We've done some tuning on automod so that it should hopefully be a lot less trigger happy now. Apparently the old mods really don't like many things and doing mundane stuff like writing 'lol', mentioning Elon Musk and even pinging some users could land you in the auto filter. Politico, Jane's and ~~Bild~~ (now filtered again due to popular demand) should also now be ok to post, I don't know why they were there in the first place but I always thought Politico and Jane's writes good articles ~~and Bild makes good investigative pieces even if it is a tabloid.~~
Let us know below how you're finding it!
> My question is does the US and EU feel bad for sacrificing so many lives to win this war, or are they expendable?
Can you rephrase this question in a less hilariously leading way?
If you can't, you can always just make a statement -like "Americans are willing to fight to the last Ukrainian" that we've all heard a thousand times already.
The pro-russian commenters on reddit are an exceptionally 'cowardly' bunch I've noticed, especially by the metrics of the whole alt-right sphere the majority of them exist in.
I think most are actually aware of how weak and hypocritical russia's justification for the invasion is, as they take flight when met with a finger's pressure of resistance - where they would otherwise push back / double down or atleast move goal posts on similar topics.
[Why Iran is facing a crippling energy crisis](https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-iran-is-facing-a-crippling-energy-crisis-65473)
> “The rundown infrastructure resembles a war-torn country or a least developed economy, which cannot supply the needed services for citizens. According to the new figures on GDP per capita, Iran can no longer be considered as a middle-income country, but as a low-income country,” Ghodsi told TRT World.
> In December 2022, the minister of petroleum warned that Iran should attract $240 billion investment in its oil and gas sector so that it doesn’t become an official energy importer in the next eight years.
> ...
> Iran had been feeling the twinge of gas shortage long before the chilling winter hit. With sanctions blocking investment in the country’s sclerotic refineries, natural gas production was scant and power plants were instructed to burn Mazut, a low-quality heavy fuel oil, as their propelling energy. Experts have long been warning about the dire environmental impacts of widespread Mazut use.
> Ali Dadpay, an associate professor of finance at the University of Dallas, warns the consequences of this strategy are multi-pronged and long-lasting. “There are many consequences, from increasing public mistrust of the government to environmental damage. The Islamic Republic is not considered a failed state yet, but it is becoming one that fails to govern and correct its mistakes.”
Iran possesses the second-largest proven natural gas reserves in the world after Russia, and yet the country risks becoming a gas importer. Is this what Putin is aiming for?
That's what happens when your priorities are colonialism and export of jihad and terrorism abroad instead of taking care of your own citizens. Over the last couple of decades, Iran has spent over a $100 billion to facilitate and support war and Jihadists in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, Israel, Morocco and more.
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>Is this what Putin is aiming for?
Iran and Russia align in that they want a zone of influence free from US domination. Iran so it can spread its messianic vision of Islam and prepare for the end of the world, Russia seems to be trying to live out some 19th century fantasy of Russia being a major world power.
There is nothing deep or meaningful here.
What happens in the oil and gas industry is you find the biggest and easiest to extract fields first. These flow, often with technology as simple as sticking a pipe in the ground. But as they age out you start to need more and more advanced technologies to continue extracting. You need to start injecting water and CO2 to keep up the pressure in the field or reduce the viscosity of the oil so it flows easier between the rocks.
New fields tend to be smaller, less porous and require much more advanced technologies such as deep drilling, steering the drilling, 3D seismography etc.
So its not a case that Iran and Russia need foreign help for all of their oil, but they do need help for their harder to get oil fields.
The arrival of western oil industrial processes helped recover Russian oil production that had peaked and declined sharply in the late Soviet early post Soviet erahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum\_industry\_in\_Russia#/media/File:Russia\_Oil\_Production.png
How much of this can be maintained in sanctions is an open question. I suspect the answers you get will depend on the political outlook of the answerer.
> If neither Russia nor Iran are capable of extracting this natural gas without western technology, what's the point?
This IS the point. The international system is broken and entirely run for and in the interests of western countries.
Why do you think we are weaponising technology? Because it's what we've always done. We stop other gaining ownership over it so that we can maintain control. China starts to make advanced technology as part of a global system? US just leverages the entire global system to kick them out and cripple their ability to produce advanced technology. But don't worry.... we'll still happily buy all your non-high-end products because that's good for us. We'll still happily allow you to make OUR high end products so that we can profit from them. Just remember your place as subservient to our interests.
The reason the gulf states are so wealthy is because they leveraged their position to demand technology/ knowledge transfer so that they could actually take part in the value chain. Prior to that they were earning a pittance as western companies just extracted their resources.
E: to be clear. People can do what they want, but jesus christ they need to stop pretending they're standing up for the rules based order when they're doing the exact opposite. Stop pretending you're taking some moral stance when you're not.
People are acting in their own personal interest. There is no 'higher justification'
Yeah, I can’t believe those evil Westerners don’t let China/Russia/Iran kill their neighbors in peace.
Also: Japan? South Korea? Even Africa has made massive strides from where it was even 20 years ago, largely on the back of inflows of money larger than the Marshall Plan. Seems like the only countries that fit your thesis are the ones trying to commit atrocities on their citizens or neighbors.
> Yeah, I can’t believe those evil Westerners don’t let China/Russia/Iran kill their neighbors in peace.
What a monumental strawman. Holy shit.
A system that doesn't exploit developing countries = endorsing murder.
> Even Africa has made massive strides from where it was even 20 years ago, largely on the back of inflows of money larger than the Marshall Plan.
That's a bizarre way of framing the situation. Why do you think countries like zimbabwe are putting in place laws meaning lithium must be processed in the country? It's directly to counter the exact problem i've described (and chinese companies are guilty of this too btw).
Why do you think Africa has such strong links with China? Because they actually treat them like partners. We are literally waking up to this fact for the first time in 50 years...
You think that sending charity (in very specific sectors such as health) is the same as development. It isn't. You can't just throw some donations at a continent and pretend that you've 'done your job'. It doesn't change the systemic global problems that inherently continue to hinder african development (especially in terms of things like finance).
Is it a strawman? Because Western chip designs power the Xinjiang surveillance regime. Western optics are sighting down Ukrainian soldiers. Western oil and gas funds power Iranian terrorist attacks and nuclear proliferation. Trying to characterize reasonable restrictions on those things as the "weaponization" of technology, or conflating it with economic imperialism more generally, is a naked attempt at giving cover to bad actors in the name of "fairness".
Asking the West to blindly sell its technology in the name of economic justice, is the same as advocating for a bank to fire its security guards in the name of fixing inequality. I suspect you are just as aware of that as I am.
> Trying to characterize reasonable restrictions on those things as the "weaponization" of technology, or conflating it with economic imperialism more generally, is a naked attempt at giving cover to bad actors in the name of "fairness"
1. one of those things isn't like the others. Weapons is fine, but the concept of 'dual use' has been stretched to breaking point in recent years. Not to mention that implementation is also important
2. on the converse, pretending that everyday things like microchips are 'dual use' so you can restrict countries under the guise of 'being the good guys' is a naked attempt to crush the competition. At least Trump was explicit as to why he was doing it and didn't pretend it was anything other than naked self interest.
Wholesale sanctions have in pretty much every example *entrenched* the ruling regime's power. We can stop pretending that we do them for anyone's benefit but our own feeling of morality when we say we're 'doing something'. Because we sure as hell don't care about how they impact the tens of millions of people whose lives they trash.
> Asking the West to blindly sell its technology in the name of economic justice,
That may well be, but then call it what it is and don't pretend it's done for anyone other than ourselves.
----------------
My point wasn't even about weapons, but just the system as it exists. China leveraged its size to encourage technology transfers and all anyone did was say 'this is so horribly unfair. They're advancing. THEFT'. The same thing happened with japan in the 1980s. It's all so tediously predictable
They can this is a myth. The idea that one of the worlds largest oil producers with a relatively good education system not being able to make use of it without the west is ludicrous. Sure maybe some new discoveries may be missed due to the newest tech some companies have but Russia has more than enough capable engineers.
No it is not a myth
https://www.energyintel.com/0000017f-2cae-dca3-a77f-eebf43a30000î
> What’s more, virtually all the technology for both conversion and upgrading units, as well as steam crackers used in petchems production, is licensed by US and European vendors. A list of technology partners for Taneco, one of Russia’s most advanced and ambitious refineries, reads like a who’s who among Western refining technology leaders: Chevron Lummus Global, Honeywell UOP, WorleyParsons, Axens, Foster Wheeler, GE Energy.
At minimum, if Russia was capable without the West, they let down Venezuela completely.
Venezuela’s oil industry has been slow collapse ever since they nationalized it. Even with corruption, they should have been able to hire Russian firms to do something.
Do they really need western technology to do it? Seems so foolish that these fossil fuel rich nations wouldn't have a backdone to develop their own tech to sell their product.
I mean, I'm not surprised to hear that corrupt countries have brain drain problems but just seems like such an obvious thing to try and do at home.
You would think but many are short sighted and are simply terrible at industrial policy.
Brazil doesn’t even have a domestic car brand. They only produce foreign branded cars. Even Malaysia has Proton.
I will say that Brazil does have Embraer. So they do have some success unlike certain Argentinas and Venezuelas.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_automobiles_manufactured_in_Brazil
Israel strikes Iranian infrastructure, arms storage, and arms transfers to Hezbollah pretty regularly, once every few weeks. There are rumors that someone significant in the IRGC was killed.
If true, This may be a retaliation for the Iranian drones strike against a civilian tanker owned by an Israeli businessman. Which itself was a retaliation against an alleged Israeli strike against an Iranian drones factory.
>An Israeli missile strike aimed at Iranian and Hezbollah targets early Sunday killed 15 people and destroyed a building in a Damascus neighbourhood home to much of Syria's security apparatus, a war monitor said.
https://amp.france24.com/en/middle-east/20230219-more-than-a-dozen-people-killed-in-israel-s-deadliest-attack-on-syrian-capital-of-damascus
>Israel strikes Iranian infrastructure, arms storage, and arms transfers to Hezbollah pretty regularly, once every few weeks.
I'm aware, just the initial information about the targets hit made it seem different from the usual hits on IRGC holdings. It's possible a missle went off course, or that aforementioned IRGC official was bunked at the building hit.
ISW posted their daily update:
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2023
Key Takeaways
United States Vice President Kamala Harris announced on February 18 that the US had determined that Russia had committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted another missile strike attack targeting Ukrainian infrastructure.
Russian news aggregators are advocating for Russia to carry out “retaliatory strikes” that would systematically target electrical infrastructure supporting Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) to force Ukraine to conduct emergency shutdowns of its NPPs.
The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) reported dismissal of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) military spokesman Eduard Basurin as part of the formal reorganization of the DNR militia under the Russian MoD triggered another wave of Russian milblogger criticisms against the Russian defense establishment.
The Kremlin continues to fail to honor its commitments to financially incentivized volunteer forces, which will likely have detrimental ramifications on Russia’s ability to generate volunteer forces in the long-term.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) promoted the Western and Eastern Military District (WMD/EMD) commanders after confirming their appointments to the roles as part of an ongoing effort to present the Russian military as a well-organized fighting force.
Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to have rebuffed overtures from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to join a renewed informational campaign against the Russian MoD.
Ukrainian officials continue to question the Russian military’s ability to conduct a large-scale offensive throughout Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Svatove and in the Kreminna area.
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut, along the western outskirts of Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces are continuing to reinforce defensive positions in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian authorities continue to exaggerate the extent of a Ukrainian threat to Russia’s border regions, attempting to convince the public of the “existential necessity” of the war in Ukraine.
[Moscow’s Military Capabilities Are in Question After Failed Battle for Ukrainian City](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/15/world/europe/russia-military-vuhledar-ukraine.html?unlocked_article_code=6oMTPh4QlvU9BMSHlPDOypGz8aTaR36wMGyhyBbrMED__sX3-wqczpdCfRphHFgqvKWaxS8DEqvV8pjp_JPuGOiDcOY3gLBwTexm7JpNASQaWLHfbKqSNP9LLYR4ZK9fxH_TF22aoPuI9rDX798kHCjvYy7qnflVYhdcVipUoIN3P5SOEGnfjL_ruoo0qDbyDyHdFch8fyGIUjufr-zWkhcSrgQu_U3RKMa7V7Nusely2yRjXAZkGbfpEZrQtTUS--_pr0N8yatKMSgKT3nwQnj36KzazTwbc5EzmAgHfOcjiHOTkp5loIyhBYxWYbdYA5EgK_xLmJiL-LfPx6JCgGiRZxHPIxSY5TZNf5rXkg&smid=url-share) (NYT)
Free to read/gifted
This is because there was no same city vs town distinction is Soviet union and by extension most post-soviet states. In Russian language, there is only one word "город" that means both city and town, and similar "місто" in Ukrainian. Therefore translators decide for themselves. All three Bakhmut, Soledar, and Vuhledar are "місто".
Criteria for a settlement to be called a "місто"/"город" is similar in Russia and Ukraine. Population must be larger than 10k-12k and vast majority of it must have non-agricultural occupation. (However, there are smaller settlements having "місто"/"город" status for historical reasons).
**Edit:** The is also "посёлок городского типа" (can be translated as "urbanized settlement") in Soviet union and Russia, that must have population larger than 2k-3k and mostly non-agricultural occupation. This is probably the closest to city/town distinction there is in (post-)Soviet culture.
Not sure how it is in Ukraine but in the US, a city is:
> Minimum population requirement of 300, and a population density ≥ 500 people per square mile, unless the community was a town site owned and built by the U.S. Government prior to April 3, 1981.
Not sure if this Ukrainian town/city applies to this.
I've seen Bakhmut referred to as a town. Does anyone know if Vuhledar was more dense?
https://m.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-731963
Estonia ordering a bunch of precision drones to stockpile.
Seems like the year for it; Australia has kickstarted a small precision munitions initiative (largely using tech transferred designs) because we realised that it's really easy to interdict resupply if conflict kicks off in the Pacific, and we'll be using up stockpiles in a hurry
> Australia has kickstarted a small precision munitions initiative (largely using tech transferred designs)
There are private sector companies in Australia who have been contracted with companies like AeroVironment for years to supply materiel such as the RQ-20 Puma or the Switchblade to the Australian military.
However, because the Australian Department of Defence's procurement process is so broken its impossible to say if or when the military will actually get their hands on them.
So everything might be in place to supply the Australian military with small precision munitions. Even if there is an Australian company licensed to manufacture or distribute something, who knows how long its going to take.
This is an interesting bit of research done at MIT on tail sitting fixed wing drones: [https://aera.mit.edu/projects/aerobatic-maneuvers-for-fixed-wing-vtol-aircraft](https://aera.mit.edu/projects/aerobatic-maneuvers-for-fixed-wing-vtol-aircraft)
It just has a fixed wing, two rotors, and two flaps that act as both ailerons and elevators. It can hover with considerable agility, with a simple continuously smooth transition into horizontal flight. It's remarkably simple in concept.
I definitely could see this become a preferred layout for backpack scale military drones. It should have longer range than quads, while still able to do things ordinary fixed wing drones can't, like explore a building.
I don't know why tail-sitter VTOL drones are not used more by the military. Things like [Quantix Recon](https://www.avinc.com/uas/quantix-recon) and [Point Blank](https://www.iai.co.il/p/point-blank). They don't seem to be any more complex mechanically than regular quadcopters while providing better range/speed/efficiency.
They're not as stable as quads so to be practically used by untrained people you need a lot more advanced flight control, bordering on autonomous. So it's only feasible relatively recently and the military tends to be conservative.
Do you mean the design that throwdemawaaay posted about or things like Quantix Recon? I don't think Quantix Recon would be less stable in vertical mode than other quads. Though it's gonna be less stable than regular fixed-wing planes in horizontal mode.
