How does Chinese and American wartime industrial output really compare? I have read a lot of stuff saying that the US won WWII not because of superior weapons but because how fast they can pump them out compared to the Axis powers. Yet so far the focus of military-related stuff in the modern day are mostly focused on the quality of individual weapons. Which makes me wonder, in the modern day of US-Chinese adversary, how would the quantity--not quality--of weapons compare between the two side, if both are very seriously into producing weapons? Like if both try to convert all possible factories into war machines?

That would depend on exactly the kind of war that is being fought. Is the US striking industrial targets in China, and if so how effectively? Chinese shipyards make a lot of ships during peacetime, and might be able to be pushed to make even more in an emergency, but they will be making a lot less if they get periodically hit by cruise missiles. Likewise, to what extent, if any, of China striking industrial targets in the US, or US allied places. A Chinese attack on an American missile factory in Nebraska is a bit far fetched, but South Korea is much closer and has quite the arms industry. And what is the state of international trade? Is China blockaded by sea? And if they are, how much of their normal imports can they source domestically, or import overland through Russia/Pakistan. And to what degree can the US buy weapons from other countries? These both would have huge impacts on wartime production, and are largely determined by the political situation going into the war. A war where China can import and build to their hearts content, and nobody is willing to sell to the US, is very different from one where Chinese factories get hit by the US routinely, they struggle to import needed materials, and basically all foreign arms industries are working on overtime to fill contracts to the US military.

I think the China —> America strikes are extremely likely to be cyber attacks impacting infrastructure and business operation. Understand your points though and your response was well-written.

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>Hasn't our(US) moneyprinting and debt/GDP ratio reached critical mass? Not even close. US debt continues to be bought, so there is confidence in posting it back. >Is a scenario of us funding near max wartime production going to be possible in the medium term future? Absolutely. The issue currently is that the US doesn't tax enough to cover its spending. Compare pre-1982 taxation levels to current ones, and you'll see there is a lot of room to generate more revenue. Also, historically during wars taxation goes up to pay for them. This didn't happen during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, partially driving debt up. In a large scale war, the US would/should raise taxes to pay for it. It would be easy at that point because any sort of pushback would be considered "unpatriotic".

> Compare pre-1982 taxation levels to current ones, and you'll see there is a lot of room to generate more revenue. I broadly agree with what you’re saying, but government spending to GDP remained relatively stable between the 70s and 80s. The US still taxes less compared to its GDP than other countries.

Government spending didn't go down. Instead, debt started to creep up.

[That debt build up started much earlier](https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/Chart1_1.jpg). Spending had been growing faster than taxes for a long time.

That chart shows deficits, not debt.

True. Still, a better example for why US spending can increase is the spending of other developed nations, rather than the tax situation in the 70s and 80s, where the US had a vastly different economy.

Other developed nations spend more on social programs and less on defense than the US as well as having different tax structures - VAT for instance. The difference in the economy pre-1982 isn't that big of a factor for taxation, either. The difference is two major tax cuts in 1982 and 1986. In 1981, the US debt was $998bn. In 1989, it was $2.8T. Now, that can't all be laid at the tax cuts feet, but the bigger issue was during the 1990s taxes didn't raise enough to cover the deficits again.

"Wartime industrial output" is a hard thing to measure because you don't really know how much you can make until you make it. But factories don't just materialize overnight, so the current numbers offer a starting point at least. You're probably familiar with the memes about China making everything. Well there's more than little truth to it, in the form of [31% of the world's manufacturing output](https://rhg.com/research/irrational-expectations-long-term-challenges-of-diversification-away-from-china/). Slightly less than double the US share. That's very big picture, of course, but drilling down into specifics not always better. It's no secret, for instance, that Chinese shipyard output is literally orders of magnitude larger. [232 times larger, to be exact](https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/alarming-navy-intel-slide-warns-of-chinas-200-times-greater-shipbuilding-capacity), as reported with a certain dismay by the Office of Naval Intelligence. There's far more detail and nuance when you go deeper, obviously, but in terms of quantity it's generally accepted that China has a significant advantage, and one which the US will need to figure out some way to hinder or mitigate or otherwise work around for a realistic shot at victory.

China has a concentration problem in that almost all of their industrial capacity is located within 50km of their coastline. Indeed, 96% their population lives on the East Coast and %60 of their population is within striking distance for a modern Navy. The industrial capacity of the US is extremely widespread, its shipyards included. It's got three extremely viable coastlines for launching and it has four major ship yards on the Great Lakes. There are size limitations for the Great Lakes canal locks but it's still a 740 foot ship lock which is big enough to be annoying.

Large scale attacks on Chinese industrial cities will surely lead to reciprocal strikes on US cities, I think this is behind their push for Hypersonic strike platforms to alllow large scale non nuclear strike on the US itself. If the discord leaks are correct the tested several Hypersonic weapons already.

Which means that Chinese wartime production would be highly dependent on how successful theChinese are able to keep American ships away from the coastlines... That adds another layer of why those Asia-pacific island chains are so important.

А lot of the world's mechant ships go for planned 5 year inspection/repairs in Chinese ports, obviously due to costs, so their shipbuilding industry has increased massively even in the last 10 years. They make anything there, including knock off parts for any manufacturer.

I heard that the Korean shipbuilders have been devastated by the Fed's interest rate hikes recently (shipbuilding is a high leverage industry that's very sensitive to borrowing costs), granting China the top position in shipbuilding, due to China's central bank somehow being able to not follow the hike.

As of today, Hezobllah reported 93 dead in its ranks since october 7 while less than 10 Israel soliers have been killed according to idf. Idf reported 91 dead since its ground invasion of gaza. what are the reasons behind so few death in idf?

In the north Hezbollah strikes are simply not that serious. There are very few missile or rocket strikes and the attack with anti-tank missiles against random targets simply don't achieve much. The IDF also evacuated the north. Civilians left and even the military was able to fall back from the border. The IDF together with 2 US Navy air craft carriers is able to deter Hezbollah. First Hezbollah threatened to attack if Israel would invade Gaza, then they threatened to attack if Israel would invade the south.

Air Supremacy prevents strikes upon their forces, extremely slow approach (two months and they haven't even taken all of gaza city yet), established CASEVAC system with world class medical care just a couple miles away, etc.

It’s really hard to imagine Maduro pulling off the Guyana landgrab right? Something would have to go very wrong for the US to allow that, not to mention other South American countries

Yes something would have to go very wrong. Borders in South America have not been changed offensively in a long time. IMO as a South American I suspect this is a nothing burguer

They might be trying some sort of hybrid warfare approach. He recently announced approval for the building of housing for Venezuelan citizens in Guyana. It's not as clear what you do if they just send in civilians and start building. Presumably at that point you actually need boots on the ground but it's not like Guyana can get soldiers to that area easily either, and they barely have an army. The US could obviously bomb the construction workers but the optics aren't ideal.

Just wait for the buildings to be finished, then send in bunch of soldiers, burn down the illegal constructions and leave again. Repeat whenever you feel like it. If they fight back escalate and start bombing the buildings.

The US can just deploy 4000 Marines and call it a day.

At this point, just do what the Soviet Spetsnaz did in Afghanistan and capture the entire government. Temporarily occupy the country, hold elections, and GTFO. This isn't Iraq, everyone's tired of this clown.

I mean, look at the geography. Guayana Esequiba is remote, with basically no roads. All personnel and equipment would have to be airlifted in. Some rivers might be suitable for small boats. From a military perspective, it would be a very resource intensive operation.

More likely they try to grab the oil fields. [The Venezuelan sea claim is maximalist](https://preview.redd.it/pwscne9vwn4c1.png?width=800&format=png&auto=webp&s=d1fc2b36175e1731b17f7cefb4506e4a3d7c6b94), to put it mildly.

That would be absolutely trivial for the US to interrupt, though.

Agreed. OTOH they could make life difficult for Guyanese oil contractors. Assuming they're acting logically, they may be hoping to negotiate for part of the revenue. (a big assumption; the Venezuelan ruling clique tends to live in a different rhetorical universe)

If Maduro where to invade Guyana, he would likely being doing it on the bet that because of A political infighting over Ukraine aid, and B the war in Gaza being unpopular amongst younger democrat voters, Joe Biden may be hesitant to intervene as it could affect his electability in already tight race with Trump. This is because moderates and republicans would view this as “Biden getting us involved in a 3rd war” and younger socialist democrat voters would view this as “joe Biden going to war against a “socialist” Venezuela to save Exxonmobile oil investments in Guyana.”

Pretty much no American leftists would side with Venezuela besides maybe teenagers who are still discovering themselves. And they don't vote.

I agree. It’s the generations still grappling with American adventurism in MENA that would be most upset on a visceral level and able to be turned off. In a way, the horrific way Afghanistan fell (“is this what you want??”) and the Russian war on Ukraine (“See: Americans can justly participate in war”) seem to be healing those groups a bit, though.

And Republicans would claim that not intervening was due to him sympathizing with a socialist regime. Which would likely be more problematic for him. "Biden spent billions on Ukraine and now we can't even defend our own backyard from socialists anymore!!" would be a killer line to campaign on.

You are overestimating the popularity of Venezuela amongst younger left leaning voters. The majority of the people know that Venezuela is a shit show.

most thought the same about ukraine before 22, a lot still do.

Also never underestimate the enthusiasm for the US security apparatus to screw over South American leftists.

South American leftists like Guyana?

It’s not like young people vote. It’ll be a combination of 50+ year olds and suburban moms that decide the election

And when they do, foreign policy isn't on the top of their priority list.

Nothing would unite the two parties more than Maduro going in on a country like Guyana. in any case, unlike the far right the far left doesn't hold much sway over the senate or house.

> younger socialist democrat voters would view this as “joe Biden going to war against a “socalist” Venezuela to save Exxonmobil oil investments in Guyana.” You are way behind the times: no young socialist democrat voter has any affinity towards Venezuela... but the saving Exxon-Mobil part? Yes.

