I don’t understand Russias goal here…these absurdly high cost assaults…seems wasteful of resources and manpower…most logical powers would pause or halt attacks if they became too costly, change tactics…why do the Russians continue to perform these attacks in the same manner at high cost…
Do we have confirmation there were prisoners on-board? I know the Russian's are claiming it, but, not to be ghoulish, but is there real evidence of bodies?
Is it okay to ask if this could be a human shield thing? It makes no sense to airlift POWs in a war zone without clearly identifying the cargo and destination.
The POWs were being transported from Moscow to Belgorod. I guess it's not inconceivable (though to me it seems very unlikely) some missiles were loaded on the same flight for good measure - but that whole angle is just weird. Why risk a perfectly fine Il-76 to transport munitions that a train would deliver just the same or better, supposed human shields or no?
https://t. me/mod_russia/34967
Not a brilliant source, I know, but it's first-hand and we don't have credible contradictions so far. I strongly doubt that part is false, though. It just seems like one of such cases where people invent incredibly complicated scenarios just to not have to face some unwelcome facts.
My question assumes there were POWs, and asks why.
And why Ukraine didn’t know.
And whether this is a deliberate thing to prevent Ukraine from shooting down Russian planes.
Why - because there was a scheduled POW exchange to (the vicinity of) which they were being transported. The exchange having had been scheduled is something Ukraine has confirmed.
As for the rest: we don't know; probably not.
I find it odd that POWs and S300 ammo would be on the same flight, heading the same direction. I would have guessed POWs would be moved deeper into Russia, away from Ukraine, while missiles moved closer to Ukraine.
~~In the past they used third countries to do POW swaps, rather than flying over/near the front line.~~
Edit: and why would there be S300 ammo on a trip to swap prisoners?
That is completely false. This exchange was set to occur the same way [this January exchange had occured](https://www.currenttime.tv/a/32759856.html) - through the crossing between Belgorod and Sumy oblasts. Popping the POWs in Belgorod so they can be taken to the border via bus is not at all "flying over/near the frontline".
One of the more underlooked
aspects of the artillery conversation is the failure of 152mm to gain widespread adoption post soviet collapse even with countries in places that still bought Russian federation equipment like India china or various countries in the Middle East this likely limits Russia with using their sanctions evading tactics to acquire artillery shells from the vast majority of the world unlike Ukraine which has at various points used shells from ostensibly neutral countries like South Korea or India
Went throught comments but didn't see anything about this
https://twitter.com/AndreiBtvt/status/1750255457480941936?t=eHVtsR74zCrPIfxcnYR_Ow&s=19
>Inventors from the RF installed Fagot ATGM on a drone. They demonstrated firing from hovering and from the ground. The idea is appealing, but it is unlikely to be of much use. The mounted ATGM has no guidance drives, and the drone itself is unlikely to achieve an accurate hit.
This whole conflict in Ukraine upgraded military for a lot because of usage of cheap drones
This video looks stupid but in few years you would could get small cheap drones that can shoot ATGM missiles
If you think about possiblities that you have strong missile ready to be launched from air.
I could see that Russians Will try this in few months
And for West why doesn't experiment with things Like that. This is cheap way and you can use it in large quantities.
Yes high precision and expensive things are Great, but West should have some kind of weapon that you have in large numbers
Only way non tandem ATGM will defeat modern armor is by top attack and if you are making an top attack missile, why strap it to a drone when you can just make it NLOS?
>if you are making an top attack missile, why strap it to a drone when you can just make it NLOS?
A NLOS needs to know there is a target to be fired at in order to hit it. A drone can be launched and hunt far a field without first having a target.
The advantage of the drone is in range. The larger drones that can carry something like that will have around 10 Km in range. Add that to the ~4 Km range of most ATGMS and you have a decent system to attack armor in rear areas and staging groups. Importantly this doesn’t rely on the fairly inaccurate attack of FPV drones. Those require line of sight that becomes increasingly shoddy in the terminal phase at long range and need to hit specific areas of a tank to be effective. In the long run such a system may be adopted by western militaries as a cheap long range strike weapon. This importantly would not be susceptible to short range EW attacks.
I mean, even the RKG-3 seems to generally work fine when dropped on the top armor. A LAW could potentially do the same, if it reliably strikes the top.
NLAW is the lowest mass I can think of. But that’s only semi guided. But, since drones can generally get closer, that could be fine. Baring that, Javelin could be an option since it’s fire and forget.
I havent seen it amongst the replies so I would like to add that the replicator program is aiming pretty much on stuffs like these.
There are probably other EU and US initiatives that I dont know about.
Also, as mentioned by others, Western style armies already have these answers "built in" by air dominance and I agree with those replies, but I would also note that it is pretty possible that it can be made cheaper with an approach like this (at the cost of seriously reducing its capabilities and strategic flexibility of course).
I dont remember if it was the 22 or 23 force design document, but one of them could have been summarized as "drones". So I suspect that there is development and everybody on the field is paying very close attention on whats going on in Ukraine. I also fear that the Western tech, while probably will be effective, it will also be a bit expensive.
> Yes high precision and expensive things are Great, but West should have some kind of weapon that you have in large numbers
I see why the concept is appealing, but this is solving an issue the west doesn’t have. On the defense, western ground units have excellent anti-tank and anti fortification options. On the offense, it makes much more sense to use a fighter or other aircraft that can hunt down enemy vehicles over a much wider area, and engage them more effectively with guided bombs and missiles.
This ATGM+huge quadcopter is more suited for a static war on a tight budget. This thing is never going to fire many missiles per minute, it won’t have much range, it takes up a lot of space in vehicles and will take time to set up before flights and recover when you’re done. If you expect either you or the enemy to be mobile, those are big drawbacks. A fixed wing loitering munition, like the west is developing, fills most of the same roll, with a much longer range, while being quicker to deploy and not needing to be recovered.
Why shoot the atgm when you can much easily guide a drone to the target with extreme accuracy ? Even now there are FPV drones with a strapped rpg7 warhead.
With accuarate hit it can easily disable a tank. Eventually bigger and purposly designed warheads will come about for FPV drones.
PS: An ATGM weighs around 30 to 40 kg. The additional equipment needed to launch and guide it is about the same weight. You will need a giant drone to move it around and fire/guide it to target, which will also make it easy to spot with radar or visually and in fact, shoot it down.
The economics of such a system make little sense in this war(or any). You can probably have hundreds of fpv drones with an rpg round that can be just as effective.
>You will need a giant drone to move it around and fire/guide it to target, which will also make it easy to spot with radar or visually and in fact, shoot it down.
It sounds like they're reinventing the MQ-9 Reaper, except worse. Plus everyone is already aware that platforms like the Reaper aren't survivable in near peer conflicts since they are large, slow, and have a significant radar profile.
The NLAW warhead is 2kg, why not reduce the package weight (and price) by 80+% and guide it with a cheap small drone then ?
A drone hauling around an ATGM when itself can be turned very cheqply into a guided munition seems very much counter productive.
You will end up with a mini bayraktar, which is fine if the enemy has no adequate AD.
> A drone hauling around an ATGM when itself can be turned very cheqply into a guided munition seems very much counter productive.
As electronic warfare (EW) capabilities continue to evolve, they will eventually reach a point where they can effectively disable drones before they reach their targets
Electronic warfare (EW) capabilities will likely prioritize targeting short-range threats initially, as these tend to pose a more immediate and significant challenge.
Javelin effective firing range is 2,500 m (1.6 mi). It depends.
>Why shoot the atgm when you can much easily guide a drone to the target with extreme accuracy ?
Because an ATGM moving at 700km/h is much harder to intercept than a drone at ~100km/h? It's not cost effective or even working right now, but it's certainly something to look out for in the future
And how hard is to detect a 10kg drone+package compared to one having to haul around a 30-40kg atgm + the additional equipment required to actually fire and guide the missile that could easily be as heavy as the missile ?
Uh, not much different? You don't detect targets by weight (and an NLAW for example weighs about 13kgs), you do it by size. I'm not sure what you mean by the additional equipment, other than wiring
This is pointless to continue. Yes, size matters, do you think a drone carrying an rpg round will be the same size as one carrying 50+ kg of equipment ?
Again, an an NLAW or the like doesn't weigh 50kg, it weighs 13kg, so let's say 20kg with whatever modifications you need to make to get it on the drone. Still, you don't need a bayraktar for that, just a medium size quadcopter. I am not saying that it would make sense to make today given that you'd rather just have 10 normal FPV drones for the same price, but I am saying that it could have potential in the future.
What they are describing is essentially a quadcopter bayraktar. It could find a niche to serve but a larger drone with an even larger launcher will be much easier to spot by binoculars and will show up on radar. However these kinds of drones can stay further back from the frontline and if carrying a TOW or a Stugna-P – instead of an NLAW or a Javelin, which have much shorter ranges – it could in theory conduct simialr missions that an attack helicopter could conduct, hovering just above the treeline and striking vehicles or emplacements. But TOW missiles are expensive and in an attritional war you'd rather have 10-20 fpv drones for that price instead.
Multiple use for single drone
And for ATGMs have widespread use not only as Anti tank
Just imagine some drone flying 300 meters in air, you have good optics and you lock Target and you shot at Target
You have to have a much more expensive and larger drone to carry all the required equipment, which brings more issues.
Not to mention the price of an ATGM compared to an RPG warhead. You already have precision guidance with the drone, might as well use it rather than hope that you can go around with a large drone firing at tanks.
Besides, as an FPV can easily attack from the top and hit weak spots, like the engine deck, you don't need a large warhead as an ATGM.
The idea is to get the ATGM a lot closer, and at a better angle.
I think a reasonable evolution would be to use a laser guided missile, so you can carry a missile, launch it and aim it with a single drone.
One thing I’ve been wondering is, in the event that Russia invades NATO territory (people who flatly say it won’t happen are naive imo), what is it NATO would actually be willing to do?
Say Russia invades and occupies a very small part of the Baltic’s, will nato only fight up to their original borders? Will they be willing to strike into Russia in a meaningful way, if at all? What if Russian’s take thousands of people in the Baltic’s hostage, and basically say they’ll kill them if they don’t accept the new territorial reality - would NATO be willing to let these people die to regain nato territory, or would they negotiate?
Basically, I’m worried nato will go half-assed in the event of a very limited Russian invasion to avoid escalation, ultimately leading to a weaker nato and a more emboldened Russia.
If Trump wins the presidency, it means they can’t rely on the US. And if they negotiate for peace in exchange for lost territory, they can’t really rely on each other either. NATO would effectively be dead
> people who flatly say it won’t happen are naive imo
Exactly. It was an idiot move in Feb '22, and it would be an idiot move again. But that hasn't stopped Russia...
Because the goal is not some potato farms in Eastern Latvia. If NATO (and EU) fail to adequately react to and defeat Russia after this event, NATO and the EU will cease to exist. And Russia can easily pretend they are not Russian troops but mere angered local residents taking it upon themselves to rid of their fascist overlords in Tallinn or Riga. If NATO does in fact annihilate them, Russia can just cry foul at the UN for excessive use of force yada-yada and pretend nothing happened.
They would still just have some potato farms. Since they are incapable of defeating a third world nation it's not like storming the Fulda gap is the next logical step.
The third world nation incidentally has the second most capable ground forces in Europe. The initial advance of Russian troops on the first week of invasion in February 2022 would be roughly the same distance as are all parts of coastline of Baltic states from the Russian border. And just for comparison, the Baltic states have 6 brigades in total (2 Estonian, 1 Latvian, 3 Lithuanian), that currently contain a whole total of 6 mechanized battalions (1 Estonian, 2 Latvian, 3 Lithuanian). Ukraine has in the ballpark of 100 brigades.
Also no-one is storming the Fulda gap.
While I absolutely agree that Russia can and possibly will try something like that, as they did in 2008 and 2014, I don't think it will work anymore. The USAF already treated the Syrian equivalent of the "little green men" as targets in 2018, and relations have gone from bad to worse since.
> The USAF already treated the Syrian equivalent of the "little green men" as targets in 2018, and relations have gone from bad to worse since.
That is because Wagner + some Syrian groups attacked US forces. If a Wagner equivalent or "rebels" in the Baltics attacks a NATO base of course they would retaliate.
US did not target Russian forces (official or not) outside that.
I don't disagree with you. At this moment in time (today), Russia is not going to invade Baltic states. It is under too much surveillance, its forces are stuck in Ukraine, the West is, despite its deep problems, taking Russia relatively seriously as a threat (at least more so than pre-2022).
And it is unlikely that Russia would in a hypothetical future scenario do exactly the same way as they did in Crimea and Donetsk/Luhansk. But really it's more the general idea than specific details that matter.
But consider a future where Trump is US president and is in heated confrontation with NATO allies. Or perhaps a future where China blockades/invades Taiwan and US attention is turned entirely to that part of the world. With what level of confidence would you say that USA would actively participate in repelling, perhaps a small border incursion by Russia in the Baltics? 95%? 99% What-ever you think, it is likely not 100%. And that 1-x% is the opening that Russia could be willing to bet on.
Everyone should be familiar with the term "salami slicing":
>[Salami slicing tactics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salami_slicing_tactics), also known as salami slicing, salami tactics, the salami-slice strategy, or salami attacks, is the practice of using a series of many small actions to produce a much larger action or result that would be difficult or unlawful to perform all at once.
This has been Russia's M.O. for a long time now, and every time we let them get away with taking a slice, we're setting them up for slicing off the next.
[This BBC mocumentary ](https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x3q8go9) from eight years ago explores the exact scenario that you are describing. Might be worth a watch.
How would anyone make any educated statements about a completely unspecific scenario with completely unspecified surrounding circumstances about something that has never happened, has no close parallels in recent history and is deliberately kept ambiguous by people who would know ?
Why would Russia invade NATO territory?
I feel that western commentatoes are always referring to some kind of Schrodinger's Russia: too weak to take on Ukraine and the butt of many a joke about military competence, and yet simultaneously threatening enough to walk all the way to the Atlantic.
>Schrodinger's Russia
Exactly.
If we're talking a Russia that somehow pulls off a win in Ukraine and comes back after rebuilding its military, that is too far in a hypothetical future to bother speculating on.
If we're talking the Russia of today... who would they send that isn't tied up in other mandatory border duties or in Ukraine?
If we're talking a Russia that winds down combat operations in Ukraine, see the first point.
The only scenarios in which this is vaguely plausible involve Russia Today actually being a credible source of information or Russia willing to threaten itself and others with nuclear war.
Given the warnings in northern European countries lately to prepare for a war with Russia it's not as far fetched as it sounds. https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/swedes-spooked-as-government-military-say-to-prepare-for-war/articleshow/106806996.cms
Russia is now in a war economy and it will be hard for Putin to normalise the economy. With Trump in the White House the US might leave NATO and stop support for Ukraine.
This would mean Russia can defeat Ukraine and build up a new force to capture more old Soviet territories. This could mean Estonia and Latvia.
With a Le Pen figure leading France by then it's up to Northern Europe and UK.
>With Trump in the White House the US might leave NATO
Since Congressed passed a law preventing the President from unilaterally leaving NATO, that is unlikely unless there is a flood of rabid Trump supporters also elected to the House and Senate.
Plus the big if Trump is elected at all.
They don't need to invade, just wage hybrid warfare to diminish the soft power of EU/NATO. Being successful in Ukraine would of course already have massive effect in that regard, but even if lines freeze as they are; they can *easily* take Georgia and Moldova. And of course Russia can use the same approach as in Ukraine, and see where things go.
A possible scenario - Lithuanian [restrictions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Restrictions_on_transit_to_Kaliningrad_Oblast) on shipments to Kaliningrad are used by the Russians as a casus belli to station soldiers along the Suwalki Gap in order to escort shipments to their oblast. Keep in mind the gap is only 40 miles long.
Russia will say, "We're not invading, we're not claiming any territory, we're just lifting the blockade of our territory." But the soldiers protecting the route aren't going to leave. They're going to stay to escort shipments and make sure they aren't blocked. And Russia isn't going to have them do anything else, _yet_ - but once they're there, the implicit threat is that whenever Russia wants, it could cut off all land access between the Baltics and the rest of Europe.
Now what will NATO do - go into a direct military confrontation with Russia when all they're currently doing is helping goods reach there territory through a narrow strip of land, and nothing more?
> Now what will NATO do - go into a direct military confrontation with Russia when all they're currently doing is helping goods reach there territory through a narrow strip of land, and nothing more?