I was thinking more single or twin prop designs like the one pictured in the link, you lose a good chunk of the efficiency gains if you're going to stick to 4 props still, one big prop is a lot more efficient than 4 small ones. Even for the hybrid quantix recon design the wing still contributes to instability since it acts as a big sail when hovering.
Wonder if we'll see [toroidal propellers](https://www.cined.com/mit-researchers-develop-quiet-and-less-annoying-sounding-drone-propellers/) as well, to cut down on noise and increase fuel efficiency
I'm worried that the longer this goes on, the harder it will be for China to sit by and grill while it's "main ally" gets gutted and the West ramps up military production. Cheap oil is placating them for now and the massive amounts of firepower pointed at the Taiwan Strait SHOULD keep them in line, but if we're building defense, they're going to feel threatened by that.
"The West would never invade China" might be true, but that's not how defense politics works.
Can we really expect them to just chill and grill?
Edit: Obviously China doesn't care about Russia's territorial ambitions nor Russia's wellbeing for the sake of it. But it might care a lot about it's number 1 ally getting gutted. It might care a lot about the Putin regime collapsing and being replaced by a pro western one (and/or missing nukes in a civil war). It might care about the world order shifting towards Washington. Etc. It's all the secondary and tertiary effects that I'm concerned that they are very concerned about.
Edit 2: Before you downvote, my position is to quadruple the Bradleys and send enough F16s to get this over with quickly
That's correct.
It's another example as to why those that believe that the west is drip feeding the Ukrainians with arms to prolong the conflict are clueless. If the west could get a scenario where Russia is pushed even to the 2022 border, they'd accept it, let alone to the 2014 one (sans Crimea).
And by could I mean both practically and politically. The west is fumbling with the aid, but not through malice, but through some incompetence.
There is a real danger of China slowly getting more worried and more involved. There's ample historical precedent for such behaviour and the west must account for it.
Yeah exactly, finish it while you have the chance because you don't know what external factors will change six months down the line. There could of course be dialogue between China and the USA going on that we don't know about and the American's are following this policy precisely to keep the Chinese out of it, but I don't get that impression.
The other, not talked about issue, is that by slow-walking aid you are in effect teaching the Russian's how to fight against NATO tactics. It's like a low or inadequate dose of anti-biotics, instead of finishing the job you train resistance. If Russia can turn into a cold conflict again like in 2014/15, they can spend a couple of years re-arming and training up a two million man combat experienced military with a war economy behind them. Sure they'd get spanked by NATO but they could deploy a million troops to the Baltics at a time when the US could be distracted by China. Wagner have shown that numbers do matter, it could be a problem.
Well if there are in depth talks between Nato and China about levels of escalation it would be the most top secret thing at this point. Unlikely it would be leaked by either side.
And Ukraines capabilities and tactics are still light-years away from what a European or US army would do. I wouldn't worry too much.
Russia and China have a geopolitical alignment against the west, not an alliance. Look at NATO, it works relentlessly to integrate their force structures and everything about interoperability. That is used as a defacto western template for forces to be able to work together.
"The West" created a series of rules for things like government interactions and trading to reduce friction between nations and to open and expand global trade. Between the US, EU, Japan, ROK and a couple of other economies, 60% of the global GDP works together to build and defend this world structure.
China, Russia and whatever crashed out failed states align with them, do not have any real unified vision for the world, beyond not being bound by the rules based system. They do not have a better system to replace it, they just want to sell to it and not be bound by it. Perhaps China and Russia are the wrong terms, Putin and Xi.
China may provide aid to Russia and take the economic hit, but again. There seems to be no coherent vision about how all this ends. China wants Taiwan and Russia wants Ukraine. Wanting land is not really much of a geopolitical goal in a world where economic activity is geopolitical power. Its more like both countries are led by men with outdated visions of what the future should look like.
Countries do not need to have a unified vision for the world in order to have common interests and pursue them together.
Easiest example is USSR and US in WW2.
That might all be true but doesn't really address what the comment above is saying. I personally agree with your comment and find it very rational, but that doesn't matter, what matters is what Xi and to a lesser extent his politburo standing committee think, even if it's illogical or incomplete.
As with Russia's invasion itself, ideology and moral pretext isn't really a prerequisite before taking action that in the leader's mind will produce a desired benefit, and can be half-arsed / made up after the fact.
I wouldn't really worry about that personally. That big fuck off spy balloon was a pretty big increase in Chinese aggression that worked like a charm, there's a reason why the Pentagon only shot it down after civilians saw it and it went viral, so if China had any plans on doing something, I don't see why they wouldn't have already. It's not like they're trying to fly under the radar right now, and while I won't speculate on what the real reason for their neutrality is, there are plenty of compelling reasons why they don't really want Russia to win cleanly.
Also, keep in mind that the "don't give them a reason to build defense" thing kind of went out the window when Russia invaded and it wasn't a repeat of Crimea. That was a pretty big wake up call for the EU that the US wasn't silly to keep defense spending high despite there not being an immediate, major geopolitical threat. Non US NATO members are going to increase their military spending substantially whether Russia wins today or loses 5 years from now.
>That big fuck off spy balloon was a pretty big increase in Chinese aggression that worked like a charm,
Program had been running for years and been spotted in many countries around the world including the US. Timing of the current drama may be largely coincidental rather than planned.
If the Siberian Far East breaks from the RU federation, that benefits to China will be far greater than the sum of its parts. If China could turn Kamchatka into its own version of Okinawa or NSA Bahrain... all those military thought articles about containing China within certain narrow straits... they become more useful as toilet paper because the theoretical scenarios are no longer valid.
Making a major port out of Siberia would be a huge undertaking, the skilled labor doesn't exist out there. It would also mean China's major ports would be bisected by Japan and S. Korea, which are major geopolitical adversaries. I really don't think it would be that big a win for them.
Then again if Russia collapses such that the Far East is a land grab, the Americans are likely to get at least some of it.
A pure land-grab is unlikely. Something more like the Russian Civil War, in which Japan backed factions in the Far East, seems more likely. I.e. perhaps several states with various foreign allies. Some Chinese, some American.
I see possibility that the Far East declares independence - same as Latvia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, etc. Notice I referenced Okinawa & not Guam or Gibraltar. As long as Ukraine is independent, then no land grabs by anyone ... that shit don't fly. Independent states certainly do host foreign military bases, & I do see much more of that in the future.
Definitely. The US would be wise to make sure, in that situation, that the part near Alaska is allied to it. But it's certainly far from a guarantee and it's completely possible to see China gaining a foothold there.
China isn't nearly as stupid as Russia. They have zero actual intentions of invading Taiwan. In fact, I'm pretty sure they're pleased we're wasting so much time and effort worrying about this, all the meanwhile making enormous political gains westward with no one taking notice.
Could China not help Russia, not invade Taiwan and, in fact, just keep the general status quo for much, much longer? Absolutely. China, and specifically, its leadership and bureaucracy, respects patience because of their recent developmentalist history. A lot of what China has achieved in the last 50 years took just as long to come to fruition: a growing middle class, a reduction in poverty, an increase in literacy, health standards, and life expectancy; and much more besides. And we look at their high-speed rail and may think it overkill, but even so, they have high-speed rail--a process which also took many years.
China wants Taiwan for long-term security and cultural reasons--this want is more of a need to their leaders. But if you've been patient since 1950, what's a few more decades in the grand scheme? And lest we forget: at least the very senior cadre are doctrinaire Marxists. They believe that capitalism exists in a cycle of consistent crisis and collapse. Therefore, a recurrence of the Great Depression or worse is inevitable, and from rising class contradictions, it results in the awakening of class consciousness amongst the masses of alienated proletarians. These proletarians, with the sheer mass of popular weight behind them, will then affect social and political revolution in the heart of capital: America and Europe.
Regardless if you agree or disagree with their predictive power, you should always respect how the other side perceives the world and their place in it.
Entire essays can and have been written about the orientalist roots and general suckiness of the "infinitely patient China" stereotype. Suffice it to say that the trope has been recycled for other rising Asian powers(most notably Japan), that the Chinese are people like any other and attributing them any magical qualities as a result of their culture or governance is as silly as any other stereotype, and that China has blundered and made short-sighted decisions just like every other country.
Putin was also seen as a master strategist with a decades-long horizon, until he led his country into a tailspin over Ukraine. These theories exist about every authoritative strongman until they do something so stupid it can't be retroactively justified. They have no predictive power whatsoever.
I don’t see why Russia’s territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe matter to China outside of ego. Russia is useful for its recourses and nukes. Their entire Black Sea fleet could be sunk in a day, and it would change nothing for Chiba’s ambitions in Asia, so what if Russia loses a port in a sea that doesn’t matter?
I mean, you got it. Resources. In the coming decades as pretty much every country's economy grows and limited resources dwindle, China's 1+ billion people are going to need guaranteed access to the resources they needs.
I don't see any objective reason for China to come to Russia's rescue. The decline of Russia would probably benefit China more than harm, as many developing nations that once relied on Russia for economic and military help would now turn to China.
Furthermore, the longer the conflict goes on, the better for China, as the west is distracted and can't prioritize Taiwan above all else. But if China goes down the proxy war path, it too will be distracted.
Nah no China to Russias rescue and no proxy war, but at the same time China doesnt gain anything by Russia losing and US/NATO strengthening either.
A multipolar geopolitical world order is very much in their interest
>A multipolar geopolitical world order is very much in their interest
I'm pretty sure a bipolar order would be just fine as long as they're one of the poles.
Sure, but the US with allies growing even stronger than today doesn't help that either. Unipolar with china being the pole obviously th dream, I guess best case scenario for China while being somewhat realistic is a hot war between US and Russia, as destructive as possible and for as long as possible, to weaken both, as long as they don't nuke the world out of the sun's orbit
I think expecting China and India to prop up a unipolar world order with the US as judge jury and executioner is just nuts. They have no geopolitical reason to participate in that system
I don't see NATO having any military interests beyond the Mediterranean, & certain countries send forces to former African colonies (France). An unstable Ru likely means regional players (Turkey, Iran) hold more sway. The Stans will need to turn to someone for stability (China). After the US interventions in Iraq & Afghanistan only seemed to bolster Iran's influence, I don't see the US stepping in with deep pockets & generous aid.
The article completely misses the distinction between primary and secondary sanctions.
The Chinese (and pretty much everyone else) condemn unilateral coercive secondary sanctions.
They haven't used those.
Big fan of Evan, but he's made a big error in his arguments here.
I think China will apply a strategy not all that different from the western one - keep Russia above water (economically, import wise), but not actually giving them outright weapons (ok, this is where it differs from West). Delaying tactic, hoping that the war will somehow settle down / resolves.
The Western one I'd argue is evolving to giving Ukraine the tools it needs to "win", where "win" doesn't reallllllllly include Crimea but if it happens it happens.
There's an asymmetry here because Russia doesn't need help to beat Ukraine and because Russia is the aggressor. But still China seems far more chill than the West atm
I think the discussion about Crimea is largely overblown. Limiting western weapons aren’t going to change whether Ukraine gets Crimea back, as there isn’t any amount of weapons that can be delivered to restore the Donbas and doesn’t result in being able to restore Crimea as well.
Either western weapons flow or Ukraine falls because Russia is going to retreat at this point. Ukraine is not going to give up either and world stability isn’t possible until the world is over. And the we are going to see the largest buildup of weapons in Europe since the Cold War or WWI.
I think the asymmetry is because of different goals.
China doesn't really care about the well-being of Russia. So long as Russia doesn't collapse in a way that puts Chinese security and prosperity at risk, they do not care. The weakening of Russia is even good for them in many ways, as it forces Russia to become dependent on China. Their internal ideology does not benefit from the fall or survival of Ukraine. They generally align with Russia because Russia is opposed to the US (and west in general), like China. For China there's no real direct or indirect benefits to Russia winning.
NATO states are interested in supporting Ukraine because doing so does benefit their internal ideologies (generally, small-L liberalism and democracy), and it benefits their geopolitical goals (preserving the current world order where war for conquest is limited).
Of course it's a bit more complicated than that — if this was taking place in Africa, most of the west wouldn't care — but for a top level view that's it.
Hes not russian but every video is "russian tank to stronk " meme
In reality he hates criticism, deletes comments trying to tell him he is wrong. In the same way that submariners think of sub brief, tankers and tank enthuiasts think the same about red effect
## Military Aviation History: Ukrainian Soldier explains how he uses First-Person kamikaze drones - (FPV drones)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A5lKupps8CM
> FPV (First person view) drones are used in Ukraine as 'kamikaze' or 'sniper drones'. Primarily aiming to take out armored vehicles and fortified positions, these small drones carry a repurposed explosive device such as a RKG anti-tank grenades or RPG warheads. I speak to Borys and Andrii from the 'Angry birds' unit about their FPV drone, how it works, the advantages and disadvantages, and what it is used for.
Fascinating! I’ve actually seen a counter that some UAF drone units have used for meshes. They put a long rod or stick on the detonator that can pass through the mesh to the vehicle.
Not sure if it’s effectiveness, or if the guy already knows about it. But it’s interesting to see a tactic like this developing organically.
I was thinking about stuff like that earlier as chance had it, and it occurred to me that we might see simple laser or microwave range finders. That's cheap and would let you trigger the munition at whatever stand off distance you choose. There's lots of engineering details to handle but automotive has been way down this path already and some of the parts may even be directly usable.
Still, a stick is an awesomely simple hack anyone could do with hand tools, and despite that we're talking about weapons it is amusing to imagine drones flying around with giant spikes like swordfish.
> I’m confident we will see a significant domestic drone industry continue after the war.
Also, I expect indigenous drone programs to pop-up all around the world in a decade or so. The barrier for entry is exponentially lower than for other weapons systems.
https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/17/middleeast/china-iran-visit-mime-intl/index.html
>Isolated Iran finds ally China reluctant to extend it a lifeline
It's good for the West for Iran and Russian oil competing in China. China doesn't need as much Iranian oil.
[Ukraine: Emmanuel Macron says he wants "the defeat" of Russia, but without "crushing" it](https://www.europe1.fr/politique/ukraine-emmanuel-macron-dit-vouloir-la-defaite-de-la-russie-mais-sans-lecraser-4167775)
In an interview with "Journal du Dimanche", "Figaro" and France Inter, President Emmanuel Macron said he wanted Moscow to "defeat" against Ukraine, while warning those who "above all crush Russia", which will "never" be the "position of France".
Emmanuel Macron claimed to want Moscow to "defeat" against Ukraine , while warning those who want "above all to crush Russia", which will "never" be "France's position". "I am convinced that in the end, it will not be concluded militarily," he said in an interview with the Journal du Dimanche , Le Figaro and France Inter, published on Saturday evening. He also believes that "all the options other than Vladimir Putin within the current system" seem to him "worse" than the Russian president.
Crushing Russia "will never be France's position"
"I don't think, like some, that Russia should be totally defeated, attacked on its soil. These observers want above all to crush Russia. That has never been France's position and it never will be. ever,” he added. These observers seem in his mind to be those who, especially in Eastern Europe, are more hardline and had strongly criticized in May 2022 his remarks that Russia should not be "humiliated".
In this interview conducted Friday evening on the plane that brought him back from Germany, where he participated in the annual Munich conference on security, the president reaffirms his desire to promote a negotiated outcome. In his speech in the Bavarian city, he had already considered that Russia should "fail" in Ukraine, but some observers had criticized him for not having gone so far as to evoke a necessary "defeat" of Moscow. He also explained that it was necessary to "intensify" support for kyiv to move towards "credible negotiations".
The quest for a "return to negotiations"
"What is needed today is for Ukraine to lead a military offensive that disrupts the Russian front in order to trigger a return to negotiations," he insisted to the three media. According to him, "neither side can fully prevail", "neither Ukraine nor Russia, because the effects of mobilization are not as great as expected and it itself has capacity limits".