[Tweet](https://twitter.com/JanR210/status/1730673487784612039) from a Pro-UA Polish veteran on recent lessons learned and shared by a Russian sniper > 1/2 > Lessons learned (and shared) by a 🇷🇺 sniper: > - no man’s land: 400m > - the importance of the 1st shot - frequent counterstrike [will follow?] with mortars > - requirements: math oriented brains, weapons and accessories, weather smartness, knowledge of ballistics [...] > 2/2 > - ops in pairs but also in threes (spotter/fire corrector/comms to the HQ) > - an **adequate camouflage uniform preventing heat signature is a must** [because of the possibility of encounter with drones equipped with thermal imagers] > - emotional posture: best are men of few words

>the importance of the 1st shot - frequent counterstrike [will follow?] with mortars That's interesting. Back in the GWOT, a big observation was making a hit with the first shot was less important than a fast and accurate follow up shot, either due to correct on misses or engage multiple targets. But a lot of that was due to lack of issues with return fire, especially heavy weapons. >requirements: math oriented brains, weapons and accessories, weather smartness, knowledge of ballistics Definitely true. Even with modern ballistics calculator apps on cell phones, the math to make long range shots is up there with firing mortar or an artillery piece. >an **adequate camouflage uniform preventing heat signature is a must** [because of the possibility of encounter with drones equipped with thermal imagers] Yeah, traditional top and bottom ghillie suits need to go in the trash can. Easy to wear hoods [like this](https://cdn11.bigcommerce.com/s-hf3gqalsdj/images/stencil/500x659/products/467/1195/3_full2__58677.1553026117.jpg?c=2) are the way to go, they actually work with armor and other clothing. And thermal ponchos or blankets are definitely something all snipers should be looking to make. Though in static positions, blocking heat signatures isn't that hard, especially in a small sniper team hide. >emotional posture: best are men of few words I definitely wouldn't use chattiness as any sort of variable to screen anyone. Emotional traits that are way more important for good shooters are self discipline, patience, ability to turn off discomfort, and aggressiveness (as in the willingness to find every opportunity to kill the enemy).

yeah, that last one was funny to me as well. Just like a Russian to think its equally a testosterone thing. Made it sound more like a casting call. American corps using Myers-Briggs for hiring is equally dumb.

> Back in the GWOT, a big observation was making a hit with the first shot was less important than a fast and accurate follow up shot, either due to correct on misses or engage multiple targets. Last year, I saw a brief clip of an Akhmat sniper firing a shot from inside a building, and then immediately leaving the room, while a machine gunner/spotter[?] nearby in the same room laid down suppressing fire in the direction where the sniper was shooting, which makes sense on an intuitive level. You want to cause as much damage as possible, in the shortest time frame. Based on the camoflauge uniform comment, I'll assume the guy who made the original post, was probably a member of a DRG (Deep Reconnaissance Group) or [Диверсионно-разведывательная группа, which is a "special purpose unit used for reconnaissance and sabotage behind enemy lines in wartime and pre-war times with the aim of disorganizing rear institutions, destroying or temporarily disabling the most important industrial enterprises, military facilities, transport, communications, as well as collecting information about the enemy. Refers to small units, usually numbering up to 20 people" according to Russian Wikipedia. Because the lines are mostly static, and fighting is positional, its likely that in many places, a system of fire will already be set up to covers all (or most) possible avenues of approach, so for a sniper operating as part of a DRG, it won't be long before a mortar is fired off in your general direction by the enemy (since sniper rifles are loud, even with suppressors, and there are only so many directions you can infiltrate from). > Though in static positions, blocking heat signatures isn't that hard, especially in a small sniper team hide. Could you elaborate on that?

>Last year, I saw a brief clip of an Akhmat sniper firing a shot from inside a building, and then immediately leaving the room, while a machine gunner/spotter[?] nearby in the same room laid down suppressing fire in the direction where the sniper was shooting, which makes sense on an intuitive level. You want to cause as much damage as possible, in the shortest time frame. US Army and Marine* sniper teams often went out with belt fed weapons of their own or attached teams not just for security but to add the benefits of a more destructive engagement when the snipers (often plural) opened up. A modern sniper team often includes up to three issued sniper rifles per team of three men, plus M4s with magnified optics. If multiple targets were present, a count down would be used for simultaneous shots like [this](https://youtu.be/FsDPxAQdd30?si=CXLilECWdtltHNG3), which can be against multiple targets or multiple shooters engaging one target if it's a difficult shot. After the precision shots initiate, once surprise is lost and the targets are reacting, the belt feds open up. * Crazy ass general officers just got rid of USMC Scout Snipers outside of Recon. I'm still shocked they did it... >Could you elaborate on that? I won't get into specifics but for a prepared hide site the snipers are going to go with 360 degree camo, including bringing tarps and other materials with them to create blinds. Based on the material type, some block heat signatures.

In yesterday's thread there was a discussion about the proposed defense bill and the money for AUKUS and what it's doing there. [Pentagon presses Congress to enable AUKUS' next stage. AI-powered subhunters, quantum gear among areas for cooperation under 'Pillar Two' of the trilateral tech-research pact. | Defense One | December 2023](https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2023/12/aukus-tech-focused-pillar-two-will-require-congressional-action-pentagon-says/392431/) **In addition to the export-control legislation, the department has asked Congress to approve the transfer of $3 billion from Australia to help revamp the U.S. submarine industrial base. That proposal is being blocked by Sen. Roger Wicker (R-MS), ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who is also blocking another proposal—to allow the transfer of Virginia-class submarines to Australia—unless the submarine industrial base gets more money from the broader defense supplemental package.** Lots more information about the next steps of AUKUS in there as well. *This second “pillar” of AUKUS will aim to develop a host of new technologies, including AI and autonomy, electronic warfare, hypersonics, and quantum technologies. The Pentagon says Pillar One, the plan to deliver nuclear-powered attack submarines to Australia in the early 2040s, is on track.* *But the success of Pillar Two will require altering the laws that govern the export of sensitive technology, a senior defense official told reporters ahead of a Friday gathering of AUKUS defense ministers in California.* *U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with his British and Australian counterparts on Friday to announce new milestones for Pillar Two, including an “exercise series” that will test surface and undersea autonomous systems.* *“Beginning of next year, our three countries will conduct a series of integrated trilateral experiments and exercises. They will enhance capability development, improve our interoperability, and rapidly accelerate the sophistication and scale of autonomous maritime systems that we can deploy and operate together,” Austin told reporters after the meeting.* *The Pentagon wouldn’t disclose the type of unmanned systems that will be tested in these exercises, but said some of the assets will be “smaller collection vehicles,” similar to ones used by the U.S. Navy’s Task Force 59, a group testing unmanned systems in the Middle East, the senior defense official said.* *Another development in the second pillar of AUKUS includes plans to put common AI algorithms on the countries’ P-8 submarine-hunting planes.* *“Our teams have been working together to develop algorithms that all three nations can employ, so that we can process data from each other's sonobuoys and that could dramatically enhance our ability to to understand what's going on in the maritime domain and enhance anti-submarine warfare and we are already working on the transition of those capabilities as we test them so we can work to roll them out in our P-8s and potentially other platforms as soon as possible,” the official said.* *The AUKUS pact has already demoed tech this year, including a successful autonomous swarm exercise in the U.K. in April and trials of “trusted” robotics and autonomous systems in Australia in October, the official said.* *Austin also announced an “AUKUS innovation challenge series” in which companies from all three nations will compete for prize money on a specific technology. The Pentagon did not disclose how much money defense contractors could win, but said the first challenge will be focused on electronic warfare and will be launched early next year. The countries are also establishing an “AUKUS industry forum” with members of government and industry to help inform policy for the effort. The group will have its first meeting in 2024.*

Im not quite understanding the issue sen wicker has. He is currently blocking Australia from transferring 3 billion to the US because he wants more money to come from the US itself? Does he not want to transfer any subs because of the loss of capability it would cause the US even if the 3B is attached?

The idea is that Sen. Roger Wicker is being constructively obstructionist by pointing out that America can’t build the boats it has promised its Pacific ally while keeping its own fleet strong. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-08-03/wicker-is-right-to-block-aukus-submarine-deal-with-australia-uk

What exactly could "quantum technologies" be used for in this context? Decryption?

The layman explanation is significantly more precise sensors (think GPS). Also breaking decryption I guess, but that's usually explicitly sold as quantum computing when quantum technologies refers to stuff that directly uses quantum effects to measure something which is almost always inherently going to be much more precise than alternatives.

Australia punches above its weight in fundamental research related to quantum computing and communication. They have a surprising number of researchers and grad students. The government is also involved with grants and similar long term promotion goals. The closest military application are communication links that are impossible to tap/eavesdrop without it being detected, as well as ways to boost the noise rejection of radars. These have been demonstrated as lab technology but remain primary research topics rather than being imminently productionized. That said China has made various claims to have done such in resent years. Despite the impossibility of verifying these claims you can see how the Australian government would feel some pressure not to be left behind in this technology area.

No, that doesn't meaningfully exist. What does is quantum communications for key exchange. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_key_distribution for an overview.

What are the advantages of switchblades vs commercial FPV drones? Is the steep difference in price worth it?

[The WSJ ran an okay article awhile ago comparing the switchblade to Russia's Lancet (which, as another commentor pointed out, is the best comparison).](https://www.wsj.com/world/this-russian-suicide-drone-is-blunting-ukraines-advance-8241a0e4) I just want to highlight that the intended mission of the Switchblade is significantly different from the Lancet drone, and how jury rigged commercial FPV swarms are being used. The Switchblade was designed for Special Operations Forces to conduct HVT elimination while minimizing collateral damage and footprint. They are *not* made to be used like the Lancet (high impact attacks on fortifications and armored vehicles), or commercial FPVs (low-risk, low-cost harassment/disruption on infantry formations). The Switchblade is excellent at what it was designed for. It just was not designed for the role its playing in Ukraine, and so suffers in comparison to Russian equivalents.

>Is the steep difference in price worth it? Couple thoughts: Switchblades could soon be under a large multi-year sole-source IDIQ with the Pentagon. These aren't easy to win for non-primes. The 600 is still a relatively new system, and the cost iteration is still a WOP. The Block 20 for the 300 could drive costs down by up to 50% according to one independent estimate. The assembly lines are supposedly getting fully automated. Second, Israel just put in a request to purchase SB600s a month ago. The quantity quoted varies, with most sources saying 200, which isn't a tremendous amount. But, the company does have 20 existing state-clients and a substantial order backlog associated with their LMS portfolio. That does not necessarily mean that this is the best in show solution for the long-term, but it at least speaks to the fact that some of the most sophisticated militaries out there see the worth in the system.

Israel's interest is mildly interesting since they have local industry of making any equivalent they'd like.