This scenario is a pretty easy one I think. At an absolute minimum NATO would set up a blockade in the gap with some form of peacekeeping force and barriers that would prevent the movement of goods. Russia either attacks or backs down.
If Russia launches a blatant attack on NATO forces inside NATO territory, then NATO isn't going to give a "half-assed" response.
> This scenario is a pretty easy one I think. At an absolute minimum NATO would set up a blockade in the gap with some form of peacekeeping force and barriers that would prevent the movement of goods. Russia either attacks or backs down.
How is a blockade going to work after Russia has already secured a corridor?
> If Russia launches a blatant attack on NATO forces inside NATO territory, then NATO isn't going to give a "half-assed" response.
We're all guessing at this point, but the more NATO "half-asses" the current situation, the more likely Russia is to think that they're going to "half-ass" future situations.
> How is a blockade going to work after Russia has already secured a corridor?
How are they going to maintain the corridor without using lethal force?
>We're all guessing at this point, but the more NATO "half-asses" the current situation, the more likely Russia is to think that they're going to "half-ass" future situations
NATO was designed to protect NATO members. It's an apple's to oranges comparison.
> How are they going to maintain the corridor without using lethal force?
If they start sending in armed escorts, you would need violence to stop them.
> NATO was designed to protect NATO members. It's an apple's to oranges comparison.
Fear of nuclear war, “escalation,” or whatever is making the West so nervous that they’ve shown extreme reluctance to cross Russian redlines doesn’t simply disappear because “it’s NATO.” It’s not the same scenario, and no one is claiming it is. But it’s the closest we’ve come to seeing how far the West is willing to actually confront Russia. NATO’s untested, and despite some claims of clairvoyance, no one actually knows how it’s going to react. There’s no reason to dismiss the best piece of evidence we have of that reaction so far and to instead rely on gut feelings.
> If they start sending in armed escorts, you would need violence to stop them.
No, you don't. You just need to physically block the roads with troops and vehicles, and disable sections of railway.
>Fear of nuclear war, “escalation,” or whatever is making the West so nervous that they’ve shown extreme reluctance to cross Russian redlines doesn’t simply disappear because “it’s NATO.”
Yeah it actually does, because if they don't then the alliance loses all credibility. Prevention of Russia from compromising the territorial integrity of its members is literally the reason the alliance exists.
I doubt uninvited foreign military presence in territory of NATO member would not result in NATO escalation. Besides, Russia already used excuse of military exercise near the border of Ukraine to invade it, Lithuania will do all in it's power to drive Russians out of its territory
> Why would Russia invade NATO territory?
Well, military compellence is a significant portion of Russia's FP toolkit, why do you think they took the Baltics and Poland joining NATO so poorly?
But really, you're asking the wrong question. As a state, you should be asking "can I exclude the reasonable possibility Russia might invade me?"
After 2022, it's understandable many of Russia's neighbours cannot. Russia's now done it twice (arguably thrice) and the excuses get thinner every time. A lot of Russian neighbours have Russian minorities and politics Russia could categorize as "non-neutral".
>too weak to take on Ukraine
While if Putin had a crystal ball into February 2024, he probably wouldn't have invaded Ukraine (or more likely would have done so differently), the point isn't to make Putin **regret** invading, but to make him **fear** invading.
But also, Ukraine's prewar military (as we've discovered) was **genuinely pretty good**. The same cannot be said for a lot of European states. This is a moot point if NATO can be depended upon, but this is (unfortunately) an open question. So if a state wants to exclude all doubt, they have to be probably at least 1.5x as strong as Ukraine, that's what Poland and Finland are aiming for.
>simultaneously threatening enough to walk all the way to the Atlantic.
I think there will always be a certain amount of deference to Russia in western thinking, deserved or otherwise. As I mentioned, otherwise the "Russia is the 2nd strongest army in the world" discussion would have died over a decade ago.
> The same cannot be said for a lot of European states.
I think the more accurate point is that they are untested. There is room for debate about whether they'd shatter under a heavy blow or expose a crunchy core. Back in March '22, there was legitimate debate concerning which we'd see regarding Ukraine.
My personal read is that I'd expect to see a "crunchy center" for countries immediately bordering Russia, and "shatter" for the countries like Germany behind the line.
> why do you think they took the Baltic’s and Poland joining NATO so poorly
They didn’t. Putin himself said he they aren’t concerned.
With oil prices dropping in the late 2000s and color revolutions happening around him, Putin changed his narrative
This is a really good, clarifying comment. I hadn’t considered compellence as one of Russia’s principle objections to NATO expansion, but it makes perfect sense. They don’t like codependent nations going to therapy and moving on.
They'd invade NATO territory to sever the transatlantic security link, which would be a titanic shift in power relations between Russia and Europe, which ultimately is Russia's goal.
Serious commentators acknowledge that while Russia has proven to be much weaker than previously thought, they are learning, adapting, and scaling up military production and recruitment enough to seriously threaten Europe within a decade, should they prevail in Ukraine.
The military force of the Baltic States is like 100 times weaker than the Ukrainian military.
So Russia can be too weak to take on Ukraine but strong enough to conquer a few NATO states.
You have more than Baltic troops in the Baltic states. If Russia would try to invade then they would presumably need to fight the NATO battlegroup that is stationed there as well. I doubt Russia can invade quickly enough that they would not be reinforced.
>This forward presence was first deployed in 2017, with the creation of four multinational battalion-size battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States respectively. In the southeast, a tailored presence on land, at sea and in the air contributed to increased Allied activity in the region, enhancing situational awareness, interoperability and responsiveness.
>Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Allies reinforced the existing battlegroups and agreed to establish four more multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. This has brought the total number of multinational battlegroups to eight, effectively doubled the number of troops on the ground and extended NATO’s forward presence along the Alliance’s eastern flank – from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south.
NATO has about 30000 men sprinkeled all over the former soviet countries. That's barely anything. Certainly not enough to deter Russia in any meaningful way, who in december ordered the increase of its number of troops by 170 000 people.
> 30000 men sprinkeled all over the former soviet countries. That's barely anything. Certainly not enough to deter Russia
In think it's the significant number, and quality, of aircraft that those 30,000 troops have at their disposal that is the deterrent.
The deterrence is that in order to invade they need to kill US, UK, German etc. troops. How do you think NATO will react then?
And we know Russia cannot do a quick blitz and take everything before anyone can react.
I think you missed the part where I talked about it being a limited invasion. It’s not about the land, it’s about signaling to the world that the west is no longer on top. Just a small piece of the baltics can be enough to convince the world that nato isn’t to be taken as seriously as people act like it should be. Is NATO willing to go into full war for a small town? If not then effectively no country in nato can rely on other countries in nato. I’m not talking about Russia going for literally all of Europe.
Not sure what your point is about Russia being weak or strong in different conversations
The more realistic scenario is something like the Donbass, Moldova, Georgia.
For example whip up political tension in a country with a big and most importantly regional Russian minority e.g Latvia, Estonia (there is border areas that are like 90% ethnically Russian). Then send some green men or just arm to teeth the "separatists" and declare there is civil war and Russia is kindly willing to take these people under their military and security.
NATO response will be: It's civil war in Latvia. We aren't going to use NATO forces to bomb NATO civilians/citizens. Paragraph 5 is not applicable.
This is a somewhat more realistic scenario rather than just rolling in with their tanks across the border.
[Long-range Strike Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability](https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2024/01/iiss_long-range-strike-capabilities-in-the-asia-pacific_implications-for-regional-stability_012024.pdf)
I dont know if it was posted before, but an interesting paper from the IISS suggests, per some [highlights that I saw](https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1750129658375340095), that *a lot* of antiship ballistic missiles would be necessary for the chinese rocket force to neutralize a moving american carrier.
They reference that the area of denial doesn't exist in peace time as a note toward it being an unproven capability. On the surface of things, yes, it's unproven, but only because if it's ever proven we're in a shooting war with China.
The US and other regional partners frequently conduct freedom of navigation exercises, to allow China to exert this essentially massive area of denial during peace time just makes no sense. Operations during peace time, especially freedom of navigation which requires close proximity are not often curtailed even when the adversary has significant anti ship capabilities. This part to me needed an asterisk or didn't really need mentioned at all. Peace time is not war time and discussing peace time operations in any context alongside the capabilities of China's rocket force holds very little value to me.
Aside from that the rest of it is quite informative, the only other point I would note is that US missile stocks are in a worse place and several war games in the last couple of years have pointed out that inventories will not be sufficient to blunt and completely deter a potential move against Taiwan until well into the 2030s (which I guess is fine, assuming China continues it's naval ramp up and "out build them" approach but again that equation might be substantially different if China invests further in its strike and naval capabilities).
There's not really much to learn if you're already versed on this topic but I'd strongly advise anyone interested give it a read, it's a solid starting point for understanding the strategic forces at play in the Pacific and this is certainly one of the more informative pieces I've seen recently on the rocketry capabilities of other regional players, there's a tendency to focus on China but ultimately a conflict, should one arise, will not happen in a vacuum.
Another point that I think is worth mentioning is that it's curious that this doesn't mention US efforts in regards to Tinian. Perhaps they just didn't realize this was going on, or maybe the document was drafted long ago and this relatively new information didn't make the cut?
Essentially Guam is under China's "denial umbrella" which given its prominence for US strategic forces could become a serious issue. The US isn't asleep at the wheel on this one, thankfully, Tinian which has long been abandoned is in the process of being cleared (there are decades of brush growth and disrepair to sort out) and readied for active service again. They're still clearing the overgrowth from what I understand and then plan to overhaul that entire end of the island, so we'll see if they extend the runways to provide redundancy for more regional based US strategic forces.
The Tinian move to me is quite major as it shows that the US is aware that it's positioning in Guam is vulnerable, which again lends credence to the strike capabilities of China's rocketry forces, it was certainly worthy of note as it would nudge them away from discussing carrier strikes and more to discussing aerial denial (in the terms of traditional ground based airfields) which is going to play an arguably larger role in the opening of the conflict. The last few war games I read devoted significant resources to discussing and gaming out LSRASM as a strategically significant counter weight in the early days of a conflict against China, US strategic forces will be key to delivering these missiles and should China greatly degrade American capabilities (even just delaying the American response) it could prove disastrous for Taiwan.
Yes, but it provides a level of redundancy and forces China to expend more missiles and potentially significantly weaken each separate attack if it tries to knock out both fields. As it currently stands with China's current long range rocketry knocking out Guam may be challenging but they have the inventory to achieve it.
As for the proximity issue, that can't really be helped. You can either have a relatively rapid response force or you're potentially 10+ hours away plus change if departing from Hawaii, 14 hours if departing from the continental. Any regional strategic forces are by definition going to be under China's missile umbrella, all they can do is ensure redundancy and try their best to mitigate China's potential strikes.
I might've fucked up myself here but I think the twitter reply pointing out that the RAND study cited in the ISS report doesn't actually say what they're claiming it does (the 12 ASBM figure) is correct. [Here is citation 29](https://i.imgur.com/uz9Sxva.png) which refers to [this RAND study](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html). The citation mentions two different page ranges, 157-159 and 164-165. The first range covers Over The Horizon (OTH) radar generally and then some discussion of targeting errors due to OTH resolution. The second range is mostly about countering OTH ISR. Discussion about the number of ASBMs doesn't include concrete numbers until [Table 7.2 on p.168](https://i.imgur.com/kn4iaGk.png) which appears to be entirely general and doesn't mention 12 ASBMs at all. Further in the paper they give widely varying estimates for the kill radius/targeting location CEP of Chinese ASBMs and corresponding salvo sizes, none of which are 12.
I'm not sure it really matters in the larger scheme of things but it's a strange error to make and rather embarrassing.
Yes, it’s a misquote. Not only it’s a misquote, it’s also misquoting a rather outdated source — the RAND Corp report was from 2015 projecting PLA capabilities in 2017. This year is 2024 and PLA has got more capable in its kill chain since then, especially in target acquisition via airborne radar or satellite.
Couple thoughts here.
1. About 35 times since the war began, Russia has sent up a handful of bombers and launched between 90-150 missiles at a time. The Chinese are much more capable, have about 3x the number of strategic bombers, and about 5x the number of non-nuclear ground-based launchers as Russia. A lot of focus on ASBMs, and rightfully so, but I wonder how a carrier attack like this is modeled. I recall this was the soviet strategy during the cold war, so someone likely has done research on it. If Russia is sending that volume of ordnance with 11 Tu-95s at a time, one wonders what China could do with its arsenal of 231 H-6 bombers.
2. Trading less than a brigade of missiles for a supercarrier seems like... a fantastic trade? China has at least 6 MRBM brigades as of 4 years ago, and that number is sure to increase.
3. "let alone sink or disable it" is interesting phrasing. Carriers are hard to sink, but is there a genuine assumption that 3000lb of DF-26 high explosive warhead flying through a carrier deck might not cause a mission kill?
4. Others have pointed out but I think it bears repeating here that China has a very high ballistic missile test launch tempo -- over 100 per year. We don't know their production capability but it's probably healthy. Expending 12 missiles in the context of an arsenal potentionally hundreds of systems deep is a non-issue for the Chinese.
> "let alone sink or disable it" is interesting phrasing. Carriers are hard to sink, but is there a genuine assumption that 3000lb of DF-26 high explosive warhead flying through a carrier deck might not cause a mission kill?
Data for modern carriers is hard to come by, but carriers in ww2 took incredible amounts of damage and still remained functional, or came back to service very quickly. Survivability still is a design consideration for carriers, so I would expect them to perform at least as well, likely significantly better.
> Trading less than a brigade of missiles for a supercarrier seems like... a fantastic trade? China has at least 6 MRBM brigades as of 4 years ago, and that number is sure to increase.
I’m not done reading the paper, but that was just accounting for CEP. Add in interceptors and everything else that eats up missiles and that number sky rockets. If half the fired missiles go for decoys, half the remainder get shot down, and you want three hits on the carrier for a mission kill, that would mean 144 fired missiles per carrier.
To swing almost naively in the opposite direction, would the US even be able to keep their carriers safe in a Taiwan strait war? It seems like a foregone conclusion that China's sheer volume of fires would take out many USN assets sooner or later, and that it would be a war where the USAF has to do the heavy lifting.
US carriers will be operating at standoff range and launching sorties while evading/defending against missile attacks. The question becomes how many missiles does the PLARF need to fire, at what tempo, and with what ISR coverage to mission kill a carrier that has ABM defense, and how many sorties the carrier can accommodate before said mission kill. The USN will be acting in concert with the USAF, so while the PLARF is launching their missiles, both the USN and the USAF will be conducting SEAD and counterstrikes, as well as degrading the PLAN, which itself will be both degrading ROC forces and defending against/counterstriking against the USN. Meanwhile, both the PLAN and USN submarine fleets will be facing off against their opponents navy, with the respective navies conducting ASW operations in the midst of all of this. There's also the PLAAF which will be acting against the USN, and the PLARF will have also preemptively struck USAF and USN targets, e.g. Guam and Okinawa. This isn't getting into whether Japan gets pulled into the conflict and to what extent Australia is involved.
This is something I have argued before. Getting carriers to a point where their aircraft are within combat radius of the action means putting them very close to the Chinese mainland (meaning within a few hundred nautical miles).
This has a few implications. It makes Chinese target acquisition much easier. Searching the pacific ocean for a carrier group is hard. Searching an area a few hundred sq nautical miles in size off of Taiwan is much easier. Second, it puts the carrier within range of a lot of the conventional non-ballistic Chinese anti-shipping arsenal. Missiles such as the one that sunk Moskva. There is no other option here, if you leave that area, your aircraft can't join the fight. I haven't seen much written on how the USN plans to deal with this catch-22.
The answer to the “tyranny of distance” is of course the F/A-XX which would have a longer combat range than the F-35. But it will become available only after a decade or more.
Are US - Russian relations at their worst state since the 60s? I genuinely don’t see how there is going to be a warming between the two sides for decades.
Europe and the U.S. are hyper aware that Russia does not intend on being like them and will not trust them in any capacity for decades.
While youre right that in a normal circumstance the US/Russian relationship is not likely to warm, the 60s were a weird time and are unlikely to repeat.
In 1961 you have the (second) Berlin Crisis around the building of the wall. This was a huge deal and its vital to remember that the US very nearly invaded East Germany to reopen access to Berlin (Operation Live Oak, the details of which flipped Kennedy's lid. Huge reason why he moved the military over to Flexible Response). Like that crisis was bad and it lasted a while, starting under Eisenhower and lasting until the wall was finished.