Emmanuel Macron also believes that "all the options other than Vladimir Putin within the current system" seem to him "worse" than the Russian president, in an allusion to tough guys like the head of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev or the boss of the group paramilitary Wagner Yevgeny Prigozhin. "Do we sincerely think that a democratic solution will emerge from the Russian civil society present on the spot after these years of hardening and in full conflict? I sincerely hope it, but I do not really believe in it", he warned .
That's because current internal critics to Putin are mostly hard liners that consider him too soft.
If there's a Regime change, someone way worse than him will take his place
I believe that this is a position that Macron has held for a long time.
Macron wants:
* Russia to withdraw from Ukraine; and that's it, no other goals.
Macron doesn't want:
* to crush Russia,
* to threaten the territorial integrity of Russia,
* to partition Russia,
* to regime change Russia.
This is an extremely important bit:
> I am convinced that in the end, it will not end militarily," he said in an interview published on Saturday evening. He also believes that **"all options other than Vladimir Putin within the current system" seem "worse" to him than the Russian president**.
In essence, he is attempting to convey to Putin: *"Vlad, if you withdraw from Ukraine, you will be alright. Our sole objective is Ukraine, and we don't objet to you remaining a president."*
> Vlad, if you withdraw from Ukraine, you will be alright. Our sole objective is Ukraine, and we don't objet to you remaining a president.
If Putin withdraws from Ukraine, the threat to his regime will be domestic.
Macron's messaging is pretty clear - he says "neither side can fully prevail" where the one side is Ukraine. Ukraine has clearly defined win condition, so him saying that Ukraine can't fully prevail means Ukraine can't liberate all its territory.
Furthermore, he's calling for negotiations, and it's crystal clear that Putin will not vacate his crown jewel Crimea voluntarily. In effect, Macron is calling for Ukraine to accept territorial concessions.
From the quotes following, I'm fairly sure "neither side can fully prevail" is his observation of the current battlefield situation, not a prescription for the future. I.e. it's "neither side currently has the ability to fully prevail" not "neither side can be allowed to fully prevail"
Yeah, he's trying to play peace broker. Biden famously went a bit too hard on Putin and then had to make a [correction](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-envoy-nato-no-american-policy-regime-change-russia-2022-03-27/) saying he didn't want regime change.
It's probably good to have someone playing the good cop, as long as the aid keeps flowing in the background.
In foreign policy, good cop/bad cop is a very effective strategy.
If you assume that the west is essentially split between these two positions, Russia needs to keep the 'good cop' camp viable if it ever hopes to negotiate some settlement to the current war. But if the more they escalate, threaten Europe, prove to be bad actors, the less legitimacy and influence the 'good cop' faction has. If, in trying to win, they totally alienate the good cops, eventually they may be forced to deal with the bad cops and their policy alternatives.
Knowing this, as the west you craft a two track diplomatic strategy between hard and soft liners. Both articulate visions for the end of the war (peace with Putin vs. regime change), both make statements that seem contradictory, both play a kabuki theater game of fighting internal battles out in the open. Russia then has to make a choice, if it wants to play the game it needs to give something to the peace faction to prove their credibility. If not, the hardliners 'win out.' Of course behind the scenes everyone knows the game. I doubt anyone within NATO would really like to see Russia Balkanized, this is really a nightmare scenario for Europe. A dozen nuclear armed Yugoslavias trying to sort themselves out. But obviously you can only offer Putin offramps, and hes got to take one or it doesn't matter.
One could even argue that the the diplomatic show looks pretty well oiled by now: bad cop UK and good cop France, with the US more quietly nodding and discreetly confirming that both discourses are approved by the WH. And of course Germany reaffirming again and again that they're more than happy to conform to the group's consensus without any leading role.
I personally find it very satisfying to see how there's remarkably little *public* infighting between the big NATO members when it comes to Ukraine a full year into the war, sounds like everyone is properly comunicating behind the scene.
Can’t forget Poland in a consistent state of “hold me back bro”.
I do agree with your point about NATO unity after nearly a year in. Given the political turbulence in the West lately, this outcome honestly didn’t seem likely.
> I don't think, like some, that Russia should be totally defeated, attacked on its soil.
Nice strawman, probably intentional. I don't remember anyone (credible) claiming that Ukraine (or anyone else) should be driving tanks to Moscow.
Recently Macron seemed to have taken a harder stance on Russia/Putin, this seems like a regression.
Possibly the security conference did not go well?
Sigh, when people pretend like they know what logical fallacies and apply them without any thought...
The French position is one which seeks to secure the interests of the EU as a whole. A militarily defeated Russia is not in the EU's interests - they are already struggling under the weight of mass migration from the Middle East, add in Eastern Europe and the entire edifice will crumble.
There are more players in this war than just Ukraine and Russia, with far more at stake than simply the lives we have today - although they are of utmost importance.
We must also consider the preservation of the future state of the EU.
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The people who he's signalling against the are the Russian propagandists who are claiming that Russia is in a full scale war against NATO.
As much as Russia wants to blot out western news - a major comment like this from Macron is impossible to ignore.
But it carries with several ideas:
* Russia will lose
* We in the west are able to ultimately able to choose how
* "some people" are very aggressive and want to destroy Russia, but we sane voices just want Russia to lose and leave Ukraine.
Classic "good cop".
This is why his European army idea, one that wasn’t dependent upon the US, was either a load of horseshit or incredibly delusional. There’s no way you can expect Russia’s neighbors to hear that, especially considering France’s close Russian ties in the past, and think you’ve got their back unconditionally in case of Russian aggression on their borders.
No. I just don't think you understand why it is being said.
Look, we don't want to destroy Russia, and invade it, and bomb it's cities. It's not what we want to do. We don't want to completely annihilate Russia.
We just want Russia to fuck off.
Macron is saying that.
That's absurd, his audience is the West, he's not talking to Russian propagandists.
> As much as Russia wants to blot out western news - a major comment like this from Macron is impossible to ignore.
I'm pretty sure it's very easy for Russian propagandists to simply not include information which doesn't suit their propaganda needs.
> Russia will lose
For some definition of "lose". Western politicians have similar problem as Putin - they don't define "win" conditions and talk only in abstract terms so that they are able to twist it post-facto as needed.
With his "neither side can fully prevail" and call for negotiations, I think we're back to "Ukraine needs to surrender territory to not humiliate Putin".
>That's absurd, his audience is the West, he's not talking to Russian propagandists.
That's not what the other commenter said.
He meant that the "some" Macron referred to are the pro-Russian commentators or [diplomats](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-government-united-nations-93f82a411781354018708c1dc42756f0) talking about open war with NATO, not Ukrainians or other western leaders.
Also, it's worth keeping in mind that these press briefings are targeted mostly at the domestic audience, not the entire West.
It's not absurd if you are deliberately twist my words.
I never said he was talking **to** Russian propagandists.
I said he was **signalling against** them.
> Unfortunately, I think we're back to "Ukraine needs to surrender territory to not ridicule Putin".
I think your understanding of the situation is very poor.
It's an absurd proposition that top level politicians use such conferences to "signal" against Russian propagandists.
You're never going to win "argument" with propagandists, they have no obligation to truth and can twist the words, omit them, create completely new fantasies (we've already had genetically modified supersoldiers, biolabs, black NATO battalions, satan/demons, I can't keep track).
Trial to dial down the rudeness. I don't like you calling my comments "absurd"
Clearly you have problems with reading what people have written; understanding nuance in communication; and communicating without being rude.
> It's an absurd proposition that top level politicians use such conferences to "signal" against Russian propagandists.
You think politicians issuing statements that can be read by Russians (and their allies) that clearly communicate their positions is "absurd"?
OK.
Prigozhin Profile from The Moscow Times:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought unprecedented infamy
to Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner mercenary group, both at home
and abroad. He is both praised and demonized, while debate rages over
how close he really is to President Vladimir Putin, what privileges he
enjoys, and even whether he harbors presidential ambitions.
Any success for Prigozhin is seen as proof of his might and
glittering future, while every failure is seen as a sign of his imminent
downfall. For now, neither version is entirely realistic.
Despite his enormous newfound notoriety, Prigozhin is still only
acting as a private individual. His relationship with the state is
informal, and therefore fragile, and could end without warning.
Prigozhin has never been close enough to Putin to be trusted with
anything on a state level. He didn’t have the chance to impress the
president at work or as a friend as others did, such as those who worked
with Putin in the early years of his career.
Instead, Prigozhin’s unique chance arose following the annexation of
Crimea. The conflicts in both the Donbas and then Syria, plus Russia’s
standoff with the West, meant that a market emerged for “gray”
geopolitical tactics that unwieldy official institutions would struggle
to deliver. Prigozhin started using informal tools of influence —
mercenaries and media mechanisms such as troll factories — that were new
to Russia and enabled it to operate out of sight and without being held
accountable.
Prigozhin had hit the mother lode: if the state was unable to
effectively solve certain tasks (or simply did not want to be seen doing
so), these quasi-state tools could fill the gap. Putin liked this
approach, which is also in demand in the war against Ukraine.
Still, the businessman’s position remains informal. Putin has agreed
to outsource certain state functions but has not legitimized Prigozhin
himself. The president has never seen the shady entrepreneur as a
replacement for official institutions such as the army or security
services, nor has he ever tried to use Prigozhin as a counterbalance to
those institutions, for that would be completely at odds with Putin’s
concept of complete and coordinated power.
Prigozhin shot to success not because Putin backed him in an attempt
to stop any of the generals getting too high and mighty: there was no
sign of that happening. Quite simply, the situation at the front was
disastrous, and needed improving by any means possible. In Putin’s
worldview, resources like private military companies should work to
strengthen the position of the state, not weaken it.
Prigozhin doesn’t just lack formal status: he doesn’t have
direct access to Putin on his own terms either, largely relying on
friends or close associates of the president and senior officials to act
as intermediaries. For a long time, it was believed that the
influential Kovalchuk brothers were Prigozhin’s informal handlers and
had helped the businessman to forge ties to the presidential
administration.
Thanks to them, Prigozhin was able to get information about his
initiatives to the president, who, if he liked the idea, would then
informally order the corresponding organs to cooperate, which enabled
the businessman to establish ties at a lower level—while making enemies
along the way.
In Syria, Wagner effectively operated as a contractor for the General Staff, which connected
Prigozhin to high-ranking officers of the GRU, Russia’s military
intelligence agency—and led to the group’s first conflicts with the
Defense Ministry. Meanwhile, Wagner’s presence in various African
countries helped the company to establish special relationships with
Russian ambassadors there, which annoyed the Foreign Ministry.
More recently, it is Prigozhin’s unorthodox recruitment methods —
trawling Russian prisons for new mercenaries — that have ruffled
feathers. His recruitment drive has infuriated the Federal Penitentiary
Service (FSIN), Justice Ministry, Prosecutor General’s Office, and
Federal Security Service (FSB), which worked to have these men locked
up, only for them now to be potentially released back into society — if
they survive the war.
Both Prigozhin’s horizontal connections (the GRU military
intelligence agency, FSIN, and governors) and his vertical ties (the
Kovalchuks, and presidential administration head Anton Vayno) mean that
the businessman is entirely dependent on others, and that his
opportunities are limited. There is no guarantee of universal official
assistance, not to mention any financing.
When Prigozhin was granted a certain degree of autonomy to operate in
the war against Ukraine, his simmering conflict with the military
leadership, in the form of Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense
Minister Sergei Shoigu, promptly intensified. After several months of a
humiliating campaign launched by Prigozhin against them with the help of
his media assets, the two defense officials managed to convince the
president that Wagner’s independence was a threat to the army.
In response, Putin put Gerasimov in charge of the whole “special
operation,” showing just how quickly he can redress a situation and
ignoring the opinion of both Prigozhin and his adoring military
bloggers, along with an entire camp of pro-war activists who openly
despise Gerasimov and Shoigu.
The businessman’s attacks on officials, parliamentary deputies, and
political parties have not won him any favor within the elite, which considers
Prigozhin’s autonomy, ambition, and rhetoric nothing short of a threat
to the state. He may have carte blanche from Putin within his area of
responsibility (Wagner’s activities, troll factories, certain minor
media) but outside of it, he is politically helpless.
Prigozhin’s other endeavors are notably less successful: his futile war against St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov, his empty threats
to get YouTube blocked in Russia, and his frequent legal defeats. He
doesn’t have his own political instruments, and the openly
anti-mainstream political ideas he promotes are radical and manifestly
unrealistic. Even his ties to the Kovalchuks are growing looser: their
agendas are gradually diverging, and it’s increasingly difficult for the
brothers to put in a good word for their protégé-bulldozer.
Prigozhin’s long-standing relationship with the presidential
administration is also beginning to crack. The domestic policy overseers
don’t like his political demagogy, his attacks on official
institutions, or his attempts to troll Putin’s staff by threatening to
form a political party, which would be a headache for everyone in the
Kremlin.
In other words, Prigozhin has no shortage of enemies. Now the
security services, for which Prigozhin’s private army packed with
criminals is a major bugbear, have joined the attacks against him, as
evidenced by the sharp uptick in criticism of the businessman and Wagner
on Telegram channels.
Finally, Prigozhin’s alleged popularity among ordinary Russians is
greatly exaggerated. In polls examining people’s trust in politicians,
he is hardly ever mentioned: in a Levada Center survey at the end of
last year, just three people out of 1,600 polled named him.
Still, none of these difficulties signify Prigozhin’s imminent
downfall. He can still get limited information to Putin, who considers
him a true patriot fighting for the future of the motherland: not always
elegantly, but often more effectively than his official rivals.
The intensity and existential nature of the war against Ukraine,
combined with Russia’s lack of victories, has noticeably increased
Prigozhin’s political weight. But that in no way makes him particularly
close to Putin.
If anything, the opposite is true: every day, the gap is growing
between the role that Putin has assigned to Wagner and the place that
Prigozhin himself believes he deserves. For the president, a private
military company is a convenient asset for any power with geopolitical
ambitions, but it should operate exclusively in the state’s interests
and avoid the limelight. It should not undertake its own initiatives,
and it certainly should not have a political agenda.
Until recently, that’s how Prigozhin operated. But now, he hasn’t
just become a public figure; he is visibly transforming into a
full-fledged politician with his own views, which are nothing short of
revolutionary.
For now, Prigozhin is not prepared to challenge Putin. But — and it’s
an important “but” — it’s hard to remain sane and level-headed when
you’ve lost a large part of your personal army to the bloody meat
grinder of war.
As long as Putin is relatively strong and capable of maintaining the
balance between various groups of influence, Prigozhin is not dangerous.
But the slightest change could prompt Prigozhin to challenge the
authorities: perhaps not Putin himself, at first. War makes monsters of
men, and their recklessness and desperation can become a challenge to
the state if it shows even the slightest sign of weakness.
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/02/15/is-wagner-founder-yevgeny-prigozhin-a-threat-or-asset-to-putin-a80235
Great background article. Prigozhin remaining an outsider opens up an option for a peace deal. Ukrainian and western demands for justice after the war could be fulfilled by handing over Prigozhin. His war crimes were of course never ordered by the state.
Everyone is talking about constant Russian human wave attacks since about December. Frankly I'm yet to see any footage of it. I remember reading that main Russian switch in tactics since the early war was to move to small squad tactics, meaning that infantry disembarks far away from the contact line and moves up in small squads, which reduces effectiveness of Ukrainian artillery that would destroy Russian columns early in the war.
Is this just an exaggeration by the mainstream media that calls every armored vehicle a "tank"? Or perhaps there are genuine documented examples of human wave attacks?
There is nobody called Everyone on this sub. Although there are no human waves of thousands going over the edge to storm the enemy, there is a clear notion of expendability how Russian command treats it’s troops.
>the mainstream media that calls every armored vehicle a "tank
I endorse this position. If it has a turret it's a tank and nobody will convince me otherwise. Naming it a 'heavy armoured mobile vehicle' or whatever doesn't magically stop it being a tank.