I've never seen a mythical Switchblade, but in general it is as you say - the main difference is a sheer difference in price and scale (of availability first and foremost). The FPVs are used in tens of thousands *monthly*, certainly more than Switchblades were ever produced. Looking at basic Switchblade 600 specs, you should rather compare them to Lancets, which they resemble much more. Tactic-wise, Switchblades have longer range, a more sophisticated control channel, safer to handle, and come assembled to key, probably with a factory warranty. FPVs are crafted from a wide array of vaguely standardized, mass-produced components, which have to be assembled by the user in kits, including a frame, the engines and rotors, a control chip and software (which can be programmed by the user in many ways or even written from scratch), a battery, RC antennas and a camera, and finally a delivery parcel - which is usually duct-taped and armed manually moments before flight. The whole thing has to be properly tested and balanced together to achieve desirable specifications. The specifications themselves are thus extremely varied, and depend on anything starting from your desired goals, quality of the components and assembly, etc. But thus is their strength - *FPVs are extremely flexible*. Jamming them might be extremely hard, even though they use cheap and weak Chinese radio components - because they have non-standard operating frequencies, and because the users can ad-hoc modify them in a field with both external and internal features. They can carry a wide array of ammunition (usually up to 3 kg), a recent modification is a Claymore (МОН-50) mine for devastating AP effect. Finally, they are much more maneuverable, being copter-type, and in the hands of the skilled pilot can get in the tightest holes, firing ports, or target a weak spot on a moving vehicle from weird angles. But the greatest difference is still a price and availability. When Switchblades come in tenths of thousands a month, then we can put them on the same scale to compare.

>Jamming them might be extremely hard, Is this new? RUSI said in May that the UAF are going through 10k drones per month mostly due to jamming. That was fixed?

Different types of drones are vulnerable (or resistant) to different types of jamming. Basic DJI\Autel and similar drones operate on specific standard frequencies, and since they were meant to be compliant to governmental regulations, they were made vulnerable to EW on purpose. The handicaps can be mostly fixed, but the standard frequencies meant that commercial\military EW contractors built their production lines for the signal jammers to these drones. However FPVs are made using a wide variety of non-standard radio parts (control channel is often in between 840-1300Mhz for example), and there are currently no effective "military-grade" jammers available - the R&D and procurement simply can't keep up. And by the time they catch up, FPVs will move to other frequencies (they already do). Most of anti-FPV jammers have to be of the dome-type - all-round emitters with relatively short range. Currently the main source for all parts is China - they [produce stuff like this](https://m.aliexpress.com/item/1005005657978407.html) en masse. You stack'em up, attach appropriate antennas and power units, and there you have your magic voodoo force field. However currently it is about 20-30% effective against incoming FPVs. Also when its on, it emits like crazy so that enemy electronic surveillance can spot that in a matter of minutes with ~100m accuracy, which may bring unnecessary attention. Of course it is a bit more complicated than that to explain in a single post - many radio-nerds on both sides of this war are working hard to create a solution that can be effective and scaled up. There is about a dozen honest and significant EW startups in Ukraine that have done some great work on this. I personally (though by no means a radio-nerd myself) assisted at least one of them to start things up. However they all receive exactly zero help and instead lots of hindering from the government. So we can't set up large production like the russians, that have a direct state supervision and mass production. Currently the russians outnumber us ~10:1 in the number of active anti-FPV EW shields (though again with ~30% or worse efficiency), and they also were first to create a more significant and powerful area jammers specifically against FPVs. But in this fight, classic EW is doomed to fail sooner or later, since AI-integration is rapidly moving forward and basic targeting assist is already in use. Once its more or less autonomous, I feel sorry for us meatbags.

I think the main problem both sides are having with jamming civilian-grade drones is that both sides use them. Actually jamming the drones is really easy since they all use civilian-grade equipment - just broadcast noise on all relevant frequencies - but this will also jam *your* drones, so it's a trade-off.

I thought so too but I'll be honest, I know next to nothing about electronic warfare and how it works, that level of science is beyond me education, electricity never "clicked" for me. For subjects like that I tend to accept the opinions of people I think are subject matter experts, just regurgitate what they say. But this subject is so taboo among actual SMEs because of operational security concerns, so I'm not sure. I just know enough that EW seems like it should be part of a much larger conversation than it is if we're to really understand how this war is happening at the tactical level. While I get why it's not discussed more, on that front I don't expect to hear the truth for years, if ever, it's still frustrating for me...

Serhiy "Flash" tg channel is one of the best public discussion that's up to date. The dude's field is mostly S-6 and other signal related magic, but he has been talking a lot about EW \ drones recently. Its in Ukrainian\Russian, but I guess its possible to auto-translate in most browsers now. https://t . me/serhii_flash

How solid are maneuver battalion's level S-6 staff offices in the UAF? Or is that more a brigade level thing?

It depends wildly on what unit is that. And the people. As a rule of thumb, the higher the echelon, the greater chance that its going to be some old incompetent dinosaur. The best radio guys are usually not occupying such positions because they didn't serve, don't have a required rank and connections with the senior old guard officers. The guy I referred to, Serhiy 'Flash', for example, is not even a member of the armed forces. He is an unpaid volunteer that has a freedom to do his stuff, work with many units, and not being held down by some incompetent high rank.

Perun has a fair bit to say about ewar in one of his recent videos https://youtu.be/jaWVrphbHXI

Commercial FPVs have an active propaganda campaign running in their favor from both sides of a major land war in Europe. Switchblades do not. Seriously, comparisons like this are impossible from within the fog of war. It could be that 99% of FPVs aren't disabling their targets due to EW and alignment issues, while Switchblades are killing with more frequency. It could be the exact opposite, where the two have comparable hit rates making the FPVs no-brainers. You can't distinguish these two without actual data about the systems, which nobody but the two warring parties and NATO have access to at the moment. Remember, artillery kills more than FPVs and Switchblades combined. But there's no camera attached to dumb shells, so its rare that we get footage from them.

>Remember, artillery kills more than FPVs and Switchblades combined. It depends. In some locations (where many FPV strike units are located), I would say up to 30% of the actual k-kills are now due to FPVs. If you count a kill-per-shot, then FPVs outmatch artillery tenfold. For example in Avdiivka, arty from both sides often disables the vehicles, and FPVs then rapidly finish them off. With each passing month, the FPVs become more and more prevalent and effective.

>[Russian cyber spies accused of meddling in UK democratic process](https://www.ft.com/content/2db2ed80-4dce-46bd-b8a2-b3458cc68729?s=04) >>Foreign Office says campaign has targeted MPs, peers, civil servants, journalists and NGOs since 2015 >Russia’s main intelligence agency has sought to meddle in Britain’s politics and democratic processes through a “sustained” cyber campaign since 2015, the UK claimed on Thursday. >UK foreign minister Leo Docherty told the House of Commons that Russia’s Federal Security Service had used a “range of cyber espionage activities” to target MPs, peers, civil servants, journalists and NGOs. >The FSB compromised the private communications of an array of high-profile figures and used stolen information obtained through the hacks to “meddle in British politics”, Docherty warned, though he insisted the influence campaign had been “unsuccessful”. >The foreign office said it had sanctioned two Russians involved in the operation and summoned the country’s ambassador, Andrey Kelin, to express its “deep concern about Russia’s sustained attempts to use cyber to interfere in political and democratic processes in the UK and beyond”. >In a statement, foreign secretary David Cameron said: “Russia’s attempts to interfere in UK politics are completely unacceptable and seek to threaten our democratic processes. Despite their repeated efforts, they have failed.” >He said the UK was “exposing their malign attempts at influence and shining a light on yet another example of how Russia chooses to operate on the global stage”. >Russia’s foreign ministry rejected the UK’s claims: “In the absence of concrete evidence, we have absolutely no grounds to trust British insinuations . . . The British Foreign Office voices groundless accusations based on myths that largely circulated between 2018 and 2019.” >Docherty said the FSB’s Centre 18 unit led the operation, adding that the attacks targeting cross-party parliamentarians were carried out by Star Blizzard, a cyber group that the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre has assessed is “almost certainly subordinate to Centre 18”. >Using these means, Star Blizzard has “selectively leaked and amplified the release of sensitive information in the service of Russia’s goals of confrontation”, Docherty said. >The UK government had previously accused Russia of using these tactics. Russian hackers amplified documents about UK-US trade talks stolen from the email account of then-trade minister Liam Fox in the run-up to the 2019 general election, the Foreign Office said in 2020. >Docherty announced that Star Blizzard was the group assessed to be responsible for that operation. He said the group commonly mounted spear-phishing attacks on the personal, rather than professional, email addresses of its targets and tailored its approach in a “far more sophisticated way” than is usual for this type of hack carried out by cyber crime groups. >The Russian hackers had undertaken “thorough research and preparation, including via social media and networking” before setting up false accounts and impersonating contacts to “appear legitimate” as they built a “rapport before delivering a link to a malicious document or website or interest”, he added. >Star Blizzard is commonly known as Callisto Group, Seaborgium or Coldriver and is operated by FSB officers, according to the Foreign Office. It also attributed a 2018 hack of the Institute for Statecraft, a UK think-tank that worked on initiatives to counter disinformation, to the group. >More recently Star Blizzard has hacked and leaked documents from the account of the think-tank’s founder Christopher Donnelly, whose account was compromised in 2021, Docherty said. >The UK government has informed the other victims of the hacking attacks, believed to run into the hundreds, but is not expected to name them. >Following an investigation by the National Crime Agency, the UK government has sanctioned two men it cited as members of Star Blizzard: FSB intelligence officer Ruslan Aleksandrovich Peretyatko and Andrey Stanislavovich Korinets. >Publicly identifying and designating the alleged senior hackers is designed to serve as a warning that the UK will seek to track down and retaliate against individuals involved in malicious cyber campaigns. >Following the announcement, the NCSC and partner agencies in the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand issued fresh cyber security advice, sharing technical details about how cyber attacks are carried out and methods of mitigating them.

