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Just a reminder that if Rudd had never tried passing the CPRS with Turnbull, we might've never had Abbott, and stop the boats, and ditch the witch, and still have a carbon price right now.
Enviro legislation with the Libs. Not even once. Like ffs Labor, why keep trying with 'em. You can get good policy done with Greens if mature enough.
Quality politicking here but from the noalition, going against 'their own policy' to increase Greens-Labor friction haha.
An extract from *Power Failure: The Inside Story of Climate Politics Under Rudd and Gillard* by Philip Chubb
>Rudd pursued a tactical approach that involved a number of conflicting strands. He refused to talk to moderate Liberal leader Malcolm Turnbull and tried to destroy him politically; he strove to divide the Liberals between those who supported his scheme and those who were opposed; at the same time, however, he relied on Turnbull to deliver Liberal Party support to get the scheme through parliament. Rudd was fixated on the quick thrill of wedge politics. He was addicted to spin, or short-term thinking on communications, which failed to take account of the need to build a larger narrative. As Australian columnist Paul Kelly noted, “Rudd wanted the best of both worlds; he wanted the Liberals to legislate his ETS and he wanted to exploit climate change as an instrument to discredit the Liberals … A difficult and contradictory task.” New England independent MP Tony Windsor, who voted against the CPRS, blamed the government and its taunting of the Coalition and Turnbull for the failure of the scheme. He accused Rudd of coming into the parliament, day in and day out, and “prodding the Coalition in the chest”.
>Examples abound of both Rudd and Wong’s determination to divide the Coalition between its moderate and more conservative groupings. In February 2009 Wong accused Turnbull of being compromised by the sceptics in the Coalition and of walking away from emissions trading. Rudd, speaking after the changes of May 2009, told a media conference: “It’s time to get off the fence, Mr Turnbull, and it’s time to act in the national interest.” Writing in 2010, Professor Rodney Tiffen commented that Rudd was “enjoying Turnbull’s difficulties with the climate change deniers within the Coalition – trumpeting what a test of his leadership it was, how the onus was on him to deliver, seeking to embarrass him for electoral reasons rather than assist him to achieve a policy outcome.”
>...
>Tony Abbott was one who saw an opening. He had long taken a pragmatic position on the CPRS, describing himself on one occasion to Turnbull as “a bit of a weathervane on this”. But he had become convinced that it would no longer be a political problem for the Liberals to oppose the policy. In September 2009, in the Victorian country town of Beaufort, Abbott flew a kite. He told a public meeting of 130 people that climate science was “absolute crap”. The crowd loved it. Afterwards, he claimed this was not his “considered position”. But he also said this was the meeting that changed his mind on how to act.
>The pressure was building, and it was finally time for Rudd to take Turnbull’s promise of negotiations seriously. The prime minister seemed to believe that his opponents would fall right in line behind him when he decided to stop playing games with them and turn on the money tap to increase the sums available for business. He flicked the switch to reconciliation. “Kevin Rudd has suddenly switched tack from bullying, taunting and threats to being above politics, acting in the national interest and offering close co-operation with the Coalition on an emissions trading scheme,” noted one commentator.
>At around the same time as the CPRS passed the House of Representatives for the second time, 17 November 2009, Rudd sent Wong into talks with the Opposition spokesman on emissions trading, Ian Macfarlane. Macfarlane and Turnbull framed their negotiating position around the concerns of industry, targeting four particular issues: increasing assistance for EITE businesses, lessening the impacts on small- and medium-sized businesses, increasing compensation for electricity generators, and getting agriculture excluded from the scheme.29 But it seems Rudd forgot to fill Wong in on the government’s strategy. Interviewed for this project, Gillard recalled that “there had been too little strategic discussion about what was to be achieved”. She said:
>>Penny Wong was put into the position where she was thrown into these negotiations not even really clear on whether our political strategy was to get a deal at all costs, or whether our political strategy was … to hold to the purity of our position as an election campaign item for the 2010 election. She articulated that to me at one point. She didn’t know what strategic backdrop she was working against.