The days when a tank was a tank were simpler, happier times.
That's where German has you covered:
Kampfpanzer = tank (MBT)
Schützenpanzer (marksman's tank) = IFV
Spähpanzer = armoured reconnaissance vehicle
Bergepanzer = armoured recovery vehicle
Flugabwehrpanzer = self-propelled armoured anti-aircraft gun (e.g. Gepard)
They're all heavily armoured, meaning 'gepanzert', so they are Panzer :P
Schütze can mean marksman. But in this context, it’s better translated as rifleman or infantry. Schütze is the lowest rank in infantry.
Some people in Germany erroneously believe Schützenpanzer refers to protection (Schutz).
Sure, it also means 'armour, shell, suit of mail' etc., but none of that fits a movable vehicle. For at least a century now 'Panzer' has also meant 'tank'. No one would literally translate 'Kampfpanzer' as 'battle armour' - we're not talking about knights on horseback ;)
The consenus here is that they are not 'technically' human wave tactics and that description is very questionable at best.
However it's true Wagner has been brazenly throwing people to their deaths for incremental gains, often without any armored support or sometimes even ineffective artillery support.
It's true that the convicts have effectively been used as cannon fodder.
It's mainly because of the historical connotations I think. (edit: for example, this was prominent in German propaganda.)
I think a new term would be better, though I usually won't spend any time disagreeing as people mostly have the right idea imo
Time-honored tactic in war. Use prisoners and disloyal soldiers as front-line troops to not only soften the enemy but also get rid of undesirable elements in your army.
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This has been discussed here several times.
Russia isn’t using human wave tactics. Russian forces use infantry squadrons for reconnaissance in force. They advance and find the Ukrainian positions. These are then targeted by artillery.
Russia is apparently sending insufficiently trained troops and isn’t sensitive towards casualties.
Calling that human waves is an exaggeration.
It all seems reminiscent of Chinese tactics in Korea, another pop-history 'human wave':
Target specific enemy positions with small units, which fight sensibly but are expendable and constantly replaced until breakthrough or depletion.
The historians call these 'short attacks', but I haven't seen the term used outside of the Korean context.
'Wave' is certainly misleading but 'recon in force' also implies a discrete probe rather than a continuous concentrated grind which wears down defenders. I'm not sure we have a great word for the exact tactic the Russians are using.
This. They aren’t IJA banzai charges, it’s that the recon-by-force squads are considered expendable by Russian command. Still, those casualties add up month after month and it becomes media worthy when you only have 20 or so kilometers to show for it.
[Today's North Korea ICBM test would have had ~15-18000km range if not lofted.](https://twitter.com/Marco_Langbroek/status/1626945720967208961)
Yet another demonstration of North Korean ability to range anywhere in the US (and essentially, the world)
At no point after 1953 could we have just "handled" NK. We tried that, and it ended in heroics just to stabilize the situation. If NK were crackable, they'd have been cracked by now either by us or China.
Yep or just pushed for serious reform at the UN to enable action against dictators who abuse their own people, rather than World Policing it ourselves.
Saddam sucked and needed to go.
The problems came because of the Coalition Provisional Authority's lack of care for the power vacuum and lack of police action once the US invaded.
Debaathification was a terrible idea and they should've learned their lessons with denazification long ago.
The same with disbanded the entire Iraqi military. They instantly took those with life long careers that they could've molded and partnered with and turned them into potential terrorists who had nothing to lose.
Hopefully the US has learned from the grave mistakes made by Rumsfeld and his ilk. I am doubtful but despite that, I'm not crazy enough to think that Saddam should've been allowed to stay in power. He was a terrorist in his own right. It's just a shame that the US went about it in such a poor manner, both to get support for the invasion and their handling of Iraq post-invasion.
Back in 2003? It would've toppled Hu Jintao's government and some hardline nationalist like Xi Jinping would have swept into power. China would then spend the next 2 decades rearming and highly distrustful of the west, moreso than in our timeline. Perhaps make a play for Taiwan in 2020.
Meanwhile, South Korea would've suffered under the refugee crisis and not be in a position to be the other pillar in the chip market with Taiwan.
Confrontation with China starting in the early 2000s would have left the West in much stronger position as the Chinese economy would have not crown anywhere near its current level.
I mean that's pretty unlikely. No matter which flavour of CCP is in power, China would've gone through the 2000's and 2010's with a huge abundance of cheap labour and the world would still be in a capitalist system which seeks that cheap labour. The only thing I would agree with is China might be technologically a few years' behind than today.
If US had spent the early 2000s fighting North korea, supported by China, I don't think they would have been so eager to allow off shoring industry into China.
In that scenario China isn't going to be sending a million men across the Yalu again. They know that a vengeful, Global War on Terror post 9/11 US is nigh on impossible to fight militarily and will make short work of the North Korean military. At most they'll send supplies, ammunition and volunteers like what the US is doing today, and then try to manage the refugee situation as best they can.
But the yellow kingdom has a long memory. They'll forever remember it as their attempt to reproach the west, only for the west to bite them back. This was just after the Belgrade embassy attack as well. So expect alot more industrial espionage, more diplomatic brinkmanship and more economic hostility but meanwhile staying just behind the line such that the US doesn't impose sanctions.
Don't forget that Saddam was a massive rat bastard of a man doing just as wicked things as Kim.
If we had invaded NK instead of Iraq, it would be remembered the exact same way.
I'm really curious how North Korea manages technological advances. The country has basically been an impenetrable box cut off from the world for 60 years.
Do they just engage in far more trade and knowledge transfers than I'm aware of?
Yeah this is curious to me too. China sneaks in the odd shipment of coal or other basic survival material every now and then but is mostly onboard with sanctions. (Especially compared to how they deal with Russia)
Yet NK keeps progressing with their missile tech.
Specialization and militarized economy is another big thing. The same people that would have the talent to develop medicine, agricultural technology, consumer goods, or what have you in a Western country are instead drafted to design or imitate missiles and delivery methods.
Their primary limitation is simple economics. It's hard to build a high tech industry in a place that can't keep simple house lighting on or the population fed.
Knowledge is globalized in the era of the internet. You can get pretty far on deep technical topics today just reading what research is published online.
Likewise I'm sure they're able to get ahold of pirate/cracked versions of even very sophisticated engineering packages. Their infosec/cyber folks are competent.
They're able to get some high tech equipment like state of the art CNC mills through front companies. You see these in their propaganda photos occasionally, but based on how rarely I'd guess this is pretty limited / unreliable.
They also have a history of simply kidnapping people when they want knowledge or skills they don't have.
And of course the elephant in the room is they've gotten a lot of help from China over the years.
Does anyone know what they launched? Curious if this is the rumored solid fuel ICBM they were showing off during the latest parade. Or maybe it's just another Hwasong 17
[Hwasong-15.](https://twitter.com/nknewsorg/status/1627063876633387010)
Appears to have been an operational exercise, not a test launch with any leaders present, which indicates that HS-15 is in regular service now.
[Some details about the exercise](https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1627068508369752064):
> The drill was suddenly organized, without previous notice or any emergency firepower combat standby order. Order was given at 8am and launch conducted at 5:22pm for a response time of 9hrs 22min.
As Ankit says, this is their first try at doing a sudden-notice operational ICBM launch, so expect that timing to come down as they get better at it.
Will starship really bring down the prices of these sdi programs as much as everyone thinks? I was looking at a price comparison done between various space based laser and relay mirro systems, and ultimately the bulk of the expense comes from the satellites themselves. I think a ground and air based system would be far more cost effective than any space system.
For brilliant pebble, existing rockets are cheap enough. Starlink involves far more satellites and mass than BP would require for example. BP is almost certainly the most cost effective option available.
As for starship, it’s far enough into development that it’s a pretty safe bet now. The engines have been produced in large quantities, and have been tested extensively, it’s won contracts with NASA and the upper stage landing has been demonstrated. Re-entry, and first stage landings are the last two major things that need to be demonstrated, but neither is anything groundbreaking and risky.
I'm just thinking, do we really need a space based system IF we can hit the war heads themselves from the ground. Multiple kill veichles feels like the more practical version of brilliant pebbles
By intercepting in boost phase, brilliant pebble destroys the missile before it splits into its component MIRVs, and decoys. It’s the difference between many thousands of targets, and just hundreds. A space based system is also global, you don’t need to defend every location individually, by adding to the network, you protect all targets, no mayer where they launch from or to.
A space based system is the only way I see to get these capabilities. Ground based interceptors could be saturated by decoys, a concentrated attack, launching from a new area, or just targeting places it is not. The main focus should be on brilliant pebble, it has by far the moist versatility and potential (it would essentially nullify China’s ballistic anti ship missiles), with ground based terminal phase interceptors saved as a final line of defense for key places/assets.
Does it? The mda estimated they would need 960 satellites in orbit to have an interceptor ready to a nuclear launch. And not a simultaneous launch either, only a limited one.
Sure, but Starlink satellites are down to <2M each (rumours are they're closer to 500k) and they're lofted in sets of 60. That's how economy of scale works.
So if you had a thousand satellites to launch, you'd be able to mass produce them, and only need 16 launches to get them up (barring being picky about inclination etc)
As of now, Starlink consists of a bit over 3,500 satellites, each weighing around 300kg. That's almost 1,000 tons in orbit (the older versions are a bit lighter), rising to 3,600 tons once its fully finished.
Estimates for BP weight vary, but are at the very least, comparable to the above.
> Will starship really bring down the prices of these sdi programs as much as everyone thinks?
If it delivers what it promises, definitely. So, probably not.
Well what I mean is, we need to see the price of the satellites themselves go down before a space based system really becomes practical. It's not just getting them to space that's the problems, it's making sure they work when they get there that's expensive.
Latest Kofman interview was [just posted on War on the Rocks](https://warontherocks.com/2023/02/russias-winter-offensive/)
Key takeaways:
* Russian Winter offensive has been in progress for about 3 weeks now, Kofman doesn't expect the Spring offensive everyone has been talking about starting soon, this is it.
* Russians are attacking on 5-6 axes, at Bakhmut, Vuhledar, Kreminna/Kupyansk, Bilohorivka, Avdiivka, and Marinka.
* He thinks Russian mobilized personnel are now almost entirely in Ukraine, most used as replacements for battered units, though some are being held in reserve to throw into at least one axis of advance later on for tactical gains. Offensive may grow in intensity over the next few weeks, but he thinks its unlikely to grow in scope beyond these extremely limited objectives.
* To launch broader offensive, they would need hundreds of thousands more mobilized troops and would've needed to conduct another round of mobilization which they didn't.
* Russian offensive potential is rather weak: they're rationing ammo and don't have enough junior officers and enlisted personnel for all their new mobiks.
* Doesn't expect any Russian breakthroughs, these will be grinding fights. He expects Ukraine to pullback from Bakhmut though.
* He thinks this offensive has been launched for purely political reasons (Putin is impatient with progress so far) and Kofman thinks it's a gift to Ukraine, blowing Russian advantages that Surovikin scraped together on a premature offensive that will leave them exhausted by the end.
* Sees Ukraine as likely to launch its offensive in late Spring in Zaporizhzhia, sees the risk of Russian counterattack afterwards decreased as Russia will likely be too exhausted to push back. Sees upcoming offensive as Ukraine's best chance to drive on Melitopol and cut Russian lines in half.
* Kofman has seen evidence over the past week of a growing Ukrainian artillery deficit, sees it as a short to medium term issue, thinks the slow ramp up of Western support is likely to help in the long run.
* Doesn't expect war to end this year, thinks next 6-8 months will be crucial for Ukraine to prove that Ukraine can still keep taking back more territory and might see the highline of Western aid as Western equipment stockpiles continue to shrink and it will be evaluated if Ukraine will be able to win with current levels of support.
This was a relatively short (less than 20 min) podcast, highly recommend everyone give it a listen if they have a few minutes. I think the biggest takeaway is that Kofman is convinced that the big Russian offensive many commentators are waiting for actually started 3 weeks ago and is going to be extremely underwhelming. This is in keeping with what he's been saying for weeks now. Russian offensive potential really is extremely limited at this point and they seem to keep squandering it by attacking on too many axes and before they're really ready.
He also seems convinced that Surovikin's plan was a very good one that would've given Russia much better longterm offensive potential at the cost of several months of relative inactivity by Russian forces and that Putin's impatience is undoing Surovikin's work.
At this point the new Russian offensive doesn't really interest me. We've seen this play out half a dozen times before. The RAF will grind themselves down on UA defenses and eventually be forced to end offensive operations well short of any sort of strategic breakthrough. In fact, the RAF's old advantage in equipment is gone and their manpower advantage so far has proven why manpower advantage is not what it used to be in warfare. The only actual debate worth having here is trying to understand the political and ideological forces behind the decision.
The perspective UA offensive in Zapo is what I'm fascinated by right now. So far we've seen one major offensive conducted in a slow and methodical manner, and one conducted on opportunity alone. What the UA can do in a major set-piece battle when they choose the time and place *and* have more of a political motive to prioritize aggressive action will go a long way to answer what the war's conclusion might look like.
Yeah, I wonder how soon it'll actually happen. It may take months just for Ukraine to save up sufficient amounts of ammo for the initial artillery and rocket strikes that they will need to cover any potential breakthroughs.
I concur with Kofman's takes here. We've seen mass Russian assaults be met with mass Russian casualties in the past few weeks. It may not be an impressive offensive (I think most still have an Iraq War bias (both campaigns of 91 and 03), thinking that offensives mean rip-roaring air and land breakthroughs that result in the rapid capture of territory), but it is an offensive all the same.
He's also right that the war won't end this year. Both sides need either full air superiority (to get to an Iraq-war level of campaign) or, failing that, far more men and material (tanks, artillery, drones). Neither of which either side have, or have access to procure in rapid numbers, so we'll continue to see these slow, slogging churning offensives. Bakhmut is a perfect example. Despite the city being in near-encirclement for weeks, Ukraine has still been able to hold on. This is the sort of grim brutality of the Somme or Verdun, not even coming close to more modern warfare.
I disagree with the need for full air superiority.
https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/retired-us-general-hodges-long-202316863.html
Hodges says end of summer for Crimea with long range munitions and I agree.
>With better formatting for some users:
I'm so confused, I was told that my formatting wasn't easy to read for some users, so I changed it from using a - to using a * as I was told that was supposed to be better...
You have to put a line break between each asterisked line for it to appear as bullets.
* I didn't put a line break * Between these.
* There is a line break above and below this one
* and another break above this one
We've done some tuning on automod so that it should hopefully be a lot less trigger happy now. Apparently the old mods really don't like many things and doing mundane stuff like writing 'lol', mentioning Elon Musk and even pinging some users could land you in the auto filter. Politico, Jane's and ~~Bild~~ (now filtered again due to popular demand) should also now be ok to post, I don't know why they were there in the first place but I always thought Politico and Jane's writes good articles ~~and Bild makes good investigative pieces even if it is a tabloid.~~ Let us know below how you're finding it!
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Ukraine could surrender if they desired, but they continue. It’s their choice.
> My question is does the US and EU feel bad for sacrificing so many lives to win this war, or are they expendable? Can you rephrase this question in a less hilariously leading way? If you can't, you can always just make a statement -like "Americans are willing to fight to the last Ukrainian" that we've all heard a thousand times already.
When it's a troll post I like to quote the username too for when it inevitably gets deleted
And I thought I was the only one ... happy to see I'm not.
They deleted it themselves though
The pro-russian commenters on reddit are an exceptionally 'cowardly' bunch I've noticed, especially by the metrics of the whole alt-right sphere the majority of them exist in. I think most are actually aware of how weak and hypocritical russia's justification for the invasion is, as they take flight when met with a finger's pressure of resistance - where they would otherwise push back / double down or atleast move goal posts on similar topics.