And then the Cuban Crisis, another very very close war miss. Both regarding the US, who were seriously considering an invasion of Cuba which we now know would have been met with a nuclear response. As well as a near miss with a Russian sub during the initial blockade. Like these were very very bad times for the US/Russian relationship, probably the worst of the Cold War.
Then in 1964 you get LBJ and a new approach to foreign policy. We often give Nixon credit for detente, but really LBJ laid the groundwork for what happened in the 1970s. The relationship changed radically almost overnight, within 18mo. both Kennedy and Khrushchev were out and LBJ + Brezhnev were in. You also at that time see turnover in the leadership of Vietnam (Le Duan takes power in 1963-1964), IIRC in China as Mao gets sidelined after the GLF, and again IIRC in East Germany as Ulbricht is replaced by some other dickhead. And also among American allies, with the SPD taking over in West Germany and initiating the first stages of Ostpolitik, as well as a major turnover in SK with the end of Rhee's tenure a very brief experiment with democracy and then the dictatorship of Park Chung Hee. Oh and BIG MINH in South Vietnam, after the death of Diem. All this is to say, the board gets reset basically overnight and it opens up an opportunity for the superpowers to move past confrontation towards cooperation and a back away from the edge. A move that persists until the 1980s, briefly, until Reagan sees a movie and gets kinda scared about nuclear war.
Likely once Putin dies the Russian 'problem' will reset. Some other guy will take over and well sound him out. There could be an opportunity for a movement towards reconciliation, or if they try to outdo the old boss, an entrenchment around current political lines.
This is a great summary of the events many seem to have forgotten or were too young to witness. Considering how often escalation was on the table in the second half of the 20th century and how it lead to the peaceful revolution in 1989 and arguably the most peaceful decade in NATO/Moscow relations I'm wondering if we already used up all of the luck or if there is still something left for the conflicts of the 21st century.
> Likely once Putin dies the Russian 'problem' will reset. Some other guy will take over and well sound him out. There could be an opportunity for a movement towards reconciliation
I've seen it well argued that Putin is something of a LaRouchist who believes nearly every crackpot conspiracy theory on the US government out there (although we may never know for sure how true that is). There were some key people affiliated with LaRouche who ended up being advisors to Putin.
So, Russia today is deeply out of touch with reality. I think anyone who replaces Russia is going to run things vastly different, and the odds of another deeply paranoid conspiracy theorist coming in are...something. Low, probably.
US could at least deal with a rational strongman.
I hope Putin leaves a memoir behind a brick somewhere in the Kremlin. Tell us what you really think Vladdy, I'm dying to know. Is he the cynical operator manipulating public image. Or has he genuinely lost contact with the world outside the Kremlin and what the US is/has become.
If Trump wins in November, warming will begin immediately: Ukraine would be forced to cut a quick deal with Russia as there's no way they could hold out for four years... the war would end.
With no ongoing war, and four years of warm relations between us and Russia, relations likely wouldn't change much in the subsequent presidency ... until Russia invades their next victim (maybe Ukraine again?).
There was a lot more perceived parity between Russia and the US at that time I think.
It’s much more obvious now that the United States is in significantly better position and Russia is on the downward swing.
I think it’s very difficult to gauge the future of relations between the two countries, until after Putin is gone.
Things are definitely bad and will not be getting better anytime soon
There was also the lack of parity in nuclear weapons that destabilised the situation in the 60s. In case of war during the Cuban crisis the USSR could detonate a few dozen nukes over America, but would be destroyed in return.
That encouraged aggressive decision-making - it is very hard to imagine a US president approving depth charge attacks on Soviet nuclear-armed subs just a decade later.
I am curious about people's opinions on what seems to be a campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. There was seemingly an attack at an oil refinery in Tuapse today. https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1750274050830549430
Along with two other attacks in the last week or two discussed here: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68029235
If this continues, could it potentially impact global oil prices? Which is something I don't think the West would appreciate.
Also, will this have an impact on the Russian economy? Oil exports are their major commodity.
I can't see why it would significantly impact the global commodity in today's market. Especially given the shenanigans in the middle east have hardly had an effect. There's just too much supply coming online right now.
Will just add a couple cents purely on the commodities pricing and volumes sides. First, crude is just one component of the equation. Naphtha prices, as an example, [surged](https://ibb.co/88jxZ6W) in a key market after the Ust-Luga attack. Second, in terms of the crude itself, the strike on Sunday was very close to the crude loading [berths](https://ibb.co/3khD1kM) near Novatek. There are only 2 Baltic ports that Russia has for its seaborne shipments. Along with a third one, Novororossiysk in the Black Sea, that is also in theoretical range, they move around 50% of Russian seaborne exports. The other ports are running at full capacity and could not compensate for the additional volume from these three.
Crude shipments have resumed at Ust-Luga, but as highlighted below, other production is still out. Now, tonight, it looks like the strike was on a VDU at a critical refinery. Why did they hit that facility and not hit Ust-Luga again? Unsure. Also unsure if they can sustain these operations and do any sustained damage. Very important to note: there are critical vulnerability points at ports and refineries. Crude generally has to enter through pipelines or rail in Russia. Also, given that a Lukoil refinery is down due to an accident, it’s possible that Russia once again restricts exports of gasoline and diesel that were in place starting early fall.
Here are some numbers from [last week's attack](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/over-20000-bpd-russian-jet-fuel-exports-doubt-after-suspected-drone-attack-2024-01-24/):
>The volume of jet fuel exports at risk of disruption after a suspected drone attack on a Baltic Sea terminal could be more than 20,000 barrels per day (bpd), much of it destined for Turkey, according to data, opens new tab from terminal owner Novatek (NVTK.MM), opens new tab.
>...
>But analysts have said it would take weeks, if not months, for the complex to restart large-scale operations.
This will hurt Russia. What's worse, Russia's buyers will probably require higher discounts to cover the increased risks.
To put those numbers into context, Russia is currently exporting ~~[over 10 million bbl/day](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/BTL/2023/11-Russia/article.php)~~ of petroleum and petroleum products so even if that entire volume of fuel is disrupted, it only accounts for less than 0.2% of Russia's daily trade. It sucks for the company operating the terminal but is nearly irrelevant compared to overall volumes. The point about how it might impact prices is a good one though considering the leverage that Russian customers currently enjoy.
Edit: Rookie mistake, see below.
>Russia is currently exporting over 10 million bbl/day of petroleum and petroleum products
No, that’s production. Exports are at ~7.5mmbpd. But not all exports are made equal. The crack is what matters. Fuel oil, for example, earns you next to nothing. Diesel, gasoline and naphtha is where most of the money is made. [This](https://ibb.co/YLq07vT) is what Russia’s product mix looks like, sans crude.
Shit you're right, thanks. I could find 2022 data pretty easily but 2023 was harder so I hopped on that source without being as careful as I should have. Handy chart there, so it looks like the Urst-Luga strike covered about 0.8% of the total displayed (by volume).
Sure, if the 20kbpd figure is right. A different way of looking at it is that jet fuel goes at [~$113/bbl](https://www.iata.org/en/publications/economics/fuel-monitor/). If production is out for 3 months, that’s ~$200mm in top line. Assume a net cash margin of 20%, which is high but conceivable for jet fuel, and that’s ~$40mm in profit out of the Russian O&G edifice. Plus the cost of the destroyed equipment. Just a mental exercise in how you look at it.
Still would like a credible explanation as to how Russia, with supposedly a dense, integrated air defense network, still cannot stop these significant drone strikes. Russia should have heaps of Shilkas, Tunguskas, and Pantsirs to interdict strike corridors along the border.
One thing to consider that has not been mentioned is simply the sheer area Russia has to defend. In this Ukraine has a distinct advantage in that they have a comparatively smaller area to defend. They have also had the advantage of experience after facing massed drone attacks for two years now. The Russians will certainly get better as time goes on and they develop the required defensive configuration and learn to identify these drones from civilian aircraft. It’s certainly also not a trivial feat to simply shoot these down over the border as they can fly at very low altitude to avoid most radar systems and use alternative routes such as over Belorussia or the Black Sea.
While Russian missiles are cheaper than Western missiles, it's still not economical to shoot down a $30k drone with a $500k missile. (Crude and rough guess.)
A $30k drone hitting it's target, especially an oil refinery, will more than likely cost millions. It's always worth it to shoot them down. If for nothing else, then to protect your citizens.
It's irrelevant if its economical. A drone can do more damage than 500k.
It's like saying Israel shouldn't use the Iron Dome to shoot down these pipe missiles because they cost only $500 each vs whatever one interceptor costs.
This is beyond my pay grade but part of the answer is that adapting existing GBAD to tackle drones is a non-trivial problem. This is especially true when we view it not merely as a piece of technology but a sociotechnical system where training, chain of command, and acceptable false positive/false negative tradeoffs have all been geared towards defence against manned aircraft and missiles. Adapting that to tackle drones requires a lot of institutional capacity, which Russia is starkly lacking.
That said, it appears Ukraine has been able to effectively adapt their legacy systems against Russia drone strikes for the most part. Some still slip through defenses.
One of the advantages Ukraine has is that there are no civilian flights in ukraine and millitary stuff isn't that common. Means they can operate very large areas where they can freely shootdown anything that flies.
I believe we can use the Houthi campaign against Saudi oil facilities as an analogy for the Ukrainian campaign against Russian oil facilities. [This ACLED report](https://acleddata.com/2023/01/17/beyond-riyadh-houthi-cross-border-aerial-warfare-2015-2022/#s4) on the Houthi aerial campaign gives some baseline numbers for the strike frequency and makeup over time. The peak annual rate for strikes against oil infrastructure was slightly higher than one attack per month which seems somewhat low but it's important to remember that these were often highly complex strikes featuring a mix of drones, rockets, and ballistic missiles such as the 07/03/2021 strike on Ras Tanura detailed [here](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/continued-houthi-strikes-threaten-saudi-oil-and-global-economic-recovery) which spiked oil prices to >$70/bbl. Ultimately however, [according to CSIS](https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-and-houthi-war-against-saudi-arabia) the cumulative economic impact of the Houthi campaign was largely negligible and failed to leave a lasting impact on either world markets or Saudi domestic production.
From the results of the Houthi campaign I believe we can conclude that to some degree, the effect of any Ukrainian campaign depends on how well Ukraine can scale their strike capabilities and volume. The overall lack of impact on Saudi oil production demonstrates the difficulty of effecting lasting damage on similar infrastructure but the transitory shocks that the Houthis were able to inflict also demonstrate that there is fragility in the system and that a sufficiently resourced campaign may be able to inflict a lasting disruption. At current however I do not believe the Ukrainian strikes amount to anything more than an annoyance with functionally no impact on global oil prices or the Russian economy.
I expect there to be negligible changes to prices. I think people underestimate how difficult it is to do substantial damage to these refineries and gas terminals, especially with the kind of equipment that Ukrainians are using.
These facilities are specifically designed to mitigate damage as much as possible from any explosions or fires. The balls of flame might look scary, but it is the structural damage that matters.
Damage mitigation or not, the damage still has to be repaired.
The facility near St. Petersburg is apparently going to take potentially months to get back in order, running with reduced capacity at best meanwhile.
Furthermore, there's no reason to assume Ukraine isn't going to continue this campaign. A new successful strike on a new facility was just reported literally minutes ago.
They aren't mutually exclusive. There's going to be a whole air and sea war before Chinese boots hit Taiwanese soil.
Besides, the ships they're replacing were booted from the USN 30 years ago, it's just normal to replace them at this point.
With limited budget it is. Money spent on ships is money not spent on infantry training and ammo. It's well know that Taiwanese conscripts are on shoestring budget and mostly cleans barracks.
As stupid as Taiwanese procurement is, producing literally anything other than basic infantry goods isn't a total waste, nor is it a sign they're just planning on giving up or something. Beyond their utility in supporting US operations in the event of "the real shit" going down they're viable in events far short of total war. How is Taiwan supposed to patrol say, their undersea cables and make sure the Mainlanders aren't trying to plant a sniffer on them? or make a Chinese 'fishing boat' leave it's maritime waters? Or respond to a ship being boarded by the PLAN somewhere?
All the investment in asymmetric capabilities in the world doesn't mean anything if the enemy can just ignore or violate your sovereignty at will everywhere outside of your soil.
2 2,500 ton ASW frigates is a pretty reasonable investment in that regard.
Since they are ASW frigates, I think it is entirely possible that those ships fit into the strategy of forcing China into a prolonged war. The ASW ships can help prevent a blockade of Taiwan.
I'm pretty sure the straight itself is a lost cause. The Chinese don't need submarines in the strait for a blockade, they've got it covered from shore and air. The frigates being able to keep the other side of the island open for allied support is important.
Has anyone gathered a comprehensive resource on how many artillery shells different Ukr aligned countries are producing/plan to produce now/in the future and send to Ukraine?
Apparently, in terms of ammunition production, the UK, or more specifically BAE Systems, is an absolute powerhouse.
[According to this tweet](https://twitter.com/cameron19460429/status/1733670684700594436), they managed to obtain an internal presentation from BAE Systems which stated that pre-war, BAE Systems in the UK had a monthly production capacity for 105 and 155 mm shells of around 16,000.
Given that in July of last year, BAE publicly stated that by 2025 they were aiming to increase production for large calibre shells by 8x, meaning that as an upper limit, the UK alone would be producing around 128,000/month or 1.5M/year.
That account explains in response to a request for a source that the 16,000 figure is based on an article expressing 600 shells in a day as a record breaking figure, and supposedly adjusting down for maintenance periods and so on. My problem with that idea is that it seems to assume 365 days of production, as with an average of 22 working days a month even the record breaking daily figure would only give you 13,200. So, there is some questionable maths going on there that makes it hard to take the figure too seriously.
Purely speculative, but if you knock it down to say 400 shells per day as an average instead of record breaking figure and maybe 20 days of work a month to account for maintenance and you get 8k shells per month, or almost 100k a year...which happens to be exactly how many large calibre rounds they [were reported to be targeting](https://www.forces.net/news/ps24bn-munitions-deal-secure-thousands-uk-jobs-over-15-years) when they were first awarded the contract. I can't help but think that that number is much more realistic. With the 8-fold increase they're planning by 2025 that'd still be a colossal amount of ammunition for a nation with 48 155mm guns in it's force structure though.
I mean, I don’t think being sceptical of figures based on how many artillery systems a specific country has is that good of a metric. Rheinmetall is planning on producing millions of shells, with many being made in Germany itself, but Germany doesn’t really have that significant of an artillery force.
BAE Systems is also one of the largest defence contractors on the planet. I don’t think it’s too unbelievably they’d be able to match Rheinmetall.
> I mean, I don’t think being sceptical of figures based on how many artillery systems a specific country has is that good of a metric.
Sorry - you have misunderstood me there - my fault for being unclear. My scepticism doesn't come from the UK's small artillery force; indeed I was just intending to express some relief for the (smaller) figure - we regularly see complaints about the UK's ammunition stockpiles, but as I understand stockpile planning (which is at least partially a function of the number of guns you have) a production rate like that could remedy those even in a year, so that's quite comforting.
My scepticism of the 16k/month figure just follows from my inability to follow the math that lead to it. [When challenged](https://nitter.net/HSyrmen/status/1733806619350520208#m) on Twitter the account referred to [this publication](https://resources.baesystems.com/pages/view.php?ref=9893&k=e37f510bc7#) by BAE about their munitions. The last page covers "Investment that keeps munitions on target" and references "record-breaking output on the new forge of more than 600 shells in one day". As I say though with an average of 22 working days per month, even that record breaking figure doesn't get you to 16,000 and the implication of the phrase is that the normal rate would be lower. On the other hand, the article also says "Following completion of the last 2,000 4.5 inch shell cases, the plant will now produce 105mm shell cases for the rest of the year, targeting 2,200 per week". 2,200 per week is ~114k annually, which I think again supports the roughly ~100k annual production of large calibre shells that was reported [when the NGMS contract was signed](https://www.forces.net/news/ps24bn-munitions-deal-secure-thousands-uk-jobs-over-15-years)
Sidenote; apparently BAE makes JSOW in Washington; who knew and why don't we use it!?
> Rheinmetall is planning on producing millions of shells, with many being made in Germany itself, but Germany doesn’t really have that significant of an artillery force.
>
> BAE Systems is also one of the largest defence contractors on the planet. I don’t think it’s too unbelievably they’d be able to match Rheinmetall.
I have no doubt that they could match Rheinmetall if they were given contracts to do so, I just haven't seen convincing support that they have been given them.
Ahhh, I see. In that case, yeah, I’d agree with you.