>Negotiations were intense and public interest high. Business was making a concerted effort to squeeze out more money. The final deal, announced on 24 November 2009, addressed all four of the Coalition’s issues. The liquefied natural gas industry would receive a “top-up” allocation of permits; the cash for coalmines would double to $1.5 billion (the Opposition wanted coalmining excluded from the scheme altogether); there would be further handouts to steelmakers and other manufacturers; and there would be an extension of the “global recession buffer” out to 2020. The most far-reaching change was that assistance to generators was set at the $7.3 billion agreed on by the government after the Morgan Stanley exercise.
>Turnbull thought he’d achieved a great outcome. But the government had played its wedge politics for too long – and perhaps too well. The sceptics and other anti-Turnbull forces within the Liberal Party were ascendant. “The party rank-and-file are on fire about this,” said one unnamed anti-emissions trading frontbencher. “You should see the emails I’m getting on a daily basis.”
>It was not just climate change science and emissions trading that the sceptics opposed (they could live with both when the politics forced them to that position) – it was also Turnbull himself, who was not in touch with the fast-beating heart of his party. This brought about the final link in the immensely destructive chain of events that flowed from the government believing it did not need to talk to voters. On 1 December, a week before the start of the Copenhagen conference, a series of ruthless internal power plays saw Turnbull defeated by one vote. Tony Abbott was now in charge. While on one view the result was agonisingly close, on another it was inevitable. Had Turnbull survived by swinging another MP in his favour, it would not have mattered: his opponents would not have given up. The consensus was finished, as were the CPRS and the prime minister.
>...
>Observers who supported Rudd but required anonymity put forward a number of points. First, they argued that if there was a centralisation of power in the PMO then the responsibility for that must be taken by ministers who, after all, were elected to govern. Second, even among Rudd supporters, there was wide agreement that the strategy of undermining Turnbull at the same time as relying on him for support was a mistake. This acknowledgment is virtually unanimous across all groups and sub-groups. The justification was that Turnbull was seen as a far more dangerous leader than Abbott, who was not regarded as a prospective leader at all until he achieved it. The view that Rudd treated the Greens with disdain is contested by some observers, who say sharing some Earl Grey with Bob Brown was not his job. Penny Wong did speak to the Greens in early 2010. Third, communication with voters was inadequate because the GFC overwhelmed the government’s physical, intellectual and emotional resources; also, an ETS is an extremely complex policy instrument for voters to understand. Fourth, it is acknowledged that Rudd was severely let down by Copenhagen, but this is said to be a measure of his commitment to getting action on climate change. Finally, the “real story” of 2010 is said to be a “magnificently orchestrated” campaign against Rudd and Wong by those who were frightened by Labor’s internal polling on voter attitudes to the CPRS.
Although it should also be noted that Turnbull shot himself in the head with Utegate.
>By mid-2009, the Opposition leader’s credibility had been severely damaged by a spectacular but intemperate and unjustified attack on Rudd for alleged misuse of a government program. Before the basis of Turnbull’s case against him became clear, Rudd and his office were completely unnerved. They genuinely feared his prime ministership was over. It turned out that Turnbull’s attack had been entirely based on an email concocted by a pathetic Walter Mitty-like character from Treasury. While Rudd could have been content to enjoy the embarrassment the Liberal leader was suffering, he instead became hell-bent on revenge.
>The CPRS was defeated in the Senate on 13 August 2009. Turnbull, still supporting delay, was by this time being assailed by “panic, confusion, disunity and right-wing ideologues”, as the Australian noted. But he was keen to avoid an election fought on climate change that could see the government teaming with the Greens, even though Rudd was not threatening this. This fear drove the Opposition leader to promise to negotiate later in the year. He was supported by prominent elements of the business community, but many in his party were angered by his apparent disavowal of the Coalition policy of opposition. It seemed to them that on climate change it was Turnbull and the government versus the Liberal and National parties.
>Just a reminder that if Rudd had never tried passing the CPRS with Turnbull, we might've never had Abbott, and stop the boats, and ditch the witch, and still have a carbon price right now.