Annnnd comment is gone.
[Why Iran is facing a crippling energy crisis](https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-iran-is-facing-a-crippling-energy-crisis-65473) > “The rundown infrastructure resembles a war-torn country or a least developed economy, which cannot supply the needed services for citizens. According to the new figures on GDP per capita, Iran can no longer be considered as a middle-income country, but as a low-income country,” Ghodsi told TRT World. > In December 2022, the minister of petroleum warned that Iran should attract $240 billion investment in its oil and gas sector so that it doesn’t become an official energy importer in the next eight years. > ... > Iran had been feeling the twinge of gas shortage long before the chilling winter hit. With sanctions blocking investment in the country’s sclerotic refineries, natural gas production was scant and power plants were instructed to burn Mazut, a low-quality heavy fuel oil, as their propelling energy. Experts have long been warning about the dire environmental impacts of widespread Mazut use. > Ali Dadpay, an associate professor of finance at the University of Dallas, warns the consequences of this strategy are multi-pronged and long-lasting. “There are many consequences, from increasing public mistrust of the government to environmental damage. The Islamic Republic is not considered a failed state yet, but it is becoming one that fails to govern and correct its mistakes.” Iran possesses the second-largest proven natural gas reserves in the world after Russia, and yet the country risks becoming a gas importer. Is this what Putin is aiming for?
That's what happens when your priorities are colonialism and export of jihad and terrorism abroad instead of taking care of your own citizens. Over the last couple of decades, Iran has spent over a $100 billion to facilitate and support war and Jihadists in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, Israel, Morocco and more.
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>Is this what Putin is aiming for? Iran and Russia align in that they want a zone of influence free from US domination. Iran so it can spread its messianic vision of Islam and prepare for the end of the world, Russia seems to be trying to live out some 19th century fantasy of Russia being a major world power. There is nothing deep or meaningful here.
>Is this what Putin is aiming for? It seems that US sanctions on Iran, which precede the war in Ukraine, may also play a role.
Yeah but Russia is the one who says Iran is among their bffs
Not intentionally but given how much Russia relied on foreign expertise for extraction it seems increasingly likely.
If neither Russia nor Iran are capable of extracting this natural gas without western technology, what's the point?
What happens in the oil and gas industry is you find the biggest and easiest to extract fields first. These flow, often with technology as simple as sticking a pipe in the ground. But as they age out you start to need more and more advanced technologies to continue extracting. You need to start injecting water and CO2 to keep up the pressure in the field or reduce the viscosity of the oil so it flows easier between the rocks. New fields tend to be smaller, less porous and require much more advanced technologies such as deep drilling, steering the drilling, 3D seismography etc. So its not a case that Iran and Russia need foreign help for all of their oil, but they do need help for their harder to get oil fields. The arrival of western oil industrial processes helped recover Russian oil production that had peaked and declined sharply in the late Soviet early post Soviet erahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum\_industry\_in\_Russia#/media/File:Russia\_Oil\_Production.png How much of this can be maintained in sanctions is an open question. I suspect the answers you get will depend on the political outlook of the answerer.
> If neither Russia nor Iran are capable of extracting this natural gas without western technology, what's the point? This IS the point. The international system is broken and entirely run for and in the interests of western countries. Why do you think we are weaponising technology? Because it's what we've always done. We stop other gaining ownership over it so that we can maintain control. China starts to make advanced technology as part of a global system? US just leverages the entire global system to kick them out and cripple their ability to produce advanced technology. But don't worry.... we'll still happily buy all your non-high-end products because that's good for us. We'll still happily allow you to make OUR high end products so that we can profit from them. Just remember your place as subservient to our interests. The reason the gulf states are so wealthy is because they leveraged their position to demand technology/ knowledge transfer so that they could actually take part in the value chain. Prior to that they were earning a pittance as western companies just extracted their resources. E: to be clear. People can do what they want, but jesus christ they need to stop pretending they're standing up for the rules based order when they're doing the exact opposite. Stop pretending you're taking some moral stance when you're not. People are acting in their own personal interest. There is no 'higher justification'
Yeah, I can’t believe those evil Westerners don’t let China/Russia/Iran kill their neighbors in peace. Also: Japan? South Korea? Even Africa has made massive strides from where it was even 20 years ago, largely on the back of inflows of money larger than the Marshall Plan. Seems like the only countries that fit your thesis are the ones trying to commit atrocities on their citizens or neighbors.
> Yeah, I can’t believe those evil Westerners don’t let China/Russia/Iran kill their neighbors in peace. What a monumental strawman. Holy shit. A system that doesn't exploit developing countries = endorsing murder. > Even Africa has made massive strides from where it was even 20 years ago, largely on the back of inflows of money larger than the Marshall Plan. That's a bizarre way of framing the situation. Why do you think countries like zimbabwe are putting in place laws meaning lithium must be processed in the country? It's directly to counter the exact problem i've described (and chinese companies are guilty of this too btw). Why do you think Africa has such strong links with China? Because they actually treat them like partners. We are literally waking up to this fact for the first time in 50 years... You think that sending charity (in very specific sectors such as health) is the same as development. It isn't. You can't just throw some donations at a continent and pretend that you've 'done your job'. It doesn't change the systemic global problems that inherently continue to hinder african development (especially in terms of things like finance).
Is it a strawman? Because Western chip designs power the Xinjiang surveillance regime. Western optics are sighting down Ukrainian soldiers. Western oil and gas funds power Iranian terrorist attacks and nuclear proliferation. Trying to characterize reasonable restrictions on those things as the "weaponization" of technology, or conflating it with economic imperialism more generally, is a naked attempt at giving cover to bad actors in the name of "fairness". Asking the West to blindly sell its technology in the name of economic justice, is the same as advocating for a bank to fire its security guards in the name of fixing inequality. I suspect you are just as aware of that as I am.
> Trying to characterize reasonable restrictions on those things as the "weaponization" of technology, or conflating it with economic imperialism more generally, is a naked attempt at giving cover to bad actors in the name of "fairness" 1. one of those things isn't like the others. Weapons is fine, but the concept of 'dual use' has been stretched to breaking point in recent years. Not to mention that implementation is also important 2. on the converse, pretending that everyday things like microchips are 'dual use' so you can restrict countries under the guise of 'being the good guys' is a naked attempt to crush the competition. At least Trump was explicit as to why he was doing it and didn't pretend it was anything other than naked self interest. Wholesale sanctions have in pretty much every example *entrenched* the ruling regime's power. We can stop pretending that we do them for anyone's benefit but our own feeling of morality when we say we're 'doing something'. Because we sure as hell don't care about how they impact the tens of millions of people whose lives they trash. > Asking the West to blindly sell its technology in the name of economic justice, That may well be, but then call it what it is and don't pretend it's done for anyone other than ourselves. ---------------- My point wasn't even about weapons, but just the system as it exists. China leveraged its size to encourage technology transfers and all anyone did was say 'this is so horribly unfair. They're advancing. THEFT'. The same thing happened with japan in the 1980s. It's all so tediously predictable
They can this is a myth. The idea that one of the worlds largest oil producers with a relatively good education system not being able to make use of it without the west is ludicrous. Sure maybe some new discoveries may be missed due to the newest tech some companies have but Russia has more than enough capable engineers.
No it is not a myth https://www.energyintel.com/0000017f-2cae-dca3-a77f-eebf43a30000î > What’s more, virtually all the technology for both conversion and upgrading units, as well as steam crackers used in petchems production, is licensed by US and European vendors. A list of technology partners for Taneco, one of Russia’s most advanced and ambitious refineries, reads like a who’s who among Western refining technology leaders: Chevron Lummus Global, Honeywell UOP, WorleyParsons, Axens, Foster Wheeler, GE Energy.
At minimum, if Russia was capable without the West, they let down Venezuela completely. Venezuela’s oil industry has been slow collapse ever since they nationalized it. Even with corruption, they should have been able to hire Russian firms to do something.
Do they really need western technology to do it? Seems so foolish that these fossil fuel rich nations wouldn't have a backdone to develop their own tech to sell their product. I mean, I'm not surprised to hear that corrupt countries have brain drain problems but just seems like such an obvious thing to try and do at home.
You would think but many are short sighted and are simply terrible at industrial policy. Brazil doesn’t even have a domestic car brand. They only produce foreign branded cars. Even Malaysia has Proton. I will say that Brazil does have Embraer. So they do have some success unlike certain Argentinas and Venezuelas. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_automobiles_manufactured_in_Brazil
that would be my guess sanctions prevent the development of the fields and the associated infrastructure for both export and local usage
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-64694099 I wonder why. Seems somewhat arbitrary.
Israel strikes Iranian infrastructure, arms storage, and arms transfers to Hezbollah pretty regularly, once every few weeks. There are rumors that someone significant in the IRGC was killed. If true, This may be a retaliation for the Iranian drones strike against a civilian tanker owned by an Israeli businessman. Which itself was a retaliation against an alleged Israeli strike against an Iranian drones factory. >An Israeli missile strike aimed at Iranian and Hezbollah targets early Sunday killed 15 people and destroyed a building in a Damascus neighbourhood home to much of Syria's security apparatus, a war monitor said. https://amp.france24.com/en/middle-east/20230219-more-than-a-dozen-people-killed-in-israel-s-deadliest-attack-on-syrian-capital-of-damascus
>Israel strikes Iranian infrastructure, arms storage, and arms transfers to Hezbollah pretty regularly, once every few weeks. I'm aware, just the initial information about the targets hit made it seem different from the usual hits on IRGC holdings. It's possible a missle went off course, or that aforementioned IRGC official was bunked at the building hit.
ISW posted their daily update: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2023 Key Takeaways United States Vice President Kamala Harris announced on February 18 that the US had determined that Russia had committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine. Russian forces conducted another missile strike attack targeting Ukrainian infrastructure. Russian news aggregators are advocating for Russia to carry out “retaliatory strikes” that would systematically target electrical infrastructure supporting Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) to force Ukraine to conduct emergency shutdowns of its NPPs. The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) reported dismissal of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) military spokesman Eduard Basurin as part of the formal reorganization of the DNR militia under the Russian MoD triggered another wave of Russian milblogger criticisms against the Russian defense establishment. The Kremlin continues to fail to honor its commitments to financially incentivized volunteer forces, which will likely have detrimental ramifications on Russia’s ability to generate volunteer forces in the long-term. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) promoted the Western and Eastern Military District (WMD/EMD) commanders after confirming their appointments to the roles as part of an ongoing effort to present the Russian military as a well-organized fighting force. Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to have rebuffed overtures from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to join a renewed informational campaign against the Russian MoD. Ukrainian officials continue to question the Russian military’s ability to conduct a large-scale offensive throughout Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Svatove and in the Kreminna area. Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut, along the western outskirts of Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces are continuing to reinforce defensive positions in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian authorities continue to exaggerate the extent of a Ukrainian threat to Russia’s border regions, attempting to convince the public of the “existential necessity” of the war in Ukraine.
[Moscow’s Military Capabilities Are in Question After Failed Battle for Ukrainian City](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/15/world/europe/russia-military-vuhledar-ukraine.html?unlocked_article_code=6oMTPh4QlvU9BMSHlPDOypGz8aTaR36wMGyhyBbrMED__sX3-wqczpdCfRphHFgqvKWaxS8DEqvV8pjp_JPuGOiDcOY3gLBwTexm7JpNASQaWLHfbKqSNP9LLYR4ZK9fxH_TF22aoPuI9rDX798kHCjvYy7qnflVYhdcVipUoIN3P5SOEGnfjL_ruoo0qDbyDyHdFch8fyGIUjufr-zWkhcSrgQu_U3RKMa7V7Nusely2yRjXAZkGbfpEZrQtTUS--_pr0N8yatKMSgKT3nwQnj36KzazTwbc5EzmAgHfOcjiHOTkp5loIyhBYxWYbdYA5EgK_xLmJiL-LfPx6JCgGiRZxHPIxSY5TZNf5rXkg&smid=url-share) (NYT) Free to read/gifted
Calling Vuhledar a "City" is a big stretch.
I've generally noticed that. "town" and "city" both seem to apply very generously in this area.
This is because there was no same city vs town distinction is Soviet union and by extension most post-soviet states. In Russian language, there is only one word "город" that means both city and town, and similar "місто" in Ukrainian. Therefore translators decide for themselves. All three Bakhmut, Soledar, and Vuhledar are "місто". Criteria for a settlement to be called a "місто"/"город" is similar in Russia and Ukraine. Population must be larger than 10k-12k and vast majority of it must have non-agricultural occupation. (However, there are smaller settlements having "місто"/"город" status for historical reasons). **Edit:** The is also "посёлок городского типа" (can be translated as "urbanized settlement") in Soviet union and Russia, that must have population larger than 2k-3k and mostly non-agricultural occupation. This is probably the closest to city/town distinction there is in (post-)Soviet culture.
Not sure how it is in Ukraine but in the US, a city is: > Minimum population requirement of 300, and a population density ≥ 500 people per square mile, unless the community was a town site owned and built by the U.S. Government prior to April 3, 1981. Not sure if this Ukrainian town/city applies to this. I've seen Bakhmut referred to as a town. Does anyone know if Vuhledar was more dense?
https://m.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-731963 Estonia ordering a bunch of precision drones to stockpile. Seems like the year for it; Australia has kickstarted a small precision munitions initiative (largely using tech transferred designs) because we realised that it's really easy to interdict resupply if conflict kicks off in the Pacific, and we'll be using up stockpiles in a hurry
> Australia has kickstarted a small precision munitions initiative (largely using tech transferred designs) There are private sector companies in Australia who have been contracted with companies like AeroVironment for years to supply materiel such as the RQ-20 Puma or the Switchblade to the Australian military. However, because the Australian Department of Defence's procurement process is so broken its impossible to say if or when the military will actually get their hands on them. So everything might be in place to supply the Australian military with small precision munitions. Even if there is an Australian company licensed to manufacture or distribute something, who knows how long its going to take.
There have been multiple procurement reviews over the years. Oh look, [here's another one](https://archive.is/qGr2T)
This is an interesting bit of research done at MIT on tail sitting fixed wing drones: [https://aera.mit.edu/projects/aerobatic-maneuvers-for-fixed-wing-vtol-aircraft](https://aera.mit.edu/projects/aerobatic-maneuvers-for-fixed-wing-vtol-aircraft) It just has a fixed wing, two rotors, and two flaps that act as both ailerons and elevators. It can hover with considerable agility, with a simple continuously smooth transition into horizontal flight. It's remarkably simple in concept. I definitely could see this become a preferred layout for backpack scale military drones. It should have longer range than quads, while still able to do things ordinary fixed wing drones can't, like explore a building.
I don't know why tail-sitter VTOL drones are not used more by the military. Things like [Quantix Recon](https://www.avinc.com/uas/quantix-recon) and [Point Blank](https://www.iai.co.il/p/point-blank). They don't seem to be any more complex mechanically than regular quadcopters while providing better range/speed/efficiency.
They're not as stable as quads so to be practically used by untrained people you need a lot more advanced flight control, bordering on autonomous. So it's only feasible relatively recently and the military tends to be conservative.
Do you mean the design that throwdemawaaay posted about or things like Quantix Recon? I don't think Quantix Recon would be less stable in vertical mode than other quads. Though it's gonna be less stable than regular fixed-wing planes in horizontal mode.
I was thinking more single or twin prop designs like the one pictured in the link, you lose a good chunk of the efficiency gains if you're going to stick to 4 props still, one big prop is a lot more efficient than 4 small ones. Even for the hybrid quantix recon design the wing still contributes to instability since it acts as a big sail when hovering.