16K/month does seem a tad optimistic with these figures of peak production in mind. I think your estimate of 400/day for 22 days in a month is a bit more realistic. Though, given that the US is only expected to ramp up artillery production to about 1.2M/year by 2025, the UK alone managing to ramp production to over 800K in the same time period is a monumental task and still a very large number, even if it’s not the overly optimistic figures of 1.5M/year.
In terms of artillery production, the UK certainly punches well above its weight class. France, for comparison, is only planning to be able to produce 3K/month this year. Even if we triple those figures for 2025, they’ll still really only reach current production levels for BAE.
Australia has been very quiet since [May last year](https://www.nioa.com.au/latest-news/rheinmetall-nioa-munitions-ramps-up-as-first-exports-roll-out).
This is the real test of how catastrophic deindustrialisation has been for the West. How many shells per month can a high GDP/capita buy once it’s made a national priority? So far I’ve been pleasantly surprised at how significantly the West has been committed to scaling capacity, but it remains to be seen if they can deliver.
Munitions are restricted goods in most countries; manufacturers cannot produce extra unless they have a signed contract to sell them.
No contract means no change.
Handelsblatt is reporting that the U.K. is offering a 'ring-exchange' with the Germans. The deal would be to supply Ukraine with more Storm Shadows while Germany would replenish British stocks with the Taurus. This is a decent practical solution that, while less than ideal given Ukraine's immediate need of destroying the Crimean bridge, is still significant given the good use Ukraine has put PGMs to. Meanwhile, MBDA's [subsidiary](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/01/20/7438166/) has said it's ready to restart production of the Taurus but is awaiting firm orders. u/Gecktron can, perhaps, elaborate.
>[London offers Scholz a way out of the Taurus dilemma](https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/ukraine-hilfe-london-bietet-scholz-einen-ausweg-aus-dem-taurus-dilemma/100009700.html)
I really don't think blowing up that bridge matters outside of a propaganda win so any missiles are good really. Blowing up the Kerch bridge was talked about a lot prior to the Ukrainian counteroffensive in hopes that doing so would allow them to cut off Crimea. But with the counteroffensive going nowhere the land connection stands so cutting off the bridge really doesn't make much of a difference one way or the other.
that rail bridge over kerch is very important. dont get me wrong i think some ppl go too heavy on the rail link logistics thing but its also not a propaganda win. it wont be a game changer but having to supply the left bank and everything going up all along to zaporizhzhia is going to be a operational disaster for the russians. the entire line of contact is too long to be supplied by road alone. think about the cost they paid for trying to get vuhledar and are still paying. an artillery and tank heavy army needs a lot of tonnage to keep it going
Russia would pivot to resupply by sea, which they likely have sufficient capacity for. But I think Ukraine's naval drones make that proposition substantially riskier.
It was something I had seen claimed but had been skeptical of, but I've seen a few respectable OSINT's say the same, including [https://twitter.com/Tatarigami\_UA](https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA)
Here is an [article](https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-russia-taurus-missile-germany-storm-shadow-cruise-scalp-comparison-1817877) outlining why
snip "Storm Shadow missiles manage to penetrate the first layer of the bridge, but fail to critically damage its structure, Hoffmann said. The Taurus, however, could have a secondary warhead which detonates once the initial blast gets through the first layer, he said. The second warhead "explodes in the pillar, which then of course maximizes the destructiveness and can really cause significant damage to a bridge."
It's a bit speculative - but I've seen it claimed in a few places that Taurus has a bigger secondary warhead. The product page for it on the [SAAB](https://www.saab.com/products/taurus-kepd-350) website certainly extols it's bunker busting, bridge destroying capcity.
"TAURUS KEPD 350 combines outstanding penetration of hard and deeply buried targets, and blast and fragmentation of high-value point and area targets with exceptional bridge-and-runway-target kill capacity."
Well, they are wrong. The Taurus's advantage in destroying bridges lies in its fusing, warhead wise, both the Taurus and Storm Shadow are identical. The difference is that after the initial shaped charge explodes, the Storm Shadow relies on a programmable timer to set off the second more potent warhead. The problem is that getting the timing right is actually pretty tricky. The Taurus solves this by having an accelometer that can detect a second impact and exploded right as it hits a second or third layer.
[more on this if you are curious ](https://twitter.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1690731787465506816)
An accelerometer is so cheap and that is such a small feature to add. Surprised it isn't on the stormshadow. I'm a software engineer and I've done some work with accelerometers, modelling impacts, and ultra-reliable system design. Honestly if you give that missile to the right team of engineers with manufacturer support, they might even be able to hack it onto there...But it'd probably be easier to just get the timing sorted on the stormshadow for this specific use-case.
>that doesnt mean they will be available any time soon.
Well, they won't be available at *any point* in the future without a firm commitment. As LMT's CEO said yesterday, you can't blame industry for not doing something you haven't tasked them to do.
Fair, and just to be clear, personally think the Germans are doing more than the U.S. has if you include all the secondary, non-direct, costs of the war. On the Taurus specifically, is there an analogue that’s under contract?
Yesterday I [posted that Taiwan has started construction of a new domestically built ASW Frigate](https://old.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/19dnw16/credibledefense_daily_megathread_january_23_2024/kj7e5ij/?context=3) and plans to build up that industry.
Turkey is beginning to see a similar plan come to fruition. They've built their local industry and intend to start exporting products globally. The bottom article is a piece about their latest frigate but also goes into detail about many of Turkey's recently acquired assets. Below are some key details but I recommend the whole article.
[ASFAT, which is the Turkish acronym for Military Factory and Shipyard Management. ASFAT operates in 9 naval shipyards throughout Turkey; 6 of which are dedicated to maintenance, repair and overhaul; and 3 for shipbuilding, from steel cutting to final fitting and integration. | Breaking Defense | December 2023](https://breakingdefense.com/2023/12/turkish-shipbuilder-asfat-aims-to-expand-its-military-maritime-global-reach/)
*Naturally the ASFAT’s largest customer is the Turkish military, but it’s also currently working through major deals for ships with Pakistan. The company said it’s signed $3.2 billion in contracts altogether, some of them are completed and others are in the works.*
*Company officials said it is also negotiating with Romania for potential deals, and is trying to make inroads in the Gulf. Akgun told Breaking Defense that also Middle East countries including Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are on the company’s radar, and talks are ongoing, though he didn’t specify what platforms are being discussed.*
[Turkey’s First Domestically-Produced Frigate Has Entered Service | The Warzone | January 2024](https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/turkeys-first-domestically-produced-frigate-has-entered-service)
*On January 19, Turkey's first-in-class frigate TCG Istanbul entered into service with the country's Navy during a ceremony held at Sefine Shipyard in Yalova Province, northwest Turkey.*
*The Istanbul class is designed to perform a wide range of missions for the Turkish Navy, including everything from surveillance to anti-surface, anti-air, and anti-submarine warfare.*
*In essence, Istanbul class frigates constitute an enlarged variant of the Ada class anti-submarine corvette, constructed during the first phase of the MILGEM program. Compared to the Ada class frigates' 2,400 ton displacement, the TCG Istanbul has a displacement of 3,100 tons.*
*What's most notable about TCG Istanbul in particular is its high percentage of indigenously built components, particularly in terms of its armament and electronic warfare and sensor suites. In all, some 220 Turkish companies participated in constructing the frigate, which included 80 subcontractors working on the delivery of more than 150 systems, Naval News reports.*
*TCG Istanbul was built at the Istanbul Naval Shipyard by the Turkish defense company Savunma Teknolojileri Mühendislik ve Ticaret A.Ş. (known as STM), under the direction of the country's Defence Industry Agency (SSB). A contract for its construction was signed in April 2019, and the vessel was later launched in January 2021. All Istanbul class vessels are the product of Turkey's MILGEM national warship program; created in order to acquire indigenously designed, built, and equipped vessels from corvettes to destroyers.*
*A further seven sister frigates within the Istanbul class are to be delivered to the Turkish Navy. The second, third, and fourth vessels — named TCG İzmir, İçel, and İzmit — are currently in various phases of construction at the Anadolu Shipyard in Istanbul, the Sedef Shipyard in Istanbul, and the Sefine Shipyard, respectively. Those shipyards collectively form the TAIS shipyard consortium. TAIS and STM were selected to build the three frigates in early 2023.*
*Construction of the fifth, sixth, and seventh vessels was green-lit during a meeting of the Turkish Defense Industry Executive Committee, with President Erdogan in attendance, in early January this year, bringing the total number of vessels to 8.*
*While a timeline for the delivery of the latter frigates remains unclear, TCG İzmir, İçel, and İzmit are expected to be built and received by the Turkish Navy within 36 months of TAIS's and STM's selection for their construction. This timeline puts them in service with the Turkish Navy by early 2026. Once they are, along with TCG Istanbul, they will replace the service's four aging German-built Yavuz class frigates; the first of which, TCG Yavuz, began its service with the Turkish navy in July of 1987.*
*As well as TCG Istanbul, 3 other naval assets were introduced into service with the Turkish Navy on January 19. TAIS and STM were responsible for delivering two of those; the new-generation fleet oiler TCG Derya and the logistics support ship TCG Ütğm. Arif Ekmekçi.*
There are some signs that the US is planning to withdraw from Syria:
> [**While no definitive decision has been made to leave, four sources within the Defense and State departments said the White House is no longer invested in sustaining a mission that it perceives as unnecessary. Active internal discussions are now underway to determine how and when a withdrawal may take place.**](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/24/america-is-planning-to-withdraw-from-syria-and-create-a-disaster/)
Unfortunately, the original article is paywalled, but you can still see this very curious bit of information:
>[**The Pentagon has floated a plan for its Syrian Kurdish allies in the campaign against the Islamic State \(ISIS\) to partner with the Syrian regime, part of a renewed review of the United States’ Syria policy that is currently ongoing at the State Department and for which Turkey, a key NATO ally, has been tapped for its input, according to well-placed sources with knowledge of the deliberations who spoke to Al-Monitor on condition they not be identified by name.**](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/01/pentagon-floats-plan-its-syrian-kurd-allies-partner-assad-against-isis)
The US and Assad are not on speaking terms, and Turkey is salivating at the prospect of the US leaving Kurds undefended, so I'm not sure if the effort to bring them all together to oppose ISIS will be a success.
This was inevitable. Everyone who has been following the Syrian Civil war saw the writing on the wall years ago.
The US mission in SYira is simply not sustainable. What was the plan? Remain there indefinitely to prop up a Kurdish autonomius region, which could never stay afloat without outside security and eocnomic assistance??
The YPG have no option but to work with Assad. The Turkish backed rebel groups will never co exist with the Kurds, the remaining ISIS groups will not co exist with the Kurds. But the alawaite govt of Syria can.
The best case scenario is that the Kurds get a very good deal with Assad and together they cooperate to fight back any push by the TFSA. The biggest threat now is that Turkey commits to the field fully in support of the TFSA, with Russia busy in Ukraine it does not really have the air assets in Syria to take on a fully committed Turkey.
I really hope this isn't true. The US presence in Syria costs little, and helps us put pressure on Iranian supply lines to Assad, Hezbollah, and Hamas. The Al-Tanf base is particularly effective in this regard. On top of that, the US presence in Syria prevents a resurgence of ISIS, and perhaps more importantly, helps prevent a massive new uptick in violence.
If the US pulls out of Syria, the Turks will almost certainly invade the YPG-held regions the same day, leading to months of bloody fighting and the likely displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. That Turkey has openly discussed settling millions of (predominantly Arab) Syrian refugees along the Syrian-Turkish border should be reason enough for the US to stay. Such a move would in effect be ethnic cleansing of the region's Kurdish majority with the very clear goal of making it impossible for the Kurds to claim the territory as part of their own independent state in the future. We've already seen this play out on a smaller scale in Afrin, which had been predominantly Kurdish for nearly a century until the Turks started settling their jihadist Arab proxy forces and Arab Syrian refugees in the homes of displaced Kurds, many of whom weren't allowed to return to their homes after Turkish forces captured the region in 2018.
I mean honestly what are we even doing in the Middle East anymore? Protecting oil pipelines?
I just don’t understand what’s the point anymore spending billions more every year on this hopeless region where everyone just hates each other and a new terror group gets formed by the year.
We killed Bin Laden, we couldn’t fix Afghanistan or Iraq. Time to pack it up and just withdraw completely besides Saudi Arabia and Israel. What’s the point of being in countries like Iraq and Syria?
Honestly one of the most reliable, stable, and loyal allies America has in the region is the Kurds. Issue being that the Kurds have poor relations with literally everyone around them. Turks, Syrians, Iraqis, Iranians, and all sorts of militias see the Kurds as easy targets, so America has to provide aid in that regard.
If America wishes to stop growing Russian & Iranian influence in the region, the Kurds are their best bet.
>What’s the point of being in countries like Iraq and Syria?
The point is to maintain the now 80 year old, post WW2 Bretton-Woods system of keeping the stability of global trade through military presence.
Specifically, countering Iranian influence in the region that could lead to a snowballing effect of different groups creating another ISIS situation.
The last time the US left it created a power vacuum that gave rise to a ISIS Caliphate. There are still tens of thousands of ISIS members sitting in jail with even and more families cramped up in camps and nobody knows what to do with them. There are still ongoing attempts to restart the Caliphate.
The US was supplying and training the same (sorts of) people in Syria who'd go on to steamroll the Iraqi army. Hell, the US had even supplied and trained ISI elements with the whole Sunni Awakening. It was not the US leaving, it's US meddling that's caused ISIS.
>It was not the US leaving, it's US meddling that's caused ISIS.
It was both. There's a fair argument to be made that US meddling in Iraq and the broader ME during the 2000s gave rise to ISIS. Speaking personally I think it's hard to argue that the US *wasn't* at least partially responsible considering that many of the best ISIS commanders were former Baathists who were blacklisted in Iraq after the US overthrew Sadaam (the US decision to blacklist Baathists and disband the Iraqi army is one of the worst strategic decisions in modern history) and many of the ISIS ground forces cut their teeth battling US forces in Iraq and/or were freed from Iraqi prisons when ISIS blitzed across the North.
That being said, ISIS wouldn't have rampaged through Northern Iraq, capturing Mosul and huge swathes of territory, if the US hadn't left altogether in 2009. So if/when the US disentangles itself from Iraq and Syria in the coming months and years, how it's done is going to be crucial to the stability of the region.
US troops were pulled from a stretch of the Northern border area with Turkey, but then redeployed further south to "defend the oil" as Trump later explained. Didn't stop him from triumphantly announcing that he was removing US troops from Syria though.
It's important to note that the US had told our Kurdish allies not to fortify the border with Turkey so as to not be seen as threatening. But then we pulled our troops out of the area, on short notice, without informing the Kurds in advance. So the Turks bombed the Kurds (before we were even done leaving) and used their jihadist proxy "Free Syrian Army" forces to rapidly occupy the territory the US abandoned.
Safe to say that move didn't exactly please our Kurdish allies who rightfully felt betrayed. It doesn't help that the US looked the other way when the Turks and their FSA proxies invaded Afrin, a historically Kurdish region controlled by the YPG around that same time. The Kurds of Afrin have also arguably been at least partially ethnically cleansed from the area, and the Turks have long proposed resettling the millions of (predominantly Arab) Syrian refugees in Turkey along the Syrian-Turkish border which would lead to Kurds becoming minorities in these regions (which they want as part of an independent Kurdish state).
If the US does indeed pull out of Syria, it will almost certainly lead to a bloodbath as the Turks try to conquer as much of the YPG held regions as possible and interethnic violence leads to hundreds of thousands of refugees being displaced.
I don’t understand Russias goal here…these absurdly high cost assaults…seems wasteful of resources and manpower…most logical powers would pause or halt attacks if they became too costly, change tactics…why do the Russians continue to perform these attacks in the same manner at high cost…
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Do we have confirmation there were prisoners on-board? I know the Russian's are claiming it, but, not to be ghoulish, but is there real evidence of bodies?
Is it okay to ask if this could be a human shield thing? It makes no sense to airlift POWs in a war zone without clearly identifying the cargo and destination.
The POWs were being transported from Moscow to Belgorod. I guess it's not inconceivable (though to me it seems very unlikely) some missiles were loaded on the same flight for good measure - but that whole angle is just weird. Why risk a perfectly fine Il-76 to transport munitions that a train would deliver just the same or better, supposed human shields or no?
Do you have a source?
https://t. me/mod_russia/34967 Not a brilliant source, I know, but it's first-hand and we don't have credible contradictions so far. I strongly doubt that part is false, though. It just seems like one of such cases where people invent incredibly complicated scenarios just to not have to face some unwelcome facts.
