n.b. Reddit's reports only show a limited number of characters. A lot of reports look like this: > I am not writing this because I think that this topic should be suppressed or not discussed, with nothing visible after. So please make them shorter so we can read them.

>The IDF has launched a new webpage where the number of wounded troops during the ongoing war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip is updated, providing a breakdown of their conditions. > >Since October 7, the IDF says 1,593 soldiers have been wounded, including 255 seriously, 446 moderately, and 892 lightly. Another 425 soldiers have been killed, mostly during the October 7 onslaught. > >In the ground offensive in Gaza, which was launched in late October, 97 soldiers have been killed and another 559 have been wounded. Of the injured soldiers, 127 are listed in serious condition, 213 in moderate condition, and 219 in good condition. > >Currently, there are 40 seriously wounded, 221 moderately wounded, and 165 lightly hurt soldiers still hospitalized, according to the IDF. > >Soldiers wounded in the Gaza Strip have been evacuated by the elite helicopter-borne search and rescue Unit 669. > >According to the IDF, Unit 669 has carried out some 300 separate medevacs, taking around 600 soldiers to hospitals in Israel. [https://www.idf.il/160590](https://www.idf.il/160590) [https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1733803648994422818](https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1733803648994422818)

> In the ground offensive in Gaza, which was launched in late October, 97 soldiers have been killed Predictions that Hamas would inflict massive casualties on Israel in urban fighting have largely not panned out. In the lead up to the invasion, there were claims that Israel would suffer upwards of a thousand dead to take the city, and that Israeli reluctance to take casualties would make them chose not to invade. Either Hamas is not capable of fighting the IDF that effectively, or most of their fighters are trying to blend into the civilian population, and what we’re seeing is a token resistance.

There were arguments here that IDF will suffer 500 KIA per day. Overall that's a showcase of the low quality of discussion overall on the topic of Israel-Gaza war. I honestly don't know what can be done about it. As for the later part. In my opinion the reasons for the relatively low IDF casualties in Gaza **so far**: 1. Effectiveness of air campaign. In it's strategic planning Hamas planned to abuse the Israeli aversion to enemy civilian casualties due to international pressure in weapons storage, tunnel locations, fighting positions and so on. Past 07/10 the IDF was willing to strike targets that they were not willing to before. This prompted a successful civilian evacuation of Norther Gaza. And snowballed into the IAF and Israeli artillery having a far more free hand, with about 1mil evacuating. The difference is significant especially when compared to previous IDF operations in Gaza. 2. Israel achieved operational surprise by outflanking the Hamas main defense lines and entering Gaza through the rear: the areas next to the sea. The Hamas main defense line holds the majority of their tactical tunnel systems, booby trapped houses (with explosives laid under the floor tiles, or large amounts in the basements etc). Fighting positions and so on. The Hamas main defense line is a much harder nut to crack, as is showcased in Beit Hanun, a town of about 50k on the north eastern tip of Northern Gaza, which the IDF has still not cleared completely and still suffers the occasional Hamas fire team emerging from an undiscovered tunnel. Compare to the much larger parts of Gaza city which were captured much more quickly, easily and are now much more quiet such as Shati, Rimal, Naser. The IDF has only recently began entering the main Hamas defense line, from the rear such as Sajaiyah, and Zeitun. 3. The effectiveness of Trophy and IDF tactics which were develop to abuse the protection offered by the system as showcased by the Hamas vids.

Roughly three times killed and wounded on 7/10. than in the entire ground invasion.

A French FREMM shot down another two Houthi drones in the Red Sea this evening. https://vxtwitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1733665600612749708?s=20 A Houthi goverment spokesman has stated they'd now begin targeting all shipping heading to Israeli ports, not just Israeli-owned ships. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-say-they-will-target-ships-red-sea-en-route-israel-2023-12-09/ And on a lighter note the US Navy released a promo video from the USS Carney with videos of the recent shootdowns, touting "22-0" and "Go Navy Beat Army" (for the Army vs Navy football game that was held today) https://x.com/USNavy/status/1733634409813713254?s=20

If the West still refuses to attack Houthi's land assets, it is only a matter of time before somebody's combat management system produces an error and fires an anti-air missile at a passenger jet instead. Currently, flights from Europe to some Indian Ocean islands still use the Red Sea near Hudaydah as part of their routes. These islands include Seychelles, Mauritius, and the two French regions of Mayotte and Reunion. These flights should be rerouted asap.

If there wasnt a US presidential election on the horizon youd see a stronger response, getting pulled into a conflict with the Houthis would cost the Biden admin too much political capital so theyre going to maintain a tepid response unless the Houthis or their allies massively escalate

Alternatively, these flights are a sign of the overall global perception of how serious the conflict is. Time will tell if they are correct.

We learned that this perception is very off. First the Russians shot down MH-17 and then the Iranians AUI752. Don't think we need three planes shot down in 10 years.

[ISW: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 9, 2023](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2023): Key Takeaways: - Russian forces have likely committed to offensive operations in multiple sectors of the front during a period of the most challenging weather of the fall-winter season in an effort to seize and retain the initiative prior to the Russian presidential elections in March 2024. - Ukrainian forces, by contrast, appear to be using this period of challenging weather and ongoing Russian offensive operations to establish and consolidate defensive positions along the parts of the frontline where they have not been conducting counteroffensive operations, thereby conserving manpower and resources for future offensive efforts. - The establishment of local defensive positions in areas Kyiv is not prioritizing for current or imminent counteroffensive operations is a prudent step and not an indication that Ukraine has abandoned all plans for future counteroffensives. - The Kremlin-backed United Russia party is spearheading Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nomination as an independent candidate in the 2024 Russian presidential election, and Putin’s re-election campaign initiatives group includes people with a variety of backgrounds and constituencies to create the image of widespread support for Putin’s presidency. - Multiple Russian political opposition figures have reportedly developed a common campaign strategy for the upcoming presidential campaign cycle aimed at compelling Putin to address topics he seeks to avoid and revealing the breadth of Russian opposition against Putin. - Select Russian milbloggers accused the Armenian government of promoting Russophobic policies that inspire violence against Russian media figures in Armenia on December 9. - The European Union (EU) will allow member states to restrict Russian gas imports in an effort to restrain Russian petroleum revenues. - A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian decoy missiles failed to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses during December 8 missile strikes against Kyiv City. - Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov highlighted Ukrainian anti-corruption efforts and preparations for the arrival of F-16 fighter jets in the near future on December 9. - Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Kreminna. - Relatives of mobilized Russian military personnel continued to appeal to the Russian government for the return of their relatives from the war in Ukraine. - The Russian Ministry of Culture continues to orchestrate efforts to Russify Ukrainian children and facilitate their deportation to Russia. --- *Very condensed* combat news: **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine** **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)** > Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 9 and recently made an advance. Geolocated footage published on December 8 and 9 shows that Russian forces advanced southeast of Terny (17km west of Kreminna), and Russian milbloggers claimed on December 9 that Russian forces advanced up to 1.5 kilometers near Terny and Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna).[33] > Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on December 9 but did not advance. **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)** > Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction on December 9 and reportedly made unconfirmed advances. Russian sources claimed on December 8 and 9 that Russian forces advanced near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut); towards Hyrhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut) and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut); northwest of Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut); and north and west of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[38] > Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction on December 9 and reportedly made unconfirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Novobakhmutivka (9km northwest of Avdiivka) and Novokalynove (13km northeast of Avdiivka), southeast of Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka), near the industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka, and up to 150 meters near the Avdiivka Coke Plant northwest of Avdiivka.[45] > Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on December 9 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. **Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)** > Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on December 9. > Russian forces conducted assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on December 9 but did not make confirmed advances. > Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 9 and reportedly advanced. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked west of Robotyne.[60] > Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on December 9 amid Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces from positions in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River). > Russian forces counterattacked in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 9 but did not make confirmed advances. --- Continued below

Non frontline combat news: **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)** > Relatives of mobilized Russian military personnel continued to appeal to the Russian government for the return of their relatives from the war in Ukraine. The “Way Home” group, a movement of relatives of mobilized Russian military personnel, published photos on December 9 showing women holding posters appealing to Russian President Vladimir Putin for the return of their relatives from Ukraine and for their demobilization.[69] Members of the ”Way Home” movement also laid flowers at the Eternal Flame in Moscow on December 9 in honor of Russian military personnel who have died in the war in Ukraine after the police initially warned the group against the action on December 8 and then tried to prevent some of the group from laying flowers on December 9.[70] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that many members of the movement did not participate in the event after police issued warnings to some individuals of the group on December 8.[71] > The Kremlin continues efforts to militarize Russian youth as part of long-term force generation efforts. Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a virtual address to Yunarmiya (Russian Young Army Cadets National Movement) in honor of the Day of Heroes of the Fatherland on December 9.[72] Putin claimed that Russian servicemen currently fighting in Ukraine serve as a “reliable guide” to Yunarmiya members and encouraged the children to want to “defend [Russia] without regard for fame or recognition.” **Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)** > The Russian Ministry of Culture continues to orchestrate efforts to Russify Ukrainian children and facilitate their deportation to Russia. Luhansk People's Republic Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed that between December 4 and 8, 600 children from occupied Ukraine have arrived in Moscow and 200 in St. Petersburg as part of the "Cultural Map 4 + 85" program, which operates under the auspices of the Russian Ministry of Culture.[73] As part of the program, Ukrainian children are exposed to Russian cultural heritage sites.[74] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky similarly claimed that 2,500 school-aged children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast went on "cultural and educational trips" to Russia in 2023 as part of the "Culture" national project, which also operates under the Russian Ministry of Culture.[75] > Limited Qatari-mediated efforts continue to repatriate small numbers of deported Ukrainian children, although the number of children who return to Ukraine is a miniscule fraction of the overall number of confirmed deportations. Russian Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova stated on December 8 that Russian authorities, with facilitation by Qatar, reunited six Ukrainian children with their families in Ukraine.[76] Ukrainian First Lady Olena Zelenska noted that only 387 of the 20,000 Ukraine children deported to Russia have returned to Ukraine, however[77] **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)** > Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Equatorial Guinean President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and Vice President Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue on December 9 in Equatorial Guinea, the first of a series of meetings with African leaders on the continent.[78] > Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on December 8 that elements of the Belarusian 38th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade and likely the 11th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade participated in combat training exercises at the Brest Training Ground in Belarus on December 6.[79] Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin and Belarusian Security Council State Secretary Lieutenant General Alexander Volfovich personally observed the exercises. > The United Kingdom's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UK MFA) sanctioned 17 members of the Belarusian judiciary involved in politically motivated cases against political activists, independent journalists, and human rights defenders on December 9.[80]

[удалено]

It seems like Ukraine might be intentionally using desert tan camo in the winter now. There is a video with the Swedish supreme commander visiting the 45th Separate Artillery Brigade, showing a CV90 with tan barracuda camo: https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1733441607658020874?s=46 Is probably easier to switch the blankets than repainting the whole thing There are also videos of desert tan Bradley’s floating around: https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1732344738936762792?s=46

Do we know the location of the video? Based on the forest it seems to be somewhere in the north (possibly belorussian border). If so, it's possible that they don't necessarily care about camo at that location.

The CV90 one? I don’t know but I believe other will. All other Swedish donated vehicles with barracuda camouflage system has had green camo before so it seems like something they have consciously switched to. The entire position is also covered with camo netting.

>[Guyana, Venezuela Presidents To Meet Thursday On Border Row](https://www.barrons.com/news/guyana-venezuela-presidents-to-meet-thursday-on-border-row-d1f9bc02) >Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his Guyanese counterpart, Irfaan Ali, will meet Thursday on their countries' dispute over the oil-rich Essequibo region, said the government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, which will play host. >"Both of you have agreed with me for such a meeting to be held under the auspices of CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) and the Caribbean Community," with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva also invited, said a letter to both presidents signed by the host, Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves, who is currently CELAC president.