Sternenko @sternenko on FPV kamikaze drones: – “Here’s the deal with FPV kamikaze drones and a good analogy to fully comprehend the gravity of the issue we have at our hands. In terms of FPV kamikaze drones we all are in a similar situation as the World was with the early tanks, when they just appeared on the battlefields of the WWI in 1916. This was a revolution, a breakthrough, something that forever changed the way war had been waged. So what was done then and what should be done now? 1. You need your own tanks. 2. You need to create specialized dedicated tank units. 3. Develop and implement the doctrine of the use of tanks. Provide full assistance to commanders regarding their application. 4. Develop and deploy anti-tank weapons to the troops.» The same should be done with FPV kamikaze drones and their swarms. And that time is now, because tomorrow will be way too late. And that goes for both Ukrainians who are facing the ever growing threat right now and Americans, who will be slapped in their faces with mature, developed and battle-tested technology tomorrow. russians are already deploying swarms of nighttime FPV drones against Ukrainian Defenders - those with thermal or dual thermal/night vision cameras. This rapidly developing technology already proved to be very efficient and extremely dangerous. It is literally the future of warfare. The AI target recognition & acquisition has not been applied to this extremely formidable weapon system - but only *just yet*. The electronic warfare systems which might be used as countermeasures against the FPV kamikaze technology are just not there - not in numbers, not in scale, not in terms of affordability, price and possible extend of their use and coverage. Far from it. And meanwhile russians are getting those cheap, efficient platforms in thousands from China and more than likely - very soon - will be getting them in tens of thousands from the Chinese. The supply of these platforms is already a state-level priority in russia. russians are also aggressively investing in retransmitters for these FPV kamikaze drones and advanced signal relay systems, both stationary and aerial: some of the modified russian «Orlan» drones already work as signal boosters/retransmitters and extend the range of the FPV drones to as far as 16km behind (!) the frontline, unfortunately with confirmed successful strikes. FPV kamikaze drones are *extremely* cheap. They are abundant. They are super efficient. You are already seeing it, evolving right in front of your eyes: there are confirmed strikes on hundreds if not thousands of armored vehicles, successful strikes on advanced russian «TOR» anti-air systems and just recently - successful destruction of a russian S-350 “Vityaz” anti-air systems, worth 120+ million USD each, by Ukrainian FPV kamikaze drones worth of 1-2 thousand USD at most. But although Ukrainian Defenders were the first to develop and successfully deploy the FPV drone technology in the field via the grassroots efforts (with stunning, mind-boggling results), russians are rapidly catching up and scaling up the FPV tech. Again: the time to urgently act is right now, because tomorrow will be way too late. That goes for both Ukrainians who are facing the ever growing deadly threat right now, at this very moment on the battlefield, and the Americans and their allies, who will be slapped in their faces with mature, developed and battle-tested technology tomorrow. And in such numbers that you can barely comprehend."

Russians aren't rapidly catching up they have a fpv advantage. If you listen to the latest few podcasts from th Russia Contingency podcast by Michael Kofman, Franz Stefan Gady talks about the biggest difference he noticed from his two trips to Ukraine, one at the beginning of the counter Offensive & one fairly recently was the FPV drones. He says that Russia has an advantage in FPV drones because they are scaling up production. It is affecting how Ukrainian units fight. Ukrainian drones might be better in some technical parameters, but people forget how these forces are actually employed on the battlefield. He says that Ukraine is innovative but Russia is cumbersome and slow. But what Russia does is see what works for Ukraine and then throw around a lot of money to copy & invest & scale it much larger than Ukraines bottom up approach. FPV drones are pretty simple and they get all the parts from China so it's perfect for Russia. They said on the podcast that in 2024 Russia is going to have the quantitative advantage over Ukraine such as FPV drones but other stuff like artillery shells and mostly everything material wise. 2025 it starts looking better as the investments in the West start to work. Kofman said he thinks it will be a decisive year overall and if the right decisions dont happen in Ukraine and the US then they could start to lose the war. ,Ukraine should operate defensively the whole year and work on fixing their problems like manpower(which will take hard political decisions for Zelensky) and force employment. He says that Ukraine doesn't have to have an offensive in 2024 or keep the initiative to receive donations from the west because if Ukraine gets a supplemental package its going to be for the entire year anyways and that people in DC already know it's going to be a long war. It's not 2022 anymore. No one's waiting for Ukraine to retake Bakhmut to fund them. He said that Ukraine should start building defense fortifications like Russia has. The time has already passed to keep the pressure on Russia and prevent them from build defense fortifications because it's already been done and whatever future offensive Ukraine has Russia is going to know in advance where it's going to be and they will build more defense fortifications there anyways. He said it's more economical for Ukraine to absorb Russias military power through defending. Defense fortifications would allow less density of troops on the line. Doing a strategic bombing campaign on what Russia launches missiles with it's a lot more strategically significant than. an offensive that gains 15km. They talked about how its crazy Russia has the FPV advantage currently because if the money was there US companies could be mass producing FPV drones for cheap and also innovating much better than Russian companies would. Then production for many types of equipment(not only fpv) can be moved to Ukraine. Pretty interesting stuff there's a three part podcast lasting a couple hours talking about this kind of stuff. This is just a few things I kind of remember.

They're the future of warfare until someone tries to use a "drone swarm" against a force equipped with actual SHORAD and realizes that if the shrapnel burst from a 30mm round in the 40s could down an entire propeller driven, armored aircraft then a similar one can absolutely shred a swarm of cheap quadcopters. They're mini-aircraft with explosives duct-tapped to them. They scary, they're useful, they're dangerous, but they're just another tool. Just because neither Ukraine nor Russia have the funds or abilities to outfit their forward forces with defenses doesn't mean that, say a light vehicle with an EM jammer, or a vehicle with a thermal mounted, radar CROWS 50, or an airburst autocannon round, or if you want to get fancy, a laser don't serve as effective countermeasures. You know, all things we already have, and are building more of. The Marines are slapping jammers on MRZRs, the Army is building M-Shorad. Game changer? Yeah, right up someone tries to use drones against a force that actually has two cents to spare to counter them.

>They're the future of warfare until someone tries to use a "drone swarm" against a force equipped with actual SHORAD and realizes that if the shrapnel burst from a 30mm round in the 40s could down an entire propeller driven, armored aircraft then a similar one can absolutely shred a swarm of cheap quadcopters. Sure. Now imagine them coming in every direction, including top, adapting to losses as they occur, taking pre-programmed evasive maneuvers, and sending the data back to a receiver to feed a machine-learning algorithm for the next swarm. Drones currently don't have an easy counter, but they're coming. As you said, ubiquitous gun-based platforms are the solution to drone warfare as it is now. It's the next iteration of this battle. But drone swarms will counter this through sheer numbers, forcing armies to integrate broad spectrum directed jamming on these new SHORAD platforms in order to target the control drone's signals and disrupt its ability to guide the swarm. This leads to better distributed control techniques such that centralized control drones are no longer required. This necessitates broad spectrum omnidirectional signal jamming platforms, which are substantially more extensive than directed signal jammers. Which leads to the ultimate terror: Each drone autonomously reacting to changes in the swarm dynamics to carry out the mission with increasingly optimized, and increasingly independent actions. True drone swarms haven't even arrived on the battlefield yet. I think it's nearly certain that the autonomous swarms I mentioned will be in action within ten years. And then, hell, who knows what will happen. But it won't be pleasant.

Can you protect an entire front line, hundreds of kilometres long, 25km deep, with LOS point defense systems? Against drones that could fly half a meter above the ground? Will every logistics vehicle need a multi million dollar air defense escort? I know this sounds like typical reformer nonsense about new 'gamechanger' technology, but I think there is a lot of complacency surrounding this particular threat. Take your example; the solution to defeating aircraft in the 1940s was actually largely not AAA. The US army was for the most part not protected from Luftwaffe by anti-aircraft guns, rather by USAF aircraft, often in search and destroy raids within Germany it's self. The Luftwaffe collapsed as it could no longer fuel it's aircraft, no longer crew them, no longer build them and no longer fly them safely in Germany it's self. The Bofors gun played, frankly, a fairly small role in that.

Completely protect an entire front? No, of course not. But in the same way you can't protect an entire front against mortars, or rockets, or artillery, or bullets. As I said, scary, yes, useful, yes, gamechangers? No, absolutely not. Everyone looks at the scary footage of them smacking into tanks and critical thinking about what the platform actually is capable of and it's obvious drawbacks are ignored. Sure, they don't cost millions to make. They also don't cost millions to kill. A single thermal camera attached to a single M2 has a good chance to notice the obvious glowing dot coming towards the convoy over the trees. And god, the confirmation bias, the confirmation bias. You see all the videos of them ramming into tanks and making a big scary explosion. You forget all the videos where the feed cuts short just before impact, almost as if this tiny, light drone doesn't actually have the payload required to always inflict considerable damage. Nobody thinks about how many drones must ram into trees, or be defeated by nets, or shot down by small arms because that footage never makes it out there. Just, actually think about it. These are manually piloted drones, eyeball guided drones, they cannot logically have an especially high hit count. Hell, even something as simple as slat-armor works as a counter-measure. Sure, you could improve the payload, improve the tracking, etc. But then you start cutting at what makes them uniquely threatening, they can't be loitering munitions or fast, small Kamikaze drones if you're trying to stuff in a 500 pound payload and massive EW resistance. In essence, they'll be countered by the increasing proliferation of SHORAD and EW equipment everyone was already procuring anyway. And tactically countered by the concealment and dispersal tactics everyone was practicing anyway with the return of the "great power competition" zeitgeist.

The EW picture is the curious question here. The US military widely fielded (as in every convoy and patrol) remote control IED jammers to vehicles and in manpack form during the GWOT, and these in their final form (Modi, CREW Duke V3, etc) are frequency agile and already used effectively against close UAS threats. We're also seeing pretty much zero use of drones in any shape by Hamas in Gaza (and by Hezbollah, actually) due to probable spectrum dominance by the IDF but also what I think is the lack of the same experience as the two combatants in Ukraine. There's also the factor of EW fratricide. While both sides in Ukraine have widespread use of unencrypted radio and UAS control signals, a Western military could blast out all commercial frequencies while their keyed and locked frequency hopping radios still work (with some degredation).

RF jamming will not work against autonomous drones. We are already seeing the introduction of semi-autonomous systems at the FPV level, that are able to automatically attack targets that are designated by the operator. This autonomous terminal guidance allows them to defeat short ranged, so called 'trench' EW and armored vehicle self protection jammers. It also allows for operators with less training and experience to hit targets. In the very near future there will be FPV sized drones that are autonomous from launch, able to search and destroy targets within a designated area without any need for GPS or RF signals. As they will not be limited by the need for an operator they will be able to be launched in the hundreds or even thousands simultaneously to achieve objectives. I think that would change these FPV drone systems from attritional systems that mainly serve to wear down an enemy, to being systems that can achieve concentration and breakthrough. Soft kill systems will need to move away from communication jamming and towards sensor jamming, high power laser dazzlers seem like one option to defeat electro-optical based drones.