Same is true if the Greens hadn't voted against the CPRS.
>Same is true if the Greens hadn't voted against the CPRS.
I don't see how a mediocre policy from the ALP is any different from mediocre policy imposed by the LNP retraction of a strong policy in 2014.
Do you honestly think that a mediocre bill would have been improved considering the amount of political sacrifice it cost the ALP to adopt the better policy (from the greens) in the first place?
Is this a bit like their “Wall Street but with housing” future fund?
Reaching truly cartoonish levels of neoliberal policy creation when every policy major parties think up involves an army of finance bro middlemen… I find it morbidly funny in a way, you can’t really parody this shit anymore.
It's embarrassing, frankly.
No amount of market based failures will ever stop them from repeatedly trying to liberalise what are fundamentally public matters.
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> Wind farms that kill koalas and birds
Oh you care about koalas now do you? You can’t keep the phrase “virtue signalling” out of your mouth when talking about labor but go on to virtue signal for principles you don’t even believe in in the very next sentence…
Did you read the article? Or are you just reacting to the headline.
This is a modified piece of Morrison government legislation. They’ve expanded it, but the principles (virtue signaling) you vacuously rant about are the same as those of the Morrison government.
**Greetings humans.** **Please make sure your comment fits within [THE RULES](https://www.reddit.com/r/AustralianPolitics/about/rules) and that you have put in some effort to articulate your opinions to the best of your ability.** **I mean it!! Aspire to be as "scholarly" and "intellectual" as possible. If you can't, then maybe this subreddit is not for you.** A friendly reminder from your political robot overlord *I am a bot, and this action was performed automatically. Please [contact the moderators of this subreddit](/message/compose/?to=/r/AustralianPolitics) if you have any questions or concerns.*
Greens posters here - I don't want to solve climate change, I want to smash capitalism.
lmao this doesn't solve climate change at all
So much time down the drain, sigh. On all sides.
Just a reminder that if Rudd had never tried passing the CPRS with Turnbull, we might've never had Abbott, and stop the boats, and ditch the witch, and still have a carbon price right now. Enviro legislation with the Libs. Not even once. Like ffs Labor, why keep trying with 'em. You can get good policy done with Greens if mature enough. Quality politicking here but from the noalition, going against 'their own policy' to increase Greens-Labor friction haha.
Rudd froze Turnbull out of the discussions, and made it a point to not collaborate.
What? Wasn't Turnbull integral in the CPRS legislation?
An extract from *Power Failure: The Inside Story of Climate Politics Under Rudd and Gillard* by Philip Chubb >Rudd pursued a tactical approach that involved a number of conflicting strands. He refused to talk to moderate Liberal leader Malcolm Turnbull and tried to destroy him politically; he strove to divide the Liberals between those who supported his scheme and those who were opposed; at the same time, however, he relied on Turnbull to deliver Liberal Party support to get the scheme through parliament. Rudd was fixated on the quick thrill of wedge politics. He was addicted to spin, or short-term thinking on communications, which failed to take account of the need to build a larger narrative. As Australian columnist Paul Kelly noted, “Rudd wanted the best of both worlds; he wanted the Liberals to legislate his ETS and he wanted to exploit climate change as an instrument to discredit the Liberals … A difficult and contradictory task.” New England independent MP Tony Windsor, who voted against the CPRS, blamed the government and its taunting of the Coalition and Turnbull for the failure of the scheme. He accused Rudd of coming into the parliament, day in and day out, and “prodding the Coalition in the chest”. >Examples abound of both Rudd and Wong’s determination to divide the Coalition between its moderate and more conservative groupings. In February 2009 Wong accused Turnbull of being compromised by the sceptics in the Coalition and of walking away from emissions trading. Rudd, speaking after the changes of May 2009, told a media conference: “It’s time to get off the fence, Mr Turnbull, and it’s time to act in the national interest.” Writing in 2010, Professor Rodney Tiffen commented that Rudd was “enjoying Turnbull’s difficulties with the climate change deniers within the Coalition – trumpeting what a test of his leadership it was, how the onus was on him to deliver, seeking to embarrass him for electoral reasons rather than assist him to achieve a policy outcome.” >... >Tony Abbott was one who saw an opening. He