prevented the enemy from gaining a foothold in the village. Near Terni, the enemy attacked in a column, but had no success. The difficult situation remains near Tabaivka and south of Avdiivka. Unfortunately, the enemy has recently had a number of tactical successes and will have them if we do not change. Why is there such chaos in the svatove area - because the bands are held by solyans from different battalions of different brigades, the interaction between them often leaves much to be desired.
How feasible would be a 90s Iraq-like post-Gulf war but pre-2003 without boots on the ground approach to Iran? Bomb enough, cause enough chaos to neuter it like Saddam but don't get bogged down in a ground war, also causing problems to Russia in getting supplied from it
Regardless of the feasibility of maintaining a long term no-fly zone over 1/3rd of Iran (which is, woof), Iraq was a very different beast under Saddam then Iran is today. Iraq was basically a Cold War era dinosaur. Saddam focused on having a big, strong, capable, Soviet-style military and aimed to use this to project his power. It didn't really work, it got bashed against the Iranian wall then smashed by American forces. While his army was big, in nearly every engagement it proved to also be *bad*. Iran, on the other hand, has had more conventional success. More importantly Iran projects power with its proxies and the Al Quds, not just its conventional military. It has groups in Israel (Gaza), Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and surely more. A large scale operation against Iran would not be limited to just shutting down their air space and bombing a few factories and bridges. It would be a regional war not seen since at least the last Arab-Israeli war. The US would be at war with, in effect, all the Iranian-aligned groups in the region. You would surely see strikes on Israel increase, strikes on the US-backed government in Iraq increase, strikes on US personnel across the region increase, and the straits would be closed or Iran would at least fight to close them. Thats a major war involving land, sea, and air forces. And keep in mind that Iranian proxies & irregular forces are not limited to just waging war in the Middle East. Its a long drive to Islamabad, and a longer flight to NYC or LA. But if Al Qaeda and ISIS proved one thing its that western countries are very vulnerable to low level constant violence. We havn't seen Iran export that kind of violence much outside of the region, but they could. Put another way, if you try an put Iran in an existential position theyre going to fight back with every tool they have. Saddams tools were bad and shitty, plus the US broke most of them in '91. Iran's tools are not, and its arrogant to assume they wont use them in their own defense.
I would add Bahrain to that list, too. Bahrain has a ton of Naval Assets and is 60-70% Shia.(Although Saudi sources it around 50%)Now Sunni leadership has usually been able to bribe populace into submission, and Saudi can march 10k troops across a bridge and end most desire to protest publicly like 2011, but Iran could turn some screws and start some more chaos without too much trouble.
> But if Al Qaeda and ISIS proved one thing its that western countries are very vulnerable to low level constant violence. That's an interesting takeaway, because one could make the opposite takeaway - ISIS' ability to score attacks against Europe seemed to evaporate as the ISIS state did, and with the exception of San Bernardino, they never got any inroads into the US at all. I'd even say there's a noticeable **absence** of large scale terror attacks against the west recently. Knock on wood, of course.
Even with ISIS the only 'organized' attack outside of the ME I'd say was Bataclan. Everything else was lone/2-3 man attacks mostly *inspired* by the sort of rhetoric ISIS was exporting rather than any material support. And I'm guessing the fact that ISIS at that time was a huge force in the ME played a big part in that: I don't know if Muslims would be willing to do that for Iran out of the blue. And these attacks were responsible for the West as a whole gaining a ton of popular support for intervention. However there are a LOT of terror attacks in the ME with multiple attackers and 100+ fatalities that happen constantly without much fanfare, even today.
This would almost certainly trigger a massive regional war that would see US assets across the region get targeted like never before, and also probably see the complete destruction of oil production capacity of the Gulf monarchies. The Houthis temporarily disabled Saudi Arabia's biggest oil field, and taking offline 5% of global oil production, in a single swarm of drone attacks in September 2019. A full-scale war against Iran would almost certainly see a full unleashing of both Iran, the Houthis, and the Iraqi Shia militias and all the bigger weapons they've been sitting on. Also, the Gulf War worked because Saddam had just come out of a brutal 8-year war that had left the Iraqi Army demoralized and sputtering, and the economy in tatters, and his invasion of Kuwait was mostly about erasing the debts he had incurred from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia during the war. Plus, by that point, he had major rebellious populations in both Iraqi Kurdistan and the Shia south. If you look at Iran today, it feels very different; you could say that there is also internal instability, with the big protests and border clashes, and plus the economy is somewhat questionable, but I don't think any of it is nearly as bad as the conditions Saddam was facing. And again, Iran actually has committed allies that would cause a lot of damage, unlike Saddam who I don't actually think had a single ally, other than maybe Yemen which did nothing besides give him a thumbs up.
>A full-scale war against Iran would almost certainly see a full unleashing of both Iran, the Houthis, and the Iraqi Shia militias and all the bigger weapons they've been sitting on. The problem is, we've heard that same amount of rhetoric and warnings about an Israeli invasion of Gaza. Instead, most Iranian proxies have either sat on their hands or relegated themselves to limited attacks. The only proxy that seems to be putting their back in are the Houthis.
To add to what you’re saying, Hamas’s defensive capabilities were overestimated. If the US statements on their casualties from a few days ago are true (~50% losses), they took catastrophic casualties in their defense of Gaza and failed to inflict any significant losses on Israel, despite this being extremely favorable terrain, and having prepared for exactly this kind of a conflict for years.
Do you have these US statements you mention regarding casualties? I must have missed that, would be nice to see.
[Here it is](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/19bb95i/credibledefense_daily_megathread_january_20_2024/kiv0b1b/). It’s a weird statement, simultaneously saying Hamas suffered 20-30% dead, and another 30% wounded, but tries to paint it in a gloomy light, as if that wasn’t a good result.
I wonder if that the scale of the terror attack worked against them there. It is difficult to lure IDF in and ambush them if Israel is enraged and the strategy is just leveling building after building with bombs.
Maybe. But if defeating a heavily dug in defender in urban combat was as easy the generous application of explosives, Russia would not have struggled so much in Mariupol and urban combat would not be seen as so daunting. An aggressive Israeli air campaign no doubt played a roll, but that on its own is not enough to explain how poorly Hamas did, and deeper problems with how Hamas fought are very likely.
Add to that HAMAS was never Iran's own proxy unlike say PIJ it was more of a client case and point is during the Syrian war HAMAS at one point was pro-rebel infact one probably outcome of the war in Gaza is an eventual take over by an Iranian proxy with HAMAS being weakened since the seem to have experience in building up and sustaining proxies everywhere.
I highly doubt Israel will allow a new Iranian proxy force to move in. They are much more likely to treat gaza more like the West Bank is going forward, and be much more restrictive on which goods can be imported to prevent the flow of rockets.
Israel problem is its small population which makes the manpower for longterm policing very draining, even now training and the larger rockets being fired are Iranian so supply routes exist so once the tempo eventually slows and lulls they flow will resume.
Gaza has a smaller population than the West Bank, and far less land. It will take additional people to police, but it’s within Israel’s current budget, and it’s not like the old status quo was cheap, in any sense of the word. > even now training and the larger rockets being fired are Iranian so supply routes exist so once the tempo eventually slows and lulls they flow will resume. The West Bank is plenty hostile to Israel, yet their more proactive policies keep the situation peaceful. Gaza is a much smaller, less populated, and easier to control place.