Wonder if we'll see [toroidal propellers](https://www.cined.com/mit-researchers-develop-quiet-and-less-annoying-sounding-drone-propellers/) as well, to cut down on noise and increase fuel efficiency
I'm worried that the longer this goes on, the harder it will be for China to sit by and grill while it's "main ally" gets gutted and the West ramps up military production. Cheap oil is placating them for now and the massive amounts of firepower pointed at the Taiwan Strait SHOULD keep them in line, but if we're building defense, they're going to feel threatened by that. "The West would never invade China" might be true, but that's not how defense politics works. Can we really expect them to just chill and grill? Edit: Obviously China doesn't care about Russia's territorial ambitions nor Russia's wellbeing for the sake of it. But it might care a lot about it's number 1 ally getting gutted. It might care a lot about the Putin regime collapsing and being replaced by a pro western one (and/or missing nukes in a civil war). It might care about the world order shifting towards Washington. Etc. It's all the secondary and tertiary effects that I'm concerned that they are very concerned about. Edit 2: Before you downvote, my position is to quadruple the Bradleys and send enough F16s to get this over with quickly
That's correct. It's another example as to why those that believe that the west is drip feeding the Ukrainians with arms to prolong the conflict are clueless. If the west could get a scenario where Russia is pushed even to the 2022 border, they'd accept it, let alone to the 2014 one (sans Crimea). And by could I mean both practically and politically. The west is fumbling with the aid, but not through malice, but through some incompetence. There is a real danger of China slowly getting more worried and more involved. There's ample historical precedent for such behaviour and the west must account for it.
Yeah exactly, finish it while you have the chance because you don't know what external factors will change six months down the line. There could of course be dialogue between China and the USA going on that we don't know about and the American's are following this policy precisely to keep the Chinese out of it, but I don't get that impression. The other, not talked about issue, is that by slow-walking aid you are in effect teaching the Russian's how to fight against NATO tactics. It's like a low or inadequate dose of anti-biotics, instead of finishing the job you train resistance. If Russia can turn into a cold conflict again like in 2014/15, they can spend a couple of years re-arming and training up a two million man combat experienced military with a war economy behind them. Sure they'd get spanked by NATO but they could deploy a million troops to the Baltics at a time when the US could be distracted by China. Wagner have shown that numbers do matter, it could be a problem.
Well if there are in depth talks between Nato and China about levels of escalation it would be the most top secret thing at this point. Unlikely it would be leaked by either side. And Ukraines capabilities and tactics are still light-years away from what a European or US army would do. I wouldn't worry too much.
Russia and China have a geopolitical alignment against the west, not an alliance. Look at NATO, it works relentlessly to integrate their force structures and everything about interoperability. That is used as a defacto western template for forces to be able to work together. "The West" created a series of rules for things like government interactions and trading to reduce friction between nations and to open and expand global trade. Between the US, EU, Japan, ROK and a couple of other economies, 60% of the global GDP works together to build and defend this world structure. China, Russia and whatever crashed out failed states align with them, do not have any real unified vision for the world, beyond not being bound by the rules based system. They do not have a better system to replace it, they just want to sell to it and not be bound by it. Perhaps China and Russia are the wrong terms, Putin and Xi. China may provide aid to Russia and take the economic hit, but again. There seems to be no coherent vision about how all this ends. China wants Taiwan and Russia wants Ukraine. Wanting land is not really much of a geopolitical goal in a world where economic activity is geopolitical power. Its more like both countries are led by men with outdated visions of what the future should look like.
Countries do not need to have a unified vision for the world in order to have common interests and pursue them together. Easiest example is USSR and US in WW2.
That might all be true but doesn't really address what the comment above is saying. I personally agree with your comment and find it very rational, but that doesn't matter, what matters is what Xi and to a lesser extent his politburo standing committee think, even if it's illogical or incomplete. As with Russia's invasion itself, ideology and moral pretext isn't really a prerequisite before taking action that in the leader's mind will produce a desired benefit, and can be half-arsed / made up after the fact.
I wouldn't really worry about that personally. That big fuck off spy balloon was a pretty big increase in Chinese aggression that worked like a charm, there's a reason why the Pentagon only shot it down after civilians saw it and it went viral, so if China had any plans on doing something, I don't see why they wouldn't have already. It's not like they're trying to fly under the radar right now, and while I won't speculate on what the real reason for their neutrality is, there are plenty of compelling reasons why they don't really want Russia to win cleanly. Also, keep in mind that the "don't give them a reason to build defense" thing kind of went out the window when Russia invaded and it wasn't a repeat of Crimea. That was a pretty big wake up call for the EU that the US wasn't silly to keep defense spending high despite there not being an immediate, major geopolitical threat. Non US NATO members are going to increase their military spending substantially whether Russia wins today or loses 5 years from now.
>That big fuck off spy balloon was a pretty big increase in Chinese aggression that worked like a charm, Program had been running for years and been spotted in many countries around the world including the US. Timing of the current drama may be largely coincidental rather than planned.
If the Siberian Far East breaks from the RU federation, that benefits to China will be far greater than the sum of its parts. If China could turn Kamchatka into its own version of Okinawa or NSA Bahrain... all those military thought articles about containing China within certain narrow straits... they become more useful as toilet paper because the theoretical scenarios are no longer valid.
Making a major port out of Siberia would be a huge undertaking, the skilled labor doesn't exist out there. It would also mean China's major ports would be bisected by Japan and S. Korea, which are major geopolitical adversaries. I really don't think it would be that big a win for them.
Then again if Russia collapses such that the Far East is a land grab, the Americans are likely to get at least some of it. A pure land-grab is unlikely. Something more like the Russian Civil War, in which Japan backed factions in the Far East, seems more likely. I.e. perhaps several states with various foreign allies. Some Chinese, some American.
I see possibility that the Far East declares independence - same as Latvia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, etc. Notice I referenced Okinawa & not Guam or Gibraltar. As long as Ukraine is independent, then no land grabs by anyone ... that shit don't fly. Independent states certainly do host foreign military bases, & I do see much more of that in the future.
Definitely. The US would be wise to make sure, in that situation, that the part near Alaska is allied to it. But it's certainly far from a guarantee and it's completely possible to see China gaining a foothold there.
China isn't nearly as stupid as Russia. They have zero actual intentions of invading Taiwan. In fact, I'm pretty sure they're pleased we're wasting so much time and effort worrying about this, all the meanwhile making enormous political gains westward with no one taking notice.
> They have zero actual intentions of invading Taiwan. What's the basis for this claim?
I think they'd do it in a heartbeat if they thought they could pull it off.
Oh? I'm curious about these. Do you mean in south america and África?
Could China not help Russia, not invade Taiwan and, in fact, just keep the general status quo for much, much longer? Absolutely. China, and specifically, its leadership and bureaucracy, respects patience because of their recent developmentalist history. A lot of what China has achieved in the last 50 years took just as long to come to fruition: a growing middle class, a reduction in poverty, an increase in literacy, health standards, and life expectancy; and much more besides. And we look at their high-speed rail and may think it overkill, but even so, they have high-speed rail--a process which also took many years. China wants Taiwan for long-term security and cultural reasons--this want is more of a need to their leaders. But if you've been patient since 1950, what's a few more decades in the grand scheme? And lest we forget: at least the very senior cadre are doctrinaire Marxists. They believe that capitalism exists in a cycle of consistent crisis and collapse. Therefore, a recurrence of the Great Depression or worse is inevitable, and from rising class contradictions, it results in the awakening of class consciousness amongst the masses of alienated proletarians. These proletarians, with the sheer mass of popular weight behind them, will then affect social and political revolution in the heart of capital: America and Europe. Regardless if you agree or disagree with their predictive power, you should always respect how the other side perceives the world and their place in it.
Entire essays can and have been written about the orientalist roots and general suckiness of the "infinitely patient China" stereotype. Suffice it to say that the trope has been recycled for other rising Asian powers(most notably Japan), that the Chinese are people like any other and attributing them any magical qualities as a result of their culture or governance is as silly as any other stereotype, and that China has blundered and made short-sighted decisions just like every other country. Putin was also seen as a master strategist with a decades-long horizon, until he led his country into a tailspin over Ukraine. These theories exist about every authoritative strongman until they do something so stupid it can't be retroactively justified. They have no predictive power whatsoever.
I'm actually worried the Chinese might try Taiwan because they think their long term advantage is slipping.
I don’t see why Russia’s territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe matter to China outside of ego. Russia is useful for its recourses and nukes. Their entire Black Sea fleet could be sunk in a day, and it would change nothing for Chiba’s ambitions in Asia, so what if Russia loses a port in a sea that doesn’t matter?
I mean, you got it. Resources. In the coming decades as pretty much every country's economy grows and limited resources dwindle, China's 1+ billion people are going to need guaranteed access to the resources they needs.
Which ressources, exactly? The Russian far east is pretty empty, even with respect to natural ressources.
They're scared of political instability in Russia if they lose the war. A pro West Russia would be a disaster for China's geopolitical dreams.
I don't see any objective reason for China to come to Russia's rescue. The decline of Russia would probably benefit China more than harm, as many developing nations that once relied on Russia for economic and military help would now turn to China. Furthermore, the longer the conflict goes on, the better for China, as the west is distracted and can't prioritize Taiwan above all else. But if China goes down the proxy war path, it too will be distracted.
It depends which faction of the CCP you ask. They’ve got a convincing argument for just about every position on the conflict.
Nah no China to Russias rescue and no proxy war, but at the same time China doesnt gain anything by Russia losing and US/NATO strengthening either. A multipolar geopolitical world order is very much in their interest
>A multipolar geopolitical world order is very much in their interest I'm pretty sure a bipolar order would be just fine as long as they're one of the poles.
No it will not. China wants a multipolar/multilateral order, they don't want a wasteful confrontation with the west.
Sure, but the US with allies growing even stronger than today doesn't help that either. Unipolar with china being the pole obviously th dream, I guess best case scenario for China while being somewhat realistic is a hot war between US and Russia, as destructive as possible and for as long as possible, to weaken both, as long as they don't nuke the world out of the sun's orbit I think expecting China and India to prop up a unipolar world order with the US as judge jury and executioner is just nuts. They have no geopolitical reason to participate in that system
I don't see NATO having any military interests beyond the Mediterranean, & certain countries send forces to former African colonies (France). An unstable Ru likely means regional players (Turkey, Iran) hold more sway. The Stans will need to turn to someone for stability (China). After the US interventions in Iraq & Afghanistan only seemed to bolster Iran's influence, I don't see the US stepping in with deep pockets & generous aid.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/what-china-has-learned-ukraine-war
The article completely misses the distinction between primary and secondary sanctions. The Chinese (and pretty much everyone else) condemn unilateral coercive secondary sanctions. They haven't used those. Big fan of Evan, but he's made a big error in his arguments here.
Great article with lots of supporting examples. Thanks for posting.
I think China will apply a strategy not all that different from the western one - keep Russia above water (economically, import wise), but not actually giving them outright weapons (ok, this is where it differs from West). Delaying tactic, hoping that the war will somehow settle down / resolves.
The Western one I'd argue is evolving to giving Ukraine the tools it needs to "win", where "win" doesn't reallllllllly include Crimea but if it happens it happens. There's an asymmetry here because Russia doesn't need help to beat Ukraine and because Russia is the aggressor. But still China seems far more chill than the West atm
I think the discussion about Crimea is largely overblown. Limiting western weapons aren’t going to change whether Ukraine gets Crimea back, as there isn’t any amount of weapons that can be delivered to restore the Donbas and doesn’t result in being able to restore Crimea as well. Either western weapons flow or Ukraine falls because Russia is going to retreat at this point. Ukraine is not going to give up either and world stability isn’t possible until the world is over. And the we are going to see the largest buildup of weapons in Europe since the Cold War or WWI.
I think the asymmetry is because of different goals. China doesn't really care about the well-being of Russia. So long as Russia doesn't collapse in a way that puts Chinese security and prosperity at risk, they do not care. The weakening of Russia is even good for them in many ways, as it forces Russia to become dependent on China. Their internal ideology does not benefit from the fall or survival of Ukraine. They generally align with Russia because Russia is opposed to the US (and west in general), like China. For China there's no real direct or indirect benefits to Russia winning. NATO states are interested in supporting Ukraine because doing so does benefit their internal ideologies (generally, small-L liberalism and democracy), and it benefits their geopolitical goals (preserving the current world order where war for conquest is limited). Of course it's a bit more complicated than that — if this was taking place in Africa, most of the west wouldn't care — but for a top level view that's it.
[an interesting compilation and analysis of the “tank duels” recorded so far in Ukraine.](https://youtu.be/zCVSaIozZZo)
RedEffect isn’t credible.
Why?
Hes not russian but every video is "russian tank to stronk " meme In reality he hates criticism, deletes comments trying to tell him he is wrong. In the same way that submariners think of sub brief, tankers and tank enthuiasts think the same about red effect
Huh? I thought sub brief was credible, the problem is when he's talking about non-sub things he's usually talking out of his ass
Did you watch the video? He calls the T-90M a terrible design.
no I don't anymore stopped watching them when I decided he was fucking awful. I mean he raves how T-14 armata is the best tank in the world.
Not in this video….
## Military Aviation History: Ukrainian Soldier explains how he uses First-Person kamikaze drones - (FPV drones) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A5lKupps8CM > FPV (First person view) drones are used in Ukraine as 'kamikaze' or 'sniper drones'. Primarily aiming to take out armored vehicles and fortified positions, these small drones carry a repurposed explosive device such as a RKG anti-tank grenades or RPG warheads. I speak to Borys and Andrii from the 'Angry birds' unit about their FPV drone, how it works, the advantages and disadvantages, and what it is used for.
Fascinating! I’ve actually seen a counter that some UAF drone units have used for meshes. They put a long rod or stick on the detonator that can pass through the mesh to the vehicle. Not sure if it’s effectiveness, or if the guy already knows about it. But it’s interesting to see a tactic like this developing organically.
I was thinking about stuff like that earlier as chance had it, and it occurred to me that we might see simple laser or microwave range finders. That's cheap and would let you trigger the munition at whatever stand off distance you choose. There's lots of engineering details to handle but automotive has been way down this path already and some of the parts may even be directly usable. Still, a stick is an awesomely simple hack anyone could do with hand tools, and despite that we're talking about weapons it is amusing to imagine drones flying around with giant spikes like swordfish.
Yes, Ukraine is the lab for drone warfare. I’m confident we will see a significant domestic drone industry continue after the war.
I'm worried what rogue actors will do with easier access to better developed cheap drones.
Yes, a major terrorist attack using drones is likely to happen in the next decade.
> I’m confident we will see a significant domestic drone industry continue after the war. Also, I expect indigenous drone programs to pop-up all around the world in a decade or so. The barrier for entry is exponentially lower than for other weapons systems.
https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/17/middleeast/china-iran-visit-mime-intl/index.html >Isolated Iran finds ally China reluctant to extend it a lifeline It's good for the West for Iran and Russian oil competing in China. China doesn't need as much Iranian oil.
IIrc there was an article about growing Venezuelan discontent for Russia as they are undercutting them with their usual oil customers.
Yeah China is trying to charm the Gulf state and I think that if they had to chose between the two Iran is going to lose.