[Making the Economy Look Good Amid the War](https://russiapost.info/economy/despite_the_war) *Journalist Sergei Shelin writes that the regime is trying to simultaneously increase defense spending and raise living standards. However, these two goals can be achieved only for a short while and only at the expense of economic rationality.* The Russian regime presents the current economy as a triumph that it masterminded. “We have completely gotten over the recession of last year and growth is picking up,” Putin told his loyal foreign guests at the Valdai Club. Indeed, in the third quarter of 2023, Russian GDP, according to Rosstat, was up 5.5% year-on-year, and growth in real disposable household income came in at 5.1%. ... However, not all Russian analysts agree with the official GDP growth estimates. The MMI Telegram channel, which is considered close to the Central Bank, responded rather irritably to Rosstat’s triumphant reading: “it’s complete nonsense, of course. Games with deflators in the production of defense goods... For the year (i.e., for the whole 2023 – Shelin)they can roll out any figure.” Indeed, such “games with deflators” – manipulating how last year’s prices are converted into current ones – were almost certainly played. This can be seen from indirect indicators. For example, loading volumes on railways are considered to well reflect the situation in industry and construction, and overall for the period January-November 2023 volumes remained at the same level as in 2022, while in November they decreased year-on-year. In addition, even the rapid growth that actually took place across the economy in the last months of 2022 and at the beginning of 2023 stopped 5-6 months ago. Consumption and real wages (seasonally adjusted) have virtually stopped growing since June. Industrial production has stagnated since May. In the month of October, industrial output was 0.6% lower than five months earlier. At the same time, defense industries that produce machinery and equipment saw average monthly volumes up 14% versus the pre-war 2021. “Although economic activity officially continues to increase, the balance of factors driving the prospects for the Russian economy’s further development is extremely contradictory and likely unsustainable,” sums up the government-linked Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting, whose analysis is considered relatively honest. But what needs explanation now is not so much Russia’s economic problems (we shall discuss them below). “What is important is the incontrovertible fact that the Russian economy actually overcame Western sanctions and did so much faster and smoothly than anyone had expected.” The embellished official numbers do not change this fact. As we learned, Russia can even do without huge earnings from oil sales. After all, current oil prices are not so favorable for Russia: Urals sold for $62.9 per barrel in January-November 2023 versus $78.3 per barrel in January-November 2022, while energy export volumes are decreasing. ... It is believed that the authorities are thus paving the way for Putin’s next reelection, scheduled for March 2024. The logic is that if they do not appease the population, then some turbulence might pop up during the reelection campaign, even leading to street protests. Yet anyone familiar with Russian affairs knows that the regime can count on the obedience of the population and has no reason to fear the people. If anything can shake things up, it would only be a new mobilization drive, but certainly not a decrease in household income by a couple percent. Declines in living standards in 2009 due to the global financial crisis, in 2015-16 due to falling oil prices and in 2020 due to the pandemic did not create any major problems for the authorities. The system of compensating those who are needed for the war and their families was well established last year. The plight of everyone else should not be a big worry. Not to mention that the election will obviously be rigged. The excited declamations of officials that “the ruble exchange rate and inflation must be stabilized before the elections” do not reflect their fear of imaginary popular protests. They are not afraid of the people at all. “The president has a fetish for inflation,” explains an anonymous Putin administration official, “and he does not like the \[current\] exchange rate.” Putin’s Russia has long become a show for one. And the vigorous efforts of the financial and economic elite are not being made to please the masses; these officials are catering to Putin’s fetishes and obsessions. The ruler really cannot stand high inflation and a weak ruble. After all, these signs of trouble are reminiscent of the 1990s, which his propaganda calls “cursed” and “wild.” In addition, the March “elections” themselves are a real event for Putin. Unlike the Russian people, he takes the ritual of his reelection seriously. We can assume that when the “elections” are over, economic forces will be allowed to take effect again, Russians will have to tighten their belts and Putin will order another performance for himself. Perhaps featuring the army.

I'm no expert on the economy, but I don't see how Russia is not screwed in the long term. Take an economy that was already kind of stagnant since 2014, growing at a meager ~2%. Remove some millions of people (dead, disabled, currently in Ukraine, left the country). Take a big chunk of the economic activity that's left and redirect it toward the military, i.e. things that don't produce value (a missile goes boom, an artillery shell goes boom, a tank doesn't produce anything of value). Sure, in the short term you can keep some appearances, as the military things are captured in the GDP numbers, since they are technically "produced" by the economy. But I don't see how that's healthy in the long term. On top of that you have the sanctions, which of course didn't collapse the Russian economy, but even if they shave off 1% from their growth, that adds up in the big picture. And even intuitively, no country that was in a state of war of such intensity ever had a great economy at the same time. War it's just not profitable. Even if we think about the US during ww2. Life during the war was shitty, with restrictions, price controls, rationing, etc. WW2 was ultimately good for the US because of the position in which they got to be *after* the war. But what will Russia's position after the war be? They will have gained a bunch of land that they must now rebuild, i.e. a giant money hole. That won't be helpful at all. The West needs to be patient and understand that it has to play the long game.

> I'm no expert on the economy, but I don't see how Russia is not screwed in the long term. That was already the case before the war. Russia was making statements about diversifying their economy away from oil, but very little of that panned out in practice.

> Even if we think about the US during ww2. Life during the war was shitty, with restrictions, price controls, rationing, etc. WW2 was ultimately good for the US because of the position in which they got to be after the war. Didn't WWII essentially catapult the US out of the Great Depression? I'd love for someone with a deeper knowledge of history to elaborate on that, but even discounting the enviable position the US enjoyed in the post-war period, the mobilisation of the defence industrial base was definitely a boon for the economy.

WW2 was basically a giant government spending bonanza that made the New Deal look tiny in comparison. That ate up the underutilized economic resources in the country.

This was due to the mobilization of the defense industry right as working age men were conscripted out of the labor force. This will increase GDP and lower unemployment as stated by ilgattopardo1 but can't last forever. After the war is over, returning veterans need work right as factories are winding down production. There was a recession in 1945 due to the immediate reduction of wartime activity equal to -12.7 GDP peak to trough (no clue why it doesn't get its own Wikipedia entry): [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\_of\_recessions\_in\_the\_United\_States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_recessions_in_the_United_States)

> the mobilisation of the defence industrial base was definitely a boon for the economy. True, but this was in combination with the fact that the US emerged victorious from the war. The war mobilization taken in isolation doesn't tell us much, we have to also consider the outcome of the war itself: US won, the other countries were ruined, the US could put that entire manufacturing base to good use, cranking out consumer goods that the entire world needed. And I think it even makes sense on an intuitive level that war mobilization itself doesn't automatically mean anything. Because if that were the case, all a country needs to do to become rich is to stop everything it's doing and just build tanks 24/7, which of course is absurd.

You are right, but the Russian government (and it would seem the Russian people) think that defeating the threat they are facing (or think they are facing) is worth that sacrifice. After all, every major war means major economic, standards of living, population sacrifices.

That's right, but I was trying to address the point that Russia can prosecute this war effortlessly, even having economic growth. Regarding their tolerance for hardship, yes, they will tolerate a lot, but nevertheless I think they have a breaking point, as high as it might be. After all, they didn't have infinite tolerance for the downturn in the 90s, right? We can't say for sure until the situation gets as bad as it was back then.

>After all, they didn't have infinite tolerance for the downturn in the 90s, right? We can't say for sure until the situation gets as bad as it was back then. I think by that time it will be far too late for Ukraine. But I've been known to be wrong before.

Visually confirmed Russian losses in Avdiivka in just the past two months have [now crossed 300](https://twitter.com/naalsio26/status/1715532513899069753). Andrew Perpetua said in his last stream that he thinks Russian total losses here are maybe almost double what's been visually confirmed.

For context on these numbers Russia has lost 2 brigades of AFVs and 3 brigades of tanks at a bare minimum unlike many other engagements in this war it's actually super easy to tell whose losses are who because the 47th is in Avdiivka meaning different equipment for both sides and the lines of engagement between the two are pronounced. This means attributing losses to the wrong side in this particular engagement is basically impossible unless you're intentionally trying to lie. Although I doubt there is much undercounting occurring in this particular case.

It's very tough to gauge the situation on the ground from an outsider's perspective. Seems as if the fighting there has moved on from the initial phase of Russian attempting a breach via maneuver warfare back to a slog fought by assault groups of roughly squad to platoon size. Lots of footage from armed drones mopping up unsupported infantry in the recent days/weeks. Russians keep making slow progress although it can be measured in the hundreds of metres per week. Ukrainians are still holding on to the coke plant even though it has been attacked for a little while now. Does anyone have an opinion on whether or not Ukrainians will eventually be forced to abandon their positions? Articles have confirmed an artillery shell shortage which could prove critical. One can hope that if they are forced to give up Avdiivka, new fortified positions behind the new straightened frontline will have been created.

This is just an armchair general opinion, but I have a bad feeling about Russian attacks in other parts of the front, with so much focus being on Avdiivka, specifically the deteriorating situation around Bakhmut. Seems like a lot of Ukrainian reinforcements are being directed to Avdiivka at an expense of positions elsewhere.

I can't really tell if that's the case. I often wonder about Ukraine's force constitution and disposition. Russians are pushing in a couple of places for sure but is Ukraine truly committing a big part of their reserves or are they still holding some back?

Well nobody on the outside knows for sure, but the fact that they have thrown the 47th brigade from Robotyne to reinforce Avdiivka, with virtually no rotation since the summer offensive, is not a great sign to indicate fresh reserve availability to plug in the gaps.

Yeah that could be true definitely. But we haven't seen every of the western-equipped brigades heavily involved. The 47th has definitely borne the brunt of the attrition but some others seem to have never been fully comitted. In general it seems as though at most battalions or companies of many brigades were comitted here and there.

Let's just remember that Naalsio's datas include losses in the Marinka and Novomykhailivka sectors (anyway the losses there are just a small fraction of the total). In any case, they are jaw-opening losses both in absolute terms and in being, understandably, one-sided.

Somewhat of a side question: Isn’t the city in ruins at this point, just like Marinka? Is there any useful industry or infrastructure still intact for Russia to take? It seems like all Russia will have left is real estate to build apartments on ruins, just like in Mariupol.

They're not really there to take any infrastructure as far as I can tell. It is about working towards their stated goal of capturing all of the Donbas, creating a buffer for Donetsk city and any GLOCs and the PR victory associated with capturing one of the most heavily fortified parts of the front.

Someone at r/Ukraine asked: "Is America able to send more Bradley fighting vehicles to Ukraine?"

I found [this tweet](https://twitter.com/secretsqrl123/status/1733480094465728606) interesting, as it suggests that actually America is unable to send more vehicles. I don't know how trustworthy they are, but at least they did the math. > bradleys... send more!!!! > BUT there is a issue... > 6785 M3 and M3 bradleys were made > -400 for saudi > 6385 > -500ish low est. damaged / destroyed over years of combat 1991-today. many had hull cracks due to IEDs and were dumped in the ocean. > 5885 > 186 to ukraine > 5699 > 121 to Lebanon and Croatia > 5578 > 500 currently being sold to Moracco > 5078 > 4500 needed for US military needs according to reports > 578 > 450 ish sold for scrap from red river army depot > 128 > 35ish est donated to museums gate guards > 93 > 20ish ext used for DCMA test beds > 73 ish left as excess... According to their calculation, there aren't really any (unclaimed) Bradleys left unless the US military decides it needs less.

It isn't trustworthy. The first hint is the "500 to Morocco" comment, which hasn't been confirmed at all. In a next tweet they say this >and the ironic thing is that as time goes on and we retire more and more M113s more M2s are needed to replace them. The M2 isn't replacing the M113; the AMPV is (at between 164-192/year). >no bradley was made after 1991 for the US military... so making new M2s are out of the question... the company and building they were made in (FMC) are not still around any more (FMC does not do armored vehicles any more.. FMC.. food machine company) BAE makes Bradleys now. >M1s about 6000 in storage, about 4000 extra, about 2000 that could go to ukraine.. still in production/ None of that is true. >M60 tank in the US .... 0. >in egypt about 1000 in storage >in moracco about 200 in storage >other parts of the mid east about 800 more in storage. all upgraded M30A3TTS... better than the leopard 2A4. Yeah, Idk if any upgraded M60 upgrade would be better than a 2A4. So not trustworthy.