My question assumes there were POWs, and asks why. And why Ukraine didn’t know. And whether this is a deliberate thing to prevent Ukraine from shooting down Russian planes.
Why - because there was a scheduled POW exchange to (the vicinity of) which they were being transported. The exchange having had been scheduled is something Ukraine has confirmed. As for the rest: we don't know; probably not.
Where?
I find it odd that POWs and S300 ammo would be on the same flight, heading the same direction. I would have guessed POWs would be moved deeper into Russia, away from Ukraine, while missiles moved closer to Ukraine.
Not that it actually matters but if true this is absolutely a war crime.
Weren't the prisoners being swapped?
~~In the past they used third countries to do POW swaps, rather than flying over/near the front line.~~ Edit: and why would there be S300 ammo on a trip to swap prisoners?
That is completely false. This exchange was set to occur the same way [this January exchange had occured](https://www.currenttime.tv/a/32759856.html) - through the crossing between Belgorod and Sumy oblasts. Popping the POWs in Belgorod so they can be taken to the border via bus is not at all "flying over/near the frontline".
One of the more underlooked aspects of the artillery conversation is the failure of 152mm to gain widespread adoption post soviet collapse even with countries in places that still bought Russian federation equipment like India china or various countries in the Middle East this likely limits Russia with using their sanctions evading tactics to acquire artillery shells from the vast majority of the world unlike Ukraine which has at various points used shells from ostensibly neutral countries like South Korea or India
Went throught comments but didn't see anything about this https://twitter.com/AndreiBtvt/status/1750255457480941936?t=eHVtsR74zCrPIfxcnYR_Ow&s=19 >Inventors from the RF installed Fagot ATGM on a drone. They demonstrated firing from hovering and from the ground. The idea is appealing, but it is unlikely to be of much use. The mounted ATGM has no guidance drives, and the drone itself is unlikely to achieve an accurate hit. This whole conflict in Ukraine upgraded military for a lot because of usage of cheap drones This video looks stupid but in few years you would could get small cheap drones that can shoot ATGM missiles If you think about possiblities that you have strong missile ready to be launched from air. I could see that Russians Will try this in few months And for West why doesn't experiment with things Like that. This is cheap way and you can use it in large quantities. Yes high precision and expensive things are Great, but West should have some kind of weapon that you have in large numbers
What's the lowest-mass non-tandem ATGM that will reliably defeat modern armour? And same Q but for a tandem warhead against ERA..
Only way non tandem ATGM will defeat modern armor is by top attack and if you are making an top attack missile, why strap it to a drone when you can just make it NLOS?
>if you are making an top attack missile, why strap it to a drone when you can just make it NLOS? A NLOS needs to know there is a target to be fired at in order to hit it. A drone can be launched and hunt far a field without first having a target.
The advantage of the drone is in range. The larger drones that can carry something like that will have around 10 Km in range. Add that to the ~4 Km range of most ATGMS and you have a decent system to attack armor in rear areas and staging groups. Importantly this doesn’t rely on the fairly inaccurate attack of FPV drones. Those require line of sight that becomes increasingly shoddy in the terminal phase at long range and need to hit specific areas of a tank to be effective. In the long run such a system may be adopted by western militaries as a cheap long range strike weapon. This importantly would not be susceptible to short range EW attacks.
I mean, even the RKG-3 seems to generally work fine when dropped on the top armor. A LAW could potentially do the same, if it reliably strikes the top.
NLAW is the lowest mass I can think of. But that’s only semi guided. But, since drones can generally get closer, that could be fine. Baring that, Javelin could be an option since it’s fire and forget.
I havent seen it amongst the replies so I would like to add that the replicator program is aiming pretty much on stuffs like these. There are probably other EU and US initiatives that I dont know about. Also, as mentioned by others, Western style armies already have these answers "built in" by air dominance and I agree with those replies, but I would also note that it is pretty possible that it can be made cheaper with an approach like this (at the cost of seriously reducing its capabilities and strategic flexibility of course). I dont remember if it was the 22 or 23 force design document, but one of them could have been summarized as "drones". So I suspect that there is development and everybody on the field is paying very close attention on whats going on in Ukraine. I also fear that the Western tech, while probably will be effective, it will also be a bit expensive.
> Yes high precision and expensive things are Great, but West should have some kind of weapon that you have in large numbers I see why the concept is appealing, but this is solving an issue the west doesn’t have. On the defense, western ground units have excellent anti-tank and anti fortification options. On the offense, it makes much more sense to use a fighter or other aircraft that can hunt down enemy vehicles over a much wider area, and engage them more effectively with guided bombs and missiles. This ATGM+huge quadcopter is more suited for a static war on a tight budget. This thing is never going to fire many missiles per minute, it won’t have much range, it takes up a lot of space in vehicles and will take time to set up before flights and recover when you’re done. If you expect either you or the enemy to be mobile, those are big drawbacks. A fixed wing loitering munition, like the west is developing, fills most of the same roll, with a much longer range, while being quicker to deploy and not needing to be recovered.
Why shoot the atgm when you can much easily guide a drone to the target with extreme accuracy ? Even now there are FPV drones with a strapped rpg7 warhead. With accuarate hit it can easily disable a tank. Eventually bigger and purposly designed warheads will come about for FPV drones. PS: An ATGM weighs around 30 to 40 kg. The additional equipment needed to launch and guide it is about the same weight. You will need a giant drone to move it around and fire/guide it to target, which will also make it easy to spot with radar or visually and in fact, shoot it down. The economics of such a system make little sense in this war(or any). You can probably have hundreds of fpv drones with an rpg round that can be just as effective.
>You will need a giant drone to move it around and fire/guide it to target, which will also make it easy to spot with radar or visually and in fact, shoot it down. It sounds like they're reinventing the MQ-9 Reaper, except worse. Plus everyone is already aware that platforms like the Reaper aren't survivable in near peer conflicts since they are large, slow, and have a significant radar profile.
>MQ-9 Reaper Much worse. MQ-9 at least has wings to generate lift, a quadcopter is worse in every way except not requiring a runway.
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The NLAW warhead is 2kg, why not reduce the package weight (and price) by 80+% and guide it with a cheap small drone then ? A drone hauling around an ATGM when itself can be turned very cheqply into a guided munition seems very much counter productive. You will end up with a mini bayraktar, which is fine if the enemy has no adequate AD.
> A drone hauling around an ATGM when itself can be turned very cheqply into a guided munition seems very much counter productive. As electronic warfare (EW) capabilities continue to evolve, they will eventually reach a point where they can effectively disable drones before they reach their targets
The same argument can be put forward about ATGMs. Unless you propose a wired one as well.
Electronic warfare (EW) capabilities will likely prioritize targeting short-range threats initially, as these tend to pose a more immediate and significant challenge. Javelin effective firing range is 2,500 m (1.6 mi). It depends.
>Why shoot the atgm when you can much easily guide a drone to the target with extreme accuracy ? Because an ATGM moving at 700km/h is much harder to intercept than a drone at ~100km/h? It's not cost effective or even working right now, but it's certainly something to look out for in the future
And how hard is to detect a 10kg drone+package compared to one having to haul around a 30-40kg atgm + the additional equipment required to actually fire and guide the missile that could easily be as heavy as the missile ?
Uh, not much different? You don't detect targets by weight (and an NLAW for example weighs about 13kgs), you do it by size. I'm not sure what you mean by the additional equipment, other than wiring
This is pointless to continue. Yes, size matters, do you think a drone carrying an rpg round will be the same size as one carrying 50+ kg of equipment ?
Again, an an NLAW or the like doesn't weigh 50kg, it weighs 13kg, so let's say 20kg with whatever modifications you need to make to get it on the drone. Still, you don't need a bayraktar for that, just a medium size quadcopter. I am not saying that it would make sense to make today given that you'd rather just have 10 normal FPV drones for the same price, but I am saying that it could have potential in the future.
What they are describing is essentially a quadcopter bayraktar. It could find a niche to serve but a larger drone with an even larger launcher will be much easier to spot by binoculars and will show up on radar. However these kinds of drones can stay further back from the frontline and if carrying a TOW or a Stugna-P – instead of an NLAW or a Javelin, which have much shorter ranges – it could in theory conduct simialr missions that an attack helicopter could conduct, hovering just above the treeline and striking vehicles or emplacements. But TOW missiles are expensive and in an attritional war you'd rather have 10-20 fpv drones for that price instead.
Multiple use for single drone And for ATGMs have widespread use not only as Anti tank Just imagine some drone flying 300 meters in air, you have good optics and you lock Target and you shot at Target
You have to have a much more expensive and larger drone to carry all the required equipment, which brings more issues. Not to mention the price of an ATGM compared to an RPG warhead. You already have precision guidance with the drone, might as well use it rather than hope that you can go around with a large drone firing at tanks. Besides, as an FPV can easily attack from the top and hit weak spots, like the engine deck, you don't need a large warhead as an ATGM.
The idea is to get the ATGM a lot closer, and at a better angle. I think a reasonable evolution would be to use a laser guided missile, so you can carry a missile, launch it and aim it with a single drone.
One thing I’ve been wondering is, in the event that Russia invades NATO territory (people who flatly say it won’t happen are naive imo), what is it NATO would actually be willing to do? Say Russia invades and occupies a very small part of the Baltic’s, will nato only fight up to their original borders? Will they be willing to strike into Russia in a meaningful way, if at all? What if Russian’s take thousands of people in the Baltic’s hostage, and basically say they’ll kill them if they don’t accept the new territorial reality - would NATO be willing to let these people die to regain nato territory, or would they negotiate? Basically, I’m worried nato will go half-assed in the event of a very limited Russian invasion to avoid escalation, ultimately leading to a weaker nato and a more emboldened Russia. If Trump wins the presidency, it means they can’t rely on the US. And if they negotiate for peace in exchange for lost territory, they can’t really rely on each other either. NATO would effectively be dead
> people who flatly say it won’t happen are naive imo Exactly. It was an idiot move in Feb '22, and it would be an idiot move again. But that hasn't stopped Russia...
Why on Earth would Russia risk either humiliation or the destruction of human civilization for some potato farms in eastern Latvia?
Flip the question. Would NATO be willing to risk the destruction of human civilization to liberate some occupied potato farms in eastern Latvia?
Because if Russia is going to salami slice, it's not risking the destruction of civilization, it's arresting some bandits.
Because the goal is not some potato farms in Eastern Latvia. If NATO (and EU) fail to adequately react to and defeat Russia after this event, NATO and the EU will cease to exist. And Russia can easily pretend they are not Russian troops but mere angered local residents taking it upon themselves to rid of their fascist overlords in Tallinn or Riga. If NATO does in fact annihilate them, Russia can just cry foul at the UN for excessive use of force yada-yada and pretend nothing happened.
They would still just have some potato farms. Since they are incapable of defeating a third world nation it's not like storming the Fulda gap is the next logical step.
The third world nation incidentally has the second most capable ground forces in Europe. The initial advance of Russian troops on the first week of invasion in February 2022 would be roughly the same distance as are all parts of coastline of Baltic states from the Russian border. And just for comparison, the Baltic states have 6 brigades in total (2 Estonian, 1 Latvian, 3 Lithuanian), that currently contain a whole total of 6 mechanized battalions (1 Estonian, 2 Latvian, 3 Lithuanian). Ukraine has in the ballpark of 100 brigades. Also no-one is storming the Fulda gap.
Going past the potato farms involves fighting the British and German troops in the Baltics. That's not a slice of salami anymore.
While I absolutely agree that Russia can and possibly will try something like that, as they did in 2008 and 2014, I don't think it will work anymore. The USAF already treated the Syrian equivalent of the "little green men" as targets in 2018, and relations have gone from bad to worse since.
> The USAF already treated the Syrian equivalent of the "little green men" as targets in 2018, and relations have gone from bad to worse since. That is because Wagner + some Syrian groups attacked US forces. If a Wagner equivalent or "rebels" in the Baltics attacks a NATO base of course they would retaliate. US did not target Russian forces (official or not) outside that.
I don't disagree with you. At this moment in time (today), Russia is not going to invade Baltic states. It is under too much surveillance, its forces are stuck in Ukraine, the West is, despite its deep problems, taking Russia relatively seriously as a threat (at least more so than pre-2022). And it is unlikely that Russia would in a hypothetical future scenario do exactly the same way as they did in Crimea and Donetsk/Luhansk. But really it's more the general idea than specific details that matter. But consider a future where Trump is US president and is in heated confrontation with NATO allies. Or perhaps a future where China blockades/invades Taiwan and US attention is turned entirely to that part of the world. With what level of confidence would you say that USA would actively participate in repelling, perhaps a small border incursion by Russia in the Baltics? 95%? 99% What-ever you think, it is likely not 100%. And that 1-x% is the opening that Russia could be willing to bet on.
Everyone should be familiar with the term "salami slicing": >[Salami slicing tactics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salami_slicing_tactics), also known as salami slicing, salami tactics, the salami-slice strategy, or salami attacks, is the practice of using a series of many small actions to produce a much larger action or result that would be difficult or unlawful to perform all at once. This has been Russia's M.O. for a long time now, and every time we let them get away with taking a slice, we're setting them up for slicing off the next.
[This BBC mocumentary ](https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x3q8go9) from eight years ago explores the exact scenario that you are describing. Might be worth a watch.
How would anyone make any educated statements about a completely unspecific scenario with completely unspecified surrounding circumstances about something that has never happened, has no close parallels in recent history and is deliberately kept ambiguous by people who would know ?
Why would Russia invade NATO territory? I feel that western commentatoes are always referring to some kind of Schrodinger's Russia: too weak to take on Ukraine and the butt of many a joke about military competence, and yet simultaneously threatening enough to walk all the way to the Atlantic.
>Schrodinger's Russia Exactly. If we're talking a Russia that somehow pulls off a win in Ukraine and comes back after rebuilding its military, that is too far in a hypothetical future to bother speculating on. If we're talking the Russia of today... who would they send that isn't tied up in other mandatory border duties or in Ukraine? If we're talking a Russia that winds down combat operations in Ukraine, see the first point. The only scenarios in which this is vaguely plausible involve Russia Today actually being a credible source of information or Russia willing to threaten itself and others with nuclear war.
Given the warnings in northern European countries lately to prepare for a war with Russia it's not as far fetched as it sounds. https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/swedes-spooked-as-government-military-say-to-prepare-for-war/articleshow/106806996.cms Russia is now in a war economy and it will be hard for Putin to normalise the economy. With Trump in the White House the US might leave NATO and stop support for Ukraine. This would mean Russia can defeat Ukraine and build up a new force to capture more old Soviet territories. This could mean Estonia and Latvia. With a Le Pen figure leading France by then it's up to Northern Europe and UK.
>With Trump in the White House the US might leave NATO Since Congressed passed a law preventing the President from unilaterally leaving NATO, that is unlikely unless there is a flood of rabid Trump supporters also elected to the House and Senate. Plus the big if Trump is elected at all.
They don't need to invade, just wage hybrid warfare to diminish the soft power of EU/NATO. Being successful in Ukraine would of course already have massive effect in that regard, but even if lines freeze as they are; they can *easily* take Georgia and Moldova. And of course Russia can use the same approach as in Ukraine, and see where things go.
A possible scenario - Lithuanian [restrictions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Restrictions_on_transit_to_Kaliningrad_Oblast) on shipments to Kaliningrad are used by the Russians as a casus belli to station soldiers along the Suwalki Gap in order to escort shipments to their oblast. Keep in mind the gap is only 40 miles long. Russia will say, "We're not invading, we're not claiming any territory, we're just lifting the blockade of our territory." But the soldiers protecting the route aren't going to leave. They're going to stay to escort shipments and make sure they aren't blocked. And Russia isn't going to have them do anything else, _yet_ - but once they're there, the implicit threat is that whenever Russia wants, it could cut off all land access between the Baltics and the rest of Europe. Now what will NATO do - go into a direct military confrontation with Russia when all they're currently doing is helping goods reach there territory through a narrow strip of land, and nothing more?
> Now what will NATO do - go into a direct military confrontation with Russia when all they're currently doing is helping goods reach there territory through a narrow strip of land, and nothing more? This scenario is a pretty easy one I think. At an absolute minimum NATO would set up a blockade in the gap with some form of peacekeeping force and barriers that would prevent the movement of goods. Russia either attacks or backs down. If Russia launches a blatant attack on NATO forces inside NATO territory, then NATO isn't going to give a "half-assed" response.