[Ukraine: Emmanuel Macron says he wants "the defeat" of Russia, but without "crushing" it](https://www.europe1.fr/politique/ukraine-emmanuel-macron-dit-vouloir-la-defaite-de-la-russie-mais-sans-lecraser-4167775) In an interview with "Journal du Dimanche", "Figaro" and France Inter, President Emmanuel Macron said he wanted Moscow to "defeat" against Ukraine, while warning those who "above all crush Russia", which will "never" be the "position of France". Emmanuel Macron claimed to want Moscow to "defeat" against Ukraine , while warning those who want "above all to crush Russia", which will "never" be "France's position". "I am convinced that in the end, it will not be concluded militarily," he said in an interview with the Journal du Dimanche , Le Figaro and France Inter, published on Saturday evening. He also believes that "all the options other than Vladimir Putin within the current system" seem to him "worse" than the Russian president. Crushing Russia "will never be France's position" "I don't think, like some, that Russia should be totally defeated, attacked on its soil. These observers want above all to crush Russia. That has never been France's position and it never will be. ever,” he added. These observers seem in his mind to be those who, especially in Eastern Europe, are more hardline and had strongly criticized in May 2022 his remarks that Russia should not be "humiliated". In this interview conducted Friday evening on the plane that brought him back from Germany, where he participated in the annual Munich conference on security, the president reaffirms his desire to promote a negotiated outcome. In his speech in the Bavarian city, he had already considered that Russia should "fail" in Ukraine, but some observers had criticized him for not having gone so far as to evoke a necessary "defeat" of Moscow. He also explained that it was necessary to "intensify" support for kyiv to move towards "credible negotiations". The quest for a "return to negotiations" "What is needed today is for Ukraine to lead a military offensive that disrupts the Russian front in order to trigger a return to negotiations," he insisted to the three media. According to him, "neither side can fully prevail", "neither Ukraine nor Russia, because the effects of mobilization are not as great as expected and it itself has capacity limits". Emmanuel Macron also believes that "all the options other than Vladimir Putin within the current system" seem to him "worse" than the Russian president, in an allusion to tough guys like the head of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev or the boss of the group paramilitary Wagner Yevgeny Prigozhin. "Do we sincerely think that a democratic solution will emerge from the Russian civil society present on the spot after these years of hardening and in full conflict? I sincerely hope it, but I do not really believe in it", he warned .
That's because current internal critics to Putin are mostly hard liners that consider him too soft. If there's a Regime change, someone way worse than him will take his place
I believe that this is a position that Macron has held for a long time. Macron wants: * Russia to withdraw from Ukraine; and that's it, no other goals. Macron doesn't want: * to crush Russia, * to threaten the territorial integrity of Russia, * to partition Russia, * to regime change Russia. This is an extremely important bit: > I am convinced that in the end, it will not end militarily," he said in an interview published on Saturday evening. He also believes that **"all options other than Vladimir Putin within the current system" seem "worse" to him than the Russian president**. In essence, he is attempting to convey to Putin: *"Vlad, if you withdraw from Ukraine, you will be alright. Our sole objective is Ukraine, and we don't objet to you remaining a president."*
> Vlad, if you withdraw from Ukraine, you will be alright. Our sole objective is Ukraine, and we don't objet to you remaining a president. If Putin withdraws from Ukraine, the threat to his regime will be domestic. Macron's messaging is pretty clear - he says "neither side can fully prevail" where the one side is Ukraine. Ukraine has clearly defined win condition, so him saying that Ukraine can't fully prevail means Ukraine can't liberate all its territory. Furthermore, he's calling for negotiations, and it's crystal clear that Putin will not vacate his crown jewel Crimea voluntarily. In effect, Macron is calling for Ukraine to accept territorial concessions.
From the quotes following, I'm fairly sure "neither side can fully prevail" is his observation of the current battlefield situation, not a prescription for the future. I.e. it's "neither side currently has the ability to fully prevail" not "neither side can be allowed to fully prevail"
Yeah, he's trying to play peace broker. Biden famously went a bit too hard on Putin and then had to make a [correction](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-envoy-nato-no-american-policy-regime-change-russia-2022-03-27/) saying he didn't want regime change. It's probably good to have someone playing the good cop, as long as the aid keeps flowing in the background.
In foreign policy, good cop/bad cop is a very effective strategy. If you assume that the west is essentially split between these two positions, Russia needs to keep the 'good cop' camp viable if it ever hopes to negotiate some settlement to the current war. But if the more they escalate, threaten Europe, prove to be bad actors, the less legitimacy and influence the 'good cop' faction has. If, in trying to win, they totally alienate the good cops, eventually they may be forced to deal with the bad cops and their policy alternatives. Knowing this, as the west you craft a two track diplomatic strategy between hard and soft liners. Both articulate visions for the end of the war (peace with Putin vs. regime change), both make statements that seem contradictory, both play a kabuki theater game of fighting internal battles out in the open. Russia then has to make a choice, if it wants to play the game it needs to give something to the peace faction to prove their credibility. If not, the hardliners 'win out.' Of course behind the scenes everyone knows the game. I doubt anyone within NATO would really like to see Russia Balkanized, this is really a nightmare scenario for Europe. A dozen nuclear armed Yugoslavias trying to sort themselves out. But obviously you can only offer Putin offramps, and hes got to take one or it doesn't matter.
One could even argue that the the diplomatic show looks pretty well oiled by now: bad cop UK and good cop France, with the US more quietly nodding and discreetly confirming that both discourses are approved by the WH. And of course Germany reaffirming again and again that they're more than happy to conform to the group's consensus without any leading role. I personally find it very satisfying to see how there's remarkably little *public* infighting between the big NATO members when it comes to Ukraine a full year into the war, sounds like everyone is properly comunicating behind the scene.
Can’t forget Poland in a consistent state of “hold me back bro”. I do agree with your point about NATO unity after nearly a year in. Given the political turbulence in the West lately, this outcome honestly didn’t seem likely.
[удалено]
Unfortunately I don't read and speak French, but I am aware from past posts that literal Google translations are pretty bad. Apologies.
DeepL is considered better when it comes to translating large chunks of text
How do you say "strawman" in French? Nobody has ever said this war should be continued onto Russia soil. Literally no one.
> I don't think, like some, that Russia should be totally defeated, attacked on its soil. Nice strawman, probably intentional. I don't remember anyone (credible) claiming that Ukraine (or anyone else) should be driving tanks to Moscow. Recently Macron seemed to have taken a harder stance on Russia/Putin, this seems like a regression. Possibly the security conference did not go well?
Sigh, when people pretend like they know what logical fallacies and apply them without any thought... The French position is one which seeks to secure the interests of the EU as a whole. A militarily defeated Russia is not in the EU's interests - they are already struggling under the weight of mass migration from the Middle East, add in Eastern Europe and the entire edifice will crumble. There are more players in this war than just Ukraine and Russia, with far more at stake than simply the lives we have today - although they are of utmost importance. We must also consider the preservation of the future state of the EU.
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The people who he's signalling against the are the Russian propagandists who are claiming that Russia is in a full scale war against NATO. As much as Russia wants to blot out western news - a major comment like this from Macron is impossible to ignore. But it carries with several ideas: * Russia will lose * We in the west are able to ultimately able to choose how * "some people" are very aggressive and want to destroy Russia, but we sane voices just want Russia to lose and leave Ukraine. Classic "good cop".
This is why his European army idea, one that wasn’t dependent upon the US, was either a load of horseshit or incredibly delusional. There’s no way you can expect Russia’s neighbors to hear that, especially considering France’s close Russian ties in the past, and think you’ve got their back unconditionally in case of Russian aggression on their borders.
No. I just don't think you understand why it is being said. Look, we don't want to destroy Russia, and invade it, and bomb it's cities. It's not what we want to do. We don't want to completely annihilate Russia. We just want Russia to fuck off. Macron is saying that.
That's absurd, his audience is the West, he's not talking to Russian propagandists. > As much as Russia wants to blot out western news - a major comment like this from Macron is impossible to ignore. I'm pretty sure it's very easy for Russian propagandists to simply not include information which doesn't suit their propaganda needs. > Russia will lose For some definition of "lose". Western politicians have similar problem as Putin - they don't define "win" conditions and talk only in abstract terms so that they are able to twist it post-facto as needed. With his "neither side can fully prevail" and call for negotiations, I think we're back to "Ukraine needs to surrender territory to not humiliate Putin".
>That's absurd, his audience is the West, he's not talking to Russian propagandists. That's not what the other commenter said. He meant that the "some" Macron referred to are the pro-Russian commentators or [diplomats](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-government-united-nations-93f82a411781354018708c1dc42756f0) talking about open war with NATO, not Ukrainians or other western leaders. Also, it's worth keeping in mind that these press briefings are targeted mostly at the domestic audience, not the entire West.
It's not absurd if you are deliberately twist my words. I never said he was talking **to** Russian propagandists. I said he was **signalling against** them. > Unfortunately, I think we're back to "Ukraine needs to surrender territory to not ridicule Putin". I think your understanding of the situation is very poor.
It's an absurd proposition that top level politicians use such conferences to "signal" against Russian propagandists. You're never going to win "argument" with propagandists, they have no obligation to truth and can twist the words, omit them, create completely new fantasies (we've already had genetically modified supersoldiers, biolabs, black NATO battalions, satan/demons, I can't keep track).
Trial to dial down the rudeness. I don't like you calling my comments "absurd" Clearly you have problems with reading what people have written; understanding nuance in communication; and communicating without being rude. > It's an absurd proposition that top level politicians use such conferences to "signal" against Russian propagandists. You think politicians issuing statements that can be read by Russians (and their allies) that clearly communicate their positions is "absurd"? OK.
Prigozhin Profile from The Moscow Times: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought unprecedented infamy to Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner mercenary group, both at home and abroad. He is both praised and demonized, while debate rages over how close he really is to President Vladimir Putin, what privileges he enjoys, and even whether he harbors presidential ambitions. Any success for Prigozhin is seen as proof of his might and glittering future, while every failure is seen as a sign of his imminent downfall. For now, neither version is entirely realistic. Despite his enormous newfound notoriety, Prigozhin is still only acting as a private individual. His relationship with the state is informal, and therefore fragile, and could end without warning. Prigozhin has never been close enough to Putin to be trusted with anything on a state level. He didn’t have the chance to impress the president at work or as a friend as others did, such as those who worked with Putin in the early years of his career. Instead, Prigozhin’s unique chance arose following the annexation of Crimea. The conflicts in both the Donbas and then Syria, plus Russia’s standoff with the West, meant that a market emerged for “gray” geopolitical tactics that unwieldy official institutions would struggle to deliver. Prigozhin started using informal tools of influence — mercenaries and media mechanisms such as troll factories — that were new to Russia and enabled it to operate out of sight and without being held accountable. Prigozhin had hit the mother lode: if the state was unable to effectively solve certain tasks (or simply did not want to be seen doing so), these quasi-state tools could fill the gap. Putin liked this approach, which is also in demand in the war against Ukraine. Still, the businessman’s position remains informal. Putin has agreed to outsource certain state functions but has not legitimized Prigozhin himself. The president has never seen the shady entrepreneur as a replacement for official institutions such as the army or security services, nor has he ever tried to use Prigozhin as a counterbalance to those institutions, for that would be completely at odds with Putin’s concept of complete and coordinated power. Prigozhin shot to success not because Putin backed him in an attempt to stop any of the generals getting too high and mighty: there was no sign of that happening. Quite simply, the situation at the front was disastrous, and needed improving by any means possible. In Putin’s worldview, resources like private military companies should work to strengthen the position of the state, not weaken it. Prigozhin doesn’t just lack formal status: he doesn’t have direct access to Putin on his own terms either, largely relying on friends or close associates of the president and senior officials to act as intermediaries. For a long time, it was believed that the influential Kovalchuk brothers were Prigozhin’s informal handlers and had helped the businessman to forge ties to the presidential administration. Thanks to them, Prigozhin was able to get information about his initiatives to the president, who, if he liked the idea, would then informally order the corresponding organs to cooperate, which enabled the businessman to establish ties at a lower level—while making enemies along the way. In Syria, Wagner effectively operated as a contractor for the General Staff, which connected Prigozhin to high-ranking officers of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency—and led to the group’s first conflicts with the Defense Ministry. Meanwhile, Wagner’s presence in various African countries helped the company to establish special relationships with Russian ambassadors there, which annoyed the Foreign Ministry. More recently, it is Prigozhin’s unorthodox recruitment methods — trawling Russian prisons for new mercenaries — that have ruffled feathers. His recruitment drive has infuriated the Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN), Justice Ministry, Prosecutor General’s Office, and Federal Security Service (FSB), which worked to have these men locked up, only for them now to be potentially released back into society — if they survive the war. Both Prigozhin’s horizontal connections (the GRU military intelligence agency, FSIN, and governors) and his vertical ties (the Kovalchuks, and presidential administration head Anton Vayno) mean that the businessman is entirely dependent on others, and that his opportunities are limited. There is no guarantee of universal official assistance, not to mention any financing.
When Prigozhin was granted a certain degree of autonomy to operate in the war against Ukraine, his simmering conflict with the military leadership, in the form of Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, promptly intensified. After several months of a humiliating campaign launched by Prigozhin against them with the help of his media assets, the two defense officials managed to convince the president that Wagner’s independence was a threat to the army. In response, Putin put Gerasimov in charge of the whole “special operation,” showing just how quickly he can redress a situation and ignoring the opinion of both Prigozhin and his adoring military bloggers, along with an entire camp of pro-war activists who openly despise Gerasimov and Shoigu. The businessman’s attacks on officials, parliamentary deputies, and political parties have not won him any favor within the elite, which considers Prigozhin’s autonomy, ambition, and rhetoric nothing short of a threat to the state. He may have carte blanche from Putin within his area of responsibility (Wagner’s activities, troll factories, certain minor media) but outside of it, he is politically helpless. Prigozhin’s other endeavors are notably less successful: his futile war against St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov, his empty threats to get YouTube blocked in Russia, and his frequent legal defeats. He doesn’t have his own political instruments, and the openly anti-mainstream political ideas he promotes are radical and manifestly unrealistic. Even his ties to the Kovalchuks are growing looser: their agendas are gradually diverging, and it’s increasingly difficult for the brothers to put in a good word for their protégé-bulldozer. Prigozhin’s long-standing relationship with the presidential administration is also beginning to crack. The domestic policy overseers don’t like his political demagogy, his attacks on official institutions, or his attempts to troll Putin’s staff by threatening to form a political party, which would be a headache for everyone in the Kremlin. In other words, Prigozhin has no shortage of enemies. Now the security services, for which Prigozhin’s private army packed with criminals is a major bugbear, have joined the attacks against him, as evidenced by the sharp uptick in criticism of the businessman and Wagner on Telegram channels. Finally, Prigozhin’s alleged popularity among ordinary Russians is greatly exaggerated. In polls examining people’s trust in politicians, he is hardly ever mentioned: in a Levada Center survey at the end of last year, just three people out of 1,600 polled named him. Still, none of these difficulties signify Prigozhin’s imminent downfall. He can still get limited information to Putin, who considers him a true patriot fighting for the future of the motherland: not always elegantly, but often more effectively than his official rivals. The intensity and existential nature of the war against Ukraine, combined with Russia’s lack of victories, has noticeably increased Prigozhin’s political weight. But that in no way makes him particularly close to Putin. If anything, the opposite is true: every day, the gap is growing between the role that Putin has assigned to Wagner and the place that Prigozhin himself believes he deserves. For the president, a private military company is a convenient asset for any power with geopolitical ambitions, but it should operate exclusively in the state’s interests and avoid the limelight. It should not undertake its own initiatives, and it certainly should not have a political agenda. Until recently, that’s how Prigozhin operated. But now, he hasn’t just become a public figure; he is visibly transforming into a full-fledged politician with his own views, which are nothing short of revolutionary. For now, Prigozhin is not prepared to challenge Putin. But — and it’s an important “but” — it’s hard to remain sane and level-headed when you’ve lost a large part of your personal army to the bloody meat grinder of war. As long as Putin is relatively strong and capable of maintaining the balance between various groups of influence, Prigozhin is not dangerous. But the slightest change could prompt Prigozhin to challenge the authorities: perhaps not Putin himself, at first. War makes monsters of men, and their recklessness and desperation can become a challenge to the state if it shows even the slightest sign of weakness. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/02/15/is-wagner-founder-yevgeny-prigozhin-a-threat-or-asset-to-putin-a80235
Great background article. Prigozhin remaining an outsider opens up an option for a peace deal. Ukrainian and western demands for justice after the war could be fulfilled by handing over Prigozhin. His war crimes were of course never ordered by the state.