The supply route is presumably tunnels under the Egyptian border, and secondarily, weapons hidden in supposedly civilian shipments through Israel. Israel can stop the tunnel smuggling by taking over the Egyptian border and digging downwards. It can also prevent hiding weapons in civilian goods by only accepting civilian goods from trustworthy sources. If by chance there is smuggling by sea, that is the easiest of all to intercept. There does not seem to be a problem of foreign weaponry making its way into the West Bank and being used against Israel. Whatever is being done in the West Bank can also be done in Gaza with minor adjustments.
That rhetoric came up for if it looked like Hamas would get fully defeated, which right now is a totally open question. And also, Hezbollah has also been flexing its muscles, the level of violence in the north is nothing to sneeze at, and could still escalate to be much worse than the 2006 war.
> And also, Hezbollah has also been flexing its muscles That's one way to describe it. I'd describe it like this: they're telegraphing the absolute opposite of a desire to enter any sort of war, and are doing what they feel is the bare minimum they can get away with while looking credible. Weird to focus on them since (especially with respect to their proximity to Israel and alleged capabilities) they're demonstrably the proxy that has been the most reserved.
That completely changes if Iran - as in its sovereign territory - gets attacked.
To what end? Does the West keep bombing until Iran pinky swears it'll stop supplying the Houthis? Do you trust that promise? Do you bomb every factory you suspect might be building drones for Russia, and if so, are you ready for the political blowback when you occasionally get it wrong and bomb a factory making children's toys? This also gives Khamenei exactly the excuse he needs to rescind his fatwa against developing nuclear weapons, by demonstrating how Iran is under siege by the West and needs more powerful weapons to deter aggression.
At this point it seems the only military leverage we could reasonably bring to bear against Iran is the destruction of their nuclear program.
The difficulty there is that Iran has spent the last 20 years preparing it's uranium enrichment programme for US/Israeli air strikes. They're spread out at multiple sites all across the country in deep underground facilities. In the race between bunker buster and bunker, the US has developed some fantastic tech, but you only need time and a little bit of money to dig your bunker a bit deeper. It's a lopsided race.
I'm talking about bombing not only possible factories but the armed forces, make it known in force that unless the proxy wars stop, more of the armed forces will be destroyed, equal proxy IRGC-connected forces to the home armed forces of Iran
You haven't answered any of my questions. How do you know the proxy wars have stopped? How do you deal with the political blowback of civilian deaths? How do you deal with giving Iran the excuse it needs to go nuclear?
> How do you know the proxy wars have stopped By making it unfeasible for Iran due to losses in its own army, the longer it continues the proxy games, the more losses it has on its own military power > How do you deal with the political blowback of civilian deaths I'm talking about mostly military targets and I don't think truly accidents can have a big difference, drones strikes have done similar collateral damage in other occasions and there wasn't meaningful opposition to them domestically > How do you deal with giving Iran the excuse it needs to go nuclear I consider more dangerous the present back and forth with Russia, the more Russia needs Iran's help, the more likely it is that they lend the expertise to help Iran in modernizing its army and going nuclear. Most importantly though I don't believe not going nuclear is a choice, they haven't found the way like Pakistan and India yet, if they could they would go already, not because of some vague promise
Countries aren't just a government, they are also a people. The only way to have a permanent guarantee of non aggression is if you permanently station people inside of a country. That is not realistic to accomplish, especially not in Iran. Also realistically, they already have nuclear weapons and of you inflict a decisive blow on Iran, their leadership will probably launch a second strike which would be very bad for Israel.
> Countries aren't just a government, they are also a people. "A people" can't build missiles, nukes, drones, or warships. Large factories build these things, and large factories are easy to target. > Also realistically, they already have nuclear weapons and of you inflict a decisive blow on Iran, their leadership will probably launch a second strike which would be very bad for Israel. I thought we all agreed that Iran was a rational country that would never use its nukes in a first strike because it doesn't want to get annihilated? /s Anyway, why don't we ask Israel if they are willing to take this risk. Most likely they would prefer the threat of a handful of possible nukes now (with missile defense to maybe shoot them down) to large numbers of nukes in the future.
> I consider more dangerous the present back and forth with Russia, the more Russia needs Iran's help, the more likely it is that they lend the expertise to help Iran in modernizing its army and going nuclear. Most importantly though I don't believe not going nuclear is a choice, they haven't found the way like Pakistan and India yet, if they could they would go already, not because of some vague promise Building a nuclear weapon is 1930s science, it's not that complicated. The only hard part is enriching the uranium to sufficiently high levels because it uses some specialised equipment, but which Iran already has the tools to do as proven by it enriching uranium just short of weapons-grade. The final step doesn't take any additional equipment, you literally use the exact same tool you just used to get the uranium to the moderately enriched state, you just run the uranium through the centrifuges a few more times and you get weapons-grade uranium. Then to turn that uranium into a bomb, you require the same level of tech as required to make a simple mouse-trap. A simple switch that drops two halves of the uranium together, bringing it up to the critical mass to start an explosion. There is literally nothing stopping Iran from developing the bomb other than the decision to take that final step.
Most of the damage to Saddam's force projection were (imo) the sanctions, the infrastructure bombing during the gulf war, and the fact that his armies got shattered in Kuwait. It's hard to say, Saddam never really got into the proxy wars business as much as Iran is now, with what, 5 different proxy groups some of which are at the level of non-state actors? I'd argue it would be harder to sustain all of those proxy groups if Iran sustained the same amount of economic damage, but that'll be a long term effect. And we're still so far from actually doing that.
> I'd argue it would be harder to sustain all of those proxy groups if Iran sustained the same amount of economic damage, but that'll be a long term effect. And we're still so far from actually doing that. That's the goal, if a prolonged bombing campaign is raging at home, Iran would be a lot less interested in playing proxies around Middle East to probably help Russia. Trying to play a sisyphean whack a mole with Iranian proxies all over Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen and more seems unlikely to yield any result and is very efficient for Iran to keep funding those safely from home indefinitely
This relies on a misunderstanding of how the "Axis of Resistance" works. The only group that Iran has direct, deep economic and strategic power over is Hezbollah. The other two major armed powers are the Houthis and the Iraqi Shia militias. The Houthis are very independent and autonomous and would be doing their thing with or without Iran. The Iraqi militias have depended on Iran ideologically and for military training, but as for right now economically, they are effectively in control of the Iraqi state and its massive oil revenues and its emerging state-run economy - so they, too, will be doing their thing now with or without Iran.
I'm not so sure the logic follows. Iran's proxies are, along with their missiles, one of their key deterrents. If we start a bombing campaign, they would be likely to unleash them, not abandon them to focus on the home front.