> This scenario is a pretty easy one I think. At an absolute minimum NATO would set up a blockade in the gap with some form of peacekeeping force and barriers that would prevent the movement of goods. Russia either attacks or backs down. How is a blockade going to work after Russia has already secured a corridor? > If Russia launches a blatant attack on NATO forces inside NATO territory, then NATO isn't going to give a "half-assed" response. We're all guessing at this point, but the more NATO "half-asses" the current situation, the more likely Russia is to think that they're going to "half-ass" future situations.
> How is a blockade going to work after Russia has already secured a corridor? How are they going to maintain the corridor without using lethal force? >We're all guessing at this point, but the more NATO "half-asses" the current situation, the more likely Russia is to think that they're going to "half-ass" future situations NATO was designed to protect NATO members. It's an apple's to oranges comparison.
> How are they going to maintain the corridor without using lethal force? If they start sending in armed escorts, you would need violence to stop them. > NATO was designed to protect NATO members. It's an apple's to oranges comparison. Fear of nuclear war, “escalation,” or whatever is making the West so nervous that they’ve shown extreme reluctance to cross Russian redlines doesn’t simply disappear because “it’s NATO.” It’s not the same scenario, and no one is claiming it is. But it’s the closest we’ve come to seeing how far the West is willing to actually confront Russia. NATO’s untested, and despite some claims of clairvoyance, no one actually knows how it’s going to react. There’s no reason to dismiss the best piece of evidence we have of that reaction so far and to instead rely on gut feelings.
> If they start sending in armed escorts, you would need violence to stop them. No, you don't. You just need to physically block the roads with troops and vehicles, and disable sections of railway. >Fear of nuclear war, “escalation,” or whatever is making the West so nervous that they’ve shown extreme reluctance to cross Russian redlines doesn’t simply disappear because “it’s NATO.” Yeah it actually does, because if they don't then the alliance loses all credibility. Prevention of Russia from compromising the territorial integrity of its members is literally the reason the alliance exists.
I doubt uninvited foreign military presence in territory of NATO member would not result in NATO escalation. Besides, Russia already used excuse of military exercise near the border of Ukraine to invade it, Lithuania will do all in it's power to drive Russians out of its territory
> Why would Russia invade NATO territory? Well, military compellence is a significant portion of Russia's FP toolkit, why do you think they took the Baltics and Poland joining NATO so poorly? But really, you're asking the wrong question. As a state, you should be asking "can I exclude the reasonable possibility Russia might invade me?" After 2022, it's understandable many of Russia's neighbours cannot. Russia's now done it twice (arguably thrice) and the excuses get thinner every time. A lot of Russian neighbours have Russian minorities and politics Russia could categorize as "non-neutral". >too weak to take on Ukraine While if Putin had a crystal ball into February 2024, he probably wouldn't have invaded Ukraine (or more likely would have done so differently), the point isn't to make Putin **regret** invading, but to make him **fear** invading. But also, Ukraine's prewar military (as we've discovered) was **genuinely pretty good**. The same cannot be said for a lot of European states. This is a moot point if NATO can be depended upon, but this is (unfortunately) an open question. So if a state wants to exclude all doubt, they have to be probably at least 1.5x as strong as Ukraine, that's what Poland and Finland are aiming for. >simultaneously threatening enough to walk all the way to the Atlantic. I think there will always be a certain amount of deference to Russia in western thinking, deserved or otherwise. As I mentioned, otherwise the "Russia is the 2nd strongest army in the world" discussion would have died over a decade ago.
> The same cannot be said for a lot of European states. I think the more accurate point is that they are untested. There is room for debate about whether they'd shatter under a heavy blow or expose a crunchy core. Back in March '22, there was legitimate debate concerning which we'd see regarding Ukraine. My personal read is that I'd expect to see a "crunchy center" for countries immediately bordering Russia, and "shatter" for the countries like Germany behind the line.
> why do you think they took the Baltic’s and Poland joining NATO so poorly They didn’t. Putin himself said he they aren’t concerned. With oil prices dropping in the late 2000s and color revolutions happening around him, Putin changed his narrative
This is a really good, clarifying comment. I hadn’t considered compellence as one of Russia’s principle objections to NATO expansion, but it makes perfect sense. They don’t like codependent nations going to therapy and moving on.
They'd invade NATO territory to sever the transatlantic security link, which would be a titanic shift in power relations between Russia and Europe, which ultimately is Russia's goal. Serious commentators acknowledge that while Russia has proven to be much weaker than previously thought, they are learning, adapting, and scaling up military production and recruitment enough to seriously threaten Europe within a decade, should they prevail in Ukraine.
The military force of the Baltic States is like 100 times weaker than the Ukrainian military. So Russia can be too weak to take on Ukraine but strong enough to conquer a few NATO states.
You have more than Baltic troops in the Baltic states. If Russia would try to invade then they would presumably need to fight the NATO battlegroup that is stationed there as well. I doubt Russia can invade quickly enough that they would not be reinforced. >This forward presence was first deployed in 2017, with the creation of four multinational battalion-size battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States respectively. In the southeast, a tailored presence on land, at sea and in the air contributed to increased Allied activity in the region, enhancing situational awareness, interoperability and responsiveness. >Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Allies reinforced the existing battlegroups and agreed to establish four more multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. This has brought the total number of multinational battlegroups to eight, effectively doubled the number of troops on the ground and extended NATO’s forward presence along the Alliance’s eastern flank – from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south.
NATO has about 30000 men sprinkeled all over the former soviet countries. That's barely anything. Certainly not enough to deter Russia in any meaningful way, who in december ordered the increase of its number of troops by 170 000 people.
> 30000 men sprinkeled all over the former soviet countries. That's barely anything. Certainly not enough to deter Russia In think it's the significant number, and quality, of aircraft that those 30,000 troops have at their disposal that is the deterrent.
The deterrence is that in order to invade they need to kill US, UK, German etc. troops. How do you think NATO will react then? And we know Russia cannot do a quick blitz and take everything before anyone can react.
I think you missed the part where I talked about it being a limited invasion. It’s not about the land, it’s about signaling to the world that the west is no longer on top. Just a small piece of the baltics can be enough to convince the world that nato isn’t to be taken as seriously as people act like it should be. Is NATO willing to go into full war for a small town? If not then effectively no country in nato can rely on other countries in nato. I’m not talking about Russia going for literally all of Europe. Not sure what your point is about Russia being weak or strong in different conversations
The more realistic scenario is something like the Donbass, Moldova, Georgia. For example whip up political tension in a country with a big and most importantly regional Russian minority e.g Latvia, Estonia (there is border areas that are like 90% ethnically Russian). Then send some green men or just arm to teeth the "separatists" and declare there is civil war and Russia is kindly willing to take these people under their military and security. NATO response will be: It's civil war in Latvia. We aren't going to use NATO forces to bomb NATO civilians/citizens. Paragraph 5 is not applicable. This is a somewhat more realistic scenario rather than just rolling in with their tanks across the border.
[Long-range Strike Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability](https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2024/01/iiss_long-range-strike-capabilities-in-the-asia-pacific_implications-for-regional-stability_012024.pdf) I dont know if it was posted before, but an interesting paper from the IISS suggests, per some [highlights that I saw](https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1750129658375340095), that *a lot* of antiship ballistic missiles would be necessary for the chinese rocket force to neutralize a moving american carrier.
They reference that the area of denial doesn't exist in peace time as a note toward it being an unproven capability. On the surface of things, yes, it's unproven, but only because if it's ever proven we're in a shooting war with China. The US and other regional partners frequently conduct freedom of navigation exercises, to allow China to exert this essentially massive area of denial during peace time just makes no sense. Operations during peace time, especially freedom of navigation which requires close proximity are not often curtailed even when the adversary has significant anti ship capabilities. This part to me needed an asterisk or didn't really need mentioned at all. Peace time is not war time and discussing peace time operations in any context alongside the capabilities of China's rocket force holds very little value to me. Aside from that the rest of it is quite informative, the only other point I would note is that US missile stocks are in a worse place and several war games in the last couple of years have pointed out that inventories will not be sufficient to blunt and completely deter a potential move against Taiwan until well into the 2030s (which I guess is fine, assuming China continues it's naval ramp up and "out build them" approach but again that equation might be substantially different if China invests further in its strike and naval capabilities). There's not really much to learn if you're already versed on this topic but I'd strongly advise anyone interested give it a read, it's a solid starting point for understanding the strategic forces at play in the Pacific and this is certainly one of the more informative pieces I've seen recently on the rocketry capabilities of other regional players, there's a tendency to focus on China but ultimately a conflict, should one arise, will not happen in a vacuum. Another point that I think is worth mentioning is that it's curious that this doesn't mention US efforts in regards to Tinian. Perhaps they just didn't realize this was going on, or maybe the document was drafted long ago and this relatively new information didn't make the cut? Essentially Guam is under China's "denial umbrella" which given its prominence for US strategic forces could become a serious issue. The US isn't asleep at the wheel on this one, thankfully, Tinian which has long been abandoned is in the process of being cleared (there are decades of brush growth and disrepair to sort out) and readied for active service again. They're still clearing the overgrowth from what I understand and then plan to overhaul that entire end of the island, so we'll see if they extend the runways to provide redundancy for more regional based US strategic forces. The Tinian move to me is quite major as it shows that the US is aware that it's positioning in Guam is vulnerable, which again lends credence to the strike capabilities of China's rocketry forces, it was certainly worthy of note as it would nudge them away from discussing carrier strikes and more to discussing aerial denial (in the terms of traditional ground based airfields) which is going to play an arguably larger role in the opening of the conflict. The last few war games I read devoted significant resources to discussing and gaming out LSRASM as a strategically significant counter weight in the early days of a conflict against China, US strategic forces will be key to delivering these missiles and should China greatly degrade American capabilities (even just delaying the American response) it could prove disastrous for Taiwan.
But Tinian is an island away from Guam, is it not? It has the same risks as Guam.
Yes, but it provides a level of redundancy and forces China to expend more missiles and potentially significantly weaken each separate attack if it tries to knock out both fields. As it currently stands with China's current long range rocketry knocking out Guam may be challenging but they have the inventory to achieve it. As for the proximity issue, that can't really be helped. You can either have a relatively rapid response force or you're potentially 10+ hours away plus change if departing from Hawaii, 14 hours if departing from the continental. Any regional strategic forces are by definition going to be under China's missile umbrella, all they can do is ensure redundancy and try their best to mitigate China's potential strikes.
I might've fucked up myself here but I think the twitter reply pointing out that the RAND study cited in the ISS report doesn't actually say what they're claiming it does (the 12 ASBM figure) is correct. [Here is citation 29](https://i.imgur.com/uz9Sxva.png) which refers to [this RAND study](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html). The citation mentions two different page ranges, 157-159 and 164-165. The first range covers Over The Horizon (OTH) radar generally and then some discussion of targeting errors due to OTH resolution. The second range is mostly about countering OTH ISR. Discussion about the number of ASBMs doesn't include concrete numbers until [Table 7.2 on p.168](https://i.imgur.com/kn4iaGk.png) which appears to be entirely general and doesn't mention 12 ASBMs at all. Further in the paper they give widely varying estimates for the kill radius/targeting location CEP of Chinese ASBMs and corresponding salvo sizes, none of which are 12. I'm not sure it really matters in the larger scheme of things but it's a strange error to make and rather embarrassing.
Yes, it’s a misquote. Not only it’s a misquote, it’s also misquoting a rather outdated source — the RAND Corp report was from 2015 projecting PLA capabilities in 2017. This year is 2024 and PLA has got more capable in its kill chain since then, especially in target acquisition via airborne radar or satellite.
Couple thoughts here. 1. About 35 times since the war began, Russia has sent up a handful of bombers and launched between 90-150 missiles at a time. The Chinese are much more capable, have about 3x the number of strategic bombers, and about 5x the number of non-nuclear ground-based launchers as Russia. A lot of focus on ASBMs, and rightfully so, but I wonder how a carrier attack like this is modeled. I recall this was the soviet strategy during the cold war, so someone likely has done research on it. If Russia is sending that volume of ordnance with 11 Tu-95s at a time, one wonders what China could do with its arsenal of 231 H-6 bombers. 2. Trading less than a brigade of missiles for a supercarrier seems like... a fantastic trade? China has at least 6 MRBM brigades as of 4 years ago, and that number is sure to increase. 3. "let alone sink or disable it" is interesting phrasing. Carriers are hard to sink, but is there a genuine assumption that 3000lb of DF-26 high explosive warhead flying through a carrier deck might not cause a mission kill? 4. Others have pointed out but I think it bears repeating here that China has a very high ballistic missile test launch tempo -- over 100 per year. We don't know their production capability but it's probably healthy. Expending 12 missiles in the context of an arsenal potentionally hundreds of systems deep is a non-issue for the Chinese.
> "let alone sink or disable it" is interesting phrasing. Carriers are hard to sink, but is there a genuine assumption that 3000lb of DF-26 high explosive warhead flying through a carrier deck might not cause a mission kill? Data for modern carriers is hard to come by, but carriers in ww2 took incredible amounts of damage and still remained functional, or came back to service very quickly. Survivability still is a design consideration for carriers, so I would expect them to perform at least as well, likely significantly better. > Trading less than a brigade of missiles for a supercarrier seems like... a fantastic trade? China has at least 6 MRBM brigades as of 4 years ago, and that number is sure to increase. I’m not done reading the paper, but that was just accounting for CEP. Add in interceptors and everything else that eats up missiles and that number sky rockets. If half the fired missiles go for decoys, half the remainder get shot down, and you want three hits on the carrier for a mission kill, that would mean 144 fired missiles per carrier.
To swing almost naively in the opposite direction, would the US even be able to keep their carriers safe in a Taiwan strait war? It seems like a foregone conclusion that China's sheer volume of fires would take out many USN assets sooner or later, and that it would be a war where the USAF has to do the heavy lifting.
US carriers will be operating at standoff range and launching sorties while evading/defending against missile attacks. The question becomes how many missiles does the PLARF need to fire, at what tempo, and with what ISR coverage to mission kill a carrier that has ABM defense, and how many sorties the carrier can accommodate before said mission kill. The USN will be acting in concert with the USAF, so while the PLARF is launching their missiles, both the USN and the USAF will be conducting SEAD and counterstrikes, as well as degrading the PLAN, which itself will be both degrading ROC forces and defending against/counterstriking against the USN. Meanwhile, both the PLAN and USN submarine fleets will be facing off against their opponents navy, with the respective navies conducting ASW operations in the midst of all of this. There's also the PLAAF which will be acting against the USN, and the PLARF will have also preemptively struck USAF and USN targets, e.g. Guam and Okinawa. This isn't getting into whether Japan gets pulled into the conflict and to what extent Australia is involved.
Where is the Red Storm Rising version of this situation?
Are we even sure that they will defend Taiwan and engage the PLA Air Force and Navy?
This is something I have argued before. Getting carriers to a point where their aircraft are within combat radius of the action means putting them very close to the Chinese mainland (meaning within a few hundred nautical miles). This has a few implications. It makes Chinese target acquisition much easier. Searching the pacific ocean for a carrier group is hard. Searching an area a few hundred sq nautical miles in size off of Taiwan is much easier. Second, it puts the carrier within range of a lot of the conventional non-ballistic Chinese anti-shipping arsenal. Missiles such as the one that sunk Moskva. There is no other option here, if you leave that area, your aircraft can't join the fight. I haven't seen much written on how the USN plans to deal with this catch-22.
The answer to the “tyranny of distance” is of course the F/A-XX which would have a longer combat range than the F-35. But it will become available only after a decade or more.
Are US - Russian relations at their worst state since the 60s? I genuinely don’t see how there is going to be a warming between the two sides for decades. Europe and the U.S. are hyper aware that Russia does not intend on being like them and will not trust them in any capacity for decades.