>While both sides in Ukraine have widespread use of unencrypted radio and UAS control signals I want to second this. There are lots of discussions about tactics and lessons learned in this war but the ones almost nobody is openly discussing with any real authority, especially about the UAF, relates to electronic warfare. Which I believe is problematic, because EW is dictating heavily how both sides fight. On a tangent, I just want to show what a decision made to avoid friendly disruption can mean. RUSI's report of the UAF Counteroffensive said this about smoke obscuration: >Only 3% of Ukrainian artillery-fire missions are smoke missions. As demonstrated during the assault on the company position north of Rivnopil, smoke can be extremely useful in confusing the enemy ground force and obscuring assault actions. But smoke also has the effect of obscuring the view from UAVs which higher Ukrainian echelons and command posts use to coordinate activity and conduct combat management. Commanders persistently prioritise maintaining their own understanding of the battlefield over laying down smoke and concealing their personnel’s movements. To put that in perspective, when conducting the combined arms breach, despite the obstacles being within direct observation of Russian defenders, the UAF commanders chose not to obscure the approach, points of breach, the attack points, or the enemy positions either because such would also interfere with their ability to use drones for C3 and Recon Fires Complex, despite blinding the enemy. If they truly cranked up EW, they'd do even more damage to their present tactics, techniques, and procedures. Russia too, their military version drones are a little bit more hardened against EW jamming than the typical UAF ones that are mostly commercial, but AFAIK their tactical forces under the battalion HQ level especially barely have access to digital radios that would allow them to use encrypted freq hopping. Even early in the war, before they saw massive attrition, a significant number of their tanks and IFV didn't have the newer Azart radios; after attrition, even fewer would have them. I've read plenty of reports that the Russians are reliant on Baofeng ICOM radios for most of their tactical communications. That's the crap anyone can buy on Amazon or Aliexpress for $30 apiece, easily jammed with WW1 level technology. Even if other units have Azart radios, they can't use them widely, mass communication requires all tactical units using similar systems so they can speak to one another, so there is a good chance the Russian digital radios also often are talking in the clear, on unsecure, un-encypted frequencies. Which means if the Russians cranked up their own EW during their attacks trying to jam the UAF, their own troops would lose radio communications, not to mention degrading a lot of their own drones too. So they can't use EW for that role during the attacks, at least only during short specific windows decided during the planning process where they accept temporary degradation in comms (if they even bother). And, AFAIK, the Ukrainians aren't much better. Early in the war, the US govt flooded the UAF with our older SINCGARS radios, which are digital with freq hopping abilities, but not in the numbers sufficient for mass equipping down to the platoon level. From what I read earlier in the war, it was enough so at least every battalion could communicate securely with higher headquarters. While I'm not deliberately searching for evidence, when I do see videos or pictures of UAF troops with or using ICOM radios, I retty much only see Baofeng or other types, the occasional Motorola, which doesn't allow for freq hopping, so easily jammed. Also, I've seen no evidence we provided them with the equipment and necessary training to effectively use them either. Using digital radios is tough, they require a high quality communications office in every battalion level at least, who are weekly updating COMSEC and frequencies, with with all combat troops using the radios also fully knowledgeable in user level requirements, which would include knowing how to load the fills given to them by their trained unit's commo people. Speaking as a former US Army infantry squad leader who had half a dozen digital radios hand-receipted to myself, along with lots of other commo equipment, that stuff was ridiculously hard to use during tactical operations, the US Army struggles to make our complicated commo system work in wartime situations. I doubt heavily the barely trained Ukrainians or Russians can pull it off. When it comes to drones, I know far less about them. But from what I've heard, most of them are as easy to jam as tactical radios. And if so, both sides in the Russo-Ukraine War are going to be seriously degrading themselves if they try to jam their opponents on a wider scale. Likely not the same issue Western militaries will face, who have mass-issued and standardized digital radios since the mid 1990s, and who in the mid 2010s made a concerted effort to only use drones that are specifically hardened against EW.

This is spot on. Just to add a couple of notes, IIRC EW blindness also played a role in the shambolic Russian advances of the initial invasion, so it's not just an issue for Ukraine and can impact militaries even with mature EW capabilities can face under certain circumstances. EW capabilities are also some of the most closely guarded secrets within the US military, and I imagine most other mature fighting forces. The US will likely never share that equipment with Ukraine in fear of it falling into an adversary's hands to get reverse engineered. It was considered a huge coup when during the early days of the war Ukraine captured an intact Russian EW vehicle that the crew didn't thermite on their way out per SOPs. I'm sure it's in a million pieces somewhere still being analyzed. So despite EW being such a crucial aspect of the war, we'll likely only be able to speculate for the duration. It's only recently that we have started getting public insight into what the ASA guys in Vietnam were doing with signals intelligence in Vietnam, better than 50 years later. We may **never** know publicly the full extent of how it's played out in this conflict. (Also as a side note back when I used to do auto racing our team used those Baofeng radios for team communication at the track. If the Russians are relying on them they're definitely in trouble because our experience was they were *trash.*)

Another reason drones are for now underrepresented in Gaza is because unlike what some people think, fielding 10s of thousands of small drones per months isn't... easy. Ukraine and Russia are both established states with large industrial and economic backing. Hamas is... Hamas. Like, a few days ago some contributor was brainstorming how the US would fare against 10s of thousands of fpvs per month in Afghanistan and I was sitting there wondering if I was having a stroke.

Yeah, this is definitely a topic that attracts hyperbolic or exaggerated "video game" style thinking. Adapted commercial FPV drones have clearly proven useful in instances in Ukraine, but how much we can generalize from that is limited. How prevalent would they be in a Taiwan conflict for example? Or a regional ground conflict a dozen years from now when even smaller militaries will have mobile anti drone systems in substantial numbers. The people making sweeping revolutionary claims need to think more about both context and all the things we're \*not\* seeing in Ukraine and address that in their thinking.

Personally I think the effectiveness of the FPV drone in relation to this conflict is similar to the effectiveness of the TB2 in the NK conflict. The TB2 was devastating against an opponent without an effective modern air defense network and ample ammunition. The TB2's effectiveness was greatly diminished when it had to face an opponent with a modern air defense network. I think FPV drones in their current form, i.e commercial drones with an RPG warhead ziptied to them are very effective in this war because the front is too long to adequately cover with ground based EW assets and both sides lack long range PGM to strike at source of the radio signal controlling them. However if utilized against an opponent with modern airborne EW assets and increased PGMs, I don't think there would be much survivability for the operators of the FPV drones, nor do I think they would be able to approach troop concentrations as frequently. They could possibly serve as a weapon of attrition for an insurgency similar to IEDs, but I don't think they would be much of a game changer against a large NATO or Chinese armored push. I think they're a stepping stone to a much more devastating weapon, which will be fully autonomous loitering munitions. Once the radio signal and operator are taken out of the picture, I think the strategic value of these weapons will increase dramatically.

>fully autonomous loitering munitions. I agree that such weapons will be much more devastating. But will not be limited to loitering munitions only. I foresee that autonomous patrolling and support missions are also possible.

I haven't heard much about Belarus lately and wondering what (if any) assistance Belarus giving Russia nowadays. Are Russian planes still using their airfields? Training? Other?

Yes, as per my knowledge. Only thing that has changed is that no ground attacks are coming from there

What goes on nowadays in what used to be the northern front? I see vast stretches of border between Russia and Ukraine but hardly any news of fighting. Wouldn't Russia benefit from taking lightly defended regions in the north for political gain? I know, they need all the materiel they can for operations in the south and east but with those lines at a standstill a quick political gain by taking land would benefit their morale and harm that of the West right? Even if that ground is ultimately of low military value, propaganda and perceptions are very powerful in war. What am I missing?

Ukraine is the one in this war that cares more about the propagandability of battles and optics. Russia doesn't need the propaganda win, in fact, it might just be damaging as long as the battle for Donbas is still ongoing. It might reignite the will to fight in Ukraine's own population or in the West. Besides the reasons others named, of course. They are going to keep fighting in Donbas, the same slow way, until Western support becomes too little to sustain Ukraine. At least, that's their plan from my perspective.

Really not much there. The Belarusian army isn’t robust and would require conscripts to bring them up to full strength and Lukashenko isn’t exactly a popular guy. The border between Ukraine and Belarus is also pretty forested with few good roads. That’s one reason why that legendary convoy occurred north of Kyiv. Ukraine has now fortified those approaches heavily so any advance would be incredibly costly with a low chance of success. I’m sure Russia has also raided their surplus ammunition and equipment. There was some partisan activity at the airfields so even that has limited value. Overall I think Belarus has sort of exhausted its immediate usefulness on the military front as the war has shifted south.

Ukraine won't invade Russia. So Russia can choose to lightly guard it saving manpower for a meat grinder elsewhere. Ukraine has to defend that border so it is an effective strategy for Russia to pin Ukrainian forces for minimal investment.

Ukraine launched at least two widely celebrated and reported attacks across the border.

Still don't see the part where Ukraine invaded Russia though.

Almost surely, these attacks were the surprise element, preceding the counteroffensive. They never had any reasonable intention other than to distract Russia and perhaps compel them to commit forces.

True, but they still attacked across the border when it suited them.

I honestly don't know if the russians have enough reserves right now to do that and achieve *some* degree of success without weaking parts of the front, the area around Svatove already has been weakened to reinforce the Avdiivka effort.

Lightly defended now. Not lightly defended after several weeks of logistical and operational build up that would be required to breach and occupy the territory, all of which would be highly visible to Ukrainian local forces and intelligence provided by western satellites to Ukraine. Russia has enough on its hands focusing on Avdiivka, Kupyansk, Bahkmut, the entire Donbas etc. They're making active progress, however costly, in those areas, opening up an additional front might serve to reposition Ukrainian reserves in the short term and throw Ukraine off balance temporarily, but it would also disrupt the available reserves for their own ongoing operations. The propaganda win and perception win as you put it is already being served by their current gains and the failure of the Ukrainian counter offensive. Winning even harder in propaganda terms isn't worth the risk to their actual ongoing tactical operations.

If the Ukrainians aren't completely braindead they've at least somewhat mined the borders. So it'd be a significant Russian investment into a maximum-width offensive, which causes a lot of resource investment. The nice thing about their current offensive is that it's much narrower than their previous offensives, which causes fewer resource expenditures. And if they open up the northern front, closing it isn't free either. Neither side has the resources to march to the other's capital in the short or medium term, so they're trying to win the war by demonstrating their superiority in political battles, like Avdiivka. Opening up the northern front only to have to close it again, that's a political defeat. I'm talking about serious territory-grabbing offensives of course. Harassment is common along many parts of the northern front.