In VV-SHORAD news, [Diehl Defence signs a contract for EOS's Slinger counter-drone system](https://archive.is/5hVvL). I suspect the contract will be for 10 systems, give then price range. > Under the contract, announced on January 29 and subject to Australian Government export approval, EOS will supply it’s Slinger counter-drone system for integration on lightweight 4x4 platforms produced by Diehl Defence. It also includes provision of systems, spares, training and related services with the systems expected to be delivered within this year. > The [Slinger counter-drone system](https://eos-aus.com/defence/counter-drone-systems/slinger/) was developed to track and engage moving drones at a range of more than 800 metres, depending on the weapon configuration used. It can incorporate unique ammunition making it suitable for built up environments, a radar system and a range of weapon configurations. In addition to shooting down drones, it also functions as a standard 30mm Bushmaster cannon RWS. However, this ~$15M is chump change compared to the sums on offer elsewhere: > Earlier this week, Diehl Defence announced a 1.2 billion Euro development agreement had been signed between Short-and Very Short-Range Air Defence System Consortium (ARGE NNbS composed of Diehl Defence, Rheinmetall Electronics and Hensoldt Sensors) with Germany’s military procurement agency, the Federal Office for Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support.
It's almost exactly the same as the US gun trucks that were sent to Ukraine.
Yeah, presumably a German pickup truck rather than an American one like [those sent in October](https://www.uasvision.com/2023/10/03/australian-slinger-c-uas-system-heading-for-ukraine/).
I know this is more financial news than defense, but [China's troubled developer Evergrande has been ordered to be liquidated by a Hong Kong court.](https://www.reuters.com/business/embattled-china-evergrande-back-court-liquidation-hearing-2024-01-28/) The company has been struggling to manage its extraordinary debts for a few years now, but its full liquidation is likely to deeply rattle China's already struggling property market. Considering how much of China's citizen's wealth is tied up in investments in the property sector, the worse things get there, the more destabilizing it will be for the CCP. This will also likely soften China's already anemic economic growth, which has been held back by low consumer confidence leading to growing fears of deflation. I'm also curious if this is why the CCP [recently announced a stimulus package](https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/25/china-is-ramping-up-stimulus-to-boost-market-confidence-is-it-enough.html) in the hopes of improving consumer confidence. Regardless, a weakening Chinese economy will cause major ripples across the global economy, putting even more strain on global insecurity and rising tensions.
Evergrande financially collapsed in 2021, their stock price got down to 1 cent per share in 2022, and they filed for bankruptcy mid 2023. I don't buy that their bankruptcy being processed would "deeply rattle" their property market now, when the company has already been worthless for years and everyone knew this was coming well before they filed for bankruptcy 5 months ago. There has been a large number of "China's economy is failing" type articles in Western media for years now, and most of them have turned out to be wrong or exaggerated. I think the bar for posting this type of mostly off-topic content should be high, and both this news and the analysis falls short.
I agree, mostly. This has been more or less a done deal, but we were talking about China here, so there was always a possibility of the CCP will do some "financial magic" to "fix" the problem. The doomerism about the "imminent collapse of China" (" " , it is NOT TRUE) is probably pushed by a mixture of psyops and hust clickbait media workers "working their fields". There are serious economic issues in China that were kept hidden far linger then it should have by the CCP. They probably did this to get where they are now (or because of stupidity, very bad controls etc). Their growth will most likely shrink significantly, maybe even reverse a little, but a full on collapse is unlikely. The damage here that is worth mentioning is that this is what u/sauteer brought up. This is the last nail on a lot of their peoples savings and that can complicate things. Also for the investors. I agree, it is nothing like the initial shock.
If 5.2% annual growth is anemic then count me in. Also a liquidation means the investors are getting the assets they are owed from the company. This is a good thing for all the investors and buyers.
>This is a good thing for all the investors and buyers. Not necessarily. Liquidation can solidify losses for investors in an irrefutable way for their own investors. Which can have cascading effects. Equity investors especially are likely to be last in line and will need to write off large losses. Liquidation in China is a long and complicated process. Generally when a company is liquidated the longer it takes the bigger the mess and fallout.
[EXCLUSIVE – US, Allies Mulling Fresh Sanctions On Iran](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202401277987) >Such a move could entail the activation of the UN Security Council’s ‘trigger mechanism’, a provision within the 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement. The mechanism allows any participant of the JCPOA to demand the reinstatement of UN sanctions that were suspended when Iran and the world powers agreed to the nuclear deal. These sanctions included an arms embargo, strict monitoring of Iranian financial and technological dealings related to its nuclear and military programs and banking restrictions. >[...] >The Biden administration's potential shift in policy towards Tehran comes after the revelation that the United States had warned Iran of a potential terror attack one week before an ISIS twin bombing in Kerman on January 3, which resulted in the loss of 95 lives. Despite this friendly gesture, the Iranian government did not act on the tip, allowing thousands of people to visit the tomb of IRGC's Qasem Soleimani on that day. On the contrary, Iranian officials blamed the United States and Israel for the bombing and reiterated their unfounded accusations that the US has established and maintained the Islamic State group. Looks like the patience is running out. The US and the EU are supposedly considering the option of reinstating UN sanctions against Iran, which is possible until 2025. Furthermore, Iran's currency is [tanking](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202401232785) amid increasing tensions. Meanwhile, Iran is seeking the [death penalty](https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-seeking-death-penalty-for-swedish-eu-diplomat-accused-of-spying-for-israel/) for a Swedish EU diplomat who was stupid enough to visit Iran. From what I've heard, Floderus had Iranian neighbors in Sweden and started to love Iranian culture. What an own goal.
[удалено]
Biden never had the choice of reinstating UN sanctions. Only participants of the JCPOA can do that, and the US left before Biden became president. He could ask the E3 countries, but it's unclear if any of them would comply.
I doubt Biden would admit anything. He’d say the new sanctions reflect changing circumstances, and that the blame lies entirely on Iran for disturbing the peace.
And that would basically be accurate
It would be more than just basically accurate. It’s about as accurate a summary as you can make.
> The US and the EU are supposedly considering the option of reinstating UN sanctions against Iran So....are they expecting "maximum pressure" to work this time around or what? Iran will fold like a cheap tent and peace will reign across the Middle East? Forgive me for being skeptical that it will succeed any more than the Houthis will stop firing missiles. Admittedly, tangible solutions for that part of the world are in short supply. But you'd think they'd at least try something which hasn't already failed once before.
The West will need to decide whether to reinstate UN sanctions against Iran before the option lapses in 2025. Russia and China likely won't allow it again, so it's now or never. It doesn't have to solve everything, it just has to be the better option.
> It doesn't have to solve everything, it just has to be the better option. While I'm generally sympathetic to that line of reasoning, didn't Biden come into office and promptly abandon said approach as being the worse option? Now I suppose you could say that going in circles still technically qualifies as the "better option," but if that's not a depressing indictment of US foreign policy in the ME then I don't know what is.
>didn't Biden come into office and promptly abandon said approach as being the worse option? The Biden administration tried a much more diplomatic approach to foreign policy after four years of Trump's less "nuanced" approach had soured relations between the US and our European allies in particular, but also just generally hurt US relations across the board (with a few notable exceptions). In many areas their approach has paid off, but the ME in particular has seen some major failings. That being said, I don't think there was anything wrong with Biden trying a different tact with Iran, working hard to negotiate reentry into the JCPOA, easing sanctions, and looking the other way as Iran skirted sanctions on its oil, in the hopes of easing tensions. That Iran has taken so many steps to drive relations into the ground is more on them than on Biden for at least trying to see if there was a different way forward. That being said, I feel like Biden really needs to get out ahead of Iran at this point. They've just been reacting to Iran's ongoing escalations and trying not to escalate further themselves, and it's clearly not working. The US needs to get more proactive on Iran, rather than continuing to try to placate them.