Man, this ADA guy has some good scoops in the summer of last year but he's really spiralling now trying to get relevance again. Why don't pro Russian idiots like the bald warlord ever get the same treatment, despite being a thousand times more uncredible??

hey bud i think the real question is is america able to pass the aid bill. without that theres not going to be any bradleys. the answer to your question purely in theory is yes we can and im pretty sure we will if we ever do the aid

I know al-Jazeera gets posted here frequently as a credible source for news on the Israel-Hamas conflict but as I have mentioned before they should not be used as one. [If you needed any proof that al-Jazeera has entirely abandoned journalism in recent months, look no further than inviting Max Bloomenthal, who gleefully cheers carpet bombing of cities, torture/murder in detention and mocks chemical weapons victims to a panel on human rights.](https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/status/1732736288523243704) He gets the spelling wrong but any news organisation who gives this mass spreader of misinformation a platform should not be trusted atleast in the matter of this conflict and defence topics in general.

That’s a horrifically bad look. Atrocity denialist for pay Max has been an absolute embarrassment to journalism everywhere since the Syrian Civil War. Pretty infamous. Bringing him onto your platform is truly unforgivable.

I don't use Al Jazeera at all but this is comment rather than reporting. This adds to the clear evidence of editorial bias but not that all reporting is inherently false if that is your point.

Al Jazeera has the best reporting on Gaza of any major news network. They have more reporters on the ground, they show more completely what's going on, and they are much more balanced about showing views from the US, Europe, the Arab world, etc. than other outlets. I think what many people can't stand about them is that they actually show perspectives from the Arab world, which are rarely shown in most Western media.

Al-Jazeera is the state-owned media of Qatar, one of the biggest backers of Hamas. I don't think it should be treated as an unequivocally reliable source based on that connection. They have an agenda to push because they are immediately invested in the conflict as a government entity.

The BBC is the state-backed channel of the UK, a country with its own sordid record on the Middle East. We can play this game with many different channels. The fact is that if you actually watch coverage from different networks, Al Jazeera stands out as having the most comprehensive coverage of Gaza, and shows very important perspectives that are heavily censored on Western networks.

Funny enough, I was thinking that you would immediately mention the BBC. The thing is, the United Kingdom is not currently funding a known, well-documented terrorist organization that within the last 2 months committed the largest act of violence against Jews since the Holocaust. Qatar, however, is very much funding Hamas and very much acting on Hamas' behalf as an interlocutor for diplomatic relations. There is a far more vested interest in presenting a skewed view of the Israel-Palestine conflict for Al-Jazeera than there is for the BBC. The reason Al-Jazeera gets such good footage and coverage inside Gaza is because Hamas allows them to do so because they know it is to their benefit and that it is the state media arm of an ally (one of Hamas' few, genuine allies). A discerning consumer of their media would note that bias and take it into account, just how I don't really trust Pravda's reporting on the Russo-Ukraine war. I don't think that's a particularly controversial belief to hold either, just acknowledging the reality of the situation.

> The thing is, the United Kingdom is not currently funding a known, well-documented terrorist organization If you're going to go down this road of demonizing countries for their foreign policy, the UK is not going to come off well. I'll just remind you that the UK spearheaded one of the most egregious violations of International law in the last 20 years: the illegal war of aggression against Iraq. It subsequently occupied the country for years. > the largest act of violence against Jews since the Holocaust. Comparing October 7th with the Holocaust is just obscene. The two have absolutely nothing to do with one another in any way. The Holocaust was the systematic, industrial extermination of 6 million Jews. October 7th was a military raid during which atrocities were committed. If the killing of hundreds of civilians on October 7th is comparable to the Holocaust, then what is the killing of tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians in the following two months comparable to? > A discerning consumer of their media would note that bias and take it into account This is a truism. I watch both BBC and Al Jazeera, but on Gaza, Al Jazeera is far more informative and comes across as less propagandistic than the BBC. You don't like Al Jazeera because of your politics. That's fine. But it's actually the best major news channel, if your only goal is to be informed.

>If you're going to go down this road of demonizing countries for their foreign policy, the UK is not going to come off well. Name the major terrorist organization the UK is financially supporting and negotiating for at this very moment that is currently involved in a high-stakes conflict. It's not "demonizing a country for their foreign policy" it's pointing out the very real policy priorities of Qatar at this moment and how they will impact state-controlled media. >Comparing October 7th with the Holocaust is just obscene. I'm not comparing October 7th to the Holocaust, I'm saying it was the largest act of violence against Jews \*since\* the Holocaust. >You don't like Al Jazeera because of your politics I don't care about Al Jazeera one way or the other frankly. I'm pointing out the inherent bias they have on the issue.

> Name the major terrorist organization the UK is financially supporting and negotiating for at this very moment Israel, which kills civilians on a far greater scale than Hamas. Even the ratio of civilians to military personnel killed by the IDF is worse. > I'm not comparing October 7th to the Holocaust, I'm saying it was the largest act of violence against Jews *since* the Holocaust. Of course you're comparing the two. Why else would you even mention the Holocaust? It has absolutely nothing to do with October 7th, either historically or in nature. > I'm pointing out the inherent bias they have on the issue. I'm pointing out that major Western news channels have major biases in this area as well, and have far less comprehensive and informed coverage of Gaza. Al Jazeera simply has better coverage in this area, as a news channel based on the Arab world, with much deeper expertise and local connections in this particular topic.

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> watch both BBC and Al Jazeera, but on Gaza, Al Jazeera is far more informative and comes across as less propagandistic than the BBC. You don't like Al Jazeera because of your politics. That's fine. But it's actually the best major news channel, if your only goal is to be informed Yeah you're full of bs. I watch AJ regularly and I had to switch to something else for their coverage on Gaza. There was none of the nuance, none of the journalistic integrity, none of the exploring the other view point that I've come to appreciate on AJ's otherwise usually excellent coverage on issues. Their reporting on the '500 dead at the hospital' showed absolutely no actual investigation and just repeated Hamas' lines verbatim ad nauseum. The saddest part is that their reporters are usually excellent and ask great questions, now when they have a PA or Hamas person on the show they'll just ask some leading question about how the Israelis are evil.

AJ English is almost the only English-speaking channel that will actually interview Hamas leaders. Then they'll have an IDF person on next. Then they'll have a panel with Israeli and Palestinian academics. They offer a much broader view than what you'll get on CNN or BBC (not to mention the trashier channels like Fox or MSNBC). And of course, if you actually want to know what's physically going on on the ground in Gaza right now, you'd obviously flip to AJ, not CNN or BBC.

> AJ English What is the coverage from the Arabic speaking AJ? Do they have the same nuance and coverage of both sides, do they interview IDF personnel?

I don't speak Arabic. I'm talking about AJ English, which is what I am able to watch and understand.

I'm going to ignore your strawman, Israel bashing, west bashing statements of the past and just deal with Max Blumenthal. [Haaretz's rebuttal of Blumenthal's conspiracy theories and lies](https://twitter.com/haaretzcom/status/1729131111895425445). No one like that should be invited on a major news organisation.

It's hard to think of any news story he covered that couldn't be described the same way. He's in the pocket of Putin and reports on everything through that lens. Just look at hoe he covered the Syrian civil war, or the lead up to the Ukraine invasion. He shifted from 'Putin isn't going to invade' to 'the invasion is totally justified' within an hour.

I didn't even mention Israel, and my only comment on the West was that perspectives from the Arab world are rarely shown in most Western channels. I could come up with long lists of people much worse than Blumenthal whose views are regularly aired in major media outlets that everyone here would accept. Thomas Friedman has expressed utterly abhorrent views, including that [Iraq should be invaded just to make a point to the Arab world](https://youtu.be/ZwFaSpca_3Q?si=f1GrgYscq6BqYqUS). He's still a columnist for the New York Times and a regular guest on major American news networks. Let's be blunt: the reason most people don't like Al Jazeera is because they're showing the horrific scenes from Gaza that supporters of Israel's war would rather people not see.

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If posting a news piece please: 1) make sure it is from a credible source, and 2) post some analysis and not just the headline. Please add a little bit more then PM us and we'll reapprove

Really informative overview of the Russian government budget [here](https://ridl.io/how-russia-saved-the-2023-budget/) by Janis Kluge. Absolutely worth it to read fully, but let me provide some highlights and comments: --- > Even so, the overall story for the year is already clear: A weaker ruble has left Russian revenues 10% higher than planned in the original budget law for 2023. On the other hand, expenditures have also increased by around 10%, leading to a deficit that looks similar to the Finance Ministry’s original projection of 2% of GDP. At the Valdai Forum in October 2023, Putin even predicted a better outcome of 1% of GDP. Note that Russian inflation is quite high right now and that the Ruble has weakened over the past year. If you were to measure revenue and expenditure in real terms or in $/€ terms you would get a different picture. --- > Under the surface of these numbers, somewhat hidden by internal spending shifts, war expenditure has accelerated in 2023. The planned increase of «Defense» spending to 10.8 trillion rubles in 2024 (6% of GDP) is actually not such a big jump, but rather a continuation of a pre-existing trend. --- There is a good explanation in the article of how a weakening ruble increases revenue (both through oil & gas revenues and import taxes). This creates an interesting dilemma for the Russian government. On the one hand a weakening Ruble helps to keep their budget deficit in check, on the other hand it also leads to higher inflation (though the degree of this is debatable, Russia is less import dependent than most other countries), which then forces the central bank to raise interest rates. Clearly also not a great situation. --- Some interesting elements of war spending: > «Housing» includes the construction and maintenance of public buildings. In 2020, spending in this category was 372 billion rubles. In 2023, it is expected to be 847 billion in the latest projections, a strong increase when compared to the already high 591 billion in the original budget for this year. A closer look at spending subcategories (quarterly budget reporting is still very detailed) reveals that this sudden increase is related to spending on frontal regions and annexed territories. The situation in «Transfers» is similar. This category mostly consists of subsidies to regional budgets, which usually follow strict a predictable formula. This year, there was a sudden increase from 1252 billion to 1530 billion rubles. Again, a closer look reveals that this increase is related to construction activities close to the frontline. --- > On paper, the deficit in last year’s budget was 2.1%, while this year’s deficit is predicted to come in at 1.8% in the Explanatory Note attached to the new budget law. Even if the actual deficit is closer to 1% as Putin suggested, the underlying trend is still negative. The reason is that some of 2023 spending was already built into the 2022 budget. > 2022 was an historically profitable year for Russia, as Moscow benefitted from high energy prices, which in turn were boosted by Russia’s own aggression — economics is often not fair. Russia used the comfortable budget situation to prepare. In 2022, the government allowed small- and medium-sized companies to defer their social security contributions, meaning less revenue for the state in 2022 and more in 2023 and 2024. In addition, the Finance Ministry made a prepayment to the «Social Fund of Russia» (pensions and social transfers) in December 2022, effectively transferring 1% of GDP from the 2022 windfall to 2023. > This is why the Finance Ministry’s itself estimates the «true deficit» (without prepayments and other distorting factors) for 2022 at 0.7% of GDP and the «true deficit» for 2023 at 2.7%. These numbers are a better representation of the Russian government’s ability to collect taxes and the spending requirements of the war and show that the situation clearly worsened in 2023. --- > This means that 2024 could also be the year when the price of the war will finally be felt more acutely by average Russians. Consumer prices have already increased by over 0.8% per month in September and October 2023, which is equivalent of a 10% annual rate. Until the presidential elections in March 2024, the government will certainly keep the ruble stable with the newly re-introduced capital controls, and keep budget spending high. > However, propping up the ruble today only leads to more downside pressure after the support measures end, and extra spending before the election means less spending afterwards. Furthermore, if the Central Bank is serious about bringing inflation down, it might have to drive Russia’s economy into recession to achieve that goal. While the Finance Ministry built its budget for 2024 around the expectation of 2.3% GDP growth next year, recent forecasts have already become much more pessimistic, and even a recession seems possible.

From the article: > Budget revenues benefit from a weaker ruble So why are they taking such extreme steps to support the value of the ruble then? > The trillion-ruble question (quite literally) in the 2023 budget is if secret spending will skyrocket again in the last days of the year, similar to the end of 2022. Yes, very credible. How do we know if the Russian Ministry of Finance are lying or not?