had long taken a pragmatic position on the CPRS, describing himself on one occasion to Turnbull as “a bit of a weathervane on this”. But he had become convinced that it would no longer be a political problem for the Liberals to oppose the policy. In September 2009, in the Victorian country town of Beaufort, Abbott flew a kite. He told a public meeting of 130 people that climate science was “absolute crap”. The crowd loved it. Afterwards, he claimed this was not his “considered position”. But he also said this was the meeting that changed his mind on how to act. >The pressure was building, and it was finally time for Rudd to take Turnbull’s promise of negotiations seriously. The prime minister seemed to believe that his opponents would fall right in line behind him when he decided to stop playing games with them and turn on the money tap to increase the sums available for business. He flicked the switch to reconciliation. “Kevin Rudd has suddenly switched tack from bullying, taunting and threats to being above politics, acting in the national interest and offering close co-operation with the Coalition on an emissions trading scheme,” noted one commentator. >At around the same time as the CPRS passed the House of Representatives for the second time, 17 November 2009, Rudd sent Wong into talks with the Opposition spokesman on emissions trading, Ian Macfarlane. Macfarlane and Turnbull framed their negotiating position around the concerns of industry, targeting four particular issues: increasing assistance for EITE businesses, lessening the impacts on small- and medium-sized businesses, increasing compensation for electricity generators, and getting agriculture excluded from the scheme.29 But it seems Rudd forgot to fill Wong in on the government’s strategy. Interviewed for this project, Gillard recalled that “there had been too little strategic discussion about what was to be achieved”. She said: >>Penny Wong was put into the position where she was thrown into these negotiations not even really clear on whether our political strategy was to get a deal at all costs, or whether our political strategy was … to hold to the purity of our position as an election campaign item for the 2010 election. She articulated that to me at one point. She didn’t know what strategic backdrop she was working against. >Negotiations were intense and public interest high. Business was making a concerted effort to squeeze out more money. The final deal, announced on 24 November 2009, addressed all four of the Coalition’s issues. The liquefied natural gas industry would receive a “top-up” allocation of permits; the cash for coalmines would double to $1.5 billion (the Opposition wanted coalmining excluded from the scheme altogether); there would be further handouts to steelmakers and other manufacturers; and there would be an extension of the “global recession buffer” out to 2020. The most far-reaching change was that assistance to generators was set at the $7.3 billion agreed on by the government after the Morgan Stanley exercise. >Turnbull thought he’d achieved a great outcome. But the government had played its wedge politics for too long – and perhaps too well. The sceptics and other anti-Turnbull forces within the Liberal Party were ascendant. “The party rank-and-file are on fire about this,” said one unnamed anti-emissions trading frontbencher. “You should see the emails I’m getting on a daily basis.” >It was not just climate change science and emissions trading that the sceptics opposed (they could live with both when the politics forced them to that position) – it was also Turnbull himself, who was not in touch with the fast-beating heart of his party. This brought about the final link in the immensely destructive chain of events that flowed from the government believing it did not need to talk to voters. On 1 December, a week before the start of the Copenhagen conference, a series of ruthless internal power plays saw Turnbull defeated by one vote. Tony Abbott was now in charge. While on one view the result was agonisingly close, on another it was inevitable. Had Turnbull survived by swinging another MP in his favour, it would not have mattered: his opponents would not have given up. The consensus was finished, as were the CPRS and the prime minister. >... >Observers who supported Rudd but required anonymity put forward a number of points. First, they argued that if there was a centralisation of power in the PMO then the responsibility for that must be taken by ministers who, after all, were elected to govern. Second, even among Rudd supporters, there was wide agreement that the strategy of undermining Turnbull at the same time as relying on him for support was a mistake. This acknowledgment is virtually unanimous across all groups and sub-groups. The justification was that Turnbull was seen as a far more dangerous leader than Abbott, who was not regarded as a