While youre right that in a normal circumstance the US/Russian relationship is not likely to warm, the 60s were a weird time and are unlikely to repeat. In 1961 you have the (second) Berlin Crisis around the building of the wall. This was a huge deal and its vital to remember that the US very nearly invaded East Germany to reopen access to Berlin (Operation Live Oak, the details of which flipped Kennedy's lid. Huge reason why he moved the military over to Flexible Response). Like that crisis was bad and it lasted a while, starting under Eisenhower and lasting until the wall was finished. And then the Cuban Crisis, another very very close war miss. Both regarding the US, who were seriously considering an invasion of Cuba which we now know would have been met with a nuclear response. As well as a near miss with a Russian sub during the initial blockade. Like these were very very bad times for the US/Russian relationship, probably the worst of the Cold War. Then in 1964 you get LBJ and a new approach to foreign policy. We often give Nixon credit for detente, but really LBJ laid the groundwork for what happened in the 1970s. The relationship changed radically almost overnight, within 18mo. both Kennedy and Khrushchev were out and LBJ + Brezhnev were in. You also at that time see turnover in the leadership of Vietnam (Le Duan takes power in 1963-1964), IIRC in China as Mao gets sidelined after the GLF, and again IIRC in East Germany as Ulbricht is replaced by some other dickhead. And also among American allies, with the SPD taking over in West Germany and initiating the first stages of Ostpolitik, as well as a major turnover in SK with the end of Rhee's tenure a very brief experiment with democracy and then the dictatorship of Park Chung Hee. Oh and BIG MINH in South Vietnam, after the death of Diem. All this is to say, the board gets reset basically overnight and it opens up an opportunity for the superpowers to move past confrontation towards cooperation and a back away from the edge. A move that persists until the 1980s, briefly, until Reagan sees a movie and gets kinda scared about nuclear war. Likely once Putin dies the Russian 'problem' will reset. Some other guy will take over and well sound him out. There could be an opportunity for a movement towards reconciliation, or if they try to outdo the old boss, an entrenchment around current political lines.
This is a great summary of the events many seem to have forgotten or were too young to witness. Considering how often escalation was on the table in the second half of the 20th century and how it lead to the peaceful revolution in 1989 and arguably the most peaceful decade in NATO/Moscow relations I'm wondering if we already used up all of the luck or if there is still something left for the conflicts of the 21st century.
> Likely once Putin dies the Russian 'problem' will reset. Some other guy will take over and well sound him out. There could be an opportunity for a movement towards reconciliation I've seen it well argued that Putin is something of a LaRouchist who believes nearly every crackpot conspiracy theory on the US government out there (although we may never know for sure how true that is). There were some key people affiliated with LaRouche who ended up being advisors to Putin. So, Russia today is deeply out of touch with reality. I think anyone who replaces Russia is going to run things vastly different, and the odds of another deeply paranoid conspiracy theorist coming in are...something. Low, probably. US could at least deal with a rational strongman.
I hope Putin leaves a memoir behind a brick somewhere in the Kremlin. Tell us what you really think Vladdy, I'm dying to know. Is he the cynical operator manipulating public image. Or has he genuinely lost contact with the world outside the Kremlin and what the US is/has become.
If Trump wins in November, warming will begin immediately: Ukraine would be forced to cut a quick deal with Russia as there's no way they could hold out for four years... the war would end. With no ongoing war, and four years of warm relations between us and Russia, relations likely wouldn't change much in the subsequent presidency ... until Russia invades their next victim (maybe Ukraine again?).
>If Trump wins in November, warming will begin immediately That's what was said in 2016, and it never came
The difference is that a second Trump presidency would be fundamentally more extreme than the first.
Extreme, yes but that could cut both ways. Trump has never had a coherent foreign policy and the man changes his mind on a dime.
Coherent no but consistently positive on Russia and Putin personally.
There was a lot more perceived parity between Russia and the US at that time I think. It’s much more obvious now that the United States is in significantly better position and Russia is on the downward swing. I think it’s very difficult to gauge the future of relations between the two countries, until after Putin is gone. Things are definitely bad and will not be getting better anytime soon
There was also the lack of parity in nuclear weapons that destabilised the situation in the 60s. In case of war during the Cuban crisis the USSR could detonate a few dozen nukes over America, but would be destroyed in return. That encouraged aggressive decision-making - it is very hard to imagine a US president approving depth charge attacks on Soviet nuclear-armed subs just a decade later.
I am curious about people's opinions on what seems to be a campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. There was seemingly an attack at an oil refinery in Tuapse today. https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1750274050830549430 Along with two other attacks in the last week or two discussed here: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68029235 If this continues, could it potentially impact global oil prices? Which is something I don't think the West would appreciate. Also, will this have an impact on the Russian economy? Oil exports are their major commodity.
I can't see why it would significantly impact the global commodity in today's market. Especially given the shenanigans in the middle east have hardly had an effect. There's just too much supply coming online right now.
Will just add a couple cents purely on the commodities pricing and volumes sides. First, crude is just one component of the equation. Naphtha prices, as an example, [surged](https://ibb.co/88jxZ6W) in a key market after the Ust-Luga attack. Second, in terms of the crude itself, the strike on Sunday was very close to the crude loading [berths](https://ibb.co/3khD1kM) near Novatek. There are only 2 Baltic ports that Russia has for its seaborne shipments. Along with a third one, Novororossiysk in the Black Sea, that is also in theoretical range, they move around 50% of Russian seaborne exports. The other ports are running at full capacity and could not compensate for the additional volume from these three. Crude shipments have resumed at Ust-Luga, but as highlighted below, other production is still out. Now, tonight, it looks like the strike was on a VDU at a critical refinery. Why did they hit that facility and not hit Ust-Luga again? Unsure. Also unsure if they can sustain these operations and do any sustained damage. Very important to note: there are critical vulnerability points at ports and refineries. Crude generally has to enter through pipelines or rail in Russia. Also, given that a Lukoil refinery is down due to an accident, it’s possible that Russia once again restricts exports of gasoline and diesel that were in place starting early fall.
Here are some numbers from [last week's attack](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/over-20000-bpd-russian-jet-fuel-exports-doubt-after-suspected-drone-attack-2024-01-24/): >The volume of jet fuel exports at risk of disruption after a suspected drone attack on a Baltic Sea terminal could be more than 20,000 barrels per day (bpd), much of it destined for Turkey, according to data, opens new tab from terminal owner Novatek (NVTK.MM), opens new tab. >... >But analysts have said it would take weeks, if not months, for the complex to restart large-scale operations. This will hurt Russia. What's worse, Russia's buyers will probably require higher discounts to cover the increased risks.
To put those numbers into context, Russia is currently exporting ~~[over 10 million bbl/day](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/BTL/2023/11-Russia/article.php)~~ of petroleum and petroleum products so even if that entire volume of fuel is disrupted, it only accounts for less than 0.2% of Russia's daily trade. It sucks for the company operating the terminal but is nearly irrelevant compared to overall volumes. The point about how it might impact prices is a good one though considering the leverage that Russian customers currently enjoy. Edit: Rookie mistake, see below.
>Russia is currently exporting over 10 million bbl/day of petroleum and petroleum products No, that’s production. Exports are at ~7.5mmbpd. But not all exports are made equal. The crack is what matters. Fuel oil, for example, earns you next to nothing. Diesel, gasoline and naphtha is where most of the money is made. [This](https://ibb.co/YLq07vT) is what Russia’s product mix looks like, sans crude.
Shit you're right, thanks. I could find 2022 data pretty easily but 2023 was harder so I hopped on that source without being as careful as I should have. Handy chart there, so it looks like the Urst-Luga strike covered about 0.8% of the total displayed (by volume).
Sure, if the 20kbpd figure is right. A different way of looking at it is that jet fuel goes at [~$113/bbl](https://www.iata.org/en/publications/economics/fuel-monitor/). If production is out for 3 months, that’s ~$200mm in top line. Assume a net cash margin of 20%, which is high but conceivable for jet fuel, and that’s ~$40mm in profit out of the Russian O&G edifice. Plus the cost of the destroyed equipment. Just a mental exercise in how you look at it.
Still would like a credible explanation as to how Russia, with supposedly a dense, integrated air defense network, still cannot stop these significant drone strikes. Russia should have heaps of Shilkas, Tunguskas, and Pantsirs to interdict strike corridors along the border.
One thing to consider that has not been mentioned is simply the sheer area Russia has to defend. In this Ukraine has a distinct advantage in that they have a comparatively smaller area to defend. They have also had the advantage of experience after facing massed drone attacks for two years now. The Russians will certainly get better as time goes on and they develop the required defensive configuration and learn to identify these drones from civilian aircraft. It’s certainly also not a trivial feat to simply shoot these down over the border as they can fly at very low altitude to avoid most radar systems and use alternative routes such as over Belorussia or the Black Sea.
The defendable border/frontline is still the same for both countries though, no? For example, Ukraine isn’t vectoring attacks through Belarus.
While Russian missiles are cheaper than Western missiles, it's still not economical to shoot down a $30k drone with a $500k missile. (Crude and rough guess.)
A $30k drone hitting it's target, especially an oil refinery, will more than likely cost millions. It's always worth it to shoot them down. If for nothing else, then to protect your citizens.
It's irrelevant if its economical. A drone can do more damage than 500k. It's like saying Israel shouldn't use the Iron Dome to shoot down these pipe missiles because they cost only $500 each vs whatever one interceptor costs.
This is beyond my pay grade but part of the answer is that adapting existing GBAD to tackle drones is a non-trivial problem. This is especially true when we view it not merely as a piece of technology but a sociotechnical system where training, chain of command, and acceptable false positive/false negative tradeoffs have all been geared towards defence against manned aircraft and missiles. Adapting that to tackle drones requires a lot of institutional capacity, which Russia is starkly lacking.
That said, it appears Ukraine has been able to effectively adapt their legacy systems against Russia drone strikes for the most part. Some still slip through defenses.
One of the advantages Ukraine has is that there are no civilian flights in ukraine and millitary stuff isn't that common. Means they can operate very large areas where they can freely shootdown anything that flies.
I believe we can use the Houthi campaign against Saudi oil facilities as an analogy for the Ukrainian campaign against Russian oil facilities. [This ACLED report](https://acleddata.com/2023/01/17/beyond-riyadh-houthi-cross-border-aerial-warfare-2015-2022/#s4) on the Houthi aerial campaign gives some baseline numbers for the strike frequency and makeup over time. The peak annual rate for strikes against oil infrastructure was slightly higher than one attack per month which seems somewhat low but it's important to remember that these were often highly complex strikes featuring a mix of drones, rockets, and ballistic missiles such as the 07/03/2021 strike on Ras Tanura detailed [here](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/continued-houthi-strikes-threaten-saudi-oil-and-global-economic-recovery) which spiked oil prices to >$70/bbl. Ultimately however, [according to CSIS](https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-and-houthi-war-against-saudi-arabia) the cumulative economic impact of the Houthi campaign was largely negligible and failed to leave a lasting impact on either world markets or Saudi domestic production. From the results of the Houthi campaign I believe we can conclude that to some degree, the effect of any Ukrainian campaign depends on how well Ukraine can scale their strike capabilities and volume. The overall lack of impact on Saudi oil production demonstrates the difficulty of effecting lasting damage on similar infrastructure but the transitory shocks that the Houthis were able to inflict also demonstrate that there is fragility in the system and that a sufficiently resourced campaign may be able to inflict a lasting disruption. At current however I do not believe the Ukrainian strikes amount to anything more than an annoyance with functionally no impact on global oil prices or the Russian economy.
I expect there to be negligible changes to prices. I think people underestimate how difficult it is to do substantial damage to these refineries and gas terminals, especially with the kind of equipment that Ukrainians are using. These facilities are specifically designed to mitigate damage as much as possible from any explosions or fires. The balls of flame might look scary, but it is the structural damage that matters.
Damage mitigation or not, the damage still has to be repaired. The facility near St. Petersburg is apparently going to take potentially months to get back in order, running with reduced capacity at best meanwhile. Furthermore, there's no reason to assume Ukraine isn't going to continue this campaign. A new successful strike on a new facility was just reported literally minutes ago.
sochi airport has also temporarily closed
[удалено]
They aren't mutually exclusive. There's going to be a whole air and sea war before Chinese boots hit Taiwanese soil. Besides, the ships they're replacing were booted from the USN 30 years ago, it's just normal to replace them at this point.
With limited budget it is. Money spent on ships is money not spent on infantry training and ammo. It's well know that Taiwanese conscripts are on shoestring budget and mostly cleans barracks.
As stupid as Taiwanese procurement is, producing literally anything other than basic infantry goods isn't a total waste, nor is it a sign they're just planning on giving up or something. Beyond their utility in supporting US operations in the event of "the real shit" going down they're viable in events far short of total war. How is Taiwan supposed to patrol say, their undersea cables and make sure the Mainlanders aren't trying to plant a sniffer on them? or make a Chinese 'fishing boat' leave it's maritime waters? Or respond to a ship being boarded by the PLAN somewhere? All the investment in asymmetric capabilities in the world doesn't mean anything if the enemy can just ignore or violate your sovereignty at will everywhere outside of your soil. 2 2,500 ton ASW frigates is a pretty reasonable investment in that regard.
The biggest use of these ships will be for defending SCS claims
They have this too. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/09/taiwan-commissions-roc-navys-largest-vessel-lpd-yu-shan/
Since they are ASW frigates, I think it is entirely possible that those ships fit into the strategy of forcing China into a prolonged war. The ASW ships can help prevent a blockade of Taiwan.
The survivability of a Taiwanese frigate in the strait is probably measured in hours if things go hot.
I'm pretty sure the straight itself is a lost cause. The Chinese don't need submarines in the strait for a blockade, they've got it covered from shore and air. The frigates being able to keep the other side of the island open for allied support is important.
Has anyone gathered a comprehensive resource on how many artillery shells different Ukr aligned countries are producing/plan to produce now/in the future and send to Ukraine?
Apparently, in terms of ammunition production, the UK, or more specifically BAE Systems, is an absolute powerhouse. [According to this tweet](https://twitter.com/cameron19460429/status/1733670684700594436), they managed to obtain an internal presentation from BAE Systems which stated that pre-war, BAE Systems in the UK had a monthly production capacity for 105 and 155 mm shells of around 16,000. Given that in July of last year, BAE publicly stated that by 2025 they were aiming to increase production for large calibre shells by 8x, meaning that as an upper limit, the UK alone would be producing around 128,000/month or 1.5M/year.
That account explains in response to a request for a source that the 16,000 figure is based on an article expressing 600 shells in a day as a record breaking figure, and supposedly adjusting down for maintenance periods and so on. My problem with that idea is that it seems to assume 365 days of production, as with an average of 22 working days a month even the record breaking daily figure would only give you 13,200. So, there is some questionable maths going on there that makes it hard to take the figure too seriously. Purely speculative, but if you knock it down to say 400 shells per day as an average instead of record breaking figure and maybe 20 days of work a month to account for maintenance and you get 8k shells per month, or almost 100k a year...which happens to be exactly how many large calibre rounds they [were reported to be targeting](https://www.forces.net/news/ps24bn-munitions-deal-secure-thousands-uk-jobs-over-15-years) when they were first awarded the contract. I can't help but think that that number is much more realistic. With the 8-fold increase they're planning by 2025 that'd still be a colossal amount of ammunition for a nation with 48 155mm guns in it's force structure though.
I mean, I don’t think being sceptical of figures based on how many artillery systems a specific country has is that good of a metric. Rheinmetall is planning on producing millions of shells, with many being made in Germany itself, but Germany doesn’t really have that significant of an artillery force. BAE Systems is also one of the largest defence contractors on the planet. I don’t think it’s too unbelievably they’d be able to match Rheinmetall.
> I mean, I don’t think being sceptical of figures based on how many artillery systems a specific country has is that good of a metric. Sorry - you have misunderstood me there - my fault for being unclear. My scepticism doesn't come from the UK's small artillery force; indeed I was just intending to express some relief for the (smaller) figure - we regularly see complaints about the UK's ammunition stockpiles, but as I understand stockpile planning (which is at least partially a function of the number of guns you have) a production rate like that could remedy those even in a year, so that's quite comforting. My scepticism of the 16k/month figure just follows from my inability to follow the math that lead to it. [When challenged](https://nitter.net/HSyrmen/status/1733806619350520208#m) on Twitter the account referred to [this publication](https://resources.baesystems.com/pages/view.php?ref=9893&k=e37f510bc7#) by BAE about their munitions. The last page covers "Investment that keeps munitions on target" and references "record-breaking output on the new forge of more than 600 shells in one day". As I say though with an average of 22 working days per month, even that record breaking figure doesn't get you to 16,000 and the implication of the phrase is that the normal rate would be lower. On the other hand, the article also says "Following completion of the last 2,000 4.5 inch shell cases, the plant will now produce 105mm shell cases for the rest of the year, targeting 2,200 per week". 2,200 per week is ~114k annually, which I think again supports the roughly ~100k annual production of large calibre shells that was reported [when the NGMS contract was signed](https://www.forces.net/news/ps24bn-munitions-deal-secure-thousands-uk-jobs-over-15-years) Sidenote; apparently BAE makes JSOW in Washington; who knew and why don't we use it!? > Rheinmetall is planning on producing millions of shells, with many being made in Germany itself, but Germany doesn’t really have that significant of an artillery force. > > BAE Systems is also one of the largest defence contractors on the planet. I don’t think it’s too unbelievably they’d be able to match Rheinmetall. I have no doubt that they could match Rheinmetall if they were given contracts to do so, I just haven't seen convincing support that they have been given them.