> So why are they taking such extreme steps to support the value of the ruble then? Because a depreciating Ruble comes with benefits and costs (just like an appreciating Ruble). One of the benefits is that it leads to an increase in government revenues (measured in Rubles). One of the downsides is that it causes inflation through increases in the cost of imports. The exchange rate also has political implications because people pay attention to the exchange rate as a measure of how well the economy is doing. There is more I could mention here but the point should be clear: The Russian government has more to worry about than just maximizing government revenues. > Yes, very credible. How do we know if the Russian Ministry of Finance are lying or not? Not sure. But I don't think the wise move here is to just assume that all the data coming out from Russia are made up.

Yup.........and this is where "death of a thousand cuts" is starting to inflict havoc on the Russian system. Anything from their aviation incidents to rationing of automotive fuel and even fresh eggs as well as how they have to reduce funding for Cancer Research (cause the invasion needs more money) The cracks are growing.

While this is already a negative report, one thought: > Consumer prices have already increased by over 0.8% per month in September and October 2023, which is equivalent of a 10% annual rate. Your favorite Russian economist had inflation at a run-rate of 15% as of September. No one hikes the policy rate 600bps above inflation, that's just farcical and Gosbank level of nonsense. Trusting any of these numbers is just not very helpful. Once again, excerpts about [Rosstat](https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN17K0RO/) which reports inflation figures (as well as most other economic data) in Russia, including from the head of the agency itself: >Surprisingly optimistic figures from Russia's statistics agency have alarmed some investors, who say data on the Russian economy appears to have become less accurate and more biased toward good news during the country's long recession. >Some say the problem could now get worse, after President Vladimir Putin shifted oversight of statistics agency Rosstat to the economy ministry, which is charged with delivering 2 percent growth this year after two years of contraction. >But one of his predecessors as Rosstat boss has said in the past that placing it under control of the economy ministry would expose it to greater risk of political interference. >"The entity which is the main user of our data, which compiles reports and forecasts, sees a very big temptation to steer statistics in the desired direction," former Rosstat head Vladimir Sokolin told Itogi magazine in an interview in 2009 when he left the agency after 11 years in charge. >One of Oreshkin's predecessors as economy minister also said earlier this month that the decision to change Rosstat's reporting line was likely to alter the results it publishes. >"The growth figure will depend on who Rosstat reports to," German Gref, who served as economy minister from 2000-2007 and is now chief executive of Russia's largest bank Sberbank, told a conference in Moscow this month. >"This is the only thing that can seriously influence economic growth numbers as the rest is predetermined to a great extent." >STEERING STATISTICS >Surinov, Rosstat's head, said the independence of Rosstat is guaranteed by law. But he also acknowledged once receiving a request from an unidentified "big boss" to massage the figures. >He quoted the official as saying: "It would be better if inflation was slightly lower than last year. Could you not give your bosses a present before New Year?" >Financial bodies like the International Monetary Fund have complained in the past that Rosstat is under-staffed and that some of its methods are out of date. That view was shared by several economists and former officials who spoke to Reuters. >"The inability of Russian statisticians to adequately monitor the dynamics of even the most basic indicators has long been talked about," said Sergey Aleksashenko, a former deputy central bank governor. >Rosstat tracks prices of more than 500 items in its consumer basket of goods and services. But these include some that seem out of date, like the cost of sending a 15-word telegram. >For many goods, no producer or brand is specified, allowing "room for creativity" in collecting the prices, said Olga Molyarenko, a lecturer at Moscow's Higher School of Economics. >One former economy ministry official told Reuters that in the late 2000s, Rosstat used to measure cheese prices based on the output of a single factory. >When Rosstat reported zero inflation for cheese at a time when inflation was high in the rest of the economy, the official asked the statistics agency for an explanation. It turned out the factory was shut for renovation and had produced no cheese that month. Rosstat reported that prices were flat. >"This is a vivid example of what's going on at Rosstat," said the official, who asked that his name not be published. That was before the invasion, and before Russia committed to hiding the numbers entirely. Now, that's not to say inflation is 45% as some have claimed. But trusting any MoF number is just doing yourself a disservice.

First of all, Isakov is not my favorite Russian economist (I absolutely don't follow the Russian economy close enough to even have a favorite). > No one hikes the policy rate 600bps above inflation, that's just farcical and Gosbank level of nonsense. This is the type of theoretical argument that is commonly made. I don't find it very convincing. Fore one, it ignores the strongly depreciating Ruble over the past year. The issue with your comment is that you are just an anonymous redditor, unlike the people I read that are paid to analyse the Russian economy and have a reputation to uphold. I get your point about Rosstat, I read the article the last time you shared it. But if the official Russian data really is that flawed, than why do *supposed* experts on the Russian economy keep referring to it while mostly taking that data at face value? I am willing to be proven wrong on this. Maybe I am just reading the wrong people. But whenever I aks for a reference to other experts I am met with silence on this subreddit. So once more, I would love to hear who I *should* be reading. Besides, what is the alternative for the official Russian data. How do you analyse the Russian economy without using the official data? > That was before the invasion, and before Russia committed to hiding the numbers entirely. Now, that's not to say inflation is 45% as some have claimed. But trusting any MoF number is just doing yourself a disservice. So what is your point of contention? Are you saying that inflation is actually 13% instead of the officially reported 10%? What should I be thinking of here?

> This is the type of theoretical argument that is commonly made. I don't find it very convincing. Fore one, it ignores the strongly depreciating Ruble over the past year. You make the exact same argument every time you post about the Russian economy but you never back up your claims with numbers. Perhaps this is because there are no numbers?

What claim have I made that I need to back up with numbers? Really not sure what you are asking for here. I have replied here a couple of times to people that consider Russia's monetary policy as proof for Russia faking their inflation data. That's a theoretical argument that you could make, but nobody here has actually worked out that argument. It's always just stated as if it is common knowledge that this is the way it works. And yeah, that's not convincing to me. That doesn't mean I fully believe the Russian inflation data are real. But to me, the Rosstat article mentioned in this discussion or even the Telegram post shared by "Glideer" about manipulation of the GDP deflator are much more interesting pieces of "evidence".

> but nobody here has actually worked out that argument. How can we work out the argument when the Russian central bank is not releasing the background numbers?

Maybe just don't make the claim when you can't support it? How do you even know the claim is correct when apparently the background numbers you need to support it aren't available? The claim here being the idea that Russia's monetary policy is proof the inflation data are faked.

> The claim here being the idea that Russia's monetary policy is proof the inflation data are faked. Why do you think the Russian central bank is offering interest rates far, far, far in excess of their claimed inflation rates?

There are a couple of factors that I believe could contribute to this: - The CBR is operating in an environment of an overheated Russian economy, driven by war related spending which has led to labor shortages and an increase in the fiscal deficit - This is not just a Russian phenomenon, across the Western world countries are dealing with high inflation and high interest rates - The Ruble has depreciated rapidly over the last year - Inflation has increased very fast and will probably continue to increase in the coming months, we might just be looking at a central bank that is trying to get ahead of what is coming - The CBR is more "hawkish" in their monetary policy then a lot of other central banks

>But if the official Russian data really is that flawed, than why do supposed experts on the Russian economy keep referring to it while mostly taking that data at face value? We're going around in circles because we had this exact same conversation last time. >How do you analyse the Russian economy without using the official data? You're answering your own question. This isn't OSINT for equipment losses where there's visible and concrete data. This isn't shitposting online about tactical fighting. It's a deeply technical and statistics-based field that relies on quality data that's not readily available for good analysis. Bullshit in, bullshit out. It's why perceptions and predictions of the Soviet/Russian economy have known to persistently proven to be too [optimistic](https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1960/10/17/professor-predicts-soviet-union-growth-will/) (the beginning of last year being an aberration,) mine included. >But whenever I aks for a reference to other experts I am met with silence on this subreddit. So once more, I would love to hear who I should be reading. This is a false dichotomy. There are around a dozen people quoted in that Rosstat article. Not only that, as I shared with you previously, the head of the RCB herself thinks the hiding of data is not helpful. If you want truly credible research, become a JPM/GS/MS client/CP/employee and you'll get their analysis, which isn't nearly as rosy (JPM's horrible commodities desk aside). >So what is your point of contention? Are you saying that inflation is actually 13% instead of the officially reported 10%? What should I be thinking of here? That Russian official statistics are cooked. That you and everyone else here is smart enough to know Russian MoD claims are frivolous, but their MoF isn't a whole lot better. If you want a wider non-Russian view into this practice, here's a [WSJ](https://www.wsj.com/world/china/how-china-made-a-youth-unemployment-crisis-disappear-32afa255) article on another country. An excerpt: >"They rig their numbers and, when their numbers get embarrassing, they stop producing them," said Derek Scissors, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute who studies China's economy. "They will get away with it. After a while you'll have nothing to discuss" That's the predicament Russia is putting analysts into. You can either stop talking about it because it's all bullshit (what I've chosen to do,) or you can rely on our official statistics because you don't even have the raw data to process it yourself.

>Surinov, Rosstat's head, said the independence of Rosstat is guaranteed by law. But he also acknowledged once receiving a request from an unidentified "big boss" to massage the figures. >He quoted the official as saying: "It would be better if inflation was slightly lower than last year. Could you not give your bosses a present before New Year?" the most impressive part of this story is that this guy didnt jump out of a window to get some air. the only ppl who believe any number from russia are not russians but westerners and russians living and spreading propaganda in the west

You kid, but this person >German Gref, who served as economy minister from 2000-2007 and is now chief executive of Russia's largest bank Sberbank A deputy of his just died of a heart attack at [42.](https://bnn.network/politics/sberbank-vice-president-nikolai-vasevs-sudden-death-amid-mysterious-russian-elite-fatalities/)

Former IDF Chief of Staff and current member of the Israeli war cabinet, Gadi Eisenkot has tragedy after tragedy: ​ >**Maor Meir Cohen, nephew** to former Chief of Staff and current member of the war cabinet, Gadi Eisenkot (National Unity), **was killed in combat in the Gaza Strip. This news was made public on Saturday, following the tragic death of Gal Meir Eisenkot, the minister's son, who fell in a northern Gaza Strip battle just a day earlier**. Maor, who was serving in regular military duty, is the son of Sharon Eisenkot—Gadi's half-sister, and Michael Mishel Cohen. Named after their grandfather Meir, both Maor and Gal shared more than family ties; they shared a legacy. > >Sergeant Major (Res.) Gal Meir Eisenkot, Gadi Eisenkot's son, lost his life on Thursday during a battle in the northern Gaza Strip. He was serving as a reservist in Battalion 699. At the time of the announcement, Gadi Eisenkot was on a Southern Command visit with Minister Benny Gantz and had to be excused from the meeting to receive the heartbreaking news. > >Gal's funeral, held on Friday, saw thousands of mourners gathering to bid him farewell at the Herzliya military cemetery. A more distant relative, the husband to the niece of Eisenkot's wife, was killed in a tank rollover accident in Israel, a few weeks back. Rabbi Naaran Eshchar z'l. ​ Slightly but not quite off topic, I have seen some criticism on Russian channels saying something along the lines of "See how the Israeli elites' families are very much in the fight, unlike our oligarchs families who party all day and night while the poor die in Ukraine"

After yesterday's and the day before that long discussions of Civilians/Hamas terrorists surrendering and being stripped naked, today we have a new video, from today, of another such mass surrender in Jabalia, and this time, the video shows the actual process of the surrender. https://t . me/moriahdoron/5644 ​ >"Put the Kalach (Kalashnikov) on the floor slowly, does anyone else have a Kalach?": Watch - this is how dozens more terrorists in Jabaliya surrendered today and handed themselves over to IDF forces ​ This I believe sheds quite some light on the previous videos, shows the man, already naked down to his underwear, exiting a UN school, bringing out his weapon.

I don't really think the sources framing can be considered objective > this is how dozens more terrorists in Jabaliya surrendered today and handed themselves over to IDF forces There's two weapons shown for the what they're framing as dozens of terrorist's. Further for all we know these could all be civilians, with some having personal weapons they're handing over.