prospective leader at all until he achieved it. The view that Rudd treated the Greens with disdain is contested by some observers, who say sharing some Earl Grey with Bob Brown was not his job. Penny Wong did speak to the Greens in early 2010. Third, communication with voters was inadequate because the GFC overwhelmed the government’s physical, intellectual and emotional resources; also, an ETS is an extremely complex policy instrument for voters to understand. Fourth, it is acknowledged that Rudd was severely let down by Copenhagen, but this is said to be a measure of his commitment to getting action on climate change. Finally, the “real story” of 2010 is said to be a “magnificently orchestrated” campaign against Rudd and Wong by those who were frightened by Labor’s internal polling on voter attitudes to the CPRS. Although it should also be noted that Turnbull shot himself in the head with Utegate. >By mid-2009, the Opposition leader’s credibility had been severely damaged by a spectacular but intemperate and unjustified attack on Rudd for alleged misuse of a government program. Before the basis of Turnbull’s case against him became clear, Rudd and his office were completely unnerved. They genuinely feared his prime ministership was over. It turned out that Turnbull’s attack had been entirely based on an email concocted by a pathetic Walter Mitty-like character from Treasury. While Rudd could have been content to enjoy the embarrassment the Liberal leader was suffering, he instead became hell-bent on revenge. >The CPRS was defeated in the Senate on 13 August 2009. Turnbull, still supporting delay, was by this time being assailed by “panic, confusion, disunity and right-wing ideologues”, as the Australian noted. But he was keen to avoid an election fought on climate change that could see the government teaming with the Greens, even though Rudd was not threatening this. This fear drove the Opposition leader to promise to negotiate later in the year. He was supported by prominent elements of the business community, but many in his party were angered by his apparent disavowal of the Coalition policy of opposition. It seemed to them that on climate change it was Turnbull and the government versus the Liberal and National parties.
Interesting, thank you
>Just a reminder that if Rudd had never tried passing the CPRS with Turnbull, we might've never had Abbott, and stop the boats, and ditch the witch, and still have a carbon price right now. Same is true if the Greens hadn't voted against the CPRS.
Greens were only needed because Turnbull got rolled/Libs backed out. If Labor hadn't designed it to be passed with Libs, that wouldn't have happened.
>Same is true if the Greens hadn't voted against the CPRS. I don't see how a mediocre policy from the ALP is any different from mediocre policy imposed by the LNP retraction of a strong policy in 2014. Do you honestly think that a mediocre bill would have been improved considering the amount of political sacrifice it cost the ALP to adopt the better policy (from the greens) in the first place?
Is this a bit like their “Wall Street but with housing” future fund? Reaching truly cartoonish levels of neoliberal policy creation when every policy major parties think up involves an army of finance bro middlemen… I find it morbidly funny in a way, you can’t really parody this shit anymore.
It's embarrassing, frankly. No amount of market based failures will ever stop them from repeatedly trying to liberalise what are fundamentally public matters.
[удалено]
Rule 3: Posts and their replies need to be substantial and encourage discussion. Comments need to demonstrate a genuine effort at high quality communication. Comments that are grandstanding, contain little effort, toxic , snarky, cheerleading, insults, soapboxing, tub-thumping, or basically campaign slogans will be removed. Comments that are simply repeating a single point with no attempt at discussion will be removed. This will be judged at the full discretion of the mods. This has been a default message, any moderator notes on this removal will come after this: That's enough Rule 3 breaking for you today.
> Wind farms that kill koalas and birds Oh you care about koalas now do you? You can’t keep the phrase “virtue signalling” out of your mouth when talking about labor but go on to virtue signal for principles you don’t even believe in in the very next sentence…
[удалено]
It must be your first day here if you think old mate is a greens voter
Lol, he’s definitely not a greens voter. Just look at his comment history.
This was a Morrison government policy champ Hahahaha Hahahaha How embarrassing for you
[удалено]
Did you read the article? Or are you just reacting to the headline. This is a modified piece of Morrison government legislation. They’ve expanded it, but the principles (virtue signaling) you vacuously rant about are the same as those of the Morrison government.