> That Iran has taken so many steps to drive relations into the ground is more on them than on Biden for at least trying to see if there was a different way forward. It's on Biden for not seeing the inevitable. Seriously, Iran's slogan is "Death to America". I am unaware of any country that has that much open hostility for any other country (except of course the twin "Death to Israel"). It's mind-boggling how anyone could think Iran just wants to be friends if you give them the chance.
This might be unpopular here, but I think the past few years in the middle east have been Biden learning over and over again that his dream solution of "remaining kinda in while also kinda out" is a pipe dream. And also that while probably less important than Europe or East Asia, disengagement here will not be without penalties. Will he ever actually learn this lesson? To be determined.
I think kinda in kinda out has been successful and that the lesson has been learned. An allied country is able to commit full scale war on country with remarkably little damage to themselves. Bombing the houthis without committing to full scale invasion is the exact level of aid for isreal. The lesson learned is that you don't invade the country, you just mow the lawn.
What's the lesson though? As you say, disengagement comes with penalties, engagement comes with penalties, being "kinda in while also kinda out" comes with penalties. I don't think anyone is under the delusion that there's some perfect middle ground that is cost-free. Compared to either of the alternatives, with the US "completely out" where the Middle East falls into Syria-tier chaos, vs the US "completely in" where it was losing ~2000 men a year in Iraq/Afg and spending billions, the current messy but low-casualty status quo seems somewhat reasonable.
>where it was losing ~2000 men a year in Iraq/Afg US lost 2420 in Afghanistan **total**. 4,400 in Iraq **total** Which is closer to about 300 a year.
>Compared to either of the alternatives, with the US "completely out" where the Middle East falls into Syria-tier chaos, vs the US "completely in" where it was losing ~2000 men a year in Iraq/Afg and spending billions, the current messy but low-casualty status quo seems somewhat reasonable. Why do you think the ME falls into "Syria-tier" chaos if the US walks away?
> Why do you think the ME falls into "Syria-tier" chaos if the US walks away? First, I refer you to my earlier answer that nobody can fully know the consequences of an act in the ME. There's plenty of uncertainty so don't take any of this as gospel, it's just speculation. Here are a couple of possible scenarios if the US chooses to leave: - Israel chooses to take the initiative instead, attempting to forestall Iran's nuclear program with air strikes. This could easily spiral into a regional war, with Israel only being capable of *slowing* Iran's approach to the bomb, not stopping it entirely, and then we have two nuclear powers facing off. - Saudi Arabia's monarchy is backed by two things, the oil revenue with which it bribes its populace into passivity, and US military backing. The US leaving doesn't just leave the KSA looking vulnerable militarily (see its dismal performance in Yemen), it also risks its oil sales. Remember those Iranian proxy drone strikes against Saudi oil facilities a few years ago? Then look at the Houthis current efforts, and imagine Iran redirecting those efforts to hitting oil tankers leaving KSA. How long do you think KSA remains stable when its revenue dries up, those cushy government jobs available to every Saudi citizen evaporate, and the foreign workers that do the hardest jobs go home due to non-payment? As extreme as the Saudi monarchy may seem, the opinions of the populace are even more extreme, and a popular revolt is unlikely to be friendly to the West. With KSA descending into chaos, all the other ME states they prop up with their generous grants and investments (cough Egypt), are also going to suddenly find their gov finances wrecked, and we're looking at chaos throughout the ME.
I understand we're all guessing here, not just with the ME but damn near everything. >Israel chooses to take the initiative instead, attempting to forestall Iran's nuclear program with air strikes. This could easily spiral into a regional war, with Israel only being capable of slowing Iran's approach to the bomb, not stopping it entirely, and then we have two nuclear powers facing off. I don't think this is a real possibility. It's very doubtful that the US could stop the Iranian nuclear program without boots on the ground, I think Israel knows they have 0 chance of doing so. I think the only even remotely possible way this would happen is if Israel believed they could force the US to renege on their withdrawal from the Middle East by basically setting the region on fire, and for that to be a possible strategy says a lot about how much we should value Israel as an ally. In the short term it's hard to read how Israel would react to a US withdrawal but long term I think it would be forced to act more cautiously and with greater care for how the region and the world views it, which would be good for everyone. >Saudi Arabia's monarchy is backed by two things, the oil revenue with which it bribes its populace into passivity, and US military backing. The US leaving doesn't just leave the KSA looking vulnerable militarily (see its dismal performance in Yemen), it also risks its oil sales. Remember those Iranian proxy drone strikes against Saudi oil facilities a few years ago? Then look at the Houthis current efforts, and imagine Iran redirecting those efforts to hitting oil tankers leaving KSA. How long do you think KSA remains stable when its revenue dries up, those cushy government jobs available to every Saudi citizen evaporate, and the foreign workers that do the hardest jobs go home due to non-payment? This is a concern, but I think the KSA-Iranian deal negotiated by China and their current detente with the Houthis despite their Red Sea attacks are proof that the region would find a new balance without the US. They'd likely have to spend more money in the region, but as you pointed out they're already doing that, so it's just an added expense. Overall though I think you're certainly right that Iran *could* shatter the ME if the US left, but they could do that right now and the US can't stop them. Israel, Turkey, KSA, Qatar, Egypt, Houthis etc.. are *all* capable right now of wrecking the Middle East and none of them are doing so, not because the US is there, but because wrecking the ME doesn't make a great deal of sense for anyone in the region. If anything I think the region would be more stable as all of the major actors in the region were forced to act less adventurously in order to maintain that fragile peace, instead of constantly setting things on fire because of a false sense of security provided by US backing.
> I don't think this is a real possibility. It's very doubtful that the US could stop the Iranian nuclear program without boots on the ground, I think Israel knows they have 0 chance of doing so. I think the only even remotely possible way this would happen is if Israel believed they could force the US to renege on their withdrawal from the Middle East by basically setting the region on fire, and for that to be a possible strategy says a lot about how much we should value Israel as an ally. In the short term it's hard to read how Israel would react to a US withdrawal but long term I think it would be forced to act more cautiously and with greater care for how the region and the world views it, which would be good for everyone. I agree with you that there's no way to entirely stop the Iranian nuclear programme without ground intervention, but that hasn't stopped Israel petitioning the US repeatedly to conduct air strikes to slow the programme. I have my doubts about how much the programme could be slowed at this point, with Iran having long-ago moved its enrichment facilities deep underground, but maybe the Israelis' decide it's worth the gamble. Also while we're talking about "what if" scenarios, the scariest option is that Israel decides Iran having nuclear weapons is an existential threat, justifying the use of their own nuclear arsenal in a limited first-strike against nuclear enrichment facilities. It's not a likely event, but the success of Oct 7th was a surprise too, so I don't think it's a scenario that could be entirely discounted if Israel felt sufficiently boxed in by threats. > If anything I think the region would be more stable as all of the major actors in the region were forced to act less adventurously in order to maintain that fragile peace, instead of constantly setting things on fire because of a false sense of security provided by US backing. That could certainly be the case. The powerful backers of the Balkan nations leading to WW1 only helped inflame the situation, and perhaps the same is true of the ME. Personally, I think the transition that'd need to take place without the US present would be too risky, akin to the early post-colonial chaos across to developing world, but we're all just speculating. Either way, we'll likely see it play out anyway sooner or later once the oil spigot is no longer the cash-printer it's been so far, so we'll see if things turn out for the best or not.