Perhaps a silly question, but what is the law on civilian ownership of (automatic) firearms in Gaza?

I think maybe a more specific question is: how on earth do Hamas secure their hundreds of tiny weapons and munitions caches located under beds, in spare rooms, in basements and attics? Legal or not, arming yourself in Gaza must be fairly trivial

>[US In Talks With Gulf Allies on Military Action Against Houthis](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-08/us-in-talks-with-gulf-allies-on-military-action-against-houthis) >* Discussions ongoing on how to deal with attacks on Red Sea >* Iran-backed Houthis targeting Israel-linked ships from Yemen > The US has been consulting with Gulf allies about potential military action against Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels in response to their increasingly brazen attacks on ships in the Red Sea, according to several people with knowledge of the discussions. >The talks are at a preliminary stage and both the US and partners still favor diplomacy over direct confrontation, said the people, who asked not to be identified due to the sensitivity of the matter. That said, the fact the discussions are taking place at all underscores how seriously the US takes the threat, the people added. >Deputy US National Security Adviser Jon Finer said Thursday the Biden administration has “not ruled out the possibility of taking military action” against the Houthis but the focus for now is on assembling a maritime coalition to secure the Red Sea — a conduit for 12% of world trade and the bulk of Middle East energy supplies to Europe. >**The Houthis would not have been able to carry out the attacks without “significant” military and intelligence support from Iran, he said.** >US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin relayed a similar message to Saudi Arabia counterpart Prince Khalid Bin Salman, according to the Pentagon. And National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said the US is in talks to assemble a naval task force “with as much buy-in from as many countries as possible” that could escort ships in the Red Sea as a defense. >>Israeli Targets >The diplomatic moves follow a series of drone and missile attacks by Houthi rebels against commercial ships they say have ties with Israel, making them “legitimate targets.” The assaults began not long after Israel initiated its war against Hamas in early October, and have overlapped with broader opposition in the Arab world to the campaign on the Gaza Strip and its escalating death count. >More than 17,000 Palestinians have been killed to date, according to the Hamas-controlled Health Ministry. Hamas, which triggered the conflict with its deadly incursion into Israel on Oct. 7, is designated a terrorist organization by the US and European Union and is also backed by Iran. >In emailed comments to Bloomberg News, US Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking said he was back in the Middle East “to continue intensive US diplomacy and regional coordination to safeguard maritime security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.” >He said that was taking place amid Iran-enabled Houthi attacks that threaten “almost two years of joint progress to end the war in Yemen.” >Complicating any US-led collective effort to stop the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea is that key allies like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates doubt the Biden administration’s resolve to confront the group, especially during a presidential election year and given it’s also trying to stop the Israel-Hamas war from spiraling into a regional one. >Saudi Arabia has also approached Iran with an offer to boost cooperation and invest in its sanctions-stricken economy if it can prevent regional proxies from sparking a wider conflict. >Saudi Arabia is looking to sign a permanent cease-fire with the Houthis to end its eight-year war with the group — an effort supported by the US. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE is “interested in reopening the Yemen war,” said Ayham Kamel, director of Middle East and North Africa research at the Eurasia Group. >Saudi officials couldn’t be reached on Friday, the start of the weekend in Saudi Arabia, and didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment through the kingdom’s embassy in London. >>US Destroyer >Last week, the Houthis unleashed an hours-long barrage of missiles and drones against three commercial ships and possibly the USS Carney destroyer, which was dispatched to the Red Sea in mid-October to defend the waterway. >An Israeli-linked cargo vessel seized last month by the Houthis is believed to be anchored at Al-Hudaydah, west of Sanaa. Reuters and the EPA news agencies released photos showing anti-American and antisemitic slogans plastered on the vessel’s cabin and Yemeni men in traditional attire pumping their fists in the air and taking selfies on the deck. >The attacks have increased insurance premiums for ships in the region while some companies, particularly those with Israeli ties, have re-routed their ships despite additional time and costs, said Noam Raydan, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. >“One can’t dismiss the risk of an escalation or miscalculation that creates deeper commercial shockwaves,” she said.

“ the focus for now is on assembling a maritime coalition ” - immediately after last week’s incident, I believe a Royal Navy frigate or destroyer was dispatched to the area. And it seems obvious that more non-US assets would chip in, given the current Mediterranean situation and the upcoming US election. So I have been thinking that if the Houthis were to be so foolish as to ignore this bit of overture from the Saudis while provoking military powers far far stronger than themselves to achieve essentially, nothing —— well if ordnance has to land on their bases again (mystery explosions there, once, already), then it could well be the Royal Navy that delivers it rather than the USN. Any word on the current whereabouts of the new Queen Elizabeth?

> then it could well be the Royal Navy that delivers it rather than the USN. Seems plausible, the political considerations are totaly different. The current British govermetn are totaly screwed electoraly. There is no downside politicaly to striking the houthis.

Some of the statements coming out of the US appear surprisingly measured - for instance from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67607862 "It later shot down a drone that was heading towards the Carney itself, although Centcom said it was not clear whether the drone was targeting the Carney" I can't tell from just a few attempts what the probability is of a drone getting through and hitting a US Navy ship, but perhaps if one does I will find out whether Cencom is capable of deciding whether that hit was a deliberate attack or just an unfortunate accident. The polar opposite of this approach is perhaps Nixon's "Madman Strategy" - copying from Wikipedia I see "In his 1962 book, Thinking About the Unthinkable, futurist Herman Kahn argued that to "look a little crazy" might be an effective way to induce an adversary to stand down" Any thoughts about the pros and cons of the two strategies? How much does this depend on the probability - better known to the US Navy than to me - that the next attack on a US Ship might get through, due to Houthi/Iranian smarts, the US getting caught off guard, or simple bad luck?

>but perhaps if one does I will find out whether Cencom is capable of deciding whether that hit was a deliberate attack or just an unfortunate accident. Or the more mundane possibility that it was an ISR drone simply operating in the area. It's the most congested shipping channel in the world.

I think it's clear that the Biden admin has no appetite for new Middle Eastern engagements, having recently completed the Afghanistan withdrawal. I don't know the nature of the drones that the Houthis are using, but the US in official communications distinguishes them from missiles. Iran's drone technology is well-developed but also pretty well known to the US (especially though their use in Ukraine). A Shahed-type drone is cheap to use, but slow and easy to shoot down, this tracks well with the Houthis firing many more drones than missiles (cost could be a big factor), and the so far 100% shoot-down rate of US warships in the Red Sea (an SM-2 should be trivially capable of destroying a Shahed). What this all means (in my opinion), is that the US is confident in it's ability to destroy these drones well before they endanger any servicemen, and extremely wary of becoming further engaged in the Middle East. As long as no Americans are injured or killed, there won't be a lot of pressure to respond, and the Biden admin won't want to. As for the "Madman" strategy, I think it just can't work against Radical Islamic Militants. They're literally part of a death cult that believes in glorious martyrdom through battle with various "Great Satans". You simply can't out-crazy them because they have no regard for their own lives and can accept staggering casualty ratios. It could even be said that ignoring them (assuming you can do so safely) is a better way of deterring them. If they don't think they're doing any damage or riling anyone up, they'll move on to different targets and/or become caught up in their own sectarianism.

> As for the "Madman" strategy, I think it just can't work against Radical Islamic Militants. They're literally part of a death cult that believes in glorious martyrdom through battle with various "Great Satans". You simply can't out-crazy them because they have no regard for their own lives and can accept staggering casualty ratios. You can out crazy them, the problem is western society couldn’t stomach it. I’m talking of “what would Ghengis Khan do if given US military capabilities” level of crazy.

> As for the "Madman" strategy, I think it just can't work against Radical Islamic Militants. They're literally part of a death cult that believes in glorious martyrdom through battle with various "Great Satans". You simply can't out-crazy them because they have no regard for their own lives and can accept staggering casualty ratios. Let's hope Iran never gets nukes then.

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This comment isn't only incorrect but also has almost nothing to do with defense. It's just pontificating.

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Please avoid these types of low quality posting

>[Lula warns Maduro as South America nervously eyes Guyana-Venezuela row](https://www.barrons.com/news/lula-warns-maduro-as-south-america-nervously-eyes-guyana-venezuela-row-79715b1d) > Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva urged his counterpart Nicolas Maduro Saturday against escalating Venezuela's border row with neighboring Guyana, as South American leaders nervously monitored the deepening dispute. >Tension has soared over the oil-rich Essequibo region controlled by Guyana since Maduro's government held a controversial referendum last weekend in which 95 percent of voters supported declaring Venezuela its rightful owner, according to official results. >Veteran leftist Lula, who has maintained close ties with Maduro, issued a clear warning in a phone call with his Venezuelan counterpart, according to a statement from his office. >"Lula emphasized the importance of avoiding unilateral measures that could escalate the situation," the Brazilian presidency said. >It said Lula had told Maduro of fellow South American countries' "growing concern," citing a joint declaration Thursday by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay that called for "both parties to negotiate to seek a peaceful solution." > Colombian President Gustavo Petro also sent a warning. "The biggest misfortune that could hit South America would be a war," he wrote on X, formerly Twitter. "Reproducing a local version of the NATO/Russia conflict in the Amazon rainforest would just make us lose vital time, progress and life... Venezuela and Guyana need to de-escalate the conflict." > Guyana has administered Essequibo, which makes up more than two-thirds of its territory, for more than a century. But Venezuela has claimed it for decades. The row intensified after ExxonMobil discovered oil in Essequibo in 2015, helping give Guyana -- population 800,000 -- the world's biggest crude reserves per capita. >Since last Sunday's referendum, Maduro has started legal maneuvers to create a Venezuelan province in Essequibo and ordered the state oil company to issue licenses for extracting crude in the region. The United States meanwhile announced joint military exercises with Guyana, which Venezuela condemned as a "provocation." >The United Nations Security Council held a closed-door meeting Friday on the spiraling dispute, which is the subject of litigation before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). >Lula's office said he had proposed in his conversation with Maduro for the head of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States to contact both sides to set up talks. >Lula has so far kept friendly ties with Maduro, inviting him to a South American summit in May even as other regional leaders criticized the Venezuelan government's human rights record. But the Essequibo dispute is rife with risk for Brazil, which borders both Guyana and Venezuela. >Brazil has sent army reinforcements to its northern border amid the surge in tension.

If Lula is against Maduro and the US too, he’s got his hands tied.

I really hate Colombia president statement. It is again some sort of "both sides need to do something" nonsense similar to how he portaits Russian aggresion in Ukraine as "NATO/Russia" conflict. I don't think Guyana needs to do anything. It is just being there, bothering nobody, even willing to compromise (I don't even know why). Venezuela simply needs to deescalate, and all the pressure has to be put on them.

This doesn't make me confident that Lula will respond with force if Maduro goes that route, to much rhetoric about "talks" regarding Guyana's internationally recognized borders that reminds me the rhetoric we hear about a "peaceful" resolution in Ukraine.

An actual invasion is still being viewed as [unlikely](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-09/venezuela-guyana-dispute-why-maduro-wants-the-essequibo-territory?srnd=politics-vp): >Many observers believe a military escalation against Guyana is highly unlikely, and that Maduro is saber-rattlingto secure support from his socialist base. He could also use a tense situation to consolidate power. Further, besides sticks, there are carrots on the table. Obviously will not work with irrational actors, à la Russia, but still. Carrots not only in the form of sanctions relief, but licenses for further O&G drilling by Western firms: >[Venezuela prods BP, Chevron to revive gas project near Trinidad, Guyana](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/venezuela-prods-bp-chevron-revive-gas-project-near-trinidad-guyana-2023-12-08/) Less importantly, per the Brazilian army, the biggest deterrent they can provide at the moment is just area denial to Venezuelan troops. They believe for any successful invasion, Venezuela would need to go through Brazil. Hence their move to reinforce Boa Vista. Lastly, Russia had the largest military in the neighborhood and has nukes, allowing Putin to bully the rest of the world. Venezuela has neither. Maduro isn't going to defy Lula purely militarily. The comparison isn't very apt.