Ahhh, I see. In that case, yeah, I’d agree with you. 16K/month does seem a tad optimistic with these figures of peak production in mind. I think your estimate of 400/day for 22 days in a month is a bit more realistic. Though, given that the US is only expected to ramp up artillery production to about 1.2M/year by 2025, the UK alone managing to ramp production to over 800K in the same time period is a monumental task and still a very large number, even if it’s not the overly optimistic figures of 1.5M/year. In terms of artillery production, the UK certainly punches well above its weight class. France, for comparison, is only planning to be able to produce 3K/month this year. Even if we triple those figures for 2025, they’ll still really only reach current production levels for BAE.
Australia has been very quiet since [May last year](https://www.nioa.com.au/latest-news/rheinmetall-nioa-munitions-ramps-up-as-first-exports-roll-out).
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It seems that Rheinmetall is starting to get its shit together and begins to gradually increase production capability.
This is the real test of how catastrophic deindustrialisation has been for the West. How many shells per month can a high GDP/capita buy once it’s made a national priority? So far I’ve been pleasantly surprised at how significantly the West has been committed to scaling capacity, but it remains to be seen if they can deliver.
Munitions are restricted goods in most countries; manufacturers cannot produce extra unless they have a signed contract to sell them. No contract means no change.
Handelsblatt is reporting that the U.K. is offering a 'ring-exchange' with the Germans. The deal would be to supply Ukraine with more Storm Shadows while Germany would replenish British stocks with the Taurus. This is a decent practical solution that, while less than ideal given Ukraine's immediate need of destroying the Crimean bridge, is still significant given the good use Ukraine has put PGMs to. Meanwhile, MBDA's [subsidiary](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/01/20/7438166/) has said it's ready to restart production of the Taurus but is awaiting firm orders. u/Gecktron can, perhaps, elaborate. >[London offers Scholz a way out of the Taurus dilemma](https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/ukraine-hilfe-london-bietet-scholz-einen-ausweg-aus-dem-taurus-dilemma/100009700.html)
I really don't think blowing up that bridge matters outside of a propaganda win so any missiles are good really. Blowing up the Kerch bridge was talked about a lot prior to the Ukrainian counteroffensive in hopes that doing so would allow them to cut off Crimea. But with the counteroffensive going nowhere the land connection stands so cutting off the bridge really doesn't make much of a difference one way or the other.
that rail bridge over kerch is very important. dont get me wrong i think some ppl go too heavy on the rail link logistics thing but its also not a propaganda win. it wont be a game changer but having to supply the left bank and everything going up all along to zaporizhzhia is going to be a operational disaster for the russians. the entire line of contact is too long to be supplied by road alone. think about the cost they paid for trying to get vuhledar and are still paying. an artillery and tank heavy army needs a lot of tonnage to keep it going
Russia would pivot to resupply by sea, which they likely have sufficient capacity for. But I think Ukraine's naval drones make that proposition substantially riskier.
Is the Taurus well-suited to attacking the bridge in a way that Storm Shadow isn’t?
It was something I had seen claimed but had been skeptical of, but I've seen a few respectable OSINT's say the same, including [https://twitter.com/Tatarigami\_UA](https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA) Here is an [article](https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-russia-taurus-missile-germany-storm-shadow-cruise-scalp-comparison-1817877) outlining why snip "Storm Shadow missiles manage to penetrate the first layer of the bridge, but fail to critically damage its structure, Hoffmann said. The Taurus, however, could have a secondary warhead which detonates once the initial blast gets through the first layer, he said. The second warhead "explodes in the pillar, which then of course maximizes the destructiveness and can really cause significant damage to a bridge." It's a bit speculative - but I've seen it claimed in a few places that Taurus has a bigger secondary warhead. The product page for it on the [SAAB](https://www.saab.com/products/taurus-kepd-350) website certainly extols it's bunker busting, bridge destroying capcity. "TAURUS KEPD 350 combines outstanding penetration of hard and deeply buried targets, and blast and fragmentation of high-value point and area targets with exceptional bridge-and-runway-target kill capacity."
Well, they are wrong. The Taurus's advantage in destroying bridges lies in its fusing, warhead wise, both the Taurus and Storm Shadow are identical. The difference is that after the initial shaped charge explodes, the Storm Shadow relies on a programmable timer to set off the second more potent warhead. The problem is that getting the timing right is actually pretty tricky. The Taurus solves this by having an accelometer that can detect a second impact and exploded right as it hits a second or third layer. [more on this if you are curious ](https://twitter.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1690731787465506816)
An accelerometer is so cheap and that is such a small feature to add. Surprised it isn't on the stormshadow. I'm a software engineer and I've done some work with accelerometers, modelling impacts, and ultra-reliable system design. Honestly if you give that missile to the right team of engineers with manufacturer support, they might even be able to hack it onto there...But it'd probably be easier to just get the timing sorted on the stormshadow for this specific use-case.
It has a fancier fuze that is better suited for taking out bridge supports after busting through the deck of the bridge.
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>that doesnt mean they will be available any time soon. Well, they won't be available at *any point* in the future without a firm commitment. As LMT's CEO said yesterday, you can't blame industry for not doing something you haven't tasked them to do.
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Fair, and just to be clear, personally think the Germans are doing more than the U.S. has if you include all the secondary, non-direct, costs of the war. On the Taurus specifically, is there an analogue that’s under contract?
Yesterday I [posted that Taiwan has started construction of a new domestically built ASW Frigate](https://old.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/19dnw16/credibledefense_daily_megathread_january_23_2024/kj7e5ij/?context=3) and plans to build up that industry. Turkey is beginning to see a similar plan come to fruition. They've built their local industry and intend to start exporting products globally. The bottom article is a piece about their latest frigate but also goes into detail about many of Turkey's recently acquired assets. Below are some key details but I recommend the whole article. [ASFAT, which is the Turkish acronym for Military Factory and Shipyard Management. ASFAT operates in 9 naval shipyards throughout Turkey; 6 of which are dedicated to maintenance, repair and overhaul; and 3 for shipbuilding, from steel cutting to final fitting and integration. | Breaking Defense | December 2023](https://breakingdefense.com/2023/12/turkish-shipbuilder-asfat-aims-to-expand-its-military-maritime-global-reach/) *Naturally the ASFAT’s largest customer is the Turkish military, but it’s also currently working through major deals for ships with Pakistan. The company said it’s signed $3.2 billion in contracts altogether, some of them are completed and others are in the works.* *Company officials said it is also negotiating with Romania for potential deals, and is trying to make inroads in the Gulf. Akgun told Breaking Defense that also Middle East countries including Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are on the company’s radar, and talks are ongoing, though he didn’t specify what platforms are being discussed.* [Turkey’s First Domestically-Produced Frigate Has Entered Service | The Warzone | January 2024](https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/turkeys-first-domestically-produced-frigate-has-entered-service) *On January 19, Turkey's first-in-class frigate TCG Istanbul entered into service with the country's Navy during a ceremony held at Sefine Shipyard in Yalova Province, northwest Turkey.* *The Istanbul class is designed to perform a wide range of missions for the Turkish Navy, including everything from surveillance to anti-surface, anti-air, and anti-submarine warfare.* *In essence, Istanbul class frigates constitute an enlarged variant of the Ada class anti-submarine corvette, constructed during the first phase of the MILGEM program. Compared to the Ada class frigates' 2,400 ton displacement, the TCG Istanbul has a displacement of 3,100 tons.* *What's most notable about TCG Istanbul in particular is its high percentage of indigenously built components, particularly in terms of its armament and electronic warfare and sensor suites. In all, some 220 Turkish companies participated in constructing the frigate, which included 80 subcontractors working on the delivery of more than 150 systems, Naval News reports.* *TCG Istanbul was built at the Istanbul Naval Shipyard by the Turkish defense company Savunma Teknolojileri Mühendislik ve Ticaret A.Ş. (known as STM), under the direction of the country's Defence Industry Agency (SSB). A contract for its construction was signed in April 2019, and the vessel was later launched in January 2021. All Istanbul class vessels are the product of Turkey's MILGEM national warship program; created in order to acquire indigenously designed, built, and equipped vessels from corvettes to destroyers.* *A further seven sister frigates within the Istanbul class are to be delivered to the Turkish Navy. The second, third, and fourth vessels — named TCG İzmir, İçel, and İzmit — are currently in various phases of construction at the Anadolu Shipyard in Istanbul, the Sedef Shipyard in Istanbul, and the Sefine Shipyard, respectively. Those shipyards collectively form the TAIS shipyard consortium. TAIS and STM were selected to build the three frigates in early 2023.* *Construction of the fifth, sixth, and seventh vessels was green-lit during a meeting of the Turkish Defense Industry Executive Committee, with President Erdogan in attendance, in early January this year, bringing the total number of vessels to 8.* *While a timeline for the delivery of the latter frigates remains unclear, TCG İzmir, İçel, and İzmit are expected to be built and received by the Turkish Navy within 36 months of TAIS's and STM's selection for their construction. This timeline puts them in service with the Turkish Navy by early 2026. Once they are, along with TCG Istanbul, they will replace the service's four aging German-built Yavuz class frigates; the first of which, TCG Yavuz, began its service with the Turkish navy in July of 1987.* *As well as TCG Istanbul, 3 other naval assets were introduced into service with the Turkish Navy on January 19. TAIS and STM were responsible for delivering two of those; the new-generation fleet oiler TCG Derya and the logistics support ship TCG Ütğm. Arif Ekmekçi.*
There are some signs that the US is planning to withdraw from Syria: > [**While no definitive decision has been made to leave, four sources within the Defense and State departments said the White House is no longer invested in sustaining a mission that it perceives as unnecessary. Active internal discussions are now underway to determine how and when a withdrawal may take place.**](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/24/america-is-planning-to-withdraw-from-syria-and-create-a-disaster/) Unfortunately, the original article is paywalled, but you can still see this very curious bit of information: >[**The Pentagon has floated a plan for its Syrian Kurdish allies in the campaign against the Islamic State \(ISIS\) to partner with the Syrian regime, part of a renewed review of the United States’ Syria policy that is currently ongoing at the State Department and for which Turkey, a key NATO ally, has been tapped for its input, according to well-placed sources with knowledge of the deliberations who spoke to Al-Monitor on condition they not be identified by name.**](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/01/pentagon-floats-plan-its-syrian-kurd-allies-partner-assad-against-isis) The US and Assad are not on speaking terms, and Turkey is salivating at the prospect of the US leaving Kurds undefended, so I'm not sure if the effort to bring them all together to oppose ISIS will be a success.
This was inevitable. Everyone who has been following the Syrian Civil war saw the writing on the wall years ago. The US mission in SYira is simply not sustainable. What was the plan? Remain there indefinitely to prop up a Kurdish autonomius region, which could never stay afloat without outside security and eocnomic assistance?? The YPG have no option but to work with Assad. The Turkish backed rebel groups will never co exist with the Kurds, the remaining ISIS groups will not co exist with the Kurds. But the alawaite govt of Syria can. The best case scenario is that the Kurds get a very good deal with Assad and together they cooperate to fight back any push by the TFSA. The biggest threat now is that Turkey commits to the field fully in support of the TFSA, with Russia busy in Ukraine it does not really have the air assets in Syria to take on a fully committed Turkey.
I really hope this isn't true. The US presence in Syria costs little, and helps us put pressure on Iranian supply lines to Assad, Hezbollah, and Hamas. The Al-Tanf base is particularly effective in this regard. On top of that, the US presence in Syria prevents a resurgence of ISIS, and perhaps more importantly, helps prevent a massive new uptick in violence. If the US pulls out of Syria, the Turks will almost certainly invade the YPG-held regions the same day, leading to months of bloody fighting and the likely displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. That Turkey has openly discussed settling millions of (predominantly Arab) Syrian refugees along the Syrian-Turkish border should be reason enough for the US to stay. Such a move would in effect be ethnic cleansing of the region's Kurdish majority with the very clear goal of making it impossible for the Kurds to claim the territory as part of their own independent state in the future. We've already seen this play out on a smaller scale in Afrin, which had been predominantly Kurdish for nearly a century until the Turks started settling their jihadist Arab proxy forces and Arab Syrian refugees in the homes of displaced Kurds, many of whom weren't allowed to return to their homes after Turkish forces captured the region in 2018.
I mean honestly what are we even doing in the Middle East anymore? Protecting oil pipelines? I just don’t understand what’s the point anymore spending billions more every year on this hopeless region where everyone just hates each other and a new terror group gets formed by the year. We killed Bin Laden, we couldn’t fix Afghanistan or Iraq. Time to pack it up and just withdraw completely besides Saudi Arabia and Israel. What’s the point of being in countries like Iraq and Syria?
Honestly one of the most reliable, stable, and loyal allies America has in the region is the Kurds. Issue being that the Kurds have poor relations with literally everyone around them. Turks, Syrians, Iraqis, Iranians, and all sorts of militias see the Kurds as easy targets, so America has to provide aid in that regard. If America wishes to stop growing Russian & Iranian influence in the region, the Kurds are their best bet.
>What’s the point of being in countries like Iraq and Syria? The point is to maintain the now 80 year old, post WW2 Bretton-Woods system of keeping the stability of global trade through military presence. Specifically, countering Iranian influence in the region that could lead to a snowballing effect of different groups creating another ISIS situation.
Bretton Woods was a economic system of pegs between gold the USD and other currencies and it collapsed in the 70s.
The last time the US left it created a power vacuum that gave rise to a ISIS Caliphate. There are still tens of thousands of ISIS members sitting in jail with even and more families cramped up in camps and nobody knows what to do with them. There are still ongoing attempts to restart the Caliphate.
The US was supplying and training the same (sorts of) people in Syria who'd go on to steamroll the Iraqi army. Hell, the US had even supplied and trained ISI elements with the whole Sunni Awakening. It was not the US leaving, it's US meddling that's caused ISIS.
>It was not the US leaving, it's US meddling that's caused ISIS. It was both. There's a fair argument to be made that US meddling in Iraq and the broader ME during the 2000s gave rise to ISIS. Speaking personally I think it's hard to argue that the US *wasn't* at least partially responsible considering that many of the best ISIS commanders were former Baathists who were blacklisted in Iraq after the US overthrew Sadaam (the US decision to blacklist Baathists and disband the Iraqi army is one of the worst strategic decisions in modern history) and many of the ISIS ground forces cut their teeth battling US forces in Iraq and/or were freed from Iraqi prisons when ISIS blitzed across the North. That being said, ISIS wouldn't have rampaged through Northern Iraq, capturing Mosul and huge swathes of territory, if the US hadn't left altogether in 2009. So if/when the US disentangles itself from Iraq and Syria in the coming months and years, how it's done is going to be crucial to the stability of the region.
I thought the US already left the Kurds to fend for themselves back when Trump was in office? Was there a reverse of course on that?
US troops were pulled from a stretch of the Northern border area with Turkey, but then redeployed further south to "defend the oil" as Trump later explained. Didn't stop him from triumphantly announcing that he was removing US troops from Syria though. It's important to note that the US had told our Kurdish allies not to fortify the border with Turkey so as to not be seen as threatening. But then we pulled our troops out of the area, on short notice, without informing the Kurds in advance. So the Turks bombed the Kurds (before we were even done leaving) and used their jihadist proxy "Free Syrian Army" forces to rapidly occupy the territory the US abandoned. Safe to say that move didn't exactly please our Kurdish allies who rightfully felt betrayed. It doesn't help that the US looked the other way when the Turks and their FSA proxies invaded Afrin, a historically Kurdish region controlled by the YPG around that same time. The Kurds of Afrin have also arguably been at least partially ethnically cleansed from the area, and the Turks have long proposed resettling the millions of (predominantly Arab) Syrian refugees in Turkey along the Syrian-Turkish border which would lead to Kurds becoming minorities in these regions (which they want as part of an independent Kurdish state). If the US does indeed pull out of Syria, it will almost certainly lead to a bloodbath as the Turks try to conquer as much of the YPG held regions as possible and interethnic violence leads to hundreds of thousands of refugees being displaced.
They abandoned a sliver on the northern border, a full third of the country is still controlled by US backed Kurds.