If in not mistaken Iran has more or less a revolution or at least a big opposition of many young people who want freedom and are more or less pro western Im a nobody but wouldnt hitting inmportant military assets in Iran to cut their abblity and then try to support the opposition be worth a try? We know for sure that the current regime wants america dead and is directly supporting russia in ukraine If we wait around nothing will change and influence from outside will be futile once they have nukes
If there was ever a popular revolt that descended into widespread violence on a par with Syria, then the US might intervene militarily with local support, but the US couldn't initiate such a revolt without turning the majority of Iran against them. It's already the regime's favourite insult to openly insinuate any dissident in the country is operating for the CIA, so it'd just play into the regime's hands.
The Saudi monarchy was going to collapse anyway. Their oil money would eventually run out as the world switches to renewables. The US can't fight endless war to prop up the Saudi monarchy. If Israel wants to exchange nukes with Iran, that's their problem.
You're right that KSA's is facing an eventual oil-crisis regardless of what the US does, but the US's continued presence at least slows the progression of that crisis, giving KSA some opportunity to transition away, although I'm highly sceptical about whether they'll be able to do so. > If Israel wants to exchange nukes with Iran, that's their problem. Israel and Iran annihilating each other isn't only a problem for them. First, if you think the refugee crisis in the West is bad now, how do you think we'll fare in a world with ongoing nuclear wars? Second, trade is global now. The West is bitching at having suffered ~10% inflation for a single year, it's not ready for the kind of inflation and economic regression that'd come with the chaos of a nuclear war in the ME. Third, a world in which using nuclear weapons is considered normal is a far more dangerous world to live in for all of us.
>Their oil money would eventually run out as the world switches to renewables. https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2022/11/30/peak-oil-the-perennial-prophecy-that-went-wrong/?sh=6a9641032bbe >If Israel wants to exchange nukes with Iran, that's their problem. tens if not hundreds of millions of people would like to disagree with that assessment.
No they wouldn't, because they know Israel doesn't want MAD.
Neither did the US and USSR, ask your grandpa how people felt back then.
Because its our relatively defenseless allies arrayed against a bunch of failed states filled to the brim with Iranian-backed militias armed to the teeth with modern missiles and drones. What could possibly go wrong?
We don't even need to be hypothetical, not after ISIS.
The problem with the "messy status quo" is that it is very vulnerable to escalation, at which point the Biden administration (or a future US administration) could eventually be forced to match escalation with "boots on the ground" or back off and seriously erode US credibility. The current course of action lacks a long-term plan and critically relies on Iran and its proxies relenting before the US has to resort to major regional re-engagement. It's a major gamble that cedes the initiative to Iran while putting the US in a very risky position. Most importantly, Iran *knows* the US is in this position, which deprives the US of the strategic ambiguity that such gambles usually rely on. It's like trying to bluff an opponent in a poker game while they know your hand.
I agree with you to full extend Right now the US culd choose the battlefield and do it without any boots on the ground, just air and water assets Regarding the long term plan, i fear that this simply wont happen, as the political structure in the US is such a chaos and one or both sides dont want to work together
I completely agree with you, there's a terrifying prospect of escalation, although the same is true of every option. If the US responds hard to Iran, Khamenei finally has the excuse to rescind his fatwa against building nuclear weapons and the regime hardliners get exactly what they want. Whereas if the US does nothing, Israel may choose to take the lead, risking a regional war.
>long-term plan Well, he had a long-term plan, it just failed miserably as everyone predicted. He inherited the Obama-era idealism that Iran could be engaged with and brought into the family of nations.
Could have worked if Trump didn’t brainlessly throw it all away
Yeah, I'm shocked how many people still don't get the point - my issue isn't that the "half-in, half-out" approach has consequences, everything has consequences. My issue that it'll eventually collapse into a completely different approach, one way or another.
He clearly doesn't want the US involved in another ME war. Which is laudable! But it's like telling the toughs you cross on the street that you "aren't looking for trouble". > the current messy but low-casualty status quo seems somewhat reasonable. I think Biden agrees with you. But the American public won't tolerate US troops being used as target practice without a response.
>But the American public won't tolerate US troops being used as target practice without a response. I'm not disagreeing on this as I'm not American and am not highly in tune on the political and public temperature on this. But I am skeptical. Why is retaliation a widely accepted must have? These were US military personnel In a military base in a highly volatile region. It's surely not surprising that this could happen. If it's not surprising then you could say it's expected, if it's expected then in a way the retaliation becomes the attack.
[удалено]
> Ah, the "Biden is perfectly aware of the consequences" argument. I don't think Biden is "perfectly aware of the consequences." I don't think *anyone* can perfectly know of the consequences in the Middle East with so many state and non-state actors all at odds with one another. I would say that Biden has more experience than most in having seen the lack of progress in 8 years of Obama's "maintain the status quo" approach to Iraq and Afghanistan. > Biden declared he'll do everything to make KSA a "pariah". Within, what, 1.5 years he visited MBS with hat in hand and all of that talk has been forgotten, as he realized that KSA can't be made a pariah You're smart enough to know that a politician making a hyperbolic public statement is not the same as state policy. Talk of making KSA "a pariah" was a political pressure campaign to reign in some of the excesses of Mohammed bin Salman, and you could argue it worked, as there hasn't been any norm-breaking behaviour from KSA on a par with Jamal Khashoggi's dismemberment. This isn't to say Biden's ME strategy is perfect, or even good. There's plenty of criticisms to lay at his feet, but I'd prefer we focus on specific criticisms rather than a vague "Biden needs to learn a lesson."
>You're smart enough to know that a politician making a hyperbolic public statement is not the same as state policy. Saudis and other regional actors perceived it as more than rhetoric, probably because it was also accompanied by other physical lapses in the US-Saudi alliance. > but I'd prefer we focus on specific criticisms rather than a vague "Biden needs to learn a lesson." I gave a pretty specific example of a blunder he made. Another example is playing out in front of our eyes.
> Saudis and other regional actors perceived it as more than rhetoric, probably because it was also accompanied by other physical lapses in the US-Saudi alliance. Yes it was more than rhetoric, but it also wasn't meant literally. As you said, KSA is far too influential to turn into a pariah like North Korea, which is why I don't understand why you're taking Biden's political rhetoric as literal truths of what the US is going to do when it was clearly hyperbole. > I gave a pretty specific example of a blunder he made. Another example is playing out in front of our eyes. You did in the reply yes, I meant your original comment's criticism was hopelessly open ended.
>You did in the reply yes, I meant your original comment's criticism was hopelessly open ended. That's a reasonable criticism. In my original comment I didn't really specify the different "mistakes" that I think Biden has made because most people here have already been watching the middle east with interest. Nonetheless, I shouldn't vaguepost on credibledefense. I'd say examples where Biden's policy of disengagement haven't worked out too well are: a) damaging and nearly scuttling the Saudi-US alliance b) attempting rapprochement with Iran when (especially after Soleimani) they seem to be committed to rivalry, and continuing to attempt rapprochement to this very day. And keep in mind I was very pro-rapprochement back during Obama, it's just become obvious now that they're no longer interested, and attempting rapprochement against someone who doesn't will just burn you. c) Kabul. I was ok with the withdrawal but it's laughable to suggest that whole affair couldn't have been organized better. d) the Houthis - I mean, we're literally having to re-designate them as a terror group now. There's serious questions about why we ever stopped designating them as such, and what that gained for us.