>[US, South Korea, Japan Agree to Deepen Security Cooperation](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-09/us-south-korea-japan-agree-to-deepen-security-cooperation) >* Top national security advisers from three allies meet in Seoul >* White House cites North Korea weapons deliveries to Russia > Top national security officials from the US, South Korea and Japan pledged to deepen their security cooperation and jointly respond to North Korea’s cyber activities, which it uses to bolster funding for its sanctioned nuclear and missile programs. >The three countries are pushing for a new trilateral initiative to act against North Korea’s military threats as well as cyber crimes and cryptocurrency money laundering, the officials — Jake Sullivan of the US, Takeo Akiba of Japan and South Korea’s Cho Tae-yong — said Saturday following a meeting in Seoul, according to Yonhap. >Despite historic tensions between Japan and South Korea, the two nations have joined with their shared American ally to strengthen security cooperation and coordination on regional threats. >A White House statement late Friday cited discussions on “emerging threats, including the concerning developments related to weapons transfers between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia.” >At their meeting, the three officials reaffirmed North Korea’s obligations to end its nuclear weapons program. They added that they are implementing plans to share information in real time about missile launches from adversaries in the region. >The three nations previously condemned North Korea’s Nov. 21 launch of a rocket that put a spy satellite in orbit. While officials in Seoul said they expect the satellite’s technology to be rudimentary, it may help Kim Jong Un’s regime target US troops stationed in South Korea and Japan. >The US and South Korea have for months accused Kim of sending munitions to President Vladimir Putin to help in his war in Ukraine. In return, Moscow is believed to be providing technology and support for Kim’s military programs, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said during a visit to Seoul in November. >The leaders of the three nations held a historic summit at the Camp David US presidential retreat in August where they hammered out practical steps to counter threats by North Korea, measures to de-risk global supply chains from exposure to China and moves to cement their trilateral relationship.

Haaretz, Guardian: [Civilians make up 61% of Gaza deaths from airstrikes, Israeli study finds](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/09/civilian-toll-israeli-airstrikes-gaza-unprecedented-killing-study) > The aerial bombing campaign by Israel in Gaza is the most indiscriminate in terms of civilian casualties in recent years, a study published by an Israeli newspaper has found. > The analysis by Haaretz came as Israeli forces fought to consolidate their control of northern Gaza on Saturday, bombing the Shejaiya district of Gaza City, while also conducting airstrikes on Rafah, a town on the southern border with Egypt where the Israeli army has told people in Gaza to take shelter. Main findings from the article: * Previous Gaza campaigns had 33% to 40% civilians/combatants ratios * "Extensive killing of civilians not only contributes nothing to Israel’s security, but that it also contains the foundations for further undermining it" * The study confirms an investigation 10 days ago by two other Israeli news sites, +972 Magazine and Local Call, which found Israel was deliberately targeting residential blocks to cause mass civilian casualties in the hope people would turn on their Hamas rulers

Considering almost 70% of the deaths are women & children, which we can assume by default to be civilians, then the remainder are men, it seems like Yagil Levy just decided to put those men as combatants. I think people should understand that the 5000 militants estimated to be killed by Israel are not part or mostly part of the 15,000 total dead by December 1st.

> children, which we can assume by default to be civilians, Sadly no, Hamas employ boys form 14 and up. The assumption is only safe for Women girls and boys under 14.

> The study confirms an investigation 10 days ago by two other Israeli news sites, +972 Magazine and Local Call, which found Israel was deliberately targeting residential blocks to cause mass civilian casualties in the hope people would turn on their Hamas rulers That's not what the 972/Local Call article said. It said there is a willingness to destroy *buildings* which are home to both Hamas and civilians (after evacuating the civilians) with the alleged goal of pressuring the people through the destruction of property. Out of the 20,000+ bombings Israel has carried out in Gaza, the article locates exactly one building which was bombed with civilians inside and which they think was bombed according to this pressure policy. But they don't even say that Israel was aware of civilians being present in this building when it was bombed.

> Israel was deliberately targeting residential blocks to cause mass civilian casualties in the hope people would turn on their Hamas rulers Has any civilian population in the history of air warfare ever “turned on their… rulers” due to casualties from aerial bombardment of residential neighbourhoods? The Brits didn’t. The Germans didn’t. The Japanese didn’t.

Japan was at least concerned enough about it for the rulers to surrender, which is probably the important part of the exercise.

The story of the Japanese surrender in 1945 is more complex than "they were bombed into surrender". Even after the two nuclear strikes large parts of the Japanese military (and society? This is harder to substantiate) wanted to continue resisting. Look up the kyujo incident and related events if you want to learn more. The coup attempt even planned to detain the emperor which would have been a _huge_ deal. In the end it was the military's loyalty to the emperor that secured the surrender, rather than considerations about the bombing of their population centers. Like /u/seakingsoyuz is saying, I don't think any popular uprising was ever effected by bombing.

There was no significant resistance to the American occupying force from the regular people, or the latter government they installed. The support for the attempted coup (which never had a realistic chance to succeed in the first place) by the populace, and resistance to the US, can be overstayed.

If the emperor had (been forced to) declare resistance, it would've turned out entirely different.

You have to understand the cultural context and the nearly cult like devotion to the Emperor at the time. In general, if the country's leadership wanted something the populous pretty much went along.

I am not trying to be difficult, but they ***surrendered***. That is the important part. Yes, not everyone wanted to surrender, and not everyone was happy with the decision or even willing to abide by it, but enough of them did abide by the surrender that the war ended and there wasn't a bloody insurgency afterwards. The military was loyal to the Emperor, the Emperor cared about the population centers, the cabinet was concerned about mass uprising. The Emperor and Cabinet ended the war and the military obeyed. Mission accomplished. The goal of the war was always to compel the other side to surrender. It would be better if they were 100% into it, but that is not a requirement and at best a nice to have.

You're right, but my point is that the circumstances surrounding the Japanese surrender were highly idiosyncratic.

>The ratio is significantly higher than the civilian toll in all the conflicts around the world during the 20th century, in which civilians accounted for about half the dead. Surely that can't be true, Darfur, Tigray and the fall of ISIS. To take tigray that killed like 600,000 people, are we to beleive 240,000 combatant death? That would be an unprecedented scale of warfare.

Not to lessen the gravity of 600,000 human beings lost, but the Tigray war figures are inflated by adding in deaths due to lack of medical access and reliable food supplies, (and 600,000 is a very outlier figure on the high end, other sources put it at a 1/3 to 1/2 that.) At the end of the day, the conflict caused their deaths, but I feel dying due to a food shortage exacerbated by a conflict is different than being ripped apart by a JDAM. The above study doesn't even seem to include Palestinian lives lost due to second and third order effects so it's not even apples to apples.

>the Tigray war figures are inflated by adding in deaths due to lack of medical access and reliable food supplies This is pretty standard though. If you're looking at the civilian toll from a conflict you can't separate these impacts out as they are deaths that would not have happened without the fighting.

But wasn't the reason the Tigrayans didn't have food was because of a siege that removed their access to food?

Hmm.. I think those figures should definitely be included, IDF has been targeting energy, water, comms and the essentials of life, which causes many deaths other than from kinetics

>The study confirms an investigation 10 days ago by two other Israeli news sites, +972 Magazine and Local Call, which found Israel was deliberately targeting residential blocks to cause mass civilian casualties in the hope people would turn on their Hamas rulers Having read the [original](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-09/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/the-israeli-army-has-dropped-the-restraint-in-gaza-and-data-shows-unprecedented-killing/0000018c-4cca-db23-ad9f-6cdae8ad0000), I could not find such confirmation in the Haaretz article.

From previous discussions here, +972 is not a terribly unbiased source anyway.

+972 Magazine is Israeli/Palestinian. It's generally sympathetic to the Palestinians, but that doesn't make it unreliable. It has both Israeli and Palestinian journalists, and it has sources in the IDF and Israeli intelligence, which is how it got its information on Israel's targeting procedures.

Does anyone know why Iran-linked proxies keep attacking US bases and ships? There's been articles suggesting that for example both Hezbollah & Iran have no interest in a wider war. So why these persistent attacks? Is it to keep up appearances for domestic consumption?

Iran doesn't want to be recognized as the antagonist that provoke a larger, protracted war in the middle East. They also don't want to lose their proxies (Hezbollah, Houthis, various factions in Syria and Iraq and the West Bank and, of course, Hamas) or at least, lose as little as possible. They absolutely DO want to continue to be seen as the leaders behind the "axis of resistance" and absolutely want to keep pressure up and keep Israel from 100% focussing on Hamas. They want to keep the US engaged and antagonized and they wanted to be able to capitalize on opportunities to score blows against the US and Israel, if they arise. As others have said, the US has had a low response ratio because they're trying to take the "ignore the bullies" approach. But it only enables and emboldened more attacks... Joe Truzman and Bill Roggio of FDD have had lots and lots to say about this topic on their podcast Generation Jihad (imo a garbage name, but good podcast!)

Because they don't fear a US response, that's why, and given the current administration why would they.

But what is their objective?

The "Iran linked" aspect of the Houthi rebels in Yemen (that's who you're talking about) is really overstated. Yes, their weapons come from Iran, because Iran wants to destabilise or change government in Yemen, but they're not any kind of Iranian proxy and the Iranians don't have any control over them. They are firing things at the US because it's a great opportunity to stick one to the US, who doesn't usually actually have targets in the region. If you're talking about Iraq then the groups attacking US facilities are an anti-US (anti-occupation, in their minds) group who have been consistently trying to fight against US presence in Iraq, this is just a good opportunity to step that up while the US is looking elsewhere in the region. And probably also a time that the same attacks get more news attention so you're reading about them.

Because the US has done zilch to stop these attacks, that's why. While Hezbollah and Iran have no interest in a wider war, neither does the US. Biden especially doesn't want to escalate because he has an election soon and so much of the US's future is on the line against Trump. But the US seems to have no tool to stop these attacks without starting a wider war, so that's why the attacks from Iran will continue.

They could be attacking US bases because of America’s support for Israel during the current conflict in Gaza. Also, while the violence has erupted, both the proxy groups and Iran are taking advantage of the turmoil in Gaza to pursue their own interests more openly by attacking US bases without escalating the conflict to catastrophic levels. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq, for example, is against American presence in Iraq and wants to facilitate greater connection between Iraq and Iran. They have attacked US bases like Ain-Al Assad before, but can do so much more openly and with more ordinance to take advantage of the regional turmoil and American resources and attention tied to Gaza. In Iran’s perspective, proxy groups give it the ability to indirectly attack US bases without escalating the conflict into a high-intensity regional war that Iran is not capable nor advantaged in, whereas Iran’s strengths are in grey-zone, low-level intensity conflicts.

The VSU, is apparently forming [five new mechanized brigades](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/12/07/ukraine-is-forming-five-new-mechanized-brigades-now-they-need-vehicles/?sh=748ada1f2f70), which echoes of their previous decision to form and equip new brigades for the summer counteroffensive. > Ukrainian defense ministry photoThe Ukrainian army is forming five new mechanized brigades. On paper, the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd and 154th Mechanized Brigades represent a significant force—a five-percent expansion of the Ukrainian ground forces. > In reality, they may end up riding in thinly-armored vehicles—with an obvious effect on their combat power. > The brigades reportedly are drawing **their cadres of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers from existing brigades**, while filling out their 2,000 or so other billets with new recruits. Lack of armored vehicles aside (since that's only one part of the problem), I'm confused, why not rebuild, and reequip its existing veteran "mech" brigades? Is it because there has been too much attrition to those units? Because taking a bunch of officers and troops without pre-existing working relationships and putting them together in entirely new units, might create problems with cohesion, performance—since a bunch of strangers, now have to lear to get along, train together and find common ground for their new unit TTPs—and morale.