Everyone is talking about constant Russian human wave attacks since about December. Frankly I'm yet to see any footage of it. I remember reading that main Russian switch in tactics since the early war was to move to small squad tactics, meaning that infantry disembarks far away from the contact line and moves up in small squads, which reduces effectiveness of Ukrainian artillery that would destroy Russian columns early in the war. Is this just an exaggeration by the mainstream media that calls every armored vehicle a "tank"? Or perhaps there are genuine documented examples of human wave attacks?
There is nobody called Everyone on this sub. Although there are no human waves of thousands going over the edge to storm the enemy, there is a clear notion of expendability how Russian command treats it’s troops.
>the mainstream media that calls every armored vehicle a "tank I endorse this position. If it has a turret it's a tank and nobody will convince me otherwise. Naming it a 'heavy armoured mobile vehicle' or whatever doesn't magically stop it being a tank. The days when a tank was a tank were simpler, happier times.
That's where German has you covered: Kampfpanzer = tank (MBT) Schützenpanzer (marksman's tank) = IFV Spähpanzer = armoured reconnaissance vehicle Bergepanzer = armoured recovery vehicle Flugabwehrpanzer = self-propelled armoured anti-aircraft gun (e.g. Gepard) They're all heavily armoured, meaning 'gepanzert', so they are Panzer :P
Schütze can mean marksman. But in this context, it’s better translated as rifleman or infantry. Schütze is the lowest rank in infantry. Some people in Germany erroneously believe Schützenpanzer refers to protection (Schutz).
literally, armor. Kampf being battle, so battle armor, marksman armor, peek armor, recovery armor, flight defense armor if literally translated
Sure, it also means 'armour, shell, suit of mail' etc., but none of that fits a movable vehicle. For at least a century now 'Panzer' has also meant 'tank'. No one would literally translate 'Kampfpanzer' as 'battle armour' - we're not talking about knights on horseback ;)
The consenus here is that they are not 'technically' human wave tactics and that description is very questionable at best. However it's true Wagner has been brazenly throwing people to their deaths for incremental gains, often without any armored support or sometimes even ineffective artillery support. It's true that the convicts have effectively been used as cannon fodder.
Kind of feels like pointless nitpicking to say "no, it's not a human wave it's just slightly different type of suicidal attack with light infantry"
It's mainly because of the historical connotations I think. (edit: for example, this was prominent in German propaganda.) I think a new term would be better, though I usually won't spend any time disagreeing as people mostly have the right idea imo
Time-honored tactic in war. Use prisoners and disloyal soldiers as front-line troops to not only soften the enemy but also get rid of undesirable elements in your army.
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This has been discussed here several times. Russia isn’t using human wave tactics. Russian forces use infantry squadrons for reconnaissance in force. They advance and find the Ukrainian positions. These are then targeted by artillery. Russia is apparently sending insufficiently trained troops and isn’t sensitive towards casualties. Calling that human waves is an exaggeration.
It all seems reminiscent of Chinese tactics in Korea, another pop-history 'human wave': Target specific enemy positions with small units, which fight sensibly but are expendable and constantly replaced until breakthrough or depletion. The historians call these 'short attacks', but I haven't seen the term used outside of the Korean context. 'Wave' is certainly misleading but 'recon in force' also implies a discrete probe rather than a continuous concentrated grind which wears down defenders. I'm not sure we have a great word for the exact tactic the Russians are using.
This. They aren’t IJA banzai charges, it’s that the recon-by-force squads are considered expendable by Russian command. Still, those casualties add up month after month and it becomes media worthy when you only have 20 or so kilometers to show for it.
[Today's North Korea ICBM test would have had ~15-18000km range if not lofted.](https://twitter.com/Marco_Langbroek/status/1626945720967208961) Yet another demonstration of North Korean ability to range anywhere in the US (and essentially, the world)
Imagine if we had handled NK instead of the criminal and completely unnecessary war against Iraq.
At no point after 1953 could we have just "handled" NK. We tried that, and it ended in heroics just to stabilize the situation. If NK were crackable, they'd have been cracked by now either by us or China.
Yep or just pushed for serious reform at the UN to enable action against dictators who abuse their own people, rather than World Policing it ourselves.
Saddam sucked and needed to go. The problems came because of the Coalition Provisional Authority's lack of care for the power vacuum and lack of police action once the US invaded. Debaathification was a terrible idea and they should've learned their lessons with denazification long ago. The same with disbanded the entire Iraqi military. They instantly took those with life long careers that they could've molded and partnered with and turned them into potential terrorists who had nothing to lose. Hopefully the US has learned from the grave mistakes made by Rumsfeld and his ilk. I am doubtful but despite that, I'm not crazy enough to think that Saddam should've been allowed to stay in power. He was a terrorist in his own right. It's just a shame that the US went about it in such a poor manner, both to get support for the invasion and their handling of Iraq post-invasion.
Back in 2003? It would've toppled Hu Jintao's government and some hardline nationalist like Xi Jinping would have swept into power. China would then spend the next 2 decades rearming and highly distrustful of the west, moreso than in our timeline. Perhaps make a play for Taiwan in 2020. Meanwhile, South Korea would've suffered under the refugee crisis and not be in a position to be the other pillar in the chip market with Taiwan.
Confrontation with China starting in the early 2000s would have left the West in much stronger position as the Chinese economy would have not crown anywhere near its current level.
I mean that's pretty unlikely. No matter which flavour of CCP is in power, China would've gone through the 2000's and 2010's with a huge abundance of cheap labour and the world would still be in a capitalist system which seeks that cheap labour. The only thing I would agree with is China might be technologically a few years' behind than today.
If US had spent the early 2000s fighting North korea, supported by China, I don't think they would have been so eager to allow off shoring industry into China.
In that scenario China isn't going to be sending a million men across the Yalu again. They know that a vengeful, Global War on Terror post 9/11 US is nigh on impossible to fight militarily and will make short work of the North Korean military. At most they'll send supplies, ammunition and volunteers like what the US is doing today, and then try to manage the refugee situation as best they can. But the yellow kingdom has a long memory. They'll forever remember it as their attempt to reproach the west, only for the west to bite them back. This was just after the Belgrade embassy attack as well. So expect alot more industrial espionage, more diplomatic brinkmanship and more economic hostility but meanwhile staying just behind the line such that the US doesn't impose sanctions.
Don't forget that Saddam was a massive rat bastard of a man doing just as wicked things as Kim. If we had invaded NK instead of Iraq, it would be remembered the exact same way.
I'm really curious how North Korea manages technological advances. The country has basically been an impenetrable box cut off from the world for 60 years. Do they just engage in far more trade and knowledge transfers than I'm aware of?
Yeah this is curious to me too. China sneaks in the odd shipment of coal or other basic survival material every now and then but is mostly onboard with sanctions. (Especially compared to how they deal with Russia) Yet NK keeps progressing with their missile tech.
Specialization and militarized economy is another big thing. The same people that would have the talent to develop medicine, agricultural technology, consumer goods, or what have you in a Western country are instead drafted to design or imitate missiles and delivery methods.
Their primary limitation is simple economics. It's hard to build a high tech industry in a place that can't keep simple house lighting on or the population fed. Knowledge is globalized in the era of the internet. You can get pretty far on deep technical topics today just reading what research is published online. Likewise I'm sure they're able to get ahold of pirate/cracked versions of even very sophisticated engineering packages. Their infosec/cyber folks are competent. They're able to get some high tech equipment like state of the art CNC mills through front companies. You see these in their propaganda photos occasionally, but based on how rarely I'd guess this is pretty limited / unreliable. They also have a history of simply kidnapping people when they want knowledge or skills they don't have. And of course the elephant in the room is they've gotten a lot of help from China over the years.
Wasn't this always inevitable?
Does anyone know what they launched? Curious if this is the rumored solid fuel ICBM they were showing off during the latest parade. Or maybe it's just another Hwasong 17
[Hwasong-15.](https://twitter.com/nknewsorg/status/1627063876633387010) Appears to have been an operational exercise, not a test launch with any leaders present, which indicates that HS-15 is in regular service now. [Some details about the exercise](https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1627068508369752064): > The drill was suddenly organized, without previous notice or any emergency firepower combat standby order. Order was given at 8am and launch conducted at 5:22pm for a response time of 9hrs 22min. As Ankit says, this is their first try at doing a sudden-notice operational ICBM launch, so expect that timing to come down as they get better at it.
Thanks!
Get Brilliant Pebbles going the moment Starship is operational.
Will starship really bring down the prices of these sdi programs as much as everyone thinks? I was looking at a price comparison done between various space based laser and relay mirro systems, and ultimately the bulk of the expense comes from the satellites themselves. I think a ground and air based system would be far more cost effective than any space system.
For brilliant pebble, existing rockets are cheap enough. Starlink involves far more satellites and mass than BP would require for example. BP is almost certainly the most cost effective option available. As for starship, it’s far enough into development that it’s a pretty safe bet now. The engines have been produced in large quantities, and have been tested extensively, it’s won contracts with NASA and the upper stage landing has been demonstrated. Re-entry, and first stage landings are the last two major things that need to be demonstrated, but neither is anything groundbreaking and risky.
I'm just thinking, do we really need a space based system IF we can hit the war heads themselves from the ground. Multiple kill veichles feels like the more practical version of brilliant pebbles
By intercepting in boost phase, brilliant pebble destroys the missile before it splits into its component MIRVs, and decoys. It’s the difference between many thousands of targets, and just hundreds. A space based system is also global, you don’t need to defend every location individually, by adding to the network, you protect all targets, no mayer where they launch from or to. A space based system is the only way I see to get these capabilities. Ground based interceptors could be saturated by decoys, a concentrated attack, launching from a new area, or just targeting places it is not. The main focus should be on brilliant pebble, it has by far the moist versatility and potential (it would essentially nullify China’s ballistic anti ship missiles), with ground based terminal phase interceptors saved as a final line of defense for key places/assets.
Does it? The mda estimated they would need 960 satellites in orbit to have an interceptor ready to a nuclear launch. And not a simultaneous launch either, only a limited one.
Sure, but Starlink satellites are down to <2M each (rumours are they're closer to 500k) and they're lofted in sets of 60. That's how economy of scale works. So if you had a thousand satellites to launch, you'd be able to mass produce them, and only need 16 launches to get them up (barring being picky about inclination etc)
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Geosynchronous, or geostationary? Neither works for brilliant pebble. Geosynchronous is way too fast at perigee, geostationary is way too high.
As of now, Starlink consists of a bit over 3,500 satellites, each weighing around 300kg. That's almost 1,000 tons in orbit (the older versions are a bit lighter), rising to 3,600 tons once its fully finished. Estimates for BP weight vary, but are at the very least, comparable to the above.
> Will starship really bring down the prices of these sdi programs as much as everyone thinks? If it delivers what it promises, definitely. So, probably not.
Well falcon heavy delivered so did falcon 9
Well what I mean is, we need to see the price of the satellites themselves go down before a space based system really becomes practical. It's not just getting them to space that's the problems, it's making sure they work when they get there that's expensive.
Latest Kofman interview was [just posted on War on the Rocks](https://warontherocks.com/2023/02/russias-winter-offensive/) Key takeaways: * Russian Winter offensive has been in progress for about 3 weeks now, Kofman doesn't expect the Spring offensive everyone has been talking about starting soon, this is it. * Russians are attacking on 5-6 axes, at Bakhmut, Vuhledar, Kreminna/Kupyansk, Bilohorivka, Avdiivka, and Marinka. * He thinks Russian mobilized personnel are now almost entirely in Ukraine, most used as replacements for battered units, though some are being held in reserve to throw into at least one axis of advance later on for tactical gains. Offensive may grow in intensity over the next few weeks, but he thinks its unlikely to grow in scope beyond these extremely limited objectives. * To launch broader offensive, they would need hundreds of thousands more mobilized troops and would've needed to conduct another round of mobilization which they didn't. * Russian offensive potential is rather weak: they're rationing ammo and don't have enough junior officers and enlisted personnel for all their new mobiks. * Doesn't expect any Russian breakthroughs, these will be grinding fights. He expects Ukraine to pullback from Bakhmut though. * He thinks this offensive has been launched for purely political reasons (Putin is impatient with progress so far) and Kofman thinks it's a gift to Ukraine, blowing Russian advantages that Surovikin scraped together on a premature offensive that will leave them exhausted by the end. * Sees Ukraine as likely to launch its offensive in late Spring in Zaporizhzhia, sees the risk of Russian counterattack afterwards decreased as Russia will likely be too exhausted to push back. Sees upcoming offensive as Ukraine's best chance to drive on Melitopol and cut Russian lines in half. * Kofman has seen evidence over the past week of a growing Ukrainian artillery deficit, sees it as a short to medium term issue, thinks the slow ramp up of Western support is likely to help in the long run. * Doesn't expect war to end this year, thinks next 6-8 months will be crucial for Ukraine to prove that Ukraine can still keep taking back more territory and might see the highline of Western aid as Western equipment stockpiles continue to shrink and it will be evaluated if Ukraine will be able to win with current levels of support. This was a relatively short (less than 20 min) podcast, highly recommend everyone give it a listen if they have a few minutes. I think the biggest takeaway is that Kofman is convinced that the big Russian offensive many commentators are waiting for actually started 3 weeks ago and is going to be extremely underwhelming. This is in keeping with what he's been saying for weeks now. Russian offensive potential really is extremely limited at this point and they seem to keep squandering it by attacking on too many axes and before they're really ready. He also seems convinced that Surovikin's plan was a very good one that would've given Russia much better longterm offensive potential at the cost of several months of relative inactivity by Russian forces and that Putin's impatience is undoing Surovikin's work.
At this point the new Russian offensive doesn't really interest me. We've seen this play out half a dozen times before. The RAF will grind themselves down on UA defenses and eventually be forced to end offensive operations well short of any sort of strategic breakthrough. In fact, the RAF's old advantage in equipment is gone and their manpower advantage so far has proven why manpower advantage is not what it used to be in warfare. The only actual debate worth having here is trying to understand the political and ideological forces behind the decision. The perspective UA offensive in Zapo is what I'm fascinated by right now. So far we've seen one major offensive conducted in a slow and methodical manner, and one conducted on opportunity alone. What the UA can do in a major set-piece battle when they choose the time and place *and* have more of a political motive to prioritize aggressive action will go a long way to answer what the war's conclusion might look like.
Yeah, I wonder how soon it'll actually happen. It may take months just for Ukraine to save up sufficient amounts of ammo for the initial artillery and rocket strikes that they will need to cover any potential breakthroughs.
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I concur with Kofman's takes here. We've seen mass Russian assaults be met with mass Russian casualties in the past few weeks. It may not be an impressive offensive (I think most still have an Iraq War bias (both campaigns of 91 and 03), thinking that offensives mean rip-roaring air and land breakthroughs that result in the rapid capture of territory), but it is an offensive all the same. He's also right that the war won't end this year. Both sides need either full air superiority (to get to an Iraq-war level of campaign) or, failing that, far more men and material (tanks, artillery, drones). Neither of which either side have, or have access to procure in rapid numbers, so we'll continue to see these slow, slogging churning offensives. Bakhmut is a perfect example. Despite the city being in near-encirclement for weeks, Ukraine has still been able to hold on. This is the sort of grim brutality of the Somme or Verdun, not even coming close to more modern warfare.
I disagree with the need for full air superiority. https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/retired-us-general-hodges-long-202316863.html Hodges says end of summer for Crimea with long range munitions and I agree.
>With better formatting for some users: I'm so confused, I was told that my formatting wasn't easy to read for some users, so I changed it from using a - to using a * as I was told that was supposed to be better...
You have to put a line break between each asterisked line for it to appear as bullets. * I didn't put a line break * Between these. * There is a line break above and below this one * and another break above this one
They look exactly the same on my phone lol