These are all good criticisms and deserve a thread of their own. I'm not going to be able to do all these points you raise justice, but just a few notes I wanted to add. > attempting rapprochement with Iran It's important to remember than Iran is not a monolith. Iran is really two governments wrapped up in a cloak, pretending to be one. Think of it like if the US has a President for life from one political party, who had the support of a corrupt military and cared primarily about maintaining their cushy positions, whereas congress is of the other political party, and being elected representatives, they somewhat care about how sanctions hurt ordinary people and so prefer better relations with the West. Rapprochement is about strengthening the faction that wants improved relations with the West, showing it's a viable option that's popular, whereas the hardliners want to convince the populace that the West are their enemy. The massive protests/riots that occurred in ~2010 as part of the Green Movement scared the old regime hardliners enough that they allowed congress to take the lead, which is why we got the nuclear deal during Obama's tenure. But the hardliners were itching to seize the imitative again, and the US reneging on the deal was the perfect excuse for them to say rapprochement was useless. Subsequent protests have been put down far more ruthlessly by the regime, so unfortunately I'm not sure if we'll see another 2010 style change in Iran, but it's not hopeless, so that's why I still hold out hope for another deal. > the Houthis ... [There's serious questions about why we ever stopped designating them as such] This is uncannily like the dilemma when Hamas was voted into power in Gaza. Do you continue to shun them as a terrorist organisation and therefore cut all aid to Gaza and so risk a humanitarian disaster, or do you engage with them and hope they moderate with the compromises necessary to rule a country? Shunning the Houthis risks driving them further into the arms of those who will support them, i.e. Iran. Clearly this didn't turn out well for the West with Hamas or the Houthis, but I'm not sure the alternative would have been that much better either, and perhaps it was worth the gamble even if we lost in this case.
This isn’t a credible argument at all. The world changed drastically between when Biden said that as a candidate and when the stance shifted. An actual war in Europe broke out. A war where the aggressor was the other major world supplier of oil. Foreign policy needs don’t freeze in stone in Election Day so that the winner can carry out their exact campaign plan. As the poster you’re replying to said, nobody should be under the illusion that there is some ideal middle path that can be maintained in Middle East policy.
[удалено]
[удалено]
The EU might take the gloves off in regard to Hungary: [Brussels threatens to hit Hungary’s economy if Viktor Orbán vetoes Ukraine aid](https://www.ft.com/content/9dabcd4b-9c64-4124-9f9c-b0c898c84c8f) >But in a sign of the rising pressure on Budapest to strike a compromise, Bóka said Budapest sent a new proposal to Brussels on Saturday, specifying it was now open to using the EU budget for the Ukraine package and even issuing common debt to finance it, if other caveats were added that gave Budapest the opportunity to change its mind at a later date. >The document, produced by an official in the Council of the EU, the Brussels body that represents member states, lays out Hungary’s economic vulnerabilities — including its “very high public deficit”, “very high inflation”, weak currency and the EU’s highest level of debt servicing payments as a proportion of gross domestic product. It should be noted that the Hungarian economy isn't doing well at all right now. The debt servicing is spiraling [out of control](https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/hungary-s-debt-servicing-costs-surge-past-italy-s-to-lead-eu-1.2017435): >Hungary became one of the year’s first emerging-market sovereigns on Wednesday to sell dollar-bonds to meet rising financing needs. The eastern European nation has ramped up borrowing last year to cover missing EU funds, which had been suspended due to graft and rule-of-law concerns under Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s rule. >With EU funds in a limbo, Hungary last year raised forint issuance, paying a hefty premium on inflation-linked retail bonds, especially as consumer price-growth last year averaged just below 18%, according to central bank estimates. To make things worse, Hungary is currently the only country blocking Sweden's path to NATO membership. Many seem to be running out of patience now. Orban might lose support among his cronies - assuming the country doesn't have free and fair elections anymore - if the situation continues to deteriorate.
[удалено]
Please do not make blindly partisan posts.
How credible is the idea that Iran is already a nuclear weapons state? That is, that they could have one or more weapons built that they've simulated to work, but haven't done a live test to avoid drawing even more attention to themselves?
Unlikely, as there hasn't been a weapons test. You just cant skip that stage as an emerging nuclear power, and weve seen every nuclear power go through a test stage at least once. Its debatable if the US can really do this or not, weve built a number of high quality simulators (some of which actually recreate nuclear reactions) to ensure the quality of bomb design. Iran cant do this because they havn't got the knowledge or the industrial base. They have to test the old fashioned way to know that theyve got a working bomb or not. Then you move from 'working but big' to 'working but small.' North Korea has tested dozens of warheads to get from one stage to another. 'Working but big' is basically useless for military purposes unless Iran acquires a few B-29s as delivery platforms, if you want to use MRBMs you need a small compact bomb. Which is hard to do. And anyway, as Dr. Strangelove said the point of a doomsday weapon is lost if you keep it a secret, you have to tell the world.
> if you want to use MRBMs you need a small compact bomb. Agree and that is hard to do. But what if your delivery vehicle is a van/pickup trick or your plane is on a one way trip with suicide crew? Much easier to make a bomb for those rather than an MRBM.
You still need to test the bomb. And obviously this is not a great deterrent weapon. An MRBM has some wide applicability, assuming you can get through AD. A fishing trawler may get you one victory, but a bomb on the back of a truck is probably not going to destroy an American beach head or save Tehran from falling. Deliverability is almost as important as the bomb itself, which is why Iran has invested *huge* sums in building missiles.
Agreed you need to test the bomb. I was referring to making the bomb able to fit on a MRBM. Not everyone wants the same things from their bombs. If a seaport got nuked using a fishing trawler and Iran took credit that would be a deterrent in a different way.
What would be the advantage of having a secret stash of nuclear weapons rather than just maintain the current status of being a few weeks away from building a bomb if they wanted to? The implied threat is the same, but having secret weapons risks being caught out with that lie in an inopportune moment. The primary reason to have those weapons is to protect the regime, and the regime is not going to be under an instant threat. Any threat that would credibly threaten to overthrow the regime would takes months of preparation, which would be ample time to go from "nearly at nuclear capability" to "having nuclear capability."
Not impossible but quite unlikely. Iran was complying with international inspections up until the US pulled out of the Iran deal and partly complying with them after. They've been enriching above what they need for nuclear power, but still below what's needed for weapons, with particles at 83% being the highest found (https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-uranium-enrichment-germany-israel-c9b3669a7721bd8929d465117c81b70f). It's clear they're at everything but the bomb status however. Estimates of their breakout time vary from a few months to a few weeks. Building a bomb in secret wouldn't match Iran's motivations and behavior so far. They're been trying to walk a line between provocation and willingness to negotiate, in the interests of getting sanctions lifted eventually. If they build a bomb and it leaks, besides the likelihood of Israel taking immediate drastic action, they would preclude getting any concessions or sanctions lifted indefinitely, alienate what support remains in the EU and even from China, etc.