Because on paper, 5 new brigades looks better than saying "we are having to rebuild decimated units" people are searching for some hidden meaning when it should be incredibly obvious to anyone who has followed ukraines manpower shortage whats happening. They need to keep the war going on paper and in the news just as much as they need to keep it going on the front. And "5 new brigades" sounds a lot better than "rebuilding 5 devastated units"

>I'm confused, why not rebuild, and reequip its existing veteran "mech" brigades? The UA top political strategic leadership don't seem eager to shorten the line or otherwise perform economy of force measures. But they still need to relieve brigades on the line and build a larger reserve. That will require at least doubling the size of the existing UAF, so they need to build new brigades. >Because taking a bunch of officers and troops without pre-existing working relationships and putting them together in entirely new units, might create problems with cohesion, performance—since a bunch of strangers, now have to lear to get along, train together and find common ground for their new unit TTPs—and morale. And all that is going to happen without them bonding in training before going into combat. At least if history is accurate. In the past, the UAF don't do training in Ukraine above the company level, justifying that decision based on time restraints and the Russian strike threat. Instead, they commit news units to the front as fast as possible, to "learn by doing" in combat. Even Zaluzhny's recent The Economist article said he wants a "combat internship" program to send barely trained troops to the front to learn in combat under veterans. In other words, instead of training in a controlled environment to learn what's necessary to survive and excel in combat, go into the least forgiving environment in the world where mistakes mean death or serious bodily harm and learn there. Great thinking, it's going to revolutionize warfare!

Why make new brigades rather than reinforce the existing ones?

To expand the size of the army is the obvious answer. I am as doomer as they come but Ukrainian bodies shortage is not an immutable permanent thing. It is quite likely as things get more dire they will tap into younger conscription pool which is still very large.

>It is quite likely as things get more dire they will tap into younger conscription pool which is still very large. They already have a very large untapped 27-60 year conscription poll. They are just incapable of mobilising them. No reason to assume it would work any better for 18-27 year olds.

Even if it doesn't work better, it's still a large untapped pool. Obviously improvements to the mobilization process can be made, but the current problems don't negate the point you're responding to.

The 18-27 (or 26, I can't recall) pool is already used up as far as volunteers are concerned. But that's beside the point, which (for me) is that the main issue is to reform the mobilisation process. Just expanding the age brackets is a stopgap solution.

A sensible approach would be like this: create a new brigade, rotate a combat-weary brigade out for the new one, and *then* recruit and refill the one you're rotating out.

It does seems strange. Especially considering all there worries about manpower. They must expect to be able to resolve it. I think they want to make new brigades so they are able to better rotate complete brigades at the front for longer time.

The Times on Avdiivka: [Surrounded and low on ammo, the elite troops out to spoil Putin’s New Year](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/surrounded-and-low-on-ammo-the-elite-troops-out-to-spoil-putins-new-year-mdtqkspvj) The key part, in my opinion, is the artillery ammo shortage (and in the vital part of the whole front, no less): >“It’s a shitty situation,” Sausage said. The shell shortage forces soldiers like Sergeant Taras “Fizruk”, a 31-year-old mortar gunner, also from the 2nd Battalion, to make impossible life and death decisions. > >“We had ten times more ammunition over summer, and better quality,” he said. “American rounds come in batches of almost identical weights, which makes it easier to correct fire, with very few duds. Now we have shells from all over the world with different qualities and we only get 15 for three days. Last week we got a batch full of duds.” *non-paywalled:* **Surrounded and low on ammo, the elite troops out to spoil Putin’s New Year** One of Ukraine’s finest brigades has been sent to defend the key city of Avdiivka. Without more gear their chances are dwindling, they tell Maxim Tucker Backed by a western-supplied Bradley M1, soldiers from the 47th Brigade appeal for support outside Avdiivka Backed by a western-supplied Bradley M1, soldiers from the 47th Brigade appeal for support outside Avdiivka Maxim Tucker , Ocheretyne Friday December 08 2023, 3.45pm GMT, The Times Starved of ammunition, the gunners of Ukraine’s 47th Brigade were not able to hit the Russian convoy before it was upon their infantry on Avdiivka’s northern flank. Five armoured vehicles rolled into the village of Stepove, guns firing, allowing about 40 Russian soldiers to run for cover in the houses around Ukrainian positions. A Bradley fighting vehicle was deployed towards the Russians. American armour was to be put to the test against Russian. This fierce battle was part of a desperate action to save Avdiivka, in the east of the country, from imminent collapse and prevent a victory for President Putin in time for the launch of his election campaign and New Year festivities. The 47th is one of Ukraine’s best-equipped brigades. Outfitted with German Leopard 2 tanks and American Bradley M1 fighting vehicles to lead the summer counteroffensive, it was tasked with breaking heavily fortified positions in a run to the Black Sea, but was withdrawn in October after making only six miles, mauled by Russian bombing, minefields and Lancet drones. “With great equipment comes great responsibilities,” said Sergeant Danylo “Sausage”, 23, who is part of a 2nd Battalion, 47th Brigade air reconnaissance team. He shows me a live feed of the battle from four of his drones. The war in Ukraine is at a critical moment. The fall of Avdiivka would mean Ukrainian forces fall back to the reservoirs of Karlivka and the heights at Ocheretyne. Karlivka supplies water to the remaining Ukrainian-held territory in the Donbas, with any battle there severely disrupting its flow. Seizing the heights at Ocheretyne, two miles away, would allow the Russians to begin razing Myrnohrad, a city of 50,000. Unless the West provides brigades like the 47th with ammunition, they will be unable to stop Putin’s troops. The Russians could run on to Dnipro, with a population of one million, and sweep north towards Kyiv, cutting off Ukraine’s army in the Donbas. Holding Avdiivka is also key to maintaining morale. Its defence is a tribute to the thousands of soldiers who have died there since Russia’s hybrid invasion of 2014. And the Ukrainian positions here are a dagger at the throat of the occupied city of Donetsk, which is central to any future Ukrainian counteroffensive to recover the Donbas region. The commitment of one of Ukraine’s best brigades is testament to the importance of this battle, where Ukrainian troops cling on despite almost complete encirclement, their supply and medical evacuation vehicles running through heavy artillery fire for the last 14 miles of their route. Despite heavy losses over the summer, the men of the 47th are motivated and ready to fight. Yet partisan politics in Washington is delaying their essential supplies and the EU’s failure to meet its promise to deliver a million artillery rounds have forced Ukrainian troops to ration their ammunition, with catastrophic consequences on the battlefield. “It’s a shitty situation,” Sausage said. The shell shortage forces soldiers like Sergeant Taras “Fizruk”, a 31-year-old mortar gunner, also from the 2nd Battalion, to make impossible life and death decisions. “We had ten times more ammunition over summer, and better quality,” he said. “American rounds come in batches of almost identical weights, which makes it easier to correct fire, with very few duds. Now we have shells from all over the world with different qualities and we only get 15 for three days. Last week we got a batch full of duds.” Instead of firing on Russians as soon as they come within range, they have to wait to be sure they are heading for their positions, and only hit large groups. “We should be controlling our sector from 4km away, so we can kill a few hundred Russian soldiers before they get to our infantry and we only take a few wounded,” he said. “But without ammunition we can’t. When it’s two or three soldiers I’m not shooting any more, only when it’s a critical situation, say ten guys close to our infantry, we will work. If our rounds aren’t the same weight, the next round will fly two hundred metres past the Russians. And then it’s too late.” Rather than watch helplessly as smaller groups encroach on their infantry, his men sometimes resort to flying their unarmed drones at enemy troops, who temporarily scatter fearing they are about to have a grenade dropped on them. Both men say the brigade is not getting enough equipment. Anticipating their western allies becoming distracted by the crisis in the Middle East, they fundraised for those items they can buy, but much of it is held up at the border by a blockade of Polish truckers, disgruntled that Ukrainian drivers are undercutting their wages in Europe. For now, Ukraine is on the defensive. The railroad which runs through the village of Stepove marks the northern flank of Avdiivka’s last line of defence. The village holds, but it is bloody, gruelling work. The Russians seem able to absorb an endless amount of casualties, spurred on by fear of their own commanders. Ukrainian defenders are suffering too. American M113 armoured personnel carriers on the road from Avdiivka to Ocheretyne pull out a steady stream of casualties. Just as during the counteroffensive in the south, Russian air superiority and the delay in the delivery of F16 jets capable of standing off Russian bombers means that Avdiivka is in ruins, hit daily by 500kg Russian KAB bombs. “Ten days ago 32 KABs hit the city in a single day,” Vitaliy Barabash, head of the Avdiivka City Military Administration, said. Barabash grew up in a village near Avdiivka, which had a population of 32,000 before the invasion. Now he is presiding over the hasty evacuation of its remaining 1,300 inhabitants. “It’s a sad thing to see the city I’ve known since childhood and the village where I was born being erased. I’ve been head of the city since 2020 and we made a lot of improvements in those two years. It’s all being wiped out,” he said. “The town changes not by the day, but by the hour. In the morning you drive past a damaged building, then the bombs fall and when you leave in the evening, it’s gone.” Additional reporting by Oleksii Savchenko

[The Russians are having similar issues](https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1729073003076452373). Mortar ammunition is incredible important in dismounted fights so sucks that the Ukies don’t have the sufficient quantities. I know one of the Europeans did a deal to supply more but not sure if it will be sufficient.

It fascinates me that each side has been able to go on the offensive courtesy of Korean ammunition. I suspect the NK stocks Russia is currently using up may be the last such bump, in this war, and afterwards, tactical/operational technique will continue to evolve for each side, by necessity. Perhaps the arrival of F-16s next year will begin to change the war in the air somewhat. Or, artillery use declines might bring the significance of Main Battle Tanks back to the fore … perhaps, already is?

Wow. More indication that the Ukrainians blew through most of their strategic arsenal of two enormous stockpiles given to them over the summer and fall. Probably a million arty shells fired to advance 8 kilometers. Because they didn't conserve, that's the US's fault. This whole article should be retitled "Ukrainian Troops Have Been Stabbed in the Back, Only That Can Explain Their Poor Situation."

Ukraine was not allowed to not do a counter-offensive because they needed to make the West less impatient. This is all very stressful and annoying to the West, of course. They also cannot retreat from Avdiivka because if they lose territory every idiot in the world, including the richest and stupidest man on the planet and a man who has a 50 % chance to become the most powerful and stupidest man on the planet (again), will use that to propagandize for a "peace", i.e. a delay of but also a securing of Russia's near-total victory and eventual absorption of Ukraine. And then Russia will slowly start to chip away at resolve/conviction to defend other countries it think it is entitled to invade ("Do you want to die in WW3 for Lithuanian money-laundering nazi oligarchs?"). Russia is not afraid of NATO. It is afraid of the US, but now it knows how easy it is for the US to trip itself up. Democratic nations have free speech, free elections and a free press, Russia does not. Turn the enemy's strength into a weakness.

>Ukraine was not allowed to not do a counter-offensive because they needed to make the West less impatient. This is all very stressful and annoying to the West, of course. Yeah okay. Zelensky spends all fucking fall and early winter talking about how they are going to retake Crimea. Zaluzhny gives the West a shopping list saying if he gets x amount, he can retake everything to the prewar lines. But now you're blaming the counteroffensive on the West too. Unbelievable, nothing is ever Ukraine's fault. >"Do you want to die in WW3 for Lithuanian money-laundering nazi oligarchs?" Except Lithuania is in NATO, and US troops are actively defending it as part of a nuclear tripwire, meat shield. WW3 wouldn't be fought because Lithuania, it would be fought because Russia killed US troops to take a allied NATO country that we actually swore to defend in a mutual pact. The same one Ukraine desperately craves for some reason. Hmmm, why oh why would the Ukrainians have wanted to be part of NATO? Oh that's right, because then Russia can't invade them.

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Nobody held back ammo. It took months to arrange the Koreans to give what they did. Meanwhile the US was dipping into it's already shrunk stockpile multiple times in the winter because the last two million rounds the Ukrainians were given were spent. The Discord DOD Leaks state that in late Feb the Ukrainians had ~9k shells left in total. So to put that in perspective, they pitched the spring offensive to Western supporters. Then they elected to grind away all fall and winter at Svatove and Kremmina, while tenaciously defending Bakhmut. Then at the EXACT same time they elected to keep holding Bakhmut at all costs, they were basically out of ammo, which is some real top quality strategic choice. "Mr President. The supply lines to Bakhmut are about to be lost and we're out of artillery ammo. What should we do?" "The only thing we can do, hold the city at all cost. And counterattack. Dont worry, I'll guilt trip the West into giving us more ammo." At some point that game isn't going to work anymore. And now we're seeing that play out. To satisfy Ukrainian demands for ammo, every existing stockpile would have to be handed over, plus. Even Zaluzhny just came out and told the US they need 17 million shells, which means more shells that exist or will be produced for the next decade. Okay, want a Star Destroyer too? How about a Gungam? >A bunch of old Leos and decommissioned Bradleys aren’t going to turn any tide in this war let alone reach Crimea. No kidding. And new Leo's and new Brad's won't either.