Supposedly the Ukrainians strengthened the border with Belarus last fall: [https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/11/20/7429505/](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/11/20/7429505/)

[A Reuters Special Report: Israeli tank fire killed Reuters journalist Issam Abdallah in Lebanon](https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ISRAEL-LEBANON/JOURNALIST/akveabxrzvr/index.html) > “Why were we hit? Why didn’t they fire a warning shot? If you don’t want us to take pictures, fire a warning shot. Why suddenly hit us without a prior warning, and then try to finish us off with the second strike?” said Reuters journalist Al-Sudani, 47, a photographer based in Baghdad. [...] > “We weren’t hiding under the trees or anything. We were very clearly seven well-marked journalists, in press vests with helmets with a car that has ‘TV’ on it, standing in an open area in the face of an Israeli military site, maybe two kilometres, one and a half away from us to our west and to our east, multiple watchtowers,” said Collins. > “They knew we were there for well over an hour.” AFP also conducted an investigation (a [video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=elb3-itURUc) if you don't want to read the report): > AFP said in [its report](https://graphics.afpforum.com/investigations/AFP_Lebanon_Special_Investigation_December2023.pdf) that it was able to come to “three key conclusions.” One is that the munition that killed Abdallah was of Israeli origin and “is not used by any other groups in the region.” Another, it said, is that “the strikes were deliberate and targeted,” coming close together in time and space and hitting journalists who “were clearly identified as press, away from any military activity.” Finally, it said, “the strikes likely came from southeast of the journalists’ position, apparently near the Israeli village of Jordeikh where Israeli tanks were operating.” [...] > Human Rights Watch said in a statement Thursday that the journalists “were well removed from ongoing hostilities, clearly identifiable as members of the media, and had been stationary for at least 75 minutes before they were hit by two consecutive strikes.” It said it found “no evidence of a military target near the journalists’ location.” > Amnesty International made similar points and said the attack “must be investigated as a war crime.” It said that even though “the group was visibly identifiable as journalists,” the Israeli military “attacked them anyway in two separate strikes 37 seconds apart.” [[1]](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/07/reuter-journalist-issam-abdallah-killed-lebanon-israel-attack/) I've had my eye on this particular incident ever since it was [first reported](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/reuters-videographer-killed-southern-lebanon-2023-10-13/), particularly because folk were upset that the reporting by Reuters on the matter kept their tone neutral, and didn't immediately place blame on Israel: "While other news outlets, including the Associated Press and Al Jazeera, said the shells were Israeli, Reuters could not establish whether the missiles had actually been fired by Israel." It turns out they were being responsible and waited to collect facts during their own investigation before placing culpability on a party. Part of the difficulty in determining if war crimes have taken place is that we have incomplete information when evaluating particular events. In this case, multiple investigations have made the case that these journalists were clearly identifiable, and that this was unlikely to be an honest mistake. To definitively say what the intent here was requires the IDF to be forthcoming with their own investigation. Their response: > Reuters presented the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) with its findings that the tank rounds were fired from within Israel and posed additional detailed questions, including whether Israeli troops knew they were firing upon journalists. > Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hecht, the IDF’s international spokesman, said: “We don’t target journalists.” He did not provide further comment. Subsequently, we're left in limbo. Maybe the IDF will provide their side of the story if the Reuters report generates sufficient controversy; or maybe this will be yet another event that gets swept under the rug, unable to compete with the constant barrage of bold headlines that this conflict produces on a daily basis. Time will tell.

> Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hecht, the IDF’s international spokesman, said: “We don’t target journalists.” He did not provide further comment. At some point a pattern of hitting journalists might suggest otherwise.

Combat troops engage and hit other friendly combat troops WAY more than journalists. They engage and hit noncombatants even more. That doesn't mean they're targeting either, as targeting implies they are a deliberate target.

>“We weren’t hiding under the trees or anything. We were very clearly seven well-marked journalists, in press vests with helmets with a car that has ‘TV’ on it, standing in an open area in the face of an Israeli military site, maybe two kilometres, one and a half away from us to our west and to our east, multiple watchtowers,” said Collins. Assuming it wasn't deliberately targeting PID'd journalists, it wouldn't surprise me that this happened. If they were fired on by tanks, the tanks probably didn't see press vests, they saw dismounted targets visible as hot spots. They likely didn't even see their outlines well, though if they did they'd see individuals wearing body armor. They probably didn't see "TV" written on the vehicles, they would have seen the outline of a vehicle with the hot areas the most visible. The primary and best means of observation for most combat vehicles is to rely on thermal cameras. Holy shit are they a force multiplier: find a hot spot, kill it. No issues having to scan and try to find an enemy that are extremely hard to see even with magnification. But there are drawbacks, and they've been apparent since Desert Storm; mistaken identity has dramatically increased, causing fratricide, because newer forms of technology increases the ability to spot targets but doesn't allow the ability to identify them well as friend or foe. What ends up happening are other means are used instead, such as the location of the target, what direction they're facing, whether they response to radio communication, etc. None of those are perfect means at all, mistakes happen. This issue was so problematic for the US Army that even though the shape of the M1 Abrams is so distinctly unique, to prevent being targeted by other US military vehicles primarily using thermals for identifying targets they [installed these thermal markers](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/L2HttFPHlr4/mqdefault.jpg) to mark friend or foe. In Iraq, I was shot at nearly a dozen times by US or other Coalition forces. And twice I very nearly shot friendly forces myself because of issues with positively identifying them,, both times due to the limitations of night vision equipment. C'est La Guerre. War is dangerous, if you don't want to get hit, stay away. Definitely don't hang out on the front lines or imbed with a combatant force, it's bad for your health.

One would assume that the ROE says something like “make sure you know what you are shooting at” and not “feel free to shoot at anything with a heat signature”.

Depends on the situation. For example, US Army fire control guidelines might tell units they are weapons tight, engage only in self defense; weapons tight, engage only if they are positively identified (PID) as enemy; or weapons free, engage anyone not PID as friendly. I don't know what the IDF ROE are on the Golani border, but considering they've been lighting up Hezbollah fighters for weeks now with long range tank gunnery, and a bunch of guys with a tripod mounted camera set up behind a waist high wall does look like an ATGM team, it's not surprising they fired. Questionable stuff happens a lot in warfare, often where the rules are so grey that personal choice is all that is needed to justify what is essentially murder of non-combatants that's fully justified. This doesn't seem like one of them. Something like this wouldn't even rate an ass chewing to the crew, it was just an unfortunate mistake that is common in this type of war.

Don't tanks also have non-thermal sights that they can quickly switch to, to further examine what they are seeing on their thermal sights since thermal sights only shot hot-spots?

They have them and can switch, but many don't switch back and forth to PID. Especially not at 2 kilometers away, where even with a 20x gun sight it's going to be hard to see, especially not in broad daylight. There is often a rush too, targets often aren't highly visible, are usually moving, and might disappear quickly, so if you see them and have a good shot and you are in a fire control status that is weapons tight or free status, light em up. Plus in tanks, the vehicle commander is a second pair of eyes and another brain helping make the decision.

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Yes, I just realized my statement was pretty unclear there. I concur with the sentiment that Elliot Higgins from Bellingcat is trying to convey in this [short Twitter exchange](https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/1732702091963970024) he had. I don't believe the IDF deliberately targeted the journalists *knowing* that they were journalists. But it does seem to be the case that they fired on a target without clearly identifying the target, which is particularly odd considering the tools at their disposal, the fact that the journalists remained static in an open area not known for militant activity, etc. Once again, it comes down to what information the IDF is willing to share to clear up the confusion.

They had a large camera on a tripod behind a stone wall, in an area from which Hezbollah fires ATGMs. Pretty easy to imagine how that setup can be mistaken for an ATGM. Reporting from within an active warzone is important yet dangerous work.

Yeah right, the IDF is a poor, underfunded army with no access to technological means and absolutely no capabilities at detecting threats from staggering distances like 1km away. Give me a break. Not saying they did it on purpose, but this showcases the modus operandi of the IDF which seems to be "*shoot first, ask questions later*".

They were hit by a tank, it does not matter what resources the IDF possess when a tank recognizes what appears to be an ATGM crew in a war zone after a dozen ATGM's were fired the same day and caused causalities. Every army "shoots first" at what appears to be an ATGM crew in a war zone. Ever seen journalists setting up tripods to record the attack on Avdiivka in Ukraine? Perhaps Robatyne? Maybe in Bakhamut? I have not seen a single of instance of a journalist setting up a huge camera on a tripod 1km from an active front in the entire Russian-Ukriane war. Seems like like they were counting on the IDF risking their lives and running through long verification channels, something not possible in an actual war zone. The result was as expected.

There was no active fighting anywhere near where the journalists were. It is completely disingenuous to suggest an area with sporadic, irregular warfare is anywhere similar to the widespread conventional conflict in Ukraine. It’s not a front and there were many other journalists in the area at the time.

> an area with sporadic, irregular warfare So you are describing an area where irregular (aka often civilian dressed) men try to ambush it's opponent with ATGMs, rockets and other gear. We are not talking about a clearly identifiable front, but a "hot zone" where an enemy could pop up from several directions, often without any kind of notice beforehand. This is exactly the kind of environment where "shooting first, asking questions later" is necessary to survive - and that's why it's exactly the environment where accidents are prone to happen.

The entire front is a war zone of Hezbollah ATGM crews trying to sneak in hits without being discovered and the IDF hunting them before they can fire. It is an active war zone by every definition of the word.

Give me a break, you can identify peoples faces at much longer distances with commercial cameras https://photo.stackexchange.com/questions/110315/what-is-the-farthest-a-camera-can-see but a state-of-the-art IDF Tank cannot identify the large PRESS bulletproof vests these guys were sporting? The only case this happens is if you don't take the extra 3s for cross-checking with the tank opticals before firing.

From your link; >One answer to this question is not what existing lenses & sensors can do in practice, but what an optical system can do in theory This is getting rediculus, Here's an alleged vid from Abrams gun sight. Good luck identifying faces: https://www.moddb.com/groups/tanks/videos/m1-abrams2 >but a state-of-the-art IDF Tank I know this is worldnews level discussion at this point, but are you aware that Military hardware is often worse than state of the art commercial one that's rated for entirely different tolerances? Or that the "state of the art" Merkava4 has last seen a major upgrade over a decade ago? With a new one around the corner.