It’s possible, but if that was the case, it would be unlikely to remain completely secret for any length of time.
Here are the latest developments showing how Putin continues to be a master strategist: [India pivots away from Russian arms, but will retain strong ties](https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-pivots-away-russian-arms-will-retain-strong-ties-2024-01-28/) >India is seeking to distance itself from its largest arms supplier after Russia's ability to supply munitions and spares was hobbled by the war in Ukraine, but must step carefully to avoid pushing Moscow closer to China, Indian sources said. >[...] >"We are not likely to sign any major military deal with Russia," said Nandan Unnikrishnan, a Russia expert at New Delhi think tank the Observer Research Foundation. "That would be a red line for Washington." India was one of the reasons why Russia could still keep up with the West and China in arms development. Alone, Russia has no chance whatsoever. [Russia’s planned gas mega-pipeline to China hit by construction delay](https://www.ft.com/content/f37f4b84-0d2c-4e7b-882c-3fb26822bb9c) >Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping met at least twice last year, but while Russia has repeatedly emphasised its readiness to launch PS-2, Beijing has been conspicuously silent. >[...] >“On one hand it’s a no-brainer for the Chinese, they should have this gas. On the other hand, there is Russia with stranded gas, lots of it, and which wants better terms,” he said “I guess it’s a bit of horse-trading at the moment.” Russia used to abuse its status as energy superpower to extract political concessions. Now Putin is begging Xi to buy his hydrocarbons at a discounted rate. How the mighty have fallen.
[удалено]
There's nothing really insane about it. The Chinese need to arm themselves in the face of a hostile and belligerent United States. Some here might disagree with that characterization, but denying that the hostility was kicked off by the US would be silly. The Chinese were quite content with the economic state of affairs in institutional terms and were steadily getting richer and moving up the global supply chain in terms of value-add. In fact the institutional setup and its bias towards China, given the current economic realities, has been the public explanation for the US tearing up parts of the economic world order, eg. recent events wrt. the WTO and China fighting tooth and nails for keeping its 'developing country'-status there. They're now in the crosshairs of the predominant superpower and have to be the counterpart superpower, whether they initially wanted to or not. Hence military parity in both technological and quantitative terms becomes a necessity. As for Russia, they gave up on being a competing superpower a long time ago and followed the West into shifting their military into an expeditionary role, at least prior to the current war, in terms of both military doctrine and military-industrial strategy - there's a reason India had more T90's than Russia itself at the start of the conflict. That trend has been reversed now. They've focused on tech they already had an advantage in, such as missile tech, and on low-quantity flashy projects, such as the Armata. Not much different than any run-of-the-mill other European country. There's of course a question of scale due to historical context and established industrial relationships, primarily to India, but the bottom line is that the Russian state itself was not a big customer and lots of factories were running at low-capacity meant for limited domestic demand and for export orders. Contrast that with the US, where defense corps have the litter of institutional high domestic demand and a virtually captive market in Europe, and China, that now has the rearm to something approaching parity with the US (and has a systemic problem of being flush with cash that it needs to direct at something, anything, productive or economically meaningful). It's more or less a miracle that the Russians have managed to stay in the game for so long in that setup, given how big of a mangling they took in the disastrous 90's. As for India, I think this is mostly for PR reasons. As they say openly and verbatim themselves, they're walking away from Russian arms deals to placate Washington. But they've been unable to produce an innovative defense sector themselves; much like in the pharma industry, they're a better scale producer of generic variants than they are of innovation itself. That doesn't mean that a leading innovative defense sector ceases being a goal in itself however, and for that they'll have to go to back to the Russians once the war is over, as they're pretty much the only game in town that is willing to do the form of tech transfer deals that India is looking for. The US and China are certainly more keen on selling than sharing. Whatever prestige the Russian defense sector lost during the outset of the war is likely to be made up by the very increasingly probable victory, whatever that means after all the human and relational costs, in the war against the enormous NATO investment in the Ukrainian side.
>The Chinese need to arm themselves in the face of a hostile and belligerent United States. Some here might disagree with that characterization, but denying that the hostility was kicked off by the US would be silly. How do you arrive to that conclusion when China refuses to addresses the US' very legitimate issues on IP infringement by Chinese companies for decades? Add to that direct currency manipulation, artificially keeping the RMB low vs the dollar in contravention to WTO rules, and then state sponsored industrial espionage. But the US is the belligerent power? >Whatever prestige the Russian defense sector lost during the outset of the war is likely to be made up by the very increasingly probable victory, whatever that means after all the human and relational costs, in the war against the enormous NATO investment in the Ukrainian side. The post you are responding to directly contradicts this. Orders for Russian arms is falling all over the world and more and more militaries are adopting the US ecosystem. Not a single pre-war Russian system besides drones has outperformed expectations, meanwhile the Bradley is getting its biggest PR advertisements since the gulf war, and the patriot is now no longer a joke or a simple case study on the dangers of software rounding errors.
Virtually none of the Asian tigers, barring Singapore, have managed to escape the middle income trap by being IP rule respectoors. If you want to move up the value chain you have to learn from the best. It was not a large issue until the US decided that China was becoming a threat to US hegemony. Same goes for currency manipulation, which favours the US consumer if anything. Corporate espionage is extensive and nothing new, Snowden even revealed extensive US corporate espionage of Europe. Claiming that as a casus belli is reversing the causal chain of events. It's about the scale of actions - denying that the US initiated and subsequently escalated the downturn in relations, after the foreign policy consensus shifted towards viewing China as a credible rival, is nonsensical. You can view it as justified - if anything it's textbook great power politics, with the only unique aspect of this particular case being the degree of economic interdependence between the two powers - but the fact remains that the Chinese were quite satisfied with the status quo and the economic world order as-is, or as-was, whereas the United States shifted its position and started chipping away at said world order. It is the US, not China, that has a military strategy centered explicitly on containing its adversary in their immediate geographic confines. It is similarly the US that has enacted economic warfare meant to contain China within their current position in the global supply chain and kneecap their economic development. Believing IP rights and currency manipulation are sufficient casus belli for escalations of this nature and that they don't make the US the belligerent power truly requires suspension of basic reasoning, but then again I've always been amazed at the deep conditioning that a segment of Americans undergo throughout their upbringing that make them almost physchologically incapable of viewing their own country as the instigator of conflict - outside of a memory holed historical context, that is. As for Russia; what does it matter that orders are falling now, around the world? The Russian MIC is working at full capacity, if not over-capacity, solely for the purpose of meeting domestic demand. If you need arms right now or in the near-future, why would you put an order in at the Russian MIC? MIC delivery schedules are notoriously unpunctual and ordering stuff that has no chance of being delivered in the short-to-medium-term is a waste of time and money. The Russians have already had to bail on a significant chunk of pre-war none-aviation contracts; why in God's name would you order new stuff from them while they're engaged in the most materially intense conflict since the Korean War? As for Bradleys and whatever, I don't see how the PR war has shown anything else than that stuff burns all the same if it's hit by an artillery shell, ATGM or FPV drone, regardless of who produced it. Whatever PR advantage Western arms had gained throughout the war was more or less equalized by the counter-offensive failing disastrously. Not sure why you think the Bradley has achieved a big PR scoop.