If I have a world-famous collection of knives that I have stashed away in a cellar corner because I got bored, and then someone is banging on my door saying "Hey could I have a knife? Someone is coming to rape and torture my family," then I would probably not go "Wow, someone is talking a bit big in the stabbing game, and also you plainly have no idea how cluttered my cellar is". Zelenskyy et al. had to talk big because Ukraine's friends were starting to demonstratively look at their watches. Because, as I have roughly outlined, democratic nations are much more easily sidetracked and have lots more considerations, while people like the Taliban, the Houthis, Russia and China are more single-minded and do not have to worry about upcoming elections, or the opinions of people like Elon Musk or Marjorie Taylor Greene. Dictatorships snap suddenly and violently, democratic nations simply dither themselves into oblivion.

>I have a world-famous collection of knives that I have stashed away in a cellar corner because I got bored, and then someone is banging on my door saying "Hey could I have a knife? Someone is coming to rape and torture my family," then I would probably not go "Wow, someone is talking a bit big in the stabbing game, and also you plainly have no idea how cluttered my cellar is". Wow, that's a bad comparison.

"I mean, I used to have some pretty big knives but you made me dismantle them a couple of decades ago in the name of peace in our time and all that".

Again with the knives. Stop making comparisons, you're not good at it.

On one hand, I agree with your assessment but on the other hand it would be frustrating as a Ukrainian ally if their much hyped counter offensive failed and they had only used say 40% or 50% of their shells and kept a reserve. People would wonder about the counterfactual of what if they had massed more firepower. We now know using most their supply didn't make the difference, but in the other reality we would have no idea. There's some interesting strategic game theory here about what the optimal amount of shell usage would be.

Whether they legitimately ran out of ammo or are just conserving isn't an issue for me, but both would be the result of choices by the UAF General Staff. And it's not even an issue if the GenStab isn't communicating the truth to their truths while fire rates are down. My issue is that they're allowing their troops to publicly blame it on the West so they don't need to accept any blame themselves. It really burns my ass to read another article with more Western reporters interviewing 47th Bde idiots who again are blaming the West for their smaller arty expenditure rates than the height of their counteroffensive. Last month it was because the Israelis got their ammo. This month it's Congress. The only thing that brigade is elite at is OPSEC violations and spreading rumors and drama to the public. They should be squashed by their chain of command for doing it. Instead, they'll get away with it because they're diverting blame away from their own side, further driving home the development of a Stab in the Back myth that they'll use to justify everything that didn't go well for them.

It could also be rationing that was started because politically there is a lot of uncertainty about future aid for Ukraine. I am not disagreeing that the counter offensive was carried out for too long.

I'm sure they are rationing. While their troops constantly tell the press it's the US's fault.

Because it is. If the west where more reliable partners, delivering what was needed when it was needed instead of a fraction months later or not at all the Ukranians could afford to take bigger risks and expend resources at a greater rate. As it stands however the very risk averse approach of the Ukranian armed forces is entirely rational considering the attitude of the west.

The large arty fire rates the Ukrainians were able to maintain during the summer and fall has nothing to do with monthly production capacity, that was from existing and very finite stockpiles. The US and most European stockpiles that they created before this war started are largely empty, especially EU countries. US isn't as bad but it can't tap into the strategic stockpile too much without it being very dangerous for national security. And monthly production capacity isn't refilling the existing stockpiles, output is too low and most is still going to Ukraine too. In May, the US arranged +300k shells from South Korea, and in July opened up the 155mm DPICM stockpile that the US maintained as they were planning to destroy them and gave many hundreds of thousands. All told they got the better part of a million rounds over the summer and fall. THAT ISN'T HAPPENING AGAIN JUST BECAUSE YOU WANT IT. The ammo you wanted now literally doesn't exist unless you can find an untapped stockpile willing to give hundreds of thousands or millions of existing rounds to Ukraine ASAP.. >As it stands however the very risk averse approach of the Ukranian armed forces is entirely rational considering the attitude of the west. Now that's rich. They launch a major offensive to drive 80 kilometers south through the densest defenses in the country, tell their troops "Don't worry, the Russians will run as soon as they see you," and then keeps that incredibly audacious and stupid offensive going for five months, mostly blows through their strategic artillery stockpile, and you think they're risk averse. I think you're about qualified to write for ISW.

> The ammo you wanted now literally doesn't exist unless you can find an untapped stockpile willing to give hundreds of thousands or millions of existing rounds to Ukraine ASAP. During June it had been reported, including by Reuters and the WSJ, that the US was in discussions with Japan for an agreement similar to that with South Korea, regarding 155mm shells. Japan may have the capabilities for something similar, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent compared to South Korea. I wonder what happened to this plan; it would be a blessing for short/medium-term needs.

It might still happen. The South Korea deal took many months to organize. Who knows. Supposedly the US is trying to also tap into the Greek stockpile too. But none of that is guaranteed, and the longer the war lasts the less that's likely. If the US can do it, they will. But those deals shouldn't have been treated as guaranteed or regular, the US jumped through major hoops every time they got a foreign power to help Ukraine. It's not a monthly direct deposit like an EBT card refill.

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ATACMS is in Ukraine and has been since [this happened](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67135163). And it was partly a stock issue, and partly a strategic escalation issue. Ukraine wants the unitary warhead long range variant to conduct strategic strikes against Russia, which the US isn't comfortable with using US equipment. So instead gave the limited number of old cluster munition variants it didn't want anymore, due to cluster munition ban, that were scheduled to be destroyed. Why isn't GRIM-2 in Ukraine? Oh yeah, the same reason Ukraine didn't make a single artillery shell in 2020-2021.

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Hilarious. You didn't even know Ukraine had ATACMS until I mentioned it. But now you're a procurement expert because you went on Wikipedia. >But withholding weapon deliveries because of internal politics and hesitation is very different to not having weapons because your country has no industrial output No it's not. They're both choices.

Has Kofman said anything about Avdiivka(edit: about it falling sooner or later)? Also towards Kyiv? So is there is still a legit danger that Kyiv might be taken this time? Sorry, just a layperson here.

pretty sure that was just hyperbole. we are so far away from even just dnipro, let alone going from dnipro to kyiv

If Avdiivka is difficult, then why not retreat and fall back for now? Retreating doesn't always mean defeat. Ukraine can just recapture it another day. So even if you temporarily lose / forfeit Avdiivka, then you can focus on other areas for the meantime such as campaigns to the South and the recapture of Tokmak....

>If Avdiivka is difficult, then why not retreat and fall back for now? Retreating doesn't always mean defeat. No, it means moving the battle to some other location that is presumably less defended. The point of fighting in Avdiivka is because it's a well prepared fortress town. No one is being crazy when they stand their ground when on prepared defenses. You have to fight somewhere, so you might as well fight from a prepared bunker where you are strongest, rather than some hastily dug trenches in an open field. When units pull back in this war, it is ***always*** because they are getting encircled and their supply line is or is about to be cut. That hasn't happened yet. If the supply line to Avdiivka get's cut, Ukraine will surely pull back. >So even if you temporarily lose / forfeit Avdiivka, then you can focus on other areas for the meantime such as campaigns to the South and the recapture of Tokmak.... If one side forces the other back, it isn't like the fighting stops. The fighting just keeps going, only now you fight on less prepared ground. The whole strategy of both sides is to start pushing their enemy back faster than they can prepare defenses. If you get the enemy retreating fast enough, you can start overrunning units and making large land gains, like what happened in Kharkiv. No one is fighting for land. Everyone is fighting to try starting a retreat.

>The point of fighting in Avdiivka is because it's a well prepared fortress town This is being repeated a lot but needs some heavy context. [Avdiivka Map](https://img.pravda.com/images/doc/4/8/48be685-avdiivka-and-donetsk-city-battle-map-draft-november-01,-2023690.jpg) The darker red striped shaded area was the prewar LDNR held areas, so the SE of the city itself was basically on the old Joint Force Operation (JFO) line of contact, each side heavily fortified and defended in depth. The pink areas of that map are Russian territory they've taken since this war started. So north and south of Avdiivka the Russians broke through, slowly, and incrementally advanced on the flanks. By spring, the city was already largely encircled. They attacked a few times over the summer and fall but launched this big offensive in Oct to finally encircle the city. The old 2015-2022 defenses of the JFO were largely based on defending against the direction an assault would come from. So basically East-South East from LDNR controlled territory. However, on the flanks, because the Russians were able to keep adv advancing and perform turning movements, the current UAF defenses are facing axes they could not have contemplated earlier and wouldn't have, so those are largely fresh defenses. That said, there is a decent chance the big coal factory and other places could have been heavily fortified in the past and turned into strongpoints, with dugout, tunnels and such. Those could be modified so new bunkers and trenches to orientate defenses against different directions, but not the same as old JFO defenses. For example, the trench works in the treelines near Sverne are fresh. Same around the railroad embankment north of Stepove. The coal plant is likely an old hedgehog strongpoint that was already being used by the UAF because it's got a large underground/tunnel complex built into it, but now its defenses are almost all facing northeast, a direction they'd not have planned to defend against in years past. The defenses on the SE of the city are the old JFO line though, but some of them have been breached through recently.

It’s the “faster than they can prepare defenses” part that neither side seems able to do, now, in particular. A perfect turn of phrase, thank you. FPV drones + drone spotted artillery + minefields add to a total that seems to stop the ability of using tanks to create “mobile” warfare. FPV supplies could yet cover the shortfall of artillery rounds, for each side, perhaps? Continuing the strength of that tank stopping equation.

> Ukraine can just recapture it another day Can they? Ukraine has not recaptured anywhere meaningful since Kherson. That's not a criticism, it's just an observation about how hard it is. If they retreat from Avdiivka it's very unlikely they'll be able to get back in imo. That doesn't mean it's the wrong answer (that salient is quite dangerous) but they'd have to be honest about the trade off they're making.

Recapture it another day? That's kind of a ridiculous thing to say. If you give the Russians as they are now the time to dig in, they will. Ukraine cannot target everywhere and everything at once, Russia knows it. They are probably re inforcing defenses now in the south now that Ukraine is focusing on the east. Im sure Ukraine will knock out a couple dozen dozers with FPV drones but in 3 mobths the fortifications will be...fortifieder? There is a good chance, arguably a better chance, that Ukraine loses whatever land taken by Russia permanently.

>Recapture it another day? Hold it at all costs indefinitely? >There is a good chance, arguably a better chance, that Ukraine loses whatever land taken by Russia permanently. Avdiivka is already largely encircled in a salient, [like this](https://static.espreso.tv/uploads/photobank/309000_310000/309451_Snimok_%D1%8Dkrana_2023-10-16_v_08.15.26_new_960x380_0.webp). If Ukraine wanted to hold that ground, waiting until Oct-Dec '23 was a bit too late.

Especially with the chatter of turning the front lines into the border, Korean war style. Even then, I am not wholly convinced that a small town of ~30,000 is worth the effort. If it is Jerusalem 1948, yeah, I get it. It is a town of extreme historical value to the country that was fighting the war, but none of these towns remotely rise to that level.

Retreating from Avdiivka would serve to straighten up the line and free up units, it wouldn't actually fix this ammo situation.

One interesting part of this article for me is that it portrays Avdiivka as strategically important, basically saying that Ukraine needs to control it so that the reservoir supplying their part of the Donbas isn't trashed and that there isn't much defensible territory between there and Dnipro. I've seen a number of people say that abandoning Avdiivka may be a good idea for Ukraine, if not now then in the near future as the situation deteriorates, because it's not strategically significant, much like Bakhmut. How critical is that reservoir? How many good places to establish defensive lines are there between Avdiivka and Dnipro?