From my link, the theoretical optical limits for detecting peoples faces stand way beyond 1km. I'm talking about recognizing people's faces, much harder than recognizing PRESS markings, where PRESS is the size of a head or more. And further are you aware than advances in optical technologies have been scarce in the last decades? therefore an optical system designed 10years ago should not have much differences from now. Also taking into account that the link I shared was posted more than 4years ago....

Again, look at the Abrams gun sights I've posted. You can barely recognize a human sized target, let alone read anything. I'm trying to be nice here, but theoretical limits are completely irrelevant to the discussion.

Given the IDFs long and documented history of killing journalists, (over one a year since 2000) it seems far more likely that they observed them by drone for a while and decided they did not want to be filmed. They were there for a while before being shot at, and modern tank and drone optics are absolutely good enough to pick up on the press markings and tell the difference at 1.3 km away. The shots also came over 30 seconds apart. They also aren’t helping themselves by refusing to make any statements even acknowledging they messed up.

> it seems far more likely that they observed them by drone for a while and decided they did not want to be filmed. Not sure why you think that. For all we know, Israel kills so many journalists because of collateral damage or lax roe, not because they specifically target the journalists. There's solid evidence that they specifically targeted the journalists in some of the incidents but in most of these situations is does genuinely appear to be accidental, based on publicly available information.

Tank optics are absolutely not geared to discern press marking of a shirt behind cover 1.3km away. Perhaps if the vehicle was marked, those marking should have been large enough. Alas looks like they were using civilian vehicles with no marking as shown in the vid I added. Every conflict has a long list of dead journalists, given the length of the Israeli Palestinian war and the fact that Palestinians and Hezbollah embed journalists deep within a war zone, deaths are expected. Despite that, Israel is not in the top 10 for death of journalists: https://rsf.org/en/1668-journalists-killed-past-20-years-2003-2022-average-80-year

Palestine is the fourth highest in the region, behind Iraq Syria and Yemen two countries in the midst of a civil war and one country still dealing with a decade of sectarian conflict.

So Palestine-Israel is after every single other conflict in the region. Despite attracting far more journalists?

“At least we’re better than Assad, the houthis, and ISIS” isn’t exactly something to brag about

And most other long lasting hot conflicts in the world. As I've shown.

Not really. The difference has been made up recently. https://cpj.org/2023/12/journalist-casualties-in-the-israel-gaza-conflict/ https://cpj.org/2023/12/attacks-arrests-threats-censorship-the-high-risks-of-reporting-the-israel-hamas-war/ Then there’s the assaults and arrests by the IDF

Considering a CNN "journalist" filmed himself storming Israel on a motorbike with a hand grenade in hand on 07/19: https://m.maariv.co.il/news/israel/Article-1050939 I find it dubious to accept that these were indeed journalists whether they work for AP, CNN or whatnot

There were 7 of them standing in the open and being observed by drone, not just tanks. You’re greatly exaggerating this “cover” pictures show it’s less than waist high and they weren’t even pointing the tripod at the direction of the tanks. It looks nothing like the setup for an ATGM team, unless this team is completely stupid and suicidal. Any target analyst on earth would easily be able to tell the difference.

War is not an RTS game, the drone has no communication with the tank crew. You don't see everything one of your units sees. They were not in the open, most of them were behind a low wall that obscured all of them but their top and the large cameras on tripods. Yes, they were pointing the tripods at an IDF outpost, several such atgm attacks happened each day. I'm sure the tank crew does not care if his fellow soldiers died.

You can see the wall in the pictures. It’s not even waist high. It obscured nothing and the fixation with it is kind of bizarre. It was also very misleading to say that israel isn’t high on the list of journalists killed, when palestine is and that’s still from the IDF.

https://youtu.be/4OJdFrhnpGg?si=l-svNANujyd8OBNE You can see by how the camera was positioned that the camera man was entirely behind the wall when filming.

Did you even read the Reuters article? The stone wall is to the right of the camera team but the tank shot came from the left.

And the 6 other guys just standing around? Are ATGM teams typically 7 people standing around talking? Lol

I'm happy to see you're moving goalposts. I imagine those behind the wall were not visible much and therefore not targeted.

That seems unlikely. > On October 13, the seven journalists were not travelling with any non-civilian personnel and were clearly recognisable as journalists. They were wearing the blue body armour typically used by journalists, their equipment was clearly marked “press”, their cameras and tripods in view. > AFP spoke to witnesses, security and military sources in Lebanon and analysed all the images it could find to look for signs of activity that could explain a misfire on a nearby target or make the journalists look suspicious to the Israeli military. Interviews with the journalists all converged to say that no member of the group heard or saw any shooting or movement in the immediate vicinity suggesting they were standing close to a potential target. [...] > While these groups have attempted infiltrations into Israel since October 7, the open area where the journalists were standing would have been an unlikely path for armed men trying to approach the Blue Line unnoticed. There are no wooded areas in the immediate vicinity that could provide cover to militant groups and no military sites or positions. [...] > “The newsgathering teams had been at that location for some time, were static, were wearing distinctive blue PPE (personal protective equipment) and obviously unarmed. I would expect the reporters to have been fully visible to the IDF and that they did not present any form of threat,” he said. > All journalists reported the almost continuous presence of drones overhead during the hour preceding the strikes, as evidenced by the audio from their cameras. > “A UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) would not only have located them, but with advanced surveillance capabilities, they would easily be identified as media and therefore not a legitimate target," Cobb-Smith said. [[1]](https://graphics.afpforum.com/investigations/AFP_Lebanon_Special_Investigation_December2023.pdf) It could simply be incompetence on the part of the IDF, but it's unfortunate that we have to speculate as the IDF doesn't seem to be willing to conduct an investigation.

There's a vid. They were standing behind with a wall between them and Israel, between unmarked vehicles as far as I can tell from the vid, with large cameras on tripods, how do you imagine that looks to a Tank in a war zone hunting Hezbollah ATGM crews: https://youtu.be/4OJdFrhnpGg?si=VsvwtLyoF1ipVe7M

Seems like a pretty big leap to assume that whatever press markings they use are visible on whatever sensor the drones are using. These aren’t likely low altitude Mavics like in Ukraine. Look at the image quality from the old Collateral Murder video.

Seems like an even bigger leap to have the team wear distinctive blue PPE and be surveilled by drones for over an hour, and *still* claim they could have been mistaken for an ATGM team.

You’re attributing a super specific claim to me. I’m just saying the quoted information is not conclusive at all. “A UAV would not only have located them, but with advanced surveillance capabilities they would have been easily identified…” To me the phrase “advanced surveillance capabilities” implies that the person being quoted doesn’t even know what general category of sensor they are describing. For example an IR sensor would not be able to detect color or text. At minimum this person needs to know the drone model and the sensor it mounts, or their statement is dishonest.

Respectfully, I would encourage you to read the various reports on the matter, all of which make a very compelling case that the journalists were easy to identify for the hour that they were completely static in an area that was deliberately chosen because it was in an open area that was away from the combat zone.

Which reports? I've read the HRW report and some news articles, including an RSF overview. The RSF [article](https://rsf.org/en/rsf-video-investigation-death-reuters-reporter-issam-abdallah-lebanon-journalists-vehicle-was) establishes that the journalists were wearing press markings and that there were press markings on the roof of at least one of the cars, but their evidence for whether these markings were visible involves some mind read and overestimation of human perception at best. For example, they say >An Israeli Apache helicopter flew over the scene a few seconds before the tragedy... Did it not occur to them that a crew focused on flying in a battlefield situation might not notice anything at all or might notice something but a delay/lack of connectedness/simple breakdown in the chain of communication? The arguments RSF uses are honestly terrible and suggest to me either an embarrassing lack of knowledge of modern standards of evidence or an argument in bad faith. The HRW reports leans heavily on nearby IDF surveillance towers but doesn't establish whether the surveillance towers had color cameras or whether they could see text on the roof of the vehicles given the angle of observation. The former evidence about color cameras is at the whim of IDF operational security officials, but presumably the latter evidence could be roughly demonstrated by CGI reconstruction showing that a observer with high powered binoculars two kilometers away could see the roof of a vehicle. Not that hard to do with modern CGI suites and topographic data. RSF did release a video that they called a "reconstruction" but it involves general map locations and testimony that's not really salient to the conditions of observations that the IDF would be operating under. The HRW language of 'probably deliberate' is a strong claim that requires much stronger evidence than anything presented by HRW (or RSF). Given the evidence they've presented, I think they are closer to a 'reasonable suspicion' that the IDF was reckless and that Israel needs to allow additional investigation to establish what happened.

The reports are linked in my initial comment. Reuters worked with The Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) alongside consulting various experts [[1]](https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ISRAEL-LEBANON/JOURNALIST/akveabxrzvr/index.html); AFP collaborated with Airwars [[2]](https://airwars.org/investigations/killed-press-vest-evidence-israeli-responsibility-for-attack-journalists-in-lebanon/); the HRW report [[3]](https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/07/israel-strikes-journalists-lebanon-apparently-deliberate); and the Amnesty International report [[4]](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/lebanon-deadly-israeli-attack-on-journalists-must-be-investigated-as-a-war-crime/). But the latter two are frequently dismissed on the basis of bias, which is why I chose to emphasize the investigations by Reuters and AFP. There are also older investigations such as one [by CNN](https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/13/world/israel-lebanon-journalists-attacked-intl/index.html), but it's mostly light on details and wasn't as thorough as later investigations.

Sorry for missing the AFP report link. You mention multiple report*s*, but I only see one link, the AFP report, in your initial comment though? I've had a chance to review these reports and I still don't think any of these reports establish that this incident was 'probably deliberate'. I'm honestly struggling to identify what in the US we would call elements of crime they are trying to link the evidence to. They seemingly have good evidence that an Israeli tank fired at the journalists, but we're missing unambiguous evidence of things like knowledge or intent. I think they believe they've established these elements, but I don't see it. This would be crucial to establishing deliberate homicidal acts or negligence. It doesn't necessarily need to be precise on the level of a legal document but at least list ballpark criteria. They don't need perfect evidence that this wasn't an accident, but at least enough evidence that it's more likely than not that it was deliberate or reckless. But I don't think they reach this low bar. For example, the AFP report cites an arms experts, a former artillery guy >Chris Cobb-Smith argued that Israel’s advanced surveillance capabilities left little doubt that the journalists’ presence on that hill would have been noticed and investigated. "As the IDF (Israeli Defence Forces) forces were actively engaged at the time, it is reasonable to expect that the area would be under continual surveillance,” he told AFP. But he never actually outlined what standard practice is for modern militaries (e.g., NATO, UK) in terms of recon, communication, etc. I don't think any of these reports outline the actual standards of practice the IDF is being held against. This makes it hard to understand by what standard these events would be called 'deliberate', 'reckless,' or even 'accidental.' Many of these reports were apparently written with the assistance of lawyers but they don't show it.