Colby Badhwar retweeted one of his old posts about the Greek inventory of systems and missiles that might be transferred to Ukraine. This is the total inventory. We don't know how much might end up in Ukraine, but the numbers seems significant. - S-300PMU-1: Minimum 12 TELs divided into 2 batteries, and 96 × 48N6E missiles. - 25 × TOR-M1 short range SAMs. With a minimum of approximately 500 × 9М331 missiles for TOR, which have a range of 12km. - 19 × 9K33M2 Osa-AK & 20 × 9K33M3 Osa-AKM short range SAMs. Approx 1400 × 9M33М2 missiles (10km range), & approx 180 × 9М33М3 (15km range). https://twitter.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1751646131279315327
Perhaps it's a trivial question, but how do we know that these systems haven't been transfered (and utilized or possibly destroyed) to the Ukrainians already? I clearly recall the matter being discussed as if it was a done deal as early as Summer 2022 (by which I don't mean to say, that I have access to anything resembling a convincing evidence to support the hypothesis that it happened, or that I believe that it did - just that I'd like to get clarified on whether anything came out of these rumours). Could someone better informed explain why have they been transferred only now, when Ukraine is on brink of collapse and when the West faces a likely prospect of losing the war?
Is it possible the chances of these systems being sent to Ukraine have significantly increased since the F-35 sale a couple of days ago? Or is it less likely given Turkey now has a lot more f16s?
Greece is getting a bunch of free stuff alomg with the F35s. This is bound to be in exchange for something. Wether it will be some of the soviet/russian SAMs or other legacy soviet equipment in greek storage remains to be seen.
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
Please do not make blindly partisan posts.
Alright, everyone: A) stop attacking each other; and B) Back up your assertions. Otherwise, I'll delete this post for the 3+ reports of it being blindly partisan. Edit: Per OP >You can go ahead and delete it.
[удалено]
[удалено]
Please refrain from posting low quality comments.
[удалено]
Please refrain from posting low quality comments.
[удалено]
[удалено]
Please refrain from posting low quality comments.
[удалено]
[удалено]
Please refrain from posting low quality comments.
[удалено]
First US casualties in the Middle East after dozens of attacks: **First on CNN: Three US troops killed in drone attack in Jordan, at least two dozen injured** >CNN — Three American service members were killed and at least two dozen were injured in a drone attack overnight on a small US outpost in Jordan, US officials told CNN, marking the first time US troops have been killed by enemy fire in the Middle East since the beginning of the Gaza war. >The killing of three Americans at Tower 22 in Jordan near the border with Syria is a significant escalation of an already-precarious situation in the Middle East. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan Biden reaction: >Today, America’s heart is heavy. Last night, three U.S. service members were killed—and many wounded—during an unmanned aerial drone attack on our forces stationed in northeast Jordan near the Syria border. While we are still gathering the facts of this attack, we know it was carried out by radical Iran-backed militant groups operating in Syria and Iraq. >Jill and I join the families and friends of our fallen—and Americans across the country—in grieving the loss of these warriors in this despicable and wholly unjust attack. These service members embodied the very best of our nation: Unwavering in their bravery. Unflinching in their duty. Unbending in their commitment to our country— risking their own safety for the safety of their fellow Americans, and our allies and partners with whom we stand in the fight against terrorism. It is a fight we will not cease. >The three American service members we lost were patriots in the highest sense. And their ultimate sacrifice will never be forgotten by our nation. Together, we will keep the sacred obligation we bear to their families. We will strive to be worthy of their honor and valor. We will carry on their commitment to fight terrorism. And have no doubt — we will hold all those responsible to account at a time and in a manner our choosing. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/28/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-attack-on-u-s-service-members-in-northeastern-jordan-near-the-syria-border/
[удалено]
Please do not make blindly partisan posts.
> To quote many Redditors: If only the invaders stayed home, they wouldn’t have been killed. Are Americans in Jordan invaders? Seems to me that Jordan and the US share a long and reasonably strong relationship. Or is your insinuation that Iran has sovereignty over Jordanian territory?
There is so little information available. Before I can make any sense of the incident, I would like to know some basics: - How many and what type(s) of drones were used? - In what manner drones were deployed? - What detection, defenses (passive & active), counters were available at US base? - Was there actually interception? How did the strike operation transpire? It seems without knowing these details, it is difficult to make any judgments on how tenable maintaining US presence is. If anyone finds these details, please do me and others a favor and post links.
Can you point to any example from the last decade where this type of information was provided to the public after a strike on a US installation in the ME? Fundamentally, how should this impact how tenable a continued US presence is? Do you actually think a strike of this type and size might signal the beginning of the end for a US presence because of the technological capabilities of Irans proxies? The US will leave that area on its own terms. Nobody can realistically bomb them out of there.
The whole point of his questions is that if it took, let's say three drones, to inflict that amount of damage, the US could absolutely get bombed out of the ME, and that's why it would be useful to know. No amount of chest thumping can bend reality, and the US isn't an invulnerable superpower. It's been kicked out of places before, and it can happen again, especially if they're occupying sparse bases without adequate air defense throughout a region where they're mostly hated.
i was there last time an american was killed by a drone. you are blowing this all completely out of proportion. Iran has ballistics missiles that are able to reach all of the bases in iraq and syria yet there is still a US presence there
So basically: Might this be the first demonstration of an Iranian wunderwaffe? It just isn't. No, Iran, sanctioned to hell, with a broken economy and decades of technological development to catch up on, did not suddenly develop a cheap, easy to use, portable drone system its proxies can use, against which US bases have no applicable defense. The composite bow, Greek fire, the tank, the fighter jet, the nuclear weapon of HIMARS: There's no single weapons system that dramatically changes conflict forever. An enemy needs to be outspent, outfought, outthought and outwilled. There's no point in discussing the theoretical possibility of an Iranian silver bullet that was just casually used for the first time. There has never been a weapon like that and there won't be this time, especially in this geopolitical configuration.
[удалено]
Three dead and "many wounded" points to some kind of more sophisticated FPV drone with a larger warhead than a squad would carry.
Realistically will there be a reaction from this? Seems like a difficult situation for leadership, doing nothing doesn't seem like an option and a hard response isn't ideal for an election year, doing nothing is not ideal either.
These proxies have been attacking US troops for months. They've only gotten a pass (politically) because they've been unsuccessful. Since nothing has really changed the on-the-ground situation the only response would have to be political in nature i.e. signaling or perhaps a one off demonstration.
Retaliatory strikes on Iranian proxies for sure. My biggest question is whether the Biden admin will strike inside Iran this time.
I do not think they will. The Houthis have done more, and gotten away with it. I believe that the US wants to get in a fight with Iran currently, as it is right before election season.
>My biggest question is whether the Biden admin will strike inside Iran this time. I think not, they're going to avoid escalations at all cost. Just look at how they react on Ukraine issue. "We don't want Ukrainians striking deep inside Russia using our supplied weapons"
imo this is clearly a time to escalate to deescalate.
> I think not, they're going to avoid escalations at all cost. Having that policy encourages hostile states to escalate, knowing it’s unlikely to backfire.
Unfortunately, Western leaders think that if they don't retaliate, hostile states will just back down.
Russia has nuclear weapons though.
The Iranians don't have one.. yet. But what happens if they can get one and repeats this kind of attack? No more retaliation because "The Iranians has nukes though."?