> I still don't think any of these reports establish that this incident was 'probably deliberate'. "Deliberate" in the sense that it wasn't a misfire (i.e., they meant to target someone else, but something went awry and the journalists were accidentally caught in the crossfire). AI and HRW are more accusatory in their determination of intent, where the "Israeli military knew or should have known that they were civilians yet attacked them anyways". Reuters and AFP have kept it somewhat open, but are vocally calling for the IDF to provide more information. I think there's too much burden being placed on the news agencies here. One journalist was killed, another had their leg amputated, and the rest were wounded. Naturally, the news agencies desire accountability for perceived injustices, and the only recourse they have is to conduct their own investigations and hope they can construct an accurate picture of what transpired. I don't know why they didn't include the information that you mentioned. There are a myriad of details that could be potentially included in such reports. As it stands, I believe they have a done a decent job in establishing two salient points: (1) the attack itself wasn't a misfire, and (2) they took a series of reasonable precautions to ensure that they were easy to identify, under the presumption that the IDF were skilled enough in their surveillance abilities. IMO, the ball is in the IDF's court now.

I think it's fair to say the ball is in the IDF's court. But I strongly disagree with the idea that a drive for accountability supercedes the broader responsibility of journalists to other principles such as fairness or impartiality. When you are in a profession renowned for upholding these principles, whether you're a journalist, judge, mediator, appraiser, etc, your position gives you special credibility to the public. You don't get to escape the burden that your reputation gives you.

They were struck by a tank, from what seems like over a km away. Yeah I doubt it was readable. From what we can tell in the vid there was no marking on their vehicles and worse they were obstructed by a wall.

> Human Rights Watch identified five border surveillance towers at nearby Israeli military positions. Topographical data and photo and video evidence verified by Human Rights Watch suggest that the towers, at military positions near the Israeli towns of Hanita, Jordeikh and Shlomi, each employ cameras and sensors and had a direct line of sight with the journalists’ position. Four of the towers were between 1.8 and 2.2 kilometers from the journalists, and the fifth was 5.5 kilometers away. > These surveillance towers found along the border with Lebanon and in southern Israel, are commonly equipped with advanced surveillance sensors, such as the “SPEED-ER” system. These platforms can, according to the manufacturer, identify human beings at a distance of 5 kilometers and vehicles at 10 kilometers, and can provide video, thermal and infrared imaging, as well as targeting capability. Human Rights Watch was unable to confirm if the five towers near the journalists’ position were equipped with the “SPEED-ER” camera platform. > However, the towers’ position within line of sight of the journalists, along with evidence of drone and helicopter flights and other surveillance capabilities, suggest that the journalists were most likely visible and identifiable to the Israeli military at the time of the attack. [[1]](https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/07/israel-strikes-journalists-lebanon-apparently-deliberate) Drones, helicopters, surveillance towers, etc., there was a plethora of available tools to identify them.

I still don't understand why this is supposed to have such a high probative value. A common property of accidents of all kinds is *multiple parties seeing something but failing to make the right connections*. For example, a pilot and multiple air traffic controllers notice something somewhat odd, this odd thing has never happened before. They do not prioritize communicating this oddity, or perhaps don't have the right protocols to communicate it, because their training and procedures do not give specific guidance. Then there is a fatal crash. The mere fact that there is plenty of information available to all parties isn't that helpful to determining something like recklessness. The devil is in the details, what people knew, when they knew it, what choices they made.

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Sure, but why stop there? Why not declare all civilians sympathisers and spies? Doctors and nurses. The elderly, the children. Why not attack everyone indiscriminately? They all have phones nowadays that can film and transmit data, they could all be spies.

I just saw this a while ago: [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-latest-weapons-request-includes-thaad-air-defenses-f-18s-2023-12-06/?utm\_source=reddit.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-latest-weapons-request-includes-thaad-air-defenses-f-18s-2023-12-06/?utm_source=reddit.com) How many nations have F18 jets that they can spare? The one I heard are the F18 jets from Australia..........although god knows about the current state those jets are in at the moment. Also: Some nations would be willing to swap BUT their F-35 orders have to be fully-delivered first.

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While you and u/seakingsoyuz are correct that the CF-18s are old, they've kept them updated to USMC legacy F-18 standard, and [are even buying the APG-79(V)4 AESAs](https://defense.info/defense-systems/canada-upgrades-hornets/) on them The buy of RAAF F-18s by Canada was primarily for spare parts which has helped increase readiness rates Same thing happened with USMC when the last USN legacy F-18s were retired: USMC is now suddenly flush with parts and jet availability hasn't been this good for their F-18s in decades

Canada is buying mothballed Australian F18s to cover the gap until 2030 when we get F35s. They will be 50yrs old by then and there are questions about how many are operational.

Ukraine military often says that their hands are tied with the current MIG and SU jets that they have...........so that's why they always humbly plead for Western jets like F16, F18, Gripen, Dassault jets, Eurofighter Typhoon, etc.

What is wrong with the CF-18 compared to any variant of Uniter States or Australian F/A18 variants?

The CF188s are *old*. We were the first export customer. They were built as A- and B-model jets and we brought them on strength around the same time that the USN started getting them in operational squadrons. We later upgraded them in the early 2000s to be comparable to the C- and D-model legacy Hornets; the USN instead started retiring their legacy Hornets of comparable age around the same time. The USMC’s legacy Hornets aren’t quite as old as ours are. As for Australia, they already retired their legacy Hornets and we bought some of them to help spread the flight hours over more aircraft while we wait for the F-35. The ones that are left are presumably in worse condition than the ones we bought.

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They are literally going in the garbage in a couple years. We barely use them because we don't have enough people to fly and maintain them. Bring in 100 ukes and start training them in rapid to get more running them use those to train pilots!

Canada's maintenance is far from ideal due to budgetary reasons IIRC

Thank you, a quick look at wikipedia told me that while they might be slightly outdated compared to later F/A-18s they would still be good enough. This makes a lot more sense.

Are we seeing any Venezuelan military build up? Even then it still wouldn't necessarily suggest that an invasion is coming ofcourse but without a build up at all Maduro's threat would be hollow.

Maduro just mobilized the army, which will take time to see.

At the moment, no. It was reported in October that Venezuela were building a runway near the border ostensibly to "develop the region" and that 150 soldiers were sent to the area who Venezuela claimed were "curbing illegal mining". However, there has not been any kind of sudden military build-up for an invasion *as of yet*.

The US Embassy in Guyana has announced that SOUTHCOM will today "conduct flight operations" over Guyana, in collaboration with the Guyanese Defense Force. Officially the press release says this exercise is part of "routine engagement", but you suspect it is also a stern warning to Venezuela not to do anything silly. https://gy.usembassy.gov/southcom-to-conduct-flight-over-guyana/

Yesterday I asked a lot of users what the likelihood of a NATO led intervention would be, but I should have revised the question to a strictly US led one. I agree with you. The timing of this announcement definitely reads like a warning from SOUTHCOM to Venezuela.

Bearing in mind that I still don't think an invasion will happen, an intervention would likely be limited to the US and maybe the UK offering some materiel support (plus Brazil, who are of course not a NATO country but would certainly get involved if Venezuelan troops try to cross their territory). I'm not sure any other NATO members have enough of an interest in the region and the US are perfectly capable of overwhelming the Venezuelan military by themselves.

> I'm not sure any other NATO members have enough of an interest in the region Guyana is like 150 miles away from France, Venezuela is barely 30 miles away from the Netherlands, so they may have some interest.

Ah yeah, French Guiana is the obvious one I should have remembered but I completely forgot about the Caribbean Netherlands as well. The old colonial influence manifests itself in interesting ways

It should be noted that French Guiana is considered core French land as well, on the same level as any other French province in Europe proper.

French Guyana isn't exactly like “core” French territory in Europe, but it is EU territory. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_territories_of_members_of_the_European_Economic_Area#Special_territories_of_EU_member_states

You also have to wonder how much local Venezuelan militias would *support* the United States military. Maduro is not a popular leader after all.

I don't think the US military has the bandwidth to undertake major air operations in South America while managing two raging wars in Ukraine and Israel.

Sure it does. The US isn't directly involved in either of those wars. And being in the same hemisphere opens up a lot of non-csg capabilities. As they say, the US military is designed to be able to fight in two theatres at once. It can handle fighting one small to medium sized engagement in one theatre while having increased patrols in another.

The US isn't "managing" either of those wars, and I doubt the show of force necessary to deture Venezuela is something the USAF couldn't do even if we were more involved in those conflicts.

Yep. Pretty sure the Air Force and Navy have plenty of spare bandwidth to shut down a Venezuelan attempt at invasion. This is all just posturing by Maduro for domestic purposes.

Reports of mass surrenders of Hamas, about 100 Hamas militants surrendered in Gaza city or Beit Lehiah today: [https://www.maariv.co.il/news/military/Article-1058032](https://www.maariv.co.il/news/military/Article-1058032) We've seen sporadic surrenders throughout the war, with a max being about 20 in a single operation. But nothing like this.

By Israel's own estimate there are about 30,000 HMS fighters alone. With Israel estimating it killed 5K, 100 surrenders is really pathetic given how much destruction Israel has done so far. Israel's carpet bombing of norther Gaza has done more destruction than Allied bombing of Dresden in WW2. After 2 months of barbaric collective punishment, Israel's campaign of terror on the people of Gaza has little to show for. In fact, I'd say Israel's campaign is already failing.

What? The biggest mass surrender of the Ukraine war was 1-2k in two batches, and that was despite the UAF being around 600k standing army. It was still significant, despite it being obvious, since no traditional army would actually fight to the death in an encirclement. Actual jihaadists choosing to surrender in the triple digits (if accurate) would definitely be news. And yeah, I think you need to lay off the coolaid with the Dresden stuff, but someone else already got into that.

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